



# The philosophical method of Hebga

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The Hebga philosophy examines a set of seemingly special problems in the pleroma of the problems posed and reflexively handled in the roamings and polarities of philosophy in history. To the extent that Hebga's figure verifies a polymathic formation, one should refrain from misunderstanding the pre-requisites and other implications arising from the formative mold that directly or indirectly governs the development and treatment that Hebga reserves to the special problems that he decides to pose as the backbone of his work of thought.

However, far from challenging the choice of the special problems which concern Hebga, it seems more interesting and fruitful to question the overall approach underlying the Hebgaean research; hence the problem of relative method(s). In general, the philosophical method consists in thinking the essential elements of existence in a conceptual, coherent, problematic and critical way. This leads us to believe that the golden rule of the philosophical method is the order of the reasons which, by the analytical way, allows us to go back to principles or even causes on the one hand, or to deduce the consequences on the other hand, until one opts for the synthetic approach. There is, then, a philosophical method or spirit from the

moment when we put forward directional and relational matrices of intelligibility and coherent successions by absolutely subscribing to the logical rigor which requires emphasizing both the meaning on the need.

Of course, in order to achieve this, it is essential to ensure the appropriation of the related processes: the analysis underlined by the concern for definition (s), the reasoning ordered by the explanation or the evidence of the classification, comparison, distinction and ultimately cause and synthesis.

For example, in Hebgä, there is a clear concern for analysis, for the decomposition of the whole (the human compound) in its parts: body and mind (a dualistic conception that is characteristic of the Indo-European world of thought); the breath, the shadow, the spirit (black African conception). In the same vein, one cannot liquidate or ignore the effort of synthetic position of the three instances or parts of this compound into a whole (postulatum of the relation between the three instances).

Indeed, in view of the texts published by Hebgä and especially his major works (*The Rationality of an African Discourse on Paranormal Phenomena; Emancipation of Churches under Trustees; Essay on the Post-colonial Era; Witchcraft: Dangerous Chimera; Africa of Reason, Africa of the Faith; etc.*, **can we speak of the philosophical method (s) proper to this thinker, and if so, what are the nomenclature and the specificity of it?** Evidently in opposition to these interrogative axes, our questioning in this elucidation of the Hebgäean philosophy cannot ignore a decisive question about the philosophical / scientific relevance of its methodological option.

## **I. Philosophical Quest and Problem of Method (s)**

**Philosophy is inseparable from the idea of method;** for if wisdom (the object of philosophical love) is indispensable to the foundation and metaphysical basin of the order existing in our rea-

son, in the cosmos and horizon of the very meaning of existence and of coexistence as well as of sense of all meaning, it presupposes that it is capital, that is, essential (teleological axiology) for the full realization of life. However, his mature appropriation obeys the principle of principle, since truth, wisdom, cannot be within the reach of the first adventurer. The main question to be asked here is: is there one or more precise and exclusive method for the successful orchestration of this quest? The history of philosophy rightly presents itself as the best framework for the various and scheduling not only of doctrines or systems of thought, but also of the plural heuristic approaches which present themselves precisely as paths, possibly different or opposite approaches, but certainly complementary, especially in relation to the common and exclusive objective of the human mind: the untiring quest for truth.

Obviously, the philosophical community agrees that philosophy is distinguished from all other sciences by its critical and instituting power of the absolute foundation as well as of the ultimate horizon. This understanding and implementation of philosophy is very verifiable since the time of the pre-Socratics, who first raise the question of the essence of things. In this perspective, the recovery of the above-mentioned question is clearly revealed, but oriented in the Hebraean philosophy towards the human compound and not of things. Certainly, with a tendency and a historically-philosophical originality, Hebraean philosophy is against the history of the Philosophy and especially well beyond the hasty certainties and other prejudices elaborated and promoted by the said history especially about the human compound.

Hence, if the history of philosophy is presented not as a long river, but rather as the interlacing of several rivers and rivers resembling the undulation of a string under the pressure of a finger, then one may be tempted to think either that there is not a philosophical method as such, or that the postulated philosophical method is diffracted in plural, dichotomous or even opposed methods; hence the

affirmation not of a single method but rather of a plurality of methods in philosophy (Wittgenstein, 1982: p.133). We have already sketched the idea, on the definitional aspect of the philosophical method, that the plurality of approaches could be the source of conceptual, theoretical and praxeological innovation. That seems very undeniable. Indeed, from the point of view of its involvement with classical science (scholasticism) and modern science (rationalism) starting with R. Descartes and F. Bacon, followed by the Enlightenment (logico-positivism and instrumental logos seized only as *Ratio*), the problem of method(s) in philosophy is, if we can thus synthesize, torn between intuitionistic, spiritualist, aesthetic-artistic, hermeneutic and hypothetical-deductive trends borrowed from the mathematical sciences especially since metaphysical atrophy proclaimed by E. Kant, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. Nevertheless, beyond their respective specificities, one must avoid thinking that these various methods are absolutely opposed, because all of them relate to cerebral functioning in its attempts to correlate with the permanent movement of the Real (human and cosmic), even though this functioning is by no means surely logical for all. And as such, all these methods deserve to be recognized in the epistemic field, which in fact appears to us above all as an immanent field in which the flesh of the mind expresses itself, becomes simultaneously a perceptive medium and an expressive medium, But also, conversely, the exteriority of the world "flows" into subjective interiority (Ullmann, 2002: 236). In such a perspective, the Real (its knowledge) object of philosophy is phenomenalized like a true labyrinth. Henceforth, the notion of method arises here as a thread of Ariadne possibly plurivocal or multiplexed within this labyrinth. And F. Bacon (1920), for example, stresses precisely to this fact that: "By its disposition, the edifice of this universe is for the human understanding which contemplates it as a labyrinth. We need a thread to guide our steps: the whole path, from the first perceptions of the senses, must be made with a sure method."

## **II. Philosophical method (s) and Hebgaean research: a caesura?**

To elucidate this precise aspect of the problem, we would gladly turn to the Hebga slayers. In this category, Marcien Towa, the first Paulin Hountondji, P. Elungu, and Fabien Eboussi Boulaga are leading figures. Indeed, Mr. Towa, for example, by affirming, in the form of an evaluation of African philosophy in the context of an interview in *Mots pluriels*, that: "The ground has been cleared to a more rigorous conception of philosophy. This is a given. It is difficult to do ethnophilosophy quietly as our friend Hebga. If we want to remain in this register, we sink into exorcism and sorcery. From a philosophical point of view, we lose all credibility (Towa, 1999). It seems that the aim of these authors "europhilosophes" (or "ethnophilosophy" as noted in the quotation?) was to be avoided, in the face of the drift of ethnological monographs, philosophy being brought back to the local, ethnic wisdom, without universal scope. Nevertheless, it is necessary to dwell on what Hebga thinks of ethnophilosophy. As he points out, "ethno philosophers" are those who resort to the Western philosophical experience and use Western methods, languages and principles, but they think and argue that Western philosophies are not enough for anyone Analyze and resolve African issues, particularly regarding sickness and death in relation to witchcraft, conversely the "Europhilosophers" are those who think and affirm that philosophy must be conducted in accordance with the principles and methods defined by European thinkers" (Hebga, 1998: 343).

Thus, Towa, the first Hountondji and many others do not admit that Hebga is doing the same thing to the cultural realities of the black continent through recourse to a mosaic of disciplines and fields of human experience, in the formulation and realization of his philosophical thought. And even worse, they find most of these disciplines and aspects of human life (linguistics, theology, anthropol-

ogy, psychology, parapsychology, mathematics, physics, and paranormal phenomena) heterogeneous to philosophy. Thus they accuse Hebga, N'daw, Kagamè, Tempels, etc., of a reductionist approach to philosophy to the concept of culture and more precisely to the notion of worldview; indeed Towa points out the concept of philosophy thus becomes "coextensive with that of culture. It remains in opposition to animal behavior ... indistinguishable from any cultural form: myth, religion, art" (Towa, 1979: 26). Later he criticized the cult and obsession with the originality and difference that governs Hebga's research. Accordingly, he adds: "Difference, peculiarity in relation to the other, has no value in itself, any more than identity with respect to itself and the tradition that defines it" (Towa, 1979: 65). It is not surprising, therefore, that if he abounds in Hebga's critique of Hebga in a paradigm complementary to that of Towa and the first Hountondji, JG Bidima in his essay "The black African Philosophy" inscribes Hebga in the camp Tempelsian. What to say? Other than that Bidima agrees with Towa that the co-extensive approach of philosophy-culture underlying the Hebgaeen heuristic approach is illegitimate; because this is neither "purely philosophical, nor purely ethnological, but ethno-philosophical" (Towa, 1979: 31).

Obviously Hebga's heuristic enterprise forces us to imagine a whole spectrum of reliance in relation to the methodological concerns of which the first obstacle arises through the restriction of the rigorous interpretation of the cultural traditions of the interior (Amougou, 2016a: 21). In this perspective, it is necessary to ask whether an individual or group of individuals with a low intellectual coefficient but belonging to a given cultural context may claim to be able to better interpret their cultural experience more than and other, intellectually for this purpose, but alien to the context in question. In fact, the best interpretation in such a situation is only possible if there is a frank collaboration between the two groups mentioned

above. In this case, the first group will provide information about its lived experiences, its representation of the world, which the second group will interpret to the extent of its theoretical-technical possibilities (cognitive-instrumental explanation). Obviously, the unknown here is correlated to the threshold of applicability of the theory. And besides, are all the sides of the eel cognitive-instrumentally explainable?

It is also necessary to highlight the absence of statistics in the methods of reflexive management of the problem of paranormal phenomena and especially of sorcery. Yet paradoxically Hebga claims to use mathematics in order to guarantee the scientific character and objectivity of his research. On the other hand, he undertakes an analysis generalizing certain practices of sorcery in Africa. In this case, Hebga seems to forget that witch production as a particular kind of knowledge and action is conditioned by the general social framework that practices or lives it (Gurvitch, 1966: 36-42).

In a way, Hebga's investigations of paranormal phenomena (notably sorcery, magic) are divided between at least two methods: first, the direct experience that one would have liked to see explicit in his works; Then the abstract induction. Thus, the distinction between the two methods is that direct experience is the method by which witchcraft is a "non-ordinary reality", that is, on which its foundation rests. It is logic different from that of our ordinary reality. In this case, in order to know and explain what sorcery is, for example, the researcher must make a personal experience of the reality in question in order to know the laws on which it is based and whose explanation constitutes witchcraft practice and the beliefs around it (Malemba-Mukengshayi N'saka, 1983: 243). The absence of this methodological perspective in Hebga, however, in our opinion seriously undermines the chances of relevance of his interpretation of the scientificity / rationality of African discourse on paranormal phenomena and especially sorcery.

Abstract induction is the method according to which witchcraft must be simply understood as a "social reality" whose existence is judged by its effects on the physical plane and by its various expressions in social life. In this frame, the researcher uses, according to T. Buakasa, the discourse of the bewitched, the seers or traditional doctors and the theories of the anti-sorcerers (Lufuluabo-Mizeka, 1977: 27). In Malemba-Mukengenshayi's view, this method seizes witchcraft as a cultural element because it is an expression of the structure and functioning of the community whose process is organized around the bewitched and the witchcraft. Of course, the bewitched are consulted, because it is they who, living the effects of sorcery, can testify of its existence with conviction. Nevertheless, abstract induction must recognize that the collective representations which dispose of witch-production vary not only with the social order (from one society to another); but also, within the latter, with the position and the concrete social situation of the producers. Thus, by opting for abstract induction, the researcher is obliged to go beyond simple ordinary discourses and to expose the reasons for the social representations that form the basis of witchcraft (Lufuluabo, idem).

### **III. Complexity of the object of philosophy and necessity of a complex approach in Hebga**

#### **From the understanding to the extension of the object of philosophy to Hebga**

Hebgaan studies undoubtedly start from his understanding of the object of philosophy to its essential extension. The understanding of philosophy here must be grasped as a synthetic and exclusive definition of philosophy in particular of its object: the rational, better, the rationalizable. Obviously, by pruning and above all by correlating the ratio with its distant history and its original source, one



realizes that this is only the meaning "B" of the term Logos from which comes the terminology Latinized through the concept Of Ratio, understood in the strict sense and restrictive of reason, faculty of reasoning, intelligence. It is true that we already find this semantic charge of the notion in question in Plato (notably in Phedre 270c, Timaeus 52c, Parmenides (135 e.). All that exists cannot be explained by the canons of reason (faculty of to judge and to link beings, things or relations between them). Except for certainty, to nuance the notion of rationality which thus unfortunately tends to enclose knowledge in a unique and closed methodology, it is important to review his content and consequently his genuine meaning. To respect a principle of openness to follow pluralistic approaches in order to meet the challenge of a reality that is not confined to ordinary human perception but can also find its roots in the universe around us (Amougou, 2016). Moreover, it is to forget or to conceal in a voluntarily negativistic way that the Sophia that inserts the logos from which comes ratio, in the tenth scheduling of its sense "A" (at least, according to the Greek dictionary -Français). By extension it refers to the subject of discussion or study, that is to say that in question or subject involved. It is precisely this meaning which, for example, Plato) in Philèbe 33c and Gorgias, 508b), but also Hebga, especially in *Emancipation of churches under tutelage* (especially in chapter V: animism and cosmology) and *In the Rationality of an African discourse on paranormal phenomena*. Moreover, Hebga's conceptual and analytical management also rigorously verifies the senses of conversation, philosophical discussion and / or historical traditions that the logos, introduces precisely in its logographic variant and / or logopoios. In fact, Hebgaean thought cannot be deprived of the deep concern to reinstate the philosophical discussion both with black African cultural traditions and with the Indo-European cultural tradition, in the face of their discordant and even opposed interpretations of the logos innervated in ratio. Therefore,

the paradigm of complexity posed as the epistemological anchor of Hebgæan thought can be solicited here.

Under the species of the complexus of the object of the Hebgæan philosophy, one will attempt a brief but concise clarification of the itinerary pursued by Hebgæ. Thus, the hebraic heuristic approach opens up an approach that affirms the primacy of methods over method, even to the detriment of method; the contemporary philosopher is likely to be pejorative and tendentious, the polymathic seeker possessing knowledge of all things as far as possible are non-transversal research not treated as partial?

Let us take now radically the pluralistic orientation of Hebgæ's methodological option. What then is the meaning and the efficiency of the Hebgæan methodological pluralism in question, in the use that this philosopher and the African theologian in fact makes use of it in particular in his analysis of special problems such as: paranormal phenomena, sorcery, metamorphoses of men in animals, etc? In short, this raises the question of whether the efficiency of this heterogeneous methodological pluralistic option is sufficient (both applicable to any other philosophical object and encompassing all disciplines to the point of having to liquidate any other method of approaching these objects) : In this case we would return / reconnect with the holistic method formerly posited as referential, although ideologically and practically evacuated to the benefit of the compartmentalization disciplinary and prejudicial to the increase of the knowledge relative to the postulation of its extension, tendency unitary, of "the real," in its natural, social, human, psychological, physical, material, and visible phenomena , immaterial, invisible, and spiritual. So there is nothing. It is amazing to see Hebgæ outline the unitary principle of both reality and truth. However, in spite of his ultimate desire to highlight the unity of knowledge, Hebgæ places particular emphasis on the analysis of the threshold of the coefficient of relevance of so-called objective knowledge with its principle: applied rationalism, subsumed by instrumental cognitivity. From

this point on, the objectivity and purity of reason in its itineraries become rather problematic (Amougou, 2008: 301). In his investigations, Hebga is concerned about the question of truth in the texts offered by the history of philosophy, on the one hand, and on the other hand, by problems encompassing certain cultural aspects (such as discourses on paranormal phenomena) that can hardly be explained by the canons of instrumental rationality. In this context, Hebga is aware of the gap between the translation of traditional African views of the world into exogenous languages and the reality expressed in endogenous languages on the one hand, and the necessary distance from the problems and methodologies, on the other hand, especially when it is a matter for the philosophers to transpose the Cartesian schemas in the treatment of the type of problematic mentioned above. Therefore the need to reformulate the question of the methods which must underlie the reflexive and practical management of the latter. At this point, since the historical, social and cultural contexts are different, it does not seem rigorous, much less objective to simply transpose methodologies from their context of elaboration to another, without seeking to falsify them, to rectify them. so to make them more operative by their adaptability. In fact, notes Hebga: "Why then do not have the courage to define special problems, to set up appropriate methodologies and to dare to think for ourselves?" (Hebga, 1998: 343). With Hebga's remarks, and in the approximation to the articulatory function of method or methods in research, but contrary to Descartes, for example, which gives an undeniably equal place to intuition and to deduction in the quest for the truth of things on the one hand, contradicting all prejudicial discourse with regard to African thoughts (hastily qualified as pre-logical) on the other hand, Hebga, through his philosophy demonstrates that deduction is constitutive in understanding and interpretation of non-Indo-European discourses and, more specifically, black African discourses.

However, in spite of this, the epistemological and theological truth (in the Aristotelian sense of the concept) in Heidegger, unlike Descartes in *Metaphysical Meditations*, is still far from being fully understood (the principle is not rationality but rather continuous rationalization). Indeed, as his faith still seems shaken by various pitfalls including the feeling of being an eternal beginner at an advanced age, so applied rationalism does not yet offer humanity the ultimate truth of things. Hence the need to continue research in all disciplines, using all possible approaches; For Heidegger: "To take proper advantage of it, it takes a time of negation and refusal, of questioning the great syntheses that once seduced us, a way of discourse of method" (Heidegger, 1976: 158). Of course, when presenting some general outlines of his research on paranormal phenomena, Heidegger states that he claims "to limit himself to establishing rationality, that is to say, the logical coherence, but it is evident that beyond this logical structure of discourse I venture to reveal the theoretical or conceptual possibility of this or that particular phenomenon, even if only indirectly by refuting the arguments which militate against this possibility" (Heidegger, 1998: 11). We must see here the sketch of a new breach induced by hermeneutic science in the dialectical enterprise. It is therefore necessary to guard against the dangers posed by the absolutization of some form of rationality: "I do not conclude that we must stop referring to reason, but that we must do it with more modesty and less triumphalism" (Heidegger, 1998: 342). But to achieve this, Heidegger hears above all, to meet the paranormal phenomena. In this perspective, to argue that he invites the reader to free himself from the habits of thinking or research, there is only one step he could take, following Georg Gadamer and Martin Heidegger, and Heidegger performs this.. In fact, there is no doubt that the Heideggerian preoccupation is to offer an interpretation of certain strange phenomena such as sorcery, multilocation and speeches and discourses. Everything is involved in a certain horizon, in the extension of the question of truth; for it must be emphasized that understanding on-

ly reaches its possibility if the opinions it puts into play are not whatever. It is therefore reasonable that the interpreter should not directly address the text, nourished by pre-opinion, relying on a pre-conception already ready in him, but on the contrary, there must be an emphasis on legitimization, that is, on their origin and validity (Gadamer, 1986: 287-288), since every fair interpretation must guard against arbitrary ideas of encounters and against the narrowness that derives from habits of imperceptible thoughts.

In a certain way, these remarks lead us to believe that in his approach to paranormal experiences, Hebga always makes use of dialogues with both victims and their torturers, and subsequently begins the critical analysis of the various theses and makes the necessary logical deduction. We thus witness the recurrence of the so-called regressive method, articulated by anthropological-philosophical considerations; hence its defense of the necessarily multi-methodological approach. Indeed, as Mutunda Mwembo clearly points out in his research on "Methodological Aspects of African Philosophy": The multiplicity of methods inspires the fact that methodological options are imbued because of the plurality of methods in science as well as in science of philosophy of the party that can be drawn from the specificity of each method, the complementarity of the methods and their possible articulation within the framework of a positive interdisciplinarity or simply their combination according to the interdisciplinary demands of the research (Mutunda, Mwembo , 1983: 170).

It is clear from this point of view that, on the basis of the problems confronting human consciousness, Hebgæan research finds its relevance only in so far as it is based on the history of philosophy, which itself deserves to be understood as the explicit spacing and temporalization of science at least, on what philosophers can master. In this framework, convinced that Pythagoras, for example, was both a mathematician and a philosopher, that the distant and / or near figures of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes and Bergson express the

intricacies of philosophy and science, Hebgā makes the decision to have his philosophical method subsumed by the principle of openness, not only to mathematical analysis, but also to history, linguistics, anthropology, psychology, parapsychology, physics, philosophy of mathematics, and theology, etc. . From this perspective it is evident that these Hebgāean methodological axes are to be compared with those of the logical atomism initiated by Russel in his lectures of 1918 (Bertrand R.1918-1919). Russel highlights the necessary match between atomic propositions and the determinate aspect of the diversity of the given. Jean-Gérard Rossi, in his article "Quine: quantification and ontology", explains this idea:

In the philosophy of logical atomism, Russel emphasizes that modern logic is atomist, a compatibility between this type of logic and a world presented under the aspect of diversity (of things, situations, aspects ...). But the atoms to which the analysis allows to arrive are not physical atoms, but logical atoms. These logical atoms are in fact atomic propositions updated by modern standard logic. These proposals are independent of one another. They are true or false, either by virtue of their form (tautologies are always true, contradictories are always false), or by virtue of their relation to the given (Rossi, 1992: 99).

From the above, it should be emphasized that logical atomism calls for a break-up of logic into a diversity of perspectives whose validity depends on its operability in explaining an aspect of the diversity of the real as well as in the explanation of the world. Thus, for the Vienna circle, for example, science can only be deployed in a logical-linguistic framework. This is precisely the reason why Hebgā thinks that linguistic pluralism opens a gap in cultural pluralism, and hence in pluralism logical and correlatively methodological pluralism. This is insofar as each language expresses a conception of the world, that is, a culture. And the plurality of cultures assumes the plurality of languages. To this end, the Hebraic heuristic approach, in the manner of Searle, in his work on speech arts, through its desire to understand certain human experiences expressed in different cultures, is deployed in the direction of the philosophy of logic. On

the basis of his analysis of paranormal phenomena in a comparative perspective between the Indo-European and African cultural schemes, the researcher finally understands that the meaning of a statement is determined by so-called and unspoken and/or rules that specify its conditions of use. This is why Hebga proceeds from the ordinary use of languages and from the use of ordinary languages, articulating the experiences that have arisen, in order to proceed to a necessary critical examination of the preconceptions and pseudo-interpretations which subsume universal rationality.

In such a heuristic approach, it is certain that: "pseudo-evidence and common sense are pre-philosophical stages" (Hebga, 1976: 103). Hence, one can establish the homology between the methodological bridges taken by the Hebgæan research and the Kantian critical method, in the sense that: "The method here presents itself as a critic, a critic of false foundations, false truths and false directions. The possibility of making a clean slate is in fact based on a power of nihilation, a power by which the culture is liberated from any attempt at imperialism and from all dogmatic aspects" (Bwelé, 1972: 58).

Ultimately, it seems important to us to insist on the fact that the Hebgæan methodological-philosophical approach presents itself as a philosophical openness, that is to say also a methodological opening. In this framework, as Jean François Malherbe rightly points out, epistemology has always played an important role in philosophy, since philosophy cannot be made without questioning the value of knowledge. In addition, all great philosophers were interested in epistemology and talked about "theory of knowledge. It is therefore necessary that" because of the contemporary fragmentation of knowledge in a multitude of different disciplines, and also because of the complementarity of these disciplines, no one can no longer avoid having recourse sometimes to knowledge developed by disciplines other than his own. (Hebga, 1976 : 103).

#### **IV. Disciplinary transversality and methodological complementarity in Hebga approach**

We note in Hebga the recurrence of occurrences related to his academic and / or multidisciplinary scientific training. Thus, in the manner of its distant predecessors such as Plato, Aristotle and Descartes, for example, Hebga opportunely and complementarily solicited linguistics, anthropology, psychology, physics, and theology to conduct his research with confidence. However, insofar as each discipline stands out from the others by the specificity of its object and its method, we can here justifiably justify the multiplicity of heuristic methods to which Hebga resorts. In fact, Hebga believes that relying on a single discipline / method does not allow for rigorous research on interpretations, explanations of human experience in its plurality and diversity through cultural traditions; hence their interrelationship for not only is the real now offered as a permanent becoming, but also the object and the subject of philosophy, namely the man whose explanation of complexity bases the invalidity of all pretensions to one and common view.

It is, for example, this fragmentation of the subject-object that determines Hebga to criticize the dualitarian (body-soul) schematism of the human compound, characteristic of the thoughts of Plato, Aristotle, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Bergson, etc.. Obviously, this Hebgaean methodological option encounters a chorus echo in scientific circles where scholars such as I. Prigogine and I. Stengers legitimize and validate such a direction of the heuristic enterprise because "questions abandoned or denied by a discipline have passed silently in another, have resurfaced in a new theoretical context. And it is above all at the intersections between disciplines, on the occasion of the convergence between separate channels of approach, that problems which were thought to be resurrected resurfaced that were able to insist, in a renewed form, old and previous



questions disciplinary compartmentalisation" (Progogine & Stengers, 1979: 28).

Insofar as Hebga's work is concerned with various and serious problems, ranging from the emancipation of the peoples of the "periphery" to the faith, through witchcraft and metapsychical phenomena, it appears that, in order to grasp his thought, it is essential to respect the methodological pluralism that subsumes it. In fact, the field of parapsychology, for example, is today a discipline that requires knowledge in anthropology, biology, psychology, physics and philosophy. From this the interpretation or explanation of the facts here must be submitted in the light of an interdisciplinary approach as emphasized" (H. Bender, 1977: 37). It seems, then, that in the precise field of parapsychology, which takes the form of the philosophy of health and occupies an axial place in its work, Hebga mainly uses three methods that are interwoven, namely:

- a. the test method of observing the reaction of a subject or a patient to determine whether he is possessed (by a wicked mind) and likely to cause some unusual behavior;
- b. the clinical method which aims to study or to identify the problem of the subject from a study of its history obtained during the direct interview with the person concerned;
- c. the so-called autobiographical method of inviting the sensitive subject to relate his or her life, or the history of his or her problems.

Thus the solicitation of these three methods is easily spotted in many of his works, and in particular, *Sorcery and prayer of deliverance*, *Witchcraft, dangerous chimera?*, *Rationality of a speech*, and so forth.

Hence, Hebgaeian research seems to be more subservient to the Husserlian approach taken up by Heidegger, which consists in going to the very things, going to experience. For it, is this methodological option which seems to offer him the grasp of the need for the subject not to forget or to despise his connection with the historical and socio-cultural context in the world. Similarly, dialectics occupies a

decisive place in its thought process, since it is thanks to it that it takes with it the history, the context in its various bifurcations and polarities. It is also thanks to it that it is possible to subject cultural traditions to criticism, better, to innovative interpretation. We can thus postulate that the methodological pluralism in Hebga obeys the principle of various fields of scientific research which leads not to relativism but rather to methodological and complex approach, because on the one hand every science is a window through, which being reflected. This is why dialogue between different sciences and different methods is important (Nkombe Oleko, 1986: 7-8).

On the other, both the theoretical analysis of lived experiences and the coefficient of relevance of the hypothetic and deductive (rationalistic) method, the aporias of contemporary science, and the current crisis of knowledge, enjoin us to reconnect with the original method of analysis, subsumed by systemic holism in a register of order not lazily multidisciplinary, but rather radically interdisciplinary if one wishes to free oneself from solipsism in order to reach the true inter subjectivity which induces the otherness of the world as well as the alter ego (individual or collective). Such are the itinerancies, the impasses, the confluences and the prospects relative to the problem of the philosophical method (s) in the Hebgaean research in relation to our desire for a strict distinction between what is rational and what is not; between what is rigorously scientific and what is not scientific. The wisdom that can be found in every cultural tradition invites us to prudence, modesty and intellectual humility, which oblige us to constantly rectify both our methods and our methodological axioms that are mono-disciplinary.

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