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Institute of African Studies
Carleton University (Ottawa, Canada)
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Nokoko is an open-access journal promoting dialogue, discourse and debate on Pan-Africanism, Africa, and Africana. Nokoko brings forward the foundational work of Professor Daniel Osabu-Kle and his colleagues when they started the Journal of Pan-African Wisdom in 2005. '*Nokoko*' is a Ga word that means something that is new, novel, surprising and interesting. The journal offers a venue for scholarship to challenge enduring simplified views of Africa and the African diaspora, by providing other perspectives and insights that may be surprising, interesting, and refreshing.

Combining spaces for academic and community reflection, Nokoko creates an opportunity for discussion of research that reflects on the complicated nature of pan-African issues. It provides a forum for the publication of work from a cross disciplinary perspective that reflects scholarly endeavour, policy discussions, practitioners' reflections, and social activists' thinking concerning the continent and beyond. Hosted by the Institute of African Studies at Carleton University (in Ottawa, Canada), Nokoko provides a space for emerging and established scholars to publish their work on Africa and the African diaspora.

Layout by **Daniel Tubb.**
Cover Photo by **Blair Rutherford**.

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Contributors

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Fathima Bushra Zaheer is a 2020 graduate from the University of Toronto, where she specialized in International Development Studies. Her professional and personal interests lie in the realm of climate policy, environmental governance and indigenous affairs. Recently, she has completed an 8 month placement with a social and environmental justice NGO called Natural Justice. During her time at the Cape Town hub, she contributed to a publication about Biocultural Community Protocol (BCP) processes in Africa that was subsequently presented at the UN COP 14. She also assisted with the development of the South African indigenous Khoikhoi and San people's Access and Benefit agreement around the uses of Rooibos, the first agreement ever signed between an industry (the Rooibos industry) and traditional knowledge holders of a genetic plant. Rooted in her experience being involved with the final stages of an accompanying Rooibos BCP, she wrote a thesis entitled Biocultural Community Protocols: A Tool to Indigenize South Africa's Response to Climate Change. In this paper, she explored the connections between traditional knowledge and community protocols as a way to meaningfully engage with indigenous peoples, ideas and governance structures in the climate change arena.

Ben O'Bright is a technology policy professional with deep experience in international development. His career includes time spent with the Global Affairs Canada Development Innovation Unit, the University of Ottawa's Centre on Governance, and Dalhousie University. He has further worked as a consultant with various United Nations' agencies and offices. He currently works at Google.

Takudzwa Musekiwa is a PHD Candidate in Development Studies at the University of Johannesburg. His research interests centre around state-civil society relations, and his PHD thesis focuses on state violence against civil society organisations in Africa. He has previously conducted research with the Local Governance Trust in Zimbabwe.

Jackson Simon Lusagalika is a rising Researcher, Data scientist, and Filmmaker. Pursuing a Bachelor degree in International Program for Sustainable Development with concentrate modules Climate change and Watershed management at Chang Jung Christian University Taiwan. He holds a diploma of Computer engineering from JR Institute of Technology Tanzania. His research interests include Air quality, Environmental awareness, and Energy conservation. He has achieved several awards including an undergraduate research grant from the Ministry of Science and Technology Taiwan in 2020 for his winning research proposal. His upcoming research paper will explore Energy literacy; University students attitudes and reported behaviors in four institutions of Taiwan and Tanzania. Jackson won 1st place at the 2019 Institute of African Studies Undergraduate Research Conference at Carleton University in Canada by writing on his study "The Role and Influence of Media in Creating Environmental Awareness in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania". He was awarded as Outstanding Delegate at the 2019 Taipei City Model United Nations Conference and he was also among the active delegates of the 10th University Scholars Leadership Symposium in 2019 at Kuala Lumpur Malaysia, prepared by Humanitarian Asia to represent Chang Jung Christian University.

Ifesinachi Nwadike is a Rapper, Essayist, Poet, Playwright and Radio Host. Ifesinachi Nwadike holds a BA and MA in English Literature from Imo State University and University of Ibadan respectively. A 2018 Ebedi International Writers Residency alumni, his works have appeared in Ake Review, ANA Review, The Sun Review, Praxis Magazine, Lunaris Review, Black Boy Review, African Writer, *Wreaths for a Wayfarer: An Anthology in Honour of Pius Adesanmi* and elsewhere. He is the Founding Editor of Ngiga Review and the Facilitator of Ngiga Book Club. He is the author of the poetry collection, *How Morning Remembers the Night* (2020).

Olúwọlé Tẹ́wọ́gboyè Òkéwándé has been lecturing in the Department of Linguistics and Nigerian Languages, University of Ilọrin, Ìlọrin, Nigeria since 1998. His research interests include the fields of African Religions and philosophy, semiotics, stylistics and Culture. His Doctoral Thesis, "A semiotic Investigation of Links between *Ifá*, *Ìbejì* and *Ayò Ọlọ́pọ́n*," is a study that establishes *Ifá's* relationship with *Ayò Ọlọ́pọ́n* and *Ìbejì* around codes, symbols, icons and indices. He has published in reputable local, national and international journals.

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Editor's Notes

Blair Rutherford

This latest issue of Nokoko continues its strength of providing an academic space for seasoned and new scholars, practitioners and cultural producers, providing new insights while pushing new boundaries on multiple areas of interest and concern within African Studies.

The issue commences with an essay that encapsulates both the experienced and the emerging, with the senior scholar and policy practitioner Hany Besada (whose career has been international) co-authoring an insightful analysis of governance and mining in Kenya with a Canadian doctoral student, Ben O'Bright. In "Policy Impacts on Africa's Extractive Sector: Kenya, Mineral Wealth, and Legislation Facilitating Inclusive Development," they astutely examine the political economy of Kenya in light of the growing importance of recently discovered but largely untapped petroleum and mineral resources. Through examining the fiscal and governance arrangements concerning minerals, Besada and O'Bright draw out both possibilities and dangers for national development in Kenya.

Olúwọlé Tẹ́wọ́gboyè Òkéwánde takes a very different theoretical lens to a very different subject matter. In "A Semiotic Investigation of the Relations between Ifá and Yorùbá Indigenous Markets, Markets Location and Marketing Theories," he draws on semiotics to trace how Ifá, the Yorùbá religion and practice of divination, inflects their economic marketplaces. Analysing the complicated Yorùbá market systems and their long histories, this University of Ilọrin academic brings new insights into understanding some of the cultural practices and logics infusing these importance places of economic exchange.

This issue also has two articles from authors whose papers were selected from the Institute of African Studies annual undergraduate conference. Although the upcoming sixth annual conference will be completely virtual due to precautions taken because of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, this unique conference organized by African Studies students (and mentored and championed by Institute of African Studies professor, and *Nokoko* editorial board member, Nduka Otiono) has long been having contributors participate from around the world through web-based means. Those whose papers are chosen as the best of the conference are then offered mentorship from a *Nokoko* editorial board member to help improve their manuscript to make it ready to be published in our journal.

Fathima Bushra Zaheer authors the first of these papers that carefully examines the growing phenomena of "climate refugees," those displaced from their homes and communities due to climate change-induced environmental changes. Through working with our board member Sinmi Akin-Aina and with feedback from an anonymous reviewer, the author has crafted an excellent analysis built around her well thought-out research design to answer the question: does the migration of Africans to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations change as a function of increasing flooding frequency in Africa between 2014 and 2016? Her paper, "A Closer Look at Climate-Induced Human Migration from Seven African Nations to Seven OECD Nations," offers a thorough analysis of relevant datasets and makes a number of important policy recommendations, showing the strength of this emergent African Studies researcher.

This strength is also apparent in Jackson Simon Lusagalika's essay, which also addresses some of the plethora of pressing concerns emerging in Africa due to climate change. With our editorial board member Chris Huggins proving mentorship, "The Role and Influence of Media in Creating Environmental Awareness in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania" is also based on a blend of secondary and primary research seeking to understand how digital media in Tanzania influences environmental awareness among residents in the bustling port city of Dar es Salaam. Examining a range of environmental groups and campaigns, Lusagalika concludes with a suggestion that media needs to enhance the feeling of belonging and commitment of Dar es Salaam residents, so they take ownership of some of the environmental problems in the city.

This issue concludes with two book reviews as a way to signal a new aspect of our journal. Recognizing that it is important to contribute to the engagement with new scholarly literature as well as more popular cultural products, Nokoko is now aiming to have book reviews. As a way to meet our aim of fostering the inclusion of new and emergent voices in African Studies, we are striving to ask graduate students or relatively junior scholars or cultural producers, particularly those based in Africa.

Takudzwa Musekiwa, a PhD candidate in Development Studies at the University of Johannesburg, incisively reviews the volume *Racism after Apartheid: Challenges for Marxism and Anti-Racism*, edited by Vishwas Satgar. This Wits University Press publication from 2019 is extremely timely, given the growing strength of anti-racism movements around the world.

The Nigerian popular culture producer, Ifesinachi Nwadike, offers a thoughtful review of James Eze's book of poetry *Dispossessed: A Poetry of Innocence, Transgression and Atonement*, published by Daraja Press in 2019.

Both reviews furthers these important conversations concerning Africa and its diasporas, furnishing a suitable anchor to this latest edition of *Nokoko*.

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A Semiotic Investigation of the Relations between *Ifá* and Yorùbá Indigenous Markets, Markets Location and Marketing Theories

Olúwọlé Tẹ́wọ́gboyè Òkéwándé[1]

Relationships in a cultural domain like religion account for wider patterns of relationships among human societies. In a predominantly Yorùbá society, *Ifá* is believed to be the springboard of Yorùbá culture. Virtually every aspect of Yorùbá life - religion, local culture and the market - links back to *Ifá* in one way or another. Previous studies have not related *Ifá* with the Yorùbá markets, location of markets and marketing theories, nor have they established *Ifá's* influence on the market institution as an aspect of economy among the Yorùbá communities. This study seeks to fill this gap using work that relies substantially on oral data collected from *Ifá* practitioners', field observations, literary texts, and *Ifá* literary corpus. A semiotics approach was utilized for data analyses with relevant data samples carefully selected. By comparing *Ifá* symbols with the Yorùbá indigenous markets the study found that: *Ifá* influences the Yorùbá markets, marketing and the establishment and/or location of the Yorùbá indigenous markets on a daily basis. As a result, the Yorùbá market symbols serve as paradigm with which the Yorùbá market system can be described and differentiated from other African markets.

Keywords: *Ifá*, *ọjà*, market, symbols, sacrifice, semiotics

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This paper establishes and examines the relationship between *Ifá* symbols, the Yorùbá markets and marketing theories as well as *Ifá's* influence on the location of these markets. *Ifá* has been defined differently by many scholars with its diverse scope of knowledge, wisdom and values serving as the bedrock of Yorùbá life. However, the previous works have underdiscussed economic influence such as that of market on the life of the Yorùbá people. Due to its complexity and position of high regard in various cultures, *Ifá* cannot simply be defined as a religion without exploring its socioeconomic links as well.

In *Yorùbá Ethics and Metaphysics* (1999, p.1), Adébọ̀wálé Akíntọ́lá defines *Ifá* as the philosophy of, or wisdom divinely revealed to, the Yorùbá deity of *Ifá*, known as *Ọ̀rúnmìlà*. In this view, *Ifá* is regarded as the spokesperson for both divinities and the living. In many ways, *Ifá* is regarded as the "living foundation of Yorùbá culture" (Abímbọ́lá 1977a, p. 14), with *Ifá's* knowledge believed to be connected in some way with life-belonging to the Yorùbá people. Louis J. Munoz (2003), on the other hand, understands *Ifá's* scope beyond Yorùbá society, asserting that, "Ifá is the most universal divinity among the Yorùbá and other West African people" (p. 179). This is also true, as *Ifá* is not necessarily geographically isolated, demonstrated by the different names and peoples it is known to throughout the world. *Ifá* is known as *Fá* among the Fon of Republic of Benin, *Eva* to Nupes, *Ifá* in Cuba, USA, Brazil, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Surinam and Togo and *Afa* by the Ewe (Ọdẹ́yẹmí 2013, p. 5). With these different realizations of *Ifá* nomenclature which cut across nations of the world, the spread of *Ifá* is not in doubt.

Given the geographic and cultural spread of different nomenclature in 2005, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) included *Ifá* as one of only 86 transnational cultural traditions to be recognized as masterpieces of oral heritage (Robinson 2008, p. 1). By this proclamation, *Ifá* became a more esteemed in need of urgent preservation. Through its various interpretations, *Ifá* remains of great interest to scholars across disciplines like medicine, philosophy, religion, art and culture (e.g. Àjàyí 1990, Yemitan and Ògúndélé 1970, Abímbọ́lá 1976 and Sàlámì 2002).

In my doctoral thesis, I adopted semiotics to establish links between *Ifá*, *Ìbejì* (twins) and *Ayò Ọlọ́pọ́n* (game board). I demonstrated such links around codes, icons, symbols and indices. The study establishes that *Ọ̀rúnmìlà*, as the progenitor of *Ifá*, is the inventor of *Ayò Ọlọ́pọ́n* as well. The thesis also accounted for the mystery surrounding the global association of the Yorùbá people with the highest dizygotic (a male and a female non identical) twinning rate to be spiritual as having great influence with *Ifá* (Òkéwándé 2017a). In Òkéwándé (2017b), I examined Yorùbá markets, marketing and advertisement. The study demonstrated that- the Yorùbá people have formidable markets, marketing and advertisement strategies that can withstand and flourish with the modern or current development. In Òkéwándé (2017c), I examined the relationship of the *Ifá* numerical symbols in Yorùbá personal names. I established in the study that *Ifá* numerical symbols 2, 8 and 200 influence names such as *'Dèjì*, (becomes two), *'Dẹ̀jọ* (becomes eight) and *'Digba/'Pégba* (becomes or up to two hundred), which have connotations with royalty, honor and wealthy among the Yorùbá people.

All the above studies affirm the influence of *Ifá* on the life and systems of living associated with the Yorùbá people in various ways. However, to date, no research work has been conducted on *Ifá's* association with the Yorùbá people's economic life, or specifically with their indigenous markets, markets location and market theories. This gap is filled by the research study presented in this essay.

In a Yorùbá community, *Ifá* consultation is the first step that must be taken by the community or individual regarding any of their proposals like installation of new king, priest, village head, and wedding, choice of a business or trading. The settlement or location of most ancient Yorùbá towns and villages were based on the directives of *Ifá*. Adédọ̀tun Ọ̀gúndèjì (2017) noted that, "rite and the rites done for the foundation of a town (*títẹ̀ ìlú dó*) or marketplace (*dídá ọjà sílẹ̀*), the *odù ifá* that emerge at such occasion are also taken as special symbols of such individual, town, or marketplace" (pp. 272-3). This is applicable to most aspects of the Yorùbá life. According to Àjàyí in his inaugural lecture delivered on "Yorùbá cosmology and aesthetics: The cultural confluence of divination, incantation and drum-talking", he observed that, "There is hardly anything people of a traditional Yorùbá society would do without seeking support and approval from Ifá, the god of wisdom" (2009, p. 8). This is because *Ifá* provides instruction and guidance about the future and/or the cause of an action. This is done- to seek the endorsement and sanctions of the ancestors, divinities and supernatural agents whom *Ifá* serves all as spokesperson. Consequently, the market institution, location and marketing strategies relating to the Yorùbá are not different from other important aspects of the Yorùbá life.

Ifá divination is mostly performed by an initiated *Ifá* priest, traditionally known as *babaláwo*. *Ifá* is a religious cult, and the training associated with it is so rigorous that many trainees dropped out in the course of their apprenticeship. The *Ifá* divinations are mostly carried out by *ikin* - sixteen sacred palm nuts (these palm nuts are of specified types) - or *ọ̀pẹ̀lẹ̀* - the *Ifá* divination chain. The recognition of the *Ifá* symbol, the marking of the symbol on the divination board and the interpretation of the symbols can only be rendered by the *Ifá* priest. Symbol in *Ifá* is known as *odù*. This means *odù* has denotation value with *Ifá*. That is, *odù* only occurs in *Ifá*, or in *Ifá*-related contexts. Importance of the use of *ikin* and *ọ̀pẹ̀lẹ̀* in divination is expressed by Àjàyí that, "under no circumstances does a *babaláwo* divine without using either the *ọ̀pẹ̀lẹ̀* (the divining chain) or the *ikin* (sacred palm-nuts); for he will not guess the dictate of the *Òrìṣà* [gods]" (2002, p. 4). This is why *ikin* and *ọ̀pẹ̀lẹ̀* are described as "most prestigious" within divination (Adéẹ̀kọ́ 2010, p. 286). In this study, the numerical structures and the symbols associated with *Ifá* (ọ̀pẹ̀lẹ̀ and ikin) have been discovered to relate with the Yorùbá market.

In the African sense, a market in the present day is a demarcated site where traders and consumers meet to exchange products. Still, trading could be made in places which were not- strictly understood as markets. For example, there were 'road-side markets' where goods were spread on the ground for viewing and sale (Ugboajah 2005, p. 103). A "market" is simply the location at which an institutional arrangement brings buyers and sellers in very close contact. It is any place where exchange of goods and services occu. They can also be a channel through which the products of farmers and artisans flow to consumers. The establishment of markets presupposes that it is an avenue, where farm produce and craft–materials, among other products, are patronized for sales.

The Yorùbá have a highly complex market system. According to Títílọpẹ́ Ọládẹ̀jọ (2017), "Yorùbá markets are important in the circulation of investment capital. The cruxes of transactions were carried on in the markets and the capital inflow and outflow presupposes that the commodities are linked commercially in the markets" (p. 524). At the center of this system is the town market. Each town and village organizes one or more markets depending on its respective population. Yorùbá markets are realized in different forms, but an organized and regular market can typically be understood in two broad forms: the local/daily market and the central/periodic market (Fádípẹ̀ 1970). This two-form understanding of Yorùbá market is what is- discussed in this essay, illustrated with the chart below:



The Chart Showing Yorùbá Regular Markets and Types (Òkéwándé 2017b, p. 555).

Based on the structure provided above, the major *Ifá* divination objects, the- *ikin* and *ọ̀pẹ̀lẹ̀* are demonstrated.

Objective of the Study

The main objective of this study is to establish *Ifá's* symbols influence on the institution and location of markets and on marketing theory. Therefore, the links of *Ifá* with the marketing system as an economic aspect of the Yorùbá people are to be demonstrated in this study.

Theoretical Framework and Methodology: Semiotic Approach

Semiotics was adopted for this study because "symbolism underlies Ifá divination" (Ọlátúnjí 2005, p. 135). *Ifá* communicates via signs and symbols, which are best interpreted and comprehended through the knowledge of semiotics that is the scientific study of signs and symbols. Semiotics can be traced to the pioneering works of American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce, and Swiss Linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. According to Saussure (1974), semiology is the study of signs as part of social life.

According to Peirce, semiotics is an abstract entity. A sign is something which stands to somebody or something in some respects or capacity. The Peirce model was adopted for this study. This is because, in the first place, *Ifá* communicates with symbol which is one of the three major modes of semiotic descriptions as adopted by Peirce (the other modes of semiotic significations are icon, and index). The symbol's connection with its object is a matter of convention, rule or agreement between the users. In Yorùbá tradition, it can be realized in form of *Àrokò* (symbolism), as such an object or something stands for something or somebody in real life. For example, *Ayé lọjà ọ̀run nilé* – that is, the world is a marketplace, heaven is home. No one sleeps in the marketplace. Ibigbolade Adéríbigbé (2016) says, "after each day's transactions he or she [the market vendor] returns home to sleep" (p. 203). It is from home-heaven that, the Yorùbá concepts of philosophy and ideology about the market begins. The symbolism of the market with the world and heaven with the home are symbols of location or place.

People's beliefs are strongly encapsulated in the philosophy that market connotes the world or earth and heaven home. For example, the work of Otakpor Nkeonye (1996) entitled "The world is a market-place" on Igbo belief concerning markets concluded that, *Uwa bu afia*, "'the world is a market-place'"- is far more than an ordinary statement to be taken on its face value. It is fully loaded and tightly packed in meaning at its deeper layers…; by studying the way meaning inheres in the expression, we are opening the way for incorporation of the world-view of a people in their use of language, since every language has a hidden code… It is a reminder that the world is not a permanent place of abode just as a market is not" (pp. 529&30). As *aye lọjà, ọ̀run nilé*, in Yorùbá philosophy reminds one that the world is a temporary place, heaven is the permanent place of abode so is *uwa bu afia* in Igbo.

The Yorùbá give prominence to home -heaven, as it is a permanent place, where one rests and sleeps; while a market is a temporary place, where one works. This is corroborated with the *Ifá* oral information collected from Awódoyè Akáláifá, a famous *Ifá* worshipper and priest, who said that, the institution of Yorùbá market on earth begins from heaven. The earth is where various transactions take place. These transactions are symbolized with the individual behaviors or characters. This is why the Yorùbá says that, *owó la fi ń ṣayé, ìwà la fi ń ṣọ̀run,* which means- that- money is a means of transaction on earth while the moral character of a person is a means of transaction to gain heaven. For example, just as money is a means or medium of transaction or exchange of goods and services in the market, the same is behavior or character of one on earth is associated with heaven. This is why *Ifá* encourages an individual to do well while on earth, because in heaven there will be compensation of whatever everyone has done. Wándé Abímbọ́lá (1977a) expressed *Ifa's* opinion that- "indeed, *Ifá* divination poetry states that a person who does not have good *ìwà* while on earth, will be punished in *Ọ̀run* after his death…. It is the wish of *Olódùmarè* and the ancestors that human beings should uphold the moral values of the society" (p. 33). In other words, human activities are not limited to the earth but such activities are revisited in heaven.

While on earth, one is expected to do good to all, to both those who are- known and those who are unknown. As a market place is a meeting point for all human beings, including many who may be strangers to oneself, to the Yorùbá people, they say *bí a bá sọ̀kò sọ́jà, ará ilé ẹni ni í bá* (Every mischief done at the marketplace comes home to roost) (Ṣótúndé 2009, p 153).This refers to the emphasis on treating everyone well, even strangers in the market as doing contrary may have- adverse consequences on individuals in heaven. The symbolism of the market with the world by the Yorùbá people is demonstrated in different philosophical expressions entrenched in *Ifá*.

Oral interviews, relevant *Ifá* texts or corpus and field research are used as sources of data relevant to the *Ifá* and the Yorùbá indigenous market. African history may be incomplete without orality. Liz Gunner (2007) says, "orality was the means by which Africa made its existence, its history long before the colonial and imperial presence of the west manifested itself. In this sense, orality needs to be seen not simply as 'the absence of literacy' but as something self-constitutes *sui generis*" (p. 67). Adélékè Adéẹ̀kọ́ (2010)- identified the relationship of *Ifá* with orality and the contents or expressions in it are subject to various interpretations and meanings. According to him, "*Ifá* divination protocols are the closest an 'oral' society could develop to fulfill the requirement of genuinely divine writing and speaking" (p. 288). In orality "an utterance connotes anonymity, a collective voice, whereas a text implies individual authorship, a singular consciousness" (Ìrèlè 2007, p. 80).

In this essay, oral data evidence from the *Ifá* professionals (especially Ifá corpus) in the aforementioned study is explored to complement the written texts and available texts which were inadequate in and of themselves to account for the analysis of the study. Despite the fact that, *Ifá* text is a culture-bound genre, data is translated into English for the benefit of a wider audience. The Yorùbá data are interpreted in some cases and in other cases, uninterpreted, in order to retain the *couleur locale* of the original texts, especially, *Ifá*, "since the indigenous language is more conducive to the interpretation of an indigenous genre" (Ilésanmí 2004, p. 111).

Ifá Daily Divination and Festival Symbols in Relation with Yorùbá Daily Market

The head or founder of a market is often referred to as- the *ọlọ́jà* (the owner of the market). *Ọ̀rúnmìlà* was first to be addressed as *ọlọ́jà* among the other Yorùbá divinities. As will be established with *Ifá* corpus in this study, *Ọ̀rúnmìlà* was first to institute the first market among the Yorùbá (on earth). Among the divinities, *Ọ̀rúnmìlà* was addressed as *ọlọ́jà ẹbọra* (the market owner among the divinities). As Adéoyè (1985) aptly stated, *"Bí wọ́n bá sọ pé 'Ifá Agbọnnìrègún' àwọn èniyàn á bá wọn parí ẹ̀ pé 'ọlọ́jà Ẹbọra' ni gbogbo ayé bá tún ń pe Ọ̀rúnmìlà ní "Ifá Àgbọnnìrègún, Ọlọ́jà Ebọra"* (whenever they called that, *Ifá Àgbọnnìrègún*, people will end it by saying that "owner of market among the divinities"; by so doing, everyone calls *Ọ̀rúnmìla* as "Ifá Àgbọnnìrègún the owner of market among the divinities") (p. 180).

Daily *Ifá* divination is usually conducted by the *Ifá* priest. The daily *Ifá* divination is not a flamboyant or elaborate one because its goal is just to commit one's way to the hands of the divinity. Daily *Ifá* divination is conducted to provide daily food for the priest. Adéoyè (1985, p. 256) aptly put it that: "Aájò kí awo má sun ní ebi wà nínú ohun tí í mú babaláwo bọ Ifá ojoojúmọ́." In order not to sleep hungry, daily *Ifá* ritual is conducted. Relating the functional roles of daily *Ifá* divination with the Yorùbá daily market, a key purpose of the daily market is to provide daily or domestic needs for individual and the community; just as the daily divination is to provide the *Ifá* priest with the daily bread.

In the Yorùbá community, the local market is located at the front of the king's palace, which is mostly situated at the centre of the town. "Markets are generally located in public squares, adjacent to the palaces or community centers" (Adéọ̀ṣun 2017 p. 475). As a result of this, almost all the Yorùbá towns have a central market known as *ọjà ọba* (king's market). *Ọba* (king) is, according to Munoz (2003), "the founder (*auctor*) - … He is the *èkejì òrìṣà*, the gods' companion, as stated in one of the titles of the Aláàfin of Ọ̀yọ́" (p. 56). Since the institution of Yorùbá market will be incomplete without the *òrìṣà* (gods), then, *ọba*, who is the representative of the *òrìṣà* must be one of the custodians of a market. This is the situations at *ọjà ọba* markets in front of *Èwí* of the city of Adó-Èkìtì and- 'Déjì of Àkúrẹ́, among others. In very rare occasions like that of Abẹ́òkúta, there is no market in front of ọba Aláke's palace. However, this is subject to further historical research outside the scope of this work. Still, it is important to note there is a daily market present there, such as Ìtòkú market in Abẹ́òkúta.

Numerical Symbols of *Ifá* Divination and Festival Periodicity in Relation with the Periodicity of Yorùbá Markets

Yorùbá markets and marketing periods are here observed to be structured on the *Ifá* major divination objects, - *ikin* and *ọ̀pẹ̀lẹ̀*. These structures are numerically symbolized with four (4), eight (8) and sixteen (16).

> Periodicity may be the most conspicuous and fundamental characteristic of the marketing scene. It accounts to an important degree for the relative locations of the markets and sets of rhythm regulating the circulation and convergence of people and goods. The distribution of market periodicities and market networks presents a complex array of functionally distinct, contiguous, and overlapping systems–a kaleidoscopic pattern of space-time interrelationships (Good, 1973, p. 1).

Geographers have established influential effects of periodicity and African markets. The periodicity in marketing is observed here to be influenced by African religions. One of the functions of African religions, including *Ifá*, is according to Ejizu (2007), "the world-view with which people explained, predicted and controlled space-time events" (p. 9). The market, is discovered by this study to be one of such space time events among the Yorùbá people, having affinity with *Ifá*. Market periodicity determines the functions as well as the values associated with a market.

Numerical symbol four (4) in Ifá, in Relation with the Yorùbá four-days Market

The Yorùbá market held every four-days can be referred to as a local market, because its geographical spread is limited to nearby villages. The symbol four (4) plays various important roles in *Ifá* divination and sacrifice. For example, every four days, which is a Yorùbá ancient week, a special *Ifá* celebration must be observed. According to Abímbọ́lá (1976), "every fifth day, when an *Ifá* priest make sacrifices to his god, he opens the bowl and takes out the sacred palm-nuts. Holding the palm-nuts on his hands, he prays to them in the belief that they are the physical representation of *Ifá* on earth" (p. 11).

In Yorùbá indigenous system of counting, the five days symbolizes four days as the first day is counted in. This is known as *ọrún*. This day is devoted to worship the divinities. Sàlámì (2002) in *Odù Òtúúrúpọ̀n* avers (with author's translation) that: *Kí la ó máa sìn tọ́rún bá pé? Òrìṣà. Òrìṣà la ó máa sìn bọ́rún bá pé* (What are we to worship on the fifth day? Gods. It is gods we will worship every fifth day, gods) (p. 189). From the *Ifá* corpus, the *Ifá* client was blessed through the fifth day via *Ifá* divination. Therefore, that day is the day of intercession and supplication to the divinities for good life and prosperity (Adéoyè 1985). As a result of this, *Ọjà ọrún* (four-days market) falls on *Ifá* divination, which serves as a major link between the economic and religious life of the Yorùbá people. The synergy or affinity between the four-days market and *Ifá* is inseparable to the extent that *Ifá* divination and festival and the four-days market are observed together in the same day. This is entrenched in *odù Ifá Òtúa-kúnkàá*[2], as Ọdẹ́gbọlá (2014) observes, "*Ṣèbí òní lọrún ọjà, ẹ wálé Ifá*" (is today not a market? Come for the Ifá divination) (p. 612). Both the market and *Ifá* divination occur together in the same

2 This is *Ifá* corpus

day. This is the true situation on ground in Yorùbáland as, "Markets touch every city, town, village and hamlet, linking them in economic, social and civil networks" (Àjàdí 2012, p. 83). There is hardly of a village, hamlet or town in Yorùbáland that is not known with a four-days market. The four- days market, *ọjà ọrún*, is the commonest periodic Yorùbá indigenous market; just as the five days *Ifá* periodic divination is as well the commonest. For example, we have *ọjà ọrún* (four day markets) in Èkìtì State, Nigeria such as Iyìn-Èkìtì, Emùré, and in Ọ̀yọ́ State, Òjé-olófì and Ọlọ́rundá-àbá in Ìbàdàn, Gàmbàrí, Ìlújù and Tewúre markets in Ògbómọ̀ṣọ́ among others.

Numerical symbol eight (8), in Ifá, in Relation with the Yorùbá eight-days Market

The eight-days market is a type of Yoruba market that can be called the national market. This is because its geographical spread covers more towns around the Yorùbá states than the four-day markets. *Ifá* divination is also associated with the eighth day. According to Adélékè (1965), "*nígbà tó bá di ọjọ́ kẹjọ, tí Yorùbá ń pè ní isán, ọdún Ifá máa ń wáyé, nínú èyí tí ìpèsè jíjẹ ti ń wáyé fún òrìṣà ati fún àwọn ènìyàn pẹ̀lú*" (On the eighth day, known as *isán*, *Ifá* festival takes place, where there will be food for the divinities and the entire people) (p. 8). The symbol eight is obtained from the *Ifá* divination chain. For example, Ilésanmí (1998), reports that, "*Odù wo nínú Ifá ni gbogbo* ***mẹ́jẹ̀ẹ̀jọ*** *ọ̀pẹ̀lẹ̀, mẹ́rin lápá ọ̀tún àti mẹ́rin lápá òsì máa ń ṣíjú sí*?" (Which of the Odù Ifá has its symbol with four of the eight ọ̀pẹ̀lẹ̀ seeds opened to the left and four opened to the right?) (p. 14). Eight is a very important symbol in *Ifá* divination system. According to Lijadu (1908b), "Ifá units are mixed 8 times (i.e. n=8), the total number of arrangements possible is 256 (i.e. s=256)" (p. ix). This demonstrates that as eight-days market stands at the center between four and sixteen-days market, so it stands at the center of *Ifá* numerical number or figures of- 4, 8 and 16. The eight-days market serves as the middle market between the *ọrún* (four days) market and *ìtàdógún* (sixteen-day) markets.

The eight-day markets are bigger in size and more organized than either the daily or four- days market. This is because distance markets are usually larger in size. People patronize such market from far and near. The calculation of this market day is the easiest of the three Yorùbá periodic markets because the market day falls on the same day of the week. Despite, eight-day markets being a bit uncommon today, one can still be located in every Yorùbá state. For example, the eight-day market is observed in Ọ̀ṣun State, such as Èjìgbò market (every Saturday) and Ànáyè-òkè, in Ìrágbìjí (every Wednesday). In Ọ̀yọ́ State eight day market is observed at Òkè-hò, known as Bínúkonú market (every Monday). In Òndó State, Ọ̀rẹ̀ market in Òdìgbó local government is observed on the eighth day (every Friday). Also, in Kwara State, Ṣàárẹ́ market is observed on the eighth day (every Saturday).

Numerical symbol sixteen (16), in Ifá, in Relation with the Yorùbá sixteenth-day Market

The sixteen-days market can be regarded as an international market. This is because its geographical spread extends a little beyond the vicinity or locality of the other markets. In this category, the sixteen-days market is referred to as the *ìtàdógún* market. It is the farthest from another sixteen-day market. In Yorùbá culture, which *Ifá* is the springboard, "the symbolic value of number sixteen for the Yorùbá should be recalled as it is also the number of the palm nuts used in Ifá divination and the odù of the Ifá Corpus" (Munoz 2003, pp. 50&1). As the "specialist trading" (the professional) is associated with sixteen-day market, so is the sixteen principal *odù* and the sixteen *ikin* (sacred palm nuts) are used by *Ifá* specialists (Abimbọla 1976). All the sixteen principals of *Odù Ifá* are *ọlọ́jà* (market owners) in their own right; as each of them is a window with which one or some problems of human life are solved. The great *Ifá* festival also holds on the *ìtàdógún* day. For example, Areoyè (1980) says that, *"ọ̀sẹ̀ ńlá àwọn babaláwo máa ń bọ́ sí ìtàdógún. Ọ̀sẹ̀ ńlá kan náà ni ń jẹ́ ọ̀sẹ̀ awo…eléyìí máa ń mú ìpàdé ọ̀sẹ̀ jágùn"* (The great week of the *Ifá* priest holds on the sixteenth day which is also refers to as the cult week…This makes the week to span for long) (p. 24).

Although, the sixteenth market day is not common today among the Yorùbá, its economic influence cannot be overemphasized. Local financial associations that werebased on the market product(s) that is/were sold)were formed and are now known as *èésú dídá* (micro-credit finance). It is a subscription contributed and collected through a rotation. There is a fixed - minimum amount of money to be contributed known as *ọwọ́* (a tranch). Furthermore, the realization of the *ìtàdógún* is not limited to the *Ifá* festival alone; but equally to span to other Yorùbá festivals. This shows how markets sit in connection with the traditional festivals and other informal or irregular markets, such as *Orò* (an exclusive cult of men), which are worshipped in Ọsí Èkìtì, Èkìtì State of Nigeria on every *ìtàdógún* (seventeenth day).

The symbolization of the sixteen-day market, traditionally known as *ọjà ìtàdógun* is common in the old Yorùbá indigenous market system. This is equally represented in *Ifá*. For example, *Odù Ọwọ́nrín*[3], the author says that, *"Ọrún ni wọ́n dájọ́ ilá. Ìtàdógún ni wọ́n ń nájà l'Ẹ́rìn"* (The five-day circle is the harvesting interval for Okro. Seventeen days is the cycle for Ẹ̀rìn market) (Sàlámì 2002, p. 3). This is evidence that, the Ẹ̀rìn market presently in Ọ̀ṣun State was observed on the sixteenth day among the Yorùbá nations.

The *ìtàdógún* market is the largest and most organized of the indigenous Yorùbá markets.

3 One of the major *Ifá* corpus

Since it is the biggest market, it almost takes care of all human market needs. It should be noted that the sixteen principal *odù Ifá* are believed to take care of all possible human problems and needs with proffered solutions to these problems. Among these markets are: Apòmù which serve Ifẹ̀, Òwu, Ìjẹ̀bú and Ẹ̀gbá, Òṣogbo market situated within Ijẹ̀ṣà kingdom[4], with boundary with Ọ̀yọ́ Ìgbómìnà and Ifẹ̀ the Àkúrẹ́ market situated within Èkìtì with boundary with Ìjẹ̀ṣà and Oǹdó kingdoms, and so on (Akínjógbìn 1980). However, this study was only able to account for two of these markets. One in Iléṣà, called Àtàkúmọ̀sà market in Ọ̀ṣun State and Òjé market in Abẹ́òkúta, Ògùn State, both are held every sixteenth-day till today.

These market days are also realized as differentiating market symbols of the Yorùbá market system from other nations in Nigeria, Africa and the entire world. The Yorùbá market symbols serve as a maxim or paradigm with which Yorùbá market system can be described among other African market system. For example, "among the Bete of Southern Cote d'ivoire, market meetings were held every ninth day, seven-day markets were more wide spread in Ghana, Northern Nigeria, among the Wolof and the Minianka. Six-day markets were the practice of the Dynla of Senegal and the Dagomba and Konkomba of Ghana" (Ugboajah 2005, p. 104).

Ifá Links with the Origin and Location of Yorùbá Indigenous Markets

Until today, there is no research on the origin of the Yorùbá indigenous markets. In Africa, there are various ways of accounting for the origin of market with different nations. As earlier explained in this study, orality is a means of sourcing for information in Africa.

4 A kingdom is represented by a major tribe among the Yorùbá. There is always an imperial king, who is a political head overseeing affairs within his territory or province.

As a result of the non-availability of written record about the origin of the Yorùbá market, an oral interview was conducted with *Ifá* priest and practitioner, Awódoyè Akáláifá on July 28, 2017. According to him, the Yorùbá market was first instituted by *Ọ̀rúnmìlà*- the *Ifá* progenitor, who consulted *Olódùmarè*- the God[5] three times, to seek for his approval to the earth and launch market for his son - *Àlọràn*. According to *ÈjìOgbè*[6]:

Ọ̀rúnmìlà ló dọ̀pàpà
Ifá mo ló dọ̀pàpà
Ọ̀rúnmìlà lóun kọsẹ̀ pàràpàrà lọ rọ́wọ́ Olódùmarè
Olódùmarè ní "Ta ní kọsẹ̀ pàràpàrà lọ rọ́wọ̀ Òun"?
Ọ̀rúnmìlà lóun ni.
Olódùmarè ní "È é ti rí"?
Ọ̀rúnmìlà lóun fẹ́ lọ dájà Àlọràn lóde ayé ni.
Lòhun wá gbàṣẹ lọ́wọ́ ìwọ Olódùmarè

Ọ̀rúnmìlà says it is hurriedly
Ifá says it is hurriedly
Ọ̀rúnmìlà says he hurriedly sought the authorization of Olódùmarè
Olódùmarè asked "who is coming consistently to him for his consent"?
Ọ̀rúnmìlà says he is the one
Olódùmarè says "What are you seeking my consent on"?
Ọ̀rúnmìlà says he wants to go and launch market for Àlọràn on Earth;
so he has come to seek the approval of Olódùmarè

From the *Ifá* corpus above, it is clear that *Ọ̀rúnmìlà* was the first divinity to institute a market for his son - ,*Àlọràn*, on earth[7]. The sanction to do this was given in *ọ̀run* (heaven) by *Olódùmarè*. The Yorùbá believe that *ọ̀run* is a place where the creator of the cosmos, *Olódùmarè*, resides and where individuals is assigned his/her *orí* (destiny), that is, the human master-plan of events to be accomplished on earth. Therefore, it can be concluded that the first stage to launch

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5 *Olódùmarè* is God, the Supreme-being in Yoruba belief.

6 The first of the sixteen major *Ifá* corpus.

7 As earlier indicated in this study, *Ọ̀rúnmìlà* was referred to as market owner - *ọlọ́jà*, among the divinities. This oral source of information attested to *Ọ̀rúnmìlà* as market owner.

a market in Yorùbá tradition must be to seek the consent of *Olódùmarè* through the *Ifá* oracle.

If a market is lunched without complying with this rule, many Yoruba will say that the market, even if successfully launched (patronized by many people initially), will eventually fold up, as the institution of a market among the Yorùbá people is associated with the forces that operate in the universe - divinities, ancestors, supernatural agents and human beings (Abímbọ́lá 1976). Therefore, to sideline any of these powers is regarded as a violation of Yorùbá belief system and tradition.

In the African cosmological worldview, the society is comprised of and controlled by two worlds - the visible and invisible (see. e.g. Ejizu 2007, p. 9). The Yorùbá society is equally influenced by the belief that- the society is controlled by the invisible and the visible beings. The opinions of the invisible beings must be sought and approval or consent obtained on important issues that concerns the community at large such as the market. The involvement of the invisible beings in the market is also realized in the beliefs of other people besides the Yorùbá nation. For example, in Igbo, "Human life and activities like market forces may be influenced by unseen hands" (Otukpor 1996, p. 525).

In the African belief system, "the invisible beings are represented by different kinds of symbols" (Ejizu 2007, p. 9). For example, *Ìwà*[8] (character), as a symbol of authority, was given to *Ọ̀rúnmìlà* by *Olódùmarè*, to launch the market on earth. Exhibition of the virtues of *ìwà* are equally extended to market institutions as indicated earlier in this study. This is why "Ifá rates ìwà above all valuable things of

8 *Ìwà* was the primordial wife of *Ọ̀rúnmìlà* who brought prosperity to his *Ifá* profession. This is metaphorically

means that without the presence of *ìwà* - there cannot be success. This is one of the reasons why women are more commonly associated with the Yorùbá market than men. See Abimbọla 1975, pp. 389-420.

the world. … Ìwà is therefore the most valuable thing among the other thing in the Yorùbá valuable system" (Abimbọlá 1975, p. 410). *Ìwà* takes prominence over all other good things that can be achieved, possessed or purchased in the world. I need to add here that there can't be interaction, including "communion" and communication, between the visible and invisible beings without sacrifice. To this end, since the invisible forces play important roles in the institution of Yorùbá indigenous market, sacrifice is critical to actualizing this goal.

In Yorùbá tradition, the prescription on sacrifice is within the prerogative power of *Ifá.* Sacrifice must be offered to the supernatural beings, as it was offered by *Ọrúnmìlà* in his attempt to launch markets on earth. For example, oral interviews conducted in this study indicated that- when *Ọ̀rúnmìlà* was coming to the earth to fulfill the need of instituting a market, he met three aged *Ẹlẹyẹ* (composition of women that are supernatural agents) under *Ìrókò agúnrejégé* (a mahogany tree). These *Ẹlẹyẹ* were in the form of birds, including: *adúhẹhẹ ẹyẹ ilé-ayé,* an earthly black bird with a quack voice, the *afọ̀hùnhùn ẹyẹ òde-ọ̀run,* a heavenly bird that speaks with a tenor voice and *afọ̀koorojáhun,* a bird that has a bass voice with authority. According to this oral history, *Ọ̀rúnmìlà* was interrogated by the supernatural beings earlier mentioned to ascertain if- he was an *awo* (a cult, initiated person) or not, a condition that will make his passage approved. He passed all their tests- and was permitted to proceed on his journey to the earth - however, he forgot to give them gifts (sacrifice). Upon getting to the earth, *Ọrúnmìlà* found that the *ìwà* that *Olódùmarè* gave him to launch a market for *Àlọràn,* was missing. Due to this strange event, he was forced to return to *Olódùmarè.*

On his way back, *Ọ̀rúnmìlà* was engaged by the *Ẹlẹyẹ* who asked him what he was looking for. *Ọ̀rúnmìlà* replied he was looking for the *ìwà* that was given to him to launch the market. The *Ẹlẹyẹ* told him *ìwà* was with them. *Ọ̀rúnmìlà* requested for what they would need so as to have it back. According to the supernatural beings, his ability to answer the two questions to him will convince them that he belongs to their cult. The first question to *Ọ̀rúnmìlà* was that: what is *Àgbà tó tẹ̀pá kùkù wọjà* (an aged person with walking stick going to the market) and *ògééré omi ọbẹ̀ tí ò ṣe é bù bọ́jú*? The impossibility of rubbing one's face with stew.

Responding to the questions from *Ẹlẹyẹ*, *Ọ̀rúnmìlà* said, "*Àgbà tó tẹ̀pá kùkù wọjà* is a giant rat." He tapped the ground, and a rodent came out, which he gave to the *Ẹlẹyẹ.* For the second question, he said: "*Ẹlẹyẹ, òògééré omi ọbẹ̀ tí ò ṣe é bù bọ́jú* is red oil." He requested for water, so that, he can demonstrate physically to them that he is not a "stranger." *Ọ̀rúnmìlà* tapped the surface of the water and the water turned to red-oil. The *Ẹlẹyẹ* applauded him. *Òrúnmila's* -successful completion of the tests permitted him to continue his journey Not far from the *Ẹlẹyẹ*, *Ọ̀rúnmìlà* rediscovered the *ìwà* that had gone missing.

The movement of humans from the physical world of the *ayé* (market) to the spiritual world *ọ̀run* (heaven) is guided by some spiritual beings that are charged with responsibilities of investigating into human activities. The entries are monitored by *oníbodè* (gate keeper) or *ikọ̀* (ambassador) who interrogates, probe and authorizes movement from heaven to the earth or vice versa as *Àlọràn* was engaged by these gate keepers in his mission to lunch a market on earth. *Àjàlọ́run*, is referred to as *Ọlọ́run* (the one who owns heaven) among the Christians. However, among the Yorùbá, *Ọlọ́run* is equivalent to *Olódùmarè.*

The demand or request for gifts by *Ẹlẹyẹ* from *Ọ̀rúnmìlà* points to the role of sacrifice in establishing a market. Sacrifice must be offered to the supernatural beings, as it was offered by *Ọrúnmìlà* in the first instance. The sacrificial prescriptions or order is given by *Ifá.* This can be in two forms: *ohun látẹ* (inanimate things sold in the markets) such as *ẹ̀kọ* (solid pap), *àgbọn* (coconut) and *ọ̀gẹ̀dẹ̀* (plantain or banana) or *ẹ̀jẹ̀balẹ̀* (animals or birds with blood) such as *ewúrẹ́* (goat), *pẹ́pẹ́yẹ* (duck) and *ẹyẹlẹ́* (peageon). To this end, sacrifice is very important to launch a market. Nothing can be successful without it, as it is a primary connecting force between the physical (human) and spiritual (supernatural) world. The group of *Ẹlẹyẹ* were mostly women which may suggest the reason why earthly women are associated with the Yorùbá market and marketing systems.

Market location is determined by *Ifá*, and sacrifices performed at a spot or square where the centre of the new market is to be located. This means that in the absence of *Ifá*, the institution of the Yorùbá market is impossible. The object/symbol set aside for the institution of the market (discussed below) is buried there in the presence of the Yorùbá market stakeholders and title-holders such as the- *ọlọ́jà* (king, chief, community head or hero), *babaláwo* (Ifá priest), *ìyálọ́jà* (market matriarch), *bàbálọ́jà* (market patriarch), *ìyálájé* (a woman in-charge of trading), and *bàbálájé* (a man in-charge of trading). Again, this is exclusively performed by the *Ifá* priest. This means that in the absence of *Ifá* priest the process of institution of Yorùbá market cannot be conducted.

In the Yorùbá ancient time, markets rotate within the four week days- *ọjọ́ Ọ̀sẹ̀, Awo, Ògún* and *Jàkúta*; but today *Ajé* (money- commerce) has its own day among the Yorùbá people as Monday, while *Ọjà* may fall on any of the week days; however, *Ifá/Ọ̀rúnmìlà* owns both (Ajé and Ọjà). For example, according to Abimbọ́lá (1977a) (with author's translation):

Ifá ló l'òní,
Ifá ló l'ọla,
Ifá ló l'ọtunla pẹ̀lú ẹ̀.
Ọ̀rúnmìlà ló n'ijọ́ mẹ́rẹ̀ẹ̀rin Òòṣà d'áyé.

Ifá is the master of today,
Ifá is the master of tomorrow;
Ifá is the master of the day after tomorrow.
To Ifá belongs to all the four days established by Òòṣà on earth (p. 10).

Yorùbá indigenous market day is not determined arbitrarily but- by *Ifá* oracle. *Ifá* owns all the four days of the Yorùbá week as indicated above. As a result of this, *Ifá* allocates market days in the Yorùbá community. This makes the roles of *Ifá* imperative in the Yorùbá market and marketing system. But- if the choice of a market day falls or clashes with another nearby market day, another day is chosen for the new market through *Ifá* divination, so that, each of the divinity is associated with a market day without any clash with another divinity.

One of the processes to launch a market is to bury a symbol of the market at the center of the market square. This is complemented by planting of a tree traditionally referred to as *igi ọjà* (market tree). There are special trees that perform this role, such as: *osè* (baobab) and *ìrókò* (mahogany). It can also be- *ìyeyè* (anacadiaceae), or *akòko* (biagnoniacae) trees (Ògúndèjí 2017, p. 270). These trees have market symbolic connotations. For example, if *pèrègún* (dracaena fragrams) tree is planted in the market, it "symbolizes longevity and good luck among the Yorùbá and it is planted as hedges and as markers of other *òrìṣà* grooves" (Ògúndèjí 2017, p. 271). The choice of which tree to be planted is dictated by *Ifá* in accordance with *odù* that is associated with the market. This is why there are different types of market trees found in various Yorùbá markets. However, if the appropriate tree is already (naturally) growing around or within the market location, it is adopted as *igi ọjà* (market tree) after necessary sacrifice has been performed on it. It should be noted that, the *ẹlẹyẹ* (earlier mentioned) engaged *Ọ̀rúnmìlà* under an *ìrókò* tree. This shows the spirituality involved in the market tree. Certain sacrifice is again performed by *Ifá* priest on the tree for market purpose. Commissioning of market is strictly undertaken at the night. The reason behind this, perhaps- is to create conducive atmosphere or environment for the supernatural agents, ancestors and divinities to play their active roles in the institution of market.

Ifa's Prescriptions on Marketing Theories

Although- both men and women are involved in long distance marketing or trading, however, "women organized local trade networks and markets" (Hamzat 2017, p. 517). Women are the key or active players in the Yorùbá marketing sector of the economy. Association of women with markets is observed in some Yorùbá philosophies. For example, it is a popular saying among the Yorùbá that- *èrè lobìnrin jẹ lábọ̀ ọjà* (A woman always comes home with profit from the market). The use of females collocates with market. It should be noted that, *ìwà* that was given to *Ọ̀rúnmìlà* symbolizes his primordial wife - given to him as a symbol. In Yorùbá tradition, a spinster symbolizes *ọjà* (market).

Ọ̀rúnmìlà enjoins the women to add profit margin to their market products, as to pave way for both business continuity and, to cater to responsibilities, such as: feeding the family and paying the shop rent, among others. According to *Òtúá Ìká* contained in Sàlámì (2002) with author's translation that:

> Nígbà ìwásẹ̀
> B'Áláròóbọ̀ bá ra nǹkan ní ọ̀kẹ́ kan;
> ọ̀kẹ́ kan náà ni ọ́n fií tà á…
>
> In the olden days
> If the market woman buys a good for twenty thousand cowries,
> She would sell it for the same twenty thousand cowries (p. 726).

This passage refers to *Aláròóbọ̀* traders, those involved in the marketing of animals such as goats, hens, sheeps, and fowls among others (Òkéwándé 2017b, p. 557). The *Aláròóbọ̀*, in the above *Ifá* corpus sold market products at product price. This resulted into market loss on the products. After consulting the *Ifá* oracle on the way forward, the *Ifá* corpus further prescribed to the *Aláròóbọ̀* that:

> 'Bóo bá rajà ní ọ̀kẹ́ kan',
> 'Mọ́ọ pè é ní ọ̀kẹ́ kan àbọ̀',

kó lè baà pé ọ′
kó ò baa` lọọ̀míì′
kó o tó jẹ′
kó o tó mu′
Ni Aláròóbọ̀ ń ṣe té e dòní
NtIfá wí fún ọn náà ni ọ́n ń lò

'If you buy your goods for one cowry'
call it one and a half'
'such that it would profit you'
And that you would be able to go for another trip'
you would have to feed yourself'
And fend for your family
This is the same thing the market women does till date
What Ifá taught them ever since is what they are practicing till date (Sàlámì 2002, 726).

Ifá proposes profit maximization theory for the *Aláròóbọ̀* traders as one of the indigenous business theories. Although- *Ifá* concentrates on the *Aláròóbọ̀* traders in the *Ifá* corpus, the application of the marketing proposals by *Ifá* in this example is applicable to all market traders. However, sometimes the Yorùbá apply the forced sales value theory[9] on their market products so the market theory proposed by *Ifá* corpus here may not be applicable with all situations. The forced sales value theory is applied on goods to be sold at a particular time because of situation beyond control. As a result, *Ifá*, in the alternative, prescribes forced sales value theory. This is the situation in Ọ̀wọ́nrán-ba-Tura verse 52, "ATAMAJUBARA (Luckless Seller), blacksmith's wife on her way to Èjìgbòmẹkùn market to sell hoes, "the diviner told her to sell at any price without bargaining at all and that, a certain man would visit her stall that day" (Lijadu 1908a, p. 41). She was prosperous in her marketing ventures because of her obedience to *Ifá's* instructions.. The *Ifá* market philosophy holds that, sometimes, market success does not depend on one's wisdom,

9 This is unconditional sales option at a particular time.

market capital/money, business or market experience and goods but rather it depends on- obedience to *Ifá's* order and instructions as prescribed by *Ifá* priest.

There are other factors that can determine the application of forced sales theory, like, the need to meet some domestic and financial exigencies such as- payment of debts, provisions of food, and health care among others. Product(s) may be sold at a loss to redeem or protect one's integrity or image, as this is associated with *ìwà* as, "goods and services carry different moral valuations" (Good 1973, p. 4). Many Yorùbá believe that, *ìwà lọba àwúre* (good character is the secret for market sales of products). In Yorùbá religious belief, *ìwà lòrìṣà, bí a bá ti hù ú sí ni í ṣé é gbeni* (There is a deity in everyone which rewards him according to his conduct) (Ṣotunde 2009, p. 248 and Ajibọla 1947, p. 23). *Òrúnmìlà* found himself in this situation when three supernatural agents- *Ikú* (death), *Àrùn* (decease) and *Èṣù*, all of whom visited him. The forced sale theory was applied by *Ọ̀rúnmìlà* to preserve his integrity and honor. *Ifá* says, *ká ta nǹkan ẹni lọ́pọ̀ sàn ju ká tara ẹni lọ́pọ̀ lọ* (it is better to sell one's products cheap rather than for one to be put to shame). There were no food stuffs at home to take care of these visitors. He had no option than, to send his wife - *Ààbò* to take some divination materials such as the *ìrọ́kẹ́* (divination club), *ìrùkẹ̀rẹ̀* and *ìbòrí Ifá* to the market for sales. According to Abímbọ́lá (1968) in *ÈjìOgbè* (with author's translation):

Ọ̀dá owó, awo Kóro, …
A díá fún Ọ̀rúnmìlà…
Ni Ọ̀rúnmìlà ba pe Àábò, obìnrin rẹ̀,
pé kí ó kó àwọn nǹkan ìní òun lọ sọ́jà lọ ta.
Nígbà tí Àábò dé ọjà Èjìgbòmẹkùn,
Ìrọ́kẹ́ Ọ̀rúnmìlà tí ó rà ní egbèje,
Nwọn ń ṣe é ní ogóje.
Ìrùkẹ̀rẹ̀ rẹ̀ ẹgbẹ̀fà.
Nwọn ń ṣe é ní ọgọ́fà.
Ìbòrí Ifá a rẹ̀ ẹgbẹ̀rìndínlógún,

Nwọn ǹ ṣe é ní ọ̀kàǹlélógún.
Ni Ààbò bá mẹ́kún, ó fi digbe;
Ó fi ìyẹ̀rẹ̀ sohùn arò.
Ó ní àwọn ọjà náà ò pójú owó.
Ni Ọ̀rúnmìlà bá fi ìyẹ̀rẹ̀ dá a lóhùn;
pé kí ó lọ ta àwọn ọjà náà bẹ́ẹ̀ bẹ́ẹ̀.
Ni Ààbò bá ta àwọn ọjà náà ní ìtàkutà,
ló bá mówó ra oǹjẹ wálé.
Àwọn olójò mẹ́tẹ̀ẹ̀ta náà- ikú, àrùn àti Èṣù-jẹ
Nwọ́n yó.

Scarcity of money in Kóro …
Cast divination for Ọ̀rúnmìlà,
Ọ̀rúnmìlà called Ààbò his wife,
to take his properties to the market for sales.
When Ààbò got to the Èjìgbòmẹkùn market,
The ìrọ́kẹ́ that Ọ̀rúnmìlà bought at One Thousand four hundred,
Was being priced at One hundred and forty.
The ìrùkẹ̀rẹ̀ at One Thousand two hundred;
was being priced at One hundred and twenty.
The ìbòrí Ifá he bought at One Thousand six hundred,
Was being priced at Twenty-one.
Then Ààbò busted into tears,
In Ifá songs-ìyẹ̀rẹ̀ mode.
She said those goods are not up to the products price.
Then Ọ̀rúnmìlà replied her in ìyẹ̀rẹ̀ mode,
To go and sell those goods just like that;
Then Ààbò sold off those goods just like that;
She used the money to buy food stuffs.
The three supernatural visitors- ikú (death), àrùn (decease) and Èṣù-eat
to their satisfactions (pp. 20&1).

When *Òrúnmìlà* was at Kóro Èkìtì, the scarcity of money compelled him to sell his *Ifá* divination materials below the market values, to maintain the integrity and the sanctity of his *ìwà* (character), by entertaining the visitors. To the Yorùbá people, character matters most - *ìwà ló jù* (character matters most), in all things. Nothing (money or material things) can be as valuable as or above *ìwà*. This is because "the gain for a moral person is the good life which is not necessarily quantifiable in financial terms" (Otakpor 1996, p. 527). This is the situation with *Ọ̀rúnmìlà* who, thought his material things are better sold at a loss (temporarily, which market symbolizes) than to sell out his *ìwà*, morals (which heaven symbolizes).

Summary, Findings and Conclusion

This study has been able to account for the historical background to establishing a market. The work points out that, the institution of Yorùbá market, marketing and location of market involves spiritual connotations. To this effect, the Yorùbá market days - daily, four, eight and sixteen day markets - have been discovered to be religious symbolism; especially *Ifá*. In relation to the Yorùbá market days, these symbols remain unchanged throughout the Yorùbá nations to the present day.

The institution, sustenance and success of Yorùbá markets depend on the integration and corporate active involvement of the divinities, ancestors, supernatural forces or agents and human beings. It is equally found that, the institution of Yorùbá markets system, location and market strategies start from heaven (invisible world) - just like the journey of the divinities to the surface of the earth and that of human beings. Markets, marketing strategies and market location are religious symbolism evinced from *Ifá*. In other contexts, -the market connotes the world (earth), as heaven connotes home (heaven). It is from home -heaven that, the Yorùbá ideology about markets begins, as indicated in the study. It is observed by the study that, *Ifá* plays a leading role in the Yorùbá market, market location and market strategies. This finding is corroborated by the Akin Ìṣọ̀lá's (2010) opinion, when he says that, "if you leave out the religion, you are left with deformed culture" (p. 36). Overall, this study concludes that- Yorùbá cultural and economic life, especially, its market economy, are unique- due to the significance of *Ifá* in the setup, location, guidelines and marketing practices. This uniqueness still persists despite the introduction of the modern and/or foreign cultural influences.

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A Closer Look at Climate-Induced Human Migration from Seven African Nations to Seven OECD Nations

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The intersection between climate change and human mobility is increasingly examined in development studies literature. Certainly, it is an important nexus to reflect on since climate change is irreversible, and subsequent shifting human migration patterns have amplified its effects. The consequences of climate change, for example, rising sea levels, the melting of the permafrost and ice caps, and increasing global sea and land temperatures, have implications as drastic as leading to the submersion of entire island nations due to the increase in sea levels (Reuveny, 2007). Once the planetary temperatures surpass the universally agreed upon tipping point by two degrees Celsius, catastrophic effects increase dramatically (Reuveny, 2007). One expected consequence is the increased forced external and internal displacement of humans worldwide. The Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) estimates that in 2008 over 20 million people were displaced by climate-related natural disasters (Environmental Justice Foundation [EJF], 2014). Furthermore, EJF projects that 150 million climate refugees will migrate to other countries in the next 40 years (EJF, 2014). These observations imply long term ripple effects for environmental migrants. Such effects range from direct to indirect impacts in situations of both external and internal migration.

External displacement will affect migrating populations in terms of political security and conflict over resources (Lister, 2014). Moreover, internal displacement may result in threats to economic livelihoods and self-determination (CREP, 2016). In this instance, an indirect impact of climate change on internal displacement can be illustrated in the increased intensity and frequency of droughts, resulting in the displacement of farm workers and their likely migration to nearby cities in order to find employment (Chang, 2009). A direct consequence of climate change on external displacement can be observed in the example of the Darfur conflict in Sudan (Verhoeven, 2011). Known as the first "climate war," shifts in rainfall led pastoralists to migrate south of the Sahara for improved grazing for their herds, but they encountered farmers who denied them access to grazing lands, contributing to a resource-based conflict (Verhoeven, 2011). Combined with deeply entrenched post-independence ethnic divisions and corrupt governance, competition over resources escalated and resulted in the migration of over 200,000 refugees across the border to Chad (Verhoeven, 2011). From the example of Darfur, it is evident that varying political, economic and social consequences arise from environmentally fueled human migration in different settings.

The urgency of climate-induced migration as a development issue emerges along Global North and South lines. In the Global South, the combination of increased vulnerability and a lack of resources to adapt functions to situate the attendant human migration push within the context of critical development. According to the 2014 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Synthesis

Report, populations lacking resources for voluntary migration experience higher exposure to extreme weather events and are also largely concentrated in the Global South (IPPC, 2014). Thus, environmental migration is related to development as the slow onset of changes, such as extreme weather events and rising sea levels, all contribute towards creating new adaptation strategies. These strategies affect the socio-economic conditions of vulnerable populations such as women, the elderly and children (Lister, 2014). Therefore, the inevitably heightened vulnerability of the Global South to the impacts of climate change, along with an absence of adaptive mechanisms, makes displacement all the more important to mitigate.

Projections of global population density demonstrate that environmental migration will also continue to affect the Global North. The human population is expected to reach nine billion in 2050, and the majority of society will live in megacities mostly located along coasts (International Organization for Migration [IOM], 2016). Climate change will thus place pressures on urban and rural societies, but at varying degrees depending on available resources and adaptive capacities. It is therefore vital to analyze the serious implications of this issue as its extreme impacts have and will continue to have far reaching consequences, directly and indirectly, on every inhabitant in the world.

The absence of a legal framework attending to climate-induced migration also exemplifies why it is a development issue of paramount importance. Climate refugees are not conferred protection under existing international agreements (Wyman, 2013); there are no treaties nor protocols that provide assistance to climate migrants. Even though current international humanitarian law may be applied to some cases of environmental displacement, relevant refugee rights, such as the right to return, does not apply (Wyman, 2013). Hence, in the absence of binding legal agreements, these displaced populations have nowhere to go (Kibreab, 2009). It is also noted that the concept of environmental refugees is not a recent concern. Fears of mass migration resulting from climate change impacts were first voiced in the 1980s (Kniveton, Smith & Black, 2012).

When the UN *Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (IPCC) released its First Assessment Report in 1990, it was suggested that large-scale global migration resulting from climate change might represent the 'greatest single impact' on world security (Kibreab, 2009). It is therefore, at once, an issue of sustained urgency with, paradoxically, little to no representation in international law. The potential for environmental migrants to receive no protection makes climate-induced displacement even more critical. It is also worth noting that climate change and human migration have habitually been discussed separately in literature, falsely suggesting little connection between the two variables.

Similarly, the 2007 IPCC report confirmed its earlier predictions that the earth's climate system is warming at an unprecedented level (Kibreab, 2009). Evidencing this, current scholarship on climate change references visible changes in the earth's physical environment. According to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), satellite sea level observations show that sea levels are currently at 85.6 mm as of July 2016, compared to 82.2 mm in July 2015 (NASA Global Climate Change [NASA GLC], 2016). Moreover, anthropogenic warming is currently responsible for roughly 75% of the global moderate temperature extremes on land, and 18% of the global moderate precipitation extremes (Fischer & Knutti, 2015).

Regarding current human migration trends, roughly 3.4% of the world's population lives outside their countries of birth (World Bank Group [WBG], 2016). Together, the current state of knowledge regarding the environment-migration nexus claims that gradual and sudden environmental changes are resulting in increased human mobility (IOM, 2016). Certainly, more research into the relationship between migration and the impacts of climate change needs to be undertaken, so as to better inform adaptation and mitigation mechanisms, policy interventions at varying scales and international climate governance. Overall, the contributions of climate change impact to the increasing forced movement of people underscores the urgency of the issue at hand.

These issues notwithstanding, there are international organizations that have been receptive to reflecting on the link between environmental change and human migration and have formulated policies that are inclusive of climate migration concerns. Three of these UN policies will be evaluated in this paper. Under Goal 13 of the United Nations (UN) *Sustainable Development Goals* (SDG), targets 13.1 and 13.3B can be extended to address climate-induced migration by targeting the preparedness, mitigation and adaptation strategies of countries that are most affected by environmental disasters. These efforts would function to reduce the forced displacement of people (United Nations [UN], n.d). Target 13.1 specifically looks at two variables: increasing adaptive capacity and the onset of climate-related disasters. Target 13.3B looks at a slightly different pair of variables: preparedness for consequences of climate change impacts and the dependent population in developing countries. Related, at the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP19) in November 2013, the *United Framework Convention on Climate Change* (UNFCCC) created the *Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage*. Action Area 6 is aimed at incorporating issues of migration, displacement and human mobility within the broader development framework (UNFCCC, n.d). Finally, endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2015, the *Sendai Framework for Action on Disaster Risk Reduction* calls for increased "transboundary cooperation [...] to build resilience and reduce disaster risk, including [...] displacement risk" (The Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility [AGCCHM], 2015).

Methodology

In order to evaluate these three policies, I will analyze the effect of climate change on the displacement of people. As an indicator for climate change, I will be looking at extreme weather events, specifically flood frequency. The scope of this analysis will be limited to the African continent as this is the region of the world most vulnerable to climate change impacts (Lister, 2014). In this paper, I will be investigating the following question: does the displacement of Africans to nations in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) change as a function of increasing flooding frequency in Africa between 2014 and 2016?

At first glance, flooding events seem like an insignificant predictor of migration based on the sheer number of landlocked countries, the uneven precipitation trends and increased desertification on the continent (Perch-Nielsen, Bättig & Imboden, 2008). However, statistics demonstrate otherwise since flooding events constituted the largest sample size of natural disaster data between 2014 and 2016 in the chosen datasets. Furthermore, flooding is a pressing concern since many countries in Africa achieved independence only in the latter half of the 20th century, thus postcolonial governments face the unanticipated challenge of having to manage the climate-induced movement of people across arbitrary colonial borders (Barrios, Bertinelli & Strobl, 2006). For these reasons, the independent variable is flood frequency and the dependent variable is the number of displaced Africans.

The following datasets will be used to assess the aforementioned policies as well as to quantify these two variables. I will be looking at the "significant disaster-related displacement events - provisional events database," which produces data on environment-related displacement events per country between 2014 and 2016 (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre [IDMC], 2016). This dataset comes from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) (2016). IDMC is part of the Norwegian Refugee Council

(NRC), an independent, non-governmental humanitarian organization (IDMC, 2016).

I will also be looking at one dataset detailing net migration inflow, and another that catalogues natural disaster frequency. The first is the International Migration Database containing the total number of foreign migrants per OECD country from 2000 to 2016 (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2016). This dataset is from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OEDC) (2016). The OECD is a forum where governments from 34 democracies and 70 non-member economies collaboratively promote economic growth and sustainable development (OECD, 2016). The second is the EM-DAT database containing the frequency of various climate-related natural disasters between 2000 and 2016 (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters [CRED], 2016). In this directory, droughts and wildfires are categorized as climatological natural disasters, and 'flooding' is categorized as 'hydrological.' Moreover, flooding is further broken down as riverine flood, coastal flood and flash flood. EM-DAT is maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the School of Public Health in the Université Catholique de Louvain (CRED, 2016).

These datasets include different types of data. The region and countries being evaluated constitute a type of categorical nominal data. The region is the African continent and the seven countries included in this study are: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger and Sudan. The period of time in which flooding events have occurred will be measured in years. Years represent quantitative continuous data. Based on the available data, the data points will be from 2014 to 2016. There are also three variables that fall under the category of quantitative discrete data: the number of flooding occurrences in Africa, the number of Africans externally displaced, and the number of foreign migrants in OECD countries.

The relationship between the independent and dependent variables can be illustrated through the following alternative hypothesis: an increase in the frequency of flooding events in Africa causes a greater displacement of Africans. Contrastingly, the null hypothesis is that the displacement of Africans is unrelated to the frequency of flooding events in Africa. In order to draw a conclusive statement on the relationship between the variables, I will perform a hypothesis test using the following types of analysis. I will begin by using descriptive statistics to calculate the standard deviation, the standard error and the range of data for each dataset. I will use standard deviation as a measure of spread for the scatter plot. Following this, I will perform a regression analysis by displaying a trendline in the scatter plot, finding the r-squared value and calculating the equation of the line. Finally, I will either accept or reject the null hypothesis by performing an analysis of variance on the data. This entails using the ANOVA tool in Microsoft Excel to determine the p-value.

Findings

My original datasets required sorting in order to filter for only the data needed to satisfy my independent and dependent variables. For instance, I filtered the type of climate disaster to flooding events. There were also differences between my datasets that required making new columns. For instance, in the IDMC dataset the unit for location was countries, while in the EM-DAT dataset location was organized by continent. I therefore took all the country values in the IDMC dataset and identified their region according to the following continents: Europe, North America, South America, Asia, Africa and Oceania. I then filtered the location in both datasets to Africa. Now that all the data points aligned, I noted that certain countries had multiple flooding events from 2014 to 2016, resulting in multiple data points for a single country. Therefore, I calculated the average number of displaced people for each country exceeding one flooding event. As a result, there was a huge range in data: seven displaced people from Seychelles to 159,040 people from Sudan. I therefore split the data in half and found that countries displaced either greater than or less than a baseline of 100,000 people. I used values greater than 100,000 displaced people because it represented the severity of the most extreme conditions caused by flooding. This reduced the sample size of my dependent variable to the following seven countries: DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger and Sudan. I then matched these data points with the seven OECD countries that have taken in at least 100,000 foreign migrants: Austria, Belgium, Chile, France, Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland. Hence, the sample size for both my independent and dependent variables is seven.

The measure of central tendency for each of my variables is calculated by taking the average. The average number of displaced Africans between 2014 and 2016 is 71,332. The average number of flooding events between 2014 and 2016 is 2.64 (or 2). The average number of foreign immigrants in OECD countries from 2014 to 2016 is 115961.74 (or 115961). The variation of my three datasets are illustrated in the table below.

	RANGE	STANDARD DEVIATION	STANDARD ERROR
IDMC	55,040 displaced Africans	+/- 85102.1427 displaced Africans	+/-32165.5865 displaced Africans
EM-DAT	6 flooding events	+/- 3.44087098 flooding events	+/-1.300527 flooding events
OECD	62023 immigrants	+/- 174640.337 immigrants	+/- 66007.8431 immigrants

In order to improve the representation of African migrants, I took both the immigration and emigration flows into account. Hence, the seven final data points for my dependent variable were calculated by taking an average of the seven data points in the IDMC dataset (number of outflow of Africans), in addition to the seven data points in the OECD dataset (number of inflows of foreign migrants), divided by two. Hence, I also calculated a new standard deviation of +/- 89842.524 displaced Africans. In the scatter plot below, the average number of displaced Africans in DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger and Sudan resulting from the average number of flooding events between 2014 and 2016 is plotted (*Figure 1.1*).



Figure 1.1

There is a positive linear correlation between the independent and dependent variables. This is indicated by the equation of the trend line which has a positive slope value of 20 985. The level of correlation between both variables is indicated by the R-squared value of 0.199. This shows little correlation between the number of flood events and number of displaced Africans. However, to either reject or accept the null hypothesis requires an analysis of variance, therefore I applied an ANOVA single variance test as shown below in *Figure 1.2*.

Anova: Single Factor						
SUMMARY						
Groups	*Count*	*Sum*	*Average*	*Variance*		
Frequency	7	18	2.57142857	4.28571429		
Average	7	1575119	225017	8071679047		
ANOVA						
Source of Variation	*SS*	*df*	*MS*	*F*	*P-value*	*F crit*
Between Groups	1.7721E+11	1	1.7721E+11	43.9091358	2.4424E-05	4.74722535
Within Groups	4.843E+10	12	4035839526			
Total	2.2564E+11	13				

Figure 1.2

As the P-value is less than 0 (2.44E-05), and therefore does not exceed the 0.05 critical point, I reject the null hypothesis while stating that there is a weak relationship between the independent and dependent variables.

Discussion: Data Interpretation, Data Limitations and Policy Recommendations

The implications of the data results indicate how climate migration policies should be assessed. The weak correlation between flood frequency and the number of displaced Africans suggests that other environmental factors may be stronger causes of displacement in Africa between 2014 and 2016. Within the category of climate-induced disasters, the frequency of droughts, forests fires and wet mass movement constitute other key contributors to displacement (EJF, 2014). Moreover, within the broader framework of climate change, the increase in temperature may also constitute a valuable independent variable. Clearly, flood frequency is just one part of the bigger picture. This shows how difficult it can be to identify a measure of climate change when deciding on an independent variable. Each region of the world will therefore have different indicators of climate change that specifically pertain to the migration flows of their citizens. This level of complexity speaks to the diverse list of environmental factors causing human migration. Hence, in support of Action Area 6 of the *Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage*, it is indeed vital to enhance our understandings of the impacts of climate change on human mobility, in order to identify the most relevant environmental-migration factors for any given region.

In addition, by continuing to use natural disasters as a measure of climate change, it is important to note that certain events are long term and therefore may not have a definite beginning and end. This is a characteristic of droughts, which are an important cause of displacement in Africa since desertification and uneven rainfall promotes emigration. Given that such natural disasters do not have a specific time frame, in terms of how long they last, there is relatively little data collected as researchers cannot estimate when exactly these events will end. Thus, the divide between the data available for sudden-onset disasters like flooding, versus slow-onset disasters like droughts, limits the possible pool of independent variables. As a consequence, variables left out, such as droughts, could be significant causes of migration.

On another note, the weak correlation between the independent and dependent variables also speaks to the under-representative aspect of the dataset. The small sample size of seven countries significantly under-represents the African continent. Certainly, there is a lack of data readily available for 2014 to 2016, and an even bigger deficit of data that accounts for phenomena earlier than 2014. A possible solution to both the uneven collection of data for all natural disasters due to their differing durations and the small sample size used in this study, can be the use of *Geographic Information Systems* (GIS) in order to record migration updates in real time. For instance, while researching databases I noticed that the UNHCR Population Statistics Database has employed GIS methods for tracking asylum seekers and refugees across all continents, and this has resulted in a better-informed database. Hence, based on the data currently available and the resulting sample size, I do not believe the results of this study can be extrapolated to other regions of the world. However, by changing the data collection method and using tools such as GIS, the sample size can begin to reflect the overall population.

The inability of the dataset to represent entire populations also makes the case for the inclusion of qualitative data, rather than solely quantitative data. For instance, anecdotal evidence and personal stories can provide important insights that numbers alone fail to consider. Some of these missing observations include whether an increase in flooding events between 2014 and 2016 has changed the daily lives of people across different countries. Furthermore, questioning the elderly population across countries affected by multiple flooding events about changes they have observed over their lifetime, may provide more insight into the projection of migration in their nations. Hence, it is important to situate the movement of humans within the context of climate change, and concomitantly humanize climate science by collecting qualitative data in addition to quantitative data.

It is also important to note that the EM-DAT database includes data derived mainly from UN agencies, insurance companies and non-governmental organizations. The sources of data highlight an important limitation, which is that the accuracy of the numbers provided within them is entirely dependent on the methodology employed by the original organizations from which the data has been extracted. The reputability of the EM-DAT database can be improved if the organizations it derived its information from employed a mixed-methods approach, valuing both primary and secondary sourced quantitative data. For instance, collaborating with insurance companies, who collect information related to the amounts of people affected by a range of disasters, would create the perfect opportunity for a private-public multilateral partnership to enable the compilation of more holistic and representative datasets. It is important to note that the trend line and the equation of this line indicate a small yet positive increase in the number of displaced Africans resulting from flooding events. In support of SDG targets 13.1 and 13.3B, this therefore implies that it is still necessary to improve the adaptive capacities and mitigation strategies of African states. Specific to flooding events, identifying African governments' lack of relevant resources, while also equipping them with the proper knowledge and technology, is important as the number of displaced continues to increase. Looking at migration at a state level allows for the extrapolation of regional trends. This can then lead to the application of micro-level strategies at a macro-level. For instance, international financial institutions can partner with less economically developed countries, identify those being impacted the most by a particular natural disaster, and equip them with the necessary material to reduce population displacement. Combining interventions is likely to be much more impactful than providing general funding with no specific expert or technological assistance. In support of the *Sendai Framework for Action on Disaster Risk Reduction*, it is therefore vital to embrace trans-boundary cooperation as a mitigation strategy.

At the same time, an important critique of all three policies examined is that none of them explicitly mention climate-induced migration. This policy gap reflects how there is still no explicit global agreement that seeks to address climate-induced migration. This study demonstrates that this lack of recognition may be partly due to the difficulty in quantifying the relationship between migration and climate change since there is limited data available, even as climate-induced migration was first recognized in the 1980s. But it is clear that the numbers of climate-induced migrants are increasing, evidencing the need to recognize this issue in stand-alone policy.

Overall, this study's main finding is that there is a weak yet positive relationship between increased flood frequency and the increase in displaced Africans. Interpreting this data result in terms of policymaking is indeed achievable and requires a broad consensus. In this regard, collaborative efforts between the least vulnerable and largely responsible countries of the Global North with their Global South counterparts is vital to tackling this problem that requires collective action. Furthermore, human displacement should be viewed as both an adaptive and mitigatory strategy; something done in reaction to certain impacts of climate change as well as to anticipate the fallouts of climate disasters.

To these ends, policy at the state-level for both origin and host countries must be oriented towards monitoring the mass movement of climate migrants, both before and after climate change impacts occur. Furthermore, climate change and migration require common policy responses. Policy makers need to be empowered at the national, local, regional and international levels, and also strive to partner with a cross section of actors in order to address the complex nexus of migration and climate change. Therefore, this study shows that climate migration is on the rise, making it imperative to explicitly acknowledge this issue in stand-alone policy and treat the subsequent negative consequences through collaborative practices.

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Policy Impacts on Africa's Extractive Sector Kenya, Mineral Wealth, and Legislation Facilitating Inclusive Development

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This paper examines the current state of natural resource development and governance in Kenya, arguing that while the country has taken several meaningful and positive steps towards less dependence on the agriculture sector and towards critical economic diversification from its underexploited mineral resources, significant challenges remain. Kenya is a heavily agriculture-reliant economy' this sector accounts for approximately one quarter of its gross domestic product (GDP). The Government of Kenya recently publicly espoused a position of seeking to reduce its dependence on agriculture in order to diversify its economy. The focus is on the development of its extractives sector which presently accounts for just 1 per cent of GDP and less than 3 per cent of the country's total export revenues (ICES, 2014). A question relevant to this shift is whether Kenya's existing governance and institutional systems are capable of managing this change from agriculture to extractive industry so as to ensure future sustainable outputs and growth overall. As such, this paper examines the current state of natural resource development alongside governance in Kenya. Implications for inclusive economic development are considered, along with the prospects of attaining broadly beneficial administrative reforms conducive to economic growth and the amelioration of Kenya's socioeconomic position. The study underscores the current state of Kenya's fiscal regime, efforts being made to diversify its economy, and steps being taken to promote linkages between and within its economic sectors from both within the state and with outside partners.

This paper[1] examines the current state of natural resource development and governance in Kenya, arguing that while the country has taken several meaningful and positive steps towards less dependence on the agriculture sector and towards critical economic diversification from its underexploited mineral resources, significant challenges remain. These include the strength of fiscal policy, shifting regulatory landscapes, linkages promotion, infrastructure deficits, and corruption. The paper considers implications for inclusive economic development, along with the prospects of attaining broadly beneficial administrative reforms conducive to economic growth and the amelioration of Kenya's socioeconomic position. The study underscores the current state of Kenya's fiscal regime, efforts being made to diversify its economy, and steps being taken to promote linkages between and within its economic sectors from both within the state and with outside partners. In so doing, it is hoped that the reader is provided with an effective review of the present state of Kenya's extractives sector.

Since the colonial era, Kenya's economy has focused on the development of farming, tourism, manufacturing and service industries (Mayer Brown, 2013). Considered a lower middle-income country by the World Bank, Kenya has a per capita income of US$1,710.00 (WBG, 2018). It is a constitutional, presidential republic with a bicameral parliament and 47 constituent counties (Constitution of Kenya, 2010). Upon gaining independence from Great Britain in

1 This paper was informed by interviews conducted in Kenya in August 2016. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives of the World Bank-Private Sector Development, International Finance Corporation, Kenya Ministry of Mining, Kenya Chamber of Mines, Institute for Security Studies and Cardno Emerging Markets. All interviews were conducted in confidentiality, and the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. The authors would like to thank Joshua Mugambwa for his research assistance on this paper.

1963, Kenya has pursued a mixed economic development strategy crafted to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), with mixed success (Republic of Kenya, 2015). Economic growth witnessed periodic declines, particularly in 2000, that was the result of a contentious constitutional review process (Booth et al., 2014). Despite these recurring challenges, Kenya has managed to sustain an average annual economic growth rate of 3.6 per cent since 1992 (World Bank, 2015), and is now the 9th largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa (Republic of Kenya, 2015). The country's socioeconomic development is relatively low by global comparative benchmarks but remains higher than most sub-Saharan African countries (UNDP, 2015).

Kenya relies heavily on agricultural output, which accounts for approximately one quarter of its gross domestic product (GDP) (World Bank, "Kenya Economic Update," 2019). The sector accounts for 75 per cent of Kenya's rural labour force, more than 65 per cent of merchandise exports (World Bank, "Kenya Economic Update," 2019, USAID, "Agriculture and Food Security," 2020). Only 20 per cent of Kenya's land is suitable for sustained agriculture (USAID, "Agriculture and Food Security," 2020). According to Deloitte, Kenya has also restricted the growth of any genetically modified produce, forcing the development of innovative agricultural technologies and techniques, as well as creating a national specialization in fresh and organic food stuffs (2015, 15). The challenge, however, is that Kenya's agriculture and livestock sectors have been decimated in recent years by the still on-going East African drought, which has led to tea crop losses of between 12-30 per cent, livestock losses of 40-60 per cent and has pushed both inflation and electricity prices to rise quickly (Were, 2017).

As a result, the Government of Kenya is seeking to reduce its dependence on agriculture and diversify its economy by focusing on the development of its extractives sector, which presently accounts for just 1 per cent of GDP and less than 3 per cent of the country's total export revenues (AfDB, 2020). There are several different ores and commodities in the Rift Valley state and Turkana County that are either currently under production, or believed to be commercially valuable, including soda ash, fluorspar, gold, oil, natural gas, and rare/heavy minerals. The government of East Africa's biggest economy also announced that it has an estimated US$62.4 billion worth of rare earth elements in its coastal region, which would place it among the top five countries in the world with such deposits.

The extraction of Kenya's mostly untapped mineral resources presents a significant opportunity for economic growth, which could serve as a boon to socioeconomic development if newfound revenues are administered effectively. Kenya's nascent extractives sector requires a policy and regulatory framework that capably facilitates resource exploration, extraction, and beneficiation activities for the good of its people. Currently, Kenya's mining sector is managed by The Mining Act 2016, and The Mining and Minerals Policy 2016 which emerged from The Mining Bill 2004; Precious Metals Act and The Diamond Industry protection Act and the Finance Act 2014.

Diversification of the Economy

The Government of Kenya is committed to diversifying its economic base, as the country continues to rely heavily upon services and agricultural output as a means of wealth creation at a time when Kenya's unemployment rate sat at 9.31%, and with 39% of Kenyan youth unemployed(Statista, "Kenya: Unemployment rate from 1999 to 2019"; Alushula, 2020.) Kenya's mining sector is underdeveloped, constituting less than 1 per cent of GDP at present, but with the potential to contribute to upwards of 10 per cent (Republic of Kenya, 2015). Metallic minerals currently produced include titanium, gold and iron ore, and the Government of Kenya has recently offered generous terms to companies willing to develop these and other minerals (Republic of Kenya, 2015). Enterprises resident in Kenya, ordinarily pay a corporate income tax rate of 28.2 per cent on revenues sourced in Kenya, while non-resident enterprises are expected to pay a rate of 37.5 per cent on such revenues (BMI Research, 2015). That said, Nairobi awarded the Kwale concession to Australia's Base Resources on the grounds that Base would pay corporate taxes of 15 per cent for 10 years –half the standard rate – along with royalties set at 2.5 per cent as opposed to the 3 per cent rate that prevailed in 2012 when the deal was made (Oxford Business Group, 2014).

It is expected that Kenyan national revenue will be bolstered by the US$305 million Kwale Mineral Sands Project, which is considered a world class advanced development initiative with an estimated 140 million tonnes of titanium deposits. The deposits are expected to yield 14 per cent of the global supply of rutile, and 10 per cent of the global supply of ilmenite, once fully operational (Oxford Business Group, 2014; Republic of Kenya, 2015). These minerals are employed in the manufacture of titanium metal, plastics, ceramics, and pigments used in paper (Oxford Business Group, 2014). It is believed that output from the Kwale Project could generate up to US$300 million in revenue for the Government of Kenya over the 13-year life of the mine (Oxford Business Group, 2014). Further exploration and provision of mineral rights could allow Kenya to become the regional mining sector hub for these and other minerals in East Africa in the years ahead (Republic of Kenya, 2015). Campbell noted that it is not clear that government earnings from taxes and royalties connected with large-scale foreign-owned industrial mining maximises the revenues and developmental benefits that could accrue to the country.

Other strategies recommended were: minerals processing, development of the mining services and equipment supply side of the industry, as well as enhanced local ownership of mining and exploration companies in order to appropriate a greater share of profits. These approaches enhance wider economic benefits for mining in industrial nations and merit serious consideration by relevant policy makers with regard to the Kenyan mining industry (Campbell, Hatcher, Lafortune, and Sarrasin, 2004). Further, Macdonald (2016) observed that considerable resource revenues transmitted to provincial governments in the form of royalties seem to have been rarely converted into social benefits, unless done by resource company intervention under the Infrastructure Tax Credit Scheme. While this was studied in Papua New Guinea it can be true for Kenya.

Complementing the activities currently being undertaken by the Ministry of Mining, the Government of Kenya has committed to several infrastructure development projects that will contribute to the pursuit of Vision 2030, Kenya's development roadmap. The Mombasa Port Efficiency Project, for example, has been undertaken to cope with an increase in traffic at East Africa's largest and busiest port, and will involve the construction of additional berths, container terminals, and the dredging of a large channel. Investments in Mombasa's port operations have resulted in tremendous improvements to its efficiency, as it now only takes 3 days to clear cargo when it formerly took 10. Another project that could be of tremendous benefit to Kenya's mining sector include the construction of a standard gauge railway from Mombasa to Nairobi, which will have 40 stations for loading cargo, and may be expanded through Uganda and into Kigali, Rwanda. It is anticipated that the rail line will be able to transport cargo to and from the Mombasa Port in under four hours on high-speed trains with modern facilities.

As noted in the previous section, Kenya is currently characterized by a shifting regulatory landscape characterized by greater oversight of the mining sector and greater transparency in the licensing process in keeping with industry standards and international best practices. It is believed that this administrative adjustment is being made to avoid the various mistakes associated with poor resource management.[2] The Ministry of Mining appears to have tightened enforcement of the sector, having revoked 42 prospecting and mining licenses granted between January and May 2013 on the grounds that proper licensing procedures may not have been respected. An independent task force was also established to review the suspended licenses (Oxford Business Group, 2014). Further to these efforts, the Government of Kenya has indicated that it intends to revoke the various rights awarded to mining companies that have held concessions without undertaking operations for over a decade or more. The administration is currently vested with the authority to do so pursuant to section 56(1)(b) of the Mining Act. As noted above, the Mining Bill presently awaiting senate approval contains several provisions enabling the Cabinet Secretary in charge of the mining portfolio to suspend or revoke mineral rights due to extended periods of inactivity on the part of license or permit holders. Officials from several mining companies have thus expressed concern that the Government of Kenya will leverage the new Mining Bill to compel them to begin investment and mining activity within the next year.[3] The Ministry of Mining is also reportedly planning to launch a core strategy to guide the country's mineral policy, which is to be coordinated and chaired by President Uhuru Kenyatta.[4] Nairobi has also recruited McKinsey & Co. to design a 20-year plan to chart the development of the country's burgeoning mining industry, which the Government of Kenya intends to harmonize with its country mining vision.[5]

Poor governance also threatens Kenya's ability to diversify, as extractives industry executives are warier of political risk and invest-

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2 Interview with Cardno Emerging Markets, August 19, 2015.

3 Interview with Kenya Ministry of Mining official, August 18, 2015.

4 Interview with Kenya Ministry of Mining official, August 18, 2015.

5 Interview with Kenya Ministry of Mining official, August 18, 2015.

ment climate challenges under such circumstances (DFID, 2015). Kenya is deemed to pose a greater risk to investors in terms of ease of conducting trade and quality of governance than neighbouring Tanzania. Kenya has also been rated more poorly than its Great Lakes neighbours Uganda and Rwanda according to trade and investment risk, and worse than Uganda and Tanzania based on economic openness (BMI Research, 2015). Moreover, the 2014 Fraser Institute Annual Survey notes that Kenya is not perceived to be a top tier mining country in comparison to Tanzania, Mozambique, or Ghana, and figures among the bottom 10 countries in terms of investment attractiveness in the mining sector. Further complicating the Kenyan extractives investment climate is a new Petroleum Bill under discussion that contains several provisions that are contentious to stakeholders. As regulatory uncertainty often serves as the handmaiden to cronyism and corruption in awarding and managing licenses and PSAs, Kenya's near term ability to attract FDI may face formidable obstacles. Nairobi must be wary of losing out to regional investment competitors in an environment where it does not enjoy a formidable reputation as a mining state, where regulatory uncertainty is fairly high, and where low return on investment is more likely in the near term (DFID, 2015).

Why the Mining Sector?

Despite poor data, studies suggest that Kenya holds a vast array of untapped mineral resource deposits, including soda ash, fluorspar, titanium, niobium and rare earth elements, gold, coal, iron ore, limestone, manganese, diatomite, gemstones, gypsum and natural carbon dioxide, collectively worth trillions of Kenyan shillings (Okoth, 2016). It is this potential for the mining industry that has Kenya scrambling to update its legislation and governance regime so as to attract foreign investors.

In 2016, the Government of Kenya signed into law a new Mining Act in an attempt to jump start an economic sector that has not seen major legislative development since the 1950s. The mining sector has faced considerable geological data omissions, culminating in a prospective business environment that failed to attract meaningful domestic or FDI (Aglionby, 2016). Indeed, legislations pertaining to Kenya's mining sector did not conform to the country's constitution as they failed to meet international standards and best practices, as well as not covering several mineral types under its remit (Government of Kenya, 2016, 7). In addition to lackluster policy and governance frameworks, the Kenyan mining sector has been impacted by disputes regarding access to land, which have inhibited exploration and prospecting. This has been further complicated through a lack of expertise in mineral marketing and value addition and inadequate funding for infrastructure (2016, 7-9). Environmental protection laws replete with gaps that have been exploited by the private sector, along with gender and labour issues - particularly for artisanal and small scale (ASM) practitioners - and inadequate institutional and human capital lacking specialized skills and the means to teach them with, finally, an absence of policies that reflect a preference towards local sourcing and value addition posed multiple policy challenges to the Kenyan government Indeed, the global financial firm KPMG (2016: 1). identified the mining sector as the black sheep of Kenyan economic potential, a void within which few dared ventures. The result was, as KPMG indicated, a mining sector that contributed a mere 0.4 per cent of the country's GDP, despite being present in the country for more than 50 years.

To solve these dilemmas and more, the Mining Act of 2016 sought to achieve a number of rapid successes. First, it aims to decentralize decision-making and place further authority in the Mineral Advisory Board, which would be charged with licensing and permit approvals. Decentralization inludes county governments who would now be required to provide consent for licensing operations and surface rights. Second, the Act seeks to establish a state-run mining corporation that will conduct activities on behalf of the government, creating a direct link between royalties, GDP growth, and mineral extraction activities. Third, emphasis is placed on rectifying the significant gaps in geological data by creating both the Directorate of Mines and the Directorate of Geological Survey. Finally, the law establishes new parameters for transparency, requiring publication of mining activity details in the public domain (KPMG 2016, 1-2). Although analysis by KPMG denotes that there remain several continuing gaps and missed opportunities, the Mining Act was the first step towards modernization of Kenya's mining sector as a means of diversifying the country's economy.

The focus of this study, however, is to examine whether Kenya is able to learn from its experience in the agriculture sector to leverage both growth and diversification in its economic output within the new focus on mining. In other words, are Kenya's existing governance and institutional systems capable of managing this transition from agriculture to extractive industry ? In line with this focus and investigation into this question, the following section explores the country's fiscal regime as it pertains to the mining sector.

Fiscal Regime

Sound resource governance is integral to realizing the potential of Kenya's mineral resources. In principle, the fiscal regime administering Kenya's minerals sector should maximize rent capture and promote FDI. The Kenyan fiscal environment is based in part on provisions found in the Mining Act 1940 (hereinafter Mining Act), which regulates all of the country's mining activities. The most recently revised edition of the act was published in 2012. Key aspects of the act include the principle that the Government of Kenya is vested with ownership of all the country's mineral deposits as trustee of the Kenyan people (Mayer Brown, 2013; Republic of Kenya, 2015). The Minister of Mines (now Cabinet Secretary) administers the right to explore and develop mineral resources and appoints the Commissioner of Mines and Geology to implement provisions found within the Mining Act (Republic of Kenya, 2015). The Cabinet Secretary is supported by the Principal Secretary, while the Commissioner of Mines and Geology serves as the chief technical advisor to the Cabinet Secretary (Republic of Kenya, 2015). The Commissioner, in turn, carries out the daily operations required to implement the provisions of the Mining Act. Finally, investors must apply to the Commissioner to acquire Prospecting Rights and mining licenses and leases (Mayer Brown, 2013)

The Government currently issues five types of mining licenses and leases under the Mining Act, though applicants must first obtain a Prospecting Right before they can acquire them. Prospecting Rights vest individuals, company agents, body corporates and other partnerships with the ability to acquire licenses and peg locations. The Rights also allow these entities to prospect on any land as authorized by the Kenyan Commissioner of Mines and Geology. Once these rights have been obtained, applicants may proceed with acquiring a mining location: the first type of license. This is mainly granted to small-scale mining entities; up to eight mining locations may be granted to a single entity per district. A single mining location consists of a block of a maximum of ten claims amounting to no more than 20,000 m^2 for precious metals and stones, and 50,000 m^2 for all other minerals.

Exclusive prospecting licenses are the second type of license, and are granted for areas exceeding 1,000 km^2, provided the applicant has deposited the necessary securities and fees, received written consent from local authorities, gained consent from land owners, and garnered other approvals from the Commissioner of Mines and Geology, while simultaneously holding Prospecting Rights. Third, special prospecting licenses are essentially the same as exclusive licenses, though they apply to property that is ordinarily off-limits to prospectors, such as game and forest reserves. Mining leases are the fourth type of license. They facilitate the exploitation of proven mineral deposits that have been discovered through prospecting and exploration activities provided by the three other types of licenses. It typically takes over one year to complete the various administrative steps needed to obtain a mining lease (Mayer Brown, 2013). Special mining leases are the fifth sort of license awarded by the Government of Kenya. These apply to properties that are normally inaccessible, and there is no limit to the acreage allotted through special leases.

Prospecting licenses are ordinarily valid for one year and are subject to renewal for no more than five years. Mining leases are issued for durations of anywhere from 5 to 21 years and can be renewed for any duration not exceeding 21 years. The Commissioner of Mines is vested with the authority to extend license and lease periods, as necessary. Assessed fees must be paid to renew mining licenses and leases in Kenya and are based on the completion of work programs subject to the Commissioner's approval. There are no restrictions to the duration of special prospecting licences or mining leases in Kenya (Republic of Kenya, 2015).

Mining leases are forfeited if leaseholders completely cease their work "in, on, or under the land" for a continuous period of six months without the consent of Kenya's Commissioner of Mines and Geology, as per clause 56 (1)(b) of the Mining Act (Republic of Kenya Parliament, 2012). The Mining Bill 2014 does not refer to leases. Rather, it differentiates between mining licenses and mining permits; both of which are considered mineral rights. Mining licenses apply to large scale operations, while mining permits apply to small scale activities. Clause 12(3)(b) of the Mining Bill 2014 vests the Kenyan Cabinet Secretary responsible for the country's mining portfolio with the authority to enact regulations governing the revocation or suspension of mineral rights, *inter alia*.

The new Mining Bill imposes deadlines by which license holders must undertake their operations. Clause 67(1)(a) stipulates that reconnaissance license holders must commence operations within three months of the license being granted. Clause 77(1)(a) of the bill stipulates that prospecting license holders must undertake their operations within three months of the license being granted, or according to "the period specified in the approved programme for prospecting operation". Clause 109(a) of the Mining Bill requires mining license holders (i.e. large-scale miners) to begin mining activities within six months, or according to the terms of an approved mining operations program or relevant minerals agreement. There is not a uniform deadline imposed on retention licenses, artisanal mining permits, prospecting permits, or mining permits (which apply to small scale operations).

Clause 147 authorizes the Cabinet Secretary to suspend or revoke any of the aforementioned mineral rights if license holders do not comply with any condition attached to their rights, including the 'use it or lose it' provisions noted above. Clause 147(3) obligates the Cabinet Secretary to provide prospecting or mining permit holders with written notice requiring them to comply with the timeline conditions stipulated in their permit "within a reasonable period of time". Clause 147(3) also allows the Cabinet Secretary to provide prospecting and mining permit holders with the opportunity to show cause as to why their mineral rights should not be suspended or revoked due to non-compliance. The Mining Bill 2014 does not appear to have a clause compelling the Cabinet Secretary to provide other types of mineral rights holders with written notice as to the pending suspension or revocation of their rights.

Under current Kenyan law, prospecting or mining for diamonds requires special authorization from the Commissioner of Mines. Unlike other minerals, diamonds are currently regulated by the Diamond Industry Protection Act, which would be repealed if the Mining Bill enters into force.

With respect to the country's taxation framework, some key features are worth noting. Corporate income tax rates are set at 30 per cent for Kenyan individuals or businesses, and 37.5 per cent for non-resident entities – including branches of foreign companies - with limited exceptions. Importantly, reduced rates of corporate income tax apply if a company has recently been listed on the Kenyan Stock Exchange. The Government will withhold taxes on natural resource income and transfers of shares or property in the extractives sector, with a 20 per cent tax imposed on the gross amount received for the sale of corporate assets. However, Kenyan nationals, involved in the transaction pay a reduced 10 per cent rate. Then, tax losses tied to mining operations can be carried forward indefinitely and deducted from the mining licensee's future income, provided it is derived from the same licence area. Rehabilitation expenditures are deductible by licensees for tax purposes, and, finally, capital gains tax on farm outs, is imposed on the assignment of mining interests at prevailing corporate tax rates (Mayer Brown, 2013; Republic of Kenya, 2015).

Despite these various provisions, the fiscal regime currently governing Kenya's mining sector may be amended in the near future as it has received criticism for being outdated. A new Mining Bill 2014 has been approved by the National Assembly. It was reintroduced in 2016 and was signed into law by President Uhuru Kenyatta in May of that year (National Council for Law Reporting, 2016) It aims was to ameliorate Kenya's mining sector by providing the Ministry of Mining with robust oversight powers while establishing greater transparency in the licensing process and efficient management of the country's natural resources, along with greater benefit sharing and disputes resolution mechanisms (Mayer Brown, 2013; Oxford Business Group, 2014; KPMG, 2016). Clause 183(2) of the Mining Bill vests the Cabinet Secretary with the authority to prescribe the royalty rates payable to the Kenyan Government, while Clause 183(5) stipulates that seventy per cent of royalties are to be paid to the Kenyan National Government, twenty per cent to the county government, and ten per cent to the community hosting the mining operations. Nevertheless, the bill does not expressly identify the exact amounts or percentages of revenues to be paid by mineral rights holders. Salim (2014) notes that the bill provides for the Cabinet Secretary to determine the royalties to be paid on the various classes of minerals through a regulation published in the Kenya Gazette, which can be amended every two years. These changes have been brought about in a bid to increase the revenue stream gained from Kenya's mining sector (Doya, 2015).

A Kenya Ministry of Mining official indicated that mining companies operating in the country over the years have often paid just 5 cents per ton in royalties. If the bill enters into force, the Government of Kenya will impose royalty rates ranging from 1 per cent of gross sales value for industrial minerals such as gypsum and limestone; 5 per cent for gold; 10 per cent for coal, titanium ores, niobium and rare earth elements; and 12 per cent for diamonds (Doya, 2015). These increases are consistent with those witnessed in other African countries in recent years, and do not represent high royalty rates when compared with those imposed by other states.[6] Moreover, former Kenyan Mines Cabinet Secretary Najib Balala has gone on record stating that the new Mining Bill will ensure that all mining entities pay their taxes so that the Government of Kenya revenues will increase to an anticipated 1.5 billion Kenyan shillings (US$15 million), up from an estimated 21 million shillings in 2012 (Doya, 2015).

In addition, capital gains tax was reintroduced to Kenyan law via the Finance Act 2014 after having been suspended as of June 1985. Capital gains are currently taxed where gains have accrued to companies or individuals on the transfer of property situated in

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6 Interview with Kenya Ministry of Mining official, August 18, 2015.

Kenya. The tax is also levied on net gains made through operations in Kenya's extractives sector. The capital gains tax rate is currently set at five per cent of net gains (KPMG Africa, 2015). In addition, Kenya introduced transfer pricing rules in 2006 to supplement the related provisions found in the country's Income Tax Act. Section 18(3) of the Income Tax Act allows the Commissioner of Domestic Taxes to adjust the profits earned by entities residing in Kenya that were gained through transactions with non-resident entities so that they are reflective of profits that would have been earned if the parties were independent and had completed the transaction at arm's length. Business entities are considered to be resident in Kenya as long as they are incorporated, effectively managed, and controlled by Kenyan laws (TPA Global, 2013). However, entities are deemed related under Kenyan law "if each participates in the capital, control and management of the business of both, be it within or without the Kenyan borders" (TPA Global, 2013, p.2).

Further to strengthening its mining legislation, the Government of Kenya has also received guidance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) so that it can augment other facets of its fiscal regime. The Kenyan Treasury and Kenya Revenue Authority have received assistance from the IMF since 2013 to craft production sharing agreements (PSAs) under the IMF's topical multi-donor Trust Fund *Managing Natural Resource Wealth*. The work of the programme was incorporated into Kenya's new Finance Act, which was enacted in December 2014. The IMF also provided the Kenya Oil and Gas Association with clarification regarding the taxation of capital gains in the sale of non-resident interests that own Kenyan petroleum rights, as well as the PSA pertaining to the sale. According to the IMF, Kenya's new tax code governing extractives is comparable to what is found in most European countries. The Mining Bill, coupled with the IMF assistance Kenya has received in the extractives sector, should provide the country with a fiscal framework conducive to the development of its petroleum and mining industries over time.

Linkages Promotion

Through analysis, the Government of Kenya's commitment to ensuring improved mineral linkage to the broader economy may be called into question. The government appeared to sound a clarion call for safeguarding local content in the mining sector with the release on October 12, 2012, of Kenya's Mining (Local Equity Participation) Regulations. The document aimed to increase Kenyan participation in mining companies by stipulating that at least 35 per cent of shareholders in mining companies subject to the terms of mining licenses awarded by executives at the Ministry of Mining must be Kenyan nationals (Mayer Brown, 2013). Ensuring local investor participation is not uncommon in the extractives sector; as such laws have been passed in Botswana, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and neighbouring Tanzania (Mayer Brown, 2013; Oxford Business Group, 2014). Botswana's approach to mining sector management particularly ensures a balance between oversight of multinational mining companies, joint management of its mining sector, and reasonable taxation in order to attract continuous FDI to the sector and reinvest resources. The Regulations were repealed in June 2013 (Mayer Brown, 2013), however, as the Government of Kenya determined that the rationale behind the law was not completely sound.[7] An issue that may have affected this decision is the inadequate financial infrastructure currently available to local investors, which would have affected their ability to raise sufficient capital to gain at least 35 per cent of shares in mining ventures in the East African country (Mayer Brown, 2013).

Many studies in the literature also focus on the effect of local content policies on producing positive outcomes towards economic development once they are properly implemented and governed by various authorities in resource-abundant economies. For example,

7 Interview with Kenya Ministry of Mining official, August 18, 2015.

Jesse Salah Ovadia (2016) established that legal initiatives which took into account local content measures contributed to the development of petroleum and mining sectors across Sub-Saharan Africa. As addressed in this study, local content policies (LCPs) encourage local and national participation in the extractives sector to shift resource allocation from exporting raw materials to local production and service provision. In an earlier study in 2014, Jesse Salah Ovadia argues that local participation in the extractive industries is another significant factor in achieving sustainable economic development in addition to the investment of the rents and taxes from resource extraction. This is particularly important since there are a limited number of jobs available in oil and gas which can be compensated for by countless employment opportunities in the goods and services industries associated with resource extraction.

However, both studies emphasize the importance of proper implementation of LCPs and how these policy frameworks are being adopted to produce positive developmental outcomes. To this extent, Jesse Salah Ovadia (2016) identifies several factors that are essential in reaching positive developmental benefits from LCPs. The study suggests that to maximize the economic benefits of adopting LCPs, it is necessary that they are implemented in a consistent and transparent manner and are monitored by qualified authorities in the public and private sectors. However, Ovadia (2016) lists the following challenges for local content in practice; corruption, local fronting, foreign labour, access to capital, skills, training and human capacity, and managing expectations. In another study, it was established that there is a relationship between specificity of local content frameworks such as policy, legislation and contracts, and outcomes achieved. Countries with more specific local content frameworks such as Angola and Algeria tend to produce better outcomes, while those with less specific frame works such as Equatorial Guinea, Tanzania and Uganda produce weaker outcomes. (Mushemeza & Okiira, 2016).

Kenya's mining legal and regulatory framework requires entities undertaking mineral activities to notify affected communities and relevant county governments to obtain their consent prior to the commencement of mineral exploitation. As with the hydrocarbon sector, provisions for local content in the mining sector are negotiated on a project-by-project basis. Notification requirements provide a forum facilitating communication and information exchange between county administrators, community leaders, landowners, lawful occupiers of land and mining license applicants. Applicant notification of community leaders and relevant county governments - along with a meeting between the two sides facilitated by the Ministry of Mining – constitutes the first step of Kenya's mining licensing process. As a means of further supporting local content in the mining sector, foreign investors are permitted to employ expatriate staff in senior management positions only where Kenyan citizens with closely aligned skill sets are not available for hire (Republic of Kenya, 2015). Looking ahead, it is believed that – in close consultation with the Government of Kenya - the McKinsey & Co 20-year Kenya mining sector diagnostic is being crafted to facilitate beneficiation and value addition inclusive of Kenyan citizens and businesses.[8] Moreover, the Government of Kenya has also demonstrated a strong willingness to collaborate with local partners in policy making, as it undertook broad consultations that resulted in robust public participation and input involving the representatives of civil society organizations and members of the private sector in drafting its Mining Bill.[9]

The bill unequivocally establishes the legality of artisanal mining, which features a suite of rights and institutions in support of the sub-sector; one which has hitherto been considered an illegal activity

8 Interview with Kenya Ministry of Mining official, August 18, 2015.

9 Interview with Cardno Emerging Markets, August 19, 2015.

in Kenya.[10] The proposed legislation also vests the Cabinet Secretary of Mines with the capacity to declare areas expressly reserved for small-scale and artisanal mining operations. Moreover, section 46 of the Mining Bill requires a mineral rights applicant to provide the Cabinet Secretary of Mines with a detailed program for the recruitment and training of Kenyan citizens for positions in the sector. The ministerial granting of such rights is incumbent upon the submission of the program proposal. In addition, section 46 of the bill also provides the Cabinet Secretary with the lawful authority to draft regulations (i) governing the replacement of expatriate workers in the mining sector, and (ii) administering the number of years they are entitled to serve in their positions.[11] It also grants the Cabinet Secretary the capacity to form partnerships with universities and research institutions to enhance the training of Kenyans so that they may better reap the gains of the country's mining sector.

Moreover, section 47 of the Mining Bill stipulates that the holder of a mineral right must give preference of employment to community members and Kenyan citizens.[12] Section 50 of the bill states that the holders of mineral rights must give preference to materials, products, services, companies, or businesses owned by Kenyan citizens in the conduct of virtually all aspects of their mining operations, while section 128 requires holders of various mineral rights to gain the consent of the communal authority or county government prior to commencing excavation or drilling operations. No-

10 Interview with Cardno Emerging Markets, August 19, 2015.

11 Please note that this sentence is mindful of the modification made to the Cabinet Secretary's administrative authority via the amendment made to sub clause 46(3), as per the Republic of Kenya's Eleventh Parliament (third session) Order Paper produced by The Senate on July 29, 2015.

12 Please note that the sentence above is mindful of the Cabinet Secretary's administrative authority that was modified by the amendment made to sub clause 47(1), as per the Republic of Kenya's Eleventh Parliament (third session) Order Paper produced by The Senate on July 29, 2015.

tably, the proposed law does not appear to obligate foreign holders of mineral rights to partner with Kenyan entities in the course of their operations. Nevertheless, the provisions found within the Mining Bill promise to encourage robust, balanced local participation in the Kenyan extractives industry once they receive presidential assent. Moreover, they have the potential to connect a growing number of Kenyans to regional supply chains, which could have positive, knock-on effects for economic growth and prosperity.

Challenges for Trade, Investment and Economic Engagement

Of all the challenges facing Kenya today, one of the most pervasive remains that of the near-institutionalization of corruption. According to Transparency International, Kenya ranked 145 of 176 analyzed countries on the 2016 Corruption Perceptions Index, falling from a position of 136 in 2013 (Lindner, 2014, p.3). In 2013, surveys by Transparency International showcased that some 70 per cent of Kenyans had reported paying at least one bribe to access social services in the preceding twelve months, with the police, judiciary, registry and permit services being sites of most frequent examples of corruption (Lindner, 2014, p.3). The latest (2013) survey results from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys indicated that depending on sector, upwards of one third of businesses expected to pay a bribe or provide a gift in exchange for public services (enterprisesurveys.org, 2013).

Despite having been elected on a largely anti-corruption platform, President Uhuru Kenyatta has struggled to address this issue. In 2015, budget audits showed the Kenyan public that government was only able to account for 1.2 per cent of its total budget allocations for the 2013-2014 fiscal year, with some $600m being lost altogether (Githongo, 2015). Reports indicate that corruption has been so widespread that it is undermining the government's ability to address terrorism and it has hollowed out public institutions like the judiciary (Githongo, 2015). According to Newsweek, Kenyatta's government could readily be classified as one of the most corrupt in Kenya's history for reasons including a lost $2.7 billion Eurobond commercial loan for national development; intimidation and deportation of journalists reporting on corruption; embezzlement of some $1.8 million from the government-run Youth Entreprise and Development Fund; lack of open bidding processes for multimillion dollar government contracts; harassment of political opponents and civil society; misappropriation of $50 million for maternity care across the country; the loss of 1.8 Kenyan shillings from the National Youth Service; 5.5 billion shillings missing from the Ministry of Health; multi-billion shilling theft from the government's National Irrigation Board by its appointed general manager; among many other examples (Githongo, 2017; Guguyu, 2017; Osiro, 2017). According to the Financial Times, even Kenya's lauded mPesa mobile payment system has been used for institutional corruption and bribery payments (Aglionby, 2016).

While some actions have been taken to attempt a large-scale remedy of engrained corruption in Kenya, including new legislation and international agreements such as the Kenya-US Joint Commitment on Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Activities in Kenya, due to a lack of meaningful actualization of these agreements and graft that may extend all the way to the president himself despite his lofty rhetoric (Mosoku, 2017), progress has been extremely sluggish. As a consequence, the ease of doing business in Kenya remains challenging; businesses face the rampancy of asset mismanagement, petty and institutionalized fraud, expectation of gifts and bribery, and procurement corruption, among other issues (PwC, 2016, p.5-6).

Besides corruption, there are other concerns about the overall contribution of mining companies to economic development as we take into consideration the payments of taxes and loyalties by these companies. Bonnie Campbell (2009), in a study on the development and regulation in the mining sector in Africa, discusses the controversial arguments concerning the economic benefits of the mining sector. It is argued in this study that although the earnings generated from the mining sector are viewed as contributions to national development and poverty reduction, there are a number of factors that lead to the overexploitation of these earnings, thus leaving very little towards national development efforts. Examples of such factors are capital allowances, excessive concessions, and incentives to investors in the mining sector, customs and tariff exemptions on mining-related equipment, and so forth.

The threat of terrorism poses a serious threat to economic engagement in Kenya. Government seemingly has not helped in curbing terrorist activities: 2017 saw police and military begin targeting Kenyan Muslim communities in an effort to root out extremist and terrorist cells, driving up tensions between religious groups in the country (Grant, 2017). As a consequence of this persistent threat of terrorism, Kenya has made a number of moves to attempt an ambitious push back. First, the Kenyatta government has signed into law a number of legislative measures intended to augment national security, including the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, and the Security Laws Act of 2014 (state.gov, 2015). The latter in particular included some 20 new amendment provisions to existing law, including the criminalization of participation in terrorism training, augmenting the breadth of applicable evidence in terrorist related prosecutions and strengthening Kenya's National Counter-Terrorism Centre (state.gov, 2015). Kenya's National Police Service has equally pursued a very public campaign of naming in national publications those organizations, banking institutions, and individuals it has connected to terrorist groups (state.gov, 2015). The result, according to government officials, has been a reduction in causality incidents as of 2016, an increase in available equipment for police services, and a growth in

Kenyan participation in AU counter-insurgency operations in Somalia (Allafrica.com, 2017).

Lastly, it is worth noting that political instability is a critical issue area that prospective partners, foreign direct investors, and international private sector actors should be wary of as they consider deeper economic partnerships with Kenya. The country, unfortunately, has had a history of electoral violence: in 2007, after the announcement of results from the then-Presidential elections, resultant violence caused the deaths of some 1,100 people, 40,000 cases of sexual and gender-based violence, and the displacement of more than 650,000 (Elder, Stigant, and Claes, 2014, p.5; Jones, 2014). It was only thanks to large scale institutional reform, including a new constitution, new electoral commission and laws, judiciary and police reform that Kenya would seemingly avoid similar mass violence in 2014; key informant interviews, however, proposed that few saw a genuine long-term commitment to the reduction of political conflict in the country by government actors (Elder, Stigant, and Claes, 2014, p.8-9). As if to reinforce this, Amnesty International reported in mid-2014 that government had systematically neglected its responsibility to investigate and prosecute crimes committed during the 2008 election, with many victims failing to report incidents to authorities out of a continuing fear for their physical and economic security (Jones, 2014).

ACAPS suggests that there are a number of contributing factors which could contribute to electoral violence in Kenya. First, analysis suggests that the withdrawal of the International Criminal Court case against both Kenyatta and Ruto, credited for disincentivizing violence in 2014, as well as the expulsion of NGO monitoring groups in 2016 and a refusal of new international civil society permits in 2017 will likely provide a fertile ground for violence this year (2017, p.1). Raila Odinga, leading opposition to the current government, has also called for mass protests prior to the August election, largely out of continued dissatisfaction with the judiciary's response to 2013 election irregularities (ACAPS, 2017, p.2). Exacerbating the above are continued widespread perceptions of marginalization in the coastal region, belief among non-Kikuyu ethnic groups that the latter has dominated Kenyan politics since independence, land grievances aggravated by political corruption and patrimonialism, and a perceived lack of credibility amongst opposition parties of the Independent Electoral Boundaries Committee (ACAPS, 2017, p.2). Indeed, the latter has been the source of considerable criticism from civil society and opposition parties, who believe that the IEBC rigged the 2013 election in favour of the incumbent government, and that it accepted bribes as part of a multi-million shilling procurement deal known as the "Chickengate Scandal" (Aling'o and Noor, 2017). As a consequence, the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy has begun leading country-wide demonstrations calling for the disbanding of the IEBC, resulting in a hardening of government positions and increased crackdowns by police on protestors (Aling'o and Noor, 2017). We also envisage the development of the mining sector as a potential risk factor for violence if the returns from it are not well managed. This can easily spur ethnic rivalries and hatred as a result of ethnic favoritism, and political patronage in the mining sector. The current circumstances of corruption and violence cannot support legitimate growth of the mining sector, so they have to be dealt with by government and citizenry. Otherwise corruption breeds misappropriation and undermines the benefits from mining investment.

Conclusion

This study has examined Kenya's institutional systems capability to manage the change from an agricultural-based economy to one being diversified through the extractive sectors. It has argued that that while Kenya has taken several meaningful and positive steps towards less dependence on the agriculture sector and towards critical economic diversification from its underexploited mineral resources, significant challenges remain. The untapped mineral resources present enormous opportunity to support Kenya's economic growth. Although they are both still in a nascent stage, Kenya's petroleum and mining sectors have the potential to attract investor interest and contribute to a substantial percentage of the country's economic output. Importantly, while legislation governing the mining sector is perceived as being out of date, the new Mining Bill has tremendous potential to protect and advance the interests of local communities and Kenyan citizens as it is developed. Kenya's prospects for inclusive growth will be realised if the government continues to facilitate FDI. This is urgent as the country's rising youth unemployment rate, and dangerous and unstable security situation, poses obstacles to the business operating environment and investment in the extractive sector (Booth et al., 2014).

Through the drafting of its Mining Bill, the creation of a country mining vision based on the AMV, and by enlisting McKinsey & Co to craft a 20-year diagnostic, Kenya appears to be attempting the implementation of a 'Botswana model' of mining sector management. Botswana's approach to mining sector management is generally well regarded for its ability to balance oversight of multinational mining companies, joint management of its mining sector, and reasonable taxation, along with country's the need to reinvest government resources and attract continuous FDI to the sector. If Kenya's mining and petroleum sectors are therefore to fulfill their potential, the government must continue to reform its historically burdensome bureaucracy and tax regime while pursuing infrastructure development to improve the country's business climate over the medium term (BMI Research, 2015). In conclusion, the impending passage of Kenya's Mining Bill has the potential to diversify and strengthen the Kenyan economy if the country manages to continue on its current path of demonstrating respect for constitutionalism and the rule of law.

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The Role and Influence of Media in Creating Environmental Awareness in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

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Environmental awareness is a prevalent phenomenon in Dar es Salaam City, the eastern part of Tanzania. Dar es Salaam is a major city in Tanzania with a large population (about 6.7 million) and hosts the headquarters of many radio stations, TV stations, and newspaper companies. This essay asks: does the availability of extensive media coverage in Dar es Salaam contribute to environmental awareness to the city's population?. The purpose of this essay is to highlight the role that media has played in creating awareness on environmental issues in the City of Dar es Salaam. This essay uses secondary data and an interview from secondary literature which analyzes different residents' attitudes towards the environment in order to assess the varying levels of environmental awareness related to media houses in Dar es Salaam. Here I use the term 'media house' to refer to producers of digital content that provide digital coverage of news via online articles, radio shows or podcasts, and videos. I have observed that the city of Dar es Salaam is still facing environmental problems due to a limited sense of ownership of public spaces, that means that people disregard environmental conservation initiatives. The majority claim to pay proper media attention and declare they are aware of environmental education through media sources, yet it's very hard for people to take responsibilities in taking major actions to conserve the environment. This essay also demonstrates that social media has been an effective platform for environmentalists and conservationists to reach the residents when addressing specific issues in environmental concern. A recent step by the government of Tanzania, a ban on

> the use of plastic bags, has gotten success by the united efforts of the government and media houses due to strict policies formulated by the government which play a major role in reforming residents' behavior in the environment.

Since Environmental education is a major concern which first gained international attention in the 1960s and 1970s through a series of intergovernmental meetings and reports. In the case of Tanzania, the idea of environmental education has been promoted since the 1980s. The government's response to the environmental issues is motivated partly by the country's diminishing natural resources and partly due to global environmental problems such as air and water pollution and global warming (Mtaita, 2007).

Tanzania has suffered environmental problems such as water ,air and soil contamination pollution and environmental degradation. Economic development such as urbanization and industrialization, leading to increased industrial waste disposal, household waste and sanitation, are key reasons for this form of environmental problems. The periodic eruption of diseases such as cholera are clear measures of poor environmental management in Tanzania (Mtaita, 2007). The mass media has been known for helping people to access EE, which is extremely important in reducing environmental concerns and their consequences, such as infections and poor water quality. This makes the media an important tool for raising people's environmental awareness (Mhache & Ambosisye, 2017).

The Municipal Council is responsible for waste disposal in Tanzania. It is estimated that 37% of the waste generated is buried, 31% is discarded and 23% is burned away (Nipe fagio Tanzania, 2018). Just 5% of waste is collected on a regular basis, 3% is taken irregularly and 1% is discarded on the roadside. Mismanaged pollution thus continues to overwhelm the waterways and the storm drains (Nipe fagio Tanzania, 2018).

Municipalities in Dar es Salaam contract waste collection activities to community based organizations in low income areas, which perform the primary collection door to door by means of wheeled pushcarts, and deliver waste to official collection points. In this case the secondary collection (transportation to Pugu dumpsite) is performed by the municipalities. In other middle income areas, the contractors collect with their own trucks and deliver to the dumpsite. Pugu Kinyamwezi is the one of the largerst disposal site that was designed as a sanitary landfill and turned into a dump site prior to its inception (Yhdego, 2017).

Solid waste includes all organic and inorganic waste materials that are normally non-free flowing and produced by human and animal activities. They have lost value to the user, and are therefore discarded by the last user as useless or unwanted (Yhdego, 2016). Solid waste management in Tanzania has faced many challenges including inadequate coverage of collection practices and controls, lack of institutional frameworks and communication services, inflexible work schedules and insufficient information on the quantity and composition of waste, as stated by (Kyessi and Mwakalinga 2009; Ogwueleka 2009).

Solid waste in Tanzania is collected in a mixed state and dumped in unplanned areas near human settlements, along the roads, at bus stations, in storm water collection channels, in rivers, etc., posing high risks to citizens due to unpleasant smells, accumulation of flies, blockage of drainage channels, contamination of surface water bodies, and other unwanted phenomena (Yhdego, 2016). This situation was mentioned in articles in East African newspapers as long ago as 1985; the articles referred to Dar es Salaam as a "garbage city" (Sunday News (Tanzania), 2 Nov 1985, p. 5) and a "litter city" (African Events, Nov 1985, pp. 3-5) and to Nairobi as a "city in a mess" (Weekly Review (Kenya), 25 Jan 1985, pp. 2-3) (Henry, etl.al. 2006). Dar es Salaam has even become worse since the 80s and 90s and in the new century, as solid waste generation has increased in proportion to the tremendous population growth of the city (Oberlin, 2011 and Yhdego, 2016).

Problem statement

There are numerous media sources in the city of Dar es Salaam, which have developed numerous campaigns and projects in response to environmental challenges, but Dar es Salaam is considered to be heavily polluted. Therefore, this essay asks; "does the availability of extensive media coverage in Dar es Salaam contribute to environmental awareness in society?"

Literature review

Knowledge, action and effect are three important characteristics of environmental sustainability. The way people behave is one important element of sustainable development. it is important that people develop a mindset of preserving and valuing the environment. The first step of skill development, the development of personal skills and the acquisition of knowledge is environmental preparation (Boin, 2010). The environmental education program tries to influence human values, behaviors and policies. The idea of environmental sustainability, the management of our natural resources and climate, is a product of environmental awareness education (Comfort, Boin & Demchak 2010). Sustainability refers to development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987).

As we address the role of media, we are focused on three key issues: to inform, to educate and to entertain (the original mission of the British Broadcasting Corporation; see Holtz-Bacha, C. and Norris, 2001). The role of the media is very important in influencing public awareness on global climate change. Technologies such as radio, television and the media have played a more important role in increasing people's awareness about climate change and the protection of the environment than many other forms of human communication. People need credible sources of knowledge and information about how to adopt a greener lifestyle. While television is still a very popular source of news, there is increasing number of people going digital for their news (Vandrick, 2011).In addition, printed items, such as book magazines and brochures which helped to pass knowledge, new and up-to-date, while radio and television are main tools for transferring quick information resources due to the wide coverage (Jharotia, 2019).The position of mass media is one of the most important factors driving environmental awareness: only on the condition that first, large numbers of the population have access to these technologies in Dar es salaam, and secondly, that people are interested in ecological knowledge. Mass media is indeed the educational platform for mass education, irrespective of caste, color, or geographic location it proves as an important means for the education to all (Saikia, 2017).

The Study Area and Methodology

The city of Dar es Salaam is among Africa's most polluted cities (Global Residence Index, 2019). The transient population of Dar es salaam leads to insufficient sense of 'ownership' of the city from the people. Poor environmental behaviours can be linked to this lack of 'ownership'. Should we conclude that the requisite environmental management information is not presented by the media? In this study, secondary data from published and unpublished books, journals, magazines, web pages, etc. was collected. In addition, an interview was conducted with an environmental activist and representative of environmental organization in Tanzania.

Tanzania's political, commercial and industrial operation center is the city of Dar es Salaam, covering a gross area of 1397 km2 (Dar es Salaam Strategic Plan 2010/2011-2012/2013). With an average air temperature of 26 ° C (Kirama & Mayo 2016), the city faces hot and humid conditions all year round.

Figure 1: Map of Dar es Salaam City Showing the Administrative Districts, Source: Dar es Salaam Socio Economic Region Profile (NBS/RSCD, 2014)

Types of waste that are found in Dar es Salaam

Solid waste generation and disposal

The municipalities of Dar es Salaam produce 3,100 tons / day of solid waste and only 1200 tons / day (39%) of solid waste are processed and disposed of (Kamukala, 2011). According to (Dar Es Salaam Population, 2020) the city's population is now estimated at 6.7 million. This indicates that the population has grown and the amount of solid waste production has inevitably risen. Together with its three municipalities (Kinondoni, Ilala and Temeke) the city council of Dar es Salaam is committed to developing effective strategies for the efficient disposal of solid waste. Nevertheless, in the town of Dar-es-Salaam, mushrooming heaps of uncollected waste spread throughout the region can be seen, and this is because the city council waste collection is not successful in supporting urban residents with health hazards.

Water Pollution

Some settlements such as Vingunguti and Hananasif are situated along the Msimbazi River and divide the region into two parts, north and south, across Dar-es-Salaam from the east to west. The drainage of the river is primarily filled with mangrove swamps. The area is popular in Dar es Salaam due to its role it plays in urban economy. Most of the fresh vegetables sold by street vendors, i.e. spinach, are grown here in Dar-es-Salaam. Also, families who have no access to piped water use Msimbazi River as a household water source. Several industries located along Pugu Road industrial area discharge their waste materials into this basin. The situation is environmentally unacceptable.

Organizations and Campaigns that raise environmental awareness in Dar es salaam.

Dar es salaam as Tanzania's biggest city, and a centre for businesses and the interaction of people from various parts of Tanzania plays an important role in different projects and campaigns which aim to raise environmental awareness in the entire country. Different NGOs, the government and private sectors have initiated and organized projects that enable the people of Dar es Salaam to understand the critical issues that face the environment. The national environmental council (NEMC), various government ministries, and environmental clubs such as the Malihai Club, the WCST (the Tanzanian National Conservation and Communication Strategy 2005–

2009), have also been active, and attempts to transmit environmental knowledge through the internet, radio and television network have also been made.

Moreover, the EE program was introduced into the formal education curriculum following the study review by the Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) in 1997. The most recent review of the program (2004/05) covered EE at all levels of education. The policy has contributed to a high level of degree programs in some colleges (Mtaita, 2007). These include environmental engineering and management courses of the University of Dar Es Salaam's (UDSM) natural resources courses, agricultural sciences courses and short-and longer-term courses at the Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA) and the Open University of Tanzania (OUT).

The following are different campaigns that were initiated in Dar es Salaam for the specific aim of raising awareness and tackling environmental problems facing the entire city.

Nipe Fagio (Let's Do it Tanzania)

Founded in 2013, Nipe Fagio is a civil society organisation. It aims at encouraging individuals (especially young people), civil society, the private sector and the government, to make the Tanzanian economy clean and sustainable, and to be conscious of their roles in waste management and reduction of environmental impacts (in terms of air, water, and soil quality).

Nipe Fagio aims to harness the power of the community to develop solutions to hygiene challenges, health problems, environmental care issues, waste management and the state of recreational areas with the collaboration of government, municipal institutions, trade and civil society groups (Nipe Fagio Tanzania, 2018).

The Let's Do It! Tanzania campaign, organized by Nipe Fagio, brings different sectors and regions together to work in a national and global movement, based on cooperation, action and technology to address these problems. The campaign focuses on local waste management solutions and climate change adaptation measures that help the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and provide environmental, social and economic benefits to Tanzania.

Bremen Overseas Research & Development Association (BORDA)

Bremen Overseas Research & Development Association is a German NGO with headquarters in Bremen and a network of local partner organizations in more than 20 countries around the world. BORDA has been involved in the fields of poverty alleviation, sustainable protection of natural resources and the development, implementation and distribution of decentralized sustainable technologies and social initiatives for potable water, treatment of wastewater, provision of energy, and solid waste management, since its establishment in 1977.

Awareness Raising Campaign: Cleanest Neighbour Competition Program in Dar es Salaam a joint collaboration between BORDA and Nipe Fagio

The goal of Community awareness campaigns was to raise awareness of problems and solutions in households regarding environmental and solid waste management by introducing a "Cleanest sub ward competition." The aim of this program was to encourage behavioral changes at the community level in the selected project areas in order to achieve good solid waste management. The initiative involved various measures that gave community leaders guidance and support, including better waste collection systems, and sound solid waste management approaches.

Kinondoni Municipal Council helped to select the location for the project. The project lead initially introduced the awareness raising campaign concept and emphasized the campaign's competition aspect the cleanest sub-ward will be the winner. The project concept was introduced in two wards at eleven sub-wards. Nine sub-wards applied to compete for project hosting in their area. Finally, two sub-wards were selected as project area which is Kibangu and Mwongozo, from Makuburi ward.

The project implementation was led by BORDA and supported by Nipe Fagio with clear roles and responsibilities. Nipe Fagio created awareness through:

1. Coordinating a door-to-door visit campaign where by the total number of beneficiaries was 29,804 people residing in 6,623 households from two sub-wards: Mwongozo (14,194 people from 3,552 households) and Kibangu (15,610 people from 3,071 households) in Makuburi.The aim was to increase knowledge and change attitudes of citizens pertaining to solid waste management at source, including waste separation, contracts with service providers, reducing open burning, littering and the dumping and burying of waste, and increasing recycling.

2. Organizing community clean-up events in drainage ditches, litter pick up around the neighbourhoods etc. This activity encouraged the community to organise monthly clean ups and it became a regular practice by the end of the project period.

3. Establishing a school program. The school program engaged students in workshops, and supported waste and sanitation education knowledge sharing in schools. Thereby students and schools could adopt better waste practices and students shared their knowledge with their families and other community members.

4. Organizing community group exchange visits. The group visits increased know-how, changed attitudes concerning waste, encouraged improved waste management practices and motivated in-

dividuals and groups to keep their environment clean, and to educate others.

Roots & Shoots Tanzania

Jane Goodall's Roots & Shoots operates in more than 130 countries today, but it has a rich history in Tanzania. It was founded in 1991 when Dr. Jane Goodall was approached by a small group of Tanzanian students at her house in Dar es Salaam. Because Dr. Jane expressed her compassion for animals and the environment, they told Dr. Jane what could be done to improve the planet. They decided to set up clubs in each of their schools after a spirited discussion to tackle the relevant issues at the grassroots level. This was Roots & Shoots very first club. Roots & Shoots creates service-oriented programs at elementary schools, high schools, and colleges as a strong international youth organization. Such clubs organize and carry out projects based on the unique interests, expertise and needs of their community. Any or more of the following three topics are discussed by the Roots & Shoots projects; Care and Concern for Animals, Care and Concern for the Human Community and Care and Concern for the Environment (Roots & Shoots Tanzania, 2013).

Findings and Discussion

Media was used as a communication strategy for all of the projects mentioned above to reach the public at the right time. Television stations, newspapers, social networking pages, blogs and radio stations have played their task professionally on their exercise of raising public awareness in Dar es salaam community regarding the projects campaign.

Mhache and Ambosisye, (2017) conducted a survey of 30 people in Dar es Salaam Region, Tanzania, regarding the contribution of mass media to environmental management. The participants were drawn from men and women, local citizens and professionals from numerous mass media. The interviewees were asked why Dar-es-Salaam is amongst Africa's polluted areas (Table 1). Many factors have been given, among which are large population (70%), the ignorance of local residents (33%), lack of serious city government measures to curb the problem (37%), and poor planning (77%).

Reasons	**Frequencies**	**Percentages**
Untimely garbage collection	25	83
Poor planning	23	77
High population	21	70
Poor management of sewage	19	63
Lack of serious measures by the city authorities	11	37
Ignorance	10	33
Lack of effective environmental by laws	7	23
Others (lack of education, fines not instituted)	5	17

Table1: Reasons for Dar es Salaam to be rated a polluted region in Africa. Source: Mhache & Ambosisye, 2017.

In an interview, Mr. Erasto Njavike from Jane Goodall Tanzania was asked the research question of this study "Does the availability of extensive media coverage in Dar es Salaam contribute to environmental awareness in the society". Mr Njavike replied that:

"The media provides us with sufficient coherence when we need to present environmentally friendly related information to the public, but the problem is the sense of ownership that people think of as Dar es Salaam. Dar es Salaam is a commercial city so the majority move to and even from different regions of Tanzania. The problem comes in the personal implementation of what a citizen is supposed to do to the environment, and by that time many of them completely neglects the environment, The main

thing now is to think about how to change people's attitudes towards Dar es Salaam and the environment as a whole" (E. Njavike, personal communication, Aug 15, 2019).

Conclusion and Recommendations

The more projects and efforts which are put into place to deal with environmental challenges, the more people become aware of and can access various sources of environmental information. Many campaigns and environmentalists in Dar es Salaam have continued to urge people to take responsibility for the environment and care for the environment. A large number of people are prepared with that understanding, but the question arises, why is Dar es Salaam still polluted?. It is undeniable that we as human beings are grown up with such habits of thinking about short-term ways of solving our problems and do not consider long-term challenges such as environmental degradation and pollution.

Media has attempted to provide information that has impact on how we should save the environment from the hands of unethical people. In Dar es Salaam, as many people migrate in and out of the city, the majority of them have developed a feeling that they are not at home, and many of them are coming from rural provinces and settle in the city. The feeling they do not 'own' or belong to the city is one that dominates the minds of many residents, but this factor has not been adequately covered by the media. However, we are supposed to raise awareness to turn environmental challenges into every human endeavour here on earth. We can change the perception of sense of ownership through the media and raise awareness on how changes to the environment contribute to climate change. Environmental-related news can be part of the process of making citizens more patriotic, especially when it comes to their own country. And this will contribute to a different feeling than we have been accustomed to for many years. Citizens have grown up with different perspectives when it comes to solving environmental challenges, to the point where everyone has the responsibility to educate the other when they encounter mistakes from the other. What changes people's attitudes and personal choice's towards the environment are other people. Let us all consider what we can do: not by force, but by showing an example.

Based on the conclusion also this study recommends the following.

i. The Tanzania National Environment Management Council (NEMC) and the Environment Ministry should continue to collaborate with journalists to increase the environmental skills of journalists, thus improving public perception of environmental issues in the media.

ii. Tanzania NGOs such as Roots & Shoots should provide primary schools with environmental education. The value of the atmosphere and the issues of not keeping the world safe should be explained to pupils and teachers.

iii. The whole issue of solving environmental challenges should be used as an opportunity for as well as the labor market within it. In this sense, people will rush for employment opportunities in the environmental sector where this will contribute significantly, removing two challenges at once.

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Reviewer: Takudzwa Musekiwa
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Racism after Apartheid, a volume put together by Vishwas Satgar, examines the racism that endured in Post-Apartheid South Africa and the role of Marxism in fighting such racism in Africa, and beyond. Marxism, in Africa, has long faced its fair share of critique, especially from African nativist initiatives including the Black Consciousness Movement. Members of this movement regarded Marxism as a foreign idea, which, as the product of white thought, was not native to Africa. *Racism after Apartheid* highlights the role of Marxism in the emancipation of oppressed people from racist oppression in different countries and regions around the world. This edited volume consists of 11 chapters, by diverse authors, covering different geographic locals and topics, from what Anti-Racists Marxism is, to the very meaning of African, to Indigenous movements in Guatemala, to the European refugee crisis, to Post-Apartheid South Africa, to anti-racist Marxist thought in India, to potential alternatives within Marxism.

In the Introduction, Vishwas Satgar, political scientist and Marxist scholar, turns to the historical record to outline an account of Marxist thinking and its intersection with anti-racist struggles and liberation movements in Africa (particularly in South Africa), dwelling in particular on the shifting categories and constantly changing historical conditions of people affected by racism.

After tracing historical challenges to the Marxist tradition, the book presents challenges that Marxism has faced since the end of Apartheid in South Africa. Here, Satgar outlines the many Marxisms of today, from ecological to cultural, feminist to anti-racist Marxisms. The book seeks to challenge these contemporary Marxisms which do not have an adequate understanding of systemic racism and contemporary forms of oppression. In mounting this challenge, Satgar underlines the relationship between anti-racism and Marx's thought, drawing on the historical record in the fight against racism and oppression across the Americas, Africa, Europe, and Asia.

Firoze Manji, critical scholar and journalist, unpacks, in Chapter 3, the term African to argue that racism is a fundamental feature of "nascent capitalism and the emergence of capitalism and the subsequent period of colonization" (54). Racism is fundamental precisely because of the need for an increasing rate of accumulation of capital. Manji goes on to argue that one cannot talk of capitalism and imperialism as something independent of racism, a perspective that puts Marxism front and centre in the fight against racism.

Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, historian and activist, examines in Chapter 2 the role of Marxism in fighting for the rights of Indigenous Peoples in Guatemala. She outlines the historical ties between this fight of Indigenous Peoples for rights and the International Indian Treaty Council (IITC), which fought for Native American's rights across the Americas. Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz also points out the role of Marxist movements in the fight against racism and colonialism across Africa.

Fabian Georgi, ethnologist, discusses in Chapter 5 the current dynamics of racism in Europe, with an examination of the European refugee and migration crisis of 2015 and 2016. The argument is not just that racism remains a potent, dynamic factor in Europe, but that the migration crisis is a transnational social conflict of which racism and racist forces are central. To understand racism in Europe today requires understanding the "migration crisis." The reason why racism persists and is currently surging in Europe, according to George, is that white Europeans enjoy real material privileges which accrue from their superior position on a racist hierarchy. It is from this position that people tend to defend their privilege and resist political measures that would undermine their position.

Aditya Nigam, political scientist, turns in Chapter 6 to the Marxists and their historical understanding of caste and social structure in India, alongside their lack of reference to the caste system in such debates. Even though Aditya Nigam's chapter does not directly discuss race, it challenges a Marxist discourse in India which has not adequately and directly challenged the caste system and the assumptions that underlie it.

Peter Hudson, political scientist and activist, argues in Chapter 8 that colonialism in post-Apartheid South Africa did not disappear but is rather repressed and unconscious. Colonialism has been inserted into democracy via capitalism, with the result that capital and its correlative powers are unconsciously in the service of the reproduction of colonialism. Hudson argues, "capitalist practice in South Africa has not changed, it is as colonial as ever" (166).

Khwezi Mabasa, political scientist, suggests in Chapter 9 that little has changed in post-Apartheid South Africa, except that its colonial character is now unconscious and obstructed from view by a combination of capitalism and liberal democracy. Racism in South Africa is inherently linked to the evolution of a racialised capitalist social order and power relations it produces. Hence it is therefore impossible to understand racism outside evolving class-power relations in the political economy of South Africa.

Vishwas Satgar endorses, in Chapter 10, Democratic Marxism as a potential solution to the challenge facing Marxism and the anti-racism movement today. Even though there is no precise or strict definition of Democratic Marxism, Satgar argues that Democratic Marxism seeks to understand various forms of revolutionary political agency that coexist with the reconfiguration of global capitalism over different historical epochs and to develop a nuanced dialectical relationship between class and race relations. Democratic Marxism shows how both colonial and apartheid capitalism are inherently linked to both white supremacy and black super exploitation. Democratic Marxism, Satgar suggests, seeks to provide a conception of racialised capitalist development that appreciates historic and contextual specificity.

In its Conclusion, *Racism after Apartheid*, offers three anti-racist strategies to target contemporary national forms of social and neoliberal racism. First, challenge racist discourses, ideologies, and the exponents of racism in the political centre. Second, attack nationalism and encourage the internationalist tradition. Third, from a Marxist perspective, overcome the social and economic conditions which lead to racism.

Where this wide ranging and well-articulated volume excels is in showing racism to be a historical phenomenon in tension with anti-racist and Marxist movements, in the past and the present. Where this volume stumbles is in failing to challenge the Marxist "liberation movements" and Marxist influenced "liberation movements" in Africa itself. These movements, for example the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF), have now become part of the State. The book is silent on the ways that once these parties controlled the state, these Marxists inspired parties maintained colonial structures for their own and their regime's benefit, while at the same time neglecting the needs and rights of their populations.

The book will benefit academics and students, who seek to understand the historical role of Marxism in the struggle against racism. Students particularly those who seek to understand the current fragmentation of South African politics and ideologies should definitely read the book.

Eze James. *Dispossessed: A Poetry of Innocence, Transgression and Atonement.* Daraja Press, 2019, 138 pages.

Reviewer: Ifesinachi Nwadike

Dispossessed reads like a bildungsroman, a sequence of growth and becoming captured through poetic essence. It reads like a station of the crosses with itinerant stoppages at various stages of the poet's self awareness and development. Symbolically speaking, the various stages in this collection are akin to man's stages of growth; infant, youth and adult, that pilgrim-like movement from the early days of a kite's birth, when its wings are still shaky and unsure, to its pubescent attempts to fly, to understand its environment and accommodate its kind and to its eventual mastery of the art of flying and the eventual possession of the skies.

Stratified into three; "innocence""transgression," and "atonement," d*ispossessed* is James Eze debut offering, chronicling his early intimations with the art of writing, his attempts to make meaning, his doubts about his genius, his young days and what time made of them, his love for man, woman, children, his heartbreaks, failures, sorrows and disappointments in his sincere attempt to understand what it means to love, his fulfillments and the joy that is his in knowing that in all these there are still people he can call his own, in true love and finally, his religious standing, his affiliation with the tribe of the hated, his allegiance to truth and peace and his patriotism to his nation.

In "innocence," James Eze introduces us to himself and his early stages of creative growth and the artistic call of duty he feels bound to answer. The poem "i am" reads: "i am the oxygenated laughter/ of africa's ruptured civilisation/ rebounding with sturdy steps/ to reclaim its missing soul". He concludes by saying "and now i stand/ in this hallway of dreams/ … i am a song in want of an audience" (6-7). From this point, the persona moves to "here i am", affirming his visions again, stamping his feet on the ground, from where he'd stand to sing, to tell the world that in this dawn of swallowed tongues, there are still a handful of griots undaunted by the glinting talons of vampires who crave the blood of fearless prophets:

> i was born for this moment
> tide-wash in noon crest
> i am the ablution and the atonement
>   rainbow in mid-arch
> straining against brooding clouds
> to blaze my name across seven hills (9)

In as much as there is beauty in the poet's categorization of the poems in this collection, I do not subscribe to the poet's designation of the second section as "transgression." Be it for want of a better caption or to fully justify the transcendental phases of his pilgrimage to the final stage of atonement, I believe that since this section is largely about love, love and nothing but love, a better caption would have done us a lot of good here where the persona serenades us with beautiful love transcripts that remind us of Pablo Neruda, Dennis Brutus, Barry White, Celine Dion and Ed Sheeran rolled in one. Hear him in "i found love", a poem no less inspired by Ed Sheeran's "Perfect": "… we survived the rains with the sun in our hearts/ and we laughed when life wagged a finger in our face/ because we knew that in the end, love would win this race" (35). So, is there something the poet is seeing that we are not?

"Atonement" is worthy of its name. It is a purely ritual attainment of artistic maturity, a maturation that manifested even as the poet-persona blooms with time through the corridor of introspection, touching on all things that demand to be touched with conscious poetry. The poetic engagements here, the thematic preoccupation of James Eze in this section, does justice to his earlier pledge in "innocence" to "reclaim africa's missing soul." From paying homage to Christopher Okigbo, of whose "tribe of defiant minstrels" (105) Eze counts himself as a member, to Gabriel Okara, to the 75 heroes of Igbo Landing in 1803, he fondly remembers, in mourning, victims and heroes of the Biafra war; a theme any conscious Nigerian poet cannot overlook even though Eze could be accused of hackneyed fixation to that theme. He extends his concerns to the victims of religious wars in northern Nigeria, especially in Jos and Kaduna, a war no less fanned by selfish leaders who ensure that religion and politics are locked in one cell room. He visits Benue, the where the worst-hit victims of Fulani herdsmen reside and the church massacre in Ozubulu in Anambra state. The results are heart-wrenching.

Eze wins my soul with his poetic reply to Ken Saro-Wiwa's "epitaph for Biafra" wherein the late environmental activist mocked dead Biafran soldiers and some of his erstwhile comrades on the side of the new republic. In all I have read as a serious aficionado of African poetry, tributes to Saro-Wiwa sound like hagiographies to me. But here is a different perspective to that ritual that I cannot disagree with:

> you took a drag from your pipe and exhaled
> the memories of erstwhile friends and poets
> claimed by the war they did not ask for
>
> you let the plume of smoke dull your senses of justice
> you shut the door on right and chose wrong
> and that is why you are not my hero… (119)

Is this collection perfect? Not really. For starters, there are, in fact, some poems in this collection that do not fit thematically into the corpus. A handful of poems, especially some of the shorter poems in "innocence" and "transgression" would have fared better outside this collection, published either as singular poems in journals or as contributions to online poetry blogs. They appear in this collection like a group of *babanriga*-donning gatecrashers in an event where the invited guests came on suits.

In some poems, the poet sometimes seems to forget to stop. There are poems that are expectedly meant to stop at some stanzas or lines, the poet's muse appears to lure him to shoot across the runway, dovetailing into unnecessary lines that attempt to drag the poems, yet they manage to stay put. For instance, in "dear mama", we expected the poem to end where he says "and though the destination is not yet in sight, mama/ i am putting in work and hoping that someday heaven will bless the just/". This is where the full stop, in my view, should have come. But he goes beyond to now ask: "dear mama, please tell me, are you proud of me?/ or would you have wished for a better man than the one you see?" To me, this is superfluous; why ask your mother if she is proud of you when you already affirmed that you are "just"—which mother would want a "just" son to become unjust? There are a few more of such excesses, or what we might term "over-writing".

Nevertheless, in his audacious attempt to make large statements using small letters all the way—like the English poet e.e. cummings—while also making sonorous music, James Eze manages not to fall off key. In the end, what dominates, what persists after one has closed the book, is a mature, beautiful and timely orchestra that beams a touching light of concern on life's lofty dreams and harsh realities that demand to be felt. Magisterial