What makes basic logical laws such as modus ponens correct? How are we justified in employing them? In this presentation, I will review a number of classical proposals related to these questions, such as meaning-based approaches, reliabilism, entitlement approaches, communitarianism, as well as the ‘no theory’ standpoint. I will argue that none of them, as such, seems to succeed in explaining the epistemology of basic logical laws. However, they also all capture something correct about the nature of these laws and about our cognitive relationship to them. What we need – or so I contend – is a fresh perspective on the matter, one that could perhaps bear the prospect of unifying the different characteristics associated with basic logical laws. Aristotle affords such a ‘fresh’ perspective in book Gamma of the *Metaphysics* and in his *Posterior Analytics*. Some key remarks of Wittgenstein also point to a similar direction. Accordingly, the objective of the presentation is to examine what Aristotle and Wittgenstein could teach us concerning the epistemology of basic logical laws in the light of the contemporary approaches.