

Fragile States Country Report No. 2

June 20, 2007



September 2006 to February 2007

Colombia


FRAGILITY IN BRIEF

Colombia is weak but stable

Colombia is weak but stable. Colombia's **authority** is weak because of security challenges presented by armed rebel groups and high crime rates driven by the narcotics trade. State **legitimacy** in Colombia is a medium fragility risk. Economic growth, over 5% per year (CIA, 2006), is not addressing problems of severe inequality (Gini score of .59, CIA, 2006). Colombia ranked 70th of 177 countries on the 2006 UNDP Human Development Index. **Capacity** is a medium risk. The state effectively conducts international affairs and economic management, but infrastructure and security provision are deficient. The Colombian state is able to meet macro-level demands but has difficulty delivering change to individuals. On the one hand, there are key strengths in the permanence of democratic rule, contract regulation, and literacy. On the other hand, conflict intensity, human rights, refugees produced, a weak tax base, and low primary school enrolment are causes for concern. Colombia is unlikely to meet its millennium development goals (MDGs) in primary education and gender equality in secondary education, and maternal mortality and disease reduction goals risk failure.

CIFP's events monitoring gives cause for mild optimism. Economics and human development exhibit slight improvement. Canada's engagement with Colombia on issues of human rights, local justice, and rural recovery occur on a foundation of high risk but threats in these areas are mixed with signs of hope apparent in recent events. Without improvement in the security environment it will be difficult for Colombia to make durable gains in stability. Despite massive internationally-backed efforts, the drug trade and the insecurity they fuel continue unabated.

Colombia Authority (A), Legitimacy (L), and Capacity (C) Triangle



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
Feedback is welcome, and may be sent to cifp@carleton.ca

MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (MDGs): LIKELIHOOD OF ATTAINMENT (UNICEF, 2007)						
Extreme Poverty and Hunger	Education	Gender Equality	Child Mortality	Maternal Mortality	HIV/AIDS & Malaria	Environmental Sustainability
High	Low	Medium	High	Medium	Medium	High

STRUCTURAL BASELINE & EVENTS SUMMARY

Overall	Security & Crime	Economics	Governance	Human Development	Environment	Demography
Medium-risk	High-risk	Medium-risk	Medium-risk	Medium-risk	Medium-risk	Medium-risk
Average Events Score and Tendency	Average Events Score and Tendency	Average Events Score and Tendency	Average Events Score and Tendency	Average Events Score and Tendency	Average Events Score and Tendency	Average Events Score and Tendency
<p>Avg Score: .5 Trend Score: .1</p>	<p>Avg Score: 0.68 Trend Score: -0.06</p>	<p>Avg Score: 1.54 Trend Score: 0.18</p>	<p>Avg Score: -0.47 Trend Score: -0.01</p>	<p>Avg Score: 1.38 Trend Score: 0.26</p>	<p>Avg Score: -1.11 Trend Score: —</p>	<p>Avg Score: — Trend Score: —</p>


SUMMARY



STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS Colombia's structural baseline performance is heavily influenced by the country's security environment. Fighting between government forces and the FARC is continuous, and the demobilisation of the AUC has been a flawed process. Colombia's security situation is particularly dire, given the high number of conflict-related deaths in the country. Governance and economics are medium risk areas, with regime permanence and investment climate standing out as structural positives. Human development is at medium risk; poor primary school enrolment is balanced by high female literacy and low HIV infection rates. Colombia is also at medium risk environmentally, with high rates of commercial energy consumption, but relatively low CO2 emissions. Demography presents a medium risk; urbanisation and a youth bulge bear watching, while religious homogeneity provides social cohesion.

Right-leaning parties associated with President Alvaro Uribe - re-elected with 62% of the vote in May 2006 - currently control both the senate and lower house of Colombia's government. Elections in March of 2006 were a major setback for the major opposition party, the leftist Liberals, who retained only a third of their previous representation. Uribe enjoys popular support. A February 2007 poll gave him a 73% approval rating (Angus Reid, 2007). Colombians generally support his free-market policies and hard-line stance toward the leftist narco-guerrilla FARC; the former have been more effective than the latter. Narcotic production remains an important element of Colombia's economy, as well as the prime driver of instability.

TABLE 1: EVENTS CHART



READING THE EVENTS CHART

- Red line (solid):** Trend line for events; downward slope left to right is negative
- Blue line (solid):** Trend line for number of events
- Purple line (dotted):** This indicates the sum total scores of events (positive or negative), as coded in the event monitoring process; the red trend line is derived from these values.
- Blue line (dotted):** The total number of events; the blue trend line is derived from these values

A more detailed description of the methodology is provided as an annex to this report

EVENTS Over the past six months Colombia has maintained an overall steady and slightly positive direction. Improvements in the economic sphere have been offset by ongoing instability in the security sector, and a recent downturn in government performance associated with revelations that many prominent government figures have been on the payroll of the right-wing AUC. Human development saw a positive trend during the monitoring period, driven primarily by NGO activity. The most important drivers of events have been internal. External shocks have been limited to flooding caused by heavy rains. Events reported by national and local media related to security, governance, and economics outnumbered those associated with human development, demographics, and the environment.

KEY ISSUES AND FACTS

Overall:

- Economic progress is balanced by security problems
- Government lacks full territorial authority
- Scandals and inequality sap legitimacy
- Capacity meets structural demands but weak at grass-roots

Security and Crime:

- Ongoing fighting between government and FARC
- Peace talks in Cuba between government and ELN
- Ineffective DDR of right-wing paramilitaries (AUC)
- Crime associated with the drug trade is a concern

Economics:

- Uribe is making gains in pushing free-market policies
- Aid from USA remains strong
- Economic growth of 5.4% in 2006) is a bright spot

Governance:

- Uribe's popularity is high despite security woes and scandals
- Left wing opposition parties are weak and unable to capitalise on government scandals
- A scandal tying government figures to the AUC is unfolding

Human Development:

- NGOs & INGOs are active in Colombia
- Child soldiers, indigenous peoples & women lack protection
- An estimated 1.8-3.8 million IDPs face challenges
- Literacy is over 90%

Environment:

- Coca eradication programs, agriculture, and extractive industries pose challenges
- Volcanic eruptions and floods disrupt daily life

Demography:

- Population growth is 1.6%/year
- One third of the country is under 14


“Colombia’s structural performance is heavily influenced by the country’s poor security environment.”

PRIMARY DRIVERS

KEY EVENTS

- AUC breaks off peace talks**
7 December 2006, Latin Daily News
 Disagreements over extradition policies and government AUC ties
- More evidence links more officials to AUC**
19 January 2007, Reuters
 Widening scandal threatens Uribe
- USA, Colombia agree to 7 year, \$3.9bn assistance program**
7 February 2007, Associated Press
 Bush administration backs Uribe; Congress concerned about "parapolitical" scandal


TABLE 2: GOVERNANCE EVENTS CHART



KEY EVENTS

- Job losses up in 3rd quarter**
11 November 2006, El Tiempo
 First time since 2002; unemployment was 15.1%, now 11.1%
- USA, Colombia Sign Free Trade Deal**
20 November 2006, El Colombiano
 Uribe's pro-USA posture reaps dividends that will benefit agriculture
- Colombian Exports up 15% to US\$24.4bn**
15 February 2007, Latin News Daily
 Economic success allows Uribe to keep the leftist opposition on the defensive

TABLE 3: ECONOMICS EVENTS CHART



GOVERNANCE

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS Governance in Colombia shows weakness with respect to the rule of law, restrictions on civil liberties, and engagement with the international community. These problem areas are moderated to some extent by the permanence of its democratic system, but other governance aspects are troubling, including those related to political and press freedoms, and high levels of corruption. Reduced civil and political liberties are associated with security problems, and the government's counter-insurgency efforts negatively impact social freedoms. The drug trade's enormous profits make bribery a serious problem, and it drives policy choices.

EVENTS Governance in Colombia has been generally stable; however, in late 2006 and early 2007 testimony by Salvatore Mancuso, a leading figure in the AUC, implicated leading government figures in collusion with right-wing paramilitary groups. This scandal entails short-term political costs for Uribe and his allies, and it could make it more difficult to settle with both the ELN and the FARC. The AUC terminated peace talks, dealing a blow to the Uribe administrations peacemaking efforts. More positively, the government eradicated opium poppy cultivation, demonstrating a capacity to carry out firm policies. The US reaffirmed its commitment to Colombia in the form of aid, giving a vote of confidence to the Uribe administration.


ECONOMICS

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS Colombia's robust GDP growth (5.4% in 2006) continues to be offset by high levels of inequality that produce a Gini score of .59 (CIA, 2006). Other fundamental weaknesses lie below the surface; these include the prevalence of black market transactions, the large size of the informal economy, a low level of participation in international economic organisations, and difficulty on the part of the government in securing its tax base. More positively, Colombia's investment climate is strong, with contract enforcement being a particular bright spot despite weaknesses in the rule of law shown in the governance sector. Colombia stands out in the region for its lack of dependence on subsidies from Hugo Chavez in Venezuela.

EVENTS The economy generally performed well during the period. This positive finding supports the idea that the Uribe government's economic management is capable and effective. Market liberalisation is moving forward and Colombia is engaging the world, at least bilaterally in trade agreements. Major factors contributing to the positive trend in economic developments included Colombia's signing of free trade arrangements with the USA as well as Central American countries and positive reports regarding exports. Downsides included some softness in employment, but this has not been serious enough to neutralise the good news. Overall, Colombia's relatively strong economy provides an important counterweight to an unsatisfactory security situation.

Medium-risk


Average Events Score and Tendency



⊗ Avg Score: -.47
 → Trend Score: -.01


Medium-risk

Average Events Score and Tendency



⊗ Avg Score: 1.54
 ↗ Trend Score: 0.18


PRIMARY DRIVERS



KEY EVENTS

- Colombia has most land mine victims in world**
13 September 2006, OSC Reports
 Colombia has overtaken Afghanistan and Cambodia; 1110 victims in 2005
- 450 FARC guerrillas launch major attack**
1 November 2006, El Heraldo
 Despite government offensives the FARC retains serious military capacity
- Colombia has fewest homicides in 20 years**
2 January 2007, EFE News
 Downward movement to 17 206 shows that murder remains endemic
- Former chief says 5,000 AUC re-arming**
5 February 2007, EFE News
 Collapse of the AUC peace process could lead to renewed fighting
- Colombia, ELN open talks in Havana**
25 February 2007, Associated Press
 "Para-political" scandal could hamper talks with the ELN
- Colombia boosts military with \$3.7 bln**
27 February 2007 - (Reuters News)
 Uribe to escalate fight with rebels


TABLE 4: SECURITY & CRIME EVENTS CHART



SECURITY & CRIME

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS Human and state security problems as well as crime are the most important drivers of fragility in Colombia. Chronic problems exist in the areas of human rights, conflict intensity, persons displaced by war, and political instability. Colombia also suffers from terrorism. Kidnappings provide illegal armed groups with an income source second only to the drug trade. However, the number of kidnappings has dropped precipitously in recent years, and were halved from over 1400 to 752 from 2000 to 2005 (US State Dept. 2006). Although Colombia has a relatively low risk of ethnic rebellion, vicious criminalised conflict rages. The conflict is partly over ideology, but primarily due to the state fighting for control against armed groups that are motivated by drug profits. Colombia's conflicts have persisted for decades, and despite President Uribe's attempts to strong-arm the FARC into submission, troubles will likely continue as narcotics regimes guarantee large profits for trafficking cocaine. Territory is another object of struggle because it is needed for drug production. The FARC controls a sizeable portion of southern Colombia.

EVENTS Events related to security comprise a recurring pattern of FARC and government attacks, coupled with positive movements in the peace process with the ELN and negative signs in the demobilisation of the AUC. Given Colombia's poor baseline performance, even though the situation is highly volatile, the fact that events were stabilizing, on balance, is positive news. For example, on 2 January 2007 the government announced that 2006 saw the fewest homicides in Colombia in two decades. Still, crime continues to be driven by the drug trade, and extradition of drug smugglers to the USA continues. Both the government and its American backers claim success in reducing Colombian drug production and exports, but Colombia is still estimated to produce 80% of the world's cocaine (US State Dept., 2006). The 13 September 2006 announcement that Colombia has the world's most land mine victims emphasises the cost of conflict to civilians.



SECONDARY DRIVERS

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

SUMMARY Primary school enrolment and completion rates are both problem areas for Colombia, but literacy, at over 90% with gender parity (CIA, 2006), is a bright spot. Water and sanitation provision is relatively strong, although there is room for improvements. Unfortunately, the country's estimated 1.8 - 3.8 million IDPs (CIA, 2006), usually fleeing drug related violence, do not have access to the same level of services as the rest of the population. Women and girls are at particular risk. On 20 February 2007, the UN made an international appeal for USD 14 million to aid IDPs. On 22 November 2006, the German ambassador announced that an estimated 14 000 boys and girls are involved with illegal armed groups, with nearly 20% of these believed to be directly connected to at least one killing. This implies serious current and future human development challenges, (El Colombiano). Human development continues to be restricted by conflict; lasting peace could open new doors that are presently closed.


SECONDARY DRIVERS

ENVIRONMENT

SUMMARY Colombia faces several environmental problems including deforestation and pollution associated with mining and agriculture, and excessive commercial energy use. From 2000-2005 Colombia lost an average of 47 000 hectares of forest cover per year; since 1990 it has lost 1.2% of its total forest. Other environmental problems include soil and water quality damage from overuse of pesticides and air pollution, especially in Bogota, from vehicle emissions. Colombia has over 3400 species of amphibians, birds, mammals and reptiles; 18% are endemic and 10% are threatened. In the past six months the country has suffered flooding and volcanic eruptions, both of which are relatively common. More positively, CO₂ emissions remain relatively low, although this could change if economic growth continues and industrialisation proceeds apace. (*Environmental data from Mongabay, 2007*)

Medium-risk

Average Events Score and Tendency




Avg Score: -1.11
Trend Score: —

DEMOGRAPHY

SUMMARY A net population loss to migration is a sign of weakness in Colombia's ability to support its population. The mestizo majority comprises only 60% of the majority; the rest is formed by, persons of African descent, and a small (1%) indigenous minority. This provides potential ethnic fault-lines, but religious homogeneity is strong and cuts across ethnic boundaries (CIA, 2006). A youth bulge and urban growth, much of which is based on slum expansion as poor people flee rural fighting, are problematic as well. More positively, population growth is expected to slow to 1.3% in the coming decade, down from an average of 2% over the past 30 years. The youth bulge is expected to diminish as well. Currently 31.4% of the population is under 15, but this number is predicted to decline to 26.8% by 2015 (UNDP, 2006).

Medium-risk

Average Events Score and Tendency



Avg Score: —
Trend Score: —

CANADA AND COLOMBIA

CANADIAN CONTRIBUTIONS

- **National Community Justice School**
Project duration: 2003–2008
CIDA contribution: \$1.4 million
Capacity building for the Network for Community Justice and Conflict Resolution; community justice programs
- **ECOFONDO Rural Recovery**
Project duration: 2003–2008
CIDA contribution: \$5 million
CIDA supports ECOFONDO, an organization aids local groups working to protect the environment.
- **International Coordination and Cooperation Meeting for Colombia**
DFAIT coordinated international participation in the International Coordination and Cooperation Meeting for Colombia, held in Cartagena 3-4 February 2005
- **Human Rights Advocacy**
DFAIT advocates for human rights protection in multilateral fora, including the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the UN General Assembly, and the International Labour Organization, and bilaterally with Colombia
- **NGO Consultations**
DFAIT holds annual consultations with NGOs on human rights in Colombia

LINKS

- **Development engagement:** Canada has provided over CAD 320 million in development assistance to Colombia since 1969. During fiscal year 2004-2005, Canada allocated CAD 13.94 million in ODA to Colombia.
- **Canadian exports to Colombia (2006):** CAD 509 million (0.12% of Canada's total) with agriculture, vehicles and equipment, and paper products leading; up from CAD 447 million in 2005
- **Canadian imports from Colombia (2006):** CAD 633 million (0.16% of Canada's total) with agricultural and mineral products heavily dominant; up from CAD 582 million in 2005
- **Colombian Diaspora in Canada (2001):** 18 115; from 1996-2001, 9095 Colombians entered Canada as immigrants or non-permanent residents. Colombian Diaspora comprises 0.06% of Canada's and 0.04% of Colombia's population
- **Canadian direct investment in Colombia (2005):** CAD 403 million
- **Colombian direct investment in Canada (2005):** CAD 2 million

(Data from CIDA, 2007, and DFAIT, 2006)

6—12 MONTH SCENARIOS

BASELINE LIKELY CASE

BASED ON BEST ASSUMPTIONS FOR EACH CLUSTER

The FARC continues to profit from the drug trade and fights to maintain its territorial base. Talks between the ELN and government persevere, but progress is slow. Meanwhile, the AUC carries on with the official demobilisation process, but many elements of the fragmented organisation carry on with criminal activity. American aid continues to flow, keeping the war on drugs alive, but progress is marginal because profit margins are high. Economic performance is strong, but inequality persists. Uribe survives the “para-political” scandal, but right wing parties are weakened. Problems in human development continue to be a secondary priority behind security, and this impedes progress toward Colombia’s MDG goals. Uribe takes steps to escalate fighting with the FARC, and this increases internal displacement. Under these conditions, violence and the drug trade that drives it are the most serious challenges Colombia faces.

ALTERNATIVE LIKELY CASE

BASED ON VARIATION IN WEAKEST ASSUMPTION

In an alternate likely case, elements of the AUC stray increasingly far from the demobilisation process and pursue profits in the drug trade. Sporadic fighting between right and left-wing groups occurs, and Colombia’s security situation degrades, although not dramatically given its already poor condition. Internal displacement increases, and MDG attainment becomes less likely. The two maps [below](#) show a rough correlation between areas with low probabilities of MDG success and areas with high levels of displacement. In spite of the violence, economic growth remains strong. Uribe is able to ride out the “para-political” scandal, but AUC activities cause further consternation internationally because of its alleged ties to government figures. Violence in the countryside worsens the situation for IDPs, and it becomes more dangerous for aid organisations to operate.

BEST CASE

BASED ON ASSUMPTION THAT POSITIVE TRENDS DOMINATE

The security situation improves marginally because of military success against the FARC, quiescence on the part of the AUC, and progress in the ELN peace process. An improvement in the security environment allows the government to try to consolidate its gains by focussing on rural development, and allows the aid community better access to troubled populations. Displacement remains stable with slight improvements. Economic progress continues at its current pace, but the “para-political” scandal enables the opposition to gain ground and push for policies that address Colombia’s inequality gap. Although this does not bring immediate results, it sets the ground for future enhanced equality. International free trade agreements boost exports, including agricultural products that benefit the rural poor.

WORST CASE

BASED ON ASSUMPTION THAT NEGATIVE TRENDS DOMINATE

In the worst case the AUC reforms on a large scale to pursue a share of the narcotics industry. This causes a full scale breakdown of the ELN peace talks and ostensibly ‘left vs right’ fighting resumes in earnest, in reality fuelled by competition for drug market share. The government’s efforts to improve military effectiveness prove unsuccessful. Anti-narcotic efforts by the state, including crop spraying with herbicides, take a heavy toll on the civilian population and reduce the ability of rural farmers to support themselves. Although economic performance remains steady, insecurity in the countryside means that less wealth leaves the city. Human development efforts are crippled by inattention and active degradation, both caused by conflict. One or more environmental disasters, either man made (e.g. associated with extractive industries) or natural (e.g. flood or volcanic eruption) could lead to major losses of life, given government preoccupation with security.

POSSIBLE POLICY ENTRY POINTS

Security & Crime:

- Colombia has more land mine victims than any other country, demining and harm reduction are possibilities
- DDR programs for ex-fighters, and similar programs for urban gang members
- Programs focused on child soldiers, with attention to girls involved with illegal armed groups, including gangs
- Police training to reduce community-police tensions and improve professionalism

Economics:

- Community-based poverty reduction in rural areas and urban slums, with attention to women and girls

Governance:

- Capacity building for NGO’s that promote effective democratic processes, with attention to transparency and accountability
- Strengthening local level government by providing resources and training



Human Development:

- Education programs can build on Colombia’s positive literacy rates
- Job-training for new urban arrivals to reduce unemployment in slums

Environment:

- Sustainable agriculture to save rainforest cover
- Canadian mining companies in Colombia and can play an important role in ensuring water supplies are safe

MAPS



INDEX METHODOLOGY

Like its predecessor the CIFP conflict risk index, the fragility index employs a methodology of relative structural assessment. The analysis begins with a structural profile of the country, a composite index that measures overall country fragility along six dimensions or clusters: governance, economics, security, human development, demography and environment. Each of these clusters is based on a number of indicators; for example, indicators under the 'economics cluster' include economic growth, gross domestic product, inflation and unemployment, etc. The data is further analyzed to provide insight into relative state strength and weakness along three dimensions of 'stateness', namely authority, legitimacy, and capacity. This multidimensional assessment methodology is a direct response to the multi-causal nature of fragility and failure; states can weaken in any number of ways, such that any attempt to attribute fragility to a single deterministic set of causal variables inevitably remains underdetermined, capturing only a limited subset of all fragile states. Instead, CIFP adopts a more inductive approach, identifying areas of relative strength and weakness across all measures of state performance.

In ranking state performance on a given indicator, global scores are distributed across a nine-point index. The best performing state receives a score of one, the worst a score of nine, and the rest continuously distributed between these two extremes based on relative performance. As country performance for some types of data can vary significantly from year to year – as in the case of economic shocks, natural disasters, and other externalities – averages are taken for global rank scores over a five-year time frame. Once all indicators have been indexed using this method, the results for a given country are then averaged in each fragility cluster to produce the final scores for the country.

In general, a high score – 6.5 or higher – indicates that a country is performing poorly relative to other states. Such a score may be indicative of an arbitrary and autocratic government, a history of non-transparent government, the presence of significant barriers to political participation, the absence of a consistently enforced legal framework, or a poor human rights record.

A low score – in the range of 1 to 3.5 – indicates that a country is performing well relative to others, or that a country's structural conditions present little cause for concern. Values in the moderate 3.5 to 6.5 range indicate performance approaching the global mean.

Score	Description
1-3.5	Country performing well relative to others
3.5-6.5	Country performing at or around the median
6.5+	Country performing poorly relative to others

EVENTS MONITORING METHODOLOGY

SUMMARY

The purpose of CIFP event monitoring is to observe and report on events within a country to better understand the dynamic trends affecting democratic processes and governance in the country. This data, when combined with structural data, provides a more comprehensive analysis of both the underlying conditions and recent developments, thereby informing a more nuanced and ultimately policy-relevant analysis. The six month monitoring period demonstrated in these reports is an integral part of the proof of concept. Subsequent reports will include systematic and long term monitoring for more complete and accurate forecasting and policy-relevant diagnosis. Ongoing monitoring that allows the production of easy-to-interpret context-specific briefings would integrate shifting stakeholder interests, changes in baseline structure and of course event dynamics.

In CIFP event monitoring methodology, events are all coded using a number of criteria. First, each event is assigned to the specific cluster area to which it is *most directly* related, either governance, economics, security and crime, human development, demography, or environment. Second, the event is coded as being either stabilizing or destabilizing to the state. The event score is then determined by answering the following three questions:

1. How direct is the impact of the event on state stability?
2. How broad is the impact of the event?
3. How intense is the event, in comparison with past events in the country?

Each question is answered quantitatively using a three-point scale; the highest score for a single event is 9. The answers to these questions are added together to generate a composite indicator for each event, thereby determining its net impact on state stability or fragility. The composite indicator is used to create time-series regression lines, as event data is plotted over a defined time period; usually six months. These trends are then analysed in aggregate, with data from all events included, as well as disaggregate, with events data is analysed within each particular subject cluster, in an effort to understand the current trajectory of the country. This trajectory is referred as the event 'tendency' during the period observed, to emphasize its role as an indicative piece of information rather than a deterministic and extrapolatable trend line. This analysis in turn provides some indication of whether the state is tending toward a state of lesser or greater fragility.

EVENTS MONITORING METHODOLOGY

COMPONENTS OF THE COMPOSITE EVENT SCORE

- CAUSAL RELEVANCE**
1. Event is relevant, but with no clearly delineable direct causal linkage to state stability or fragility (e.g. an announcement of funding, or an international soccer friendly).
 2. Event is relevant, with a delineable, though indirect causal linkage to state stability or fragility (e.g. New legislation enhancing minority rights is passed, or a bomb detonates within an ethnically divided region).
 3. Event is relevant with a delineable and direct causal linkage to state fragility (e.g. Declaration of a ceasefire or the assassination of a government minister.)

CENTRALITY

1. Event affects less than 25% of political stakeholders.
2. Event affects 25% - 75% of political stakeholders.
3. Event affects more than 75% of political stakeholders.

INTENSITY/ESCALATION

1. Event is comparable to others experienced in the state in the previous six months.
2. Event is more intense than others experienced in the state in the previous six months.
3. Event is more intense than others experienced in the state in the previous five years.

STAKEHOLDERS

As part of the initial country profile, the analyst compiles a list of stakeholders. Stakeholders are those individuals or groups that possess an identifiable, broadly similar political agenda and either have an effect on or are affected by state stability or fragility. They often have an organizational structure in addition to sufficient resources to pursue explicitly or implicitly articulated goals.


EVENT ANALYSIS

The analysis occurs in both aggregate (all events) and disaggregate (events analysed by cluster) by using quantitative data in two ways. First, **summary statistics** provide the analyst with an overview of the average event scores. Positive average event scores are indicative of an environment that experiences more or more significant positive events than negative events. Negative average scores indicate the opposite.

Tendency Key	Negative Slope	Status quo Slope	Positive Slope
OLS Slope value	Below -0.1	Between -.1 and .1	Above +0.1
Symbol			

The second avenue of analysis is via **regression lines** to observe whether the events demonstrate any positive or negative tendency over time (left). The composite indicators are plotted over a defined period of time – usually six months – and trend lines are generated using ordinary least squares regression. The trend line uses a weekly aggregate in order to capture the changing magnitude of events as well as any increase or decrease in the total number of events; both phenomena are

Example Summary Graph



deemed important to the analysis. Thus, a rapid increase in the number of positive events may result in a positive trend line, as might an increase in the average score per event. This trend analysis provides an overview of general event-driven developments over the months under consideration. On the other hand, a negative slope denotes a deteriorating situation one in which there is an increase in the number or significance of negative events relative to positive ones during the time period under observation.

The example **summary graph** (right) captures both structural and dynamic event-based data in a single graphic. The structural risk level is indicated by the colour coded band at the top of the graph, while the event “barometer” below captures both the average score and regression line slope tendency for events in the relevant cluster.

SCENARIO GENERATION

The report includes scenarios for the country’s fragility over the short term, normally 6-18 months. Normally, the analysis includes three scenarios: a best-case, worst-case and most likely case, with each based on an analysis of overall and cluster summary statistics and trends. The best-case assumes that the strongest positive trends will dominate over any negative trends in the near future. Conversely, the worst-case scenario assumes the opposite. These two scenarios are intended to highlight different facets of the situation for the reader. The best and worst cases consider the strongest trends among stabilizing and destabilizing events, drawing attention both to dominant threats and potential points of entry. Finally, the most likely case scenario extrapolates future tendencies based on the overall trend within the state. To begin with, it identifies dominant trends – those most likely to continue in each of the 6 dimensions of fragility over the next six to eighteen months. These trends are then combined to form an overall portrait of the country over the near term, providing a baseline “likely” scenario. Taken together, these three scenarios define the universe of developments that may occur in the country in the near term, and give some sense of what may reasonably be expected in the same period. Such insights may inform contingency planning processes in both the domestic government and international partners, and provide some assistance when setting benchmarks with which to evaluate the success of initiatives intended to improve state fragility.

STRUCTURAL DATA (SOURCE AND SCALE OF RAW DATA IN PARENTHESES)	Cluster avg.	Raw Data Five year avg	Frag. index score	Fragility index rank	Last Year of Available Data	Trend Score
1. Governance	5.08					
Freedom of the Press (FH, 0-100)		62.0	6.2	68	2006	s.q.
Gov't Effectiveness (WB Governance Matters, Deviation from mean)		-0.2	4.9	101	2005	*
Level of Corruption (TI, 0-10)		3.8	4.4	111	2006	s.q.
Level of Democracy (Polity IV, (-10 - 10)		7.0	4.6	89	2004	s.q.
Level of participation in international political organizations (CIFP)		9.0	8.2	1	2005	*
Percentage of Female Parliamentarians (WB WDI)		12.0	4.8	110	2005	s.q.
Permanence of Regime Type (Polity IV, years since regime change)		45.0	2.5	131	2004	s.q.
Refugees hosted (UNHCR, number)		179.4	2.2	127	2005	s.q.
Restrictions on Civil Liberties (FH, 1-7)		3.8	5.1	77	2005	s.q.
Restrictions on Political Rights (FH, 1-7)		3.8	5.2	80	2005	pos
Rule of Law (WB GM, Deviation from mean)		-0.8	6.7	57	2005	*
Voice and Accountability in Decision-making (WB GM, Dev. from mean)		-0.5	6.2	70	2005	*
2. Economics	5.47					
Economic growth -- Percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		3.4	5.4	74	2005	s.q.
Economic Size -- Relative -- GDP per capita (WB WDI)		2056.8	4.7	95	2005	s.q.
Economic Size -- Total -- GDP (WB WDI)		9.10E+10	2.8	140	2005	s.q.
External Debt -- percentage of GNI (WB WDI)		49.1	5.2	64	2004	*
FDI -- percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		2.8	5.3	78	2004	s.q.
Foreign Aid -- % of Central Government Expenditures (WB WDI)		2.8	4.5	43	2004	*
Foreign Aid -- Total per capita (WB WDI)		10.6	3.1	124	2004	s.q.
Inequality -- GINI Coefficient (WB WDI)		58.6	8.7	5	2003	*
Inflation (WB WDI)		6.5	6.6	41	2005	pos
Informal Economy -- Black Market (Heritage Fund, 1-5)		3.5	4.0	86	2006	s.q.
Informal Economy -- Ratio of PPP to GDP (WB WDI)		3.2	5.9	63	2005	neg
Infrastructure -- Reliability of Electricity Supply (WB, % output lost)		21.7	7.6	20	2003	pos
Infrastructure -- Telephone mainlines per 1000 inhabitants (WB)		178.8	4.3	109	2004	s.q.
Internet Usage per 1000 inhabitants (WB)		47.1	5.0	97	2004	s.q.
Investment Climate -- Contract Regulation (Heritage Fdn, 1-5)		3.0	2.1	88	2006	s.q.
Level of participation in international economic organizations (CIFP)		2.0	8.0	24	2005	*
Paying Taxes (WB Doing Business, global rank)		172.0	8.8	4	2006	*
Regulatory Quality (WB GM, deviation from mean)		0.0	4.6	109	2005	*
Remittances Received -- percentage of GDP (WB)		0.0	6.3	53	2005	s.q.
Reserve Holdings -- Total (WB)		1.21E+10	3.1	128	2005	s.q.
Trade Balance -- percentage of GDP (WB)		-1.4	4.7	84	2005	s.q.
Trade Openness -- percentage of GDP (WB)		42.1	8.2	17	2005	s.q.
Unemployment -- Total (WB)		17.0	8.1	8	2003	pos
Women in the labour force (WB)		43.6	4.2	106	2005	s.q.
3. Security & Crime	7.65					
Conflict intensity (Uppasala PRIO, number of conflict-related deaths)		1083.8	8.8	4	2005	*
Dependence on External Military Support (FFP, 1-10)		8.1	7.6	16	2006	*
Human Rights -- Empowerment (CIRI, 0-10)		7.0	5.2	88	2004	neg
Human Rights -- Physical Integrity (CIRI, 0-8)		0.6	8.9	3	2004	s.q.
Military Expenditure -- percentage of GDP (WDI)		4.0	7.7	18	2005	s.q.
Political Stability (WB GM, deviation from mean)		-2.0	8.7	9	2005	*
Refugees Produced (WB)		28638.9	7.2	31	2004	neg
Risk of ethnic Rebellion (CIFP, based on MaR dataset)		3.6	5.0	58	2005	*
Terrorism -- Number of fatalities (US NCTC, number of fatalities)		467.5	8.7	6	2005	*
Terrorism -- Number of Incidents (US NCTC, number of incidents)		415.5	8.7	7	2005	*

STRUCTURAL DATA (CONT'D)

4. Human Development	4.34					
Access to Improved Water (WB WDI, pct)	93.0	4.2	104	2004	*	
Access to Sanitation (WB WDI, pct)	86.0	4.0	104	2004	*	
Education -- Primary Completion -- female (WB WDI, pct)	92.1	5.2	66	2004	s.q.	
Education -- Primary Completion -- total (WB WDI)	89.9	5.5	61	2004	s.q.	
Education Primary Enrolment -- total (WB WDI)	89.9	5.5	61	2004	s.q.	
Education -- Primary Enrolment -- Ratio Female to Male (WB WDI)	99.1	3.7	115	2004	s.q.	
Food Security -- Aid as percentage of total consumption (FAO STAT)	0.1	3.8	86	2001	*	
Gender Empowerment Measure (UNDP HDR, o-1)	0.5	6.5	24	2004	*	
Gender-related Development Index (UNDP HDR, 0-1)	0.8	4.1	94	2004	s.q.	
Health Infrastructure -- Expenditures as a percentage of GDP (WB WDI)	8.0	2.7	147	2003	neg	
HIV/AIDS -- New AIDS Cases Reported (UN CD)	
HIV/AIDS -- Percentage of Adult Females Infected (WB WDI)	27.3	3.5	77	2005	*	
HIV/AIDS -- Proportion of Adult population infected (WB WDI)	0.6	5.3	68	2005	*	
Human Development Index (UNDP HDR, 0-1)	0.8	4.1	110	2004	s.q.	
Infant Mortality (WB WDI, per 1000 live births)	18.8	4.2	114	2004	*	
Literacy -- total (WB WDI, pct. of population age 15 and above)	92.8	3.5	80	2004	*	
Literacy -- female (WB WDI, pct. of female population age 15 and above)	92.7	3.5	80	2004	*	
5. Demography	4.74					
Life Expectancy -- Female (WB WDI)	75.4	4.0	121	2004	*	
Life Expectancy -- Total (WB WDI)	72.2	4.0	118	2004	*	
Migration -- Estimated Net Rate (UN CD)	-0.9	6.1	68	2005	*	
Population Density (WB WDI, population per square km)	42.6	3.8	122	2005	s.q.	
Population Diversity -- Ethnic (CIFP)	0.6	7.0	37	2005	*	
Population Diversity -- Religious (CIFP)	0.2	2.8	119	2005	*	
Population Growth (WB WDI, annual pct.)	1.6	5.6	79	2005	s.q.	
Slum Population -- proportion of population (WDI, UN CD)	0.2	4.1	62	2001	*	
Urban Growth Rate -- Annual percentage (WB WDI)	2.0	5.0	96	2005	s.q.	
Youth Bulge -- Pop. Aged 0-14 as a % of Total (WB WDI)	31.7	4.9	92	2005	s.q.	
6. Environment	4.41					
Arable/fertile land availability (WB WDI, hectares per person)	0.1	7.6	35	2004	s.q.	
Consumption -- Commercial energy consumption per capita (UN CD, kg of oil equivalent)	478.6	4.2	111	2003	s.q.	
Consumption -- Use of solid fuels (UN CD, pct population using)	15.0	4.5	98	2003	*	
Disaster Risk Index, (UNDP, average number of deaths per million)	3.8	6.9	46	2001	*	
Ecological Footprint -- Global hectares per capita (WWF, Global Footprint Network)	1.2	4.1	93	2003	*	
Water — Annual withdrawal (FAO STAT, pct. of total renewable)	0.5	2.0	137	2002	*	
Water — Available renewable per capita (FAO STAT, m ³ /year/inhabitant)	47868.3	1.8	156	2006	*	
Forest — Annual percentage change in area (FAO)	-0.1	5.2	70	2005	*	
Pollution -- CO2 Emissions per capita (WB WDI, metric tons per capita)	1.4	4.4	104	2002	pos	
Pollution -- CO2 Emissions per dollar PPP (WB WDI, kg per 2000 US\$ PPP)	0.2	3.4	115	2002	s.q.	
	5.3	5.2				

For trend scores, (s.q.) indicates continuation of status quo;(pos) indicates a positive trend toward stability, and (neg) indicates a negative trend toward fragility. (*)Indicates insufficient data for calculation of trend and volatility scores.

STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

COLOMBIAN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

- President Alvaro Uribe, re-elected president in May 2006 with 62% support as a right-wing independent on a platform to restore security to the country (closest challenger, left-wing senator Carlos Gaviria, took 22% (BBC, 10/03/2007))
- Pro-Uribe parties (National Unity, Conservative Party, and Radical Change) won clear majorities in both houses of congress, March 2006 (US State Dept., 2006)

Interests

- Assuming control over entire country, defeating and/or demobilising rebel groups
- Maintaining close ties with the USA in order to ensure economic, military, and counter-narcotic support
- Maintaining electoral support of Colombian population

Recent Actions and Attitude

- Under Uribe the government has taken an aggressive approach toward guerrillas and the narcotics industry in general
- Committed to free market economic development, as indicated by pursuit of free trade agreements with the USA and other states
- Uribe's government has been recently struck by a high reaching scandal about involvement with right-wing paramilitary groups

FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS DE COLOMBIA (FARC)

- Manuel Marulanda (original member) heads FARC; committed to the group's formative leftist ideology although many elements of his organisation have been criminalised.
- Leadership is relatively decentralised

Background

- Established 1964 as a leftist guerrilla group fighting for political and land reform.
- 12 000 members; largest rebel group in Colombia (MIPT, 2007)
- Self-supporting via the drug trade and kidnapping
- Controls a large portion of south-eastern Colombia

Interests

- Maintaining/expanding control of drug production zones for incomes
- Effecting political change in Colombia, including land reform

Recent Actions and Attitude

- FARC shows willingness to negotiate, but not make major concessions
- Has sustained some losses in the face of pressure from the central government
- FARC appears relatively strong and unlikely to change activities in the near future

OPPOSITION

- Led by the Liberal party, headed by former president Cesar Gaviria; won only 17/102 seats in 2006 election, a third of previous representation (IFES, 2007)

Interests

- Recovering or consolidating electoral support

Recent Actions and Attitude

- Traditional parties (Liberals and Conservatives) declining in power due to rigid beliefs, demonstrated inability to govern effectively, and internal strife; smaller parties emerging as challengers

OTHER LEFTIST INSURGENT GROUPS (EJÉRCITO DE LIBERACIÓN NACIONAL - ELN)

- Commander in Chief Nicolas Rodriguez Bautista leads the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)
- ELN leadership is divided between hard-line more conciliatory members

Background

- ELN has approximately 3000 members (largest leftist groups after FARC); most active in rural areas of the north-eastern portion of the country; formed 1964 as a Marxist guerrilla group fighting to broaden democratic participation in the Colombian system (SITE, 2006).
- Self-supporting by kidnapping and extortion, and has some engagement with the narcotics industry, although it typically denies this; has limited ties to Cuba (SITE, 2006)
- Other groups include the EPL (minor); most are highly criminalised, with involvement in the narcotics industry obscuring possible political ambitions

Interests

- Achieving favourable terms in ongoing peace talks with government (currently in 5th round), including an amnesty and recourse for people forcibly displaced by the conflict, democratic reform, and reform to the paramilitary demobilisation process
- Promoting populist democracy in Colombia
- Maintaining income sources if peace cannot be achieved

Recent Actions and Attitude

- The ELN appears interested in a peace deal with the government, if terms are met
- Maintains ability to employ force, but is currently participating in peace talks

STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

PARAMILITARY FORCES (AUC)

- Leadership has been fragmented by the demobilisation and amnesty process; Salvatore Mancuso remains a leading figure, but is currently testifying as part of the amnesty

Background

- Right wing forces led by the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) formed by wealthy landowners to fight leftist guerrillas; became highly criminalised
- At peak AUC had 20 000 member; most have since been officially demobilised, but in reality many carry on drug and extortion activities

Interests

- Fragmented by demobilisation; some members seek to take advantage of amnesties, while other continue to exploit criminal possibilities

Recent Actions and Attitude

- Salvatore Mancuso's recent testimony about AUC activities and links to the Uribe government is driving a major scandal in Colombian politics
- Doubts about the veracity of AUC demobilisation persist in Colombia
- Criminal elements of AUC are pursuing interests vigorously

ILLEGAL NARCOTICS INDUSTRY

- FARC controls roughly half of the cocaine trade, although this control is often loose (US State Sept, 2006)
- AUC (or its successors) remains heavily engaged
- Dominant cartels of the 1990s smashed; fragmentation has occurred

Background

- 80% of world cocaine supply (and 90% of supply to USA) is believed to originate in Colombia (US State Sept, 2006)
- Coca cultivation decreased by 15% from 2001 to 2005, while opium poppy cultivation decreased by 68% from 2001 to 2004 (US State Sept, 2006)

Interests

- Maintain autonomy from government control; avoid prosecution/extradition to USA
- Maximise profits

Recent Actions and Attitude

- In spite of Uribe's efforts, narcotic industry thrives

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

- Ambassador: William Braucher Wood

Interests

- Reduction/elimination of drug trade
- Success of Uribe because of his anti-leftist free market stance
- Promotion of trade

Recent Actions and Attitude

- USA and Colombia sign free trade pact November 2006 (not yet ratified by Congress)
- American lawmakers are nervous about the recent Uribe government/paramilitary scandal
- American aid to Colombia in 2007 estimated at USD1.38 billion (USD624 million military, USD756 million economic) (Center for International Policy, 2007)

NEIGHBOURING STATES

- Panama
- Ecuador
- Peru
- Brazil
- Venezuela

Interests

- Prevention of narcotic industry spill-over
- Border security with regards to rebel and criminal groups
- Trade

Recent Actions and Attitude

- Ecuador has an ongoing diplomatic dispute with Colombia over Colombian spraying of drug plantations near the Ecuadorian border
- Ties with Venezuela have improved since a series of disputes in recent years; Uribe does not appear to make fighting Chavez for Washington a priority
- Brazil is selling military aircraft to Colombia

COLOMBIAN POPULATION

Background

- Serious negative effects from years of civil war and drug-related violence
- Wealth distribution inequality is high, with a Gini index score of .59 (CIA, 2006)

Interests

- Peace and security
- Economic development and distribution

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EVENT MONITORING SOURCES

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Associated Press	Just Auto
BBC	Latin American News Digest
Boston Globe	Latin News Daily
Business News Americas	Miami Herald
Christian Science Monitor	Noticias Financieras
Department of Defense Documents	Orlando Sentinel
Dow Jones Commodities	OSC Report (WNC)
Dow Jones International	PR Newswire
Edmonton Journal	Reuters
EFE News Service	States News Service
El Pais	Toronto Star
Global Insight Daily Analysis	US Fed News
Globe and Mail	US Newswire
Houston Chronicle	Xinhua

ABOUT THE STATE FRAGILITY PROJECT

This project is intended to contribute to a better understanding of fragility in Colombia, thereby providing support to decision-making for Canadian foreign policy and development actors in the country. The project aims to support informed, evidence-based decision making for Canadian foreign policy and development assistance related to fragile states. The report is intended to communicate the preliminary findings of the project; its findings should not be considered definitive or final.

The report is based on three elements. First, structural indicators are grouped into six clusters capturing different facets of state fragility: Security and Crime, Governance, Economics, Human Development, Environment and Demography. The structural data includes more than 80 separate structural indicators providing a detailed quantitative baseline portrait of the country.

Second, the analysis draws on event monitoring data compiled by CIFP researchers over a six month period extending from September 2006 to February 2007. Collected from a variety of web-based news aggregators, which include both international and domestic news sources, the events are evaluated and assigned quantitative scores to identify fragility trends. Third, the report includes a series of analytical exercises, including stakeholder analysis and scenario generation. This multi-source data structure enables more robust analysis than any single method of data collection and assessment.

ABOUT COUNTRY INDICATORS FOR FOREIGN POLICY

CIFP is a research project located at Carleton University in Ottawa. Its core mandate is to develop analytical methodologies that will generate information on the key features of the political, economic, social and cultural environments of countries around the world, providing at-a-glance global overviews, issue-based perspectives and country performance measures. While the initial dataset focuses on measures of domestic armed conflict, as part of this project that database has been substantially revised to capture state fragility.

The CIFP database includes statistical data in the form of over one hundred performance indicators for 197 countries. With its focus on policy relevance, the CIFP provides a rich information resource to policy officers across all government departments. By offering a detailed assessment methodology for evaluating individual country performance, the CIFP provides guidance to program officers working in complex and fragile environments, enabling them to focus their efforts and resources on the root structural causes rather than the outward symptoms of a problem.

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