


GINS 4090

China's Belt Road Strategy & the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR)

Fridays 8:35 p.m. – 11:25 p.m.

Please confirm location on Carleton Central



Instructor: Elizabeth Cobbett
Office: TBA
Office Hours: 14:30 to 16:30 Thursdays (or by appointment – please email me)
Telephone: TBA
E-mail: Elizabeth.Cobbett@carleton.ca

Overview of course

This course is an opportunity to study what is being referred to as the biggest infrastructure project in the modern period. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a grand strategy. While it is unclear what it will change in terms of world order and power, one thing is clear: the BRI is on everyone's radar. The focus in this course is predominantly, but not exclusively, on the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR).

As the world's economic centre of gravity progressively moves eastwards, China is extending its trading routes westwards and the IOR, once again, at the heart of historical convulsive transformations and great power strategies. Of course, the same can be said of Eurasia, but there are less players there than in the IOR. All global powers have needed to establish presence and control in the IOR as it sits in one the busiest shipping, trading and most densely populated region. China already has dominance in the Asia Pacific area, the BRI extends China's powers beyond this region. China is not the first to try and use this great water expanse to support its domestic economy. Merchants, sailors, peddlers, pirates, and pilgrims living along the IOR for centuries have seen the Roman Empire, Arabian traders, European traders - Portuguese, Dutch, and then British Empire – all try to dominate, influence, and profit from this area. The twentieth century saw USA military control of the seaways and conduct its fight on terrorism. China's new Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) is the latest ambitions of a rising power hoping to use the IOR to its advantage. This course thus focuses on one this strategic region. Students will study the developments of rising China's global governance ambitions as they are articulated in this strategic oceanic world.

Learning Outcomes:

Knowledge and understanding:

- introduce students to current debates on shifts in global politics, changes in global governance and world order through a focus on China and its grand strategy, the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI);
- foster awareness of the historical background of Chinese systems of governance and an understanding of the way historical paths shape current developments.
- examine the relationship between China and other emerging powers through the BRI;

Skills and abilities:

- apply relevant theoretical and methodological tools in the comparative study of regions and powers within them;
- formulate relevant research problems within the field emerging powers in the global arena;
- discuss particular versus general processes involved in the emergence of powerful countries and regions;
- support students as they consolidate academic skills such as conducting independent research, making oral presentations in groups and engaging in class debates.

Overview of Weekly Topics:

Week 1 (January 11):	Introduction: China's Tributary System & World Order
Week 2 (January 18):	China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Week 3 (January 25):	Indian Ocean: historical significance of the interregional area
Week 4 (February 1):	Idealism: Narratives, Cartographic Imagination & Representations
Week 5 (February 8):	Materialism: Big projects, logistics, transport, infrastructures, & ports
Week 6 (February 15):	Political Economy of BRI – Development banking, finance, trade

Week 7	Winter break
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Week 8 (March 1):	Security in the Indian Ocean
Week 9 (March 8):	Community of shared destiny(?): Indian subcontinent & South Asia
Week 10 (March 15):	Community of shared destiny(?): Middle East & Africa
Week 11 (March 22)	Community of shared destiny(?): Eurasia, Russia

Week 12 (March 29):	Elizabeth at ISA (International Studies Association) conference
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Week 13 (April 5):	Conclusion: <i>Pax Sinica</i> - Win-Win?
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Evaluation Summary:

1. Weekly attendance and active participation in class debates	22%
2. Online analysis weekly readings (8 weeks 3-11)	24%
3. Presentation	14%
4. Final essay due 9 April 2019	40%

Discussion of Evaluation Components:

1. Weekly attendance and active participation in class (ongoing) 22%

Attendance is mandatory. Regular participation and willingness to engage in discussions, based on informed and respectful comments directly related to the readings is a key component of this 4th year seminar course.

- You will have already written your weekly analyses/summaries by the time you come into class Friday.
- Attendance will be recorded but counts for only part of your participation grade, active discussion is important to earn full marks. As you will come to class fully prepared, you can get high grades by bringing ideas, insights, questions and interesting points to class and contributing to fruitful discussions;
- Please let me know in advance (in person or by email) if you will be missing a class for urgent reasons (medical or family emergency, etc.).

2. 8 x Online analysis weekly readings (weeks 3 – 11) (ongoing) 24%

Each student will write **eight (8)** 700-800-word analytical summaries during the semester that will be submitted each week via CuLearn

- Each summary must be submitted to the CuLearn online discussion group by **Tuesday 5pm, BEFORE** the assigned Friday class.

Each summary/analysis must include the following:

- ✓ An answer to the question:
In what ways do these texts help us think about China, global politics, & world order in the 21st Century?
- ✓ The principal arguments (thesis statement) being made in each of the readings;
- ✓ The key debates or issues raised by the authors;
- ✓ The strengths of the readings, what you liked and why;
- ✓ The weaknesses in the readings, what you saw as being problematic.

NB - The goal here is to think transversally and work through all the readings together in your analyses and not one after the other. In this way, the readings become more alive and interactive to bring new insights. So, it is not really summaries per say, but really analyses.

3. Presentation (ongoing) 14%

- Each student will make one 12 – 15 mins in-class presentations. Dates will be agreed upon at the beginning of the semester.
- The goal of the presentations is for each student to convey the main analytical ideas and questions coming out of that week's readings.
- To do this, students will use ideas, reflections from their peer's online summaries in their presentations, as well as their own main argument/point about where they stand in regard to the theme and that week's readings;
- The presentation **is not a summary or recap** of the weekly readings, as everyone has already done the readings and written a summary. Rather, the goal is to be **analytical**;
- As well as a formal grade, students will receive written and oral constructive peer review/feedback in class.

4. Final essay (due 9 April 2019) 40%

You will write a research paper (12-15 pages - double spaced, standard margins, 12-point font) in response to the following research question:

Is China's presence in the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) significant for world order?

Your sources for the paper may include internet sources, non-academic data and sources – such as policy tanks, media, briefs, etc. – but must include at least 8 refereed journal articles.

The assignment will be graded based on the quality of your writing, research and analysis, the organization of the paper, the depth of research on the topic, and the coherence and originality of your argument. The essay should be posted to CuLearn by 11:55 pm on April 9th.

WEEKLY READING LIST

All readings will be made available over Library Reserves and ARES (electronic reserves)

Week 1 (January 11): Introduction: China's Tributary System & World Order

1. **Topic:** lecture on World Order and the BRI

2. **Overview of course**
 - General discussion of expectations of the course
 - Explanation of assignments
 - Tentative allocation of presentations slots

3. **Discussion of Required Readings:**
 - Pan, Su-Yan, and Joe Tin-Yau Lo. 2017. "Re-Conceptualizing China's Rise as a Global Power: A Neo-Tributary Perspective." *Pacific Review* 30 (1): 1–25.
 - Wang, Ban. 2017. *Chinese Visions of World Order. Tianxia, Culture, and World Politics*. Durham: Duke University Press – read Introduction, pages 1-22
 - Wang, Yong. 2016. "Offensive for defensive: the belt and road initiative and China's new grand strategy." *Pacific Review* 29, no. 3: 455-463.

Optional readings

- Chebankova, E. 2017, "Russia's idea of the multipolar world order: origins and main dimensions", *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 33, 3, pp. 217-234
- Cooper, Andrew F and Daniel Flemes. 2012. "Foreign Policy Strategies of Emerging Powers in a Multipolar World: an introductory review." *Third World Quarterly*, 34(6), 943-962
- Joseph Nye. 2017. "Will the Liberal Order Survive?" *Foreign Affairs* 96, no. 1: 10-16.

- Zhou, F. 2011. "Equilibrium Analysis of The Tributary System". *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 4, no. 2 (2011): 147-178

Week 2 (January 18): *China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)*1. **Topic:** lecture on BRI

As the single biggest infrastructure redevelopment project underway, the Belt and Road Initiative has attracted attention and generated heated discussion around the globe. No other state-sponsored enterprise is currently provoking more discussion, dread or excitement. Upon completion, it should comprise 55% of the world's GDP, 70% of the world's population and 75% of the world's energy reserves and stretch from the South China Sea to the Baltic. As far as historical parallels go, there isn't one. The only scheme remotely comparable was the US Marshall Plan, a project to rebuild Europe after WWII, which the BRI dwarfs. In way of comparison in today's money, the Marshall Plan cost \$110 billion, the price China will pay to link the world's supply chains is \$900 billion.

2. **Discussion of Required Readings:**

- Boriçi, Gjon. (2018). "China's One Belt and One Road Initiative: The Response to Western Globalization?". *ILIRIA International Review*, Vol 8, Iss 1 (2018), (1).
- Ferdinand, Peter. 2016. "Westward ho-the China dream and 'one belt, one road': Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping." *International Affairs* 92, no. 4: 941-957
- Huang, Yiping. 2016. "Understanding China's Belt & Road Initiative: Motivation, framework and assessment." *China Economic Review* 40, 314-321.
- Summers, Tim. 2016. "China's 'New Silk Roads': sub-national regions and networks of global political economy." *Third World Quarterly* 37, no. 9: 1628-1643.

Optional readings

- Hongjun Xiao, Junjie Cheng, & Xin Wang. (2018). Does the Belt and Road Initiative Promote Sustainable Development? Evidence from Countries along the Belt and Road. *Sustainability*, Vol 10, Iss 12, p 4370

Week 3 (January 25): *Indian Ocean: historical significance of the interregional area*1. **Topic:** lecture on IOR

By the time Marco Polo set out to explore East Asia in the 13th century, communities across Africa, Asia and the Mediterranean had been exchanging their wares for already over **hundreds of years** in a vast network driven by the monsoon winds of the Indian Ocean.

During its peak, the oceanic trade network connected the Gulf, India, China, Rome, and southern African kingdoms such as Great Zimbabwe. In terms of the sheer amount of goods moved, the maritime trading system rivalled its more famous inland relative, the Silk Road. In 1498, Portuguese entered the Indian Ocean trade as pirates rather than traders. Europe had little to offer as trade in this established sophisticated commercial network. In 1602, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) sought a total monopoly on lucrative spices. In 1680, the British joined in with their British East India Company, which challenged the VOC for control of the trade routes. Goods moved increasingly to Europe, while the former Asian trading empires grew poorer and collapsed.

Move to the 20th Century, during the Cold War the ‘action’ was in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans— where submarines, ships, and planes played out superpower rivalry. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the rise of China, however, the focus has shifted again to the East, Asia and the Indian Ocean Rim which is gaining increasing prominence as an arena for geopolitical rivalry as well as cooperation and collaboration.

2. **Discussion Required Readings:**

- Bose, Sugata. 2006. *A Hundred Horizons: the Indian Ocean in the age of global empire*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. **Two chapters:**
 - Start with the Conclusion: “The Indian Ocean Arena in the History of Globalization.”
 - Then go to the Introduction: “Space and Time on the Indian Ocean Rim”
- Christian Bouchard & William Crumplin (2010) “Neglected no longer: The Indian Ocean at the forefront of world geopolitics and global geostrategy,” *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region*, 6:1, 26-51
- Prestholdt, Jeremy (2015) Locating the Indian Ocean: notes on the postcolonial reconstitution of space, *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 9:3, 440-467

Optional readings

- Fatima, Qamar, and Asma Jamshed. 2015. “The Political and Economic Significance of Indian Ocean: An Analysis.” *South Asian Studies* (1026-678X) 30, no. 2: 73-89.

Week 4 (February 1): Idealism: Narratives, Cartographic Imagination & Representations

1. **Topic:** lecture on Idealism

The term Silk Road (in German Seidenstraße) was first used by the German geographer, Ferdinand von Richthofen, in 1877. Doyle (quoted in Sidaway &Woon) refers to

'interimperiality,' the ways in which empires rework networks, ideas, sites, and spaces – which she termed “sedimented infrastructures,” that were, in turn, central to other prior imperial systems. Most public discussion of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) tends to paint it as a coherent strategy of the Chinese Communist Party. One school argues that this strategy is largely economic in focus, the other major approach focuses on the political drivers. What both need to consider is that either way, the BRI is being promoted as a global brand.

2. **Discussion Required Readings:**

- Bhoothalingam, Ravi. 2016. “The Silk Road as a Global Brand*.” *China Report* 52, no. 1: 45.
- Callahan, William A. (2016) China’s “Asia dream”: The Belt Road Initiative and the new regional order. *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, 1 (3). pp. 226-243.
- Thusu, Daya. “BRI: Bridging or Breaking BRICS?” *Global Media & China* 3, no. 2 (June 2018): 117.
- Sidaway, James D. & Chih Yuan Woon (2017) “Chinese Narratives on “One Belt, One Road” (一帶一路) in Geopolitical and Imperial Contexts”, *The Professional Geographer*, 69:4, 591-603

Optional readings

- Jean-Marc F. Blanchard (2017) “Probing China’s Twenty-First-Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI): An Examination of MSRI Narratives”, *Geopolitics*, 22:2, 246-268
- Tom Baxter. Zooming In, Zooming Out: the frames through which Western media see Belt and Road: An awareness of the narrative frames used by Western media to portray BRI can lead to better reporting” *Panda Paw Dragon Claw*. Available <https://pandapawdragon-claw.blog/2018/07/27/zooming-in-zooming-out-the-frames-through-which-western-media-seebelt-and-road/>
- L.H.M. Ling. “Beyond Soft Power: Cultural Power from India and China Today through Film,” *China Report*, Volume: 53 issue: 2, page(s): 172-187 available <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0009445517696632>
- Liu, Weidong, Michael Dunford, and Boyang Gao. 2018. “A Discursive Construction of the Belt and Road Initiative: From Neo-Liberal to Inclusive Globalization.” *Journal of Geographical Sciences* 28 (9): 1199.

- Diana T. Kudaibergenova. 2017. "'My Silk Road to You': Re-Imagining Routes, Roads, and Geography in Contemporary Art of 'Central Asia.'" *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, Vol 8, Iss 1, Pp 31-43 (2017), no. 1: 31.

Week 5 (February 8): Materialism: Big projects, logistics, transport, infrastructures, & ports

1. Topic: lecture on Materialism

The BRI is the single biggest infrastructure redevelopment project in history, and no other state sponsored enterprise is currently provoking more discussion, dread or excitement. This is because, above all, BRI is a connectivity project. It is set to improve transportation infrastructure, connecting

various countries in Asia, Europe, and Northeast Africa. One component is the land transportation infrastructure (known as the One Belt), mostly via high speed trains. The other is the sea transportation infrastructure (known as the Maritime Silk Road), via trans-ocean ships. It encompasses transportation and logistics, production and investment, finances, research and technology, humanitarian affairs, and foreign policy.

Discussion Required Readings:

- Doyle, Laura. 2013. 'Inter-Imperiality: Dialectics in a Postcolonial World History'. *International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* Volume 16 Issue 2, 2013.
- Notteboom, Theo and Zhongzhen Yang. "Port Governance in China since 2004: Institutional Layering and the Growing Impact of Broader Policies." *Research in Transportation Business & Management* 22 (March 1, 2017): 184–200
- Wang, James Jixian, and Selina Yau. 2018. "Case studies on transport infrastructure projects in belt and road initiative: An actor network theory perspective." *Journal of Transport Geography* 71, 213-223.

Optional readings

- Dollar, David. 2018. "Is China's Development Finance a Challenge to the International Order?." *Asian Economic Policy Review* 13, no. 2: 283-298.
- Lee, Paul Tae-Woo, Zhi-Hua Hu, Sang-Jeong Lee, Kyoung-Suk Choi, and Sung-Ho Shin. 2018. "Research trends and agenda on the Belt and Road (B&R) initiative with a focus on maritime transport." *Maritime Policy & Management* 45, no. 3: 282-300.
- Li, Kevin X., Mengjie Jin, Guanqiu Qi, Wenming Shi, and Adolf K. Y. Ng. 2018. "Logistics as a driving force for development under the Belt and Road Initiative - the Chinese model for developing countries." *Transport Reviews* 38, no. 4: 457-478.

Week 6 (February 15): *Political Economy of BRI – Development banking, finance, trade*

1. **Topic:** lecture on Political economy of BRI

Any discussion of the Belt and Road Initiative inevitably turns to consideration of how the various projects within it are to be financed. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which became operational on 16 January 2016, was conceived at a time when ideas on the initiative were first taking hold. While the AIIB can and does finance infrastructure projects in Asia, it is not confined to doing so. The project also has implications for the expansion and internationalization of the renminbi (RMB), both in the real economies of Belt and Road host countries and in global offshore financial markets such as London.

2. **Discussion Required Readings:**

- Chin, Gregory T. 2016. "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Governance Innovation and Prospects." *Global Governance* 22, no. 1: 11-25.
- Hong Yu (2017) Motivation behind China's 'One Belt, One Road' Initiatives and Establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 26: 353–368
- Xin Zhang (2017) "Chinese Capitalism and the Maritime Silk Road: A World Systems Perspective", *Geopolitics*, 22:2, 310-331

Optional readings

- Ramasamy, Bala; Yeung, Matthew; Utoktham, Chorthip; Duval, Yann (2017) : Trade and trade facilitation along the Belt and Road Initiative corridors, ARTNeT Working Paper Series, No. 172, Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade (ARTNeT), Bangkok <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/172051/1/1006745505.pdf>
- Sanders, Gerard J. 2017. "The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative: Complementarities and Contrasts." *Chinese Journal of International Law* 16, no. 2: 367-371.

Week 7

Winter break

Week 8 (March 1): Security in the Indian Ocean

1. **Topic:** lecture on Security in the IOR

China's entry in the Indian Ocean region, through economic investments, political influence, and military presence along the Maritime Silk Road is significantly altering regional dynamics. It has spurred India-China rivalry, which overlaps with US-China competition. China's economic and energy security is also inextricably tied to shipping routes across the Indian Ocean and through the Strait of Malacca, motivating a growing military and commercial footprint in the region. In order to protect its economic investments along the Silk Road, we can expect China to increase its military footprint in the Indian Ocean.

2. **Discussion Required Readings:**

- Brewster, David. 2017. "Silk Roads and Strings of Pearls: The Strategic Geography of China's New Pathways in the Indian Ocean." *Geopolitics* 22, no. 2: 269-291.
- Timothy Doyle (2018) Blue Economy and the Indian Ocean Rim, *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region*, 14:1, 1-6
- Chia-Yu Huang, Mike. 2018. "A New Game Started? China's 'Overseas Strategic Pivots' in the Indian Ocean Region." *China Report* 54, no. 3: 267
- Gurpreet S. Khurana (2016) China as an Indian Ocean power: trends and implications, *Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India*, 12:1, 13-24

Optional readings

- Pham, J. Peter. 2013. "Pirates and Dragon Boats: Assessing the Chinese Navy's Recent East African Deployments." *Journal of The Middle East & Africa* 4, no. 1: 87-108.
- Krupakar, Jayanna. "China's Naval Base(s) in the Indian Ocean—Signs of a Maritime Grand Strategy?." *Strategic Analysis* 41, no. 3 (May 2017): 207.

Week 9 (March 8): Community of shared destiny(?): Indian subcontinent & South Asia

1. **Topic:** lecture on Indian subcontinent & South Asia

Now, the Indian Ocean has once again become the key strategic arena for Asian powers. With a booming economy and aspiring great power status, China is entering the Indian Ocean by

becoming an active player in the region. India, however, has been a vocal opponent of the BRI as it includes close cooperation with its arch-rival Pakistan, in particular in the form of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, which passes through Kashmir—a region that the Indian government understands to be occupied by Pakistan. It also undermines the Indian vision of itself as the ‘big man’ in south Asia.

2. **Discussion Required Readings:**

- Blah, Montgomery. 2018. “China’s Belt and Road Initiative and India’s Concerns.” *Strategic Analysis* 42, no. 4: 313.
- Chung, Chien-peng (C. P.). 2018. “What are the strategic and economic implications for South Asia of China's Maritime Silk Road initiative?” *Pacific Review* 31, no. 3: 315.
- Kaya, Taylan Özgür, and Fatih Kılıç. 2017. “Sino-Indian Strategic Rivalry in the Indian Ocean Region.” *Human & Society / İnsan Ve Toplum* 7, no. 2: 155-172.
- Ke He. (2017). Belt and Road (B&R) Initiative and its impact on ASEAN Integration: From a perspective of structural realism. *Asian International Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol 17, Iss 4, Pp 4-27

Optional readings

- Khan Samra Sarfraz. 2018. “The Trans-Regional Implications of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the One Belt and One Road Initiative.” *Studia Humanitatis*, Vol 1 (2018).o6
- Maqsood, Asia. 2018. “Can Belt and Road Initiative Slacken Probabilities of a Nuclear War between India and Pakistan by enhancing Pakistan’s maritime Security?.” *Defence Journal* 21, no. 11: 34.
- Tom Miller. 2017. ‘Introduction’ in *China’s Asian Dream: empire building along the new Silk Road*. London: Zed Books`
- Nicholas Szechenyi (Ed). (2108) “China’s Maritime Silk Road Strategic and Economic Implications for the Indo-Pacific Region,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)*. Available <https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-maritime-silk-road>

Week 10 (March 15): **Community of shared destiny(?): Middle East & Africa**

1. **Topic:** lecture on Middle East & Africa

China's rise and Middle Eastern insecurity are two dominating themes in international relations today. Yet, their relevance for each other is less discussed. The most important connection is China's and the Persian Gulf region's new economic interdependence – a part of China's New Silk Roads. Energy and non-energy trade between the Gulf and China has grown fast and is increasingly accompanied by investment flows in both directions, as well as closer diplomatic relations.

2. **Discussion Required Readings:**

- Christian Bouchard & William Crumplin (2013) Indian Ocean region: The evolving context and rising significance of the African littoral, *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region*, 9:2, 150-172
- Li, Fuquan (2018) The Role of Islam in the Development of the 'Belt and Road' Initiative, *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies*, 12:1, 35-45
- Shariatinia, Mohsen, and Hamidreza Azizi. 2017. "Iran-China Cooperation in the Silk Road Economic Belt: From Strategic Understanding to Operational Understanding." *China & World Economy* 25, no. 5: 46.

Optional readings

- Kamel, Maha S. 2018. "China's Belt and Road Initiative: Implications for the Middle East." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 31, no. 1: 76-95.
- Kim, Hwa-Joong, Jasmine Siu Lee Lam, and Paul Tae-Woo Lee. 2018. "Analysis of liner shipping networks and transshipment flows of potential hub ports in sub-Saharan Africa." *Transport Policy* 69, 193-206.
- KÜÇÜKCAN TALİP. (2017). The Belt and Road Initiative and Middle Eastern Politics : Challenges Ahead. *Insight Turkey*, (3), 83
- S. Wu, "The Strategic Docking between China and Middle East Countries under the "Belt and Road" Forum", *Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies in Asia* Vol. 9 No. 4 (2015)

Week 11 (March 22) Community of shared destiny(?): Eurasia & Russia

1. **Topic:** lecture on Eurasia & Russia

China and Russia have formed a strategic partnership since the mid-1990s. Driven their shared interest in opposing what they characterize as power politics and US hegemony, Beijing and Moscow have formed a united front on many important issues such as global governance and the respect for sovereignty and pledged support to each other's diplomatic initiatives. Russia's Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) is the result of the ideological victory of the

concept of Eurasianism among Russia's policy makers, the disillusionment with the idea of Greater Europe and the success of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) as the regional block headed by Russia. The opportunities for Chinese-Russian cooperation in the context of the BRI and the GEP significantly outweigh the barriers as it becomes evident from the analysis of scholars and the clear instances of China and Russia openly avoiding avenues for confrontation.

2. **Discussion Required Readings:**

- Druzhinin A. G., and Dong Y. 2018. "One Belt — One Road Initiative: A Window of Opportunity for Russia's Western Border Regions." *Baltic Region*, Vol 10, Iss 2, Pp 39-55 (2018), no. 2: 39.
- Yongquan Li. 2018. "The Greater Eurasian Partnership and the Belt and Road Initiative: Can the Two Be Linked?" *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, Vol 9, Iss 2, Pp 94-99 (2018), no. 2: 94.
- Ivan Timofeev, Yaroslav Lissovlik, and Liudmila Filippova. 2017. "Russia's Vision of the Belt and Road Initiative: From the Rivalry of the Great Powers to Forging a New Cooperation Model in Eurasia". *China & World Economy*. Volume25, Issue5, Special Issue: Eurasian Perspectives on China's Belt and Road Initiative

Optional readings

- Elena F. Tracy, Evgeny Shvarts, Eugene Simonov & Mikhail Babenko (2017) China's new Eurasian ambitions: the environmental risks of the Silk Road Economic Belt, *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 58:1, 56-88
- Kaczmarek, M. (2017) "Two Ways of Influence-building: The Eurasian Economic Union and the One Belt, One Road Initiative", *DEurope-Asia Studies*, vol. 69, no. 7, pp. 1027-1046
- Mia M. Bennett. 2016. "The Silk Road goes north: Russia's role within China's Belt and Road Initiative." *Area Development and Policy*, Volume 1, 2016 - Issue 3

*Week 12 (March 29): Elizabeth at ISA
(International Studies Association) conference*

Week 13 (April 5): Conclusion: Pax Sinica - Win-Win?

1. **Topic:** lecture on Pax Sinica – Win-Win?

Many expect that the BRI will be a key determinant of the direction not only of China's future, but of the world's future as it negotiates the anticipated rise of China to growing levels of wealth and power. The goal is to weave neighbouring countries into a Sino-centric network of economic, political, cultural, and security relations. Beijing's grand strategy thus is to re-constitute the regional order – and eventually global order – with new governance ideas, norms, and rules. Critics of the BRI claim that the vast global network of new road, rail and pipeline projects will benefit primarily China. Securing sea lanes, ports and refuelling stations will help China's exporters reach overseas markets and give China uninterrupted access to energy imports. Establishing overland connections to the Indian Ocean will open new trade

routes and make Chinese military and commercial vessels less vulnerable to strategic choke points such as the straits of Malacca and Hormuz. Hence while the Asian region is an important focus of Chinese foreign policy, Beijing's peripheral diplomacy is about more than win-win cooperation in the neighbourhood. It also acts as the means to the much larger end of promoting China's new vision of global governance.

2. **Discussion Required Readings:**

- Nordin, Astrid and Mikael Weissmann. (2018) "Will Trump make China great again? The belt and road initiative and international order." *International Affairs* 94, no. 2: 231-249.
- Suisheng Zhao (2015) "Rethinking the Chinese World Order: the imperial cycle and the rise of China", *Journal of Contemporary China*, 24:96, 961-982
- Zeng, Lingliang. "Conceptual Analysis of China's Belt and Road Initiative: A Road towards a Regional Community of Common Destiny." *Chinese Journal of International Law*, no. 3 (2016): 517.

Optional readings

- Justin V. Hastings (2011) The fractured geopolitics of the United States in the Indian Ocean Region, *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region*, 7:2, 183-199

Academic Accommodations: The Paul Menton Centre for Students with Disabilities (PMC) provides services to students with Learning Disabilities (LD), psychiatric/mental health disabilities, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD), chronic medical conditions, and impairments in mobility, hearing, and vision. If you have a disability requiring academic accommodations in this course, please contact PMC at 613-520-6608 or pmc@carleton.ca for a formal

evaluation. If you are already registered with the PMC, contact your PMC coordinator to send me your **Letter of Accommodation** at the beginning of the term, and no later than two weeks before the first inclass scheduled test or exam requiring accommodation (*if applicable*). After requesting accommodation from PMC, meet with me to ensure accommodation arrangements are made. Please consult the PMC website for the deadline to request accommodations for the formally-scheduled exam (*if applicable*).

Accommodation for Religious Observance: Students requesting accommodation for religious observances should apply in writing to their instructor for alternate dates and/or means of satisfying academic requirements. Such requests should be made during the first two weeks of class, or as soon as possible after the need for accommodation is known to exist, but no later than two weeks before the compulsory academic event. Accommodation is to be worked out directly and on an individual basis between the student and the instructor(s) involved. Instructors will make accommodations in a way that avoids academic disadvantage to the student. Instructors and students may contact an Equity Services Advisor for assistance (www.carleton.ca/equity).

Accommodation for Pregnancy: Pregnant students requiring academic accommodations are encouraged to contact an Equity Advisor in Equity Services to complete a *letter of accommodation*. Then, make an appointment to discuss your needs with the instructor at least two weeks prior to the first academic event in which it is anticipated the accommodation will be required.

Plagiarism: The University Senate defines plagiarism as “presenting, whether intentional or not, the ideas, expression of ideas or work of others as one’s own.” This can include:

- reproducing or paraphrasing portions of someone else’s published or unpublished material, regardless of the source, and presenting these as one’s own without proper citation or reference to the original source;
- submitting a take-home examination, essay, laboratory report or other assignment written, in whole or in part, by someone else;
- using ideas or direct, verbatim quotations, or paraphrased material, concepts, or ideas without appropriate acknowledgment in any academic assignment;
- using another’s data or research findings;
- failing to acknowledge sources through the use of proper citations when using another’s works and/or failing to use quotation marks;
- handing in “substantially the same piece of work for academic credit more than once without prior written permission of the course instructor in which the submission occurs.

Plagiarism is a serious offence which cannot be resolved directly with the course’s instructor. The Associate Deans of the Faculty conduct a rigorous investigation, including an interview with the student, when an instructor suspects a piece of work has been plagiarized. Penalties are not trivial. They may include a mark of zero for the plagiarized work or a final grade of “F” for the course.

Intellectual Property: Student or professor materials created for this course (including presentations and posted notes, labs, case studies, assignments and exams) remain the intellectual property of the author(s). They are intended for personal use and may not be reproduced or redistributed without prior written consent of the author(s).

Submission and Return of Term Work: Papers must be submitted directly to the instructor according to the instructions in the course outline. Late assignments may be submitted to the BGIInS office in 2404R, River Building. For essays not returned in class please attach a **stamped, self-addressed envelope** if you wish to have your assignment returned by mail. Final exams are intended solely for the purpose of evaluation and will not be returned.

Grading: Standing in a course is determined by the course instructor, subject to the approval of the faculty Dean. Final standing in courses will be shown by alphabetical grades. The system of grades used, with corresponding grade points is:

Percentage	Letter grade	12-point scale	Percentage	Letter grade	12-point scale
90-100	A+	12	67-69	C+	6
85-89	A	11	63-66	C	5
80-84	A-	10	60-62	C-	4
77-79	B+	9	57-59	D+	3
73-76	B	8	53-56	D	2
70-72	B-	7	50-52	D-	1

Approval of final grades: Standing in a course is determined by the course instructor subject to the approval of the Faculty Dean. This means that grades submitted by an instructor may be subject to revision. No grades are final until they have been approved by the Dean.

Carleton E-mail Accounts: All email communication to students from BGIInS will be via official Carleton university e-mail accounts and/or cuLearn. As important course and University information is distributed this way, it is the student's responsibility to monitor their Carleton and cuLearn accounts.

Official Course Outline: The course outline posted to the BGIInS website is the official course outline.