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Nokoko is an open-access journal promoting dialogue, discourse and debate on Pan-Africanism, Africa, and Africana. Nokoko brings forward the foundational work of Professor Daniel Osabu-Kle and his colleagues when they started the Journal of Pan-African Wisdom in 2005. '*Nokoko*' is a Ga word that means something that is new, novel, surprising and interesting. The journal offers a venue for scholarship to challenge enduring simplified views of Africa and the African diaspora, by providing other perspectives and insights that may be surprising, interesting, and refreshing.

Combining spaces for academic and community reflection, Nokoko creates an opportunity for discussion of research that reflects on the complicated nature of pan-African issues. It provides a forum for the publication of work from a cross disciplinary perspective that reflects scholarly endeavour, policy discussions, practitioners' reflections, and social activists' thinking concerning the continent and beyond. Hosted by the Institute of African Studies at Carleton University (in Ottawa, Canada), Nokoko provides a space for emerging and established scholars to publish their work on Africa and the African diaspora.

Layout by **Daniel Tubb.**

Cover photograph of the 2019 Algerian protests by Hamza Hamouchene.

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Firoze Manji is Firoze Manji is a Kenyan activist with more than 40-year's experience in international development, health and human rights. He is the founder and former editor-in-chief of the pan-African social justice newsletter, Pambazuka News and of Pambazuka Press, and former executive director of Fahamu—Networks for Social Justice. He has previously worked as the Director of the Pan-African Baraza for ThoughtWorks and Head of CODESRIA's Documentation and Information Centre. He is a co-editor, with Sokari Ekine, of *African Awakenings: The Emerging Revolutions*. He was previously a Visiting Fellow at Kellogg College, University of Oxford, and is currently a Richard von Weizsäcker Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin. He is also an Associate Fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies. He holds a PhD and MSc from the University of London. He is the publisher of Daraja Press.

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Incorporeal Words

The Tragic Passing of Pius Adesanmi

And on the way I would say to myself:

"And above all, my body as well as my soul beware of assuming the sterile
attitude of a spectator, for life is not a spectacle, a sea of miseries is not a
proscenium, a man screaming is not a dancing bear…"

> — Aimé Césaire, "Notebook of a return to the native land," *Aimé
> Césaire : The Collected Poetry*¸ translated by Clayton Eschleman and
> Annette Smith (Berkeley: University of California Press), p45.

Perhaps it would be a conversation with Saint Peter, the late great
Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe, the late great Sénégalese author
and feminist Mariama Bâ, and the 157 newly arrived about why
there are these barriers to enter the welcomed afterlife. One of those
who was unexpected to be on this journey, trying to collect his
thoughts about why he was there way before his time, yet still swift
enough to find one of his usual incisive questions, posed eloquently
and yet tinged with his well-known reticence to grant authority any
respect it may not have earned. Why, he asks, can't anyone freely
enter this desired afterlife? Be it the Gates to Heaven or the 8 doors
of Jannah, every soul may not enter, as if paradise was one of the
fortified, exclusive gated communities on Banana Island in Lagos! A
city in the country of his birth and to which he was inelecutably
committed, despite everything… The dialogue would be profound,
on the edge of being profane, weaving in Yoruba deities, quotidian
Nigerian expressions, hip hop poetry, African nationalist and Pan-
Africanist dreams, searing indictments of the incompetent, the
corrupt, the racist, the patriarchal, and the violent that not only tend

to overdetermine postcolonial African governments – like the colonial regimes before them – but also are widely found in the oh-so-comfortable so-called Global North, likely bringing in as a case-in-point the recent coming-to-light of the brazen attempts by the Trudeau Liberal government in Canada – where this newly arrived had lived, taught, and also was a citizen – to interfere in prosecutorial decisions to ensure that the Canadian multinational engineering giant, SNC Lavalin (already found guilty for a slew of other corruption cases, even having many of its subsidiaries being debarred by the World Bank for ten years in 2013, see, e.g., Garossino 2019) is not prosecuted for allegedly paying millions of dollars in bribes in return for billions of dollars in contracts to the murderous Gaddhafi family when they controlled Libya. It would be literate and literary, cogent and contemplative, allegorical and deeply historical, with the phatic thrust aiming to force the reader to appreciate the depthless complexities of life that marks "Africa" inside and outside the continent, to fight against the multitudes of injustices, and to empathize with the human dreams, trials, and tribulations of the living….

But this is but speculation on my part, trying to imagine how Pius Adesanmi would write about the untimely, numbing loss of his passing in the tragic crashing of the Ethiopian Airlines flight from Addis Ababa to Nairobi on March 10th, 2019. His rich and imaginative prose and poetry directed always to the many pressing topics of African Studies were unparalleled in multiple ways, as he drew on an incredible depth of knowledge of literature, literary criticism, history, cinema, politics, philosophy, the humanities writ large, mass-mediated current events, and slivers of everyday life in Nigeria, other parts of Africa, Europe and North America. From his 2002 doctoral thesis in French Studies at the University of British Columbia (Adesanmi 2002) to his award-winning book (*You're Not a Country, Africa*, see Adesanmi 2011), from his articles over a decade ago in *Pambazuka News* (founded by one of our *Nokoko* board

members, Firoze Manji) that provocatively challenged many prejudices and inequalities within African countries and beyond (including the canons of feminist literary criticism in "Disappearing Me Softly: An Open Letter to Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar," Adesanmi 2007, which was one of my favourites) to the brilliant eviscerations of Nigerian politics, economics and sociocultural dynamics as a committed, sympathetic, deeply attached but profoundly disappointed observer in important Nigerian online news outlets like *Sahara Reporters*, *Premium Times*, and long-established papers like the *Nigerian Tribune*, let alone his books published in Nigeria (like his 2001 collection of poetry *The Wayfarer and Other Poems* and his 2015 *Naija No Dey Carry Last*, see Adesanmi 2001, 2015) and innumerable social media postings engaging with tens of thousands of followers and beyond, along with endless other examples within a "from/to" rhetorical device, Pius was a public intellectual *par excellence* of African Studies, Nigeria, the world… and one that was viscerally connected to Carleton University's Institute of African Studies and its open-access journal, *Nokoko*.

Professor Pius Adesanmi of Carleton's Department of English and Director of the Institute of African Studies has been, was (as it is too hard at this moment to think of him in the past tense), a founding member of the *Nokoko* editorial board. He not only provided intellectual support, editorial reviews, and boundless energy to our publication but he also is deeply implicated in some of our future endeavours. As we will be discussing shortly on our website, *Nokoko* is building on our revised Mission and Vision Statement[1] with a number of exciting initiatives to broaden our reach and our ability to provide different ways for new and novel voices concerning Africa and its diasporas to be heard. One of these initiatives is to gather some articles published in our first five issues

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1 Please see carleton.ca/africanstudies/research/nokoko

into a book, an idea that Pius came up with as a way to both mark the early, formative years of *Nokoko* as well as the tenth-year anniversary of the founding of our Institute of African Studies. While he was busy organizing a conference to mark the anniversary tentatively scheduled for October 2019 (which I strongly suspect may become one of many tributes to Professor Adesanmi), I had been writing part of our Introduction for this edited book, *Africa Matters: Cultural politics, political economies, & grammars of protest*, to be published by Daraja Press. I sent him my incomplete and quite incoherent draft by email on Thursday, March 7th to have him read, revise, and add his own words and thoughts. He soon emailed me back saying "I leave for Nairobi on Saturday. Plenty of inflight reading and working time!" to which I replied the perfunctory "travel well"; a convention to which I say without thinking and to which I assume would happen automatically, save for this unforetold disastrous trip….

Pius's words in his innumerable writings, the recordings of his talks (some of which are found on the Institute's YouTube channel[2]), and the memories so many of us, from near and far, have of him will continue to inspire, to help us hone our analyses, our writings and our actions within African Studies, *Nokoko* included. But it is unfathomable to think that he will not physically be here in person or behind the keyboard or on his phone to discuss, debate, strategize, plan, commiserate, with his intense focus on the academic, the work, the serious, always leavened with his deep humour, delight, and *joie de vivre*.

Mourning practices are intensely cultural and often highly gendered, with particular bodily, sartorial and linguistic expressions of affect and practices of grief typically marked for women and men, for different family members, friends, dignitaries. Like all things

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2 Please see www.youtube.com/channel/UCTuiOo9K4adr5FeyLycW77w

cultural, there is usually a great hybridity, even if (perhaps, especially if) they are said to be defined by particular religious, cultural, national traditions. The grieving is always intense for tragic deaths and for someone with Pius's great stature and regard, it has spread incredibly wide as one has been witnessing in the many digital worlds.

One practice that comes to me during this time of such numbing grief is the ChiShona expression of condolences, *kubata maoko*, to grab the arms. From my interpretation of this phrase and experiencing its use in Zimbabwe, it articulates the giving of physical support to those whose normal control of their bodies has given way in this time of intense shock. It also underscores the solidarity one has with others as we all try to work through the indescribable loss of a loved one, a friend, a colleague, an inspiration, a voice. The physical and virtual arms seeking to support each other now are innumerable, a testament to Pius's brilliance in so many ways. This is but one small expression of such solidarity of what will be many tributes we do in his honour here at *Nokoko*.

— *Blair Rutherford, Editor of Nokoko,*
Berlin, Germany
March 11, 2019

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Editors' Notes

Elections and Electoral Politics in Africa

Movements Forward, Backwards or Nowhere?

Toby Leon Moorsom, Wangui Kimari, and Christopher Webb

Virtually every African country has held multi-party elections in the past 4 years, most of them under systems of liberal democracy, and some on the heels of 'uprisings' of various forms. This is extraordinary considering that 30 years ago there were somewhere in the range of 35 single-party systems on the continent. The period 1952-1970 saw 28 successful coups, and by the late 1980s the majority of African countries faced single-party systems, many with leaders that had been around for more than two decades. Most of these were, however, swept aside between 1989 and 1994, as no less than 27 African countries underwent 'third wave' democratizations spurred by a changing geopolitical order, the rise of civil society organizations and new political conditionalities tied to IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs.

At the core of these latter changes were the 'good governance' policies of the IMF and the World Bank that were intended to liberalize African economies and address state corruption. The impact of these reforms has, however, been decidedly mixed across the conti-

nent. While some countries have held free and fair elections with minimal incident, others were plagued by widespread intimidation of opposition groups, silencing of the press and civil society, and little independent oversight.

More recently, some African countries have witnessed elections that have challenged the legitimacy of entrenched nationalist movements that still held power, both through the ballot box and through popular mobilization. For a time, the monumental upheavals of the so-called 'Arab Spring' and 'African Summer' seemed to generate new political currents. The failure of these movements to alter state power and institute more democratic forms of rule demands further analysis. At the same time, current mobilizations in Algeria, Sudan (and, to a lesser extent, Zimbabwe) show us that this moment of collective struggle for transformation is not over. Activists in Sudan appear to be taking lessons from the Egyptian and Zimbabwean experiences, and are so far unwilling to settle for a resolution orchestrated by generals from within Bashir's inner circle.

While the winners of these voting rituals are often predictable, the electoral process is also constituted by unpredictable twists and turns which are often accompanied by repression. A prescient example is the case of the 2018 elections in the DRC. After only one week, with 53% of votes counted, Félix Tshisekedi was announced the winner, a move that the opposition say was blessed by former president Joseph Kabila. These events occur against the suspension of Internet services by the government a day after votes were cast, the deportation of an international journalist and the inability of local election monitors to gain access to the count.

Unfortunately, the Congo is not an exception on the continent. In the Nigerian elections earlier this year, logistical problems and electoral violence caused significant voting delays, and voting patterns continued to reflect deep geographical, religious and ethnic divides. As Kialee Nyiayaana describes in this issue, entrenched patterns of voting along ethnic and religious lines in the landmark 2015

elections calls into question the democratic nature of Nigeria's political space. On the other side of the continent, the Kenyan elections of 2017 witnessed abusive police operations, with police killing at least 100 opposition activists and bystanders (HRW 2018). In other cases, the military has played a prominent role in both destabilizing existing political regimes and instituting new forms of despotism, as the Egyptian and Zimbabwean cases make clear.

The 'good governance' elections of the 1990s increasingly coexist with renewed forms of despotism and attempts to quell political opposition both on the street and online. While there are undoubtedly signs of democratic process in many cases, these exist amidst what Cheeseman and Klaas (2018) describe as, "the greatest political paradox of our time", in which globally "there are more elections than ever before, and yet the world is becoming less democratic". Certainly, there is a gradual decline in the quality of democracy in the world, based upon measures of political freedoms, independence of the civil service, functioning checks and balances between branches of government, freedom of the media, minority rights, vote-buying, violent repression, the assassination and imprisonment of rivals, gerrymandering, voter suppression, ballot-box stuffing, digital manipulation and the control of the media—among other assaults on common citizens.

While regimes in the Global North, particularly the G7 powers, continue to decry 'anti-democratic' regimes in the South, there is a growing tolerance among them for anti-democratic behaviour. The maintenance of a global capitalism rests, it seems, on increasingly authoritarian forms of rule, from Bolsonaro in Brazil and Putin in Russia to Erdoğan in Turkey. The sweeping back of the Pink tide in Latin America has also been treated, with some fanfare, as an indication of the supremacy of the market and the anti-democratic impulses within socialism. These moves come, of course, as economies in the North are keen to reassert their influence in Latin America. The resurgence of right-wing populism in the North finds its mirror

in the South; these alliances of the right threaten not only democratic systems but civil society, indigenous communities and political activists who push back against the forces of global capital.

The positive side of these new contortions of empire is that, globally, movements against the normalization of this new wave of authoritarianism are also emerging. In North America, we see the prominent role of indigenous movements calling for climate justice, while in places like Algeria and Sudan we see movements against both political despotism and the ravages of neoliberal austerity. Thus, Africa continues to be at the frontlines and the margins of the global anti-poverty movement as it was during the misnamed 'Arab spring' and 'African Summer' (Moorsom 2011).

Africa's new batch of authoritarians are qualitatively different than many of those who emerged on the African continent post-independence. While the former single-party states were ultimately authoritarian regimes, they came into being with reasonable claims to democratic legitimacy because of the post-colonial conditions many states found themselves in (Macpherson 1965, Zolberg 1966). In particular, they had tiny capitalist classes with limited space to maneuver within the global economy. Their lack of class articulation meant they often did not form into political parties with distinct ideological positions. While resistance to colonialism existed in popular, grassroots forums and among labour unions, formal representative bodies tended to come through the leadership of classes associated with the state (teachers, civil servants and others educated abroad), utilizing an amalgam of liberal, ethnic and nationalist discourses. This led to broad coalitions, often with significant tensions between 'traditional authorities' and those interested in land reform. Political mobilization was also along ethnolinguistic and regional lines. Such tensions remained latent when European powers were forced to acquiesce either by resistance of the colonized, or through budgetary pressures.

The result was that a diverse set of political actors, with insufficiently articulated politics, united around the need to achieve material benefits from independence; what some have described as the developmental state moment (Leys 1996). They cooperated with each other, and with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank), to build schools, universities, public works like water distribution networks, health centres, and roads (Shivji, 2009). They also sought to widen and de-racialize markets. They worked to build a newfound national culture through various state-supported schemes to promote cultural exchange, knowledge of differing populations and promoted the "nation" over ethnolinguistic divisions (read: 'tribalism'). A massive political science literature supported anti-statist IBRD and IMF depictions of these states as rife with corruption, neo-patrimonialism, and dominated by a "politics of the belly" (Bayart 1993). Despite a degree of truth behind these depictions, there is now evidence they were far more successful than the narratives of the late 1980s and early '90's made them out to be (Mkandawire 2001, Moorsom 2016).

Much has happened between the independence struggles and the 'third wave' liberalizations. Initially the most radical, that sought more fundamental transformation of colonial societies, were taken out by war, military coups or assassination. Sometimes well-meaning leaders found pragmatic reasons to tolerate imperialism, while others were true compradors. However, it was the oil crisis of the 1970s, the declining terms of trade and sky-rocketing interest-rates following the Volcker shocks of 1979-1981, which brought the contradictions within those initial coalitions into, at best, a state of dysfunction, and, at worst, civil war. It was in this context that the early heroes of independence were turned into authoritarian leaders who opened the door to the IFIs and loan conditionalities.

There were, at times meaningful, grassroots movements in the early 1990s that contested the IFI agenda. They were comprised of broadly popular movements, of which workers played a significant

role. However, this was also the era of the 'new social movements', which in turn coincided with a new-found love of 'civil society' coming, rather uncritically, from the left and right. If there is one truth about neoliberalism in Africa, and globally, it is that it has significantly disciplined labour and working-class unionism in particular. Aside from South Africa and Nigeria, there is virtually no labour movement on the continent, and these too have succumbed to pro-business, 'third-way' unionism that has led to the creation of two-tier workplaces and subsequent inter-class divisions. The energy and symbolism of nationalist struggle has been concentrated in the state and more precisely in ruling parties, while the dynamism of civil society has failed to create cross class and ethnic forms of unity that could challenge this order.

The type of democracy that was implemented following this 'third wave' was often a disciplinary form. This democratic model separated the political from the economic, while stripping democratic controls in the latter (multi-faceted assaults on trade unionism, deregulation of finance, exchange rates). Meanwhile, the political dimensions of this democratic model led to increased factionalism, heightened clientelist and neopatrimonial fighting for dwindling state resources (Allen 1995). While the number of political parties multiplied, platforms had virtually no variation. Politicians parroted simplistic phrases about efficiency and good governance, and private media did nothing to supply citizens with tools to challenge the pseudo-scientific justifications for neoliberal policy. Political debate fixated on the personalities and character attributes of candidates that stoked regional and ethnic chauvinisms. Civil society organizations multiplied and morphed into powerful NGOs as philanthropies poured money into the continent, and many often came to stand in for the state in policy circles.

Thus, is it unsurprising that Nyiayaana, in this current volume, describes recent elections in Nigeria as 'voting without choosing.' While elections have been generally solidified as the main method

of gaining legitimacy, they function as a ritual that legitimizes authoritarians, as Cheeseman and Klaas (2018) point out. There are, of course, significant overlaps between the ambitions of authoritarian leaders and global capital. For them, it is critical that the economy is formally and juridically separated from the sphere of popular control, in a manner described by Wood (1995) as a means of liberating class power from democratic control. Just prior to her death, Wood argued that, given these circumstances, the contemporary definition of democracy is in fact its opposite; the disempowering of the people.

The articles collected in this special issue of *Nokoko* provide a range of perspectives on electoral politics, voting behaviour and the mixed outcomes of Africa's 'third wave' democratizations. While recognizing the value of democratic spaces and freedom of speech, they call into question the democratic nature of these processes and the ends they serve. In the Nigerian and Ghanaian cases, political parties have similar platforms with voting largely determined by regional and ethnic commitments alongside ostentatious and obscene levels of corruption and wealth concentration. Tatenda Nhapi and Takudzwa Leonard Mathende describe the disenchantment among Zimbabwean youth with major political parties, as they are seen as unresponsive to the social and economic challenges faced by young people. In the Kenyan case, Oyunga Pala surveys the country's turbulent elections of 2017 and 2018, the 'self swearing-in' of Raila Odinga and the eventual, though questionable, victory of Uhuru Kenyatta. The fragile orchestrated peace between them, he argues, provides little hope for an end to inter-party factionalism and actual peace, principally in a context of increasing precarity for the majority of citizens. Thomson and Hopper's paper focuses on the entrenchment of authoritarian power by Paul Kagame's Rwandan Patriotic Front through 'electoral management.' The manipulation of electoral politics does more than simply entrench the power of political elites,

in the Rwandan case it renders political participation a form of compliance to power.

The article by Anastasia Ufimtseva offers an excellent example of the links between the political and economic dimensions of democratization. She shows that Angola suffers from weak regulatory regimes and governance structures coinciding with an overly centralised 'hyper-presidential' regime (with marked similarities to the Rwandan case). As with the cases of Ghana and Nigeria, the Angolan economy remains overly dependent upon fluctuations of prices of two or three commodities, which, in turn, leave the country prone to financial uncertainty. In addition, the country is overly dependent upon 'resource for infrastructure' contracts amidst decreasing public ownership in the petroleum sector. Angolans have good reason therefore to question the nature of 'independence' after decades of civil war.

The issue also includes an extended book review by Andrew Heffernan reflecting on three influential monographs of recent years. It examines the failures of the theoretical tools of the discipline of International Relations to actually make sense of the complexity and historical specificity of politics among African states. It in turn examines the possibilities for an increased flow of knowledge from the South to the North, which can begin to counter the overwhelming dominance of knowledge production outside the continent.

Finally, this issue culminates with an interview with African political thinker and publisher Firoze Manji, who reflects on the lineages of his 2011 book *African Awakenings: The Emerging Revolutions* (Manji and Ekine 2011). At the time, the book was the first to situate the Arab Spring moment within Africa itself, and to look for the echoes of the uprisings across the continent. The disappointing outcome of the Arab Spring moment is, unfortunately, reflected across the continent where opposition movements, trade unions and civil society face violent constraints. Manji situates the rise and decline of these movements in their historical context and in relation to the

global forces (neoliberal orthodoxy) that has guided development on the continent. He argues there is the pressing need to move beyond old organizing models and generate more inclusive practices combining both progressive political and economic aspirations. This, he suggests, will lead to a renewed left politics across the continent. Fortunately, we have some lights to guide us down this path. Here Manji reflects on the life and writings of Samir Amin, who died in 2018. Amin's commitment to a socialist internationalism, and his abiding interest in the political economy of African development leaves a rich resource and legacy for scholars and activists in Africa today. It is our hope that this issue makes a small contribution to furthering the radical scholarship and debate that sustained Amin's life and work.

The production of this issue was subject to a series of delays, the most significant being due to the grave tragedy of losing our editorial board member, Pius Edesanmi. Pius was the Director of the Institute of African Studies the vibrant space that we have all been connected to in some way since its founding nearly a decade ago. For this reason, the special issue opens with a few words from the former Director, Blair Rutherford. Many of us have taken inspiration from Pius' writings as well as from his friendship, warmth, camaraderie, sharp mind, and the wit it included. He played a nodal role in a wide intellectual community associated with African Studies. We hope that in his absence, the community will be drawn into this journal as a means of keeping those links that Pius nurtured alive.

We thank all those who contributed to this issue, and the nuanced discussions they brought forward, from Ghana to Angola, towards engendering more complex debates on elections and electoral politics in Africa.

— The Editors, *Nokoko 7*
Toby Leon Moorsom, Wangui Kimari, & Christopher Webb

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Entrenched Dictatorship

The Politics of Rigged Elections in Rwanda since 1994

Susan Thomson with Madeline Hopper

Elections in authoritarian regimes are performative—there is little electoral choice or contestation in cases where there is the appearance of multiple partyism. The rise of the "new" African leader, heralded by Western leaders such as American president Bill Clinton, has resulted in electoral authoritarianism, not the desired transition to liberal democracy (Carothers, 2002, p. 6). Instead, since the early 1990s, regimes undergoing authoritarian entrenchment vary according to degree of political competition and repression (Matfess, 2015). The common feature is a political balancing act between the formal adoption of democratic institutions and procedures and the use of formal and informal strategies intended to manage the emergence of democracy. The key mechanism is rigged elections, manipulated to ensure the "right" candidate wins. Elections in authoritarian systems "are intended to show that the dictatorship can make the dog perform tricks, that it can intimidate a substantial part of the population, so that any opposition is futile" (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006, p. 21; Levitsky and Way, 2002).

Since the mid-2000s, authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes are now the global norm, with skilled dictators employing the tools and language of democracy to legitimate and deepen their grip on power (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2011; Dobson, 2012;

Gandhi and Przeworkski, 2006; Simpser, 2013). Autocrats such as Rwanda's Paul Kagame and his ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) easily and readily manipulate the minimal standard of international election observers: The perception of free and fair universal suffrage in a multi-party setting, with each party offering a different policy platform. As Cheeseman and Klaas demonstrate, the rigging of elections is "the greatest political paradox of our time" with more local and national elections being held than ever before (2018, para. 3). Yet, at the same time, in 2017, more than sixty percent of the world's population lives in unfree or partly-free political systems (Freedom House, 2018). By standard democracy measures, including the Economist Intelligence Unit (2017) and Freedom House (2018), Rwanda is widely understood to be "not free," ranking amongst the worst in the world for civil and political liberties, the active participation of citizens, the protection of human rights and the rule of law.[1]

Rwanda since the 1994 genocide follows this trend of rigged regular national elections, made even more pointed with the country's history of civil war and genocide in which an ethnic Hutu-led government orchestrated the murder of at least 500,000 ethnic Tutsi (Des Forges, 1999, pp. 15-6). While international post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation toolkits aim to promote democracy, the empirical evidence illustrates that recovery from violent conflict rarely drives democratization. In practice, the reality is quite the opposite, particularly in cases of civil war, such as that which preceded the 1994 genocide. Civil war undermines three key ingredients for democracy: The quality of political institutions, the nature of elite cohesion and the character of civil-military relations (Cheeseman, *et*

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[1] The AfroBarometer database (http://afrobarometer.org/countries) does not include Rwanda. It does not fit many of the necessary criteria to assess and conduct surveys on democracy: Openness and ability of citizens to express views, access to census data and ease of travel to remote areas (Nkomo, 2018).

al., 2018, p. 31). We employ this "key ingredients for democracy" framework to understand the role of rigged elections in Rwanda since 1994. Local and national elections are strategically deployed to assure the RPF's preeminence in all spheres of public life: Politics, the economy and the military while representing itself as the only game in town.

Our paper focuses on two key areas of national electoral management as mode of entrenching the power and authority of the ruling party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front: 1) the formal political arena, notably via a 2003 constitutional revision (analyzed in Part III); and 2) RPF rhetoric to promote a Rwandan-style of democracy in the name of national peace and security (analyzed in Part II). We also consider the RPF's rhetorical strategies that allow party representatives to gain popular compliance through physical coercion, repression of civil liberties and the suppression of political opposition. Since 1994, Paul Kagame has framed his leadership as necessary if Rwanda is to both develop economically and avoid a future round of genocide. His colonial predecessors, Juvénal Habyarimana (1973-1994) and Grégoire Kayibanda (1962-1973), also presented themselves as the sole leader capable of providing peace and prosperity (Desrosiers, 2014). Like authoritarian leaders in other states, Rwanda's postcolonial presidents have invested in both a political system designed for control. Indeed, as we demonstrate in Part V, the current Rwandan government, the RPF, uses the cultural mechanism of *imihigo* (government performance contracts) to ensure popular political participation as a form of compliance.

As we analyze in Part IV, ordinary Rwandans and the local officials charged with governing them are accountable to the president through an intricate top-down state system. In turn, this produces the feeling of being watched that results in a culture of obedience that ensures the expected electoral outcome. Lastly, in Part VI, we assess the RPF's treatment of two opposition politicians who dared to challenge the incumbent Kagame. Victoire Ingabire (an ethnic

Hutu) and Diane Rwigara (an ethnic Tutsi) fell afoul of the regime respectively in the 2010 and 2017 presidential elections, the result being that both women have been imprisoned for their political views. We conclude that the RPF has practiced adroit electoral manipulation to ensure that its vision for what is needed to avoid future rounds of violence has instead entrenched a system that could, if left unchecked, foretell a return to mass political violence.

A Setting for Democratization?

Rwanda has long been home to civil conflict that in turn results in low elite commitment to democratic institutions and processes (Reno, 1999). The nature of Rwanda's political leadership is military by design, in readiness for civil conflict. Constitutional reforms, whether taken before or after the 1994 genocide, have focused on entrenching single-party rule that legitimates the presence of the military in civilian politics (Ottoway, 2003). Senior members of the government, including the president and his advisors, are military trained, and are often active members of the armed service.

Loyalty is of the utmost importance in Rwandan political culture. Loyalty to the president of the day is expected of the rank-and-file who earn favor by monitoring the population, while the monitored populations demonstrate their loyalty by performing deference to the leaders of the day (Purdeková, 2016; Thomson, 2013).

Post-colonial political elites are products of Rwanda's militarized society that keeps the country on a war footing, willing and able to use force to quell challenges from the opposition or the general public to assure their political primacy (Desrosiers, 2014). Rwanda has yet to enjoy a peaceful transition of power by way of democratic practices such as voting, strong institutions such as an independent judiciary or through a strong parliament capable of checking executive power. There has not been, nor is there today, a

burning incentive for political-military elites in Rwanda to craft strong, plural and impartial political institutions (Sebarenzi, 2009).

Instead, Rwanda's post-colonial elites work to ensure their political and military primacy through repression, notably the denial of civil and political rights, the disappearance, detention or death of political opponents, and control of the population (Reyntjens, 2013; Thomson, 2018). When they find themselves under pressure, Rwanda's elites choose ethnic violence to maintain their grip on power (Desrosiers, 2014). In other words, postcolonial regimes ramped up anti-Tutsi rhetoric in response to threats to their political power.[2] Civil conflict is the mode of regime change since the country gained independence from Belgium in 1962. The ruling RPF knows this violent history all too well.

Ethnically-motivated violence at key junctures in Rwanda's political history inform the choices of the ruling RPF to employ elections to legitimate its rule: The Social Revolution of the Tutsi monarchy by a Hutu counter-elite (1957-62), a military coup that installed a second Hutu president (1973-1994), and the civil war and genocide (1990-1994) that the then rebel RPF launched when it invaded Rwanda from Uganda. In addition, some eighty percent of the population is ethnic Hutu, the majority of who, like their non-elite ethnic Tutsi kin and kith, live in the rural countryside. The ethnic Tutsi-led RPF believes that they are governing a "mostly hostile, mostly Hutu country" (Prunier, 1998, p. 133). The fear of a return to genocidal violence informs all aspects of RPF rule, a legitimate concern given the magnitude of the violence of the 1994 genocide and the damage left in its wake. The RPF leadership thinks that ethnic Hutu will vote along ethnic lines, meaning that it could not win the votes from the majority in free and fair elections (Waldorf, 2014). Given this belief,

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2 Desrosiers found, through careful archival work, that Rwanda's postcolonial regimes deployed anti-Tutsi violence in moments of crisis as a way to deflect their shortcomings. See also C. Newbury (1988).

the RPF has adopted and refined a strategy of political repression and mass reeducation to ensure loyalty to the government (Hayman, 2011; Reyntjens, 2013). Foreign observers and domestic critics who comment that the political system is entrenching RPF rule instead of building a democratic system of checks and balances are denounced as traitors.

The ruling RPF is not unique in coopting formal and informal democratic norms. Successive generations of postcolonial elites have used the promise of democracy to justify domestic repression at home while ensuring the continued flow of maximum international donor dollars (Uvin, 1998, pp. 40-50). Rwanda's current leadership is no exception: The RPF explains its domestic political repression to international audiences in two key ways. First, the average poor, rural Rwandan is not ready for Western-style, first-past-the-post democracy (Republic of Rwanda, 1999). Second, the RPFs ideology of good governance is committed to democracy without representation. The logic is straightforward: The Hutu majority needs to be taught democratic values that accord with Rwandan values of deference to authority to assure the country's genocide-free future (Thomson, 2018, pp. 133-4). The result is a political environment without opposition, controlled by the Tutsi-led RPF, who in turn oversees performative elections that require the full participation of the electorate.

Crafting the Narrative

The RPF, the rebel group turned government credited with stopping the 1994 genocide, has used national and local elections to ensure its political dominance (Longman, 2011; Meierhenrich, 2006; Stroh, 2009). The legitimacy of the RPF rests on a social contract that is ultimately authoritarian, despite all its proclamations in favor of economic development as the basis of democracy (Abrahamsen, 2000). In exchange for supposed peace, security and devel-

opment, it governs with a degree of popular consent on terms and conditions that are ultimately set, and enforced, by the RPF in concert with the Rwandan Defense Force (RDF). President Kagame makes no apologies for his party's approach to governance, whose rules are constitutionally enshrined. As Jones notes, "the RPF is not [politically] dominant in spite of its constitution, but in part because of it" (2016, p. 344). Kagame rules with an iron fist, proclaiming loudly and often to international and domestic audiences that he is Rwanda's best bet against future rounds of civil war and genocide (Thomson, 2018, pp. 242-255). Rwanda's foreign donors have generally accepted this proclamation, thus offering feeble condemnation of the RPF's electoral politics despite their regular deployment of observers to monitor voting (Reyntjens, 2013).

Since July 1994, when the RPF took State House, the leadership quickly and strategically, with considerable success, dispatched both the military intelligence services and public relations machinery to craft a singular victor's narrative of Tutsi victims and Hutu killers (Pottier, 2002). Critically, the RPF produced a singular and hegemonic narrative that frames itself as Tutsi heroes who saved Rwanda from chauvinist Hutu elites with ethnic hatred in their hearts. Widely accepted in policy and popular circles, the narrative has provided the government with the moral authority, political means and military say-so to remake Rwanda in its vision of benevolent RPF leaders governing the largely uneducated and rural masses. As such, the RPF aims to govern through a uniquely Rwandan style of democracy: A political environment without voice yet with the appearance of full popular participation.

Recognition of the RPF's official narrative of who did what to whom during the genocide, and what is needed to never again allow genocide to unfold in Rwanda is, in the RPF's telling, a simple tale: The majority Hutu killed their Tutsi brethren as a result of ethnic hatred that was sharpened to the point of genocidal action by Belgian colonizers (1931-1962) and Rwanda's Hutu-led postcolonial

governments (1962-1994) (Republic of Rwanda, 1999). This framing erases the RPF's role in partially creating the conditions for genocide, as a rebel group that sough political power at any cost, including the loss of Tutsi lives (Kuperman 2004; Purdeková *et al.*, 2018). The official position that only Hutu killed also effaces the war crimes and crimes against humanity its troops committed before, during and after 1994 genocide (Thomson, 2018, pp. 23-24). A May 2003 constitutional amendment made formally illegal what was already an informal political norm: Public references to ethnic identity (article 33) as well as speech that promotes ethnic divisionism or trivializes the genocide (article 13) is illegal, punishable by up to 30 years in prison. This legislation has allowed the RPF to suppress the voices of those who question or criticize its policies and practice (Human Rights Watch, 2008).

The RPF has long targeted individuals with political aspirations, or those who express criticism. Real or perceived rivals are dead, in jail, or have fled the country. Domestic opposition politicians, the press, women's and religious groups, among other members of civil society also keep quiet (Reyntjens, 2013, pp. 124-162). The RPF have co-opted civil society, allowing it to operate only as the development branch of the government (Gready, 2011). Opponents and critics in exile also pose little threat to the RPF's electoral dominance, for operating outside the country mutes their local impact on the ground, for the electoral system is not designed for their participation (Jones, 2016). It is nearly impossible for political opponents to organize or campaign as the RPF-appointed National Electoral Commission manages elections while the Department of Military Intelligence also monitors the political activities of those in exile, making it a brave choice for them to return to campaign (Bouka, forthcoming).

Constitutional Re-Engineering

Upon taking power, the RPF began to lay the groundwork for the 2003 constitution to be put in place. In mid-July 1994, the RPF named a 70-member transitional government called the Government of National Unity (GNU). The GNU was a product of the RPF's stated commitment to sharing political power, as outlined in the August 1993 Arusha Peace Accords.[3] The Accords, along with Rwanda's 1991 Constitution, formed the constitutional law of the land at the time.[4] Rwanda's foreign donors believed that the RPF would keep its promise of power sharing by including five opposition political parties that had not supported the genocide, namely the MRND government of then president Habyarimana and a Hutu nationalist splinter party, the CDR.[5] The main coalition partner was the Republican Democratic Movement (MDR), a Hutu-led party that was also the main opposition during the Habyarimana regime (Human Rights Watch, 1999, p. 96). By the end of 1995, it was plain to see that RPF Tutsi who had grown up in exile in neighbouring Uganda dominated the GNU (Burnet, 2011, p. 309). The effect was the consolidation of a consensual dictatorship that would pave the way for local-level elections in 1999 and national parliamentary and presi-

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3 The Accords were the product of peace negotiations held between the Habyarimana government and the then-rebel RPF, which resulted in an accord designed to facilitate an end to Rwanda's civil war via an internationally brokered power-sharing arrangement (Kuperman, 2004).

4 Rwanda's basic charter at the time was the Fundamental Law, an amalgam of the 1991 constitution, two agreements among various parties and groups, and the RPF's own 1994 declaration of governance. Since 2003, the revised constitution is the primary law of the land.

5 An extremist faction of the National Republican Movement for Democracy (MRND) called the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR) planned and implemented the 1994 genocide. Both were excluded from the GNU. The coalition parties were the RPF, the Republican Democratic Movement (MDR), the Democratic Christian Party (PDC), the Democratic Islamic Party (PDI), the Liberal Party (PL), the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the Socialist Party of Rwanda (PSR), and the Democratic Union of the Rwandan People (UDPR).

dential elections in 2003. The adoption of the 2003 constitution marked the formal end of Rwanda's transitional period. Under the new constitution, the appointed GNU was replaced by a bicameral parliament made up of a Chamber of Deputies (80 seats) and a Senate (26 seats). Deputies serve terms of five years while senators serve for eight.

In 1998, the RPF-controlled GNU made a formal declaration of democratization, in a nod to foreign donors who tied their aid to vague commitments to democratic governance (Zorbas, 2011). In the years since the genocide, the RPF has restricted political party activity (a violation of the Arusha Accords), coopted or suppressed civil society organizations, and curtailed freedoms of speech, press and association (Longman, 2011). Rwanda was at the time (and remains) home to almost a dozen political parties. International donors took their presence as a healthy sign of an emergent democracy; they failed to appreciate that the parties operated in a coalition with the RPF. Independent or alternative political platforms were (and are) forbidden (Longman, 2011, p. 31). Instead, in July 2003, the GNU created the National Consultative Forum of Political Organizations as a branch of the National Commission of Elections (NEC), established in 2000 as part of the preparations for the 2003 presidential and parliamentary elections. The constitutional task of RPF-appointed NEC was to observe electoral campaigns, manage the electoral infrastructure, register voters, regulate the nomination of candidates, accredit local and international monitors, and oversee civic and voter education in the countryside. The Consultative Forum provided an avenue for opposition party leaders to be vetted by the RPF in the name of ensuring ethnic unity and political consensus. Consensus meant adherence to RPF policies. Dialogue and debate were not encouraged, nor was their discussion of alternative policy proposals (Waldorf, 2014). Within this carefully ordered environment, the RPF could rest assured of its success at the polls it

stage-managed; with seats populated by party loyalists, Rwandan-style democracy could proceed.

Maintaining Electoral Hegemony

Since the initial post-genocide transition to "democracy", the RPF has staged 13 local and national elections, something that international and regional election observers have broadly praised as promising despite numerous procedural flaws.[6] RPF incumbent Kagame won the most recent August 2017 presidential elections once again, this time with 98.8 percent of the vote. Winning by such margins is Rwanda's democratic norm. As RPF spokesperson explains, "People trust [Kagame]. If it were not democratic, he could even score 100 percent. There is nothing strange as to the high score in terms of votes" (quoted in Baddorf, 2017).

Wide margin electoral victories are also a form of political might in competitive authoritarian systems: "Manipulating elections excessively and blatantly [i.e. beyond what is necessary to win] can make the manipulating party appear stronger" (Simpser, 2013, p. xv). Kagame's, and by extension the RPF's, 2017 electoral victory is part of a longer strategy of maintaining power and extending authority through the ballot box. The electoral code is complex by design, being a mix of direct and indirect elections at the local and national levels. The result is "a near constant electoral cycle, the effect of staggering the elections to five-year positions (localities and Chamber of Deputies), seven-year Presidential terms and eight-year Senatorial terms" (Jones, 2016, p. 345).

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6 The European Union oversaw the international monitoring of local elections in 1999 and national elections in 2003, hailing them as an important step in Rwanda's national reconciliation (MOEEU, n.d.). Subsequent national elections have been marred by "excessive control" (HRW, 2018) and "long-standing concerns over the integrity of the vote-tabulation process" (US Department of State, 2017).

Obscurity is at the heart of Rwanda's complex electoral system. Encoded in the 2003 constitution, the processes and procedures for choosing candidates, campaigning, and voting is opaque, particularly as some government officials are appointed in the interests of national (not regional or local) representation. Being elected to represent Rwandans, rather than specific localities also means that legislators lack specific constituencies. The effect of appointed representatives is that they can be dismissed for non-performance, an undefined term that allows the RPF-controlled NEC to recall and replace parliamentarians. Between 2003 and 2008, dismissal without just cause affected 25 percent of the membership of the Chamber of Deputies (Stroh, 2009).

Electoral legalism allows the RPF to present vague commitments to democracy even as it has systematically entrenched a voting system that endorses political hegemony. This system of elections by constitutional coup is nothing new. Former president Habyarimana benefitted from a 1973 constitutional amendment that resulted in an extended presidential mandate (from four to five years) (Desrosiers, 2018). The local- and district-level elections held prior to 2003 constitutional revision were a dry-run for the RPF's plan of nation-wide consultations to revise the constitution in its militarized vision of pride, dignity and ethnic unity (Republic of Rwanda, Office of the President, 1999; Purdeková, 2016). With its primacy assured, the RPF could now make a symbolic gesture to elections as a sign of democratic commitment while also assessing the readiness of the population to vote for the RPF. Appointed local officials, often in the presence of armed military observers, lectured Rwandans in pre-election sensitization meetings about voting for the "right" candidate, meaning the RPF-vetted and NEC-approved individual (International Crisis Group, 2001, p. 7).

 In March 1999, local-level elections were held up as a sign of the population's readiness for democracy, much to the relief of Rwanda's foreign donors (Freedom House, 1999). In their rush to

congratulate the RPF, donors failed to appreciate that the elections offered no contestation, with their observers instead offering words of praise for Rwanda's electoral effort (e.g., MOEEU, n.d., p. 3). All candidates stood under the RPF's banner and it was unclear how they were chosen (Jones, 2016, p. 345). Missing from the analysis of international monitors was the RPF's control of candidate lists, polling booths and voter rolls (International Crisis Group, 2001, p. 23). Throughout the country, RPF handlers roused sleeping Rwandans as early as 1 a.m. to vote as instructed by queuing behind sanctioned candidates at open-air community meetings. Elections were a public affair for which the RPF offered no apology. Its form of democracy was (and is) a top-down, highly controlled process.

Central to the RPF's electoral machinery is a civilian cadre of party loyalists, trained by the Department of Military Intelligence, known to Rwandans as *abakada* (a Kinyarwandan take on the French word 'cadre'). The *abakada* were first set-up during the civil war that preceded the genocide to mobilize and recruit those living in RPF occupied territory, and to spread its liberation ideology among Rwandans living in- and outside the country (Thomson, 2018, p. 37). From July 1994, members of the *abakada* were posted to all levels of the bureaucracy, in Kigali and the countryside, to monitor the work of local political and military officials and to report on activities of ordinary people. They also worked in UN agencies, local and foreign non-governmental organizations and the private sector to monitor attitudes towards the government, and to survey political activities, including electoral campaigning and voting (Rever, 2016). The *abakada* acts as the eyes and ears of the RPF regime, ensuring compliance with government directives, including when and for whom to vote. As Burnet (2008, p. 366), notes, the "orchestrated nature of elections is an open secret in Rwanda," performed to legitimate the RPF and appease the good governance requirements of foreign donors, notably the US and the UK.

Following the success of the 1999 local elections, measured by the NEC as the ability of the majority of Rwandans to vote as expected, district level elections were held in 2001, soon followed by the creation of an RPF-appointed Constitutional Commission. In May 2003, the RPF-controlled parliament approved a new constitution through a national referendum organized by the NEC. Foreign donors hailed it as a sign of democratic commitment, for 87 percent of four million eligible voters approved of the new constitution (Economist, 2003). True to form, the RPF had left nothing to chance. The *abakada*, along with local political and military officials, were deployed to ensure the result. The new constitution forbids political activity at the local level, a move that all but eliminates the presence of opposition parties in the countryside. The RPF is not affected having already established its grass-roots presence while proclaiming it needs a local level presence to oversee government development initiatives and poverty alleviation programs (Purdeková, 2011).

Just days after the new constitution was promulgated, the NEC announced new dates for the 2003 presidential and parliamentary elections. The news came as a surprise to many, for a November election had been planned. Bringing the elections forward to August 2003 significantly reduced the time for opposition parties to prepare. In July 2003, the NEC ordered the dissolution of the main opposition party, the MDR, on grounds that its leadership had minimized the significance of the genocide and mobilized support along ethnic lines (Meierhenrich, 2006, p. 629). The party was dissolved using constitutional provisions allowing for the disbanding of political organizations that do not "constantly reflect the unity of the people of Rwanda" (art. 54). The electoral playing field was now squarely tipped in favour of the RPF, and its presidential candidate,

the incumbent Paul Kagame.[7] Speaking in March 2003, Kagame challenged the opposition: "I can even say that the outcomes of the elections are known. Those elected will be individuals who are 100 per cent in line with the current political agenda, aimed at building the country. […] Anyone who would bring in division—because I know the views of those who intend to come back are based on division—will not be elected" (quoted in Human Rights Watch, 2003, pp. 1-2).

Equating criticism to genocide denial has been an effective RPF tactic since 1994. The RPF adroitly denied all criticisms about the lack of political competition before international audiences and asserted to domestic ones that restrictions on party activity were necessary to assure national unity, given Rwanda's history of ethnic violence. When donors pushed the RPF to clarify its position, the government portrayed its authoritarian tendencies as benign, declaring that it was committed to a democratic transition. Opportunities for any political opposition to operate freely and on an equal footing with the RPF in both urban and rural areas evaporated.

Unsurprising then, were the results of Rwanda's first post-genocide national elections. Kagame won the presidency with 95.5 percent of the vote. His challenger, former MDR party president (and first post-genocide prime minister) turned independent candidate, Faustin Twagiramungu, an ethnic Hutu, garnered just 3.6 per-

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7 Paul Kagame acceded to the presidency in March 2000. He was Rwanda's de facto leader from July 1994, in his role as vice president, head of the military and, from 1998, chairman of the RPF. The first post-genocide president was Pasteur Bizimungu, who served as a figurehead president from 1994 to 2000. An ethnic Hutu who has served in the pre-genocide government, Bizimungu was a founding member of the RPF who later spent time in prison, in solitary confinement, after a public falling out with Kagame. In 2001 he started a new political party that was banned almost immediately upon registration, on allegations of ethnic mobilization. In 2004, Bizimungu was found guilty of trumped-up charges of embezzlement, attempting to form a militia, and inciting public violence. Unexpectedly, Kagame commuted Bizimungu's sentence in 2007, but he was no longer a political force of any repute (Waldorf, 2009).

cent. The RPF read this meager support as a sign that some Rwandans were still voting on ethnic lines. In his acceptance speech, Kagame praised the NEC for its ability to ensure that 96.5 percent of the electorate turned out (Republic of Rwanda, 2004). Voting in the parliamentary elections lasted for three days, 29-30 September and 2 October, a full month after the close of the presidential elections. The vote was staggered to allow for enough time to sensitize the population on the proportional representation components of the newly revised constitution. Guaranteed seats for women, youth and the disabled were elected on the first day. On day two, the election for 53 seats of the Chamber of Deputies took place. Day three marked the election of the 24 seats allocated to women as well as all senate seats. The RPF and it coalition party allies won in a predictable landslide. The parliamentary elections resulted in 39 seats for women, accounting for almost 50 percent of the MPs in the Chamber. While certainly an impressive outcome, those women who stood did so following careful vetting by the NEC (Thomson, 2018, p. 164). While parliament is majority female, most of these women are card-carrying members of the RPF, or its coalition allies (Burnet, 2011, p. 310).

The presidency is elected by a relative majority of votes. The majority of parliamentary seats of the House and Senate are gained through a closed list system of proportional representation to allocate 53 of the 80 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (2003 constitution, art. 77). The remaining seats were reserved for special representations for gender (24 seats), youth (two seats) and the disabled (one seat). Twelve of 26 senate seats are allocated and then indirectly elected by an electoral college made up of the executive committees of sectors, districts, and municipalities (art. 86). The remaining 14 seats were said to be open for elections, being one representative for each of Rwanda's 12 provinces, and two seats designed to representation institutions of higher learning (art. 82). For the 2003 parliamentary elections, President Kagame and the Forum of Political

Organizations appointed twelve senators, as suitable candidates could not be found to stand for election. Samset and Dalby speculate that the lack of qualified candidates is likely a function of needing to have impeccable credentials that were verified by the Supreme Court of Rwanda, not the NEC (2003, p. 23). NEC officials violated electoral law they helped draft in asking the Supreme Court to approve senatorial candidates.

The shallow pool of vetted parliamentary candidate highlighted the extent to which the 2003 constitution and electoral laws were designed to formalize a single-party system, with the RPF at the helm (Longman, 2011). This mirrors the single-party system instituted at the end of colonial rule in 1962, a system that has deepened in scope and substance in subsequent parliamentary and presidential elections. Rwanda's 1978 constitution formalized single-party rule, mandating that all Rwandans become members of the National Republican Movement for Democracy (MRND) party (Desrosiers and Thomson, 2011). Critically, only the leader of the MRND could stand for president, resulting in personalized rule for the organs of the state and of the political party overlapped. Then, like today, the separation of institutional powers exists in name only.

The legacy of single-party rule is the enduring presence of weak political institutions designed to perform the governance duties set out in the constitution and legal system, including basic democratic norms such as judicial and legislative independence as well as checks on the power of the executive branch (Dahl, 1971). Belgian colonial rule undermined the possibility for a democratic system to evolve in Rwanda. Divide-and-rule policies instituted during the colonial period sharpened and politicized preexisting ethnic identities of the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority, in turn paving the way for elite conflict.[8] Historically and today, elite power struggles are

8 Rwanda is also home to a politically marginal ethnic group, the Twa, who make up just one percent of the population (Newbury and Newbury, 2000, p. 836, ftn. 11).

shaped by a winner-takes-all political culture, resulting in the exclusion of the losers in politics, the military and the economy.

For Rwandans, history is cyclical, meaning Hutu elites are to revenge the hurts and losses of all Hutu, while Tutsi elites are to do the same for all Tutsi (C. Newbury, 1998, pp. 9-10). The cycles of revenge that characterize the historical resolution of political conflict in Rwanda mean that those elites who employed violence to hold power fear later being targeted for death in response to the violence they ordered. The result is that, in Rwanda, political conflict is resolved on the battlefield, not institutionally. In the minds of the current RPF leadership, a fear of sharing power with Hutu is legitimate. Not only have Hutu political elites targeted Tutsi when under political pressure in the past, they have also demonstrated that they are more interested in maintaining their political primacy rather than sharing power. All too aware of this history, the political choices of the RPF are security-seeking, intended to contain what they think is a restive Hutu population while assuring the safety of politically loyal Tutsi as an ethnic minority. As the Rwandan proverb goes, "He who wishes for peace prepares for war" (Des Forges, 1999, p. 96).

The RPF has no intention of transitioning to a Western-form of liberal democracy of multiple political platforms represented by different parties, a free and open media as well as a capable and informed civil society, the minimum democratic standard theorized by Dahl (1971). Nor is there open political space to allow a broad range of civil society actors to act to limit and control the power of the state. Speaking in 2000, Johnston Busingye, secretary general in the Ministry of Justice, made the government's position plain: "When civil society sees itself as something different to government, as almost opposed, then it is a problem" (quoted in Gready, 2011, p. 89).

In post-genocide Rwanda, civil society is best understood as a development partner of the RPF, not a counterweight. Control, not criticism or confrontation, define the RPF's relationship with civil

society. Laws designed to control the political activities of civil society were introduced by 1998 (INCL, 2018). Subsequent revisions further entrenched control of the civil society sector, including provisions to monitor staffing, ensure their work reflects national development priorities and that they reach government-approved beneficiaries.[9] Even those parts of civil society, such as think tanks or the university that appear to produce critical research do so with the rubber stamp of government approval (Nylen, 2018). In Rwanda, the existence of 'critical' research centers and institutes allows the government to silence foreign critics as evidence of 'independent' voices that question government policy and elite behavior. The reality is such research is usually vetted by the government, and approved by the relevant line ministry before publication, as Ingelaere documents in his analysis of World Bank reports that were embargoed by the Ministry of Local Government (2010, pp. 49-51).

Structural Control and Electoral Outcomes

The 2003 parliamentary and presidential elections did not result in democratic outcomes (Meierhenrich, 2006, pp. 633). The efficient administration of the elections gave the RPF leadership international legitimacy it craved, paving the way for continued foreign aid and good will as the government pushed its developmental credentials (Longman, 2011; Matfess, 2015; Reyntjens, 2013). International organizations failed to see that orderly electoral outcomes resulted in tighter authoritarianism. As such, the first national elec

9 As a result, domestic civil society organisations struggle to form partnerships with international NGOs, human rights organisations, and other not-for-profit groups such as church groups, women's coops and student clubs (ICNL, 2018). Not only are such partnerships mediated through the government, DMI monitors the speech of development workers, foreign journalists, and other internationals through an unspoken "24/20" rule. A health specialist living in Kigali explains: "You say something wrong and you get 24 hours to leave the country with 20 kilos worth of stuff" (Santoro and Thomson, 2014).

tions since the 1994 genocide inaugurated constitutional dictator-
ship dressed up as a Rwandan-style consensual democracy. By the
end of 2003, the higher echelons of power were firmly in the hands
of a few men, notably President Kagame and his inner circle of polit-
ical, military and business advisors, most of whom were either
founding or longtime members of the RPF. The parliamentary (2008
and 2013) and presidential elections held since 2003 (2010 and
2017) reveal a political system designed for control rather than dia-
logue (Waldorf, 2014).

Kagame, in consultation with a small inner circle of trusted in-
telligence, military and political aides from the ruling Rwandan Pat-
riotic Front, sets government policy on practically all issues without
involvement of cabinet, parliament or the senate, and without judi-
cial oversight (Longman, 2017, pp. 135-186; Reyntjens, 2013, pp.
57-97). Indeed, 2015 saw the passage of an important constitutional
amendment allowing the incumbent Kagame to potentially remain
in power until 2034 (Thomson, 2018, p. 243). For the RPF leader-
ship, the amendment is a uniquely Rwandan solution to the socio-
political problems it inherited since the genocide. This narrow and
self-serving approach to democratization rests on the RPF's belief
that it is the sole political entity capable to ensuring Rwanda's geno-
cide-free future (Thomson, 2018, pp. 141-142). As such, Rwandans
from all walks of life must offer up unfettered support for RPF poli-
cies for as long as it takes for "democracy" to take hold in their
hearts and minds (Straus and Waldorf, 2011, p. 16; Thomson, 2013,
pp. 220). For the leadership, the rationale is simple: Since Belgian
colonial rule sowed ethnic divisions among Rwandans that resulted
in the 1994 genocide of ethnic Tutsi by ethnic Hutu, the RPF needs
to first develop democratic political institutions and norms of politi-
cal behavior, both among elites and the ordinary citizen, that will
ensure a peaceful and prosperous Rwanda.

By the time of the 2008 parliamentary elections, the RPF had
extended its reach, administratively to the grassroots through a poli-

cy of decentralization, and into the hearts and minds of Rwandans through citizenship reeducation and voter sensitization campaigns (Sundberg, 2016, pp. 183-217). This reach is a product of "clear hierarchies and an intricate organization" that appoints government officials to positions with overlapping administrative roles (Purdeková, 2011, p. 481). Official restructuring in 2006 decentralized state bureaucracy under the guise of better grassroots service delivery. Units of governance are divided into six levels: 5 provinces, including Kigali City, 30 districts, 416 sectors, 2,146 cells, 14,774 villages and *umukuru* (village committees). As of 2014, RPF-appointed local government officials represent fully half the government's payroll (Chemouni, 2014, p. 246).

Paradoxically, rather than transfer power or devolve influence to ordinary people, decentralization has allowed the RPF to expand its authority and ensure obedience to the many rules and regulations instituted since 1994 (Thomson, 2018, pp. 203-220). Officials at the lowest level of the political system, the cell, look to Kigali for policy instructions as well. Working as the heads of cell committees, these unpaid, elected volunteer coordinators are responsible for the daily administration of the people in their jurisdictions (Ingelaere, 2011, p. 71). Together, the sector and the cell represent the immediate source of state power at the level of the individual. It is at these levels that the control and authority of government play out in daily life. Reports on individual behavior, as well as requests for benefits or privileges, start at the local level (Ingelaere, 2011, pp. 73-74).

Top-down administration is institutionalized and incentivized in the form of performance contracts known in the national language, Kinyarwanda, as *imihigo. Imihigo* requires local government officials, be they appointed or elected, to publicly swear under oath to implement national policy goals as instructed by government superiors in Kigali. These local government officials are charged with monitoring the population residents in their bailiwick for signs of political opposition, and ensuring that everyone turns out for RPF

campaign rallies and votes for the RPF candidate. Any deviation from these directives is a breach of contract, punishable by dismissal, imprisonment and in extreme cases, flight into exile (IPAR, 2016; Silver, 2009). The threat of breaking *imihigo* commitments intensified pressure on local government officials. As one local official sighed, "*imihigo* is the engine of everything," before lamenting, "it is killing us, no one can escape it" (quoted in Chemouni, 2014, p. 250).

A mixture of government incentive, demographic density and Rwanda's hilly terrain explain the impressive ability of the RPF-led government to command authority, mobilize the masses and prompt compliance. In 2016, population density had grown to 468 per square kilometer. Almost twice as many people live on Rwanda's rolling hills than in 1993, when 255 people occupied a square kilometer. In contrast to the vast expanses of open land that characterize most African countries, Rwanda's densely inhabited hilly landscape has a fishbowl quality. There is a feeling that anyone who wishes can see and know anything, placing considerable power in the hands of local officials, and providing incentives for friends, family and neighbors to betray them in exchange for favours or preferential treatment (Thomson, 2018, p. 153). Purdeková explains this "sphere of vision" as the "experience of being seen—whether real or suspected—[affecting] the performance of those under state watch" (2016, p. 62).

Many Rwandan citizens claim to feel watched, and they are, as the political system is designed for compliance. The government aims to produce individual compliance through its many legal rules and cultural codes, including a vast surveillance network. The RPF oversees local life through administrative presence. Respect for authority and hierarchy is everything. Political and military elites dictate policy, programs and practice down to local government officials, who then ensure that the rural masses carry out the orders as instructed. Local leaders, in turn, monitor the activities and speech

of individuals within their bailiwick (Thomson, 2013, p. 37). Compliance with government directives is paramount, as is knowing and respecting one's spot in the hierarchy. It is common to see poor, rural Rwandans supplicating before local officials in hopes of securing much-needed social benefits, and then to observe those same local authorities deferring to their higher-ups (Thomson, 2018, p. 154) Naturally, President Kagame is at the top of the pyramid. Rwanda's hierarchical political structure has its origins in precolonial monarchy: The pecking order has merely been refined by successive political leaders (Des Forges, 2011; Newbury, 1988). The RPF and President Kagame are but the most recent beneficiaries of this centralized and stratified system.

This structural reality goes some way to explaining why President Kagame and his RPF consistently garner so much of the national vote. It is unsafe to not vote for them, despite a fledging critical opposition that operates from exile. Although, opponents did come out of hiding to challenge Kagame during the 2010 and 2017 presidential elections, they were not able to participate on a level electoral playing field.

Eliminating Opponents

Since 2003, the RPF handily controls the political realm, and by extension, electoral outcomes. The presidential contest is the most visible of these, and President Kagame has used his platform to praise his government's efforts at rebuilding Rwanda to international audiences while denying opportunities for an opposition to emerge, let alone participate. The exclusion of political opponents is, in Kagame's mind, easily explained: Anyone who questions RPF rule is preaching genocide denial or seeks to destabilize Rwanda with divisive politics (Reyntjens, 2013, pp. 187-194). The result is a non-existent domestic political opposition, despite the presence of a few parties willing to contest the hegemonic RPF. In the last two dec-

ades, waves of political dissenters have left the country, either by force or in self-imposed exile (Bouka, forthcoming). Many of them were critics of the government in the immediate post-genocide period, urging the RPF to allow space and resources for democratic institutions and norms to take root (Thomson, 2018, pp. 137-140).

By the time of the 2010 presidential elections, "almost all of Rwanda's opposition figures were in exile," unable to operate fair and square on the ground (Jones, 2016, p. 347). Despite the RPF's near-total domination of the electoral realm, it sought to further tighten its electoral grip. Anyone who stands against Kagame is ruthlessly punished. Take for example the experiences of Victoire Ingabire in 2010 and Diane Rwigara in 2017. Both women sought to challenge Kagame's preeminence, and both have paid dearly, imprisoned (at the time of writing) in their pursuit of standing for office.

Throughout the 2010 presidential campaign, Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza, of the United Democratic Forces–Inkingi party, along with other senior FDU members proposed that the genocide affected all Rwandans, not just Tutsi. This, unsurprisingly, drew the ire of the RPF. Both Ingabire and the party's general secretary were arrested at different times early in 2010. Ingabire's troubles began at her very first rally. In a January 2010 speech at the Gisozi Genocide Memorial Centre in suburban Kigali, Ingabire implored the government to recognize Hutu lives that were lost in 1994. Ingabire's suggestion was politically tone-deaf, not because it was incorrect— indeed, her words resonated with many who were unhappy with how RPF-led reconciliation efforts were progressing—but because, by equating Hutu lives lost during the 1994 genocide with Tutsi lives lost, Ingabire essentially denied the RPF's singular narrative of Tutsi victims and Hutu perpetrators (Jones, 2016). As such, she was charged with denying the 1994 genocide of Tutsi given its narrow legal definition.

In short order, Ingabire became the object of recognizable RPF tactics to control who can say what to whom and when about the 1994 genocide. The RPF stymied FDU efforts to register for the 2010

elections and aimed to weaken its appeal in the countryside without raising negative comment from donors. At first, the RPF engaged in subtle obstruction. Bureaucratic hurdles were raised to prevent party registration. RPF-controlled media outlets denounced FDU leaders. Party activities were placed under perpetual surveillance. In time, these tactics gave way to more direct forms of intimidation and harassment at rallies and organizational meetings (Reyntjens, 2013, pp. 187-211). Soon after, Ingabire was arrested on allegations of genocide denial, as well as for terrorism and having genocide ideology.[10] Following her trial, in 2012, Ingabire was found guilty of conspiracy to undermine the government and genocide denial, and sentenced to eight years in prison (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Her case was appealed before the Rwandan Supreme Court, whose judges increased her sentence to fifteen years. Despite international donor pleas for an impartial retrial, Ingabire remains in jail at the time of writing in mid-2018.

Diane Rwigara's presidential campaign was entirely different than Ingabire's. Diane's father, Assinapol Rwigara, a wealthy businessman and one of the original ethnic Tutsi funders of the then-rebel RPF, was killed in a car accident in 2013. Over the following twenty-four months, the government seized or destroyed his assets, including property in Kigali. Rwigara's wife and adult children claim the RPF murdered him to appropriate the family's sizeable wealth, and on suspicion that the family was funding political opponents, despite his impeccable political credentials (Thomson, 2018, p. 252). It is widely believed that the senior Rwigara had become disillusioned with the politics of the power hungry Kagame, in turn forging ties to the Rwanda National Congress, an opposition-in-exile party founded by former Kagame confidantes in 2010.

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10 These charges stem from Ingabire's alleged political ties to armed rebel groups operating in neighbouring DRC, with the presumed intention of overthrowing the government (HRW, 2012).

As expected, Kigali police declared Rwigara's death an accident following a "professional" investigation (Times Reporters, 2015). In May 2017, Diane Rwigara announced her intent to stand in August's presidential elections. RPF-controlled news outlets promptly released doctored nude images of Ms. Rwigara following her announcement, claiming that she lacks the moral propriety to be president, a violation of the 2003 constitution (Kitungu, 2017). This gendered form of attack is common in Rwandan politics. It occurred before the genocide and it is still practiced today (Burnet, 2012, pp. 42-6; Jefremovas, 1991). Sexualized nude images of politically aspirant women such as Ms. Rwigara are published in government-sponsored outlets to both personally humiliate and politically sanction. Such images, along with a constitutional moral propriety clause, serve to remind women that politics is the domain of powerful men and that their rightful place is at home, not in the public sphere (Jefremovas, 1991, p. 380-382). Also at stake are Rwigara's honour and status as a young, educated and elite Tutsi woman. The nude images are likely a reminder of the gendered pitfalls of breaking with other elites.

Yet Rwigara's candidacy gained traction, particularly among Rwandans living in exile as young Rwigara chose to challenge President Kagame at the polls—something few others dared do.[11] Diane Rwigara's campaign ended before it could even start. The NEC declared Rwigara ineligible to stand as a presidential candidate, following the rejection of her nomination. Rwigara has been in prison since September 2017, on allegations of tax evasion and forgery (Economist, 2018).

The experience of both women offers important insights about how the RPF, under Paul Kagame, plan to rule Rwanda for the fore-

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11 Voters living outside of Rwanda are eligible to vote provided they register with the Diaspora Directorate, an office located in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (http://www.rwandandiaspora.gov.rw/).

seeable future. As yet (openly) unopposed in its implementation of national unity and reconciliation policies, the RPF could govern Rwanda for another two decades. Such an assertion can be made with confidence since 2015. In a nationwide constitutional referendum, Rwandans voted to amend their constitution to allow president Kagame—and only Kagame—to stand for a third seven-year term, and then for two additional five-year terms. Following his reelection in August 2017, with 99 percent of the vote, in an engineered ballot that was neither free nor fair, the president is unlikely to be prevented from governing until he chooses to step down (Thomson, 2018, pp. 253-255). Absent are both domestic checks and balances on Kagame's unfettered rule, and international sanction for his government's entrenchment of dictatorship. President Kagame all-but-asserted as much in December 2016, a full nine-months before the 2017 presidential elections, saying that *his* RPF plans to run the country until at least the year 2050 (Kwibuka, 2016). We see no reason to disagree, given the lack of space for a political opposition to arise.

Conclusion

Our analysis concludes that the RPF has used, with great success by its own measures, the promise of a specific Rwandan-style of democracy, inclusion and popular participation to ensure its political and military preeminence. The use of democratic tools to exclude those who question or criticize the government is at the heart of what the RPF considers a uniquely post-genocide style of democracy: Politics without representation and popular participation without voice at both the local and national levels. In addition, we find that the RPF has invested in deepening the reach of the Rwandan state system to serve its hegemonic role in society, as demonstrated by Kagame's continuous efforts to ensure the RPF is seen and felt at every level of society (Purdeková *et al.*, 2018). The goal is simple: To

assure the RPF's preeminence in the political, economic and military spheres of public life as the foundation for securing the country's stability and security. This security and stability is largely a mirage, rooted in a dense and decentralized administrative structure designed to ensure popular compliance (Ingelaere, 2001, pp. 69-71).

As a result, prospects for a post-genocide transition to democracy are non-existent. In highlighting the relationship between the quality of Rwanda's post-colonial political institutions and civilian rule by military leaders in the name of peace and security, Rwanda's legacy of ethnically-motivated civil conflict has produced weak elite commitments to political power-sharing, coopted political institutions and the overall militarization of the political realm. Historically and today, Rwanda's political leadership, whether Hutu or Tutsi, are prone to resolve political crises through force rather than compromise. The result is weak democratic institutions, a political culture characterized by repression, a co-opted civil society sector and low citizen trust in political leaders and military officials.

Though the RPF is dedicated to creating a façade of democratic elections, the international community has become increasingly aware of its intensely authoritarian electoral practices. Multiparty politics have virtually disappeared and the little that remains is thwarted by the RPF's control, minimizing chances for a peaceful change of power in the future. Victoire Ingabire and Diane Rwigara serve as a grave reminder to all Rwandans and especially to those with the determination to challenge the RPF of what obstacles remain in the political realm. Kagame's power hungry attitude was solidified through the 2017 constitutional amendment that allowed him to potentially serve as president until 2034. While there still remains an unpredictable nature to the RPF hidden behind this façade of democracy, one thing remains clear: Political elections will remain largely uncontested in an environment ridden with political fear.

Rwanda's top-down and centralized state system produces physical, emotional and economic violence that is intimately related to historical ethnic, class and gender hierarchies (Burnet, 2012, pp. 41-73). All societies harbor such cleavages. What matters is how they are defined and made real in people's lives. This is why voting, and by extension, civil and political rights matter; they provide recourse for people to seek redress for wrongs suffered at the hands of the government. No such custom is entrenched in Rwanda, and throughout its tenure, the RPF gone out of its way to prevent a culture of civic protection from emerging, using elections as a legitimating tool.

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Electoral Democracy and the Attenuation of Subaltern Resistance in Ghana

Why Democracy is increasingly becoming a Poisoned Chalice in Africa

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Abstract: The paper highlights one of the central arguments of my book, *Neoliberal Globalisation and Resistance from Below: Why the Subalterns Resist in Bolivia and not in Ghana*. Electoral democracy is one of the distinctive properties of the present socio-historical context of Ghana, a factor that has strongly shaped the political agency of the subaltern classes. Since holding its "founding" elections in 1992, Ghana's (re)democratisation has become a model of electoral democracy in Africa. Yet the democratic experience of the subaltern classes is that of misery and a neo-patrimonial democratic state, buried neck-deep in corruption, unable to deliver basic necessities of life to the poor. Paradoxically, the Ghanaian subaltern classes have not mobilised in an Arab Spring-style to resist the failed democratic developmental state. They are rather divided by and loyal to their political tribes, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic (NDC) party. They sometimes even engage in internecine intra-subaltern struggles over the patronage dispensed by the neo-patrimonial political oligarchy. Thus, one of the paradoxes of electoral democracy in Ghana is that, rather than opening political space for subaltern groups to mobilise from "below" to hold the state accountable, it has led to, on one hand, the attenuation of subaltern resistance; and on the other, the emergence of a politically gullible and pliant subaltern class that is deeply divided along party-tribal lines.

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In his influential book, Africa Since Independence, Paul Nugent asked whether independence was a "poisoned chalice or a cup of plenty?" (Nugent, 2004, p. 7). Another watershed event in the political history of Sub-Saharan Africa (henceforth, Africa) that happened in the postcolonial era was the wave of democratisation which swept the region in the early 1990s. Indeed, some observers even described the latter as the 'second independence' or 'second liberation' of Africa (Legum, 1990; Muna, 1991; Ake, 1993). After two decades experience with electoral democracy, the time is ripe to pose Nugent's question again: is democracy a poisoned chalice or cup of plenty? From a radical perspective of political accountability, my contribution addresses this question by scrutinising Ghana's 25 years of democratic governance, "held up as one of Africa's star democratizers" (Gyimah-Boadi, 2015, p.101). Since holding its "founding" election in 1992, Ghana has since organised six successive, four-yearly periodic, and peaceful elections. The most recent, 2016 elections, lent credibility to the narrative of Ghana being a star democratizer, with the organizational capacity and requisite political culture of holding relatively peaceful, free and fair elections. They were the third elections whose results have led to the rotation of power between the incumbent party and its political opponent, the opposition party. The Ghanaian subaltern classes often turn out in massive numbers to vote, and in some cases, wait several hours in the queue to do so. There is a sense in which one may argue that the subalterns have embraced electoral democracy, if even their wellbeing has not improved in any significant ways (Ayelazuno, 2015).

Ghana's (re)democratisation has been a magnet for the work of scholars, democracy-promotion civil society groups, and development aid agencies. With electoral democracy promoted as the "only game in town", a voluminous body of literature, both scholarly and grey, has been produced. A great deal of this work has fixated on promoting and analysing Ghana's progress on the minimum conditions for the consolidation of electoral democracy, the predominant

model of democracy shaped by the neoliberal world order. In contrast to this oeuvre, this paper interrogates Ghana's 25 years-old electoral democracy from a more radical perspective of democracy and political accountability and legitimacy. I argue that Ghana's electoral democracy has led to the installation an elected neo-patrimonial oligarchy that uses the political legitimacy bestowed on it by elections to command the resources of the state. It then distributes them to themselves, their cronies, and clients.

What electoral democracy has done in Ghana and elsewhere in Africa is to give political legitimacy to the hitherto authoritarian neo-patrimonial state. The corollary of all this is the emergence and consolidation of the elitist, Schumpeterian model of electoral democracy where elections are not mechanisms for holding the political elites accountable. They are rather institutional arrangements through which the political elites are vested with "the power to decide on all matters as a consequence of their successful pursuit of people's votes" (Held, 2006, p. 142). Far from being rule by the demos, electoral democracy in Ghana is increasingly becoming a poisoned chalice because of the attenuation of resistance from "below" against the elected oligarchy. Unchecked from "below" by the subaltern classes—safe the four-yearly ritual of elections—the elected oligarchy of Ghana acts like the ancien regime of France prior to the 1789 Revolution in eighteenth century. They overindulge themselves openly in opulent lifestyles which—in a country where every corner is marked by one subaltern or the other eking out a miserable life—represents islands of wealth in an ocean of poverty. The prediction of Ghanaian Political Scientist, F.K. Drah, on the eve of the (re)democratisation of Ghana has become true: he anticipated that the participation of the masses in the democracy they struggled for would be manipulated by the political class for their selfish ends if the masses did not keep control of the political class (Drah, 1987, p. 31).

This perverted democracy is shaping the wind of disillusion-ment with democracy blowing across Africa and the world in general because of its failure to deliver substantive material equality. Liberal democracy all over the world is being called to question because of its inherent contradictions, major among them is the gap between the enjoyment of procedural equality and immiseration from struc-tural socioeconomic inequality; a condition engendered by neolibe-ral globalisation. This situation is giving rise to creeping political tribalism even in the heartlands of democracy like USA and UK, where the disappointments with democratic governance is creating an increasingly intolerant and tribalistic democratic citizenry, fuelled by extreme right-wing populism (Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Zaka-ria, 2016; Chua, 2018; Fukuyama, 2018). The (re)democratisation of Africa happened in the specific socio-political context of polities characterised by widespread practices of neopatrimonialism (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Allen, 1995; Sandbrook, 2000). Not to be outdone, these neopatrimonialism practices have, unsurprisingly, come back with vengeance—if they ever went anywhere at all—to debase democracy to the ritual of rotating one elected neo-patrimonial oligarchy with another by means of so-called free and fair elections.

In this political context, periodic elections will not suffice to make democracy truly participatory and social-democratic (Drah, 1987, p. 30–1; Ake, 1996, p. 132, 137). Even in the celebrated de-mocracy of Ghana, elections have merely led to the rotation of one elected neopatrimonial oligarchy to another. Radical modes of hol-ding the elected neopatrimonial oligarchy accountable to the subal-terns for their decisions, actions, and inactions are required. I am, here, canvassing for resistance from the "bottom" by the subaltern classes; I am urging the participation of the Ghanaian subalterns in 'contentious politics' (Tarrow, 1998) or 'collective action' (Piven, 2006). In addition to queuing long hours to vote every four years, the subalterns need to mobilise as a class—not supporters of diffe-

rent political parties—to mount "contentious challenges through disruptive direct action" (Tarrow, 1998, p. 5) against the political elites for their harsh neoliberal policies, their obscene display of profligate lifestyles, and the massive corruption they are engaged in. The active participation of the subaltern classes in contentious politics is critical to rescuing democracy from the capture of neo-patrimonialism. However, these non-traditional modes of political participation have been marginalised in the era of the hegemony of liberal democracy where periodic elections are viewed as the only mechanism by which the citizenry can hold the state accountable in a democratic system of government. The refrain is that citizens should go out and vote; it is better to use the ballot, as "paper stones", than to use barricades and bullets (Przeworski and Sprague, 1986).

Yet the erosion of contentious politics is rather ironic as the universal suffrage, by which electoral democracy is practised, was made possible through contentious politics. The (re)democratisation of Africa happened on the back of contentious politics. Courageous ordinary people defied the brutality of authoritarian regimes and organised protests against their tyrannical rule. Contentious politics opened the political space for variegated transitional trajectories to electoral democracy in Africa and other parts of the world such as Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia. It was, more recently, tried in North Africa and the Middle East, though with few successes

Paradoxically, the prospects of radical modes of holding the state accountable from "below" are not bright in Ghana—despite the hospitable political context liberal democracy has provided through constitutional guarantees of freedoms of association and expression, as well as the rule of law and due process. There a sense in which liberal democracy, with all its contradictions and democratic deficits, opens the political space or provides what social movement theorists conceptualised as the 'political opportunity' (Tarrow, 1998; Meyer, 2004) for the subalterns to mobilise from "below" against elected

neo-patrimonial oligarchy for their corrupt practices and harsh neo-liberal policies. Paradoxically, the Ghanaian subalterns have not mobilised in an Arab Spring-style to resist the failed democratic developmental state. Why? This is the question I posed and addressed in detail in my recent book published with Routledge, Neoliberal Globalization and Resistance from Below: Why the Subalterns Resist in Bolivia and not in Ghana (Ayelazuno, 2019). While the Ghanaian subalterns have historically been "virile and irrepressible by nature" (Padmore, 1953), electoral democracy has led to the diminution of resistance on one hand; and on the other, the emergence of a politically gullible and sycophantic subaltern class that is deeply divided along, and loyal to, the two major political tribes in Ghana: The National Democratic Congress (NDC) party and New Patriotic Party (NPP). Because of their party-tribalism, the subalterns do not mobilise as a unified class to resist the elected neo-patrimonial political elites. They rather engage in internecine struggles over the patronage dispensed by their political patrons. Clearly, elections and the elected neopatrimonial political elites in Ghana have not only divided the ranks of the subaltern classes, the latter have continued to exploit this division to their political advantage (Ayelazuno, 2019, p. 193, 216-217).

Democratising the Ghanaian Neo-patrimonial State

Electoral liberal democracy presumes a form of state that has well-developed institutions; functional and effective in meeting the minimal procedural standards of democracy. Institutions are the building blocks of democracy (Luckham, et al., 2003). They determine whether democratic standards and procedures are followed or not, whether democratic goods (even in their nominal and procedural form) are delivered to the citizens or not, and for that matter, whether or not citizens enjoy the democratic goods they are entitled;

and whether the roles that democracy plays for the general good of society are played effectively or not.

Functional and efficient institutions are key to whether elections can be a conflict resolution tool; whether elections can be a procedure of political accountability; whether a democratic citizen of Ghana gets treated equally before the law; whether he/she gets treated fairly by, say, the judge, police officer, prison officer, and the bureaucrat; and whether horizontal accountability of government to citizens through checks and balances works or not (see O'Donnell, 1996). As advocates of liberal democracy assert, when functional institutions do not exist or are in short supply, the most critical pillar of liberal democracy crumbles, leaving it on shaky grounds (Fukuyama, 2015). Not that strong institutions can do anything to address the inherent contradictions of liberal democracy: to address, for example, the contradiction between procedural political equality of citizens on one hand and substantive economic inequalities on the other. They cannot, but good institutions are the prerequisite for any modicum of credibility in the defence of liberal democracy by its advocates.

In the 1990s, neo-patrimonial practices of autocratic African leaders led to crises in political legitimacy, culminating in the agitations of the masses for democracy, and subsequently the transition from authoritarian to variegated democratic regimes (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, p. 98-99). As will be revealed below, these neo-patrimonial practices have intensified after the transition to democracy in Ghana. Indeed, they are practised brazenly and with audacity because of the tendency of electoral democracy to degenerate to "delegative democracy" where elections lead to the installation of "a caesaristic, plebiscitarian executive that once elected sees itself as empowered to govern the country as it deems fit" (O'Donnell, 2010, p. 33). In a neo-patrimonial form of state like Ghana, elections do not produce representative and accountable governments. They rather produced an elected oligarchy, whose members, depending on

their position in the government, behave like lords, nobles, princes, and princesses. This poses a poignant question whether democratising a neo-patrimonial state changes its perverted characteristics to anything close to a semblance of an effective state with the capacity and political commitment to serve the good of all citizens irrespective of their political connections and socio-economic class.

The answer to this question must be no. What has happened in Ghana is the replacement of the authoritarian neo-patrimonial state with a democratic patrimonial state, a worse form of this perverted form of state. Perverted because it deviates from the ideal state, which is supposed to be founded on strong institutions, and supposed to operate strictly according to formal rules guiding the discharge of the duties and behaviour of state officials. Why these officials need to be guided by formal rules is because their actions and inactions make the state functional or dysfunctional; make it effective or ineffective; make it deliver services efficiently or inefficiently to citizens. It is the actions and inactions of these officials that make the state accountable to the citizens or to the special interests of a few elite groups of people. Their behaviour can make the state propitious of a form of development that serves the general good of all the citizens or make it a non-developmental state that fails to provide conditions for citizens to meet their basic needs. Worse than that, their actions and inactions can waste the resources of the people on useless things, but which are otherwise useful to the political class because they serve their personal and political interests, as well as those of their relatives, cronies, and clients.

The Ghanaian state under electoral democracy is afflicted by many incurable maladies of the neopatrimonial state. In most cases, state officials operate more on informal rules than the formal ones they pledged to be guided by. For example, the elected oligarchy and top public servants are mostly corrupt, adept in manipulating and subverting the formal rules they are supposed to operate by, to enrich themselves and to live lavishly. Writing in the 1970s, Nigerian

political scientist, Peter Eke, correctly described the character and behaviour of the Ghanaian political and bureaucratic elites of today: their behaviour reflect the "amorality of an artful dodger" (Ekeh, 1975, p. 107), who sees the state and politics as not the realm for morally-upright behaviour of serving the citizens diligently and honestly. They rather see the state as a pot of gold, and politics as the pathway to grabbing it to serve their personal interests. This characterization generally remains true in 2018.

Though celebrated as a model of electoral democracy, the Ghanaian democratic state meets most of the characteristics of the neo-patrimonial state, captured in the oft-cited conceptualisation of this perverted form of state;

As with classic patrimonialism, the right to rule in neo-patrimonial regimes is ascribed to a person rather than to an office, despite the official existence of a written constitution. One individual (the strongman, "big man", or "supremo"), often a president for life, dominates the state apparatus and stands above its laws. Relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a formal political and administrative system, and officials occupy bureaucratic positions less to perform public service, their ostensible purpose, than to acquire personal wealth and status (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997, p. 62).

The two authors document in detail the dynamics and characteristics of this perverted form of state in Africa. Some of these characteristics that stand out as the defining features of the Ghanaian liberal democratic state are:

1. Officially, state officials receive salary but they also "enjoy access to various forms of illicit rents, prebends, and petty corruption, which constitute a sometimes important entitlement of office" (p. 62);

2. Formal rules exist on paper, but "parallel and unofficial structures may well hold more power and authority than the formal administration" (p. 62);

3. Formal institutions or rules hardly constrain state official from using their offices to serve their narrow selfish interests. On the contrary, the

    personal interests of political leaders and top public servants take precedence over formal institutions and the public good (p. 63)

4.   Government, especially the executive arm, is transformed from an institution exercising authority within the bounds of checks and balances to what is conceptualised as "presidentialism"; where the executive head, the president or head of state, exercises wide-ranging power directly himself, rarely delegating to any other persons to act on his/her behalf (p. 63)

5.   Some citizens, some more than others, are transformed to "clients". Rather than the lofty civic virtues highlighted above, they become gullible and sycophantic supporters of the political elites, and expect to receive, and receive favours in exchange for their support and loyalty (p. 65). In Ghana these favours include political appointments such chief executives of local government organs, state organisations, board members and chairpersons of public organisations, special assistants and spokespersons; scholarship to study abroad; award of contracts; material and monetary gifts such as cars and lump sums of money.

6.   The corollary of all the above perversions is a state whose officials have no sense of the distinction between public and personal resources. Political elites and top public servants dip their hands into the public purse to dispense favours and enrich themselves and commandeer other resources of the state such as vehicles, land, minerals, oil and fuel to serve their private interests (p. 66).

The postcolonial Ghanaian state exhibits most of these characteristics of the neo-patrimonial state, whether governed by democratic or authoritarian regimes.

Implications of the Democratisation of the Neo-patrimonial Ghanaian State

The nature of electoral democracy, in the way that it involves competing for votes, deepens and extends some of the practices of neo-patrimonialism outlined above. The stakes of winning or losing elections are often high, as this determines whether political elites get control of the state and its resources or not. Being a zero-sum game in which the winner takes all, and loser loses all, elections must be won at all cost, regardless of the means used to do this. The end justifies the means, including the means by which votes are bar-

gained for and bought. These dynamics of elections not only reinforce the patron-client transactional relations but broaden them across a broader constituency of clients and across all corners of the country. Small wonder that some electorates in Ghana see elections as a 'harvesting season' and a time to "chop, a season during which voters demand favours from politicians and for politicians to distribute patronage to voters for their votes" (Lindberg, 2003, p. 124). This way of viewing elections turns them to something totally different from an institution for voters to participate in politics as political equals and as an organised way of choosing representatives to govern on behalf of the citizens. Nor can they be mechanisms for vertical political accountability where the citizens punish or reward their representatives for exercising their mandate well or badly.

As correctly noted by Lindberg;

> The function of such giving and taking is to establish and reproduce pacts of mutual loyalty… In this instance, there is little left of the idea of democratic accountability in a liberal democracy. Elected officials are not held accountable for their action, or inaction, with regard to public matters and their political agendas rely on the provision of socioeconomic benefits in personalized networks (2003, p. 124).

The wide powers given to the president of Ghana by the Fourth Republic Constitution of Ghana have opened the floodgates for the neo-patrimonial practices sketched above, making political accountability of Ghanaian presidents to the citizens a caricature of itself.

One of the unremitting promoters of liberal democracy in Africa made a notable and accurate observation of the risks posed to democratic governance by the overly powerful Ghanaian president;

> …so far, elections have proven an uncertain mechanism for guaranteeing the political accountability of political leaders [in Africa]…Thus, despite two decades of democratization across the sub-Saharan subcontinent, political executives in Africa continue to enjoy considerable room for decision-making maneuver with all the opportunities for corruption and maladministration that such discretion allows (Bratton and Logan, 2014, p. 1).

Precisely what has happened in Ghana? A case in point is the extensive powers of appointment Article 71 of the constitution gives to the president. He has the power to appoint heads of key public institutions such as the Commissioner for Human Rights and Administrative Justice and his/her Deputies; the Auditor-General; the District Assemblies Common Fund Administrator; the Chairmen and other members of the Public Services Commission; the Lands Commission; the governing bodies of public corporations; and Chairman, Deputy Chairmen, and other members of the Electoral Commission. In addition to article 71, other articles of the constitution give the president the power to appoint the Chief Justice and other Justices of the Superior Courts (article 144); the Chief of Defense Staff of the Armed Forces (article 212); and The Inspector-General of Police (article 202). A president with megalomaniac tendencies may abuse these powers to serve his or her narrow political interests. Concerned to protect their selfish interests and to create a personality cult of themselves, Ghanaian presidents have the tendency to use these appointments to reward relatives, friends, and party loyalist; they use them to punish those who are disloyal or suspected to belong to the opposition party; and in some cases, to show those who disagree with or criticise them where power lies.

One of the dangerous developments in Ghanaian democracy is the increasing politicisation of most public agencies supposed to be serving citizens rather than the president, including the politicisation (and doubly dangerous at that) of the military, police and other security organs. With the awesome powers of the president to appoint and sack—known in recent political discourses in Ghana as the power to appoint and disappoint—most public servants who serve at his pleasure are mostly afraid to serve the public if doing that will displease the president, his appointees and party top executives such as the national and regional chairmen/persons. Cowardly, these politicised, rather than neutral public servants run around with their tails in-between their legs carrying out the orders of the president,

his ministers, appointees, and top/influential executives of his party—even if they border on his personal interests and the interests of his political party. Or, they do not perform their functions if doing so will hurt the personal or political interests of the president, his appointees, friends and relatives. Even military and police commanders have become eye-pleasers of the president rather than the professionals they are supposed to be, and in whose safe hands the security of the homeland and the protection of national resources from the loot of the political classes may be left in. The commanders of these agencies, particularly the police, have become toothless in the face criminal abuse of political office; unable to deal with acts of lawlessness or crimes involving the political class, their loyal supporters, and those who are well-connected politically.

Spawning from the politicisation of the security agencies by the political elites are two threats to the democratic political stability of Ghana: political party vigilantism and discontent simmering below the surface of the existing order in these agencies. Political party vigilantism has emerged in Ghana, with the foot soldiers of the NDC and NPP constituting themselves to security agencies responsible for the protection of the interests of their parties, including the use of violent means (Bob-Milliar, 2014). The very core quality of the Ghanaian state, the monopoly of the use of force and right to raise military/paramilitary forces, is challenged by the existence of party vigilante/paramilitary organs such as Azorka Boys, Bolga Bull Dogs, Invincible Forces, Bamba Boys and the Kandahar Boys. For fear of losing their positions, the chiefs of state security organs have failed to take firm action to dismantle these vigilante groups. Yet there are career military or police personnel who want to discharge their functions as professionals, not party men or women. Herein lies the second threat to the democratic stability of Ghana. This professional segment of the security agencies, concerned to protect the integrity of their profession, may rise up against the increasing politicisation of the army or the police. This is no doomsaying, based on un-

founded fears. If the history of military coups in Ghana and Africa is any guide, the politicisation of the security agencies of Ghana risk reversing the country's enduring democracy and may plunge it back into the dark era of coups and counter coups of the 1970s.

Corruption is one of the practices of the neo-patrimonial that has been made worse by electoral democracy. One keen observer once noted that corruption is so endemic in Ghana it is openly accepted as part of the economic system of the country (Brittain, 1983, p. 51). Older Ghanaians would blame the military government of Colonel Acheampong for painting such an ignoble image of the country. His government and the 1970s—the period that he ruled— are known for the widespread practices of corruption, patron-client transactions, and nepotism. So widespread were these practices that a local word, kalabule, was coined to capture them and the klepto-cratic tendencies of Acheampong. It took a revolution by Flight Lieu-tenant J.J. Rawlings—under the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)—to cleanse the Ghanaian society of this moral decadence that had eaten so deep into its fibre. Indeed, the AFRC adopted vio-lent, highhanded and extrajudicial measures to do so.

With the benefit of hindsight, the revolution failed to change the inherent neo-patrimonial practices of the Ghanaian state, parti-cularly, with the redemocratisation of Ghana in 1992. Thus, Acheampong's government may mark the worst autocratic neo-patrimonial state, but the democratic neo-patrimonial state that emerged in 1993 has surpassed Acheampong's regime with neo-patrimonial practices, particularly corruption. This is not surprising because military governments often do not need elections in order to continue to stay in power, nor do they need the support and loyalty of a big and wide range of clients to stay in power. In con-trast, because of the high transactional cost of elections and elec-tioneering, the inherent practices of corruption of the neopatrimo-nial state may worsen. Corrupt practices in Ghana have gotten worse because the political class and their accomplices in the public service

and private sector have become bigger than existed in authoritarian regimes of government. Unlike electoral democracies, the authoritarian regimes of Ghana did not need parliamentarians and party executives; as well, they didn't need so many ministers and political appointees as it pertains to the democratic regimes that have existed since 1993.

To be added to these are the huge opportunities for corruption that opened up in the era of liberal democracy. Money and other resources flowed in from development aid and commercial loans in the name of implementing so-called development projects to improve the wellbeing of Ghanaians. The reality, however, is different. In Ghana, most development projects open up avenues for the political and bureaucratic elite to make a lot of "dirty" money. If the project involves the award of contract, the procurement of goods, and the recruitment of staff, it is a juicy opportunity for a syndicate of the political, bureaucratic, and business elites to get rich and dispense largesse of state and favours to various constituencies of supporters, friends, and relatives. It is not surprising that, between 2012 and 2014, Ghana lost more than $3 billion every year through corruption; an amount that is about 300 percent of the aid it received during this period (IMANI Ghana, cited in Citifmonline.com, 15 May 2016; see also Graphic.com.gh, 4 July 2018).

Corruption pervades the fibre of the Ghanaian polity in such crass and reckless abandon, it is described aptly in the words of Justice Jones Dotse as a situation where the political, bureaucratic, and business elites conspire "to create, loot and share the resources of [Ghana] as if a brigade had been set up for such an enterprise" (Ghanaweb.com, 21 June 2013). Justice Dotse said these words when he read his opinion on a corruption case involving the payment of €40million and GH¢51.2 million as judgment debt to Waterville Holdings Ltd and businessman, Alfred Agbesi Woyome—what has become known in Ghana as the Woyome Gate Scandal. This scandal is one of the major cases of corruption that occurred

under the government of one of Ghana's two major political parties, the NDC party. However, it is a microcosm of the broader and gargantuan spate of corruption that has characterised the Fourth Republic of Ghana under the government of the two major parties, the NDC and NPP: the two parties that have rotated power between themselves through the four-yearly periodic elections held in Ghana since 1992. The pulse.com.gh, one of Ghana's online news media portals, did a good job of publishing on its website '15 memorable quotes on corruption by famous Ghanaians' (Buabeng, 10 September 2015). The famous Ghanaians quoted included all the six presidents of Ghana, both former and incumbent, with all, except professor Atta Mills, still alive. All the statements point to the enormity of the problem and looming threat it poses to the very existence of the Ghanaian polity. The former Chief Justice, Mrs Georgina Theodora Wood's words capture this picture vividly;

> Our country is caught in an unending spiral of decadence. Every day we read and hear of unspeakable corruption and abuse of the public purse by individuals and institutions entrusted with public funds. The situation has reached tipping point and our citizens genuinely wonder if any public official or institution can stand up to scrutiny (Buabeng, 10 September 2015)

Irked by the massive corruption in Ghana—and rightly so—one Ghanaian argued with concrete examples similar to the Woyome gate scandal that 'create, loot, share (CLS) is the 'new norm' in Ghana (Kaminta, myjoyonline.com, 29 May 2017).

Any casual scan of the reportage of the Ghanaian news media—who do a good job of raking up dirt from the hidden closets of public institutions—affirms the claim of Kaminta that 'create, loot, share (CLS) is the 'new norm' in Ghana. The works of Ghanaian investigative journalists such as Anas Aremeyaw Anas and Manasseh Azure Awuni have uncovered corruption scandals in the public sector of Ghana, illustrating the huge cost to the country and the modus operandi of the perpetrators. Apart from his recent (2018) earth-shattering documentary—Number 12: When misconduct and greed

become the norm—in which he reports the shocking corruption that has bedeviled the Ghana Football Association (GFA), Anas has also reported on other corruptions scandals in Ghana: in 2011, he exposed the bribery and corruption of customs officials at Tema harbor; in 2012, he exposed officials of the Electricity Company (ECG) who engaged in illegal supply, distribution and debt collection; and in 2015, he exposed corruption in the judiciary involving over 30 judges of both lower and higher courts, of which several of them were dismissed and others disciplined in other ways. Manasseh Azure Awuni's investigative work into the Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial Development Agency (GYEEDA) and the Savannah Accelerated Development Authority (SADA) similarly uncovered various acts of corruption in these public institutions. His documentary, the Sad SADA Story, reported vividly how a project involving the planting of trees in the northern part of the country was buried in corruption and mismanagement—a typical characteristic of the implementation of development projects in Ghana.

This author wonders the weight of guilt J.J. Rawlings carries on his shoulders, still living and seeing what has become of the Ghanaian state. His two military governments killed people for relatively minor acts of corruption and waste of state resources. Yet, literally unfolding before his very eyes, are massive, widespread corruption and crass abuse of public offices marking every corner of the country. It is not uncommon to hear from one of the presidents of Ghana or their loyal supporters asking for evidence to support allegations of corruption, arguing that the allegations are most often based on perception. This attitude betrays their motivation to engage in and machinations of corruption. They are motivated because the legal bar set for prosecuting and convicting criminal offences and criminals is so high, they know they can get away with corrupt practices without prosecution and conviction. By their positions and authority in various public institutions, they have the luxury of time and institutional space to scheme, create, loot, and share while covering their

tracks—sometimes, by manipulating administrative procedures, or exploiting loopholes in them, or both.

The legal bar for prosecuting and convicting offences/offenders of corruption needs to be lowered below other criminal cases because it is a white-collar crime that is very difficult to prosecute. Unlike other crimes like fraud, stealing, forgery, and dishonestly receiving where the evidence is difficult to cover up, corruption can be covered up with administrative procedures and the exercise of discretion. In any case, one doesn't have to look beyond the political elites, the perpetrators of corruption, for the evidence. It is all documented in the content of the news media in Ghana where the political class engage with each other publicly. In trying to gain political advantage by criticising and discrediting each other for political advantage, they provide the smoking gun of the widespread nature of corruption in Ghana. The endemic nature of corruption exposes the hypocrisy and empty rhetoric embedded in such high-sounding anti-corruption aphorisms designed and parroted by Ghanaian leaders like "probity and accountability" (à la President Rawlings), "zero tolerance for corruption" (à la President Kufour), "I am incorruptible" (à la Mahama), and "I am not into politics to take bribes or be corrupt. I did not come into politics to line my pockets with the money of poor Ghanaians" (à la Akufo Addo). Indeed, the Rawlings-led AFRC and PNDC (as aforementioned) used extrajudicial measures to cleanse Ghana of corruption. But one of Rawlings' political legacies, the formation of the NDC party, is deeply involved in the widespread corruption of democratic governance in Ghana sketched above. Similarly, even though President Kufuor won the 2000 elections partly because of his promise of zero tolerance for corruption, he left office with his infamous saying that corruption is as old as Adam.

The veritable display of the neo-patrimonial state in Ghana is the obscene overindulgence of public servants, both elected and appointed, in lavish lifestyles in the midst of suffering and indigent

masses. Rather than servants of the masses—which is what they are supposed to be in a democratic system of government—they have become lords, nobles, princesses and princes. They see themselves as a privileged caste, superior in social status to the citizens whom they treat with scorn and contempt—as if to say the citizens belong to the lower caste and they the superior caste. Suddenly, they become "Honourables" and "Excellences", entitled to live a luxurious lifestyle befitting their status. To do this, they give themselves extravagant perks of office, which they unconscionably and crassly flaunt in front of the bulging and miserable poor.

Thus, the quintessential paradox of Ghanaian democracy is that it has led to the installation of the ancien régime of Medieval France, with all the flamboyance and overindulgence reminiscent of the trappings of the status of the nobility. One example of this flamboyant lifestyle will suffice: their taste for super-luxurious cars. They must ride in Toyota Landcruiser V8 vehicles, customised with specs to suit their taste and status. At the moment, this is the vehicle of their taste; but they used to ride in Nissan Patrols before they discovered the more luxurious Landcruiser. In the near future they may upgrade to any other car the automobile companies may invent which is more luxurious than the Landcruiser. The cost of the car doesn't matter, let alone the servicing and fuel consumption; and despite the high fuel consumption, the engines of these cars must be left running for hours, waiting for one noble or the other to return from a meeting to ride without feeling any sign of heat. Never mind that this may be someone who might not have bought and ridden in an air-conditioned car before entering into politics. Also bear in mind that the combined cost of all the above expenses on the car can pay for the cost of building a clinic in one of the remote villages or slums they would be going back to canvass for votes during the next round of elections. Never mind that by the time they go back, some of the inhabitants might have lost their lives through cholera or malaria, especially children. When they are riding in these cars,

they are entitled to break all the traffic regulations; they must put on hazard lights and even trigger off the sirens for everyone to give way to this privileged class to pass.

Liberal/electoral democracy is elitist indeed! It inverts the principal-agent and master-servant relationship between the citizens and their elected or appointed public servants to a totally different relationship: superior-lower caste relationship. Surprisingly, the citizens seem to have accepted this new relationship wholeheartedly and unquestioningly.

Surprise! Democracy in Poverty and Inequality

Promoters of liberal/electoral democracy are surprised that it has endured in some parts of the world where the socioeconomic and political conditions are inhospitable for its survival. Countering the current thinking that democracy is on the decline, Levitsky and Way (2015, p. 73) cited countries like Ghana, Benin, and others where democracy is surprisingly thriving despite unfavourable conditions like 'little or no democratic tradition, weak states, high levels of poverty and inequality, and in some cases deeply divided societies.' Larry Diamond is also surprised that democracy has survived in countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone where the objective conditions for sustaining it are unfavorable due to poverty (Diamond, 2015, p. 99).

True, the consolidation of liberal democracy in Ghana is surprising; more so from a radical perspective of democracy and political accountability. This is a democracy in which the luxurious lifestyles of the elected oligarchy and the top public servants belie the levels of poverty and underdevelopment that exist in the country. They belie the fact that the Ghanaian economy is on the life support of loans and development aid (Whitfield 2010, 2011), including those from China, a non-democratic state which has become one of the leading actors of "development" in democratic Ghana. They belie the fact

that the Ghanaian state cannot provide essential services to it citizens; and in some cases, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have to fill in for the state by providing some of these services or helping the citizens to provide them themselves (Bawa, 2013). Despite all the glorification of Ghana as a model democracy, the country is essentially, so poor and underdeveloped that it even had to go through the humiliation of joining the highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) in 2001.

Anyone visiting Ghana for the first time will be highly impressed with the modern infrastructure she will see; ranging from the relatively modernised airport that she arrives at, to the paved roads she would drive on from the airport to the hotel she may be lodging at the plush airport or East Legon Residential areas. She may also be impressed with the huge shopping malls where she can buy everything found in any mall in a Western country like USA, Britain, and Canada. However, this is a highly deceptive picture of development in Ghana. In fact, a paper-thin façade that masks a country that is essentially a Fourth World country in Castell's (2010) formulation of the concept: a country characterised by extreme poverty, misery, and deprivation of the majority subaltern classes. The visitor begins to get this real picture of the level of development of Ghana when she drives a few kilometres outside Accra to the nearest village; more so, when she travels towards and to the northern part of the country. She will discover that Ghana is a Fourth World country in which most Ghanaians lack adequate healthcare; in which children still attend schools under trees; in which open defecation is rampant; in which people still drink unpotable water from streams, dams, and rivers; and in which children suffer from malnutrition. It is a country in which some parts are usually cut off from the rest during raining season because there are no bridges to cross the river to join the mainland. Ghana is a country that the state cannot even manage waste. Its capital city, Accra, is buried up to the neck in filth. Ghana is a country in which the state cannot provide reliable electricity.

Local level governmental bodies like district assembles which are supposed to provide basic services such as water, sanitation, education, and health cannot do so because they lack funds. They are neither able to generate enough revenue nor get funds from central government. In most cases, funds from central government are often in three quarters arrears of what is budgeted for the year (Barnett et al., 2018).

Characteristic of a Fourth World country, a great number of Ghanaians still suffer appalling levels of poverty and deprivation in this twenty-first century of abundance of wealth and advanced science, technology, and medicine. The national poverty line of Ghana is based on the monetary measurement of the consumption basket. That is the amount of money needed to command the food and non-food basics of life such as the nutritional requirements of each member of the household (Ghana Statistical Service [GSS], 2017, p. 8). There are two levels of poverty lines: lower and upper poverty line. The lower or extreme or food poverty line, pegged at GH¢792.05 per adult per year—that is about US$164 per year—is the amount of money needed just to meet the nutritional requirements of household members. The upper poverty line, pegged at GH¢1,314 (about US$273) per adult per year, is the amount of money needed for both essential food and non-food consumption goods. Nominally, poverty is said to be reducing in Ghana in the last three decades, between 1992 and 2013, when it has reduced from 56.5% to 24.2%; thereby achieving the MDG1 (Cooke et al., 2016, p. 1). However, the latest Ghana Living Standards Survey 7 (GLSS 7) reports that more Ghanaians are living in extreme poverty in 2017 than they did in 2013: "the number of people living in extreme poverty increased from 2.2 million in 2013 to 2.4 million in 2017" (GSS 2017, p.). The report gives a sobering interpretation of what this means: an estimated 2.4 million Ghanaians "cannot consume the minimum daily requirement of 2,900 calories per adult equivalent of food per day, even if they were to spend all their expenditures

on food. This figure is up from the 2013 levels, by almost 200,000″ (GSS 2017, p. 14).

Note that GH¢792.05 (US$164) may not be enough for the monthly servicing of one Toyota Land Cruiser V8 used by state officials, both elected and appointed. It may not be up to the sitting allowance paid to members of a committee or board of a public organisation per sitting. It is certainly not enough to pay one-night hotel accommodation for one top state official, political appointee or public servant. Bear in mind, also, that the amount the poor Ghanaian needs just to feed himself/herself the whole year may not even be enough to pay the per diem of one of the above-mentioned officials when they travel within the country or abroad. For example, the Chief Executive Officer of the Microfinance and Small Loans Centre (MASLOC), Mr Amoah, has said that his predecessor, Mrs Sedina Tamakloe Attionu, used to draw GH¢5000 as per diem when she travels outside Accra; but he has slashed it down to GH¢1500 for himself (Starrfmonline.com, 29 October 2018). If related to the national poverty line, it means that his successors used to take more than six times what an extremely poor Ghanaian needs to be well-fed the whole year. Even in its drastically reduced amount of GH¢1500, it represents two times the amount the extremely poor need the whole year to be well-fed. Even though this author hardly makes official travels, he takes per diem of about GH¢250 when he travels within the country, a third of what an extremely poor Ghanaian needs to be well-fed the whole year.

In Ghana, and in most of Africa, it is the rural areas that are hardest hit by poverty. About "15.6 percent of the projected 14.2 million persons in the rural localities are extremely poor, and they contribute 93.8 percent to this national extreme poverty" (GSS, 2017, p. 14). Yet poverty does not inflict rural people evenly across Ghana. It is worse in some regions and districts than in others. The Northern, Upper East, and Upper West Regions are poorer than the rest of the ten regions. Even in these regions, some districts are worse

off than others. For example, between 80% and 90% of the population in the West Mamprusi and Mamprugu Moagduri districts in the Northern Region and the Builsa South districts in the Upper East Region live below the national poverty line (Barnett et al., 2018). What is even across Ghana are elections. Barring communication hitches, the remotest parts of Ghana—even those places in "overseas", often cut off from the rest of the country in the raining season by flooded rivers—exercise their rights to vote. Not only does the Electoral Commission set up polling stations, voting booths, and send personnel there to organize elections. The politicians invade there, unashamedly, with their Toyota Land Cruiser V8s to canvass for votes.

Inequality is the bedfellow of poverty in Ghana. While all Ghanaians irrespective of class, gender, sex, and ethnicity are equal in the political realm, there is widening inequality between the haves and have-nots. Obscene inequality is the hallmark of our present neoliberal order that promotes liberal democracy as the best model of democracy. Liberal democracy does not see any contradictions between being free and equal in the political realm and unequal and trapped in poverty in the economic realm. Little wonder that we live in a world that is dominated by democratic governments; yet equality of wealth between regions, countries, and people is widening. For example, in 2016, the 10% top income earners possessed 37% of the wealth of Europe, 41% of the wealth of China, 46% of the wealth of Russia, 47% of the wealth of US and Canada, and around 57% of the wealth sub-Saharan Africa, Brazil, and India (World Inequality Lab, 2017, p. 9). Having implemented neoliberal economic policies for more than three decades and practised liberal democracy for 25 years, Ghana is a microcosm of the atrocious inequality of our present world order. The gap between the poorest 10% and the wealthiest 10% of Ghanaians has been widening between 2006 and 2013. Whereas the "wealthiest 10% consume around one third of all national consumption…the poorest 10% consume just 1.72%"

(Cooke et al., 2016, p. 2). In the cities of Ghana like Accra and Kumasi, the yawning chasm that separates the Ghanaian ruling class, a fraction of the population, from the majority living in grinding poverty is so evident to the casual observer. One is confronted in these cities by a distasteful scene of islands of wealth in a sea of despair and poverty, with wealthy people (including the political class) conspicuously displaying their wealth in the midst of beggarly young people eking a living by selling knickknacks.

The figures cited above give us a good picture of poverty and inequality in Ghana. However, it is only when one sees the real life-world of the poverty in which the subalterns live, observe their miserable living conditions, and how they strive to survive in these extremely difficult circumstances that the enormity of the problem is brought into sharper focus than figures can do. Some of the news media, both local and foreign, have been doing a good job of bringing the appalling living conditions of the poor from the dark remote parts of the country to the spotlight and the awareness of people across the world. For example, TV 3's Mission Ghana and Joy News Seyiram Abla Desouza's documentaries on development problems in the rural areas give panoramic and vivid picture of the miserable living conditions of the rural poor and dismal failure of the state to promote development in Ghana.

The dark side of Ghana's electoral democracy is that the democratic state fails to provide even the most basic things like furniture to schools. We are told in one recent news report that:

> Pupils of Kalbeo-Tindongsobligo primary school in the Bolgatanga municipality in the Upper East Region sit on the bare floor for studies…Pupils of the school which has an enrolment of over 400 pupils from kindergarten to primary four sit on the bare floor for their lessons (ghanaweb.com, 27 October 2018).

Ian Birrell of the UK newspaper, The Daily Mail, has filed a report on the failure of The Millennium Villages Project (MVP), a five-year development project implemented in northern Ghana with £11

million of the British taxpayer (see also Barnett et al., 2018). His report (and Barnett et al.'s) illustrate not just how extremely incapacitated the democratic neo-patrimonial state of Ghana is to promote development; it is spiced with embarrassing photos of the development-backwardness of the country. One photo shows miserable school children sitting on a dirty floor of a class room in the village of Duu in the West Mamprusi District in Northern Region, listening attentively to their headteacher, Mr. Abdulai Shefu (Birrell, 14 October 2018).

If one is elected into a political office in a Fourth World country like Ghana—where some of your school children don't have classrooms, chairs, and desks—that elected public servant doesn't deserve to ride even on a good motorcycle, let alone a Toyota Landcruiser V8. As a president of a country like this, you don't even deserve to fly business class in a commercial airline let alone flying in a presidential jet. Top public officials, both elected and appointed, see all these as normal perks of their office befitting their status as the nobility. Therein lies the paradox of development aid, targeting democratic African countries. Ghanaian political leaders go with cup-in-hand to the Western industrialised countries, genuflecting to collect aid to improve the wellbeing of their people. Yet they are not restrained by their begging to live luxurious lifestyles that their Western counterparts, the givers of the aid, would envy.

Conclusion: Why no Resistance from below in Ghana?

If material hardships and socioeconomic inequality of class were enough to get the subaltern classes up in arms against the ruling classes, Ghana should have experienced, at least, one Arab Spring-style rebellion—especially, with its bulging unemployed youth. Enter my book! It took issues with the industry of Marxist literature claiming a groundswell of resistance from "below" against neoliberal globalisation. The central claim of this oeuvre is that neo-

liberal globalisation is unjust and has inflicted untold hardships on the lives of the subaltern classes. In response, they have mobilised around the idiom of "Another World is Possible" to resist this economic and political order. While this may be true in some countries such as Bolivia, it is false in Ghana. Far from rising up against the state and the elected oligarchy, the subalterns have become loyal supporters of the two dominant parties, the NDC and NPP; the governments of which have implemented and continue to implement harsh neoliberal policies with deleterious effects on their lives. Despite the failures of these governments to improve their wellbeing, there is no evidence that the Ghanaian subalterns are mobilising across party and ethnic lines as a class to mount an Arab Spring-style revolt against the corrupt and non-performing leaders of these two parties. Rather than raising the flag of class, the subaltern classes have raised (and continue to raise) the flag of party and ethnicity.

The fundamental question the book then addresses is why the subalterns in Bolivia resist and their counterparts in Ghana do not. It argued that the political agency of the subaltern class is shaped by the socio-historical context in which they live and reproduce themselves, materially and socially. It is this that shapes what they define as intolerable injustices, whether they can do something about it, the resources they have to do something about it, and the counteracting imaginings of what is defined as a just world and why the status quo should not be disrupted. One of the distinct properties of the socio-historical context of Ghana between 1992 and present (2018) is electoral democracy. Situating the political agency of the Ghanaian subalterns in this specific context, the book illustrates that the traditionally radical civic culture of Ghanaians in holding their traditional authorities (like chiefs) accountable is eviscerated by electoral democracy and its concomitant partisan party politics. Even the traditionally militant and well-organized civic organizations like university students' associations and workers unions have all become dormant as their leaders and the rank and file are all di-

vided by partisan politics. To be added to this is the increasing politicisisation of the academia. Intellectuals who used to speak truth to power are increasingly becoming loyal supporters of NDC and NPP, throwing into the dustbin any sense of critical and objectives analysis of issues—let alone the boldness to speak out based on findings of such critical scrutiny. Essentially, electoral democracy has killed the republican virtues of the Ghanaian subaltern and spawned a political culture that betrays a clientelist, gullible and sycophantic Ghanaian citizenry who uncritically imbibe the political rhetoric of the political class; and are prepared to defend them against their own interests as a class.

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Voting without Choosing?

Ethnic Voting Behaviour and Voting Patterns in Nigeria's 2015 Presidential Election and Implications for Institutionalisation of Social Conflicts

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Abstract: Nigeria's 2015 Presidential Election was widely seen as competitive, fair and less violent than other elections since the transition to democracy in 1999. This paper does not argue otherwise. Rather, it problematizes ethnic voting behaviour and voting patterns observed in the election and raises questions about their implications for institutionalisation of democracy and social conflicts in Nigeria. It argues that while scholarly examinations portray the presidential election results as 'victory for democracy', not least because an incumbent president was defeated for the first time in Nigeria, analysis of the spatial structure of votes cast reveals a predominant pattern of voting along ethnic, religious and geospatial lines. It further contends that this identity-based voting not only translates into a phenomenon of 'voting without choosing,' but is also problematic for social cohesion, interethnic harmony and peacebuilding in Nigeria. The relaxation of agitations for resource control in the Niger Delta throughout President Jonathan's tenure and its revival in post-Jonathan regime is illustrative of the dilemmas and contradictions of ethnic voting and voting without choosing in Nigeria. This observation draws policy attention to addressing structural underpinnings of the relationship between ethnicity, geography and voting behaviour in Nigerian politics so as to consolidate democratic gains and enhance democratic peace in Nigeria.

Nigeria's 2015 Presidential election has been described as a turning point in the country's political history and democratic evolution. For

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the first time, an incumbent president was defeated in office. The ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) led by the incumbent President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan lost power to the opposition candidate, Muhammadu Buhari of the All Progressives Congress (APC). The election was also remarkable in the sense that Jonathan peacefully handed over power to Buhari, a transition that was devoid of litigations and post-election violence, which are characteristic of electoral competitions in most African countries.

Emerging scholarly interrogation of the 2015 presidential election tends to devote attention to explaining why Jonathan lost and Buhari won (see Animashaun, 2015; Owen and Usman, 2015; Ewi, 2015; Orji 2017). Overall, there seems to be a consensus amongst scholars that the March 15, 2015 polls were keenly contested, substantially fair, and less violent than others in Nigeria's electoral history. Indeed, popular votes counted and it was described as 'a victory for democracy' (Ewi, 2015, p. 207). The election was, therefore, a significant measure of progress towards the domestication of liberal democracy in Nigeria since the third wave of multiparty democratic elections that swept across Africa in the 1990s.

This paper does not argue otherwise. Rather, it contributes to the existing literature on the election by interrogating ethnic voting behaviour and voting patterns observed in the election and raises questions about their implications for institutionalisation of social conflicts in Nigeria. It builds on Olayode (2015), Anejionu et al. (2016), Olasile and Adebayo (2016), and Lawal's (2017) comparative study of the spatial structure of voting patterns and distribution of election results in the 2011 and 2015 presidential elections to develop a better understanding of the intricate connections between ethnicity, geography and class-based form of solidarity in the determinations of voting behaviour in Nigerian politics and what these mean for emergence and reinforcement of identity-based conflicts in Nigeria.

The analysis is based on data obtained from votes cast in different states across Nigeria in the 2015 presidential election as released by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). It adopts simple descriptive quantitative analysis of the votes cast in the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria to determine the voting behaviour and voting patterns in the elections. The central argument is that the votes cast in the presidential election did not reveal a significant change in voting patterns along ethnic, religious and geospatial lines. A majority of voters in the largely Muslim-dominated Hausa/Fulani ethnic group of Northern Nigeria voted for the APC presidential candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, a northerner and Muslim from Katsina state. A majority on the South voted for the incumbent President, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, a Christian from Balyelsa in the South-South of Nigeria who led the PDP. Beyond the significance of regionalism, ethno-religious bias weighed heavily in support for the two main candidates across much of Nigeria's 36 states, thus reinforcing the argument that amongst other factors, the politicisation of ethnicity is important in understanding why people merely vote in Africa but do not choose (Ake, 1996, p.24).

The foregoing argument is structured into seven sections, beginning with the introduction. The next section provides the theoretical and conceptual analysis of voting behaviour in the extant literature and relates them to the Nigerian experience in the 2015 presidential election. This is then followed by an analysis of the spatial distribution of votes cast and electoral voting patterns in the election. Section four explains the social determinants of ethnic voting behaviour in the 2015 election. Section five examines the structural limitations and impact of religion on voting behaviour in the election while section six analyses peace and conflict implications of ethnic voting and 'voting without choosing' in Nigeria. The last is the conclusion, and highlights policy implications of findings of the study.

Theoretical Foundations and Premise of the Paper

Broadly conceptualised, "voting behaviour is defined as a set of personal electoral activities, including participation in electoral campaigns, turnout at the polls, and choosing for whom to vote" (Bratton, 2013, p.4). This paper focuses on the latter and addresses a key question: How did the Nigerian electorate vote in the 2015 presidential election and what influenced their voting behaviour? It situates the analysis and arguments within the sociological school of thought while also acknowledging the significance of other paradigms that explain electorate voting choices.

In the existing literature, there are several analytical explanations of voting behaviour that revolve primarily around three dominant theoretical perspectives. These theories are: sociological theory of the Columbia School (Lazarsfield et al., 1944; Lipset 1960); the psychosocial or the Michigan School (Campbell et al. 1960) and the rational choice theoretical model (Downs 1957; Fiorina, 1981).

Succinctly, the Columbia School sociological model argues that social factors, such as socio-economic variables, religion and location are crucial determinants of electorate voting decisions (Lazarfeld et al. 1948, p. 27). For the psychosocial perspective, the main contention is that voters' political affiliation or party identification, a product of socio-psychological motivations, influences voters' decision-making. It is noted that there is a sense of personal and emotional attachment to political parties, an attachment that is historically rooted in the ideological orientations of the parties. This partisan disposition guides voters' evaluation of policy preferences of political parties and hence their judgment and votes (Goren, 2005; Alvarez and Brehm, 2002; Feldman, 1988). The rational choice model explains that a voter's decision and choice are based on the realities of cost-benefits analysis. The argument is that as rational actors in the electoral process, voters are pragmatic and strategic in their motivations. Their preferences and choices weigh in favour of maximising the utility of their votes in terms of future realisation of

concrete political, economic and material benefits. Accordingly, "the rational choice theory operates on the basis that all decisions, whether made by the voters or political parties, are rational and guided by self-interest" (Saxena, 2017, p.90).

As the foregoing suggests, different theories have their explanatory power, utility and significance. Nevertheless, none can effectively explain voting behaviour independently. There are issues of mixed motivations, complementarities and interconnectedness, raising questions of complexity of causality. Some people vote during elections, not because of perceptions and influences of expected material gains as rationalists would argue, but, as a dutiful obligation of citizenship (Blais, 2000). Some also have theorised about the interplay between institutional rules and the context of voting as a crucial determinant (Guenther, n.d. p. 11). In much of Africa, some people are apathetic to voting, not necessarily because their votes may not count, because elections have turned into wars and armed conflicts. The recurring incidence of pre- and post-election violence in Kenya and its associated deaths is illustrative of these contextual and structural threats to voting as a form of electoral participation in Africa. Beyond attitudinal factors, influences on voters can also be external, drawing attention to social contagion effects. Some merely vote because others have voted. This is at issue, particularly amongst illiterate voters in emerging democracies of the developing world. Furthermore, the revolutions in information technology, especially the use of internet and social media have been identified to influence voting behaviour and electoral participation (Bimber, 1998; Bimber, 2001; Biswas, Ingle and Roy, 2014).

By and large, whether voting behaviour and the pattern it forms are internally and externally driven, the import of the foregoing theories is that the decision to vote or not is an exercise of the inalienable rights and autonomy of the people. Voting is thus an essential element of the democratic system, which facilitates and reinforces individual autonomy and freedoms of choice. Voting raises an im-

portant question of the exercise of rights to choose representatives and leaders during each election cycle, thereby, "helping to achieve the fundamental right of government by consent" (Mazrui, 2002, p. 15). In democracy, the centrality of the people's votes is emphasized as politicians must be seen to represent their constituencies in order to gain re-election as they engage in a, "competitive struggle for the people's vote" (Schumpeter, 1950, p. 269).

The theoretical argument of this paper is hinged on the assumptions of both the sociological and rationalist approaches to understanding and explaining voting behaviour. The psychological perspective is less persuasive in the context of Nigeria where most political parties are bereft of defined political philosophies, ideological leanings and ultimately distinctive political image. Thus, voting in Nigeria is primarily candidates-centred rather than political party-based or policy driven. Accordingly, Nigerian voters, as in much of Africa, often identify with candidates that show promise for social change in which ethno-religious identities of the candidates rather than political parties and their ideologies are key considerations and sources of influence. Furthermore, members of political parties in Nigeria often defect to other parties, mainly to reposition themselves to grab power and opportunities. In 2013, for example, seven serving governors of the PDP defected to the APC. More recently, in 2018, high profile defections, which included, but were not restricted to serving governors and senators, occurred both in the PDP and APC, the two major political parties in Nigeria. Senator Bukola Saraki, the current Senate President and Chairman of Nigeria's National Assembly elected on the platform of the PDP in 2015 was among the senators who defected to the APC. Since the return to democracy in 1999, crisscrossing from one party to another within the context of defection has defined political life and party activities in Nigeria. Party identification, which is said to be relatively stable over time because party ideologies change slowly, is, therefore, fluid in the Nigerian context. In this regard, a combination of the sociological

and rationalist perspectives is more appropriate in explaining how an incumbent president was defeated in power in the 2015 presidential election in Nigeria without a fundamental shift in ethnic voting behaviour and voting patterns.

Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2013) have shown that 'close' elections in Africa are associated with increase in the salience and strength of ethnic voting. This speaks to Mahmood Mamdani's argument in *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* that an enduring obstacle to democratisation in Africa is the legacy of complex political identities occasioned by European colonialism. Mamdani's (1996) basic thesis is that colonial laws and policies, particularly indirect rule created racial identity in citizens and ethnic identity in subjects during the era of European imperialism in Africa. As Mamdani notes, Europeans colonizers who were presumed to be superior and civilised came under civic citizenship and were bound by the same civil law and this promoted unity amongst them. On the other hand, the colonised natives conceptually described as subjects were organised under different native authorities based on customary laws and traditions that were largely perceived as static and immutable enjoyed ethnic citizenship. More critically, Mamdani contends that while civic citizenship was racialised and belonged to the national state with individual rights and privileges, ethnic citizenship was ethnicized and the institutionalisation of different customary laws for the natives further balkanised them into separate ethnic groups with access to customary rights only. In this way, the policy of indirect rule underpinned the institutionalisation of ethnic difference and the reproduction of ethnic identity into particular forms of political identities (Mamdani, 1996).

Put in context, the colonial state formation process in Africa set in motion processes of politicisation and evolution of cultural identities into complex political identities such as the indigene/settler dichotomy, religious and regional identity. More importantly, since these group identities were legally institutionalised and enforced,

even after political independence, they shape relations between people and the state and to one another through the state (Mamdani, 2002). Overall, the point is that, "Once the law makes cultural identity the basis for political identity, it inevitably turns ethnicity into a political identity" (Mamdani 2001, p. 661). These politicized identities, therefore, underlie struggles amongst citizens and ethnic groups for entitlements and rights, raising questions of inclusion or exclusion. Bitter contestations amongst ethnic communities in African states over which ethnic group should assume the presidency in each election cycle, as we see often in Kenya, is one of several examples of the significance and impact of political identities on electorate voting behavior and the character of post-colonial democratic politics. The point of emphasis in Mamdani's theoretical formulation that is relevant to this paper is that it promotes a better explanation and understanding of the dynamics of ethnic voting behaviour in post-independence Africa.

Analysis of the Spatial Distribution of Votes Cast and Electorate Voting Patterns in the Election

For an effective mapping of the results and analysis of spatial distribution of vote cast in the 2015 presidential election, there is need to first examine the structure and ethnic configurations of Nigeria and how they impact the voting patterns in the election.

Nigeria is a multicultural society of about 170 million people, with an estimated 350 ethnic groups, structured into in 36 states. It is geographically divided into North and South. This spatial division corresponds to the ethnic stratification of the country as well as religious differentiation and identification, both of which have implications for identity-based loyalty and polarisations. The North is populated largely by Muslims of Hausa/Fulani ethnicity even though there are minor linguistic categorisations such as some of the middle belt minority groups of Birom that resist their inclusion into the

broad Hausa/Fulani conceptualisation. The South on the other hand, comprises different ethnic groups, which are predominantly Christians, and is made up of 19 states. In 1996, the Sani Abacha military regime restructured the country into six geopolitical zones for administrative convenience. The regions are: South-South, South-East, South-West, North-Central, North-East and North-West (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Map of Nigeria showing the six geopolitical Regions and their States

Source: Ekong, et al, 2011, p.171

Empirical studies have demonstrated that the foregoing ethnic con-figurations and structure of the Nigerian state have shaped voting patterns in previous elections in the country including presidential elections since the colonial period and post-independence era (see Olayode, 2015; Nwobashi and Itumo, 2017, p. 439). In this paper, nationally aggregated data of the votes cast for the APC and PDP across the thirty-six states of the Nigerian federation were analyzed based on figures released by the INEC. The aim was to examine the strength of ethnicity in the voting choices of Nigerian electorates in

the 2015 presidential election. In other words, "the spatial analysis of votes cast for each party offers a new opportunity at examining the pattern formed by this activity" (Lawal, 2017, p.2).

I employed simple descriptive statistical analysis of percentages of electoral votes cast for the two main presidential candidates at the regional and state levels to identify the pattern they form in the election. In Table 1, the statistical analysis indicates that the South-South region where the then president, Goodluck Jonathan hails from, recorded 91.8% of the votes cast in the region while Buhari got just 8.2%. The same ethnic and territorial logic played out in the North-West geopolitical zone, the home region of Buhari of the opposition APC party. Buhari garnered 84.2% as against 18.5% received by Jonathan of the PDP. Table 1 is also illustrative of these dominant patterns for both candidates across the six geopolitical zones. In the North-east and North-central regions, Jonathan received 21.9% and 40% and Buhari obtained 3.0% in the South-East, and 53% in the South-West, suggesting a 7% vote, slightly above Jonathan in the South-West zone. It is argued that the fact that Buhari got, "significant votes from the South-West did not mean that he is "loved" by a wide range of people in the zone who voted across ethnic lines to elect him" (Olasile and Adebayo, 2016, p.4).

Table 1: Distribution of Presidential Votes by Candidates and Regions

Region	Total votes cast	Buhari (APC)	% share	Jonathan (PDP)	% share
South-East	2,593,154	78,248	3.0	2, 514, 906	97.0
South-South	5,102,705	418,580	8.2	4,684,125	91.8
South-West	3,571,363	1,904,101	53.3	1,667,262	46.7
North-Central	3,986,327	2,392,612	60.0	1,593,715	40.0
North-East	3,645,266	2,848,678	78.1	796,588	21.9
North-West	8,454,918	7,115,209	84.2	1,339,709	15.8

Source: INEC

Instead, it shows that in mapping the results, every picture tells a story. This story includes, but is not restricted to, the yearning for socio-economic change. Other factors include the role of Bola Tinubu as an influential Yoruba leader and national leader of the APC as well as the fact that Prof. Yemi Osibanjo, Buhari's running mate is also from the South-West and a Christian. Osibanjo is a Senior Pastor in the Redeemed Christian Church of God, one of the fastest growing Pentecostal churches in Africa with huge membership. In Nigeria, ethno-religious identity of candidates is historically a major consideration for the choice of running mates, whether in local government, state government or presidential elections. Ethnic balancing is considered strategic for promoting ethnic and political stability in Nigeria, and more importantly, for securing ethnically-driven votes. The factors of Tinubu and Osibanjo are, therefore, important explanatory variables in understanding Yoruba votes for Buhari. The widely reported outbursts of the Oba of Lagos who threatened Ibos in Lagos to vote APC or else jump in the Lagos lagoon and perish may also be interpreted as an attempt to secure Lagos and more broadly, Yoruba support for Buhari (Olayode, 2015, p.20). Generally, the emerging picture from Table 1 is that a regional voting pattern dictated by North versus South-based division and, "the politicisation and transformation of ethnic exclusivity into po-

litical cleavages" (Ake 1993, p. 2) can be discerned. To argue differently, both Buhari and Jonathan won and lost respectively with a substantial ethnic political support base.

Table 2 also indicates a strong statistical correlation between ethnicity and voting outcomes. Both Buhari and Jonathan won overwhelmingly in their respective states of origins: Katsina and Bayelsa with 93.1% and 98.6% respectively. Given these patterns of voting, it can be argued that considerations of 'sons of the soil syndrome' were significant factors in the elections. In fact, these voting patterns in both core Northern and Southern states speaks to questions of ethnicity and broader issue of North-South geographical and socio-cultural distinctions (Lawal, 2017, p.10). But, why is this the case?

Table 2: State by state distribution of Presidential Votes cast for the APC and PDP

State	Total votes cast	APC	%	PDP	%
Abia	381,697	13,394	3.5	368,303	96.5
Adamawa	626,365	374,701	60.0	251,664	40.0
Akwa-Ibom	1,011,715	58,411	5.8	953, 304	94.2
Anambra	678,688	17,926	2.6	660,762	97.4
Bauchi	1,017,683	931,598	91.5	86,085	8.5
Bayelsa	366,403	5,194	1.4	361,209	98.6
Benue	677,698	373,961	55.2	303,737	44.8
Bornu	499,183	473,543	94.9	25,640	5.1
Cross-River	443,221	28,358	6.4	414,863	93.6
Delta	1,211,405	48,910	4.0	1,211,405	96.0
Ebonyi	393,171	19,518	5.0	373,653	95.0
Edo	495,338	208,469	42.0	286,869	58.0
Ekiti	296,797	120,331	41.0	176,466	59.0
Enugu	567,160	14,157	2.5	553,003	97.5
Gombe	458,118	361,245	78.9	96,873	21.1
Imo	692,438	133,253	19.2	559,185	80.8
Jigawa	1,028,902	885,998	86.1	142,904	13.9
Kaduna	1,611843	1,127,760	70.0	484,085	30.0
Kano	2,119,778	1,903,999	89.8	215,779	10.2
Katsina	1,444,378	1,345,441	93.1	98,937	6.9
Kebbi	668,885	567,883	85.0	100,972	15.0
Kogi	414,438	264,451	63.8	149,987	36.2
Kwara	434,647	302,145	69.5	132,502	30.5
Lagos	1,424,787	792,460	55.6	632,327	44.4
Nasarawa	510,369	236,838	46.0	273,460	54.0
Niger	931,138	657,678	70.6	273,460	29.4
Ogun	457,512	308,290	67.4	149,222	32.6
Ondo	506,839	298,889	59.0	207,950	41.0
Osun	634,971	383,603	60.4	251,368	39.6
Oyo	778,549	528,620	68.0	249,929	32.0
Plateau	732,516	429,140	59.0	303,376	41.0
Rivers	1,556,313	69,238	4.4	1,487,075	95.6
Sokoto	824,125	671,926	81.5	152,199	18.5
Taraba	572,126	261,326	45.6	310,800	54.4
Yobe	471,791	446,265	94.6	25,526	5.4
Zamfara	757,035	612,202	81.0	144,833	19.0
FCT	303,594	146,399	48.2	157,195	51.8

Source: INEC

Explaining the Social Determinants of Ethnic Voting Behaviour in the 2015 Election

Two major reasons can be advanced for the observed ethnic voting pattern in the 2015 presidential election as in other presidential elections in Nigeria, particularly since 1999. First, ethnic voting

behaviour in Nigeria, as in much of Africa, responds to the historicity of communalism in the continent. This is complicated by the fact that ethnicity has also not been creatively adjusted to the emerging liberal democratic order (Ake, 1996, p.24). The second argument is that ethnicity has been effectively mobilised by political elites to gain power at the expense of the people. This relates more to the character of the Nigerian state and the nature of social distribution of power amongst the various ethnic groups that are decidedly political and historically rooted in British colonialism and Nigeria's post-colonial state formation process. The ways both of these factors decisively impacted how individual Nigerian voters voted in the 2015 presidential elections in Nigeria are elaborated below.

First it is pertinent to note that ethnicity remains the primary mode of association, solidarity and expression of collective group identity in Nigeria as in most African societies. Ethnic politics has its social origins in the cultural politics and economics of European colonialism (Eke, 1990; Ake, 1993, Mamdani, 1996; 2001; 2002). It has consolidated since then to the extent that people define themselves first and foremost in terms of their ethnic origins. Thus, citizens' loyalty is first expressed to their ethnic group, and then the Nigerian state. This socio-psychological attachment influences the exercise of franchise, and generally, electoral behaviour in national elections and party politics in Nigeria. There is, therefore, a cultural and historical context that promotes collective group identification, which often translates into what may be aptly described as 'group voting' in contradiction to liberal democratic elections that emphasise one person, one vote. Group voting is defined here as the tendency for members of the same ethnic group to identify with, and vote *en masse* for a candidate based on ethnic descent. The candidate is perceived as a 'brother' or 'sister' based on theoretical considerations of primordiality. Given this context, voting is primarily expressive because identity politics rules. In some sense, it also shows that ethnicity is yet to be effectively adapted to the evolving liberal de-

mocracy in Nigeria, which emphasizes individualism and individual rights rather than group rights (Beissinger, 2008, p.93).

This does not imply that ethnicity and democracy are necessarily incompatible. "There are extremely diverse societies (India, Papua New Guinea) that rate as successful democratizers" (see Beissinger, 2008, p.87). In other words, "A society can function perfectly well if citizens hold multiple identities, but problems arise when those subnational identities arouse loyalties that override loyalty to the nation as a whole" (Collier, 2009, p.51). In the Nigerian context, however, the majority of the electorate continue to vote along ethnic and religious lines as shown in tables 1 and 2. Strong ethnic loyalties are founded on the assumptions that when an 'ethnic brother' is voted into power, he/she would most likely share and support their basic political views and hence respond to the needs of his/her own people as a differentiated other. Ethnic identity may, therefore, be viewed as a politicized collective identity. In this regard, there is a 'group think' in the sense of the causal connections between ethnicity and voting behaviour (Norris and Mattes, 2013). Accordingly, "ethnic identity has often been treated as a group marker in which voters opt for candidates who are members of the same ethnic group." This suggests that, "voters may favour a political party and candidates endorsed by their ethnic members (e.g. the Latino population typically supports the Democratic Party and its candidates in the U.S.), (Graves and Lee, 2000).

Drawing on the foregoing, it can be posited that the South-South region, as indicated in Table 1 voted for Jonathan primarily because he is an indigene of the Niger Delta. In this regard, the electorate of the region expressed preferences for Jonathan rather than Buhari even though the six years of Jonathan's presidency saw no policy intervention in the Niger Delta that addressed the lingering crisis of resource conflict, underdevelopment and marginalisation. To put in another way, the people of the Niger Delta failed to hold Jonathan accountable for his policy indifference to the resolution of

oil conflicts in the Niger Delta between 2010 and 2015 through the ballot box in the election of 2015. Rather, they consciously chose to vote massively for him as a kinsman. But, this seemingly predictable voting behaviour is part of a more complex set of considerations including, for example, the nature of geo-historical division of power in Nigeria and cultural politics of ethnic marginalisation. The ways these variables interacted, were contextualised and interpreted during the 2015 presidential election are particularly important for understanding how the people of the region voted.

Geographically, the Niger Delta region of Nigeria is located in the South-South geopolitical zone. It comprises ethnic minorities, which are endowed with oil and gas resources. From the 1970s to date, oil and gas have emerged as the main sources of national revenue in Nigeria and have since then sustained the political economy of the country. Oil accounts for over ninety per cent of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings and eighty percent of national revenues. Nevertheless, due to the nature and character of socio-political distribution of power in Nigeria, the people of the Niger Delta have benefitted little from the oil wealth generated from their lands. The major ethnic groups in Nigeria have had a strangle-hold on both economic and political power to the detriment of the ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta. It has been empirically demonstrated that it was during the period when the major ethnic groups dominated the political space as Nigeria's presidents that all the draconian legislation such as the Petroleum Act of 1963, the Land Use Decree of 1978 that deprived the Niger Delta oil-producing communities the right to ownership of oil resources found on the lands were enacted.

It is against these dynamics and familiar patterns of land and oil-related legislation that the people of the Niger Delta have made accusations of ethnic discrimination. "The indigenes of the South-South geopolitical zone (part of the old Eastern Region, referred to as the Niger Delta) strongly believed they have been marginalised by almost four decades of civilian and military rule headed by Northern

Nigeria politicians, which failed to develop the region" (Iwuagwu cited in Anejionu et al., 2016, pp 455-456). Some have aptly described this political condition as a case of internal colonialism, not least because poverty, social conflicts and environmental degradation have defined Niger Delta history since oil exploitation started in 1958 (Naanen, 1995; Nbete, 2012). Yet, Niger Delta residents have remained alienated from the existing power equation and calculus of power in Nigeria, particularly with reference to being able to occupy the office of the president of Nigeria. It was not until in 2010 that Goodluck Jonathan, an indigene of the Niger Delta emerged for the first time as president of Nigeria because of the sudden death of Yar'Adua.

Historically, therefore, the Niger Delta people had over the years developed grievances and resentment, not just against the Nigerian state, but also against the existing structure of ethnic domination that had underpinned their marginalization. Accordingly, the 2015 presidential election was bound up with these local political dynamics. Yet even though Jonathan failed to transform the socio-economic and political conditions of the people in the previous six years, this was not an issue in the 2015 elections. As shown in Table 1 and noted earlier, nine out of ten voters in the Niger Delta voted for Jonathan. In other words, Jonathan's exercise of leadership in the previous six years, which did not connect to the socio-political needs and economic aspirations of the local populations in the Niger Delta, was not the key determinant factor in preferring Jonathan to Buhari in the election. Ethnicity held sway. It can be argued that the people were more or less interested in politics of representation rather than political accountability and performance. Therefore, the votes of the people of the Niger Delta simply point to intrinsic and overt struggles by an in-group against an out-group to retain the presidency in the South-South zone.

Similar considerations may have influenced the Northern 'group vote' for Buhari. To illuminate this point, there is need to re-

visit briefly the power rotation agreement that emerged between political elites of the North and South within the ruling PDP before the 2015 presidential elections. In 2007, Musa Yar'Adua from the North was elected as president of Nigeria to succeed Olusegun Obasanjo with Goodluck Jonathan as the Vice-President. Based on an alleged existing PDP power sharing arrangement, it was expected that Yar'Adua or the North would complete his turn in office and thereafter return power to the South (Owen and Usman, 2015, p. 457). Eventually, when Yar'Adua died in office in 2010, Vice-President Jonathan from the South-South took over power as the president. In 2011, Jonathan presented himself as a candidate for the presidency in further violation of the PDP's internal power rotation principle, thus denying, "the northerners opportunity to complete the unfinished terms of late President Yar'Adua's presidency" (Olayode 2015, p.19). The action of Jonathan generated serious contention, acrimony and significant dissent within the PDP.

The important point that is relevant to this analysis is that Jonathan's disloyalty to the PDP and the fragmentation it created within the party did not remain an internal party affair. Narrow and parochial interests of northern political elites in their struggles to capture power were broadly framed and mobilised as the turn of the North to reclaim its lost opportunity to rule the country again. Consequently, the pattern of the conflict reflected and dovetailed into an entrenched national and wider inter-ethnic struggle for political domination between the North and the South, thereby reasserting and reinforcing historical and structural questions of power that found expressions in the voting patterns in the presidential election. In other words, "...the Northern Region, especially North-West and North-East geopolitical zones, who relinquished power to the South-South zone in 2010 at the unexpected death of President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua were very eager to claw back power" (Anejionu et.al, 2016, p.456). The people of the North were mobilised to vote along this line of thinking. It was not surprising, therefore, as already not-

ed, to observe that the people of the North-West, North-Central and North-East regions of the county all voted overwhelmingly for Buhari. In their view, power must return back to the north, irrespective of whether Jonathan's regime was responsive to the North or not. The expression, politicisation and mobilisation of religious sentiments also had similar impact on voting behaviour in the election.

The Limitations and Impact of Religion on Voting Behaviour in the 2015 Elections

Closely related to the influence of nationalism and ethnic identity-based cleavages in the determinations of voting patterns in the 2015 presidential election was religion. Worldwide, religion is viewed as a multidimensional phenomenon centred on belief, behaviour and identity, all of which shape democratic attitudes. It is argued that religion can hurt or enhance democracy, but the exact relationship is complex, and is context specific. In Nigeria, religious affiliation, defined primarily within the context of Muslim-Christian divide is a dominant expression of identity. Nigeria is widely described as a deeply religious nation where religion has emerged, and become consolidated over the years as a strong political force, shaping individual sense of belonging, voting decisions and political dynamics in the country.

By virtue of the geographical and cultural configurations of Nigeria, ethnicity and religion are intimately connected in such a way that they are very difficult to separate in Nigerian electoral process and politics. In Southern Nigeria, you find people who are predominantly Christians. In the South-West and South-Eastern regions, for instance, you find social groups such as the Yoruba and Igbo who speak a common language respectively, and are mainly Christians by their religious faith and beliefs. In Northern Nigeria, the people are primarily Muslims. This geography reinforces the link between religion and nationalism in Nigeria. The people of both Southern and

Northern Nigeria see themselves as different peoples, each group united by religious and cultural ethnicity. Consequently, Hausa Muslims are is most likely to vote for a Muslim candidate from the North and vice versa in the South. As illustrated in Tables 1 and 2, "Buhari, a Muslim, garnered massive support from states which had incorporated Sharia law into their legal system. Christian states on the other hand, voted for Jonathan, a Christian from the South" (Anejionu et.al 2016, p.459).

Kaduna state provides an interesting and illuminating illustration of the politics of religion and the saliency of the influence of geography on voting preferences of the people for the two main candidates in question. Kaduna state is a core Northern state, but internally it is more or less a reflection of the broad religious division of Nigeria into a Christian-dominated South and Muslim-dominated North. Northern Kaduna is highly populated by Muslims while the South is largely Christians. While on the whole, the APC won in Kaduna state (see table 2), regional analysis of the results of Kaduna state shows that Buhari won massively in the Northern part and Jonathan won overwhelmingly in the South (Obiora, 2015). In some measure, it can be argued that Nigerian voters are at present, largely inclined to vote for a candidate who shares the same faith with them, and who is also more likely to protect their religious beliefs and religious identities. In Southern Nigeria, Buhari was roundly perceived as, "a strong advocate of Sharia implementation" (Ukiwo and Rustard, 2015, p.3) and a likely candidate to Islamise the country. This attribution was a key consideration for voting preferences in the Christian-dominated regions of the country.

Therefore, given the centrality and place of religion as a force for mobilization, electioneering campaigns by both candidates were not devoid of appeal to, and exploitation of religious sentiments throughout the country. Jonathan, for example, paid several visits to many Christian organisations across Nigeria to mobilise Christian voters to "identify with their Christian brother" (Oloyode, 2015, p.

18). The then governor of Rivers state, and now Minister of Transportation who headed the APC presidential campaign, Mr. Rotimi Amaechi alleged that the Jonathan presidency bribed the leadership of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) with a whopping sum of N7-billion to campaign against General Buhari. According to Animashaun (2015), "Although the national leadership of CAN rejected the allegation, the Executive Director of the Voice of Northern Christian Movement, Pastor Kallamu Musa-Dikwa, insisted that the national office of CAN had received the money and disbursed it to state chapters of the religious body." (p. 194). On the side of the APC, a popular Catholic Priest, Rev. Mbaka, was widely reported in the Nigerian media to have openly preached and campaigned against Jonathan, while also mobilizing a significant section of Catholic Faithful in Enugu city to vote for Buhari. This character of politics has serious implications for effective and productive inter-ethnic relations in Nigeria and the prospects for enhancing internal peace and the building of a viable state and state institutions.

Social Conflicts Implications of Ethnic Voting and Voting without Choosing in Nigeria

The main claim of this section is that the strength of ethnicity in Nigerian electoral politics is not without its complications for the institutionalisation of democracy. On democratic consolidation, the basic argument is that the structural limitation of ethnicity on voting behaviour in Nigeria is that voting is least emancipatory and liberating. Voting along ethno-religious and geospatial lines is a metaphor for powerlessness. In Claude Ake's view, this character of voting does not really amount to choosing because ethno-religious parochialism rooted in elite manipulation tends to hold sway (Bratton, 2013, p.5; Ake, 1996, p. 25, 27). People technically have abstract voting rights, not choosing rights. For example, "if individuals vote in blind support of their ethnic ingroup or in opposition of ethnic outgroups,

their decisions will not involve substantial systematic processing, potentially undermining the principles and effectiveness of the democratic system (Lee et, al, 2016, p.12). Indeed, "by responding to ethnic appeal, the voter is frozen in a moment of particularity and obliged to renounce the universality of democratic consensus-building and collective identity" (Ake, 1996, p.11). Ethnic voting, therefore, has mutually reinforcing implications for voting without choosing and the outbreak of ethnic conflicts. This is because there is no space that fosters collective identity, and in state characterised by negative unity such as Nigeria, electoral politics is more or less "a fabrication of an endless war between regional, ethnic, religious and communal groups" (Ake, 1996, p.8).

The resurgence of militancy in the Niger Delta region barely a year Buhari assumed office as President speaks to the nature of iden-tity-based electoral politics in Nigeria. Between April and May 2015, a variety of militant groups emerged in the Niger Delta under the aegis of Niger Delta Avengers (NDA). They organised themselves and revived the agitation for resource control in the region, agitation that was almost totally relaxed throughout Jonathan's presidency. The new enthusiasm among the militants soon found expression in violent attacks on oil pipelines in the region (see Table 3). The vari-ous attacks of the NDA contributed significantly to the collapse of oil production, thus complicating the economy that was already reeling under conditions of falling international oil prices. The oil-based Nigerian economy was, therefore, severely threatened by new uprisings presented by Niger Delta militants. In fact, it took direct negotiations of Vice-president Yemi Osibanjo with NDA's militants to restore calm and for oil production to resume again in the region.

It is worth recalling that Niger Delta militants had prior to the election threatened that if Jonathan, their own 'son of the soil' lost his re-election bid in 2015, they would unleash violence in the re-gion to undermine oil production activities and political stability in Nigeria (Animashaun, 2015, p.194, Oloyade, 2015, p.17). The new

wave of militancy that confronted the Buhari regime can, therefore, be interpreted as a rejection of Buhari's victory and the corresponding power shift from the Delta region to the North.

Some, such as John Campbell, former U.S. ambassador to Nigeria have argued that the rationale for the NDA's attacks was driven purely by greed rather than nationalistic grievances. Indeed, greed and criminality cannot be entirely ruled out given the emergent character of the Niger Delta struggles, particularly since the post-Cold War when agitation in the region assumed violent and criminal dimensions. Nevertheless, the timing of the NDA's attacks suggest an instrumentalisation of ethnicity. It is interesting to note that Jonathan's presidency, between 2010 and 2015, was largely characterized by inaction on the part of the Niger Delta militants, and on the other, policy indifference by the Jonathan regime toward addressing the root causes of oil conflicts in the region.

The relaxation of resource control agitation by the people of the Niger Delta may have been influenced by perceptions that Jonathan, the first Niger Delta indigene to assume the Presidency needed ethnic loyalty and strong political support from his constituents. Presumably, passive resistance was considered necessary for Jonathan to succeed in office. He was, therefore, tolerated by his own people, ignoring the fact that the Niger Delta Question is a deeply structural issue. Throughout Jonathan's tenure as president, a combination of cooptation and policy indifference to resource conflict in the Niger Delta, both aimed at securing oil production, rather than sustainable peace, held sway. Political cooptation involved the award of oil pipeline security contracts to ex-militant leaders such as Ateke Toms, Asari Dokubo and Tompolo to ensure that there was temporary peace and security in Niger Delta rather than finding lasting solutions to the festering crisis in the region.

Table 3: Attacks on Oil Facilities by the NDA, February-June, 2016

S/N	Date of Attacks	Armed Group Involved	Oil Company Affected	Nature and Place of Attack	Impact
1	10/2/2016	NDA	NLNG	Bombing of Bonny Soku Gas Line, Gbaran	--
2	8/4/2016	NDA	Chevron	Bombing of Chevrons valve platform (an offshore oil facility) Benikuruku, Excravos in Abiteye, Warri South-West LGA	-
3	8/5/2016	NDA	Chevron	Bombing of Chevrons three swamp stations Warri south-West LGA	Estimated loss of 40, 000 bpd of crude oil
4	8/5/2016	NDA	Agip	Bombing of Agip Oil Pipeline Azuzuama, Tebidaba Brass in Bayelsa	-
5	13/5/2016	Unnamed Group	Chevron	Bombing of pipeline Makaraba Community, Gbaramatu Clan Warri South-West LGA, Delta state	-
6	May 2016	NDA	NNPC	Bombing of the truck line supplying crude to both the Kaduna and Warri refineriesas well a pipline supplying Gas to Lagos and Abuja electricity plant, Delta State	-
7	1/6/2016	Chevron	Chevron	Bombing of Chevron's Oil Wells: RMP 23 and RMP 24	About 5 Soldiers died
8	9/6/2016	Unnamed group	NPDC	Bombing of pipeline Chinomi Creeks Warri Southwest Local government	-

Source: Compiled by Author

Conceivably, ethnicity and political elitism interacted in such a way that foreclosed efforts to transform state-society relations as the basis for building sustainable peace in the region. Consequently, the Niger Delta did not experience any form of social, institutional and structural change during his tenure or any policy response to the Niger Delta crisis that had direct positive impacts on the material conditions of majority of the local people in the region. Jonathan's

failure to complete the construction of the East-West road, a major road project inherited from the Yar'Adua administration, which would have had direct impact on the lives of the ordinary people, is regarded as the height of insensitivity to the plights of the Niger Delta people. Contradictorily, the Niger Delta, which widely accepted Jonathan as evident in their voting patterns in the election, were also very quick to reject the government of Buhari. For example, the renewed wave of militancy mentioned earlier was complemented by the rise in civil society agitations for resource control in the region in post-Jonathan administration.

Edwin Clark's campaign for resource control in the Niger Delta in post-Jonathan administration is particularly illustrative of the changing dynamics and politicisation of ethnicity in the region. Edwin Clark is a prominent Ijaw leader, who was a key member of Jonathan's kitchen cabinet. He was generally quiet on agitation for resource ownership rights in the Niger Delta when his kinsman was in control of the Nigerian state. Surprisingly, Clark joined forces with other socio-political pressure groups in Nigeria to agitate for political restructuring and resource control immediately after Jonathan was voted out of power. It meant little or nothing to Clark that Buhari implemented the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Report on Ogoni barely a year in office, which Jonathan failed to do in six years. The UNEP Report was released in 2011. It details how negative extractive activities of the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC or Shell) devastated the Niger Delta environment and its implementation by the federal government, was widely considered a major step towards reviving the fractured relationships between the Niger Delta people and the Nigerian state. While Jonathan jettisoned the UNEP Report, Buhari a northerner implemented it. Nevertheless, for the militants and people like Edwin Clark, Buhari was perceived as a president from the north, and Buhari's policy actions in the Niger Delta simply did not matter. Generally, the contagion effects of militants' resumption of

armed agitation in the Niger Delta and Edwin Clark's campaigns in post-Jonathan presidency contributed to the intensification of debates on political restructuring of Nigeria and its associated ethnic tensions and perceived threats of disintegration of the Nigerian state.

In the North, similar deployment of ethnicity, reminiscent of what occured in the Niger Delta under the Jonathan administration was discernible in the spread of armed attacks of Fulani herdsmen when Buhari assumed power in May 2015. Herdsmen armed attacks and herder-farmer conflicts are not entirely new in contemporary Nigerian history. They have been there for over two decades, but were mainly confined to Northern Nigeria between Christian farmers and Muslim herders, especially in the Middle-Belt region. However, recent escalation and diffusion of attacks of the herdsmen across Nigeria, particularly into Southern Nigeria have been predicated on the arguments that when Buhari, a Fulani from Katsina state emerged as president, the herdsmen appeared to have been emboldened and motivated by the politics of ethnicity. This correlation is hinged on the response gap between the rising incidence of herdsmen attacks and the apparent demonstration of impotence by the Nigerian state to contain the rampaging herdsmen. Since 2015, for example, armed attacks of herdsmen on local communities in southern Nigeria have not only consolidated, but had also constituted serious security challenge in social dislocation, internal displacement, economic losses and deaths. In April 2016, herdsmen attacked Ozalla community in Nkanu West Local Government Area of Enugu, Enugu state, killing about forty people and destroying farm lands (Mamah, et al 2016). There have also been attacks in Rivers, Delta and Ondo states. In Ondo, for instance, a former secretary to the federal government and presidential candidate in 1999 was kidnapped from his farm by herdsmen and held hostage for some days. In fact, these increasingly deadly attacks have started taking place more frequently in the southern states, something even Boko Haram has yet to attempt to date (Amaza, 2016).

Given the increasing escalation and persistent security threats posed by herdsmen since 2015 as illustrated by the killing of over 80 people in Benue state on New Year day in 2018, some have described herdsmen as local versions of Boko Haram terrorists (Omitola, 2014, p. 3; Umoru, 2017). Yet, Buhari had failed to take decisive actions against them. Even when president Buhari ordered a military crackdown on herdsmen, such pronouncements were not backed by concrete actions to show a commitment to protecting lives of vulnerable Nigerian citizens. Against the seemingly impotent response of the federal government, many Nigerians, particularly those from the South believe that the president has deliberately turned a blind eye to the herdsmen security crisis because he comes from the Fulani ethnic group (David, 2016).

These ethnic sentiments compelled attention, and were reinforced when president Buhari deployed a military taskforce, code-named Operation Python Dance to subdue the struggle for self-determination by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) in the South-East in September 2017. The contention was that Buhari who had turned a blind eye to the activities of the herdsmen despite the threats they posed to national security suddenly mustered political will and demonstrated such a hard stance on the IPOB. He declared the IPOB a terrorist organisation and began the process of proscribing it, an action that was viewed as political suppression of legitimate dissent. The application of double standards in the response of Buhari to the IPOB and the herdsmen's security predicaments is said to be underlined by political ethnicity. Not the least, because the declaration of the IPOB as terrorist organisation and discursive constructions of security threats posed by the group raises questions of securitisation within the context of politics of protection and national security (Wæver, 1996; Williams, 2003). Therefore, it was somewhat not surprising for the upper legislative chamber of Nigeria's National Assembly, the Senate, to condemn the deployment of the Operation Python Dance and subsequently set up a committee

to probe the alleged violations of human rights committed by the soldiers. Similarly, the United States government promptly rejected claims that the IPOB was a terrorist group. Beyond the issue of IPOB and herdsmen security crisis, Buhari has also been accused of making political appointments and recruitments into the civil service that smack of ethnicity. It is claimed that these appointments were selectively made to disproportionately favour the North in violation of Nigeria's federal character principle that emphasizes ethnic balancing.

Taken together, Buhari's nepotism with regard to lopsided political appointments, and the failure to address the herdsmen security crisis as well as the resurgence of armed agitations in the South-South and South-East reflect the continuation of the politics of ethnic loyalty expressed in the voting patterns in the election. The logic of all these ethnically-driven social conflicts is that Buhari was popularly voted into power but not chosen. Seeing voting in terms of the substantive freedoms of people to freely choose candidates at elections irrespective of their ethno-religious backgrounds and states of origins will reduce the tendency to resort to nepotism and ethnically-induced violence, thus facilitating the evolution of democratic peacebuilding in Nigeria and development of an inclusive Nigerian society.

Conclusion

This paper has analysed voting behaviour and the pattern it forms in the 2015 presidential election. It argues that historic alignments of ethnicity and religion, which have significantly influenced voting behaviour, voting patterns and electoral outcomes in Nigerian politics since political independence in 1960 were striking in the 2015 presidential election results. The votes cast for Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP and Muhammadu Buhari of the APC reflected perceptions of support for an ethnic kinsman. For example, 90% of vot-

ers in the South-South, the home region of former President Jonathan voted along ethnic lines. Similarly, the North-West voted overwhelmingly for Buhari of the APC. Indeed, across the six geopolitical regions, the results broadly indicate regional voting patterns along North-South-based ethno-regional and religious divisions, and the geopolitical support and votes of the Yoruba people in the Southwest for Buhari were critical in his winning the election. The strategic choice of Osinbanjo as Buhari's running mate contributed significantly in swaying the 53% votes of Yoruba people for the APC. In fact, the Southwest was generally perceived as a stronghold of the APC, not the least, because many of its leaders including Tinubu, the national leader of the party and Buhari's running mate, Osinbanjo were from the region. To this end, the Southwest's vote was more or less as an expression of nationalistic support for ethnic kinsmen, and not necessarily a support for the APC along ideological and policy lines.

The article contends that the causal connections between ethnicity and voting outcomes in Nigeria can be located in African communalism and the nature of the socio-political distribution of power in Nigeria. It further notes that liberal democratic elections that swept across Africa in the 1990s in the so-called third wave of democratisation, which emphasize individualism are yet to be creatively adjusted to the historical, cultural, and practical realities of communalism and ethnicity in Nigeria. There is still a pervasive sense of collective identity built around primordial conceptions of ethnicity, one that is also intensely instrumentalised by political elites who appeal to voters, weeping ethnic and religious sentiments in a bid to capturing and retaining power. Ethnicity, thus, continues to condition people's social, economic and political relations, for example, in the unfair distribution of power and opportunities amongst ethnic groups as well as voting choices expressed during national elections.

The interaction of social constructivist and primordial interpretations of ethnicity is problematic for electoral competitions and democratic outcomes, and peacebuilding in Nigeria. Both are mutually constitutive in the emergence and sustenance of identity-based struggles in the country. This is because the predominance of ethnic voting behaviour translates into a phenomenon of voting without choosing. The relaxation of militant and civil society agitations for resource rights in the Niger Delta during the tenure of Jonathan, for example, and their revival in post-Jonathan regime are illustrative of the challenges and contradictions of voting without choosing for social conflicts in Nigeria. These were also expressive in Buhari's nepotism in appointments that favoured northerners and his divergent strategy in responding to threats of the IPOB and northern Fulani herdsmen. This article, therefore, draws policy attention to voter and citizenship education including addressing structural underpinnings of predictable ethnic voting behaviour and voting patterns in Nigerian electoral politics so as to promote democracy and enhance democratic peace in the country.

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Governing Extractive Industries

The Case of Angola's Petroleum Sector

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Abstract: Natural resources can be extracted to support socioeconomic development in resource-rich countries. However, a developmental model based on the extraction of natural resources can produce negative externalities such as environmental degradation, conflict, and political instability. These externalities are well documented by scholarly literature on the resource curse that identifies governance as one of the chief culprits for the curse. The fall of commodity prices has prompted regulatory changes in resource-rich countries, including Angola. This paper analyzes the impact of falling commodity prices on the governance of extractive industries. Specifically, it examines the petroleum industry in Angola to explore governance strategies that countries can pursue to support socioeconomic development. It argues that Angola can attain a balanced model of economic development if the stakeholders support economic diversification and strengthen natural resource governance.

Governance of natural resources rests on a government's ability to manage resource wealth. It is a daunting task for the governments of resource-rich countries as a developmental trajectory based on the extraction of natural resources may lock countries into a path-dependent outcome with suboptimal results. Natural resources are prone to the resource curse. The curse is associated with slower economic development, conflict, and political struggle in developing countries (Karl, 1997; Ross, 2012). This paper draws on the literature on the resource curse to examine a case study of Angola. The

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objective of this paper is to identify natural resource governance op-
tions which Angola can use to support its economic and social de-
velopment as it transitions away from the Dos Santos era of political
and economic leadership.

Angola presents an interesting case study from a perspective of
qualitative research. It is a resource-rich, post-conflict country.
Amongst countries located in the Sub-Saharan Africa, Angola ranks
as the third largest economy, second largest oil producer, and the
third-largest producer of diamonds (Business Monitor International,
2015a). While Angola has the potential to attain a sustained eco-
nomic development through diversification, it must overcome the
resource curse, which is rooted in Angola's dependence on extractive
industries. As demonstrated by the global collapse in oil prices in
2008 and then again in 2014, Angola's economic overreliance on
the petroleum sector is unsustainable in the long term. In this paper,
I propose that Angola's domestic political actors can cooperate with
international organizations and transnational corporations to pro-
mote economic diversification, as recommended by Angola's *Na-
tional Developmental Plan 2018-2022* (Government of Angola,
2018a). The paper focuses on the changes in the Angolan political
economy in the aftermath of the 2017 presidential election that
marked a change in governing coalition away from a Dos Santos 38-
year political reign and toward João Lourenço's leadership of Angola
and the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA). At the
time of this transition, Angola represents a contemporary case for
investigating how a change in political leadership creates space for
structural economic transformation to reduce the constraints of the
resource curse, given political imperatives of retaining access to eco-
nomic rents to retain political power.

To examine this proposition, the paper proceeds to analyze An-
gola's natural resource sector. First, it outlines the existing debates in
the resource curse literature. Second, it considers the historical emer-
gence of resource dependence in Angola's economy and contextual-

izes it within the resource curse debate. Subsequently, it will examine the governance of petroleum extraction, which is the country's main resource that generates the largest revenue for the government. Lastly, the paper outlines strategies for economic diversification before concluding with a preliminary assessment of President Lourenço's economic policy adjustments, in terms of their ability to undo negative political, economic, and social consequences of Angola's oil export dependency.

The Resource Curse Debate

Resource-rich countries, blessed with abundant natural resources, are faced with a set of unique problems that are known as the *resource curse* in the literature. This term first appeared in qualitative and quantitative studies conducted in the 1980s and 1990s (Gelb, 1988; Auty, 1993; Karl, 1997). The extensive literature on the resource curse lists a set of pathologies that resource-rich countries may experience. In the realm of economy, states suffering from the resource curse develop slower than their counterparts (Sachs & Warner 2001), exhibit low levels of human development (Ross, 2012), rank high on corruption levels (Leite & Weidmann, 1999), suffer from economic inequality, have rampant poverty, and exhibit high unemployment (Ross, 2012). Scholars examining political aspects of the curse have found a correlation between natural resource abundance and authoritarian regimes (Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004; Ross, 2012). Scholars have also associated the presence of natural resources with an increased likelihood of a prolonged civil conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2006; Ross, 2012). Thus, the curse may affect local economy, politics, and society.

As the studies on the *resource curse* grew into prominence, more scholars became cautious about the existence of the *curse*. Studies by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), Lederman and Maloney (2008), and van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010) are among the few that

challenge the *resource curse* hypothesis after re-examining measurements and data used by other scholars when studying the resource curse. Despite the broader debate about the existence of the curse, scholars tend to agree that resource extraction is generally problematic due to high development costs, volatile revenue, and the enclave nature of the deposits. Resource extraction is especially difficult for countries that possess "point source" resources, such as hydrocarbons, which are confined by geology and are easily exploited by the local elites (Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett, & Busby, 2005). Since natural resources may be a source of a negative social, economic, and political externalities, their governance becomes a very salient issue for scholars, policymakers, and civil society actors.

For the purposes of this study, it is important to note that not all countries will exhibit these problems and that some countries may experience multiple symptoms of the curse. To illustrate, some countries, such as Norway, exhibit virtually no symptoms of the curse, while others, such as Venezuela, appear to exhibit most of the curse's symptoms. Despite the difference in these outcomes, for most countries, natural resources present a challenge and opportunity, that needs to be properly managed to ensure that it provides benefits while minimizing externalities. In Angola, as I will illustrate in the subsequent section, the curse manifests itself along economic, political, and social dimensions.

Natural Resource Governance Issues in Angola: Historical Legacy and Contemporary Problems:

Throughout history, Angola's governance structures, designed to govern natural resources, reflected the needs of dominant political actors. Portuguese colonial administration developed Angola's first resource-governance structures after the discovery of large petroleum and diamond deposits in Angola. In 1910, the Portuguese government approved Angola's first oil concession, and in 1956 the Com-

panhia de Petróleos de Angola (Petrangol) began oil extraction (García-Rodríguez, García-Rodríguez, Castilla-Gutiérrez, & Major, 2015, p. 169). While petroleum is Angola's most profitable resource, it is not the sole resource coveted by foreign extractive corporations. Angola's abundant diamond reserves began to be exploited in 1917 by the Companhia de Diamantes de Angola (Diamang). Diamang represented a consortium of Portuguese, French, American, and Belgian investors, who enjoyed substantial autonomy from the state (Veranda & Cleveland 2014, pp. 88 and 91). Diamang and Petrangol, with the support of International Oil Corporations (IOCs), were the first administrators and producers of diamonds and oil in Angola.

Angola's extractive governance arrangements were reshaped after Angola gained independence from Portugal in 1975. The liberation struggle from Portugal was characterized by local anti-colonial revolts and guerilla warfare that lasted from 1961 until the independence (Guimarães, 2016). After gaining independence, Angola suffered from a prolonged civil war between the MPLA, União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) and Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola (FNLA) that lasted around 22 years and ended in 2002, leaving the MPLA government victorious. The parameters of this were shaped by the dynamics of the Cold War as MPLA, UNITA and FNLA received support from various foreign governments (Le Billion, 2001; Guimarães, 2016).

Angola's history as a post-colonial and post-conflict nation shapes its approach to resource governance. In the post-colonial period, Angola's economic activities focused on the extraction of domestic natural resources as other economic sectors were underdeveloped (Botchway, 2011). Angola decided to nationalize foreign mining companies and to create state-owned enterprises to manage the extraction of its natural resources. While scholars note that the post-colonial governance arrangements have reproduced colonial extractive structures (Le Billon, 2001; Malaquias, 2001), it is important to

add that governance arrangements have become more fragmented as a result of the civil war. To illustrate this, there were parallel governance arrangements in the resource sector to meet the needs of multiple authorities that were represented by the warring parties—MPLA, UNITA, and FNLA. MPLA relied on oil revenues generated by the parastatal, Sociedade Nacional de Combustíves de Angola (Sonangol), and used it to finance MPLA's military operations and state expenditures (Aguilar & Goldstein, 2009). On the other hand, UNITA used illicit money from its diamond revenue to bankroll its military operations (Le Billon, 2001; Weigert, 2011, p. 75). Thus, the presence of natural resources in Angola prolonged the duration of the civil war, as UNITA was unwilling to give up its diamond-generated revenue (Weigert, 2011, pp. 126-7).

Angola's historical legacy is partially responsible for the state of its current natural resource governance framework. In general, the country follows a continental trend identified by Botchway (2011, pp. 5-7), where African governments that depend on resource rents suffer from "weak regulatory framework for resource exploitation" that may lead to suboptimal management of the resource-generated revenue. Botchway's argument is supported by the data generated by the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI). Based on the rankings produced by the NRGI (2017), Angola's resource governance structures are "weak" (with an overall score of 35 in 2017). The NRGI's (2017) indicators note that the weakness of Angola's governance structures stems from a weak rule of law, heightened corruption, ineffective government, and lack of transparency. The Institute also stresses that Angola has a non-transparent petroleum sector controlled by Sonangol, which provides limited information about its activities (NGRI, 2017). While Angola's government has taken steps in 2010 toward improving transparency in its budgets by introducing the 2010 Law on Administrative Probity, the extractive sector has retained its secretive nature (NGRI, 2017). The weak gov-

ernance structure coupled with the country's dependence on the extractive industries has reinforced the dynamics of the resource curse.

Angola also suffers from the political aspects of the resource curse. While Angola opted for a multiparty presidential system with tri-partite division of power (i.e. it has executive, judicial, and legislative branches) after the civil war ended, Angola's democratic structure retains elements of authoritarianism (García-Rodríguez et al., 2015, p. 166). The political system is "hyper-presidential", as the president is the key figure in all three branches of the government (Amundsen, 2014, p. 176). A new constitution adopted by the MPLA government in 2010 has reinforced the presidential power over the governance apparatus, as it abolished the direct election of the president. This resulted in a "de facto absence of separation of powers" (García-Rodríguez et al., 2015, p. 166; Amundsen, 2014, p. 188). As Angola's leadership relies on natural resources to back up its activities, it does not have to rely on taxation but rather on networks of "patronage and coercion" to rule the country (Le Billon, 2001, p. 79). Angola's political structure exhibits patronage politics that produce a patrimonial state, which, in some areas, resulted in a "phantom state", because the state failed to perform its responsibilities, such as the provision of public goods and security, to citizens, such as the provision of public goods and security (Power, 2012; Harvey, 2005). These trends illustrate that Angola's political system remains dominated by a small elite group. For over 30 years, this group was led by President Dos Santos, who recently retired and was replaced from within the MPLA by João Lourenço in 2017.

Angola's economic performance is affected by the fluctuation of global commodity prices due to its dependence on petroleum exports (OECD Publishing, 2011; Morakabati, Beavis, & Fletcher, 2014). During periods of high commodity prices, it seems that Angola does not suffer from the curse. To illustrate this, Angola's economy grew by 14.9 percent annually when oil prices were high (2002-2008). This growth is captured in figure one, based on the World

Bank's data. During this period, Angola ranked among the fastest growing economies in the 2001-2010 period (The Economist, 2011). As Angola's economy grew, public debt declined from 49.9 to 28.7 percent of the GDP (The International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2015). However, as commodity prices fell, Angola's economic recovery reversed. Angola's economic growth begun to cool down in 2008, reflecting a global drop in commodity prices. This trend reverberated into the public debt that began to rise as of 2012. The IMF (2015) predicts that the public debt ratio will reach 53 percent of GDP by 2016. These two economic trends suggest that the global commodity prices are important determinants of the condition of Angola's economy. The fluctuation in the GDP growth suggests that the economic development focused on petroleum is not sustainable.


Figure 1: Angola's Annual GDP Growth (%) (Based on the World Bank's World Development Indicators Data, 2018)

Other economic indicators suggest that Angola's economy suffers from multiple aspects of the resource curse. Angola has high levels of income inequality, with a Gini coefficient of 42.7 (Muzima, 2018). The data shows that the distribution of the resource wealth among the Angolan population is highly unequal and skewed in favour of the elites. High levels of inequality are associated with high

rates of unemployment (20 percent) and poverty (37 percent) (Muzima, 2018). Additionally, Angola's economic performance is aggravated by high levels of corruption. In 2014, Angola ranked as the 161st most corrupt country (Transparency International, 2014). Angola's weak economic performance is associated with the low ranking on human development index (149th out of 188 countries; see The United Nations Development Programme, 2014). All of these indicators suggest that Angola is facing economic and socio-political difficulties.

Furthermore, Angola suffers from the Dutch Disease, where an inflow of foreign capital increases the value of the domestic currency and lowers competitiveness of Angola's products on the global markets. A World Bank's economic study (2013) notes that the "appreciation of the Angolan kwanza is significantly diminishing the competitiveness of the non-oil economy by making imports relatively cheap compared to the domestic goods" (p. vii). The World Bank (2013, p. 18) data indicate that Angola's currency has appreciated by approximately 12 percent since 2004. High prices of non-traded goods are reflected by high living costs in Angolan cities. For example, the Mercer's *Cost of Living ranking* (2015) has ranked Luanda as the most expensive city in the world for expats for three consecutive years. Currency appreciation inhibits the growth of other economic sectors, such as manufacturing (The World Bank, 2013, p. 3). In Angola, manufacturing accounts for less than 10 percent of GDP (Muzima, 2018). As global oil prices fall, Angola's currency depreciates to make domestic products more competitive, but new problems arise.

The recent drop in global oil prices resulted in budget cuts and a reduction in public spending by 50 percent (Mendes, 2015). These budget cuts are borne by the poorest segments of the population, who do not have access to proper sanitation, food, and healthcare. Since the budget cuts occurred, the sanitary and sewer systems collapsed resulting in an outbreak of a disease in Angola (Coroado,

2016). The government has also implemented a set of oil subsidy cuts that increased the price for fuel in Angola (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015). Higher prices for fuel will likely be passed on to the consumers in the form of an increase in the prices of other products. Furthermore, the fall in oil prices increases the propensity of domestic governments to borrow funds abroad. As the oil prices fell, Angola's budget was reduced by a quarter. The country had to access loan packages—worth of $10 billion USD - from international investors to support its development plans and to stabilize its domestic economy (England, 2015). If Angola's economy was more diversified, then the government would have been able to maintain internal economic stability despite the fall in oil prices (Morakabati, Beavis, & Fletcher, 2014, p. 417).

In the social realm, Angola appears to suffer from the social aspects of the resource curse. The Angolan government negotiates with separatist groups seekingto gain control over oil that is discovered on their territory. Separatists remain active in Angola's oil-rich province of Cabinda. The residents of Cabinda do not self-identify as Angolans, instead, they prefer to be seen as "Cabindans" in pursuit of independence (Reed, 2009, p. 11). Cabinda's separatist movement is carried by the Frente para a Libertação de Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC) that fought for Cabinda's independence since the colonial era (Reed, 2009, pp. 36 and 48-49). The group seeks to gain control over Cabinda's oil industry, which produces over a half of Angola's petroleum (García-Rodríguez et al., 2015, p. 169; Reed, 2009, p. 1). The government often suppresses the secessionist attempts to maintain its grip over the province (Reed, 2009, pp. 7 and 11). In 2006, the government signed a peace deal with the separatist group. Yet, Cabinda's separatists continue their operations. For example, in 2010 separatists attacked Togo's football team and Chinese workers (BBC news, 2010). Therefore, Cabinda's secessionist movement elevates security risk for the businesses operating in Angola (Business Monitor International, 2015a).

The economic, social, and political aspects of the resource curse in Angola are linked to its dependence on the petroleum sector, which accounts for the majority of Angola's exports (90 percent) and about a half of the country's GDP (OPEC, 2018). While the sector has been often associated with the resource curse (Le Billon, 2001; Ross, 2012), it may harbour opportunities for the government if managed sustainably.

Petroleum Extraction and Investment:
Opportunities and challenges

Angola is currently the second largest petroleum producer in Sub-Saharan Africa with 9 billion proven crude oil reserves located both onshore and offshore (EIA, 2015). While half of these reserves are in Cabinda, the majority of the oil projects are concentrated offshore because onshore production was complicated during the civil war (EIA, 2015). The majority of Angola's petroleum is extracted from Africa's two most productive basins: Lower Congo and Kwanza (Malaquias, 2001). The Kwanza basin is preferred by the IOCs because it has pre-salt formations that are geologically predisposed to hold larger quantities of hydrocarbons (EIA, 2015). Relative political stability today enables corporations to extract oil onshore in the Cabinda province. The onshore fields will provide new opportunities that are less capital intensive than the offshore fields.

Extractive corporations operate under Angola's domestic regulations. Under the Dos Santos' administration, Angola's petroleum activities law No. 10/04, adopted on November 2004, set a regulatory framework for the oil industry. This law reaffirmed that oil revenues are public, owned by the state, and managed by Sonangol, a state-owned oil company (Miranda & Associados Socidade de Advogados, 2004). This affirmation is rooted in the United Nation's resolution 1803 (XVII) granting "Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources" to the resource-rich states to ensure that natural re-

sources are extracted on the basis of national interests and for the benefit of local people (The United Nations General Assembly, 1962). Yet, it is unclear whether Angolans will benefit from the extracted resources or whether the majority of wealth, which will be captured by the elite through Sonangol, which manages oil operations.

Sonangol dominates Angola's oil industry and serves several functions in the oil sector. Under Dos Santos' leadership, Sonangol had a mandate to develop a vibrant domestic oil sector, maximize government's oil revenue, promote local employment and private sector, and engage in the governance of the oil sector (Heller, 2012, pp. 836-839). The company allocated oil resources among foreign investors through joint ventures or production-sharing agreements. The former type of agreement allowed corporations to share the investment and production, while the latter provided an investor with a share of production after the investment is made (García-Rodríguez et al., 2015, p. 170). Under the new Lourenço government, the concessionary responsibilities and regulation migrated from the hands of Sonangol to the newly created National Petroleum and Gas Agency to increase transparency and efficiency (Presidential Office, 2018).

As oil prices began to decline, Angola's government has altered some of its policies to attract foreign investment into the extractive sector. The government issued the Presidential Decree No.3 in 2012 to allow public and private companies to reduce their participation in production-sharing contracts from 50 to 35 percent and exempted them from a requirement to provide financing for research and social projects (The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2012). To further sweeten the investment climate, Angola adopted a new investment law no. 14/15 in August 2015 to cut bureaucratic red-tape and lower tax burdens for foreign investors (Ernst and Young, 2015). The government has also reaffirmed its commitment to attract foreign investment in September 2015 by issuing the

Presidential Order 182/15. This order adopted a "fast lane" approach to investment by speeding up processing times (Angola Hub, 2015). In 2018, Angola also cut the taxation rate for marginal oil fields—with production tax lowered to 10 percent from 20 percent and income tax from 50 percent to 25 percent—to stimulate foreign investment (Eisenhammer, 2018a).

Despite the adoption of new laws, foreign investment in Angola's oil sector declined in light of the low-price environment (Business Monitor International, 2018). Other factors can also be responsible for falling FDI in Angola's hydrocarbon sector. Investors may be deterred from investing in Angola due to certain legal constraints, such as the Foreign Exchange Law, issued in 2012, that requires foreign oil firms, engaged in Angola's oil extraction, to use Angola's bank accounts to make their payments in local currency, kwanza (KPMG, 2014). While this law may discourage investment, it is an important mechanism for local diversification as the law is meant to increase the capacity of Angola's financial sector by promoting de-dollarization of the Angolan economy. De-dollarization increases foreign currency reserves, increases the use of kwanza, and reduces capital flight (Mecagni et al., 2015, pp. 46-47). As dollarization of Angola's economy declines, local people who are getting paid in kwanza may benefit from increased use of the currency.

Angola plans to increase its oil production by exploring new projects with IOCs and other international partners. A recent launch of the Kaombo ultra-deepwater offshore project by Sonangol in partnership with Total, Sonangol Sinopec International, ESSO, and Galp in 2018 is a case in point. The field will increase Angola's oil production by 1.794 million barrels per day by 2019 (Business Monitor International, 2018). Angola has multiple other oil producing fields in operation that Sonangol explores in partnership with Western IOCs and other national companies from China. Angola's oil production will also rise with the help of the CLOV floating production project which is the largest of its kind (Oil and Gas: Angola,

2014a). The CLOV project combines resources from four oil fields (Cravo, Lirio, Orquidea, and Violeta) that will add up to 505 million barrels to Angola's proven reserves. These plans may partially help to offset losses in tax revenue and falling exports that occurred in 2014 after the oil prices plummeted (Oil and Gas: Angola, 2014b). However, these projects have become complicated by a complex relationship between Sonangol and foreign oil-extractive companies (Business Monitor International 2018, p. 19).

Under the previous administration, Sonangol was able to shape the conditions for the presence of foreign actors in the oil sector through the management of concessions. In 2015, Sonangol revealed plans to auction 15 new oil and gas concessions in the Congo and Namibe basins with hopes to increase oil production in 2015-2016 (Oil and Gas: Angola, 2015a). The auction was conditional on a corporate partnership with Sonangol. Sonangol was also able to cancel concession rounds to reflect changes in the oil prices (Business Monitor International, 2018, p. 9). Thus, the opportunities for foreign actors to gain access to new oil fields in Angola production depended on the decisions of Sonangol. This practice provided Sonangol with a bargaining tool to negotiate better conditions for itself from foreign partners at the time of high oil prices—following the prediction of the 'obsolescing bargain model' developed by Raymond Vernon (1971). Sonangol's power to shape the terms of contract with foreign companies will likely erode under Lourenço's administration, which created the National Petroleum and Gas Agency to oversee distribution of concessions.

New opportunities in Angola's oil sector are closely tied with Angola's strategy to strengthen its political and economic position by diversifying its foreign partners. In 2007, Angola became one of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) members. Angola's membership in the OPEC club expands Angola's political ties with like-minded countries and enables plurilateral coordination of petroleum production in a way that ensures a secure en-

ergy demand at stable and reasonable prices. Some scholars propose that by joining OPEC, Angola attained greater bargaining leverage against investors that compete for Angola's oil (García-Rodríguez et al., 2015, p. 170). This competition is also shaped by oil prices, as noted earlier, and the number of different actors in the industry. For example, the entry of Chinese state-owned companies during the period of high oil prices was beneficial for Angola as China offered a unique package of incentives to Angola. The resources-for-infrastructure deals, regarded as the 'Angola model' by scholars, have supported local diversification initiatives and increased Angola's bargaining power against Western investors (Habiyaremye, 2013). With time, China was able to surpass Angola's largest trade partner, the US, and became the largest export destination for Angola's oil (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2013).

Potential challenges to new investment in the oil sector are related to the peak oil hypothesis, where oil production grows until a certain maximum point is reached and subsequently begins to fall due to a decline in reserves (Bardi, 2009). Some of Angola's oil fields have reached peak production in 2008 (EIA, 2015). Therefore, there are potential difficulties in maximizing production in fields that are near depletion, as they require technological advances (IEA, 2006, p. 96). Although new reserves can be discovered to replace the falling production, these new reserves may face several constraints, such as technological limitations. Recent technological progress permits the expansion of offshore oil production, which allows corporations to drill at greater depths at reduced risk (IEA, 2006, pp. 94-96). However, only corporations with sophisticated technology are able to access deep and ultra-deep offshore oil reserves (Aguilar and Goldstein, 2009, p. 1557). In addition to geological and technological limits, political considerations may play an important role. New oil investment may be hindered by potential violence and secessionist attempts in Cabinda. As discussed earlier, the secessionist movement in Cabinda is still active, although much weaker since 2002 accord-

ing to Soares de Oliveira (2016). If this movement regains its strength, it may destabilize existing political and economic arrangements in the oil sector.

Angola's Political Economy and Economic Diversification:

Angola's early attempts to promote economic diversification were hindered by the civil war that locked Angola onto a developmental path focused on the extraction of oil and diamonds at the expense of other economic sectors (Le Billon, 2001, pp. 60-61; Malaquias, 2001, p. 524). The reliance of the warring parties on natural resources has reinforced the prominence of natural resources in the local economy, while other economic activities became marginal due to an unstable politico-economic environment. Therefore, Angola's present economy remains overly dependent on the extraction and export of petroleum. Angola's dependence on petroleum extraction grew in the post-conflict environment to such an extent that Angola became the second most concentrated economy in the world (Da Rocha, Santos, Bonfirm, Paulo, Kolstad, & Wiig, 2014). This dependence is associated with a productive deficiency, which is defined as "an absolute and increasing reliance on revenues derived from the finite and non-renewable resources of crude oil" that is linked to a rentier economy (al Kuwārī, 2012, pp.102).

Angola's dependence on petroleum is economically, politically, and socially unsustainable because the petroleum sector is not well integrated with the rest of the economy (Le Billon, 2001, p. 61; IEA, 2006). Since offshore oil production is shallowly integrated, a development model based on a prolonged extraction of oil will lead to a lopsided growth that will hinder the development of other economic sectors. Additionally, the capital-intensive nature of the sector provides limited employment opportunities (Le Billon, 2001, p. 61). Since the petroleum sector is not well integrated into the domestic

economy, economic diversification will be necessary to reduce Angola's economic, political, and social instability. Under the Dos Santos neopatrimonial regime, economic benefits (and wealth) were concentrated in the hands of elites through patronage networks. Under this system, the economic benefits often fail to reach the rest of the population. While economic solutions, such as economic diversification, may alleviate the resource curse, change in Angola's governance model is necessary to ensure that economic diversification will provide equitable benefits to Angola's population at large. In the next paragraphs, I will outline the benefits of economic diversification before turning to governance aspects that can enhance the benefits of economic diversification.

Angola has two choices to attain economic diversification. It can support business activities that add value to its natural resources, or it can invest in other economic sectors and develop new socioeconomic capital (Turok, 2014). Both options are dependent on the government's ability to effectively manage the extractive sector and to invest its oil-generated revenue into other economic sectors (OECD Publishing, 2011, p. 18). In this section, I will discuss both options. First, I will provide two examples of inter-sectoral diversification in the oil sector. The first example focuses on the liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector and the second on the refining sector. Second, I will discuss Angola's attempts to diversify its economy to other sectors, such as mining and agriculture. Subsequently, I will briefly discuss local content policies that can support the development of local capacity, which is essential for economic diversification.

Angola has the potential to expand its role in the global hydrocarbon value chain by increasing its production of natural gas and refined petroleum products (AFDB, OECD and UNECA, 2014, p. 201). Angola has already started developing its capacity in LNG with the support of the government and Sonangol. This move supports inter-sectorial diversification to reduce reliance on oil. Angola did not have a gas industry until 2013. Prior to that, Angola flared

around 70 to 80 percent of the natural gas that was a by-product of oil extraction (IEA, 2006). Gas flaring is not only environmentally damaging but also economically inefficient practice as the resource could be captured and sold on the international market for profit. To generate profits from the LNG industry, the government and international corporate actors agreed to construct Angola's first LNG plant, Angola LNG, which was completed in 2012. The plant that cost around $10 billion dollars is a joint venture between Sonangol (22.8 percent), Chevron (36.4 percent), Total (13.6 percent), British Petroleum (13.6 percent), and Eni (13.6 percent) (Angola LNG, 2017).

Angola produced its first LNG in 2013 and shipped it to Brazil (Oil and Gas: Angola, 2013). Experts project that Angola will produce 5.2 million tonnes of LNG per year from the Soyo plant for the next 30 years (Oil and Gas: Angola, 2013). The company responsible for the management of the LNG plant signed multiple sale agreements with several companies, such as Glencore and Vitol SA, to sell LNG (Angola LNG, 2017). The LNG facility adds value to the existing oil production and prevents environmentally damaging disposal of natural gas. While this diversification strategy is still based on the hydrocarbon sector, the production of a different hydrocarbon product enables Angola to enter a different market niche.

Local content policies are currently being implemented in the hydrocarbon industry to support economic diversification. Domestic laws and production sharing agreements (PSAs) in the oil sector help to integrate local businesses into the global supply chains (Ovadia, 2014, p. 138). Local content or the 'Angolanisation' policy is embedded in the new petroleum law, which stipulates that foreign companies should purchase local goods and services of similar quality to support local businesses and should promote local education/training (IEA, 2006, p. 106). The Angolan government under President Dos Santos devised three mechanisms that strengthened local content requirements. First, it introduced tax incentives for oil

exploration and production by domestic corporations. Second, the government requires foreign oil corporations to use Angolan banks to process oil-related transactions in local currency and, lastly, it devised investment in manufacturing and oil sectors through Sonangol Industrial Investments (Ovadia, 2014, p. 141-143). These policies can be the first step toward diversifying away from the oil and gas industry while keeping the industry functional.

Angola's policymakers may also promote the development of the latter stages of the hydrocarbon supply chain by developing domestic refinery capacity. Currently, Angola has only one refinery in Lobito that was constructed in 1955. This refinery is inefficient and operates at full capacity (IEA, 2006, p. 20). Since the refinery operates at full capacity, it will be unable to meet the increase in demand for refined oil products. Since Angola lacks adequate domestic refining capacity, the majority of the oil produced in Angola is refined in the US or in China (IEA, 2006, p. 97). Angola's refining potential may increase with the help of foreign investment in Angola's downstream sector. Just in 2018, the government received 63 proposals from both domestic and international companies to build a refinery in Angola (Agênica Angola Press, 2018). Angola has already embarked on two attempts to build refineries with the support of Chinese companies. Angola's development of the Sonaref refinery in Lobito, with the help of a loan from China Development Bank (Oil and Gas editors, 2014), was postponed in August 2016. Angola's other refinery, Soyo, which will be built by China Tianchen Engineering Corp, is currently undergoing a review by the Government and developers. If completed, the two projects will help Angola alleviate dependence (its currently at 80 percent) on imported refined oil products (Agênica Angola Press, 2018). These refineries may also likely generate more domestic jobs.

A second method to diversify Angola's economy is to expand investment in economic sectors that are currently underutilized and

underperforming. In this case, Angola should use its oil-generated revenue to support other economic sectors (OECD Publishing, 2011, pp. 52-53). Agriculture, fisheries, livestock, forestry, mining, tourism, services, and construction are some of the sectors with great economic potential (OECD Publishing, 2011, pp. 52-54). All of these sectors are currently operating below their potential, due to a lack of regulation and deficiencies in human capital. To illustrate, agriculture utilizes only 3 percent of the arable land and thus has the potential to expand its productive capacity in the future (OECD Publishing, 2011, pp. 53). Similarly, fisheries can benefit from the expansion. They are the third most important sector in Angola, after oil and mining (The Food and Agriculture Organization, 2014). In the mining sector, Angola can increase investment in diamond extraction that was previously hindered by the UNITA rebels (Malaquias, 2001, p. 525). Angola is currently the third largest producer of diamonds in Sub-Saharan Africa and has the potential to expand its production (Business Monitor International, 2015b). Therefore, Angola has the potential to benefit from expanding production in the non-oil extractive sectors.

The mineral sector is expected to grow and attract an inflow of foreign investment as Angola seeks to diversify its economy. Angola's new mining code that entered into force in 2012 streamlined foreign investment in the extractive sector. The code allows investors to take on majority ownership in locally owned companies and reduces taxes for mining firms (Business Monitor International, 2015b, p.15). Angola's diamond sector is a beneficiary of the relaxed investment environment. Foreign investors interested in this sector partner with Endiama, a national company responsible for the governance of the diamond sector, to gain concessions for mining operations. Russia, Brazil, and Israel are dominant players in the diamond industry and exercise substantial control over the sector. Endiama is currently looking for investors in diamond concessions in Luanda Norte, Luanda Sul/Moxico, Malanje/Cuanza Sul, Ui-

ge/Bengo/Zaire, Moxico, and Planalto Central provinces (Endiama, 2016). These concessions provide an opportunity for new investors to enter Angola's mining sector. As hydrocarbon prices remain low, the mining sector will continue to benefit from the relaxed investment environment. According to media reports, Russian companies remain the largest investors in the diamond sector as foreign investors face an unfavourable market environment, which will be reversed with the help of new regulations drafted in 2018 (Eisenhammer, 2018b).

Similarly, agriculture may regain an important role in Angola's economy. In 2018, the World Bank (2018) announced that it will give Angola a loan worth $130 million USD to support the development of commercial agriculture under the *Commercial Agriculture Development Project*. This loan covers over half of the estimated cost of the project - $230 million USD. The feasibility study prepared by the World Bank notes that Angola has supportive environmental conditions that have substantial potential for agricultural development, as only 8 percent of arable land is currently cultivated. This 8 percent accounts for 5 percent of GDP and over 9 percent of income for rural Angolans (The World Bank, 2016). Since Angola's agriculture was decimated during the war, the country was initially dependent on imports of foodstuffs, which negatively impacted local food security (The World Bank, 2016). The revival of agriculture with local and foreign support will have substantial benefits for Angola.

Under Dos Santos' leadership, the Angolan government made an early commitment to support diversification in the 2014 election and in the Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento 2013-2017 (National Developmental Plan, 2013-2017) (Ministério do Planeamento e do Desenvolvimento Territorial, 2012). Diversification was first mentioned in *The National Medium Term Plan for 2009-2013* but remained on the sidelines of Angola's development strategy (Da Rocha et al., 2014). Commitments to pursue economic diversification were

renewed by Joâo Lourenço after he assumed Presidential office in 2017. In his inaugurate speech, the new president stressed the importance of economic diversification for the economic well-being of the country (Lourenço, 2017). In light of these promises, it is important to consider the potential changes in Angola's governance under the new leadership that may have ramification for the economy.

The commitment of the new administration to economic diversification is enshrined in two core strategic documents— "Macroeconomic Stabilization Program 2017-2018" (Government of Angola, 2018a) and the "National Developmental Plan 2018-2022" (Government of Angola, 2018b). Under Lourenço's leadership, the government turned to the international community and investors to achieve economic diversification. An example of this is Angola's growing relationships with Germany (Agência Angola Press, 2018) and international organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank. It is plausible to conclude that international actors may play an important role in the country's objective to develop the non-fossil fuel sectors of Angola's economy.

As a president and a newly-elected leader of the MPLA, João Lourenço plays a central role in steering the economy away from the neopatrimonial model. Immediately after the election, Lourenço made a commitment to change the policies adopted by the Dos Santos regime. At the sixth congress of the MPLA, Lourenço made a commitment to eradicating "corruption and nepotism…that have taken place over the last few years" (Africa Research Bulletin, 2018). After assuming leadership, the new leader of the MPLA has replaced ministers connected to Dos Santos and Dos Santos' family members from the leadership positions[2] in Angola's leading organizations and companies (Africa Research Bulletin, 2018; Vines, 2018; Pilling,

2 Isabel dos Santos left Sonangol and José Filomeno dos Santos was dismissed from his Chairman position at the Fundo Soberano de Angola

2018a). By liberalizing the economy from the grip of the old ruling elite, Lourenço has created room for economic reforms (Pilling, 2018a). Lourenço's administration also added progressive laws to repatriate illegally obtained financial resources of Angola's nationals (Government of Angola, 2018c) and to raise capital levels (Almeida & Mendes, 2018). After loosening the grip of the previous regime on the economy, Lourenço concentrated his efforts on attracting new foreign and domestic capital to support economic diversification (Pilling, 2018a).

This change has been positively received by the international community. The Managing Director of the IMF, Christine Lagarde, has welcomed political reforms by referring to Angola's efforts to reduce corruption and increase checks and balances (IMF, 2018a). IMF promised to support Angola's efforts to reform. IMF's support translated to $3.7 billion USD extended arrangement to support Angola's macroeconomic reforms, including diversification (IMF, 2018b). As noted earlier, Angola's reforms are also supported by the World Bank, which supports the Commercial Agriculture Development Project in Angola (The World Bank, 2018). Along with the return of international donors, the IMF's and World Bank's financial support may help Angola to improve its economic woes. International support will have to be matched by domestic efforts to support governance arrangements.

While several initiatives to promote economic diversification are in place, there are several constraints that inhibit Angola's diversification from occurring. A potential limitation to Angola's diversification is the over-specialization on a single economic sector/commodity that attracts substantial foreign investment (OECD Publishing, 2011, p. 11). This problem is compounded by Angola's loss of biodiversity and arable land, which were severely damaged during the civil war due to the presence of landmines (OECD Pub-

lishing, 2011, p. 57). The commercial development of agriculture is also hindered by the issues linked to land tenure/property rights[3] that arise due to regulatory gaps, which increase vulnerabilities of landowners to land grabbing. Another issue is associated with a lack of infrastructure that is necessary to support other economic activities, such as tourism. Angola is currently ranked at the bottom (139th out of 144 countries) of the *Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Index Ranking* (World Economic Forum, 2015). If the government develops infrastructure, Angola will likely benefit from the tourism sector, which is backed by the United Nations Development Programme and is part of the domestic tourism programme.

Certain economic sectors, such as tourism and agriculture, will require substantial time and effort to be rebuilt. A central problem that underlined the inability to diversify is linked to governance. International agencies note that Angola's efforts to diversify its economy were hindered by weak governance structure, and corruption (IEA, 2006, p. 30). This problem may be corrected by the new government under Lourenço as discussed in the earlier paragraphs. If political concerns related to corruption and mismanagement of the economy will be alleviated, Angola will have a chance to support the aforementioned economic activities.

Conclusion

Angola's economy is currently overly-dependent on the extraction of hydrocarbons, which are associated with the resource curse. Although other natural resources are also extracted, they assume a secondary role in Angola's economy. This paper proposed that Angola's dependence on a single commodity leads to negative economic, political, and social outcomes. Since commodity prices are volatile

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3 For more information, see the work of The Lutheran World Federation on land grabbing in Angola

and cyclical, dependence on a single commodity is economically unsustainable (Ross, 2012). A recent drop in oil prices has exposed problems of economic overreliance on a single commodity. A decline in commodity prices served as a warning sign. It suggested that a development model based on a single commodity is prone to economic instability. In light of the falling oil revenue, Angola's economy showed signs of unsustainable development based on excessive spending of revenue or borrowed funds backed by the oil collateral. Even in periods of high prices, resource extraction remains problematic. For example, high oil prices are associated with the Dutch Disease, which decreases the competitiveness of non-petroleum economic sectors. Thus, economic diversification may contribute to a more balanced economy. However, as demonstrated in this paper, economic diversification is a complex process and requires a strong commitment from the government and corporate actors.

This paper argued that Angola can attain a balanced model of development if it diversifies its economy from dependence on a single commodity - petroleum. As I proposed in this paper, diversification can be achieved by pursuing a dual-track strategy by diversifying within the petroleum industry and by diversifying outside of this sector. Whereas the Dos Santos administration seemed more interested in economic control than diversification, President Lourenço has taken a number of steps towards broadening the Angolan economy. The change in the political guard may not correct the political curse unless a proactive policy is implemented by the new elite to correct economic mismanagement of the past decades. Current media reports indicate that several economic changes are taking place, including the dismantling of monopolies close to the Dos Santos regime and higher capital requirements for banks (Pilling, 2018b). The change that is afoot needs to be expedited and expanded beyond the replacement of the old political regime with new elites, which may continue following the same path (Cotterill, 2018). While some observers are more skeptical than others about political

changes, it is plausible that by correcting underlying political issues Angola's economy will climb out of the crisis.

The change will rest on the ability of the new administration to implement the necessary political and economic framework to promote other economic sectors, such as agriculture and mining. With the support of foreign investors, Angola's government has succeeded in developing the LNG sector but was less successful in promoting domestic refining capacity. Although the inter-sectoral diversification is beneficial, it will not reduce Angola's vulnerability to fluctuating commodity prices. To avoid this, Angola needs to diversify into non-fossil fuel sectors, such as diamond mining, agriculture, and tourism, among others. Additionally, Angola can benefit by diversifying its investors, trade partners and aid donors. For example, China's rising influence in Angola is linked to the expansion of local infrastructure (Habiyaremye, 2013). New investors, partners, and donors may help Angola's economy to diversify by investing and promoting other economic activities that do not focus on resource extraction.

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An Exploration of Domains Towards Unlocking Zimbabwean Youths' Socio Economic and Political Empowerment

Tatenda Goodman Nhapi and Takudzwa Leonard Mathende

Abstract: Zimbabwe is at a critical juncture in terms of its political economy post-November 2017 political developments. After dollarization and resultant ephemeral economic stability achieved during the Government of National Unity (GNU) 2009-2013, Zimbabwe today faces: slowing economic growth; a financial crisis, particularly liquidity crunch; increasingly erratic weather patterns; rising poverty and inequality; and a political legitimacy crisis. The economy is unable to meet the needs of the ballooning urban youth community. The 2012 Zimbabwe Census found that 69.8% of the population is 29 years old or under, with approximately 41.7% falling within the 10 to 29-year-old range. Due to patriarchal and hierarchal structures, this "youth bulge" is presenting challenges in Zimbabwe, with issues like unemployment, high disease burden, and limited space to engage in socio-economic and political spaces as major factors. Both the socio-economic and political legacy in Zimbabwe has created such significant structural barriers to youth participation and influence. Through a literature review of commissioned reports, newspaper articles, and empirical research studies, this article interrogates the dominance and pervasiveness of socio-economic disenchantment embedded in Zimbabwean youths during turbulent economic times. We argue that political discourses and agendas dominate thwarting ways to expand economic opportunities for youth. We conclude with reflections on potential next steps for research and policy regarding the reduction of stigma and strengthening of youth policy pathways for the purpose of creating more transformative approaches to youth political, economic and social capabilities.

A rapid increase in the number of educated youths seems to precede episodes of political upheaval, as well-educated youth have often been observed in central positions in episodes of riots (Urdal,

2006). This is called the "Youth Bulge Theory", which theorizes that developing countries that have undergone "demographic transition"- moving from high to low fertility and mortality rates- are especially vulnerable to civil conflict (Hendrixson, 2003). According to the Youth Bulge Theory, young men and women below the age of 30 are a historically volatile and ever-increasing demographic, and the presence of more than 20% young people in a given population raises the potential for rebellion and unrest. The concept specifically equates a large percentage of young men with an increased possibility of violence, particularly in the Global South, where youths account for 60% of the population (Hendrixson, 2003). Such perspectives have meant it is increasingly important to examine how youth in Africa can become more active within democratic practices. According to Ndebele and Billing (2011), not only are there unique challenges regarding the promotion of youth participation in governance during transitional political contexts, but these are due to complex and shifting power dynamics that create difficulty for young people to penetrate decision-making structures.

For example, over the last decade in sub-Saharan Africa, policy and programme interest in both youth and employment has increased dramatically, with youth voter registration drives popping across the continent (Ayele et al., 2017). This reflects a perspective many young citizens hold that elections are pragmatic action to contributing to the governance of their country, and ensuring addressing youth exclusion by govern and youth apathy (Research and Advocacy Unit, 2017). Another key example is South Africa, which has been implementing manifold programmes at various levels of government since the end of apartheid with legislation like the National Youth Policy 2015-2020, National Youth Commission Act 1996, White Paper on Social Welfare 1997, National Youth Development Policy 2015-2020, and the 1998 Skills Development Act. These policies coexist with the nation's powerful youth-led political

party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), which is currently the third-largest party in both houses of the South African parliament.

Today, a large majority of African youth have expressed interest in public affairs and assert they discuss politics with those around them, yet relatively low levels of civic engagement and political participation have been found across the continent, suggesting a disconnect between the aforementioned "youth bulge" and individual national democratic processes (Nkomo & Du Plooy, 2015). This article considers these issues in the context of Zimbabwe, exploring the aspirations of Zimbabwean youth in relation to socioeconomic turbulence. As a starting point, we look at various perspectives regarding Zimbabwe's socioeconomic dynamics. We then interrogate how the dominant narratives of youth-lived realities within the challenging context of Zimbabwe, with specific attention paid to how youth grapple to unlock opportunities that might enhance social functioning and better understand youth coping mechanisms. The article concludes by indicating and expanding on current gaps in present understandings of how what we call "youth-centred development" can apply to Zimbabwe, and where further investigative work is necessary.

Socioeconomic Context

According to Sachikonye (2017), Zimbabwe governance and development rankings in most indexes is very low. Zimbabwe is amongst the bottom 10 countries in overall governance in the Mo Ibrahim Index, and in the bottom 30 in development in the Human Development Index (Sachikonye, 2017). Zimbabwe's economy is heavily dependent on its mining and agriculture sectors. But these sectors and the economy at large severely contracted from 1998 to 2008. Then the economy recorded real growth of more than 10% per year in the period 2010-13, before slowing to roughly 4% in 2014 due to poor harvests, low diamond revenues, and decreased

investment (CIA World Factbook, 2017), and growth turned negative in 2016. Lower mineral prices, infrastructure and regulatory deficiencies, a poor investment climate, a large public and external debt burden, and extremely high government wage expenses all impede the country's economic performance (CIA World Factbook, 2017). Furthermore, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) notes Zimbabwean Foreign investment inflows stood at $387 million in 2011, then reached a high of $545 million in 2014 declining to $421 million and $319 million in 2015 and 2016. Among other issues, the lack of policy consistency, the government's disregard for property rights, and corruption have all been identified as factors dissuading investors from Zimbabwe's vast mineral deposits (Kachembere, 2017).

Politically, until late 2017, Zimbabwe had been ruled by Robert Mugabe and his ruling ZANU (PF) political party since independence in 1980. The military and others within the ruling party removed Mugabe.

In addition to Mugabe's long leadership, Zimbabwe had a devastating start to the 21st century, when it experienced severe economic decline, social turbulence and drought, resulting in much increased levels of poverty and vulnerability (Alexander and MacGregor 2013). Life expectancy had dropped sharply to 34 years for women and 37 years for men. Zimbabwe's substantial formal sector, strong post-independence history of service provision had marked it out as an 'exception' to West and Central African countries' experiences, which often providing the empirical basis for state 'failure' and social and political disorder theories. After 2000, Zimbabwe increasingly looked like such northern countries (Alexander & McGregor, 2013). At end of 2008, at the nadir of a decade-long economic slide, the inflation rate had reached world record-setting levels.

Politicians in Zimbabwe prefer to provide limited political space to the youth and restrict them to their youth league for-

mations. Depriving the youth socioeconomically is a modus operandi they use. It makes youths controlled by the politically and financially empowered' who purchase youths energy. It therefore follows that being able to address the social inequality challenges faced by the youth limits the ability of politicians to convince the youth to participate in violent acts (Musarurwa, 2016).

Conceptual Framework

Since the 1940s, sociologists and social anthropologists insisted that attention to youth, invariably referring to young men, is a panicked reaction to the impact of social change (Mate, 2014). In a country such as Zimbabwe calls to support innovative young activists and peace builders' efforts of addressing daily youth challenges are often dismissed by politicians and state media as political mischief and a push for regime change (Musarurwa, 2016). However, this does not tell us how young people are dealing with these challenges in different cultural spaces (Mate, 2014). Analysing youth means paying close attention to the social landscape's topology —to power and agency; public, national, and domestic spaces and identities, and their articulation and disjuncture; memory, history, and sense of change; globalization and governance; gender and class (Durham, 2000).

According to Ayele, Khan, and Sumberg (2017) renewed interest in youth and work reflects a heady combination of ideas, policy entrepreneurship, fear and crisis response, kicked off by the 2007 World Development Report, Development and the Next Generation (World Bank 2006). However, in many jurisdictions in Africa such interest faced an enduring politics of patronage and neopatrimonialism in which elected leaders are more concerned with using state resources to create and sustain clientelism and loyalty networks based around personal material benefit. Under neo-patrimonialism the media and oversight institutions such as the police, courts and

parliament become weak due to the illicit administrative practices that go unchecked (Research and Advocacy Unit, 2017). When neo-patrimonialism degenerates into a "predatory state", the consequences for citizens can be even more severe, as exemplified in Zimbabwe (Research and Advocacy Unit, 2017). In the same vein Honwana (2014) conceptualises the discourse of waithood encompassing the multifaceted nature of youth transitions to adulthood, which goes beyond securing a job and extends to social life and civic participation. For Honwana, waithood—youth's inability to access basic resources to become independent adults—does not result from a failed transition on the part of the youth themselves but rather from a breakdown in the socioeconomic system supposed to provide them with the opportunities to grow up healthy, get a good education, find employment, form families.

Chatora (2012) observes political participation forms include voting, regarded as the most common and most basic form of political action. Electoral participation also encompasses various other processes, such as citizens' involvement in election campaigns, attending meetings or attempting to access information on different political parties (Chatora, 2012). Citizens' engagement in grassroots politics within their local communities through community gatherings attendance and interaction with local political representatives are other forms of participation noted by Chatora. Political participation also includes actions such as attending civil protests or signing petitions on different issues and joining interest groups that engage in lobbying or political advocacy. Being a student is a transitory stage creating space for the youth population to experiment with various identities which protects them from exploitation, abuse, and exonerates them from onerous responsibilities (Chikwanha, 2000). Students played an important role in challenging ZANU (PF) before and after the birth of the MDC in 1999, which became the main challenger to ZANU (PF). For example, Hodgkinson (2013) is intrigued by the phenomenon of 'hardcore activism' among students

from 2000 in the context of subjection to acute political violence and deepening economic hardship and its effects on students' status and aspirations, represented by the 'University Bachelors' Association'. This comprised 'male students who lionised revolutionary struggle' and who engaged in 'aggressive debate' and 'working-class camaraderie' (Hodgkinson, 2013). He further notes after 2000, violent confrontations between student activists and ZANU(PF) created a hardened and militarised self-image that extolled bravery in demonstrations. Furthermore, adult idealism sees the youth as lacking knowledge and experience, and they are thus unwilling to give the youth much political space (Musarurwa, 2016). Youth aspirations and the challenges working against their realization are thus an important dynamic to Zimbabwe today.

Socioeconomic and Livelihoods Dynamics in Zimbabwe

The Zimbabwe 2012 population census notes the country has a young population with 77% of the 13 061 239 national population consisting of children and youth below 35 years of age. Youth aged 15-34 years number 4 702 046 which constitutes 36% of the national population and those aged between 15 -24 years are 20%. The youth aged 15-34 years constitute 56% of the economically active population (Murinda, 2014). While the education system churns out over 300 000 young people into the labour market annually, less than 10% of these are absorbed into formal employment. The rest have to find their way into the informal sector where they have to run their own enterprises for survival. The CIA World Factbook (2009) also cites a 95% unemployment rate for Zimbabwe, but cautions readers that, "true unemployment is unknown and, under current economic conditions, unknowable" (Central Intelligence Agency World Fact Book, 2017).

The government plans for improving employment are rendered impotent as the country is still reeling from a fragile economic cli-

mate. Zimbabwe is still struggling with the aftermath of the economic collapse and hyperinflation of the mid to late 2000s. The collapse of agriculture and attendant economic collapse of the economy precipitated by fast-track land reform in the absence of a programme of government support for small-scale farmers continues to undercut growth and economic diversification (Alexander, 2015). According to IMF:

> In the 1990s, Zimbabwe was one of the most developed economies in Africa. While many of the country's underlying strengths remain, some of its industrial and agricultural base has since eroded. The nominally dollarized economy now faces difficulties as diminishing net capital flows and an expansionary fiscal stance have generated an acute cash shortage that has prompted the use of quasi-currency instruments amid imposition of controls over capital and current account transactions (International Monetary Fund Zimbabwe Country Office, 2017).

Finally, the youth unemployment problem is multifaceted, and it has been attributed to some of the following causes:

i.   Mismatch between the skills possessed by the unemployed youth and labour market demands;

ii.   Poor economic performance (demand deficient unemployment) for a decade and half

iii. Increasing population growth;

iv.   Financial and social exclusion that reduce self- employment opportunities;

v.   Legal rigidities in labour laws (Muranda, Rangarirai, & Saruchera (2014).

Youth in Zimbabwe face limited access to credit to capitalise their micro-informal businesses. Despite potentially having brilliant business ideas, the youths are sometimes regarded as a high-risk clientele group as they do not have the prerequisite collateral. Therefore, they often cannot access project funding from the formal financial institutions. This has left the youth stuck in the vicious poverty

cycle as their businesses remain merely aspirational and micro in nature, providing income for subsistence purposes only.

Young people undertake a range of activities to "get by." Jones discusses *kukiya kiya*—Zimbabwe's 'economy of getting by' ranging from vegetable vending to illegal foreign currency trading to bribe-taking and pilfering at work. In local parlance '*kukiya-kiya*' refers to multiple forms of 'making do' (Jones 2010). To 'survive' youth will do what is 'necessary' towards that end and their lost faith—in institutions, in morals, in things 'straight'—is hard to recover, and frequently find another reason to suspend the rules 'just this once' (Jones, 2010, p. 286).

Furthermore, Department for International Development notes:

> An informal sector in Zimbabwe does not exist. Instead, there is an informal economy—the whole economy is an informal economy based on unwritten rules, relations, social capital and structures of power. Yet despite this, official government reports state that the informal economy contributes only about 20% of the Gross National Product.

> The informal economy is not just for the poor. A preoccupation with the poor fails to capture (i) the symbiotic interactions between the poor, the middle classes and elites; (ii) movements in and out of poverty; and (iii) deeper and more sustainable interventions based on opportunity rather than poverty driven understanding of local circumstances. (2017, p. 15)

The 2012 Population Census data shows that youths aged 15-34 years constitute 84% of the unemployed population and those aged 15-24 years constitute 55%. The statistics additionally indicate the highest concentration of 31% of the unemployed is between the ages of 20 and 24 years. There are higher levels of unemployment among female youths despite there being more females than males in the population.

The Zimbabwe 2011 Labour Force and Child Labour Survey (LFCLS) indicates the overall unemployment rate for youth aged 14-34 years is 15%, the majority (87%) of the employed youth aged 15-34 years are considered to be in informal employment; 9% in formal employment and 4% in unclassifiable employment (Murinda,

2014). Implemented labour market interventions like the Ministry of Youth, Indigenization and Empowerment non-formal skills training provision targeting school drop-outs and disabled youths are adversely affected by outdated equipment and prohibitive fees (UN Country Team 2014).

A Tech-Savvy Youth and Impacts of Extended ICTs Uptake

Internet users have thus evolved from consumers of web-based content to 'prosumers' who also produce content. This shift has led to the development of many different forms of social media platforms. These web-based tools include Internet forums, weblogs, social blogs, microblogs, wikis, podcasts, photographs, videos, rating and social bookmarking. There are six different categories of social media platforms: collaborative projects (e.g. Wikipedia); blogs and microblogs (e.g. Twitter, real-time information networks); video content communities (e.g. YouTube); social networking sites (e.g. Facebook); virtual game worlds (e.g. World of Warcraft) and virtual social worlds (e.g. SecondLife); and picture sharing sites (e.g. Flickr) (Chatora, 2012).

The youthful Nelson Chamisa, former leader of the MDC's National Youth Assembly, was elevated to the powerful Vice President position in his party and recently became leader after Morgan Tsvangirai passed away from cancer in 2018. Notably, Nelson Chamisa was the youngest government minister during the inclusive government between 2009 and 2013, heading the ICT ministry. During his tenure, he embarked on an extensive programme to improve internet connection and phone connection across the country and digitalising government departments earning him compliments from President Mugabe of being the supersonic Minister (Newsday, 2011). Resultantly, technological advancement in Zimbabwe has become a platform for anti-government protests mobilisation, as the majority of the youth own a mobile phone device. In Africa social

media has reshaped structures and methods of contemporary political communication by influencing interaction between politicians and citizens in Zimbabwe it remains a miss and hit process (Mushakavanhu, 2014). With a mobile penetration rate of 106 %, more Zimbabweans now access information and news via mobile gadgets. Data and Internet subscriptions are now in the region of 5,6 million and disgruntled citizens—particularly urban young people—have turned to social media, venting their frustration (Mushakavanhu, 2014). Protests and work stoppages have been encouraged by social media activists, most prominently Pastor Evan Mawarire, founder of the #ThisFlag movement, which was fronted when Mawarire deftly used social media in a quest for justice and rights. One of his videos went viral. "ThisFlag," he says in the video, "every day that it flies, is begging for you to get involved, to say something, to cry out and say, 'Why must we be in this situation?'" Social media's influential role has underlined the vast spread of internet use in Zimbabwe, primarily on mobile smartphones and, like in the so-called Arab Spring uprisings in 2011, it has political ramifications (Tendi, 2016).

Evan Mawarire has left an indelible mark on youth political activism as his cyber activism was based on uploading his videos on YouTube, Facebook and WhatsApp aimed at mobilising the youth to stand up and speak out against government led injustice and corruption. Professor Jonathan Moyo, then a government minister, went on to describe #ThisFlag supporters as "nameless, faceless trolls", and initiated his own social media campaign, #OurFlag, which has not been adopted with nearly as much enthusiasm. Mawarire insisted that he is non-partisan and has no ties to any political parties. He argued that politicians from across the spectrum have failed Zimbabwe—not just the ruling ZANU (PF).

#ThisFlag was very successful in this endeavour leading to the emergence of the leaderless #*Tajamuka/Sijikile* led by a coalition of youth organisations from both political and civil society organisa-

tion, *#Tasvinura* led by youth in Masvingo province, *#MyZimbabwe* led by MDC Assembly, *#BeatthePot* led by MDC Women's Assembly, the #NERA (National Electoral Reform Agenda) and *#ThisGraduate* led by unemployed youthful graduates. It seems, in most cases the protesters are young and leaderless but, united by social media. Most recently after the ascendancy of Nelson Chamisa as the president of MDC, and MDC Alliance presidential candidate we have seen the emergence of *#Generational Consensus.* This platform is championing for youth inclusion in politics, business and society, and it is openly supporting the candidature of Nelson Chamisa. It has presence on social media, as well as its programmes like #run for change. It argues that is the time for the post-independence generation to take over the reins of the country. The group clearly states that by advocating for general consensus, it is not declaring a war with the older generation but advocating for the inclusion of youth in mainstream. MDC has reserved 20 % of the parliamentary seats to the youth. Generation consensus has become a key rallying point of these candidates.

However, the media freedoms are limited, and freedom to assembly has not been fully freed, due to the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the Public Order and Security Act of 2002 (POSA) respectively. At one point on 5 August 2016, the Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe banned data bundle and airtime promotions by cellphone network providers, which was widely viewed as being an attempt to stifle impoverished youth from having access to internet and ultimately reduce protests. Although the new Constitution of Zimbabwe's Amendment No. 20 has rendered these laws unconstitutional, the ZANU (PF) government in the new dispensation post the November 2017 events has not proactively softened these laws application on people's rights, especially opposition and civil society sectors. This effectively means that internet access became significantly more expensive for Zimbabwe's unemployed youth. Further-

more, the government has crafted the Computer Crime and Cyber Crime Bill to control online activism, but it might find it difficult to keep track of services such as WhatsApp, which now operate with end-to-end encryption making them very hard to keep track of. 46 people in 2011 including Munyaradzi Gwisai, a professor and labour activist and former legislator in Zimbabwe were arrested, charged with treason or with attempting to overthrow the government by unconstitutional means, after convening a meeting in which they watched videos of the protests in Egypt and Tunisia and discussed their implications on the situation in Zimbabwe (Chatora, 2012). Forty of the activists were later freed due to insufficient evidence against them while the remaining six were offered bail by high court judge Samuel Kudya, who described the evidence against the six as unsubstantiated. According to Chatora (2012), in the ruling Judge Kudya said, "I see no iota of evidence that any Zimbabwean ever contemplated any Tunisian or Egyptian revolution."

For Chatora (2012), this statement indicates that these arrests were politically motivated and meant to dissuade people from copying protests in the Arab world. In October 2017 cabinet restructuring resulted in the new Ministry of Cyber Security, Threat Detection and Mitigation formation. Its creation came after the government said would now treat social media as a security threat after accusing users of spreading rumours about shortages of basic goods, which caused panic buying and price increases. This showed the government's unease with social media after activists such as Pastor Evan Mawarire and his #This Flag movement used social media to organise a stay-at-home demonstration, the biggest anti-government protest in a decade. The new ministry will also be responsible for bringing to parliament a long awaited cyber-crimes bill that criminalise false information posted on the internet, revenge porn, cyber-bullying and online activity against the government. Significantly, the new Zimbabwean president Mr Emmerson Mnangagwa on 11 January

2018 joined other netizens as part of the national dialogue and to better listen to the citizens' wishes (Chronicle newspaper, 2018).

Youth Participation in Governance and Accountability Issues

The 2011 State of the African Youth Report revealed that a realisation of a new emergent and integrated Africa can only emerge if the bulging youth population is mobilised, equipped to contribute to integration, peace and development agenda (African Union Commission & United Nations Population Fund Agency, 2011:1; see also Bartlett 2010). However, Honwana (2014) contends formal institutions and authorities often view youths' ways of operating as distasteful, dangerous and criminal and their relationship with the state and the formal sector is marked by tension and mutual distrust.

In Zimbabwe, the state enforces laws that delimit and control the spaces of legitimate activity and mark them as outsiders. Furthermore, Zhangazha (2017) argues Zimbabwe is straddled by an aged/ageing political elite (and its families, ethnic groups) using the state to not only enrich itself but also to co-opt masses into a specific silence that leaves them with no choice but to appear to accept the invincibility of the ruling party. They promote the view that change of leadership can only be found by being part of the ruling establishment (Zhangazha, 2017), as witnessed by the November 2017 coup when the 93 year old Robert Mugabe was replaced by the 75 year old Emmerson Mnangagwa, yet ZANU (PF) remained in power. In Zimbabwe this is heightened by the considerable polarisation along political lines. The greatest obstacle to participation for most citizens in both rural and urban areas as well as women and youth is the nature and structure of the state institution of the local government (Research and Advocacy Unit, 2016). Active citizenship is understood to mean the agency exerted by citizen through their voice

and participation in the socio-economic life of their communities (Research and Advocacy Unit, 2016).

In the same vein according to Chikwanha (2000), the absence for a long time of effective opposition in Zimbabwe left space that was filled by the students (especially university students) who translated and actioned many public concerns like violation of human rights by the government. However, as a privileged lot with access to information, it is amazing that their activism is not only largely political but also violent (see also Hodgkinson 2013). The biggest challenge observed in the youth activism activities in Zimbabwe is their piecemeal approach to doing things. An analysis of the demands made by the #ThisFlag movement, as well as *Tajamuka/Sesjikile's* 10 principles, shows that they are all advocating for the same things. What differs, then, is the manner in which they are laying out their demands and taking action (Musarurwa, 2016).

Student bodies began using any political event perceived to be unpopular, in order to vent their anger at the authorities (Makunike, 2015). Importantly, Zimbabwe's student bodies, are now split into two since 2004, one backed by ZANU (PF), i.e. Zimbabwe Congress of Students Union (ZICOSU), while Zimbabwe National Students Union is the oldest one, inclined to oppositional politics. This fragmentation and political inclination has rendered them less effective, though one could argue that it does provide a range of views to the student body politic, which could be valued in terms of freedom of expression. Finally, Madondo (2004), argued that barely six months after the June 2000 parliamentary election (in which the MDC took 57 of the 120 contested seats), the National Youth Service (NYS) proposal by government deliberately sought to hijack Zimbabwe's youth. According to Madondo (2004),

> The NYS also aimed to in still a "sense of responsible citizenship among the youth" and to prepare them for "the world and for work in their country". It proposed to inculcate youth with a sense of national duty, patriotism and responsibility to uphold Zimbabwean and African culture and val-

ues. The syllabus proposed to "integrate youth in all government policies", "provide opportunities for youth employment and participation in development" and "develop vocational skills". It also proposed to "reduce teenage pregnancies, the spread of HIV/AIDS, alcohol and substance abuse… (and) promote gender equality". An NYS certificate of attendance became a pre-requisite for joining the army or police or for enrolling in government vocational training institutions.

Ominously, "politically conscious youth" creation, the catch-phrase of the Youth Brigades, was the main argument for the new programme by the then Minister of Youth, Gender and Employment Creation, Border Gezi (Madondo, 2004).

The Way Forward for Youth Empowerment

Existence of youths' exclusion undermines the pursuit of social justice and egalitarian ideals. The challenge for the government and civil society is therefore.to achieve inclusiveness in youth centred socio-economic development. The following section of the article proposes strategies that can galvanise youths' visibility and empowerment on socio-economic and governance discourse. Stereotypical perceptions of youth, politically and traditionally, as ignorant, problematic and useless have led to young people's exclusion from decision-making processes—even on issues that they could solely deal with. Youth are virtually left with no room to learn by doing. African governments are busy looking for miracles to solve the problems in Africa. Yet the biggest miracle is right in front of them: African youth (CODESRIA, 2017).

A shift in working with young people, and valuing them as assets - as advisors, colleagues and stakeholders - is crucial if development policies are to be truly representative and effective. Youth participation means the active, informed and voluntary involvement of people in decision-making and the life of their communities (both locally and globally) (Restless Development, 2010). Yet youths' engagement to promote their participation in decision-making in Zim-

babwe has been minimal. Over the past 30 years, youths have periodically been recruited into quasi-military groups or 'youth wings' of political parties, often to perpetrate politically motivated acts of violence (Ndebele & Billing, 2011).

A rights-based approach to addressing the needs of young people creates greater focus on the root causes of poverty by highlighting the importance of specific rights and the obstacles to realising those rights. Secondly, a rights-based approach makes it easier to specify the criteria for measuring outcomes. Thirdly, governments and other agencies need to give attention to finding ways to better involve youths in all of social, governance and economic activities. Governments need to involve citizens including the poorest, as far as practicable, in the development and implementation of public policy to give effect to their right (United Nations Population Fund , 2010).

In the backdrop of the country's perennial unemployment, Zimbabwe should try Employment Generation or Guaranteed Schemes (EGS) targeting the unemployed youth. The Overseas Development Institute (2011: 1) defines EGSs as a form of employment programme that guarantees employment, in return for cash or in-kind payment, to a specified population over a sustained or ongoing period. This is what the Zimbabwean government can do to remove the restless youths from the streets rather than resorting to teargas. In South Africa, for example, their EGS is the Community Work Programme whereby participants are provided with part time community useful work for two days per week, which amounts to eight days per month, 100 days spread throughout the year, earning R71. 00 per day (Mathende, 2015).   It is evident that EGS may have both workfare and welfare benefits for youth. If replicated in Zimbabwe, the country can enjoy youth induced crimes. However, from a political realist perspective (Kumar 2010), programmes like these can also be used to manipulate the youth by the ruling ZANU (PF) regime. The private sector in Zimbabwe is in its comatose state, and

unable to contribute meaningfully to job creation, therefore the government should take a principal role to create jobs by being the employer of resort, as long as it does not politicize such a scheme. A co-ordinated Labour Market Information System could be established to monitor labour market trends and facilitate the designing, planning and monitoring of policies and programmes geared at employment generation more broadly and for youth in particular (Chingarande & Guduza, 2011). Such help can also take the form of technical and vocational education and training programmes, as discussed by Kerr (2017). Another possible mechanism to assist youths includes the promotion of savings groups, informal groups typically consisting of 15 to 30 members who meet on a regular basis (usually weekly) to save and borrow money, can foster financial inclusion, financial literacy, entrepreneurship, and life skills. The central proposition is that access to financial services will support new income-generating activities and job creation.

Youth Development Advocacy and Capacity Building

For under-18s, the right to express one's views freely and have them taken into account in decision-making, in accordance with one's age and maturity, is set out in the Convention on the Rights of the Child Article 12. The greater autonomy and participation rights of older youth (18 to 24-year-olds) are perhaps less visible, being dispersed across a number of civil, political, economic and social rights frameworks. However, participation in development "of the entire population and all individuals" is a theme of the UN Declaration on the Right to Development (1986) (Restless Development, 2010).

Africa is a young continent. Yet despite their numerical strength, many still regard the youth as a transitory social category driven by emotions and impulses and largely incapable of making informed political choices and decisions or 'matured' enough to

govern (University of Peace, 2017). Thus, age qualification is one the criteria for contesting political office in many African countries and the implication is that a gerontocratic culture flourishes in which the average age of Africa's heads of state is around 62 years. As such, a generational disconnect exists between much of the youth population and the rulers in Africa, which helps to account for the limited youth involvement in politics and mass migration for "greener pastures" outside their country, if not the continent (University of Peace, 2017).

Zimbabwean civil society have been very proactive and well organized in terms of their engagement on the Agenda 2030, which are the SDGs. SDGs are also known as "Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development." Interventions by civil society include:

The establishment of a national youth taskforce on SDGs titled 'Youth4SDGs' bringing together 100 youth organizations working in 10 provinces of Zimbabwe in 2016. The overall objective of the 'Youth4SDGs' is to provide strategic direction for youth inclusion and participation in the implementation and monitoring of the SDGs in Zimbabwe. The Youth4SDGS also seeks to educate youth in rural, peri-urban, mining areas, farms and urban areas on the SDGs, their importance and link to policies and national development in Zimbabwe (Government of Zimbabwe, 2017).

Other initiatives include finding space on public media for youth. For example, every Tuesday evening from 6.30pm to 7.00pm young people come into the studio on ZiFM, a radio station, to broadcast a weekly show hosted by UNICEF with support from the Swedish Government, called the Youth-Zone (Y-Zone). The goal of the Y-Zone is to serve as a voice for young people on their development needs (UNICEF, 2014). The Junior Parliament of Zimbabwe and other youths have been using the platform to advocate for various issues affecting their constituencies such as education, health, budgeting and water among other issues. Also, robust gender analy-

sis to ensure both young men and women are supported to enhance their levels of participation is also emerging (Ndebele & Billing, 2011). Furthermore, in pursuit of the 1999 Nziramasanga Commission, the Ministry of Higher Education, is rolling out the Science, Technology and Mathematics (STEM programme), encouraging youth and students in high school to take up science subjects. The government will then assist with the payment of their school fees. The programme aims to close the skills gap in the technology field while enabling the youths to be employable as technology is the mainstay of the Zimbabwe's developing economy.

However, given its political history the danger of the state or political parties in Zimbabwe advocating for "youth involvement" is high, given a long history of tendentious efforts to use youth for parochial political purposes, including intimidation and violence. Besides the economic role of the Ministry of Youth Indigenisation and Empowerment, the same ministry running the National Youth Services, which in the early 2000s unleashed violence on citizens. This programme has been manipulated by ZANU (PF). Though this paramilitary arm of the ministry went dormant during the time of the inclusive government, currently there are reports that the organ is being resuscitated to counter the various youth led protests as a way to safeguard the ruling ZANU (PF) government. Political inclusion of youth in countries like Zimbabwe thus run the risk of perpetuating non-democratic activities.

Conclusion

This discussion shows that Zimbabwean youths have a pivotal national development role despite manifold socio-political challenges they are experiencing. The situation calls for heightened political will and solidarity between youths and various duty bearers. As Ighobor, (2013) puts it, Zimbabwe's youth in particular and Africa in general should be viewed as either a "ticking time bomb" or an

opportunity. It is an opportunity if the government acts now; if not, the government and those to come will be haunted, for example, by chronic youth unemployment. If this continues, Zimbabwe in the future will have a generation of older persons who have never worked for wages in their lives, and without old age pensions to talk about. This is an indication that by solving problems of youths to-day, governments will be solving future problems, thus investing in future.

Given their energy, enthusiasm and innovativeness, young people have the potential to contribute immensely to the socio-economic development of the country. As such they must be placed at the forefront of building the economy of the country. This article therefore shows the need to create an enabling environment and opportunities for the socio-economic empowerment of the youth. It is the collective responsibility of a majority elected government, the private sector, civil society and development agencies to design and implement practical programmes to generate decent employment, reduce poverty among the youth and economically empower them to play a more meaningful role in the development and upliftment of their communities and the nation at large.

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The People's President?

Raila Odinga and the "Tunaapisha" Movement

Oyunga Pala

January 30, 2018 enters Kenya's history books alongside September 1, 2017—the day when, for the first time, an election in the country was nullified. Many dismissed the opposition coalition's, the National Super Alliance (NASA), threat to swear in its principals, Raila Odinga and his deputy Kalonzo Musyoka, as a PR gimmick.

Yet, as the new year rolled in, the momentum for the "swearing-in" gained traction within the NASA ranks, and it became apparent that the "tunaapisha movement" (we are swearing in) had prevailed over the moderates. The new concern became the likelihood of a violent clash between the security forces and opposition hardliners.

On the morning of 30 January 2018, Nairobi had a cloud of unease hovering over it. Uhuru Park (Freedom Park) was buzzing as early as 4 am, and waves and waves of humanity swept into the park despite the open threat of repercussion from security authorities. Doomsayers predicted a bloodbath; it was expected that there would be violence when opposition supporters faced the state's firepower.

The day fell on a Tuesday at the end of the frugal month of January. The usual end-of-month buoyant mood, habitually displayed by salaried workers making up for weeks of being broke, was absent. I encountered no traffic as I drove to meet a business prospect in the Lavington shopping centre at about eight in the morn-

ing. On my way into the mall, I said hello to a security guard, a familiar face, and asked him why he was not at Uhuru Park. "We don't have the luxury of demonstrating. You will be quickly sacked and replaced here," he answered, with a trace of annoyance in his voice.

As my business prospect and I sat down for tea, an elderly Caucasian male walked past, chatting to the mall's security guards with the ease of a regular and teased them: "Hurry up guys, I have to be in Uhuru Park before seats run out."

There was a mix of excitement or dread in the air depending on what sides of the political divide one stood. A ruckus interrupted our conversation. The noise of loud whistles and raised voices filtered through to where we were seated. My guest, worried about his car, muttered: "I hope these guys have not started rioting. I should have parked in the basement."

A gang of five men came into sight, walking boisterously past a line of taxis with their drivers standing alert. The undertones of aggression were not reassuring. Three military Land Cruisers had driven past James Gichuru road, awakening our internal anxiety buttons.

The ceremony

An hour later, I returned home to monitor the live broadcast on TV. The crowds had swelled to proportions I had never seen before. With some relief, I noted that the police were out of sight and the procession to Uhuru Park was peaceful, though the city remained edgy. I got frantic calls from my relatives in the village asking whether we were okay. Since I am involved in the media, I received recurring questions: "What do you think is going to happen? Will they kill 'our' people?" I hoped for the best as I mentally prepared for the worst.

Even from the screen, one could make out that the crowd at Uhuru Park had reached proportions that appeared to rival the

swearing-in ceremony of Mwai Kibaki as president in 2002—a watershed moment that marked the end of a Moi dictatorship.

You could throw a bead in the air and it would struggle to hit the ground.

But there was no way in hell that a ceremony of this nature, the first "people's swearing in" in Kenya's history, would go down without any drama.

At around noon, the government switched off the live broadcast of major TV channels, starting with Citizen, Inooro and NTV, and then followed by KTN. Not to be deterred, Kenyans switched to online streaming; the media blackout only heightening tensions.

At Uhuru Park, the atmosphere seemed electric, the sea of humanity, estimated to be in the hundreds of thousands, patiently waiting for the man of the moment, even as the "swearing-in" was running late. Though many had been waiting since early morning, by 1 pm none of the principals had arrived.

It was only at around 2 pm that Raila Odinga finally arrived and was received by a tumultuous welcome. His co-principals, Kalonzo Musyoka, Musalia Mudavadi and Moses Wetangula, were nowhere in sight. With him were Mombasa Governor Hassan "Sultan" Joho, James Orengo and T.J. Kajwang in ceremonial advocate dress ready to administer the oath. The fiery lawyer Miguna Miguna and businessman Jimmy Wanjigi were conspicuously defiant in posture.

At about 2.45 pm, Raila raised a green Bible and read the oath swearing himself in as "the People's President." Applause reverberated throughout the park. He delivered a short and hurried speech in Kiswahili, trying to explain the absence of his co-principals, and then switched to English, giving an even shorter remark and closing with the solidarity slogan: "a people united can never be defeated." The speech lasted barely five minutes. He then swiftly exited the platform.

A sense of flatness descended soon after, anti-climatic in some respects, because the masses gathered at Uhuru Park had hoped that

the moment's significance would be immediately tangible. The crowds dissolved peacefully within the next two hours. The self-policed gathering appeared innately alive to the fact that any type of violent behaviour would have soiled the occasion, fueling the narrative of opposition supporters' appetite for violence and destruction. The peaceful assembly cast the police as the provocateurs.

The casualness of the whole affair was comically deceptive: an opposition leader had just sworn himself in as "the People's President" less than three months after Uhuru Kenyatta was sworn in, right in the middle of the city and in broad daylight. Uhuru Park, with its heavy symbolism as a monument to Kenya's liberation movements, is a mere hundred metres away from the Parliament building, the seat of Kenya's power, and about four hundred metres from State House -- the president's residence. The possibility of riotous thousands storming either State House or the Parliament, in Kenya's own version of a people's coup, was not far-fetched.

2017 was an unprecedented election year even by Kenya's controversial standards. The August 8 election, contentiously won by Uhuru Kenyatta, against bitter rival Raila Odinga, was annulled by Kenya's Supreme Court after an appeal by NASA. A second presidential election was called slightly over 60 days later on October 26. Raila Odinga, and by extension his support base, withdrew from the October elections, leaving Uhuru Kenyatta with no formidable challenger. As a result, despite a voter turnout that was, disputably, 30%, the incumbent was declared the winner with 98% of the votes cast in his favour. The boycott of this second election is what set the momentum for the "swearing in" of the "People's President."

The "swearing-in" ceremony, caricatured as a farce and a self-defeatist move by its critics, achieved its aim in the eyes of the proponents of the secession movement who want Kenya to be divided between ruling party's regional enclaves and opposition strongholds. After January 31, Kenya had acquired two "presidents" for each

stronghold, placing the country in an unprecedented political stalemate.

Certainly the "swearing- in" went against the Constitution and was even treasonable, as former Attorney General Githu Muigai had boldly stated. But for the millions of NASA supporters it was a cathartic moment. They had sent a loud and clear message that the Jubilee government was illegitimate and that the leadership of Uhuru Kenyatta was an imposition that they would not stop contesting.

Raila Odinga's disobedience and resistance was a strategic salvo from a disenfranchised opposition that had lost complete faith in acquiring any sort of electoral justice under the present state of affairs. A growing rank of radicals appeared to be in control of the opposition's momentum, led from the front by NASA strategist and economist David Ndii and Miguna Miguna the self-styled "general" of what he would call the National Resistance Movement.

On December 9 2017, after his release from police custody for alleged incitement charges, David Ndii had stated his position clearly: "If the Jubilee administration decides to go extra-legal then there is absolutely nothing law-abiding people can do if their government goes rogue. It becomes the responsibility of citizens to see how they navigate themselves out of a situation where the state is captured by a rogue regime and that's why we have constituted the People's Assembly."

While leading an opposition that was intent on contesting the status quo, Raila lived up to his nickname, Agwambo (the unpredictable one), and in this "swearing in" conquered the fear of his own political death in one transcendental moment. Courage is what the millions of supporters demanded of their leader, and he stood a man apart from his co-principals who succumbed to the pressure of the moment, much to the disgust of their core bases in Ukambani and Luhya land.

The "swearing-in" reinforced Raila's status as untouchable. The word on the street was "touch Raila and the country burns." Raila

has (not yet) suffered the fate of other opposition leaders who have dared to question the legitimacy of a sitting government in this brazen manner. The other African opposition leaders who had sworn themselves in, namely Kizza Besiyge, Mashoud Abiola and Etienne Tshesekedi, were promptly bundled into jail.

In the Kenyan political game of thrones, Raila is better in the field than out of the play, good for business so to speak. During the opposition boycott of the October 26 election, Raila's absence on the ballot box was blamed for the low turnout in Jubilee strongholds, bringing credence to the rumours that Jubilee voters do not necessarily vote *for* the party but rather *against* Raila, the perennial bogeyman in Central Kenya.

What next?

The question remains: what next? Soon after the ceremony at Uhuru Park, Ruaraka MP T.J. Kajwang was temporarily arrested for his role in the "swearing-in." This was followed by the dramatic arrest, court run-around and eventual deportation of Miguna Miguna to Canada, where he had lived previously, despite being born in Kenya. These actions and the consequent disregard for court orders were signs of a government flexing muscle and saving face as it confronted challenges to its contested legitimacy.

I believe that the January 30 swearing-in was about common people, the *hoi polloi* asserting their presence in a highly visible manner. One barman at a restaurant I frequent told me that it was no longer about Raila Odinga; he was the symbol of resistance who he most respected, but if Raila had hesitated to swear himself in his supporters would have installed him as their leader anyway.

Similarly, the several ordinary Kenyans I spoke to as I sought to gauge the pulse of the nation all alluded to the fact that Kenya had crossed the red line of public cynicism about its politics. The political elites were completely divorced from the suffering of the masses. Life was hard for everyone *no matter* who you voted for.

There was also a sense of hopelessness about changing the system through legal means because the rules were regularly flouted to cater to the interests of the political elite. The public had decided it was pointless to talk about democracy where rules were made to be broken.

Meanwhile, Western countries that had championed democratic reforms in the past discredited themselves by taking a unified stand to remain mum on illegalities raised by numerous civil society organizations about the nullified August 8 election. During press briefings, the face of the diplomatic corp, U.S. Ambassador Bob Godec, harped on about peace in place of justice, stability in place of protest and a return to normalcy, which is the euphemism for a return to the established status quo.

The global North has gradually lost moral credibility, and the rise of Donald Trump, a bungled Brexit move and France's failure to face up to racism within its borders has only served to further undermine their standing abroad. The open bias of the Western media around issues of electoral injustice and the adoption of a lower standard for African elections has established, in the minds of ordinary Kenyans and Africans, that the West can no longer occupy the moral high ground it put itself on: their calls for and modeling of "democracy" is a charade.

Something else had changed before the "swearing in": people were not afraid to die for this new ideal they believed in. According to a feature that ran in the Standard newspaper, Kenya's second largest daily, on January 3 2018, NASA supporters were planning funerals for the living as a precautionary action before any demonstration. One interviewee was quoted saying: "I do not know if it is my turn today but I beseech you my friends, when I go down, do not let the ground that has fed on millions of bodies feast on mine in Langata [cemetery]. Send me off with honour."

This honour seems incomprehensible to the elite; it is easier to diminish protestors as thugs, militia or brainwashed and ignorant

adherents of opposition politics. But the nature of any movement changes when its followers are no longer afraid of death. The reality of the lives of millions of struggling Kenyans locked in informal settlements or in neglected villages leaves no room for fence sitting. Innocent people have been killed in their homes and children have been shot while playing on balconies. These repeated encounters with police brutality have turned many people living in the slums of Nairobi and other parts of the country into die-hard protestors.

During the September 2017 demonstrations against the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), protestors in Kisumu reprimanded the police for showing restraint and demanded the use of tear gas to disperse them. Beyond the comical undertones of that stance, protestors daring police violence has become a way of reclaiming moral authority against the state's monopoly of violence and police brutality.

In the run up to the August 8 election, political tensions had risen significantly after the murder of IEBC's ICT manager, Chris Musando, a week before voting was to take place. This was further exacerbated by news reports of ethnic-profiled victims of state-sanctioned violence in opposition areas during the election, adding credence to the narrative of political profiling as opposition supporters became disproportionately targeted in the police crackdowns.

Therefore, there is a sense on the ground that the only way to draw attention to the plight of the victim is to sustain violent protests– the only language that the political elite responds to.

Kenya crossed a tolerance threshold on January 30 2018. The facade of democracy and unity fell apart and Kenyans have now occupied hard-line positions, well aware of the transactional political climate. The dominance of the political class has created an "us" versus "them" reality, whereby oppression is the grievance that unites Kenya's disenfranchised masses against the "the ruling class".

Then, unexpectedly, on March 9 2018, President Uhuru Kenyatta and his political nemesis Raila Odinga staged a heavily publicized handshake and buried the hatchet. This is after two divisive elections in 2017, and the symbolic swearing in ceremony in 2018.

They promised to work towards uniting the country and engaging in progressive politics. And, just like that, political temperatures dropped. Several analysts concluded that the handshake was a reflection of the transactional reality of Kenyan politics. Indeed, there are no permanent enemies in politics, just permanent interests.

Nonetheless, the great unwashed remain restless for the negotiated peace between the rival camps is no substitute for justice, nor has it delivered prosperity for all. The Kenya Project remains standing on the shifting sands of politics: though symbolic and an important moment, the swearing in did not usher the "People's President" as hoped.

As the political tensions lowered with no official opposition in place, the cost of living has continued to rise, returning the disenfranchised Kenyan masses to a perpetual state of angst, as if living next to a haunted swamp that keeps bubbling. There is evidence that something lurks. The weather just needs to change, as it likely will, and the soul that desires change will be seized again.

After the African Awakenings

An Interview with Firoze Manji by Nokoko Editors, Toby Moorsom and Christopher Webb

Firoze Manji is a Kenyan activist with more than 40-year's experience in international development, health and human rights. He is the founder and former editor-in-chief of the pan-African social justice newsletter, Pambazuka News and of Pambazuka Press, and former executive director of Fahamu – Networks for Social Justice. He has previously worked as the Director of the Pan-African Baraza for ThoughtWorks and Head of CODESRIA's Documentation and Information Centre. He is a co-editor, with Sokari Ekine, of African Awakenings: The Emerging Revolutions. He was previously a Visiting Fellow at Kellogg College, University of Oxford, and is currently a Richard von Weizsäcker Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin. He is also an Associate Fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies. He holds a PhD and MSc from the University of London. He is the publisher of Daraja Press.

Toby Moorsom: This issue of Nokoko provides an assessment of electoral politics in Africa. We've chosen this theme because we are approaching 30 years since the so-called third wave transitions of the 1980s, a process that saw the simultaneous adoption of liberal democracy and neoliberal economic policies. Looking back over the interim years would you say this has been a period of progress for African nations?

Firoze Manji: Well, the short answer to that is rather limited. In order to really understand what's going on, we need to look at the

political nature of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism, after all, serves a political need; it is not merely an economic policy. I draw this very much from Domenico Losurdo's outstanding book, *Liberalism: A Counter History*. The point that he makes is that liberalism was born out of the Enlightenment, but it was born as a twin of racism. In other words, the enlightenment occurred in the immediate aftermath of massive primitive accumulation through genocide and slavery. The democracy that emerged out of that was a democracy for a very tiny elite. When democracy was born in the United States, for example, only white, male, slave owners were allowed to vote. It was, in other words, an exclusive project. There were two domains created out of that process: first, the so-called 'sacred space,' an exclusive club that has the right to vote and access to privilege, and second, the profane space where everyone else, including women, were condemned to being the 'other', those considered non-human or less-than-human.

Now, it's really important to frame it in this way, because the struggles that have occurred over the last several hundred years have been about ordinary people demanding to be recognized as human and therefore, having rights to claiming a universalist humanity. In other words, all the democratic gains, including social welfare etc. weren't something granted as *noblesse oblige*, it was won through struggle. The abolition of slavery, for example, came about as a result of the massive opposition that occurred to the whole process of enslavement in Africa, in the Americas and the Caribbean, including the establishment of Haiti, the first successful overthrow of slavery. I'm belaboring the point, but once we understand the nature of liberalism—that it is constantly seeking to have an exclusive domain of the sacred space and constantly in struggle with those in the profane who are seeking democracy and access to justice and dignity—only then we can understand that *neoliberalism* (that is new liberalism) is a return to the fundamental aspirations of liberalism.

That is, over the last 30 to 40 years, there is a growing attempt to exclude the majority of people from the sacred space and to push them into the profane. I think the election and language of Trump is a perfect example of thrusting out, and building walls against, what the regime believes are the members of the profane space.

One of the things I think many of us have failed to acknowledge has been that over the last 40 years in Africa, since the implementation of neoliberal policies, we see a vast majority of people condemned not merely to transient periods of unemployment, but to conditions of 'never employment'. People have been dumped in the dustbin of history, and as a result, are condemned to a profane space in which they have no access to rights, justice or dignity as humans. The last 30 to 40 years has been a period in which the membership of the profane has expanded concurrently with the growth of a greater exclusiveness of the sacred space. We see this in all African countries; you have a minority who are incredibly rich. They have been given access to the privileges of the sacred space while the vast majority of people are excluded and condemned to impoverishment. If you talk about Kenya for example, and you think about people living below five dollars a day—the World Bank talks about one dollar a day, but who can live on one dollar a day? What Africa experienced 30 to 40 years ago as 'structural adjustment' is precisely what Europe and the North are experiencing today as 'austerity'. But austerity is not a transient thing as it was in the past. This is the creation of a permanently unemployed population excluded from the exclusive privileges of the sacred space. This is happening both in Africa and in the advanced capitalist countries.

The struggle for independence has been a struggle to establish a zone wherein the majority can actually experience justice, dignity and self-determination. The gains of independence lasted only until the beginning of the 1980s when, with the rise of neoliberalism, most of

the gains of independence were reversed. We tend to accuse the World Bank and IMF for imposing structural adjustment programs that privatized the commons and opened our countries to exploitation by transnationals and finance capital, but this isn't quite the whole story. African elites have been amongst the greatest beneficiaries of structural adjustment. They have accumulated at an extraordinary pace while the vast majority have been impoverished. So, has there been any progress? Well for the emerging elite in Africa, it has been a period of huge progress.

One of the impacts of neoliberalism has been to reduce the democratic space: although, now multiple political parties are allowed, in practice there is little to distinguish between them in terms of their political programs. Elections have become all about whose turn it is to eat.

Toby Moorsom: These changes have coincided with increasing forms of consultation, so, for example, development aid packages usually require a consultative process. So that's been reified, but it hasn't translated into material changes in people's daily lives.

Firoze Manji: A rose by any other name ... the so-called consultative processes of PRSPs and so on have been public relations exercises for the implementation of the same policies as structural adjustment. But implementing them has not been straightforward. If one takes a longer view, what we have seen are growing movements seeking to re-establish their right to justice, dignity and to their futures. Michelle Alexander has recently made the point in an article in the New York Times that there is a tendency for us to see our struggle against the Trumps of this world as 'resistance'. But this, she argues, is not the resistance. We—the movements for justice and dignity— are the ones who are giving birth to a new world. It is the Trumps of the world, that is the ruling classes, which are in crisis, it is they who

are the resistance; they fear the new world that these movements are trying to give birth to.

Looking at it that way completely transforms the way we see the struggles that are going on. We have to see the struggles that have emerged since we published *African Awakenings* as giving birth to a new world. It is not just that, as the World Social Forum put it 'another world is possible,' but rather another world is *absolutely necessary*! Because if one looks at it in terms of the human destruction that's going on, compounded by the environmental and climate crisis, we see the contestation between the profane and the sacred as being central to the future. It is the movements of the profane that are seeking to create a new world, but there is resistance to this from the establishment and the elites.

Chris Webb: In *African Awakenings* you argue that the Arab Spring was accompanied by related uprisings across the African continent, against impoverishment, despotism and the multiple effects of neoliberalism. Seven or eight years later, what do you think the legacy of some of those uprisings has been?

Firoze Manji: First, I think we must acknowledge that since that book was published, there continue to be movements struggling to give birth to that new world. One looks at, for example, Abahlali baseMjondolo, the shack dwellers movement in South Africa. Their membership has expanded, and they have forged partnerships with groups like NUMSA, the South African metalworker's union. In Burkina Faso, we've seen the ousting of Compaore. We've seen similar things going on across the continent, but under very difficult circumstances. Our elites are getting more and more ruthless. Their resistance against us is escalating, and they are drawing on the military might of the US and Europe to help them. If one considers the scale of militarization: AFRICOM has had more than 150 operations in countries across Africa over the last year, but it is not

simply occupying the continent: AFRICOM is there at the behest of our elites. That militarization is happening on a grand scale. It is accompanied by the militarization of aid, of humanitarian assistance, to say nothing of the direct military interventions to protect what are perceived of as 'US interests'.

Toby Moorsom: Do you see any connection between the crackdown on these protests particularly in North Africa and what has been referred to in Europe as the migrant crisis? What is leading people from everywhere from Libya to Nigeria to flee these countries in such numbers?

Firoze Manji: Well, I think that the conditions people are facing in Africa, especially as a result of military interventions in places like Libya and Mali, is such that people are seeking desperately to find refuge. The majority of them are not going to Europe—they are seeking and finding refuge in Africa. While it is well-known that the Mediterranean has become a massive cemetery of refugees, it is small in comparison to the cemetery that the Sahara has become. The EU has been outsourcing its borders to Africa with African regimes paid huge sums to prevent people reaching Europe. Development today has been turned into a means of providing the necessary resources for preventing migration, and this has been accompanied by both security and military interventions to ensure that Africans do not go to Europe. So, people are desperate, and this is an outcome of neo-liberalism. It is an outcome of the exclusion of the profane from the sacred spaces. And it is fundamentally racist: there are no mechanisms placed on preventing the migration of US citizens, Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders etc.

Toby Moorsom: I want to go back to the issue of the economic policies imposed over the last 30 to 40 years. Their justification was partly that liberalization would remove the oppressive yoke of the state from interfering in the capacities of a nascent bourgeoisie; and

allow the innovative capacities of such a bourgeoisie to take root. Looking back, are these new elite the sort of comprador class, in the way that Fanon wrote about them, or have there been some among them who have really become an indigenous bourgeoisie?

Firoze Manji: What Fanon talks about with this elite was its parasitic nature and how much it is compliant with the needs of international capital. I think one of the things that has happened in Africa (not everywhere, but certainly in Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa) is that you have the emergence of a class who are actually part of the transnational bourgeoisie. They have morphed from being parasitic accumulators, to become members of a transnational class. Now that has very important implications because, in that process, they have sidestepped any development as a national bourgeoisie, in the sense that such a national capitalist class would seek to develop the productive forces in their own countries. The main way in which they accumulate profits is through rent rather than through production. Agriculture is like mining, it is two thirds, maybe nine tenths, rent. If one looks at the developer of the mobile phone companies, you can see that wealth is entirely from rent —charges imposed on telecommunications that in reality cost almost nothing. There is no, or very little, productive investment. If one looks at South Africa, you can see this huge problem that the real productive capital remains largely in white hands, and the headquarters of these companies are no longer in South Africa.

So this isn't, in my view, a productive bourgeoisie. It isn't seeking to develop the productive forces. You may find there are examples of individual capitalists who are committed to productive investment, but they are a minority. What structural adjustment did was open up borders for the movement of capital which means that international capital was able to move in, with no tariff barriers, and able to flood the markets with products produced elsewhere, with the effect that

they completely smashed local industry. At the same time, structural adjustment allowed this aspiring transnational class to export capital elsewhere and make a lot of money in the international speculative domain.

Chris Webb: You make the argument that structural adjustment created this elite that has access to the political sphere, that accumulates in a variety of ways, and then the creation of this profane layer, a surplus population. But the anthropologist Tania Li makes the point that this actually isn't very good for capitalism. You have all these people that are effectively excluded from the market, and this is a barrier to capitalist profitability. So, how does this shape our understanding of the nature of capitalism in Africa? Is this capitalism? What type of capitalism is it?

Firoze Manji: Capital is moving into a stage where there is a lot of discussion about robotics and artificial intelligence, so you're finding fewer and fewer people are being employed. On a theoretical level, there is a contradiction here. If you don't have a market where you can realize the surplus value that has been incorporated in commodities, then you're in trouble. The other contradiction is that the majority of the accumulation that's occurring comes from speculative activity, playing the markets. It's a casino economy. It is speculative because it's not on the basis of what is actually being produced, it's what might be produced or might be linked to what might be produced. So, we have a global crisis of capitalism, but it doesn't mean it will be resolved in our favor. The crisis of capitalism is precisely that it cannot resolve its own contradictions without engaging in destruction.

Part of the destruction that is going on in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia and, in due course, in Iran as well, are part of that process of destruction. If you can't develop capital productively and you have limits to how much you can get out of the speculation, you

are going to have to engage in some kind of destruction. So, I think we are living in very dangerous times because I think the stakes are really high. Politically, even the elites have given up on this idea of 'promoting democracy'. This belongs to the past. Today, dictatorships are much more important for them. Saudi Arabia is a good example, and many of our regimes in Africa are good examples. Capital will back them because that's their guarantee. I think that the terrifying thing about the Brazilian case with the rise of Bolsonaro is that it is not an exception. The neo-fascist resurgence is something that is happening in Europe, in India, in the Philippines, and it could happen anywhere.

Toby Moorsom: I want to go back to the discourse of 'civil society' that arose in the late 1980s and early 1990s. At the same time as economic conditionalities were being imposed on African countries, a number of them also had a surge of new civil society movements that were heralded as very important developments, which almost justified getting rid of the supposedly oppressive state. That civil society discourse therefore, had undersides to it. How do you see the broader impact of that discourse?

Firoze Manji: If one looks at the period of *liberalism* it was characterized by a huge resurgence of philanthropy. In Africa, that was historically carried out by missionaries during the colonial period. Under *neoliberalism* we see the same phenomenon happening. The growth of NGOs in Africa was a direct result of the neoliberal policies which reinforced the argument that the state was inefficient. Basically what was happening was that neoliberalism sought to privatize the public domain. Where it was profitable, like water, telecommunications, and healthcare, they privatized those and the corporations made a fast buck. But when it came to rural development or, water provision or, healthcare for the poor, that's not a profitable venture. So, they sold it off to the other private

sector, the so-called civil society organizations. As a result, citizens are turned into beggars for healthcare rather than having that as a right, which is what we had after independence.

But I think NGOs are facing a crisis because their funding is dropping. I think the access to serious funds is waning because money is now not going to NGOs so much as to the militarization of aid. I think we are seeing another crisis brewing amongst NGOs. At the same time, there are some, a very small minority, who are political and are engaged in the struggle for justice, in the struggle for providing solidarity to those who are engaged in struggles. But words, like solidarity, are today dirty words amongst civil society because it is overtly political. As I have pointed out in previous publications, the majority of NGOs, especially international NGOs, have contributed to the depoliticization of impoverishment.

Chris Webb: With the rise of right-wing populism in Europe and North America, there's also been some hints of a left-wing populism. I am thinking of Corbyn and Momentum in the UK and Sanders in the US. Do we see something similar on the African continent? Is there a Left to speak of anywhere in Africa now that poses some sort of alternative?

Firoze Manji: First, I think that the left in Europe and in the West has undergone a social democratization; it's drifted to the right over the last period. But there's a crisis of social democracy and also a crisis of dogma in the revolutionary parties, which I'm very skeptical about. The so-called revolutionary left are too preoccupied with reiterating dogmas, rather than developing critical analyses that enhance our understanding of how to challenge the rule of capital. I think what we're seeing is, at the same time, a recomposition taking place. I think we need to start thinking about whether the vanguard party is the way forward. I think there are too few left organizations that spend their time actually listening to and engaging with

movements where people are giving expression to the world that they want to give birth to.

But no, there is hardly any left in Africa, at least a left that is committed to the goals of emancipation of humankind, of asserting the dignity of the oppressed and exploited, and who are committed to building movements of self-determination. There are some lefties in some of the bigger countries like Nigeria. In Kenya, they are almost completely absent except in the main urban centres, but they have little influence. Many may call themselves the 'Left,' but that is essentially in a social democratic, rather than an anti-capitalist tradition. The left in South Africa is also a complete mess: the major left formations are focused on how to manage capitalism in the peripheries to behave nicely, rather than seeking to overthrow capital. So, I think we have a real problem. I believe that the objective conditions provide a real potential for the left to emerge as a strong force, but the ability to deliver has thus far been very limited. The challenge remains of building an explicitly anti-capitalism movement in every country of the continent.

The tragedy in countries like Venezuela, as in other Latin American countries, is the social democratization of the Left. That is to say, that it is not concerned with the complete abolition of the social relations of production of capital. Rather, it has the view that you can manage capital; that you can be nice to people and still have capitalism continue and still have private accumulation happening. Unfortunately, the Left in Latin America never challenged the dominance of capital. It was a form of social democracy in those circumstances. We can see that Brazil is a very good example of how that is completely being overturned, and I think we've seen it in Venezuela. I'm hopeful about Mexico, not because I have any illusions about Amlo, but we will see that there are limits to compromises with capital. Capital will go in for the kill. I think

that's guaranteed to happen unless a strongly anti-capitalist movement emerges.

Toby Moorsom: What do you think of the position of the African Union (AU) in building any kind of left alternative given that it's been central to promoting neoliberal policy on the continent? Is it an organization that the left should be engaging with and, if so, in what ways? I want to qualify this by saying that over the last couple of years that I've been in Accra, I've seen efforts of very committed Pan-Africanist scholars who are taking on the discourses of the A.U. and seem to be functioning as if it's an important field of struggle for the left.

Firoze Manji: Well, we have no choice, wherever we are, but to engage with the state. We engage our own governments in policy and so we do the same with the AU. You have the European Union, for example, which offers some guarantees to workers and so it has to be engaged with. But there is a distinction between having to engage because we have no choice and engaging because that is all we think needs to be done. These are where decisions are made; this is where the ruling class operates. We have no choice but to engage. But we cannot have the illusion that just by engaging with it that we are creating an anti-capitalist movement. It's not one or the other. We have to do both.

So, we have to do both with the African Union. At one level, you could just say it's a 'dictators club', but at the same time, there are big decisions that are made there. But to have illusions that the AU is where the left is going to be, that it has the ability to provide any anti-capitalist progressive outcomes, I am very skeptical about that. There are gains to be made by engaging with the institutions of so-called democracy, but it has to be done at the same time as trying to build movements that are explicitly anti-capitalist and outside the state.

Chris Webb: I wanted to ask about a topic that's both personal and political for you, which is about the late Samir Amin who, of course, died on August 12, 2018. When did you first encounter Samir Amin's work and him personally?

Firoze Manji: I think it must have been in the mid-1970s that I first came across Samir's work, in particular *Unequal Development*, around which many of us had many long debates. He was incredibly prolific, an incredible thinker, and somebody who was amazingly kind. The number of people I've come across who have written to say, Samir helped me when I was planning my thesis, is amazing. He always had time for other people.

In the 1990s, I began to feel that people had forgotten Samir Amin and that he wasn't being given the recognition that I felt was due to him. So I made contact with him at a CODESRIA meeting in Yaoundé and, I said to him, look, I think your books need to come out and reach into Africa and to a much wider audience than they do now. So, he agreed to Pambazuka Press publishing a series of his books and we became, over time, his main publisher, whereas now it is mainly Monthly Review that is fulfilling that role. For some time, Pambazuka became a place where we actively sought to promote Samir because he is an African thinker, an economist and has written some extraordinary work that I think has been responsible for the rekindling of interest in Marx's economic writings.

Samir was very committed to building some other means of moving things forward. Two weeks before he died, I had dinner with him to discuss a document he had prepared to organize an international conference to bring people together from the left. A lot of people talked about the formation of a 'Fifth International,' and our discussions led to a point where we both agreed that was not the way forward. What we needed to do was to allow a diversity of the

left and peoples' movements to come together to think through collectively what way forward involved representative movements and not just little political parties. The idea was to have a much broader movement and so, we were in the process of preparing. I revised one of his documents and arranged translation. That was two weeks before he died, and I have not yet got over that loss. He was such a sweet man, incredibly generous and always had time for people. We've lost a real giant.

Toby Moorsom: I actually started thinking about some of his ideas when you were previously talking about the ways the African elite sidestepped a developmental stage gravitated towards sectors which are heavily rent dependent. I was thinking about an article that was very influential to me, which is Samir's 1972 article, *Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa: Origins and Contemporary Forms.* In many ways, what you described is indicative of these long-term historical trends in which the African bourgeoisie was pulled away from productive sectors of the economy, especially toward transportation and mercantilism. This was something especially prominent in West Africa and so you see from his work, how these are world historical processes which are linked to the broader world systems theories that he was engaging with. I'm wondering, for you, are there particular aspects of his thought that you find have been most influential in the way you think about Africa and have thought about Africa over the years?

Firoze Manji: I think one of the most important lasting, short comments that Samir repeatedly made, and was really important in terms of framing one's thinking was to point out to us that capitalism is but a mere 'parenthesis in world history'. It is a short-lived parenthesis. And I think that's really important because he reminds us of what was happening internationally in China, in Africa and elsewhere before the birth of capitalism and what the

potentials therefore are in the aftermath of capitalism. But the other point I would make is that the core motivator of capitalists is to increase the rate of profit. It's not just about making profit; it's about increasing the rate of profit.

In the independence period, when capitalists emerged and the state became a tool of accumulation, they didn't want a 50 year investment plan. The problem is that the imperial form of accumulation was not open to the emerging African bourgeoisie. For a bourgeoisie like the European bourgeoisie to emerge in Africa, it would have to have the ability to enslave millions and to send millions of its citizens to establish settler colonies across the world, to say nothing of the need to carry out plunder, genocide and mass killings, it would need to do that to get really serious about primitive accumulation. There was no capacity existing in the 1960s and 70s for that kind of accumulation to take place. And so what do you do? How do you make a fast buck? And you are competing with everyone else as well so what do you do? So, you forge strategic alliances with capital, investments overseas, overseas banks, you name it, you look for every way in which you can turn a fast buck faster than your competitor because then you have more power over them.

Chris Webb: You mention that Samir Amin's ideas were not receiving the attention they deserved or his work wasn't getting read as widely. I wonder if this is because of a waning interest in the 1990s in Marxism and dependency theory? Do you see a renewed interest today in Samir Amin's ideas?

Firoze Manji: Yes, I think we made a really good intervention in popularizing him, not just by publishing his books, but getting him to write articles and doing interviews with him. So, we take some of the credit for keeping the flag flying. I think to a large extent we succeeded. I think today Samir Amin is viewed in very different ways

and I think it's encouraging that people are aware of him and some people have read him. But what we need to encourage is some critical reading. In other words, to listen to what he has to say and build our own perspectives so that we become part of that creative movement he was part of.

Toby Moorsom: I wonder if you have any advice for young, emerging activists today on the continent or outside of the continent. What are some of the avenues for supporting African liberation struggles today? For a time, Samir Amin was engaged in the World Social Forum (WSF). Is that one of the avenues that young activists should be gravitating towards?

Firoze Manji: I think the World Social Forum has passed its 'sell-by date'. I think it achieved a certain amount, but it did become too much of a cattle market. The ethos of equivalence of all participants was lost. If you went to any of the WSF events, if you had a lot of money, you had much larger stalls. If you had only a small amount of money, you had tiny stalls, and so, the basic democratic aspiration that we're all equal was lost. So, it was totally undemocratic. It reproduced the social relations of the market economy.

My message to young people would be this; we need to ask questions framed in the following way: What are we doing to contribute to the emancipation of our people? What is it that we are doing for the freedom and dignity of people? We have to recognize that being African was originally a term of abuse which Europe created. You know in France, immediately after the Thermidor (the 1794 defeat of the first post-revolutionary government), anyone who resisted the turn intended to reestablish, if not slavery, then the regime of white supremacy, in the colonies was branded 'an African'. It was a shorthand for the non-human. The term African was subsequently appropriated by the liberation movements and turned

into something that was about emancipation, about the creation of a universalist humanity, an inclusive humanity. And in that period, Africa immediately became associated with the struggle for liberation. But after (African) independence, the term has been detached from the meaning of emancipation and freedom and dignity. Instead, it's a taxonomic term. It's been attached to identity politics; it's all about whether you have curly hair or broad nose or dark skin or not. So, it's lost its emancipatory link. And so, for the young people they have to say, look, the true African is a liberator, fights for freedom and finds opportunities for the emancipation of humanity. To build a universalist inclusive humanity is the most important thing that we can focus our attention on today.

Toby Moorsom: When you talk about universalist claims, that hearkens back to the liberatory aspects of Enlightenment thinking that were not made available to Africans, or other people in the peripheries. But when you look at major issues facing countries in many parts of Africa (and I'm thinking of the city I mean right now, Accra) you have massive informal settlements with no water supplies, no proper sanitation, all of these conditions which are extremely unhealthy for people on so many levels. When I see the scale of these problems, it's really hard for me to imagine resolving them without Africans re-engaging with ideas of modernization that were previously associated with independence struggles. Obviously, one must remove their authoritarian dimensions, but there seems to be a need to take on big projects. I'm wondering if you'd agree with that and if so, how do you address the logistical problems of trying to finance such investments?

Firoze Manji: First of all, let's be clear: it was African people who had been enslaved and shipped to San Domingue (later Haiti) who were to develop further the idea of a universalist humanity that the French revolution was unable to—we need to give recognition to

what Toussaint Louverture achieved. There were similar struggles elsewhere on the main continent. So, it is not accurate to say that the ideas of Enlightenment were not available to Africa. As for modernization, that was a euphemism for establishing the hegemony of capital in Africa and particularly of transnational capital. That's what it did. We should refer to it strictly as Euromodernization. People don't have water, not because of an ontological condition of 'poverty', but because they have been *deprived* of water. The issue is a political one, not an economic one. It is a question of how we organize to recapture the public domain for the public. How do we organize in order that our interests, that the interests of the vast majority, that the interests of dignity and humanity and justice prevail as the motive force for liberation? Because it is only by so doing that we stop the constant and persistent impoverishment of our people. That is why it is not going to be solved by economic development in the abstract. It has to be a product of struggles for that justice. It is only then that there can be a debate about how do we then produce? What do we produce? For whom do we produce? In what way do we produce? How do we build a world that we want to live in collectively? And that's the framework for an economic policy and economic development. It can't be a technical one. It can't be about 'modernization'. For the basis for the idea of modernization is to become like the European. Europe has lost its humanity. The rekindling of a universalist humanity will happen in Africa, of that I am convinced.

Africanizing the State: Globalizing the discipline

Andrew Heffernan[1]

> There are certain trees that seem worthless but when gone leave empty spaces through which bad winds blow. There are other trees that seem useless but when felled worse things grow in their place.
> — Ben Okri, *Famished Road.*

Review Article :

Comaroff, J and Comaroff, J. (2012). *Theory from the South: or, How Euro-America is evolving toward Africa.* Boulder, Colo.: Paradigm Publishers.

Death, C. (2016). *The green state in Africa.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Taylor, I. (2010). *The international relations of Sub-Saharan Africa.* New York; London: Continuum.

International Relations (IR) as a discipline has failed to adequately globalize to account for the most pressing issues challenging all levels of politics around the world. The theory, the scholars and the scholarship do not reflect the complex and ever-evolving nature of the social make up or the needs of society. This book review assesses this issue and the way these three monographs seek to deal with the ongoing question of Africa's place in the discipline and in the academe more broadly. By analyzing, comparing and contrasting the arguments of these authors this paper will unpack many of the issues facing the continent and its place in scholarship, while

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> more importantly painting a picture of the important road needed to write the continent back into the theories that purport to analyze and treat it. Today, the major issues facing the world are those which are felt most by the African continent and include issues of poverty, disease and environmental pressures rather than large scale state on state warfare with which the discipline was initially developed to deal with. It must now evolve and must globalize itself in order to deal with the issues of the modern globalized world.

Mearsheimer and Walt (2013) warn scholars of International Relations (IR) about rigor mortis which Thakur (2015, p. 214) presents as a cause to "the 'theoretical peace' in the discipline, the lack of theoretical contributions, and the absence of theoretical rigor." These authors suggest this end of theory would imply there are no new theoretical paradigms to be explored and that henceforth IR would be developed largely through substantive inquiries, rather than the rigorous theoretical foundations on which it was built. To those who subscribe only to the disciplinary traditions of IR, this is true. Theories about large scale conflicts, the traditional Weberian conception of the nation-state as the sole referent object, and theorizing about issues which can be neatly separated by boundaries and treated through traditional understandings of power, hegemony and sovereignty have been exhausted and in this sense rigor mortis has indeed set in on the discipline of IR.

The world however has evolved, and alongside this evolution the major issues in global politics have similarly complexified. Put simply, this evolution can be conceptualized as the many processes of globalization. As the world has globalized, many scholars have criticized IR for failing to globalize as well (Abrahamsen, 2017; Dalby, 2015; Ní Mhurchú, 2015; Thakur, 2015; A. B. Tickner, 2013). It has become viewed as a Western-centric discipline that is set in its ways rigorously churning out new versions of the same academics trained in the largely unchanging disciplinary traditions and approaches, whose work is accepted only when it conforms to the desired form and rationalities of the leading IR journals of yesteryear.

In this sense IR has forgotten the developing world, and within this vast region, specifically the continent of Africa. Africa, and Africans are largely invisible in the literature, and have certainly in no major way been formative to its evolution (or lack thereof). IR's inability, unwillingness, and abject failure to globalize and become both representative of, and represented by Africa, runs parallel to its failure to adequately evolve to treat the problems that the era of globalization have brought with it.

The modern problems that affect us can largely be seen to affect individuals rather than states (Burgess, 2014). They transcend borders, laws, regulations, and largely cannot be met through any degree of military might. They are unrecognizable in so many ways to the theorists of the past, and while breaking from foundational concepts and theories in so many ways, they remain imbedded in the world founded on principles of sovereignty, the rule of law, and centred around power-politics. The three monographs upon which this review article will focus each place a unique focus on Africa and the challenges it faces today. All of them theorize the various ways in which the challenges facing the African continent relate directly to the challenges facing the wider world and the effects these have on the discipline of IR. It is often and perhaps increasingly claimed that African politics cannot be understood without world politics. The three works reviewed presently put into focus why this, as well as its reverse, have become inextricably linked in limitless way in the modern era of hyper-globalization. This review article will compare and contrast ideas put forward by these and other authors to explore the issue of climate change politics in Africa to conceptualize the way in which global politics have changed. I will ultimately compile the theses put forth by these authors to argue that there is not only an absolute need for the discipline to globalize, and to evolve to treat modern issues, but that we are also already on the precipice of doing so and possess all the tools needed thanks to gradual inroads made by feminist scholars, neo-Gramscian and post-structuralists.

While I posit that these approaches are not sufficiently global in the sense I have begun to lay out above, they have set the ground work for more critical approaches such as critical race theory and postcolonial theory which have contributed to challenging some of the core aspects of traditional realist/liberal/constructivist IR theory. What is required for this necessary evolution then, is not revolutionary change of any sort but rather, a revolution in the way in which we employ the knowledge and tools already at our disposal.

Disciplining the discipline

There has been great and ongoing criticism of the scholarly process in recent decades, specifically, as one might imagine, by those who fall outside certain disciplinary boundaries. IR has certainly not escaped this critique as the problems with which it is being tasked to theorize about have evolved and globalized outside the scope of its traditional means. Many, like Jan Aart Scholte argue that the problem lies in the very way by which scholars of IR are trained, accepted and thus perpetuate continuous processes of disciplinary fortifications as,

> Most professional research continues to be funnelled through discipline-related organs. Similarly, most academic conferences have remained tribal conclaves on disciplinary lines. Most academic funding has continued to flow through disciplinary channels, and respect of disciplinarity normally still provides researchers with a faster track to promotion than alternative approaches. In short, some minor inroads aside, disciplinary methodology remains quite firmly entrenched in the contemporary globalizing world (Scholte, 2000, p. 198).

This claim is true in many ways and has contributed directly to many of the problems now facing the discipline. Taylor (2010) highlights that it is because of this process that the scholarship and scholars have become overwhelmingly Westernized, and specifically Americanized. Thus, the issues treated by the discipline have remained largely the same and are viewed through the same theoreti-

cal lens of old by the same sets of eyes, and subsequently discussed with the same voice using the same language. This is only further proven with the very texts with which this book review is concerned as, not only are the three books written by Western Educated, Westerners, but similarly are the vast majority of authors providing supporting evidence throughout.

To be sure, this is not by design, or to support my arguments or conclusions in any specific or pre-ordained way. It has simply traditionally been a challenge to find much in the way of truly 'African' IR scholarship. This poses several problems which are treated by these books in different ways and while they are all open about the issue, none of them are able to provide an adequate response to it. The main reason put forth for this by Comaroff and Comaroff (2012), as is made implicit throughout their arguments, is the way in which global politics seem only to follow great centres of power and wealth. Even for these authors who seek to point to this problem and thus to provide potential solutions for it, both to help the discipline and the continent, they perhaps inadvertently reify the very issue themselves. They specifically state that South Africa is indeed the 'most Western/American' of all the African countries. It boasted, until recently, the continent's largest economy, is the most economically developed in many ways, and is often seen as a regional leader. Perhaps partly as a result of all of this but serving only to perpetuate the issues facing the discipline of IR with which they attempt to treat, they discuss South African case studies far more than the rest of the vast and diverse continent combined. To be sure, this is partly a result of it being the country of which there is the most evidence, scholarship and information to work with and where the authors have focused their research and studies. However, in writing a book that purports to bring theory back to the south—put otherwise to input Africa into IR—their approach and methodologies, serve to remind us that there are haves and have nots in the world and that much more often than not, it is only the haves that

find themselves in the scholarship, and only they who are represented in, or representative of the theory.

Taylor (2010) provides a thorough, though far from exhaustive, analysis of the plethora of ways in which this disciplinary tradition has worked to write Africa out of both International Relations and international relations. He, like many, widely discusses the ways in which the international community (but mainly the West) have contributed to the protracted underdevelopment of the African continent and shows the many ways they are continuing to do so. Taylor provides what has by this point become a common understanding of African international relations arguing for 'African solutions to African problems.' With this theoretical approach, he and other authors acknowledge the way Africa has been left out of the discourse in so many ways and that rather than adding Africa to IR and stirring, as Abrahamsen (2017) argues will not produce great benefit, the continent and its people must manage its development and relations to the rest of the world from within. Beyond this, Taylor seeks to address the need for African agency, and while acknowledging that it is something that has always been there, as described by Bayart (2000) with his 'extraversion,' Taylor still packages it in an almost 'Africa vs. them' understanding—one where Africa is not itself inserted as an important cog of an international system that is indivisible.

Taylor provides an interesting introduction to modern African politics and a thorough analysis of the new ways in which the globalized world is both affected by and affects the continent. He does however tend to be largely descriptive in his engagement and reading his work provides less in the way of new theoretical foundation by which to provide the much-needed reconceptualization of African politics. Taylor articulates the ways in which Africa has been left out of important debates but fails to provide any meaningful remedy for treating this problem or any of the other issues facing an inadequately evolved discipline. Subsequent sections of this review will

demonstrate how the authors build on these conceptions in order to grow toward a more thorough and useful understanding of Africa and its place in IR.

While together the monographs focused on in this review shed important light on many of the failures of traditional IR scholarship with regards to keeping pace with modern issues in global politics in general, and with issues facing the Global South in particular, it must further be understood that critical inroads have begun to de-colonize and globalize the discipline, albeit at an underwhelming pace. Despite the lethargy with which change is occurring, it is important to understand the incursions that have been made by feminist IR scholar, neo-Gramscians and post-structuralists. This type of cutting-edge critical research has laid important theoretical framework on which more recent developments in critical race theory, post-colonial theory as well indigenous knowledge in IR theory have continued to decolonize the traditional disciplinary fortifications that served to keep so much out for so long. The list of authors has grown too long to explore at length here but some noteworthy contributions stems from Anievas, Manchanda, & Shilliam (2014), Sajed (2018) Smith (2012), and Tickner (2013). It is beyond the scope of this review to delve into these important contributions but suffice it to say that scholars of International Relations have not all been hamstrung by the rigor mortis discussed by Mearsheimer and Walt. Many are indeed developing ever more cutting-edge approaches to ensure the theories, approaches, methodologies, and the scholars of the discipline are not left behind by the ever-complexifying and globalizing world.

Africanizing conceptions of the state

Africans are often portrayed as peasants, tied to their land, loyal to their clans, families, and localities, while cut off in many ways from the wider world and disassociated in any meaningful way from

their state. In this sense it is often portrayed as a continent of individuals rather than states and even at that its states are often known more for their fragility than ability (Howard, 2014). Taylor compares this to the ways in which it has become fashionable both within IR and without to write of the doing away of the state. For Sassen (1994) this is less a disappearance of the state but rather, a disaggregation and partial re-aggregation of it. There is a plethora of authors who have approached this subject and regardless of their precise conclusions, it is generally clear that more often than not it is 'the African state' that fits these models of disappearing states—at least much more or more rapidly than 'proper' Western states (Ní Mhurchú, 2015; Thakur, 2015; A. B. Tickner, 2013). While I would argue that this is incorrect for many reasons, the above two notions of disappearing African states and the growing importance of individuals are key aspects to problematize and analyze. This is not however, to say that the state is either disappearing or that dealing with modern problems would fall outside the paradigm of traditional IR with the state as the referent object. It is rather to argue for a reconceptualization of the state with a renewed emphasis on its constituent parts. States are comprised of individuals and it is individuals who are increasingly at risk with modern global challenges rather than the state itself which used to face existential threats (Burgess, 2014). Taylor makes this clear in writing of the ample ways Africans are being negatively affected by the increasingly compound effects of globalization and the existing international order.

As debates within the discipline of IR have seethed around some of its foundational concepts, two of the most contested have been 'state' and 'sovereignty.' Both concepts are at once inextricably linked and cannot be understood separately, yet each have vastly differing understandings in their own way. It is through adequately conceptualizing these two notions that one can grasp a necessarily evolved modern understanding of the issues facing Africa and global politics writ large. Death (2016) explains that "sovereignty is a tool

and form of government, of governmentality, by which subjects can be divided, classified, and made responsible. The ecological implications of practices of sovereignty are neither straightforwardly good nor bad." (2016 p. 231). Indeed, varying conceptions of the state are central to the arguments of all the authors discussed in this review. For Taylor, the state is largely the issue, for Comaroff and Comaroff a forward-looking understanding of the evolution of the state will be the solution, and Death presents the 'Green State in Africa' as a wider assemblage in the global sphere that will help allow for a retooling of the state by political scientists to better grasp its place in the modern world.

Comaroff and Comaroff concur with the notion that Africa is in many ways a region of individuals over states, and for them this is central to their thesis that indeed 'Euro-America is evolving toward Africa' rather than Africa playing a sort of catch-up in modernization as traditional theories would have it. This argument is furthered by Smith who details how the major issues facing the world today are not being adequately addressed by IR and that "it is quite obvious that Africa, its development and its special problems have had strikingly little impact on IR theory" (Smith, 2012, p. 22). Many authors, including those focused on in this review, have posited that global politics and indeed IR cannot be adequately understood without Africa, while some further this, arguing that the continent is indeed central to any comprehension of global politics. Often however, these arguments are vague and do not explain what this means for theorising about the modern world outside of a few historic examples. Comaroff and Comaroff seek to advance their theory that Africa is leading the modernization of global politics, along with conceptions of the state, sovereignty and even power as it is so centrally inserted into world events and (perhaps unfortunately) exists at the forefront of the type of challenges that IR must now seek to treat. While perhaps at one-time Africa existed on the fringes of major world events as demonstrated by Taylor (2010) and affected global

outcomes only marginally, it is now central to major issues and reconfiguring the very way global politics happen and are understood.

Death takes this a step further, grounding Comaroff and Comaroff's abstract theorizing into a concrete example of what IR in the modern era can look like with Africa at its centre, or at the very least thoroughly inserted into an indivisible system. Each of these authors is open about the existential issues facing the state and the way narrow conceptions of the state have so limited a global IR. In reading them together though, none offer an alternative and as such, it becomes clear that working within the disciplinary traditions that revolve around a world of states, sovereignty and power politics is indeed where our understanding both as academics, and otherwise should remain. It is clear however, that a reinvention of the framework within which these concepts are understood and the rules of engagement with which the scholarship functions is necessary in order to bring about understandings that are conducive to the forward evolutionary motion of the issues facing these modern, and constantly reconceptualised, perhaps even disaggregated and reaggregated entities. For death,

> A truly environmental politics implies not the end of the state but a state that is reshaped, refashioned, and transformed to enable better prospects for human and nonhuman flourishing, while acknowledging that our human capacity to ever know the consequences of our actions is limited (Death, 2016, p. 245).

Death focuses on climate change and environmental issues as a vehicle through which to propel his arguments, but this could easily be read into both Taylor and Comaroff and Comaroff's works and rather than 'a truly environmental politics' might be read as 'a truly international politics.' These authors offer quite different packages that take vastly different routes, but all are presenting similar theoretical attempts to write Africa, and the issues of globalization back into both IR and international relations.

African solutions to global problems

One of the arguments put forth for Africa's many issues, and its resultant omission from global politics is the failure of the African state to modernize. In so many ways the Africa state is a descriptor for the dark 'other' to what we in the West envision ourselves to be living in—fully functioning states with a monopoly on violence, functioning institutions, strong defined borders etc. (Abrahamsen, 2013; Howard, 2014). As many African states lack these apparently necessary components, the argument goes that they have failed to adequately modernize. In laying the foundation for what might be the most revolutionary of the approaches treated in this review the Comaroff and Comaroff contest

> that modernity in the south is not adequately understood as a derivative or a doppleganger, a callow copy or a counterfeit, of the Euro-American "original." To the contrary: it demands to be apprehended and addressed in its own right. Modernity in Africa—which, as Masilela (2003) shows has a deep history—is a hydra-headed, polymorphous, mutating ensemble of signs and practices in terms of which people across the continent have long made their lives; this partly in dialectical relationship with the global north and its expansive capitalist imperium, partly with others of the same hemisphere, partly intra-continently, partly in localized enclaves (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2012 p.7).

This it is an important starting place in attempting to understand Africa's place in IR as well as its relative 'modernity.' To be sure, Africa is a continent that is not in the West. It has its own unique history, culture, and has experienced global events in its own way, though it has certainly experienced them, been greatly affect by and likewise had a great effect on them. Thus, Africa is indeed modern as many scholars rightly point out, but it is modern in its own way, not simply as some distorted refractionary vision of Western modernity. That being said, it is a set of states that exists within the same world and same international order as those of the West and thus it is best to understand "the green state in Africa [as] the effect of an assemblage of environmental rationalities, discourses and technologies of gov-

ernment through which territories, populations, economies and in-
ternational relations have been brought within the scope of sedi-
mented power relations" (Death, 2016 p. 234). Death lays out his
version of the 'green state in Africa' as a new conceptualization of
the state which provides one example of a much sought-after novel
lens through which to understand the place of the state vis a vis
modern global issues. One which provides a way to view states, both
in Africa and elsewhere, as part of a wider assemblage rather than as
separate and unequal component parts of global politics and IR as
has historically been the case.

While providing an entertaining, interesting and unique vision
of the African state and its place in a global assemblage, Death's
main fault can be deemed over-ambition. While he focuses on envi-
ronmental politics and the green state in Africa, unlike Comaroff
who present too narrow a geographical base, Death reaches to in-
corporate every corner of the continent and attempts to present a
laundry list of issues, challenges, strengths and weaknesses relating
to the African continent and at times the wealth of information be-
comes overwhelming and detracts from a methodical and succinct
presentation of his argument. While for the most part it becomes
clear his overall statement of what the green state of Africa is, and
what it means for global politics can become lost in the plethora of
wider ongoing debates in African politics which he presents well, but
perhaps too immoderately.

As has been described, the increasing and seemingly endless
complexification of global politics and the issues facing both Africa
and the world continue to pose limitless challenges. Climate change,
often deemed the greatest challenge of our generation, encapsulates
these growing complexities of both the issues, as well as the ongoing
debates within IR (Dalby, 2015). It is the very nature of these chal-
lenges such as terrorism, HIV/AIDS and other diseases, and climate
change as a few examples that go to the heart of the internal debates
that have been plaguing (or perhaps strengthening) the discipline

for quite some time. As such, in sifting through a wide birth of events throughout Africa's history by conceptualizing a potential new understanding of the state in relation to the issues of climate change which encapsulates so well the nature of modern issues, Death offers one account of what a different IR can look like that is importantly both more global, but also remains within existing traditional disciplinary boundaries.

Conclusions: Toward a global discipline

While engaging quite different approaches the authors build chronologically one off another's theses to together, bring us toward a better conceptualization of a modern international politics that provides a more global understanding of the types of challenges with which we are faced today. They each explain why and how Africa and Africans have largely been left out of the debates in IR and each in their own way describe both the folly of doing so as well as offer their version of a potential pathway toward a solution. While Taylor situates the issue by presenting a thorough analysis of where the discipline of IR stands in relation to the continent and how it got there, both Comaroff and Comaroff and Death provide building blocks from which to begin to answer the question of how to more adequately globalize the discipline to maintain its usefulness and relevance.

Throughout the arguments it often becomes tempting to toss by the wayside the existing international framework as well as doing away with notions of the state and sovereignty which have for so long remained inadequate in treating certain parts of the world and which seems to be disappearing in so many ways of their own accord. Death however, explains that "just as African states, hitherto neglected in debates over the green state, have a vital role to play, so developing states within the broader global south must be at the heart of green politics" (2016 p. 245). Through using the challenges

presented to global politics by climate change, Death uses the modern and hyper-globalized nature of this issue to open a path in which the Green African state, can be viewed as part of a larger assemblage of green states all of which operate under similar natural laws and have analogous goals and tools by which to attain them. Rather than Africa being viewed as a weak, 'other' version of a state then, this assemblage approach presents the qualities these states have rather than their shortcomings and it does so within existing paradigms, rather than trying to achieve what is likely impossible in reimaging a new world order treated by a wholly revolutionized IR.

The quote presented at the outset of this paper read at face value can be seen to suggest in its simplest terms that deforestation can lead to desertification and that, though some trees may seem worthless to individual Africans, their value is often much more than can be easily observed. This is similar to the major causes of environmental degradation as so often the price of pollution is not factored in to economic activity; but it is clear that there is always a price. Beyond this reading though this quote can be understood to represent the omission of Africa and the wider developing world into the discipline of IR as well as the international system more broadly. Often, this is done expressly as these places are seen to be 'failed' at worst, and virtually powerless and therefore meaningless at best. It is now more clear than ever however, that by not adequately treating these states, undesirable things can grow and fester in the neglected voids. Issues such as terrorism, environmental degradation, and conflict can proliferate and in the modern era of globalization in which states and boundaries have new understandings, no longer can these issues be kept localized but instead reverberations can be felt half a world away. These authors shed light on the importance of writing Africa and Africans into the scholarship, and as is demonstrated there are indeed ways to do that within existing frameworks. Thus, what is needed is not a revolution, simply a revolutionary approach in order to Africanize the state and globalize the discipline.

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