“Black against black, blood against blood”¹
How International Complicity Incubated Genocidal Violence in Rwanda

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Colonialism acts as an incubator of genocidal violence due to factors such as severe human rights violations and political oppression marked by Western capitalism and neocolonialism. Traces of colonial ideologies are found in the approaches or discourses of organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. The criticisms of acclaimed theorists such as Gérard Prunier and Frantz Fanon identify origins of genocidal violence within colonial discourse, and so the application of colonial ideologies in international organizations can be examined while aligning a specific focus on the hypocrisy of the West in its attitude towards global violence. To understand the international community’s role in the Rwandan genocide, factors such as Rwanda’s colonial and post-colonial history, the role of UN ambassadors and imperial countries such as France and their investment in Hutu extremism, and the complicity of

¹ A quotation taken from the poem, “Blood of Rwanda” written by the poet: Ms. Freda Denis-Cooper: “Children hand in hand, Hutu and Tutsi scatter like cockroaches and killed just like that, as if they were. Separate as if unequal. Separate as if... Black against black, blood against blood. No help from within, no help without. U.N. rescue missions abandon millions left to die. Taking whites only, only leaving behind weapons of mass black destruction. Here are the weapons of mass destruction. The blood of her people is on our hands. The blood of Rwanda is yet on our hands.” In particular, the quoted line illuminates the Western imperial perception of the identity politics in post-colonial Rwanda.

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international organizations should be examined. From the examination of these factors it becomes clear that Western capitalism, liberalism, and racism – the unyielding forces of colonialism – do indeed facilitate global violence and incubated the violence in the Rwandan genocide.

Keywords: KEYWORDS

Things that love night
Love not such nights as these. The wrathful skies
Gallow the very wanderers of the dark
And make them keep their caves. Since I was man,
Such sheets of fire, such bursts of horrid thunder,
Such groans of roaring wind and rain, I never
Remember to have heard. Man’s nature cannot carry
Th’ affliction nor the fear.
— William Shakespeare, King Lear

Introduction

Nazi hunter Simon Wiesenthal once said that genocide is the result of “too much power in too few hands” (Ayer and Chicoine, 1998, p. 62). Within a deadly one-hundred-day period in 1994, Rwanda experienced epidemic levels of political violence with a murder rate exceeding that of the Holocaust (Barnett, 2002, p. 1). Following the assassination of the Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana on April 6, 1994, a Hutu whose killer’s identity is unknown and a matter of much controversy, the Rwandan extremist government ordered the Hutu majority to destroy the Tutsi minority (Barnett, 2002, p. 1). Human Rights Watch reports describe various ugly scenes: “the dead body of a little girl, otherwise intact, had been flattened by passing vehicles to the thinness of cardboard in front of the church steps; […] on a nearby hill, a small red sweater held together the ribcage of a decapitated child” (Human Rights Watch, 1999, para. 6). Skulls and bones, twisted bodies, and pieces of human flesh were scattered along the streets. Genocidal violence is intimately linked with colonial practices of economic control and cultural exploitation. In the
neocolonial context of the Rwandan genocide, the death of roughly eight hundred thousand Rwandans must be viewed as an awful failure of the international community to respond to a humanitarian crisis in a poor African country (Barnett, 2002, p.1). This inherent complicity reflects the West’s selectiveness with its power: in their eyes, some countries are worth saving, while others are not. What is then left is a disturbing and depraved tragedy that forces one to consider the foundation of Western power and morality in a new light.

Colonialism’s Legacy: The Myths and Truths of Rwandan Society

Nearly as tragic as the Rwandan genocide is the international community’s reaction to it. The lack of political action towards the genocide by international powers reveals that the Rwandan genocide is not only about the capacity of human murder; it is also about the apathy of those nations which had the ethical responsibility and economic ability to prevent that violence, yet chose not to do so. To evaluate the weight of this matter adequately, the Rwandan genocide needs to be examined within colonial discourse. Andrew Wallis (2006) argues how Belgian colonisation had a “devastating effect” on the Rwandans: “…until 1880 [Rwanda] was ruled by a king (Mwami), with the help of a village hierarchy and ancestral tradition, [but] was split apart 100 years later by a ‘modern’ world in pursuit of geo-strategic, economic and political ambitions” (p. 9). It is precisely these “geo-strategic, economic, and political ambitions” that need to be explored in order to reflect on the imperial dynamics and colonial culture that precipitated the Rwandan genocide.

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3 It should be noted that other critics suggest that precolonial political formation in Rwanda was more complicated in nature. David Newbury (2009), for example, writes that precolonial Rwanda included a variety of local ecologies, physical stocks, and political units. He claims that the historical reality of Rwanda exceeds the view that race, culture, and power were all interconnected (p. 284).
During their colonial tenure, the Germans and Belgians ruled Rwanda indirectly through Tutsi monarchs and their chiefs. As Gérard Prunier (1995) argues, the presence of the German colonizers was “structurally essential since it inaugurated a colonial policy of indirect rule” (p. 25). The European colonizers exacerbated simmering ethnic tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi by redefining the distinctions between them according to the Hamitic hypothesis: a racial myth constructed by anthropologists that can be dated back to Judaic and Christian myths (Mamdani, 2001, p. 80). The hypothesis posited that the Hutus were racially inferior agriculturalists who had been dominated by the innately superior Tutsi Hamites, who “were actually Caucasians under black skin” (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 81 and 82). Applied to the Rwandans by the Belgians, the hypothesis stated that the Tutsi were ancient “elongated East Africans” who had migrated to Rwanda from southern Ethiopia (Mamdani, 2001, 47). Racist ideologies imported by colonialism had catastrophic effects on Rwanda; the placement of the Hutu and Tutsi on an inferior and superior axis, respectfully, exacerbated existing ethnic tensions and catalyzed the ensuing political disorder. In his book When Victims Become Killers, Mahmood Mamdani (2001) argues that the racial distinctions fabricated by the colonizers explain the motivation of those who engineered the genocide. He reminds us that, “whereas ethnicized Tutsi existed before colonialism, the racialized Hamites were creatures of colonialism” (p. 231). Similarly, Prunier (1995) argues:

If we combine these subjective feelings with objective political and administrative decisions of the colonial authorities favouring one group over the other, we can begin to see how [this manufactured] a very dangerous social bomb … (p. 9)

Since indirect rule required identifying indigenous authorities, the Belgian administration registered all of the population in the 1930s and issued identity cards that designated each individual’s ethnicity (Twagilimana, 2016, p. 32). This and other policies effec-
tively eliminated the flexibility in Rwanda’s ethnic structure, making it incredibly difficult for Hutu to become Tutsi just at a time when being Tutsi was particularly advantageous (Prunier, 1995, p. 26-27). A huge gap between the ethnic groups was produced as educational, economic, and employment opportunities were reserved for the Tutsis. (Prunier, 1995, p. 33).

Emblematic of imperial racial theorizing, this distinction of civilization was marked by supposed physical differences, with the taller, allegedly more refined Tutsis destined to rule. Prunier (1995) describes the nineteenth-century Europeans as “racially-obsessed” (p.6), and contends that they built “a variety of hazardous hypotheses on their […] ‘indubitable’ origins” (p.7). Resembling from the premises of Social Darwinism, and because of the view that the Tutsi and Hutu had separate origins, the Tutsi were viewed to resemble Europeans, as they became civilized under African conditions (Magnarella, 2000, p.10 and Mamdani, 2001, p. 47). The Tutsi, through this reconstruction, were posited as having a civilizing, Caucasian influence among the thick-lipped, indigenous Hutu. According to Matthias Bjørnlund (2004), the Hamitic Myth facilitated the dehumanization of the Hutu and thereby crystallised the “genocidal mentality” – the ideological and mental processes that facilitate genocidal impulses (pp. 143 and 156). Mamdani (2001) explains how the Hamitic hypothesis had uniquely racial connotations in Rwanda: “Only in Rwanda and Burundi did the Hamitic hypothesis become the basis of a series of institutional changes that fixed the Tutsi as a race in their relationship to the colonial state” (p. 35). Buried under the weight of colonial initiative, the Hutu and Tutsi were continually subject to civil hostility. As Gérard Prunier (1995) reminds us, “although Rwanda was definitely not a land of peace and bucolic harmony before the arrival of the Europeans, there is no trace in its pre-colonial history of systematic violence between Tutsi and Hutu as such” (p. 39). Therefore, it is through the reconstructed reality defined by racial myths by the European colonizers that caused for the
Rwandans what Prunier (1995) compares to an unpredictable time-bomb (p. 39). Consequently, the Belgians pursued to fix these racial categories and interpellate the Rwandans into their genocidal ideology and colonial disposition. As Adam Jones (2006) argues, the selection of the Tutsis as colonial favourites reflects how it is typically easier for colonizers to secure the loyalty of a minority, which is manipulated to believe that its survival depends on bonds with the imperial authority (p. 349). Sixty subsequent years of such ruinous constructions inflated the power dynamics between the Hutu and Tutsi entirely: the Tutsi became increasingly entitled to power, while the Hutu suffered an aggressively sour inferiority complex. Given this colonial context of Rwanda, one can reasonably conclude that the Rwandan genocide was not just another cycle of ethnic violence or an uncontainable outbreak of insanity. The victims of the Rwandan genocide were battered because of the unequal distribution of economic and political power granted to them by the Belgian colonisers.

**Anti-Colonial Violence in Rwanda**

But why violence? It is clear that the situation in Rwanda was marked by unconceivable fear and ferocity. To an outside viewer, the violence involved in the Rwandan genocide can cause one to conclude that the genocide was a single-layered, domestic instance of Rwandans fighting for ethnic power and superiority. But this conclusion would be erroneous. General Roméo Dallaire—General in the Canadian Armed Forces serving under the UN during the genocide—has said: “My force was standing knee-deep in mutilated bodies, surrounded by guttural moans of dying people, looking into the eyes of children bleeding to death with their wounds burning in the sun and being invaded by maggots and flies” (as cited in Melvern, 2000, p. 197). In this way, the targeted Tutsis were left powerless and immobilized as a result of racist ideologies imported from colonialism.
as imperial powers such as the UN failed to acknowledge the geno-
cide and intervene on moral grounds. The psychological conse-
quences of these ideologies are enduringly detrimental to one’s well-
being. In Jean Hatzfeld’s (2005) insightful book, Into the Quick of
Life, Francine, a young Tutsi woman who saw her family being
slashed to death, explains how the Rwandan genocide has con-
demned her to a life of guilt, regret, and fear:

When you have lived through a waking nightmare for real, you
can no longer sort your day thoughts from your night ones as before.
Ever since the genocide I have felt pursued day and night. In bed, I
turn away from the shadows; on the road, I look back at the figures
that follow me. I am afraid for my child each time my eyes meet
those of a stranger’s … I feel a sort of shame to have to spend a life-
time feeling hunted, simply for what I am. (p. 25)

Individuals blocked from power, or those at risk of being
blocked, seek for themselves new forms of recognition to gain access
to power and self-restoration. Violence as a means of psychological
liberation for the colonised subject is supported by Fanon (1963),
who writes: “At the individual level, violence is a cleansing force. It
rids the colonised of their inferiority complex, of their passive and
despairing attitude. It emboldens them, and restores their self-
confidence” (p. 51). Following Fanon’s logic, colonial ideologies
such as white supremacy and racism contribute to instances of vio-
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trol and dignity.

Colonial ideologies such as white supremacy and racism con-
tribute to instances of violence as the colonized populations seek to
restore their sense of control and dignity. The coupling of ethnicity
and violence, Barnett (2004) argues, is due largely to a colonization
process that introduced myths of a superior race coming from the
north to conquer an inferior native population, which in general
terms led to feelings of entitlement and superiority among the Tutsis
and a massive inferiority complex among the majority Hutu (51).
Accordingly, decolonization provided the Hutus with the first chance to pursue power and take revenge on the Tutsis. In what came to be known as the “Hutu Revolution,” from 1959 to 1961, a series of violent events shook Rwanda and resulted in the reduction of Tutsi political power (Barnett, 2004, p. 53). The Revolution was responded to by the UN as they switched to favouring the Hutus’ side once it became clear that a Hutu-dominated political party would win the 1961 election, and their decision to set 1962 as the year for Rwandan independence, which it achieved on July 1st that year (Barnett, 2004, p. 52). Through the escalation of the inflated Tutsi cultural ego and aggressively resentful inferiority complex of the Hutu, the Tutsi eventually developed a reputation as the evil “other” once they lost the election, despite being cast as the superior group originally (Gibson, 2003, p. 509). Consequently, the authoritarian and firmly regulated character of the political regime installed by the country’s post-independence rulers, including the inferior status it assigned to Tutsis, fuelled a Tutsi-led rebel movement (Jones, 2006, p. 348). From the 1960s until 1994, the nativist ideology promoted by the Hutu ruling elite was that the Tutsi were foreign invaders and were marked as colonizers who could not be reasonably considered as citizens, meaning that the Hutu were the only legitimate inhabitants of Rwanda (Magnarella, 2000, p. 26). Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed (2011) validates this point when he writes, “Through this process of ideological radicalization, violence against an especially defined group becomes legitimated as a rational strategy to secure social stability” (p. 25). The Hutu population demanded majority rule and considered the trope of democracy to be a “convenient device” to justify their bid for power (Barnett, 2004, pp. 51-52). As a result, a Hutu-dominated government was not only legitimate but also “ontologically democratic” (Prunier, 1995, p. 80). This political ideology validated the persecution of the Tutsi and the autocratic rule of the Hutu elite. The assumption of power by the Hutu in postcolonial Rwanda saw sporadic massacres and persecu-
tions of Tutsi throughout the country. As Prunier (1995) argues, Belgian authorities reversed allegiances and now expressed “extreme partiality” for the Hutu, even letting their militants burn Tutsi houses (p. 49). Further, starting around the early 1960s, the colonial government began to replace most of the Tutsi chiefs with new Hutu ones, thereby “organizing the persecution of the Tutsi on the hills they now controlled” (Prunier, 1995, p. 51). As the Hutus controlled political power, the newly elected President Kayibanda was “more than willing to use ethnic terror and sow divisions to maintain his rule” (Barnett, 2004, p. 52). In this way, the racist ideologies imported by colonialism cultivated a Rwandan culture that had internalized such ruining perceptions towards mankind by viewing violence as the only fitting means of obtaining social and individual refuge.

Frantz Fanon’s (1963) paradigm of violence views violence as a legitimate means of overthrowing ingrained inequalities embodied in the institutionalised domination of the oppressor. He argues, “For [the colonised man] [...] colonization and decolonization are simply a question of relative strength. The exploited man sees that his liberation implies the use of all means, and that of force first and foremost” (p. 60). Accordingly, Fanon extols the virtues of violence as a means for colonial subjects to achieve political and psychological liberation. Following this paradigm, the Hutu-extremists that conducted the violence in the Rwandan genocide were thereby engaged in victim-on-victim violence in efforts to keep whatever power they felt they could retain. In the context of Fanon’s theory of violence, the Rwandan victims of colonization directed their internalized rage at each other instead of their European oppressors in their attempts to retain their individual power. In the preface to Fanon’s *Wretched of the Earth*, Jean-Paul Sartre (1963) explains that the issue of victim-on-victim violence is a result of the internalized rage of colonized victims. He argues:
This repressed rage, never managing to explode, goes round in circles and wreaks havoc on the oppressed themselves. In order to rid themselves of it they end up massacring each other, tribes battle one against the other since they cannot confront the real enemy—and you can count on colonial policy to fuel rivalries. (pp. lii-liii)

This displaced rage is exemplified in some written accounts of the killers. One killer in the Rwandan genocide, Pio, shares his dissociative experience with murder:

[I]t is as if I had let another individual take on my own living appearance, and the habits of my heart, without a single pang in my soul. This killer was indeed me, [...] but he is a stranger to me in his ferocity. I admit and recognize my obedience at that time, my victims, my fault, but I fail to recognize the wickedness of the one who raced through the marshes on my legs, carrying my machete. That wickedness seems to belong to another self with a heavy heart. (Hatzfeld, 2003, p. 48)

While the disassociation described in this passage does not excuse the fact that Pio was a murderer in the Rwandan genocide, it does reveal the psychological complexity that informs the victim-on-victim violence explained by Sartre that was experienced by some of the Hutu extremists as they inherited the tyrannical forces of colonialism. This psychological complexity is reflected in what Bjørnlund (2004) calls the “healing-killing paradox,” which he says is connected to the ideological creation of a genocidal mentality (p. 146). The paradox explains how “killing becomes a prerequisite for healing”, whereby destroying members of a group that is perceived as being responsible for a societal illness will save or cure the perpetrator group (Bjørnlund, 2004, p. 146). As Bjørnlund (2004) importantly notes, “this ‘paradox’ is [...] part of a deliberate strategy initiated by the societal elite: [...] threats and indoctrination are used on a collective level” (p. 164) In this way, the internalization of colonial ideologies rendered the violence of the Rwandan genocide as utterly political—not ethnic. Put simply, the Rwandan genocide was not just
a result of national conditions; it was a complex fabrication of colonial and neocolonial ideologies that were fostered predominantly by the countries in power.

**Connections between Colonialism and Theories of Anti-Colonial Violence**

Fanon’s theories on violence can be compared with the writings of other social theorists in order to clarify the connections between colonialism and violence and the role of this connection in the Rwandan genocide. Chinese Marxist and theorist Mao Tse-tung provides an instrumental justification of violence as a legitimizing force in revolutionary struggles. Tse-tung’s military writings are based on his own experiences of guerilla warfare against the Japanese when he successfully led the Chinese Communist Party to victory over the Chinese Nationalists and Japanese in the 1940s. Tse-Tung (2013) has famously proclaimed that “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun” (p. 12). Regarding his position in the war, Tse-Tung (2013) has said: “We desire peace. However, if imperialism insists on fighting a war, we will have no alternative but to take the firm resolution to fight to the finish before going ahead with our construction” (p. 66). Otto von Bismarck, the man credited with the unification of Germany in the 19th century is recorded as saying that, “[t]he great questions of the day will not be settled by means of speeches and the resolutions of majorities […] – but by blood and iron” (as cited in Taylor, 2005, p. 112). Therefore, just as Fanon discusses the need for various guerilla operations in Africa such as the FLN in Algeria, Tse-tung views violence as an essential component in any revolutionary struggle. He believes that “war can only be abolished through war, and in order to get rid of the gun it is necessary to take up the gun” (p. 63). For Tse-tung (2013), non-violent resolutions are not an option for revolutionary struggles since they would deprive a revolutionary movement of its principal means of legiti-
macy (p. 94). For Herman Marcuse, violence is creative if it comes from below, from the “oppressed” (as cited in Burton, 1977, p. 15). As he argues, violence functions as a necessity to break political disorder, which was necessary for psychological freedom. From the perspective of the colonized victim, psychological problems must be met by political action (as cited in Burton, 1977, p. 15). Hannah Arendt (1970) elaborates on this point as she argues that the notion of violence and creativity figuring in the “rebellious state of mind” can be traced back to Marxian and Nietzschean moral-political philosophies (p. 74). She writes: “To see the productivity of society in the image of life’s ‘creativity’ is at least as old as Marx, [and] to believe in violence as a life-promoting force is at least as old as Nietzsche” (p. 74). Accordingly, then, when Fanon (1963) speaks of the “creative frenzy” present in the mobilized violent actions of the colonised, he refers to how violence gives power a new dynamism and attempts to challenge the complications enforced by colonialism (p. 52).

Following Rwandan independence, postcolonial state violence became a fundamental feature of Rwanda’s politics. Importantly, as Barnett (2004) points out, “Although popular images of ‘tribal’ and ‘ethnic’ politics in Africa suggest a never-ending cycle of violence and warfare, the Hutus and Tutsis managed to exist relatively free of mass violence—until colonialism” (p. 51). During colonialism, the Hutus were verbally and materially belittled and oppressed, which produced a “reality” of Tutsi superiority and Hutu inferiority (Barnett, 2004, p. 51). After Rwandan independence, however, the Tutsi were treated by Present Kayibanda and President Habyarimana as colonizers; the mythologies that had legitimated and privileged Tutsi rule inverted “like a photographic negative” (Barnett, RPF2004, p. 53). As stated in a 1961 UN Trusteeship Council report: “The developments of these last 18 months have brought about the racial dictatorship of one party. [...] An oppressive system has been replaced by another one. [...] It is quite possible that some day we will wit-
ness violent reactions against Tutsi” (as cited in Melvern, 2000, p. 17). In this way, violence from an oppressed and racialized minority is orchestrated by the tyrannical ideologies and politics enforced by colonialism, which demanded for an “ethnically pure Rwanda” (Barnett, 2004, p. 54). In the build-up to the genocide, when the British, U.S. and Ugandans supported the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which was largely comprised of children of Rwandan Tutsis who fled the violence perpetuated by Hutu militias in the late 1950s to neighbouring countries such as Uganda, had invaded Rwanda in 1990 and an uneasy truce was declared, Hutu nationalists and militants revived these narratives. Anti-Tutsi resentment was fuelled during the war between the RPF and Rwandan government as the RPF offensive exacerbated ethnic divisions and set the stage for further radicalization of politics (Melvern, 2000, p. 34).

**The Inheritance of Colonial Ideologies**

Some scholars argue that there were other contributing factors to the simmering unrest. In his analysis of the Rwandan genocide, Paul J. Magnarella (2000) says that the roles of the UN Secretariat and Security Council “had little impact on the conditions endemic to Rwanda that were primarily responsible for the periodic massacres and great tragedy of 1994” (p. 27). In his analysis, the increasing occurrence of malnutrition, hunger, and periodic famine incubated the Rwandan genocide as the Hutu extremists chose to respond to these conditions by eliminating the Tutsi portion of the population (2000, p. 27). He argues that in addition to relieving the fear of the alleged evil Tutsi, eradication of the Tutsi population also secured physical benefits such as land, cattle, and loot (2000, p. 26). However, while Rwanda’s economy was engendered by macro-political forces and economic shortages, Rwanda’s scarcity of land and large population did not function as the primary impetus for the genocide. As Prunier (1995) writes, “Ideas and myths can kill, and their manipulation by
elite leaders for their own material benefit does not change the fact that in order to operate they first have to be implanted in the souls of men” (p. 40). The ideologies that underpinned the Rwandan genocide were crafted by the Belgian colonisers— and colonialism in Africa aligned with European racial ideologies. Characterized by Western epistemology, the politics that engender genocide and the Orientalist concept of “Othering” (McLeod, 2010, p. 49) continue to be practised by current Western powers that rationalize violence as a means to attain economic and political supremacy. It becomes clear that within this historical framework and the neocolonial context of the Rwandan genocide that many Hutus were oppressed by colonial ideologies, and practices of discrimination in the colonial period up to the 1950s, when the Belgians tried to reverse its previous support to Tutsi elites which in turn led to violence. The perspectives of many Rwandans reflected the conditions described by Fanon: as the Hutu’s innate freedom was threatened by the racially “superior” Tutsi, violent eradication of the racial oppressor was the only viable resolution. According to Fanon (1963), anticolonial violence is the formation of a national, collective self; however, its instrumental application is to reinforce a national identity, not subvert it: “The mobilization of the masses […] introduces into each man’s consciousness the ideas of a common cause, of a national destiny …” (pp. 92-93). Imperialism destroyed nationalism and rather encouraged nativism in Rwanda; the reinforcement of racial distinctions by the Belgian colonizers eliminated any potential for a positive “national destiny.” The brutal perversion of Fanon’s anti-colonial paradigm can then be attributed to the internationalization of the racial rhetoric fabricated by the Belgians; it was instrumental to the genocidal practices in Rwanda.
The Catholic Church

It should be noted that in addition to its colonial dimensions, the Rwandan genocide was influenced by a number of Christian aspects (Bjørnlund et al., 2004, p. 159). As Bjørnlund (2004) explains, in the Rwandan genocide, both the killers and victims were Christian, despite the fact that most genocides involve members of one religious group attempting to eliminate the other (p. 159). As Christophe Kougniazondé argues, “…religious influence […] constituted the supernatural rampart without which the colonial brutality against, and de-humanization of the Rwandese people could not have reached its goal without any major social explosions against the colonial regime” (as cited in Bjørnlund et al., 2004, p. 169).

Much like the international community, the Catholic Church failed to respond to the racism, oppression, and massacres of the genocide, which, as Bjørnlund (2004) argues, renders them as “legitimating these crimes, abandoning the victims, and even acting as an accomplice in the genocide” (p. 177).

As an institution of power with a supposedly “moral agenda” (Bjørnlund, 2004, p. 176), the Catholic Church contributed to the creation of a genocidal mentality through the ways in which it aimed to make Rwanda a Christian country. Prunier (1995) argues that the Catholic Church also structured the educational system to favour the Tutsis. He writes that “since the Tutsi were the ‘natural-born chiefs’ they had to be given priority in education so that the church could enhance its control over the future elite of the country” (p. 33, author’s italics). As Ian Linden (1977) argues in his study of church-state relations in colonial Rwanda, the missionaries of the Catholic Church cultivated a consciousness that raised ethnic tensions between Hutu and Tutsi sharply as the missionaries were enchanted by the Tutsi-rulers (p. 91). Further, Bjørnlund (2004) argues that, “In its struggle to Christianize Rwanda, [the Catholic Church] allied itself firstly with the colonial powers, and, through the creation and institutionalization of the racist and oppressive Hamitic
Myth, with the Tutsis” (177). Thus, the Catholic Church was part of the government that helped create and institutionalize the Hamitic Myth that was utilized by the Hutu extremists in the genocide’s execution (Bjørnlund, 2004, p. 176). In this way, through their implicit endorsement of the Hamitic hypothesis and relationship with colonial powers, the Catholic Church is complicit in setting up the divisions on which the genocide was premised.

The Complicity of the UN and Some Members of the Security Council

The Rwandan genocide reveals the true forces that undergird neocolonialism: capitalism, imperialism, and racism. Neocolonialism is when a power indirectly exercises its control over other regions or people through economic and political policies, also described as “a new form of colonialism” (Basu, 2012, p. 105). In the Rwandan genocide, neocolonialism achieved through neoliberalism what colonialism achieved through physical force and discourse. Notably, Western neocolonial ideas are not only adopted by Western European States but are also found amongst the UN Security Council’s five permanent members (France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the People’s Republic of China). The composition of the Security Council, however, requires attention; if the Council is to properly fulfill its objective of upholding international peace and security, it must remain attentive to all regions of the world rather than those of its own choice. In the case of the Rwandan genocide, the UN’s complicity is demonstrated through their decided ignorance of the genocide. As Colin Keating, the UN ambassador for New Zealand with a non-permanent seat on the Council, has said: “We only dimly perceived the steady deterioration in the Rwandan … situation. […] The deeper and more dangerous problem of a monumental threat to human life was ignored” (as cited in Melvern, 2000, p. 130). On October 5, 1993, the Security
Council passed Resolution 872, mandating the creation of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). The United States only wanted a “symbolic presence” in Rwanda and demanded that any operation should not exceed the cost of $10 million per month (Melvern, 2000, p. 93). When the mission for Rwanda was devised, the United States argued for a reduction in the role of peacekeepers in order to minimize costs, and, with the support of Russia and the UK, substantially diluted the peacekeeping provisions of the Arusha Accords—a comprehensive agreement that promised political, military, and constitutional reform in Rwanda (Melvern, 2000, pp. 60 and 93).

Evidently, international powers could have safely prevented the Rwandan genocide before the genocide’s objectives were fulfilled (Barnett, 2004, p. 1). The problem, as Carol Off (2000) points out, is that the word “genocide” carries legal obligations (p. 72). To formally recognize what was actually happening meant that all countries who had signed the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 were obligated by international law to act upon it; however, no country was interested in assuming that responsibility. Thus, one can argue that the UN operates predominantly on self-interest as it denied its legal obligation to intervene in Rwanda and this is another angle to what can be called its complicity. Upon the early outbreak of the genocide, there were twenty-five hundred United Nations peacekeepers in Rwanda, and soon after the killing began, the UN’s force commander, Canadian General Roméo Dallaire, appealed for a well-resourced body of troops to cease the massacre (Barnett, 2004, p. 2). However, on April 21, the UN backed Resolution 912 to reduce Dallaire’s UNAMIR force by 90 per cent to a mere 270 peacekeepers, weakened the UNAMIR so much that it would be nearly unmanageable for it to give humanitarian support to victims or assist those who required UN protection (Wallis, 2006, p. 104)
The complicity of the UN demonstrates how predatory capitalism and ethnocentrism are given more privilege than international compassion. Klaus J. Dodds (2005) describes the “absence of an effective United Nations” as “lamentable” (p. 176). Linda Melvern (2004) argues how the UN was obligated to fulfil its peacekeeping role in the Rwandan genocide. She states: “As permanent members of the UN Security Council, the UK and the US could have taken action in accordance with the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, a legally binding treaty” (p. 272). Samantha Power (2002) extends this notion of international complicity when she argues that, “When they ignored genocide around the world, U.S. officials certainly did not intend to give the perpetrators the go-ahead. But since at least some killers thought they were doing the world a favor by ‘cleansing’ the ‘undesirables,’ they likely interpreted silence as consent or even support” (p. 507). Thus, Magnarella’s argument that the genocide was precipitated largely by land scarcity and poverty overlooks the dominant ideology of the “cleansing” of the “undesirables” – an ideology inherited from European colonialism that incubated the Rwandan genocide far more substantially than its pre-existing economic and political climate.

Following the Cold War, states filled into the UN to recite the rights that they believed bound them as a single global community: human rights, liberalism, peaceful settlement of disputes, freedom, progress, development—rights that frequently populate General Assembly addresses and UN documents (Barnett 2004, 25). However, despite these transcendental values, Western epistemology is typically characterized by imperialistic motives. The UN’s shameful complicity with the violence in Rwanda is reflected in the statements of leaders of member states such as President Francois Mitterrand, who reportedly confided to a colleague that, “‘in countries like [Rwanda], genocide is not very important’” (Barnett, 2004, p. 171). But the UN is more than an accumulation of individual opinions; it is also the
official division of the world’s humane values, or, as Barnett (2004) puts it, “[The UN is] an expression of the international community” (p. 175). Yet, when the UN’s action towards the Rwanda genocide is examined, the humanitarian values by which they claim to abide seem remarkably absent.

When General Roméo Dallaire travelled to New York in 1993, he discovered that there was no paperwork available in the Secretariat about the political and military situation in Rwanda, even though UN officials had attended the negotiations (Melvern, 2000, pp. 95-96). Some critics argue that it was not the responsibility of the UN to intervene in the Rwandan genocide. Some UN officials defended that even if they could not stop the murders in Rwanda, at least the culprits should not believe that they would be free of punishment. Objectively, that is a credible standpoint, but one that is difficult to genuinely accept given the complicity of leading authority figures belonging to the institution that was supposedly trying to prevent Rwanda’s dreadful fate. Notably, the UN has defended its accused indifference to the Rwandan genocide by concluding that, “If the UN was effective only under conditions of stability, then it is not obligated to become embroiled in humanitarian nightmares. […] Acting responsibly […] included a duty to safeguard the organization’s health. It was Rwanda’s misfortune to be the site of the first explicit applications of these rules” (Barnett, 2004, p. 176). However, the organization’s health is dependent on its expression of global concern for crimes against humanity, as the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has said: “Our job is to intervene; to prevent conflict where we can, to put a stop to it when it has broken out, or – when neither of those things is possible – at least to contain it and prevent it from spreading” (Barnett, 2004, p. 170). Philip Spencer (2013) acknowledges the inherent hypocrisy in thinking that neoliberal institutions such as the UN are a support system that rescues genocide victims, since Western imperialism was essentially responsible for producing the inevitability of the genocide (p. 612). The
connection between the UN’s complicity and Western imperialism asserted by Spencer is articulated through the way in which imperialism sets up the structure for violence. Indeed, the Hutus were driven to commit such physical acts of violence in the Rwandan genocide as a result of deeply entrenched humiliation that was fostered by colonialism. The logic of violence triggered by imperialist occupation inevitably continues to occur as previously oppressed groups turn upon those who were either their colonial oppressors or, in the case of the Rwandan genocide, were deemed wrongly by the colonizers to be their superiors. Surely, the logic of imperialism greatly informed the UN’s attitudes towards intervention in Rwanda. The racist ideologies embraced by imperialism certainly dictated the Council’s decisions towards intervening in the genocide as they deliberately demonstrated ignorance towards its development.

Ironically, Prime Minister Balladur defended France’s stance towards backing Resolution 912—an agreement that involved the reduction in the size of an already insufficiently equipped UN peacekeeping force—on the grounds that his country could not take an initiative to send troops to Rwanda as this would seem to come across as a “colonial operation” (Wallis, 2006, p. 104). However, France’s role in the genocide has been perceived as scandalous. As Melvern (2000) writes:

Research undertaken by the arms division of Human Rights Watch established that on five occasions in May and June 1994 weapons were delivered to the Rwandan government army through neighbouring Goma, and that these arms came from the French government or French companies operating under government licence. (p. 206)

In his book Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France’s Role in the Rwandan Genocide, Andrew Wallis (2006) reveals how France was secretly providing military, financial and diplomatic support to the genocidaires throughout the genocide, as France was fearful that they would lose a client government with which it could perform
profitable business, and to also prevent the threat of having it replaced by Anglo-Saxons (p. 12). France’s pathological anxiety that French Africa, which often they included countries that had been colonized or administered by the Belgians, is under constant threat from Anglo-Saxon influence is what Wallis (2006) describes as “an area of policy that continues to unite socialist and Gaullist political groups and seems to override all other political, military, and strategic viewpoints and, in the case of Rwanda, human rights and morality as well” (p. 12). In his outraged critique of France’s involvement in the genocide, Wallis (2006) argues that the genocide was a methodically planned event: “Like all genocides, this one had been meticulously planned and organized up to two years in advance. It was not the work of ‘savages’ or ‘typical African intertribal warfare’ […]. It was a genocide that intelligent, professional, university educated people had masterminded” (p. 5). While French politicians described the violence as the work of gangsters, Wallis (2006) argues that French politicians and the military were collaborating with the Rwandan killers on a daily basis and that, in fact, the murders were a calculated occurrence (p. 55). In addition, new evidence highlights the complicity of French troops in training the Hutu-extremists to kill (Wallis, 2006, pp. 55-56). Prunier (1995) has compared France’s role to that of a person giving a bottle of brandy to an alcoholic, as Mitterrand and his military advisers were determined to get the best outcome for France by supporting a regime that had murdered a million of its people (p. 352).

President Clinton, on the other hand, attempted nearly every diplomatic manoeuvre to prevent the United States from being involved in a country in which, with or without genocide, the United States was not interested (Wallis, 2006, p. 210). Or, as Samantha Power (2002) puts it: “American leaders did not act because they did not want to” (p. 508). Of course, at the outbreak of the genocide, little attention was given to Rwanda and the safety of its citizens by the Western media. As Gil Courtemanche (2004) writes in his novel
a Sunday at the pool in Kigali, Western media continued to propagate the colonial narrative that the Rwandan genocide was purely the result of uncontrolled “tribal” rivalries. He writes:

[I]n its major international bulletin, CNN spent twenty seconds on the recurrence of ethnic problems in Rwanda, giving assurances, however, that foreign nationals were safe. Even the perspicacious BBC said little more. Radio-France Internationale talked about recurrent confrontations and ancestral tribalisms, wondering if Africans would ever be able to rid themselves of their ancient demons that kept provoking the most dreadful atrocities. (pp. 226-227)

Following this point, it must be noted that the United States did not even want to use the word “genocide” to characterize what was happening in Rwanda. Certainly, the vocabulary adopted by the UN in its approach towards the genocide exemplifies its selective attitude towards intervening in crimes against humanity. As Barnett notes, “the grammar for intervention was certainly available,” yet the UN decidedly avoided the use of the word “genocide” and instead used the term “ethnic cleansing” to describe the events in Rwanda (2004, p. 120). On Friday, April 29, 1994, twenty-three days after the genocide had broken out, the Security Council eventually addressed the possibility of genocide in Rwanda. The president of the Security Council at the time, Colin Keating, invoked the 1948 Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by proposing a presidential statement to recognize that genocide was happening (Melvern, 2000, p. 202). The United States’ reluctance to specifically use the word ‘genocide’ surrounding the Rwandan crisis indicates, according to Melvern (2004), that they were markedly aware that the disaster in Rwanda required a form of obligation to act towards its prevention (p. 272). Karel Kovanda, the Czech ambassador to the UN at the time, had previously confronted the Council with the word genocide, and claimed to be shocked that 80 per cent of the Council’s time had been spent deliberating withdrawing the peacekeepers in Rwanda, after which diplomats from the UK
and United States told him that “on no account was he to use such inflammatory language outside the Council. It was not helpful” (Melvern, 2000, p. 202). After the UN Security Council Presidential Statement draft was submitted, it became subject to vigorous objections (Melvern, 2000, p. 203). British ambassador David Hannay supposedly did not want the word ‘genocide’ to be used because the Council would be a ‘laughing stock’; of course, to classify the crisis as a genocide and not act on it would be perceived as ludicrous (Melvern, 2000, p. 203). After being drafted by the British, which Melvern (2000) condemns for their “mind-numbing ambiguity,” another statement was finally released, which, unsurprisingly, did not use the word genocide (p. 203).

Of course, the obvious refusal to use the word genocide reflects the UN’s utter awareness of a genocide actually occurring. For the UN to deliberately manipulate their statements as to avoid any immediate controversy, contradicts what the UN defines as ‘genocide.’ Regardless of the strategy chosen, the UN Convention defines genocide as an act “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group” (Jones, 2006, p. 13). Notably, “complicity in genocide” is listed under the punishable acts in Article III (Jones, 2006, p. 13). While the UN defends its lack of intervention through claiming it was satisfying the health of the organization at large, the UN’s complicity facilitated political violence in Rwanda through systemic racism and its favour of Western domination over poor countries. Arguably, given the UN’s failure to act, the indifference UN leaders showed towards the peacekeeping operation in Rwanda, including when the violence began, was a sign of racism.

Certainly, the international community demonstrated their complicity in the genocide through actions and decisions made outside of Rwanda. While in Kigali, General Roméo Dallaire (2004) witnessed upsetting examples of Western ‘assistance’:
I passed by an assembly point where French soldiers were loading expatriates into vehicles […] and as I wended my way through the crowd, I saw how aggressively the French were pushing black Rwandans seeking asylum out of the way. A sense of shame came over me. The whites, who had made their money in Rwanda and who had hired so many Rwandans to be their servants and labourers, were now abandoning them. Self-interest and self-preservation ruled. (p. 286)

Here, Dallaire’s account of the cruel treatment of innocent citizens speaks directly towards the French’s complicity and failure to act in humanitarian crises involving Africans. This failure to act is informed by the racist logic that dominates Western imperialism. In this manner, the Rwandan genocide is illustrative of how Africans are placed on a sub-human status—they are, according to the imperial eyes of the West, unworthy of being saved compared to their white ‘superiors.’

“Economic Terrorists”: The IMF and World Bank

As “economic terrorists from the perspective of developing nations” (Allen et al., 2011, p. 23), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) contributed to the Rwandan genocide on various levels. These organizations function on a predatory kind of capitalism connected to neocolonialism, which “implies a form of contemporary, economic imperialism wherein powerful nations behave like colonial powers […] [which] is likened to colonialism in a post-colonial world” (Basu, 2012, p. 105). As Fanon (1963) argues, “[c]olonialism and imperialism have not settled their debt to us once they have withdrawn their flag and their police from countries. For centuries the capitalists have behaved like real war criminals in the underdeveloped world” (p. 57). Neoliberal policies imposed by multilateral organizations facilitated genocidal violence in Rwanda through exacerbating existing gaps in power. Joseph Stiglitz (2003)
writes: “The IMF’s structural adjustment policies – the policies designed to help a country adjust to crises as well as to more persistent imbalances – led to hunger and riots in many countries; […] often the benefits went disproportionately to the better off, with those at the bottom facing even greater poverty” (p. xiv).

In 1988, the World Bank travelled to Rwanda to evaluate the country’s public expenditure plan (Chossudovsky, 1999, p. 115). Supposedly having the intentions of assisting Rwanda’s potential of achieving economic growth, the World Bank concluded that Rwanda’s economy would be reinvigorated by increasing levels of consumption through the upsurge of coffee exports if they depended on neoliberalist policies such as trade liberalisation, currency devaluation, and the privatization of state enterprises (Chossudovsky, 1999, p. 115). Unsurprisingly, after implementing these policies, Rwanda’s economy plummeted. The implementation of neoliberal measures resulted in the disarray of the state administrative apparatus with state enterprises being pushed into bankruptcy and the collapse of public services (Chossudovsky, 1999, p. 116). Furthermore, health and education crumbled under the impact of the IMF-imposed neoliberal practices, with the frequency of child malnutrition increasing by 21 percent in the year immediately after the espousal of the IMF programme (Chossudovsky, 1999, p. 116). In this way, despite their supposedly noble intentions, the IMF and World Bank exacerbated Rwanda’s economic hardship by promoting its hard core interpretation of neoliberal ideology. The imposition of comprehensive macro-economic reforms by World Bank and IMF exacerbated the already bubbling ethnic tensions. If the World Bank had not enforced policies that inevitably would weaken an already developing nation, the Rwandan population would have been less likely to sink into poverty, leading to its so-called “economic genocide” (Chossudovsky, 1999, p. 103). Therefore, while not entirely responsible, both the economic and political collapse of Rwanda caused by the imposition of the IMF and World Bank precipitated the genocide.
These are just a couple of the many examples of the genocidal consequences of imperialism.

**Conclusion**

A survivor who hid throughout the genocide once said, “When I came out, there were no birds. There was sunshine and the stench of death” (Law, 2013, p. 80). The stench of rotting bodies, the unusual absence of sound, and cadavers clogging the church halls not only assaulted the Rwandans’ senses, but also their quality of life. The scenes of the Rwandan genocide are scenes written from the darkest pages in human history. Africa, it seems, is the continent subject to the Western world’s paradoxical exploitation and neglect at the same time. Why do some conflicts matter, and others do not? As Canadian General Roméo Dallaire (2004) says, “We have fallen back on the yardstick of national self-interest to measure which portions of the planet we allow ourselves to be concerned about” (p. 517). Perhaps if the genocide started today, and Rwanda had an oil reserve the size of Iraq’s or Libya’s, the Rwandan genocide would be an entirely different tale. As Bonaventure Niyibizi, a Tutsi survivor of the Rwandan genocide has said, “You cannot count on the international community unless you’re rich, and we are not. […] We don’t have oil, so it doesn’t matter that we have blood, or that we are human beings” (as cited in Gourevitch, 1998, p. 315).

It is said that the Rwandan genocide is an instance of how the world falls into a cycle of violence (Thompson, 2007, p. 225). But I do not believe this to be true. Sixteen-year-old Rwandan Brenda Indekwe conveys this notion perfectly in her poem entitled “Silence”: a blank page with tiny writing at the bottom reading: “Whenever we keep silent about our history, experiences, and thoughts, we leave a blank page for anyone to write anything they wish” (Youth Literacy Organization, 2014, p. 26). This is the world we live in: the world that believes, or lets its people believe, that it truly had done its best.
Few knew or cared about the dreadful details of the Rwandan genocide while it was happening, and the UN leaders’ complicity and indifference speaks towards how the UN Security Council functions on racist and neoliberal ideologies. But as global citizens, it is our duty to educate others about the genocidal consequences of imperialism to inspire future world leaders to prevent such a wretched tragedy from ever happening again. The crimes of the international community need to be condemned. Their crimes were so calculated, so deliberate, and so deceiving. But the international community appears to be decidedly complacent with its moral ambiguity in response to modern genocides. While, indeed, the Hutu extremists conducted the physical acts of slaughter, the real culprits are those who displaced compassion and humanitarianism for their own personal and institutional interests. Or, as Fanon (1963) articulates, imperial powers that claim to be “strong on principles but abstain from issuing marching orders” (p. 21).

People do not kill for no reason. In 1994 and today, the UN and international community has maintained an image of promoting and fostering international peace and justice. It projects the notion that it will uphold humanitarian principles and value the protection of citizens; however, Rwanda was a different story.

References


