

Honduras Policy Paper

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INAF 5499
December 9, 2016

Executive Summary

Honduras has exited fragility, but current trends raise concerns that the country may be stuck in a legitimacy trap¹ or that conditions may worsen in the state, leading to continued or increased violence and impunity. Honduras' legitimacy trap emerges from the consolidation of authority through an increase in authoritarianism and inequality under the guise of securitization.² Widespread impunity for violence and crimes, coupled with extensive corruption – both of which extend to the government – undermine legitimacy.

Legitimacy traps are difficult to confront because of issues with measuring the problem³ and efforts to do so are further complicated in states like Honduras which engage in isomorphic mimicry.⁴ However, it is evident that escaping the legitimacy trap in Honduras will require addressing corruption to improve the state's governance outcomes. Further efforts to reduce violence are necessary but rather than just continuing with the militarization of security services, the state must be engaged to make real commitments to addressing violence, impunity and vulnerability, and creating economic opportunities for all Hondurans.

Honduras has been a country of focus for Canada since 2014 and is an economic partner of the state.⁵ Canada and Honduras are connected through foreign direct investment (FDI), free trade and development assistance, are members of many hemispheric and regional organizations, and Honduras' crime and transnational gangs in Honduras have affected Canada. As a result of these ties, Canada is implicated in the success of Honduras and the Canadian government has a responsibility to engage the Honduran government. Canada should play a key role in addressing the challenges facing Honduras, including the key theme of corruption, which is a major driver of the impunity for violence, murders, human rights violations, and

increasing inequality across Honduras. At a minimum, it is the duty of our policies to do no harm, but Canada can also have a positive impact on Honduras' sustainable development.

It is recommended that Canada engage with Honduras in support of current anti-corruption and -impunity efforts, while simultaneously undertaking a comprehensive strategy to promote sustainable agriculture to have a positive impact on the livelihoods of vulnerable Hondurans. Once corruption and impunity have been reduced, Canada should advocate for the creation of formal avenues for collaboration between the state and civil society to mend state-society relations and continue progress towards stronger institutions in Honduras that work for citizens.

Methodology

The methodology for this project borrows some elements from Carleton University's Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP)⁶ and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) fragile states indices.⁷ The brief focuses on the following CIFP clusters: security and crime, governance, environment, and economic development. Human development and demography are also discussed but are considered of secondary importance. A threefold approach to understanding the state's fragility was undertaken: events monitoring, structural data consultation,⁸ and the application of theoretical approaches from scholarly materials. The structural data was collected using indicators from CIFP, the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), and the Fragile State Index (FSI) because these are widely recognized and cited, and provide necessary information to monitor trends over time.

A challenge for properly representing the current state of affairs in Honduras is the

fact that the most recently available structural data is from 2014, which does not reflect current and emerging trends. Events monitoring allowed for the construction of a more accurate picture of current trends to address the shortcomings of available structural data.

Stakeholders

The Honduran government has solidified its authority over the state, and the key stakeholders all have ties to actors within the government. There is an intricate web of connections and distinguishing among those who would support or spoil reform is challenging.

Primary Stakeholders

Honduras has a small group of ruling elite families who maintain oligarchic control of government and business interests.⁹ The government is led by current President Jose Orlando Hernandez (JOH) of the National Party of Honduras (PNH, by its Spanish initials).¹⁰ JOH is closely tied to the military and of particular importance are the elite military police, the force “TIGRES,” and the force “FUSINA,” who have received training and support from the U.S. military but are also accused of carrying out hit lists for businesses or maintaining ties with drugs cartels and gangs.¹¹ The police are also heavily involved in combatting violence and impunity, but maintain ties to the gangs and cartels, and have corruption at some of the highest levels.¹²

Civil society, environmental and Indigenous rights groups like the Civic Council of Popular and Indigenous Organizations of Honduras (COPINH, by its Spanish initials) present challenges to the state in the media and international fora, and through public protests of the elite groups over impunity for violence, property rights, expropriations, poverty, corruption, and environmental degradation. The Honduran

people are primary stakeholders in this analysis and their interests may be best represented by civil society actors.

The largest business conglomerates, such as the Dinant Corporation (the Facussé family) and the Grupo Continental (the Rosenthal family), control everything from telecommunications, mega agri-businesses, banking, and manufacturing. There is overlap among the members of these business families and the leadership of two major political parties: PNH and opposition Liberal Party (PLH, by its Spanish initials).¹³ This year, ties between these families and cartels and gangs have been revealed through U.S.-led multi-year stings.¹⁴

The U.S. has a long history of engagement in Honduras; during the Cold War, the U.S. trained anti-communist contra fighters in Honduras.¹⁵ Changing legislation has led first to repatriation of gang members and then to arrests and extradition of drug traffickers.^{16,17} The U.S. has an interest in reducing violence and improving economic conditions in Honduras to stem the flow of (mostly unauthorized) migrants and child migrants.

Canada has public and private interests in Honduras. In 2015, Canada was the 4th largest bilateral donor to Honduras, with \$30 million in ODA to Honduras last year.¹⁸ Canada also contributes to multilateral programs in Honduras, like the UNDP and the OAS. In 2014, Canada signed onto a free-trade agreement with Honduras, and Canadian mining companies control 90% of foreign mining investments in Honduras.¹⁹ During the period of 1997 to 2014, roughly 184 Honduran nationals were deported from Canada each year, compared with nearly 18,000 from the US and over 45,000 from Mexico in 2015 alone.²⁰ The repatriation of criminals and gang members from the Northern Triangle in their home countries after serving their prison terms has been

linked to recruitment, and the building of transnational networks.²¹

Secondary Stakeholders


The below stakeholders have a vested interest in the outcomes of policies and practices in Honduras but may not be able to directly affect those outcomes. Neighbouring states, as well as criminal gang elements, can trigger events and contribute to improving or deteriorating conditions in Honduras, but they are not the drivers of changes.

The presence and operations of ruling gangs (MS13, Barrio 18, Valle Valle, Cachiros) and cartels (AA Brothers, Los Pinos, Sinaloa, Cartel del Atlántico, Zetas) are more symptomatic of the post-coup situation in Honduras and repatriations than current drivers of fragility, but these groups remain important stakeholders in the state.

Neighboring Central American states, but particularly the other two members of the “Northern Triangle,” Guatemala and El Salvador, are also stakeholders.²²

Cluster Analysis – Primary Drivers

Honduras is a relatively stable state, but conditions have been deteriorating, especially since 2009. From 2011-2014, Honduras was the murder capital of the world outside of a warzone. The map at the top of the next column shows the homicide rates per 100,000 people by administrative region for January to December 2014.²³ The analysis below presents the CIFP identified clusters in the order of importance for analysis of the severity of Honduras’ fragility. The combination of consolidating authority while losing legitimacy and failing to deliver basic services are related to the extremely high levels of corruption and impunity that we discuss under the governance cluster. The overall threat to Honduras’ stability appears to be mild, but the current issues in governance are severe and concerning, and could lead to deterioration.



Although there has been a decrease in murders, the security and crime cluster is also severe and in need of attention. The security conditions are deteriorating because of the widespread impunity and collusion between the ruling oligarchs, criminal elements, security forces, and the political establishment. We placed security and crime as a primary driver because it has contributed to the governance issues while permitting the state to consolidate its power and authority in the name of a tough on crime approach.

The elements of security and crime coupled with poor economic development have contributed to massive migration that is having deleterious effects. Economic development and environment are closely tied in Honduras, with vulnerability and high levels of poverty leaving the state exposed. While conditions are currently moderate to severe, a single shock could hasten serious challenges to life and livelihood.

Human development and demography are secondary drivers. While all of the clusters contribute to conditions of fragility or stability, human development indicators have consistently improved in Honduras in absolute terms. Therefore, human development, though moderate, is improving.

Relative to the rest of world, Honduras is still lagging. Considering Honduras' HDI rank, its position has declined from 86th to 131st out of 166 since 1980.²⁴ Demography is mild to moderate. Honduras, like many developing nations, is heading toward a youth bulge, and there are continuing demographic shifts from rural to urban. Overall, demography is not driving the deteriorating conditions in Honduras.

Governance

In 2009, the democratically elected PLH government of Manuel Zelaya was overthrown in a military coup. During Zelaya's presidency there were considerable improvements in state-society relations, the state was making moves to reform land and property rights laws that would benefit small holder farmers.²⁵ Outwardly, the coup was attributed to Zelaya trying to make a constitutional amendment in order to eliminate presidential term limits.²⁶ There are also accusations that the country's oligarchs orchestrated the coup in order to protect their business, economic, and political interests.²⁷ These two arguments are made along party lines. Every CIFP governance indicator has deteriorated since the coup except for corruption,²⁸ which we argue is a poignant example of isomorphic mimicry.

A combination of initiatives undertaken since the start of JOH's mandate in 2014 seem to demonstrate the consolidation of the government's power, which erodes democratic governance and contributes to impunity and corruption: the adoption of a constitutional amendment to remove presidential limits, the avoidance of a congressional vote on the increase in military police (which falls under control of JOH), the passing of the 2014 Statute that allows the government to withhold information on security and defence for 25 years (including the military police budget), and the restructuring of ministerial portfolios to reduce

the number of individuals overall and instead create broader "umbrella agencies."²⁹ JOH has dismissed and replaced 4 out of 5 supreme court justices, raising concerns about the independence of the judiciary, and when his proposed increase in military police was deemed unconstitutional, he decided to call a plebiscite in 2017.³⁰ JOH declared in November 2016 that he intends to run for a second term³¹ after seeking approval to do so from the Supreme Court, though the discussion over the removal of term limits is the exact unconstitutional action that allegedly triggered the 2009 coup against former President Zelaya. A 2015 corruption scandal revealed the PNH and the President himself benefitted from \$350 million in campaign funding that was embezzled from the Honduran Social Security Institution (IHSS), which activists claim resulted in as many as 3000 patient deaths.³²

Dissent and opposition are controlled in Honduras and protection for vulnerable groups is not prioritized. Thousands of NGOs have had their legal status revoked and the process to register an NGO has been made more complicated.³³ The state is the most dangerous place in the world to be a journalist or environmental activist: there were 74 lawyers and 25 journalists murdered between 2009-2014.³⁴ According to the Guardian, 101 human rights and environmental activists were murdered in Honduras between 2010 and 2014.³⁵ Anyone who may interfere with the existing power structures is targeted; anti-drug trafficking officials have been assassinated³⁶ and even students protesting the privatization of universities have been the targets of violence.³⁷

Corruption is a problem within Honduras and is linked to other issues the state faces, including violence and crime, migration, inequality, underdevelopment, and slow growth. To address this issue, based in part on the successful anti-impunity efforts in Guatemala,³⁸ Honduras and the Organization

of American States (OAS) formalized the Support Mission Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH, by its Spanish initials) in January 2016.³⁹ The body was created in response to citizen protests against corruption in the state. The MACCIH aims to support Honduras' judicial system in preventing and addressing corruption and impunity.⁴⁰ Rather than operating independently to conduct investigations and prosecute as CICIG can, MACCIH works through the Honduras judiciary.⁴¹ It is still supposed to be able to investigate high-level officials in politics, security, and the judiciary, but there are concerns that the body will be less effective than CICIG given the perception of political influence over the Honduran judiciary. In its first year, the courts that were empowered to try cases did not bring forward a single case.⁴²

Further, members of some of the elite ruling families have recently been involved in drug trafficking, money laundering, and US-DEA arrests. The brother of the president, Juan Antonio "Tony" Hernandez, is a member of congress and has been linked to the Valle Valle gang.⁴³ Three members of the Rosenthal family, who are the owners of major firms in Honduras and one is a former leader of the PLH, were arrested in Miami on money laundering charges and have been linked to the MS13 and Cachiros.⁴⁴ The former mayor of El Paraiso, Alexander Ardon is a known member of the Sinaloa Cartel.⁴⁵


Security and Crime

In the last decade, Honduras has experienced high levels of violence that have been mostly attributed to gang warfare and transnational drug cartels. Honduras was listed as the murder capital of the world outside of a war zone from 2011-2014.⁴⁶ The steady increase in the murder rate coincides with the military coup in 2009. While the new government was trying to consolidate their authority⁴⁷ in the capital, the borders and

regions with drug trafficking and gang activity were paid little attention. The military was first given a role in combatting violent crime in 2011 as a temporary measure before full police reform could be undertaken.⁴⁸ After coming into power, JOH's government confronted the growing security crisis through a 50% increase in military presence in an "iron fist" emergency measure to combat urban violence.⁴⁹

Although reduced, violence remains an issue in Honduras, due in part to initiatives to control violence centering on gangs rather than other groups that are a source of even greater concern. Less than 1.5% of murders recorded from June 2015-June 2016 could be directly attributed to gangs but 33.8% were attributed to "hired killers,"⁵⁰ which can include "death squads" (military or police). Police have admitted to seeing "hit lists"⁵¹ and there are accusations against major businesses of hiring hit men.⁵²

Security forces are corrupt and inefficient. In 2015, at least 20 police officers fired for failing confidence tests were put back in service.⁵³ The military police have been accused of involvement in at least 9 murders, more than 20 cases of torture, and approximately 30 illegal arrests.⁵⁴ In 2014, impunity for criminal cases reached 96%.⁵⁵



The violence⁵⁶ and forced recruitment into gangs has contributed to a 300% increase of Hondurans trying to migrate to the US.⁵⁷ 60% of the over 500,000 Hondurans in the US

are unauthorized. In 2014, President Obama declared a humanitarian situation⁵⁸ because the number of unaccompanied minors arriving at the American border from Honduras went from 7,000 in 2013, to 17,500 in 2014.⁵⁹


Economic Development

Honduras is the second poorest, and most unequal country in Latin America. Honduras is third in the world for informal employment. The Honduran economy relies on services, however nearly 40% of the population is employed in agriculture.⁶⁰ Remittances from Hondurans abroad make up 15% of the country's GDP.⁶¹

Table 1. Rural poverty

- Minorities: Indigenous groups 7%, Afro-Hondurans 2%
- 80% of Indigenous people live in rural areas.
- ~71% of Indigenous people live in poverty.⁶²
- 70% of farming families are subsistence farmers.
- National average: 66% (extreme poverty 46%); Rural poverty: 71% (extreme poverty 58%).⁶³
- 25% of homes below the poverty line are female-headed households.

As of 2012, Honduras' tax revenues as a percentage of GDP were slightly under the 18% average for the LAC region.⁶⁴ By 2014, this had increased to 19.8%, but was still below the LAC average (21.7%).⁶⁵ This low contribution exacerbates inequality and strains public services. Hondurans also have to pay an estimated \$200 million in annual extortion fees to organized crime groups,⁶⁶ which limits the income they have to use on purchasing necessary goods and services and provides further income to alternative groups in the state that cause problems for development and governance.



There are rural poverty issues that intersect with agriculture and Indigenous peoples' rights. The above poverty headcount map shows the highest levels of poverty are in rural areas (see appendix 7 for comparison of population density, poverty headcount and the location of Indigenous peoples).⁶⁷ Although members of the 9 recognized Indigenous minority groups⁶⁸ in Honduras are marginalized and underrepresented in government, these social cleavages are unlikely to result in more than continued protests to business projects and forced evictions and calls to the international community for help or condemnations of state action. However, these same people are threatened, intimidated, attacked and murdered: in the Bajo Agúan region “more than 100 people, mainly peasant activists, have been killed, many at the hands of state or private security forces.”⁶⁹

Violence, impunity, and economic development are intertwined. The two cities with the highest rates of violence also have the greatest population density: the capital Tegucigalpa and the border town of San


Pedro Sula. There are also connections to corruption among the elites. The Facussé family owns and runs the Dinant Corporation, which is a conglomerate involved in damming projects in the contested Bajo Agúan, and runs mega agribusinesses in African Palms for Palm oil. There have been accusations of the security companies privately hired by these businesses shooting at peasant farmers, and accusations of their involvement in human rights violations, including kidnapping, torture and murder.⁷⁰

Environment

Honduras is ranked as one of the most vulnerable, least resilient countries to economic and environmental shocks in the region. For the period from 1995-2015, Honduras ranked among the highest countries in the world for vulnerability along with Haiti and Myanmar.⁷¹ Honduras is highly vulnerable to extreme weather events linked to climate change, including hurricanes, floods and drought.⁷² Honduras is currently in the third year of the worst drought the region has faced in 30 years⁷³ and 2 million Hondurans are facing food insecurity.⁷⁴ Unequal access to land, deforestation and soil degradation exacerbate climate issues and negatively impact already low agricultural productivity.⁷⁵ This is especially problematic because of the prominent role of agriculture in the lives of impoverished Hondurans who depend on crops for income and sustenance.

The government has enacted climate change legislation and signaled their commitment to addressing the topic,⁷⁶ but environmental protection efforts by citizens that conflict with economic development and the expansion of business, which leads to expropriation of land and resources held by marginalized populations,⁷⁷ are often met with violence. For example, Berta Cáceres, an Indigenous Lenca woman and a high-profile leader of COPINH, was assassinated this year and many international observers have linked

this to her activism against the Agua Zarca dam and the threat this posed to the company behind the project.⁷⁸ Of the five individuals arrested for her murder, two of were employed by the company and two were part of the Honduran Army (one actively serving, one retired).⁷⁹ These acts of violence against environmentalists are so common that Global Witness named Honduras the most dangerous country per capita for environmental and land activists in 2015.⁸⁰



The Honduras Documentation Centre claims that 52% of conflict in Honduras is related to natural resource management.⁸¹ Others highlight the unsettled land disputes between agribusiness and Indigenous groups on the Northeast Atlantic coast of Honduras where most murders occur geographically,⁸² however this is also a part of the drug trafficking route through the state. The above map⁸³ shows the cocaine trafficking routes by air, land, and sea in Honduras (for comparison with murder rates, location of forced evictions in the Bajo Agúan, see Appendix 6).

Secondary drivers

Human Development

Human development presents an analytical challenge because Honduras ranks low in comparison to other states, but has seen steady improvements in human development indicators. In absolute terms, Honduras' HDI

ranking is 131 out of 166 countries.⁸⁴ This speaks to the government's ability to deliver services to the population necessary for development.⁸⁵ However, government capacity is also challenged by the prevalence of informal employment: Honduras ranks 3rd in world for informal employment,⁸⁶ with 72.8% of total employment in non-agricultural jobs.⁸⁷ Ultimately, human development is low: more than half of the population in Honduras lives in poverty, educational quality is low, and citizens face a high degree of risk for major infectious diseases.⁸⁸

Current large-scale initiatives to address these issues are poorly perceived by citizens. In 2014 public perception polls, the "Vida Mejor" ("Better Life") program, which is a major government project meant to target poverty and improve living conditions for Hondurans, was seen as ineffective: 73.5% of thought that conditions remained the same or worsened the "Vida Mejor" program.⁸⁹ In 2015 polls, 59.5% of respondents thought that the "Vida Mejor" program was mostly political propaganda, while 80% of respondents said they were aware of the program but did not benefit from it in any way.⁹⁰ The other major program to foster development, "Alianza para la Prosperidad," ("Alliance for Prosperity"), is a donor-funded initiative in place in the Northern Triangle. Public perceptions of this program were similarly weak: most of the respondents had never heard of it, and those who had did not think it could improve current conditions.⁹¹

Demography and Population

Demography and population are not major drivers of fragility in Honduras. The state will experience a youth bulge, but, overall, population growth, urban growth, and things like life expectancy have stayed stable or improved. Urbanization in Honduras is driven by the rural/urban divide of poverty or economic opportunity.

ALC Analysis

This brief utilizes the authority, legitimacy, capacity (ALC) model developed by Carment et al. to analyze the fragility of the state of Honduras based on its structural features and state-society relations.⁹² Authority measures the ability of the state to provide security within its borders.⁹³ Legitimacy measures societal perceptions of the state.⁹⁴ Capacity measures the state's potential for mobilizing resources and employing them to provide services to the population.⁹⁵

Authority

The laws of the state trump all others, except that many factions of the ruling elites have de facto exempted themselves. The state has lost some control in border territories and within the government apparatus because of infiltration by gangs and cartels. Impunity for crimes means that citizens are not protected from violence or predation. This tacitly permits extrajudicial killings by police, as well as gang- and cartel-related violence. The state lost more control of fringe territories that are sparsely populated because they had to focus on consolidating their power. Despite these challenges and inefficiencies, the state's authority is quite stable. There was a peaceful transition of power from Porfirio Lobo to JOH after the election at the end of 2013. The government's power base is solidified through its connections with business elites, the judiciary and security services, though this poses its own challenges to the state and its citizens. Impunity is seen as a symptom of this corruption and the inefficiencies it causes rather than a disregard for state authority.

Legitimacy

While the government has a mandate through their democratic election and citizens have responded favourably to the lower crime rates that are associated with the current administration, there is also discontent. Protests are common and have taken place

against the perceived corruption of the government (especially in response to the embezzlement scandal), privatization of public enterprises, and the president's recent decision to run for re-election at the end of 2017. The Supreme Court struck down a constitutional article on term limits, but there remain concerns about the constitutionality of his decision to seek a second term.

The state also lacks legitimacy because of its failure to resolve impunity for violence and widespread corruption. Past efforts have seen some success but have failed to achieve broad progress. The government has recently committed to the MACCIH, but its efficacy remains to be seen. Challenges to state-society relations are also evident in the great inequality in the state, poor service provision, and the treatment of activists, journalists, legal professionals, the LGBTQ community, and other marginalized groups. These groups experience higher rates of poverty and violence. Honduras is described as the most dangerous place to be both a journalist and an environmental activist, and state forces have been implicated in the violence perpetrated against these individuals. Minority groups are also underrepresented in the political sphere. The state has not acted to address these issues, focusing its attention instead on organized crime and securitization of the state.

Capacity

There is weak provision of social services like healthcare and education, and especially unequal distribution between rural and urban provision of services. Infrastructure in the state is poor, especially in rural areas, which compounds many of the challenges the state faces in service provision. Most of the government's attention is placed on security provision to address high rates of crime and violence. There is extensive impunity, murders are rarely investigated or resolved, security forces experience

corruption, and the judiciary is widely seen as being susceptible to outside influence. The security and justice apparatus is slow to investigate, process, and prosecute crime. Policy responses, even in the security realm, seem to address short-term concerns rather than seeking long-term reform to improve conditions. The state collects limited revenue from citizens for service provision, and citizens are under pressure to provide further income to other groups to address crime.

Because of the corruption in the state and the other challenges, Honduras is a difficult environment for businesses. A small percentage of the population form a business elite that dominate the economy and this inequality adds further challenges to the functioning of the economy.

Based on this analysis, Honduras is not in immediate danger of fragility, but there are signs of a legitimacy trap emerging as the state focuses on securitization and consolidation of power rather than providing for citizens to address other concerning trends in the state, such as vulnerability and poverty. Corruption and impunity serve as an explanation for the government in justifying some of its actions, such as the growth of the military police force, but both corruption and impunity are also deeply connected to relationships between elites in the country, including within the state apparatus, and will only be resolved effectively when responses address elite groups' involvement and create more substantial reform. For state-society relations to improve, ordinary citizens who have demonstrated their discontent with the current functioning of the state need to see these initiatives being undertaken to improve their perceptions of legitimacy, as well as a greater focus placed on sustainable human development instead of just securitization to see progress in the long term and to improve the immediate situation of poor citizens.

Scenarios

There are broad and specific events that could create a best- or worse-case outcome in Honduras in the next 12-18 months, impacting state-society relations and perceptions of state legitimacy.

Best case

The Honduran Attorney General brings Berta Caceres' case to court and justice is served. This could be a point to improve Indigenous peoples' perceptions of the state's ability to prosecute crimes and present a more credible commitment to the MACCIH.

Citizens vote in favor of the 2017 plebiscite on amending the constitution to approve growth of JOH's military police force. The increased presence of military police contributes to greater reductions in murders in the most densely populated areas. More U.S.-led arrests and extraditions take place to continue to root out elites tied to the transnational drug trade, which can contribute both the decreasing crime and gang activity, while also decreasing corruption since the costs of participating or being attached to these activities rise.

Improved perceptions and actual conditions in security and crime begins to stem the out-flow of Hondurans attempting to migrate to the U.S. The improved security conditions and apparent credible commitment to reducing corruption and impunity improve conditions for doing business in Honduras, and renew the interest of the international community and international financial institutions in investing in Honduras.

Continued cooperation with multilateral institutions and donors, coupled with responsible government expenditure increases the resilience and insurance against shocks of the vulnerable populations. The conditions of the current drought or a major climate event do not completely destroy agricultural productivity and the livelihoods of the worst-off citizens. Those affected

receive aid from the state, through international engagement, and are able to recover and regain losses.

Worst case

Berta Caceres' case does not make it to court and the Honduran government demonstrates no commitment to the MACCIH, continuing the impunity in the state and further deteriorating perceptions of the legal system's corruption.

Citizens vote in the 2017 plebiscite and the outcome is incongruent with popular opinion, causing large-scale protests against the government, highlighting corruption, and further deteriorating state-society relations. This could also lead to violent repression by the state of those in opposition to the results. The situation could be deteriorated by the inappropriate involvement of the military police, or police and security forces engaging against the population.

The Dinant corporation and others involved in mining, damming, tourism development and agribusiness continue to harass, threaten, displace, and murder activists, journalists, and Indigenous people with impunity. Land disputes are settled with more forced evictions. Impunity, violence, and lack of economic opportunity contributes to increasing numbers of migrants and unaccompanied minors fleeing the country and greater poverty for those who remain.

There is a major climate event (such as a hurricane, flood, or continued drought) that exacerbates the food insecurity in Honduras and creates a humanitarian emergency. This could also have negative impacts on the economic growth of the state because of infrastructure needing to be rebuilt or the cost of other recovery efforts.

The recent arrests of 'kingpins' in organized crime creates a vacuum and increases violence because of competition for territory among cartels or gangs. Gangs and cartels cement their power and relationships

with the state by continuing to bribe from the outside, and/or obtaining political posts. This could undermine not only legitimacy and governance, but could lead to a lapse of the state authority over its territory.

Policy Recommendations

It is recommended that the Government of Canada (GC) implement the following policies to contribute to the improvement of state-society relations in Honduras and ensure the positive development of the state. The policies are outlined in the order in which they should be undertaken to ensure efficacy.

Support for improved governance is crucial as the first step to addressing the rampant corruption and impunity and contributing to the success of other initiatives undertaken in the state. It is still recommended, however, that the second policy be implemented immediately as well to address the growing vulnerability of the majority of Honduran citizens to economic and environmental shocks. The final policy should only be implemented once progress is realized in addressing impunity to protect civil society engaged with the state.

Continue support for the MACCIH

Policy recommendation: It is recommended that Global Affairs Canada (GAC) continue its support for the OAS-backed effort to address impunity and corruption in Honduras by: (1) advocating the importance of this agreement internationally to maintain public pressure on the Government of Honduras to cooperate; (2) encouraging the MACCIH officials to undertake a national consultation process with Honduran residents on their expectations for the body and what they hope it will achieve in order to facilitate awareness, encourage citizen oversight of the initiative and the government, and build citizen trust; and (3) closely monitoring the progress made on the reform measures the body aims to

implement. Throughout this process, which it is recommended continue until the end of Canada's funding to the MACCIH in 2018 to give the initiative adequate time to be show progress, other aid to the Honduran government should be frozen, and only provided upon the completion of set targets in a cash-on-delivery approach. If the state does not demonstrate sufficient commitment to the MACCIH and reforms are not realized in the judicial sector to address corruption and impunity by the end of 2018, Canada should cease its financial support of the MACCIH and halt all aid to the state.

Cluster/ALC targets: Governance; legitimacy

Rationale: Though the MACCIH has not yet prosecuted a case and citizens have indicated their preference for a more independent body like the CICIG,⁹⁶ the agreement is only in its first year and greater power for the body is dependent on the agreement of the government, which seems unlikely to be yielded easily by JOH. As the international community, including Canada,⁹⁷ has already invested significantly in the MACCIH,⁹⁸ other initiatives implemented by JOH's administration have proven ineffective,⁹⁹ and addressing governance shortcomings is central to improving the conditions in Honduras, it is recommended that Canada utilize the entry point provided by the MACCIH and work to ensure the greatest potential efficacy of the body by serving as a vocal advocate for the initiative, in addition to undertaking comprehensive monitoring of the body's functioning. This will also help to ensure the success of our already-committed financial contribution, and provides a route for addressing governance in Honduras without the necessity of providing funding to – and risking its improper use by – the state apparatus.

The three-fold approach above is recommended in order to ensure that there is

both visible international and local pressure on the government and judiciary of Honduras and the MACCIH. To ensure local pressure, citizens must first better understand the initiative and embed legitimacy at that level. It will be necessary to convince the OAS and the MACCIH to undertake the consultation to achieve this objective.¹⁰⁰ Citizens have also indicated their desire to be further consulted regarding government initiatives through consultation processes.¹⁰¹

JOH's government has demonstrated itself to be susceptible to public and international pressure in agreeing to implement this body, and continued pressure applied by the region as a whole through the OAS, individual major donor countries to the state like Canada and the US, as well as citizens of the state, could continue to drive progress. With the election approaching, JOH may be further interested in cooperation and ensuring the success of the project to demonstrate the efficacy of his anti-corruption and -impunity agenda.

A further argument to encourage Honduras' cooperation with the MACCIH is the fact that the state's corruption has prevented it from being able to access funding from the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). The "control of corruption" score has been below the passing threshold to be considered for funding in its last three evaluations. Addressing corruption would then directly lead to an increase in aid funding for the state.¹⁰²

It is recommended that these efforts begin immediately. Should measurable progress, guided by the indicators included below, not be realized by the end of Canada's funding commitment in 2018, it is recommended that Canada cease its financial support for the project and disengage from interactions with the Honduras government. At such a point, continuing to engage with Honduras would go beyond Canada's commitment to "responsible conviction"¹⁰³ as

our funding would contribute to an administration that had demonstrated disinterest in addressing corruption and impunity in their state.

Partners & stakeholders: The OAS, fellow member states of the OAS, MACCIH states, the government and judiciary of Honduras, and Honduran citizens will all be stakeholders. Those who benefit from the impunity in Honduras would also be affected by its success.

Risks: Most elements of the policy present only low risks to Canada because no further financial or political commitments are required; rather, they would help to ensure the efficacy of a commitment already made by the state to provide funding for the initiative until 2018. It is a risk, however, that the MACCIH will be ineffective even with this advocacy. The fact that it operates under the judiciary, which is subject to influence by the groups involved in the state's corruption, presents a major challenge to making progress against corruption and impunity. Many elite groups benefit from these detrimental practices by the state, and they would have a reason to spoil progress to protect their advantages. It is also because of the positioning of the judiciary over the MACCIH, and seeing the Guatemala comparison of the CICIG, that it might be difficult to earn citizen support for the MACCIH. The most substantial risk comes from the encouragement of citizen participation in national consultation processes because of control of opposition in Honduras. Canada's advocacy of such a policy should only proceed after careful weighing of different options to ensure citizen safety.

Measuring success: Success of individual initiatives will be measured by: (1) mentions of the MACCIH in Inter-American and

bilateral fora by Canadian personnel; (2) the occurrence of the national consultations; and (3) through careful GAC evaluation of the project's goals as outlined on the project's GC page - strengthened national institutions to undertake investigation and prosecution to dismantle corruption networks; increased transparency and accountability of Honduran political party system; and enhanced national institutions to implement the reforms of the Honduran justice system.¹⁰⁴ Emphasis in evaluation must be placed on seeing judicial reform, in particular through mechanisms to create a more independent judiciary, such as a re-selection of supreme court justices or an independent selection process for major roles like the attorney-general, and lowering of the rate of impunity. Aid to Honduras until the end of March 2018, when our project commitment ends, should be doled out in portions every three months dependent upon the achievement of progress towards such reform initiatives and the prosecution of cases identified through the MACCIH. Insufficient progress and a continued lack of prosecutions by the MACCIH by the end of March 2018 should end Canada's financial contributions to the support body. Control of corruption, which is the ultimate goal of the MACCIH, will be measured using the MCC's "control for corruption" score and Honduras' eligibility for a Compact. This is recommended to be the final indicator to determine Canada's continued engagement in Honduras. If the state is unable to secure an MCC Compact by 2018 due to insufficient efforts to control corruption, Canada should also halt its funding to the state and only consider reinstating this aid if progress can be achieved. These intentions should be communicated with the state to demonstrate the severity of the corruption situation and the need for action.

Promote sustainable agricultural practices

Policy: It is recommended that Global Affairs Canada (GAC) provide support for programming to improve the capacity of smallholder farmers through training in sustainable agricultural practices in order to increase the resilience of impoverished Honduran citizens to both economic and environmental shocks. The programming should be comprehensive and equally address food security, climate change adaptation and poverty reduction, rather than subordinating climate change to economic development. Finally, it should engage farmers directly – including women and youth – to have an immediate impact in improving capacity, but also engage the government to ensure that each poverty reduction, agriculture, and climate change policies and strategies all consider the interconnection of the other topics.¹⁰⁵ Because of Honduras' vulnerability to climate change and extreme weather events,¹⁰⁶ it is further recommended that Canada mainstream sustainability into each of its projects in the state related to agriculture.

Cluster/ALC targets: Economic development and environment; capacity and legitimacy

Rationale: While improving governance is the primary point of concern in Honduras, the majority of the population in Honduras is impoverished and Canada can undertake effective interventions to decrease vulnerability and improve living conditions. Agriculture is being targeted because of the number of drivers of fragility that can be addressed with intervention in this area. There are intimate links between food security, poverty, climate change and economic growth in the country.¹⁰⁷ Smallholder agriculture is the main source of income for many in Honduras,¹⁰⁸ but their production capacity, as well as the amount of food their families have access to, are

negatively impacted by the extreme weather events in the country. The use of inefficient agricultural techniques limits their own capacity further and contributes to climate change.¹⁰⁹ Climate variability is also a concern, as risks are evolving and current coping mechanisms may not be effective for long.¹¹⁰ Despite these challenges, small-scale farmers receive less government funding than mega-projects and export crops, which also means that directing state attention to this sector can also help begin to re-build state-society relations.¹¹¹ Because of this, it is important to engage the state as well in order to influence policy and the long-term viability of this approach to small-scale agriculture.

Infrastructure was also considered as a policy response to address inequality and poverty as it can similarly have a positive impact on a number of different connected areas by creating jobs, contributing to economic development, facilitating disaster response, and improving state capacity as a whole. However, it is hoped that the anti-corruption efforts underway in the state will lead to Honduras' ability to receive MCC funding and infrastructure was the main area in which the last was invested.¹¹² Agriculture and food security is also an area of focus in Canada's international development work, and of programming in Honduras, making this a strong match for the policy to pursue to improve citizen livelihoods. Each of the current projects has a narrower focus and recognizes less the interconnections between food security, climate change, and poverty reduction so a comprehensive approach like the one proposed can improve Canada's efficacy as a donor in Honduras.

It is recommended that this policy be implemented at the earliest feasible time at which Canada to secure the funding and necessary partnerships. While Honduras is not in immediate danger of fragility, many citizens are suffering because of poverty and

vulnerability, and improving their living situations should be a priority.

Partners & stakeholders: Partnership should be sought with the UNDP as both pieces of the strategy proposed is based upon a recent initiative undertaken in the state: "Addressing Climate Change Risks on Water Resources in Honduras: Increased Systemic Resilience and Reduced Vulnerability of the Urban Poor." The project sought to mainstream climate change risks into government policy on water and poverty; strengthen the national meteorological network; improve information on climate change impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation; and strengthen sustainable land use practices piloted around the city.¹¹³ Though the initiative is concluding this year, reports signal that progress has been achieved through the project and it could be expanded to other areas of the country.¹¹⁴ The organization has experience in the country and in the executive of these projects, has established relationships with the appropriate individuals and government agencies, and is an organization with which Canada works closely in other contexts as one of the top government contributors to the organization.¹¹⁵ Further, the Administrator of UNDP and the UNDP's Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean were in Honduras November 22-24, 2016, to discuss the organization's future work there, demonstrating their continued interest in engaging in the state.¹¹⁶ Because of this, the UNDP also represents the best entry point to Honduras for this initiative.

It is also recommended that Canada engage with local civil society organizations that are promoting sustainable small-scale agriculture in Honduras. One such organization is Seed of Progress (*La Semilla del Progreso*), which uses a farmer-to-farmer methodology to educate on sustainable farming practices and infrastructure.¹¹⁷ These organizations could help increase the area

covered by the sustainable agriculture initiative through continued use of the network methodology the Seed of Progress already employs.

Other stakeholders include the small-scale farmers and their families, and relevant government agencies and departments.

Risks: The primary risk with the initiative is the need for education on the interconnectedness of the different phenomena so that the approach is understood and well-incorporated into policy and training programs. There is also risk associated with ensuring the long-term benefits of the program, particularly in the work with small-scale farmers directly, due to the dynamic processes that are economic development and climate change in Honduras. Land owned by a small-scale farmer could be appropriated by the state for monoculture and export crops, or other business initiatives. In terms of climate change, it is possible that the risk to farmers could change, altering what would be the most appropriate technique or infrastructure.

Measuring success: Success should be measured through the increased resilience of the small-scale farmers in Honduras, including decreased amount of time to respond to shocks and improvements or stability in annual crop yields regardless of weather, and a decrease in rural poverty. To understand the progress made in ensuring a comprehensive approach to food security, poverty, and climate change, systematic reviews of policy implemented by the Government of Honduras in each of the areas should be undertaken, as this will shape the state's future efforts in each area. Evaluation after the expansion beyond the UNDP's original project implementation sites should be conducted after two years to ensure sufficient time for progress to have been realized by the farmers and government agencies.

Foster formal avenues for collaboration between the state and civil society

Policy: It is recommended that the GC advocate for the creation of formal mechanisms for collaboration between civil society and the government once corruption and impunity efforts have demonstrated success and there are less signs of danger for activists. Civil society consultation or advisory groups could be formed to assist with the planning and implementation of initiatives like the "Vida Mejor" program. In the meantime, Canada should ensure its own development efforts in Honduras are undertaken in conjunction with civil society to begin to normalize this interaction.

Cluster/ALC targets: Governance; legitimacy

Rationale: State-society relations in Honduras are weak, and civil society is being systematically disengaged from governance and decision-making. The violence occurring against activists threatens human rights and development. The state also suffers from these actions, as they threaten legitimacy and weaken governance. Citizen engagement in the state is important to guarantee human rights and government oversight and accountability, and to ensure that initiatives undertaken address citizen needs and have support from the population. Encouraging the creation of formal avenues for collaboration between the state and civil society will help to ensure these perspectives are systematically incorporated into government decision-making and help to build state-society relations and perceptions of legitimacy of the state.

The "Vida Mejor" program can serve as an access point because it is a major investment by the government of Honduras in poverty alleviation, but it is perceived as ineffective by citizens. Involving civil society would improve government capacity as its reach is extended through the involvement of

the civil society actors, benefiting more impoverished Hondurans, and this would in turn improve government legitimacy and state-society relations. The investment by the state would also be more effective as a result.

However, it is currently unsafe in Honduras for activists and the state seems otherwise unreceptive to dissenting points of view, which would likely surface in conversations regarding policy initiatives. Because of this, it is recommended that the creation of these groups is not advocated until impunity and violence against activists have decreased.

Partners & stakeholders: Stakeholders for this policy include the Government of Honduras and civil society actors in the state.

Risks: While the risks to such a policy are seemingly low to Canada because it requires only advocacy for the creation of these bodies within the state, the risks could be serious if this is done prematurely because of current efforts to minimize opposition within the state. It should be ascertained that dissenting groups can do so with relative safety before Canada encourages their formal engagement.

Measuring success: Once implemented, the program should be measured by the number of formal spaces existing through which civil society can contribute to the formation of government policy and legislation, partnerships in implementation, and the contributions made by these groups that are substantively incorporated into government initiatives. Systematic review of policies and programs following the creation of these spaces should also be undertaken to ensure that civil society perspectives have been incorporated substantively and these actors are being utilized in delivering relevant services.

Appendix 1: Legitimacy Trap and Additional Reading

According to Charles T. Call a legitimacy gap is hardest to measure this is why Moreno-Torres & Anderson do not use legitimacy as a measure because it is hardest to measure, and existing indicators are unreliable or fail (according to them to capture and measure the idea of legitimacy). They reject accountability and voice for example. Call argues that ways to address a legitimacy trap is by empowering the counterweights to the government, national actors should have a voice. This is a challenge in Honduras since it is ranked as one of the most dangerous places in the world to be an activist (member of civil society) and the government has revoked and blocked the legal registration of NGOs. Call's article "Beyond the Failed State: Toward Conceptual Alternatives" discusses states emerging from violent, armed conflict so the example may not apply neatly to the case of Honduras. For Call elections matter, they are a window of opportunity for enhancing accountability and transparency. Van de Walle explains that structural factors contribute to a legitimacy trap when institutions and extractive capacity are weak. Extractive capacity is weaker in agrarian states where it is harder to collect taxes. In Honduras GDP depends upon on services, however outside of cities, rural areas are sparsely populated and poorly administrated. According to Van de Walle civil service is weak because of patronage and politicization prevents capacity building to maintain rent seeking and again weakens extraction. Then we see a "hollowing out" while those in power try to remain in power to access international aid they ignore their responsibilities of acting like a state. This is harder to respond to which contributes to a decline. Elites do not purposely try to make the state fail. Pritchett, Woolcock, and Andrews introduced us to the idea of isomorphic mimicry. They used international country risk guide (ICRG), looking at measures of bureaucratic quality and corruption. Leaders manage an elite capture, and participate in mimicry by following the rules even as conditions deteriorate. Finally, important for this project, LeMay and Hebert argue that effective political authority that is seen as legitimate cannot be created merely by trying to strengthen input sources of legitimacy (formal rules) or output sources (improved performance). Perceptions matter, legitimacy is endogenous.


References:

- Call, C. T. (2011) "Beyond the Failed State: Toward Conceptual Alternatives". *European Journal of International Relations*, 17(2), 303-326.
- LeMay, H. and Hebert, X. (2014) "The OECD's discourse on fragile states: expertise and the normalisation of knowledge production". *Third World Quarterly*. 35(2) 232-251.
- Moreno-Torres, M. and, Anderson, M. (2004) "Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction." United Kingdom Department for International Cooperation, PRDE Working Paper 1 (August). Available online: www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/56/21684456.pdf.
- Pritchett, L., Woolcock, M., and Andrews, M. (2013) "Looking like a state: techniques of persistent failure in state capability for implementation". *The Journal of Development Studies*, 49(1), 1-18.
- van de Walle, N. (2003) "The Economic Correlates of State Failure: Taxes, Foreign Aid, and Policies" in Rotberg, R. ed., *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*. Princeton University Press.

Appendix 3: Honduras Governance Indicators

1. Governance	(if available)				
	2000	2004	2009	2013	
Indicator Name	[2002]				Honduras (most recent)
Freedom of the Press	partly free	Partly Free	Partly free	not free	Press Status: Not free (2015)
	43	52	52	62	Press freedom score: 68 on 100 (100 bad)
	14	14	15	17	Legal environment: 19/30 (30 worst)
	17	22	23	30	political environment: 34/40 (40 worst)
	12	16	14	15	Economimc environment: 15/30 (30 worst)
Government Effectiveness	-0.54	-0.56	-0.66	-0.73	Governance score (-2.5 worst): -0.82
	33.66	32.2	29.67	25.59	Percentile rank (100 best): 20.19
Level of Corruption		114	130	140	Rank: 112/168
		2.3/10	2.5/10	2.6/10	Score: 31/100
Level of Democracy	Dem 7	dem 7	dem 7	dem7	Polity score: 7 (min 6 max 10)/ auto =0
Level of Participation in International Political Organisations					55
Percentage of Female Parliamentarians	9.4	5.5	18	19.5	25.8
Permanence of Regime Type	18	22	27	31	33 (Says score is the number of years since regime change based on POLITY score seems incorrect.)
Refugees Hosted	903	484	1166	3301	Refugee by country of origin 2015: 4312
Restrictions on Civil Liberties	3	3	3	4	4 (2014, 7 is worst)
Restrictions on Political Rights	3	3	3	4	4 (2014, 7 is worst)
Rule of Law	-1	-0.75	-0.9	-1.2	Governance score (-2.5 worst): -0.95
	18.18	27.27	19.91	10.8	Percentile rank (100 best): 16.83
Voice and Accountability in Decision-making	-0.19	-0.32	-0.55	-0.5	Governance score (-2.5 worst): -0.45
	46.63	37.5	30.33	31.46	Percentile rank (100 best): 32.02


Appendix 4: Intentional Homicides Trends in the Northern Triangle and Venezuela
Data source: World Bank





Appendix 5: Comparison of Honduras' Human Development Indicator Scores

Source: Country Economy. "Honduras- Human Development Index – HDI."

<http://countryeconomy.com/hdi/honduras>





CPIA Human development indicators using World Bank HDI data




Appendix 5 continued


CPIA Human development indicators, World Bank HDI data




Appendix 6: Mapping murder, drug trafficking, and business in Honduras
 SINIT-SEPLAN 2014 Map Homocides per 100,000 people, by administrative division.¹¹⁸




Duke university map, drug trafficking routes in Honduras.¹¹⁹



Appendix 6 continued: Mapping murder, drug trafficking, and business in Honduras
 Map of estates in Bajo Agúan and forced evictions 2012¹²⁰




Map of Present and prospective megaprojects for Tourist development.¹²¹




Appendix 7: Mapping poverty, population density and Indigenous populations in Honduras

Map of Population density (2000)¹²²




Map of Poverty Headcount divided into Quintiles and by administrative municipal region. (2002)¹²³



Appendix 7 continued: Mapping poverty, population density and Indigenous populations in Honduras

Map of location of Indigenous peoples in Honduras 2001¹²⁴

Ubicación de los pueblos indígenas en Honduras
Fuente Oxfam en base a datos del INE 2001, Elaboración propia



 End Notes

¹ See appendix “Legitimacy Trap and Additional readings”

² Takeuchi, S., Murotani R. and Tsunekawa, K. (2011) “Capacity Traps and Legitimacy Traps: Development Assistance and State Building in Fragile Situations”. In Catalyzing Development: A New Vision for Aid, ed. Kharas H., Makino, K. and Jung, W. Brookings Institute Press.

³ Moreno-Torres, M. and, Anderson, M. (2004) “Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction.” United Kingdom Department for International Cooperation, PRDE Working Paper 1 (August). Available online: www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/56/21684456.pdf

⁴ In Honduras an example of Isomorphic mimicry is that they were signing onto anti-corruption aid deals while embezzling money from public service institutions. The state is “hollowed out,” (per Van de Walle, ref. in next endnote) with individuals trying to remain in power for the benefits this yields, while ignoring the responsibilities of acting as a state. This is harder to respond to, which contributes to decline of state-society relations and the stability of the country. Elites do not seek to cause state failure, but they are trying to incur the benefits of their positions of power. Pritchett, L., Woolcock, M., and Andrews, M. (2013) “Looking like a state: techniques of persistent failure in state capability for implementation”. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 49(1), 1-18.

⁵ Global Affairs Canada (11/09/2016) “Honduras.” <http://www.international.gc.ca/development-developpement/countries-pays/honduras.aspx?lang=eng>.

⁶ CIFP developed tools to monitor, forecast and evaluate fragile and failed states. CIFP created a methodology for evaluating individual country performance. And finally, “the project engages in statistical and theoretical research, regarding the nature of the relationship between state fragility and selected key variables.”

⁷ OECD fragility report proposes assessing fragility across five clusters: violence, justice, institutions, economic foundations, and resilience. OECD. (2015) *States of Fragility 2015: Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions*, OECD Publishing, Paris.

DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264227699-en>

⁸ Considering CPIA, FSI, CIFP, OECD, informing data extraction from World Bank Data bank.

⁹ Many list 10-12 historic ruling families, the same names do not always appear, for the purposes of this brief we will only focus on actors directly implicated in our analysis.

¹⁰ See social network map appendix. Other political and business actors concerned are discussed in the appendix, the emphasis here is on JOH and the ruling party since they will be one of the primary points of entry for policy.

¹¹ La Prensa, (11/10/2016) “EUA tras Cartel formado por jueces, militares, alcaldes y policia” <http://www.laprensa.hn/honduras/1007292-410/eua-tras-cartel-formado-por-jueces-militares-alcaldes-y-polic%C3%ADas>

¹² Example from Insight Crime: Alonso, L.F. (2016) “81 Honduras Police Officers Allegedly Worked For MS13 Gang” <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/81-honduran-police-officers-allegedly-worked-for-ms13-gang>. Clavel, F (2016) “Honduras Police Reformers Release Details of Online Complaints,” <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/top-crimes-of-police-officers-according-to-online-denunciations-honduras-police-reform-commission>. Gurney, K. (2014) “Honduras Announces New Wave of Police Purges” Insight Crime, <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/honduras-announces-new-wave-of-police-purges>. Arce, A. (15/04/2016) “Un informe revela nombres y hechos relacionados con asesinatos cometidos por la policia en Honduras” The NYT America Latina, <http://www.nytimes.com/es/2016/04/15/un-informe-revela-nombres-y-hechos-relacionados-con-asesinatos-cometidos-por-la-policia-en-honduras/#>.

¹³ See Social Network appendix. Dudley, S. (2016) “Why Elites Do Business with Criminals in Honduras”, Insight Crime. <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/why-elites-do-business-with-criminals-in-honduras>

¹⁴ Fagensen, Z. and Stempel, J (07/10/2015) “US Charges Soccer Club Chief with Laundering Drug Money” Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-honduras-soccer-crime> idUSKCN0S125620151007

¹⁵ Dudley, S and Lohmuller, L. (2013) “Docs Reveal CIA-Guadalajara Link, Not Conspiracy” Insight Crime. <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/the-death-of-camarena-and-the-real-cia-guadalajara-cartel-link>

¹⁶ Insight Crime (2015) “MS13” Profile, <http://www.insightcrime.org/el-salvador-organized-crime-news/mara-salvatrucha-ms-13-profile>

¹⁷ Stone, H. (2012) “With Extradition Law, Honduras Outsources Justice to US” <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/with-extradition-law-honduras-outsources-justice-to-us>

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- ¹⁸ Global Affairs Canada (11/09/2016) “Honduras.” <http://www.international.gc.ca/development-developpement/countries-pays/honduras.aspx?lang=eng>.
- ¹⁹ Jiminez, M (16/08/2016) “Honduran activist wants Trudeau to pressure Canadian mining companies on human rights abuses” The Toronto Star. <https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2016/08/16/honduran-activist-wants-trudeau-to-pressure-canadian-mining-companies-on-human-rights-abuses.html>
- ²⁰ Muggah, R and Burt, G. (25/05/2016) “Deportations are helping make Honduras one of the world’s most violent countries” The Hill Times, CGAI. <http://www.cgai.ca/opedmay252016b>
- ²¹ *ibid.*
- ²² These countries share borders with Honduras, often referred to as the “northern triangle”, international policies and donors target them together. These three countries are the transit area for the transnational drug trade from South America to North America, either directly or through the Carribean. the murder capital of Honduras in 2014 was San Sula Pedro, a border town with Guatemala.
- ²³ Map of murders in Honduras for 2014. Map source: SINIT-SEPLAN
- ²⁴ See Appendix 4 Honduras HDI Comparison of Honduras’ Human Development Indicator Scores
- ²⁵ Council on Hemispheric Affairs (2014) “Human Rights Violations in Honduras: Land Seizures, Peasants’ Repression, and the Struggle for Democracy on the ground”. <http://www.coha.org/human-rights-violations-in-honduras-land-grabs-peasants-repression-and-big-companies/>
- ²⁶ Center for Constitutional Rights (2010) “Wikileaks- Cable from US Government Analyzes Honduras Coup”, Source: Embassy Tegucigalpa. <https://ccrjustice.org/wikileaks-cable-us-government-analyzes-honduras-coup#>
- ²⁷ This list is published on a blog, the original list appeared in an El Libertador editorial, a daily Honduran newspaper, which has since been deleted. Bricker, K (translator) (21/09/2009) “The Golpistas” The Honduran Resistance, <https://hondurasoye.wordpress.com/the-golpistas/>
- ²⁸ Using World Bank Data, Polity IV, Freedom House, and World Development Indicators. See Appendix.
- ²⁹ Freedom House (2016) “Freedom in the World 2016: Report for Honduras.” <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/honduras>.
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