GINS 4090B

AMERICA AS EMPIRE

WINTER 2020

Prof. Andrew M. Johnston

Office ▮ Department of History ▮ 414 Patterson Hall

Office Hours ▮ Mondays and Tuesdays 9.30-10.30 or by appointment

Seminar ▮ SA 315 ▮ Monday ▮ 11.35 a.m. - 2.25 p.m.

BA in GLOBAL AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Kroeger College of Public Affairs, Carleton University

A nation that should never do wrong must necessarily govern the world.
— John Adams, Journal entry (6 August 1796)

America ... goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all.
— John Quincy Adams

No imperial designs lurk in the American mind. They are alien to American sentiment, thought, and purpose. Our priceless principles undergo no change under a tropic sun. They go with the flag.
— William McKinley

It is time to begin teaching the American people the absurdity of that clause in the Declaration of Independence which derives all just powers all just powers of government from the consent of the governed.
— Whitelaw Reid, owner of the *New York Tribune* (1899)

American cannot have an empire abroad and a republic at home.
— Mark Twain

Today, in American imperialism, the commodity has reached its most grandiose historical manifestation.
— C. L. R. James

WELCOME TO GINS 4090

The United States has tended to believe that it is exceptional among world powers, and one way it has been most exceptional is in *not* having had an empire. On the other hand, U.S. historians have, since at least the 1950s, spent a great deal of energy trying to debunk that myth. During the Cold War, it was especially difficult to make the argument that the U.S. was in some way "imperial" because this was what America's arch-enemy the Soviet Union was saying about it. After the end of the Cold War, however, when the US appeared to occupy a unipolar place in the world, it became possible—indeed in some circles, desirable—to describe the United States as an empire. Today, the question is debated in different forms, but it still seems to hinge on the idea of whether America's promotion of "liberal internationalism" constitutes a form of global hegemony or is rather some form of teleological playing out of the fate of history itself.

This course aims to tackle some of these debates. It will do so by tracing the long history of U.S. expansion—continental, hemispheric, and global—and the historical controversies that each phase of that expansion engendered. It will examine the first "great debate" over imperialism in the early 1900s, when the U.S. possession of the Philippines prompted a fierce argument in Congress about whether such overt colonialism was consistent with American political values; it will ask whether Woodrow Wilson's liberal internationalism constituted a form of empire or was merely a reflection of the

expanding influence of liberal political values around the world; it will study the Cold War and the question of whether its singular global presence in the post-World War 2 world was a function of an "empire by invitation" or the continued expansion of a liberal-capitalist world order that served U.S. interests and values. In this context, the Vietnam War served as a powerful reminder of the limits of U.S. power but also prompted a revival of older debates about the correct relationship between American values and American power that showed once again the persistence of an anti-imperial strain in American politics. Finally, we'll look at the post-Cold War debate over globalization as an expression of a limitless, de-territorialized republic that early American political theory actually imagined.

INSTRUCTOR

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OFFICE HOURS

Monday and Tuesday 9.30-10.30 a.m. or by appointment.

BOOKS

We will work with a wide variety of books, articles, and archival sources in this course, so there's no required text *per se*. The sources will be either placed on reserve or posted on cuLearn.

ASSIGNMENTS AND EVALUATION

This course offers two assignment streams: (1) A **reading and review** stream in which you write two short papers that address some of the historiographical material we cover (I will provide the questions and the additional reading sources); OR (2) a **research stream** in which you produce a major research paper involving the use of primary materials from assorted published and online archival collections. In addition, students will be evaluated on their seminar participation, which will include weekly reading responses. There is no exam in this course.

Grading Values:

1. Essays [40%]
(A) Reading and Review Stream: Each paper (7-8 pages) will be worth 20% for a total of 40%
(B) Research Paper Stream: Proposal (2 pages worth 5%) + Final paper (15 pages worth 35%) for a total of 40%

2. Reading Responses (10, i.e. you may miss 3 weeks): 2% each for a total of 20% [20%]

3. Participation [10% + 30%]
There are two assessments. You will each be asked to co-moderate (with me) ONE class discussion (depending on the number of students, you may also share the moderation with another student), worth 10%. Your task is to provide a brief summary of the main issues raised in the readings, along with a series of discussion questions. Your moderation text should be submitted to me as a single page document. The remaining assessment (30%) will come from your overall participation in the seminar discussions. Active participation by everyone is essential to the success of the seminar, especially if we see this as a collective effort to help each other better understand the material. Participation is about showing that you have done the readings well and developed interesting thoughts about them. If you manage to demonstrate that you are more or less on top of the material, then the quantity of your contributions will matter less. While I recognize and will—to the best of my ability—fully accommodate the different levels of comfort students have with discussions, do bear in mind that it's also not entirely fair to benefit from a discussion being carried by other students. We will try finding ways to support and engage everyone on their own terms, and to understand that

we're not in competition with each other, but are working collectively to understand difficult historical questions.

For more details and guidance on each of these assignments, see the **Assignment Guidelines** folder posted on the Course Website.

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SEMINAR SCHEDULE

WEEK 1 (J.6)
INTRODUCTION: EMPIRES HISTORY AND IS THE UNITED STATES ONE?

+ Alejandro Colás, *Empire*, chap. 1

If you have time to take a look at this brief introduction to Colás' book, it will help get us all on more or less the same definitional page. If you're interested in the definitional history of the term, I would also recommend, chap. 1, "What is an Empire?" in Charles S. Maier's *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and its Predecessors* (2006). Beyond that, the first week will mostly be about going over the syllabus and getting to know each other.

WEEK 2 (J.13)
MISSIONS AND FRONTIERS: A TOPOLOGY OF U.S. EMPIRE(S)

Required:

+ Julian Go, *Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), introduction ("Empires in Comparison"), pp. 1-27
+ Anders Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the Empire of Right* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), pp. 3-66
+ Amy S. Greenberg, *Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), introduction, pp. 1-17

Discussion:

This week's three readings explore some of the literature that tries to show multiple traditions of U.S. foreign policy (are Americans a "covenanted people" who like to turn inward against the world or a "missionary people" who want to transform the world around them?), as well as the argument that the U.S. was from the outset perhaps simply an extension of the same imperatives of the British empire, but now harnessed to a new "national" narrative and security exigencies. This poses a basic question: what is the "ideology" of the United States and how was it formed by its early revolutionary and national history? Is Stephanson convincing in attributing so much influence to Puritan notions of destiny and providence if the Puritans represented only a small part of America's identity? How do religion and economic progress interact in explaining American expansion? Or as Amy Greenberg proposes, where do race and gender fit into this?

Extra perspective:

+ Sexton, Jay, *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2011) and H-Diplo Roundtable Review on Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine*, December 3, 2012, at: https://issforum.org/roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-XIV-10.pdf
+ Frank Ninkovich, *The United States and Imperialism* (2001)

Archive:

Every week, I also post a handful of "archival" documents that come from the period under discussion. You don't have to read these before the class. Depending on the discussion, we may set aside a bit of time each week to look at some of them in detail, dissecting them for their meaning and significance as

artefacts of U.S. imperial history. The specific archival sources may change as the course goes along, depending on the kinds of things we find interesting and topical.

John Winthrop, "City on a hill," (1630)
Thomas Jefferson's "Empire of Liberty" (1780-1809)
The Monroe Doctrine (1823)
John L O'Sullivan, "Manifest Destiny" (1839)

WEEK 3 (J.20)
EMPIRE AS A WAY OF LIFE, PART 1

Required:
+ William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (1959, 2009), Introduction, and chaps. 1-2, pp. 16-83.
+ James Field, "American imperialism: the worst chapter in almost any book," *American Historical Review* 83, 3 (June 1978), 664-679.

And ONE of the following:
+ Hugh DeSantis, "The Imperialist Impulse and American Innocence, 1865-1900," in Haines and Walker, eds., *American Foreign Relations: A Historiographical Review* (1981)
+ Edward Crapol, "Coming to Terms with Empire: the Historiography of Late-Nineteenth-Century American Foreign Relations," *Diplomatic History* (1992), 573-597
+ John A Thompson, "William Appleman Williams and the American 'empire'," *Journal of American Studies*, 7, (1973), pp. 91–104
+ Andrew J. Bacevich, "Tragedy renewed: William Appleman Williams," *World Affairs*, Winter 2009
+ Ian Tyrrell, "Making nations/making states: American Historians in the context of empire," *Journal of American History*, 86, (1999), pp. 1015–44
+ James Livingston, "William Appleman Williams: fifty years after his book on the tragedy of American diplomacy," *History News Network*, 4 May 2009.

Discussion
The change in U.S. policy from continental to overseas expansion at the end of the 19th century triggered both political opposition (the "Anti-Imperialists") and academic debate. "Progressive historians" around the time of the First World War worried about the wisdom of American involvement in the world of European imperialism (for American values), but it was not until 1959 and William A. William's *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* that the historical profession finally had to address the possibility that late 19th century imperialism was not an aberration but the logical expression of American economic and providential thinking. Williams created an entire school (later known as the "Wisconsin School" or "Open Door" school) that looked at the contradictions between the needs of American capitalism and its self-image as the liberator of humanity. Are you convinced? And if the U.S. inevitably needs to constantly expand its markets and resources to offset the need for social redistribution at home, what can historians like Williams and his followers do to stop it? And what do we make of the word "tragedy"? Was the U.S. a virtuous, exceptional nation to start with only to have its world mission derailed by its own economic system? Finally, if you read Andrew Bacevich, you will read a conservative man whose disillusionment with American foreign policy in the 2000s led him back to Williams.

Extra perspective:
+ Bradford Perkins, "The tragedy of American diplomacy: twenty-five years after," *Reviews in American History* 12 (March 1984), 1-18 (reprinted in the 1988 edition of *The tragedy of American diplomacy*).
+ Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898* (1963; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998)
+ Ernest May, *American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay* (New York: Atheneum, 1968)

Archive:
William Graham Sumner, "The fallacy of territorial expansion." (1896)
Henry Cabot Lodge, "For Intervention in Cuba" (1896)
The Teller Amendment (1898)
William McKinley's War Message (1898)
Anti-imperialist League platform (1899)
The Platt Amendment (1903)

WEEK 4 (J.27)
EMPIRE AS A WAY OF LIFE, PART 2

Required (read any TWO of the following)
+ Christina Duffy Burnett and Burke Marshall, "Between the Foreign and the Domestic: The Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, Invented and Reinvented," from Burnett and Marshall, eds., *Foreign in a Domestic Sense: Puerto Rico, American Expansion, and the Constitution* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), pp. 1–36. [e-book in library]
+ Kristin Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and the Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), introduction and chapter 1 ("The Manly Ideal of Politics"), pp. 1-42.
+ Gail Bederman, "Theodore Roosevelt: Manhood, Nation, and 'Civilization,'" in Bederman, *Manliness and Civilization: a cultural history of gender and race in the United States, 1880-1917* (Chicago, 1995), pp. 170-215.

Discussion:
This week's readings look at different sides of America's imperial outburst at the turn of the century. Hoganson and Bederman locate the zest for overseas territory in the psychic need for masculine rejuvenation during a peculiarly unsettling period of U.S. history. What role did gender anxiety play in the "nationalism" of the Progressive Era, and in Theodore Roosevelt's cult of the "Strenuous Life" in particular? Measured against other explanations for imperialism at the turn of the century, how does gender rank? How do you decide whether gender or economics or national security or race is decisive? Burnett and Marshall, on the other hand, examine the anomalous legal status of the new American overseas territories, namely whether the "Constitution follows the flag": do the "foreign" people of these territories enjoy the same rights as American citizens? Apparently not, as the "Insular Cases" created different legal conditions throughout "American" territories based largely on presumed racial status. Why did the U.S. settle on this arrangement? Is it better for foreign people to be incorporated into the U.S. or to be outside it? Did the racial assumption of Anglo-Saxon superiority simultaneously demand that the U.S. incorporate other peoples *and* deny them equality?

Extra perspective:
+ Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876-1917* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000),
+ Laura Briggs, *Reproducing Empire: Race, Sex, Science, and U.S. Imperialism in Puerto Rico* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002)

Archive:
Theodore Roosevelt on "The Strenuous Life" (1899)
Senator Albert Beveridge, "The March of the Flag" (1899)
Jane Addams, "Democracy or Militarism," Address before the Chicago Liberty Meeting (April 30, 1899)

WEEK 5 (F.3)
THE PHILIPPINES

Required:

+ Daniel Immerwahr, *How to Hide and Empire*, chap. 5 ("Empire state of mind") and 6 ("Shouting the battle cry of freedom"), pp. 73-107.
+ Paul A. Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), chap. 4. ("Tensions of Exposition: Mixed Messages at the St. Louis World's Fair"), pp. 229-84.

Discussion:
So why, in the end, did the U.S. decide to "keep" the Philippines and supress its nationalist insurrection? How did the U.S. experience with the Philippines represent such a significant change in U.S. self-perception? How does reading about U.S. atrocities in the Philippine War change your perspective on the historians' debate on imperialism? Given those atrocities, how did the 1904 St. Louis World's Fair (itself a centennial commemoration of the Louisiana Purchase) represent the acquisition of the Philippines and the Filipinos? Why did it appear to convey, to many viewers, the wrong message? Do you think the claim that the U.S. was serving its civilizational purposes in bringing "civilization" to the Philippines was a genuine belief or a moral cover for other less noble aims? If so, what aims? And why the need for a cover?

Extra perspective:
+ Erin Murphy, "Women's Anti-Imperialism, 'The White Man's Burden,' and the Philippine-American War," *Asia-Pacific Journal* (July 2009), pp. 1-12

Archive:
Advertisement for human exhibits from the Philippine Islands at the World's Fair, St. Louis, 1904
"Facts about the Filipinos," Philippine Information Society, 1901

WEEK 6 (F.10)
WILSON AND WILSONIANISM: WHAT IS LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM, REALLY?

Required:
+ Lloyd Ambrosius, *Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and his legacy on American foreign relations* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), chaps. 1 and 2
+ Arthur Link, "The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson," from *The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson, and Other Essays* (Nashville, 1971), 127-39
+ John A. Thompson, "Wilsonianism: the Dynamics of a Conflicted Concept," *International Affairs* 86 (2010): 1-22.

Discussion:
Woodrow Wilson left an enormous stamp on 20th century U.S. foreign policy first for his decision to lead the United States into the First World War and then to use its influence to try to reform the international system along lines he thought reflected American principles and values. Critics then and now believed that this reformism (which included a commitment to bringing more democratic self-determination to the world, to creating an inter-governmental League of Nations, and supporting freer trade, was naïve and undermined U.S. security interests. Yet its rhetorical appeal was undeniable. What then, is liberal internationalism as Wilson announced it? In what ways does the world today reflect Wilson's imprint? Are you convinced by the criticisms of people like Ambrosius? Is the desire to export American political values a form of imperialism, or was the U.S. actually capturing the democratic Zeitgeist of the world opinion at the end of the First World War?

Extra perspective:
+ Lloyd Gardner, "American foreign policy 1900-1921: a second look at the realist critique of American diplomacy," in Barton Bernstein, ed., *Towards a new past: dissenting essays in American history* (1968)
+ Frank Ninkovich, *The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy since 1900* (1999)
+ Trygve Throntveit, *Power without Victory: Woodrow Wilson and the American Internationalist Experiment* (2017)

Archive:
Wilson's Address to the League to Enforce Peace, (May 1916)
Wilson's "Peace Without Victory," Address to the Senate (January 1917)
Wilson's War Message (April 1917)
The Fourteen Points (January 1918)
Wilson defends the peace treaty and the League of Nations (1919)
Lodge's reservations (1919)

► **Reading and Review Stream: First Short Paper** is due this week Monday at midnight.

WINTER BREAK ❱ FEB.17 - 21

America has never been an empire. We may be the only great power in history that had the chance, and refused — preferring greatness to power and justice to glory.
— George W. Bush

American imperialism has always been the imperialism that has been frightened of speaking its name. Now it's beginning to do so. In a way, it's better. We know where we kneel.
— Tariq Ali

The United States does not, and indeed no nation-state can today, form the center of an imperialist project. Imperialism is over. No nation will be world leader in the way modern European nations were.
— Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri

Another name for what we're doing, by the way, is liberal imperialism. That's not a name that is traditionally associated with U.S. policy, but it's apt to describe our mission in many parts of the world, and it's not a name that we should necessarily shy away from. It used to be that only leftist critics of America talked of American empire; but I've noticed an interesting phenomenon occurring in the last few years. American empire has become respectable.
— Max Boot, 2003

WEEK 7 (F.24)
WILSONIANISM, SELF-DETERMINATION, AND EMPIRES

Required:
+ Emily S. Rosenberg, "The Great War, Wilsonianism, and the Challenges of U.S. Empire," in Thomas Zeiler, David K. Ekbladh, and Benjamin Montaya, eds., *Beyond 1917: the United States and the Global Legacies of the Great War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 213-231
+ Chris Capozzola, "The United States Empire," in Robert Gerwarth and Erez Manela, eds., *Empires at War* (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 235-253.
+ Erez Manela, "'Peoples of Many Races': The World beyond Europe in the Wilsonian Imagination," in John Milton Cooper and Thomas J. Knock, eds., *Jefferson, Lincoln, and Wilson: The Dilemma of Race and Democracy* (University of Virginia Press, 2010), pp. 184-208.

Discussion:
Wilson famously promised that the right of self-determination would be part of the postwar "new diplomacy" of liberal internationalism. But what did it really mean for the colonial world? Did the United States see its postwar role in the world as upholding national territorial independence, or did Wilsonianism mean the economic and political authority of American values exported to the world? Three historians here explore the ambiguities of Wilson's vision for the world, a vision that left traces in all 20th century U.S. foreign policy. This is especially true on the issue of race. Wilson, a Southerner by birth and a racist by temperament, held traditionally imperialist views of U.S. leadership but was he actually a bit better on this than his European allies?

Extra perspective:

+ Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Colonial Nationalism* (2007)
+ David Milne, "Kant's Best Hope: Woodrow Wilson," in Milne, *Worldmaking: The Art and Science of American Diplomacy* (2015), pp. 69-122.

Archive:
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations
James Weldon Johnson, "Self-Determining Haiti," [4 parts] *The Nation* 111 (Aug. 28, 1920)
Jay Lovestone, *American Imperialism: The Menace of the Greatest Capitalist World Power* [Workers Party of America (1923)

WEEK 8 (M.2)
PAX AMERICANA AND INFORMAL EMPIRE

Required:
+ Beverly Silver and Giovanni Arrighi, "Polanyi's 'Double Movement': The Belle Époques of British and U.S. Hegemony Compared," *Politics & Society* 31 (2003): 325-355
+ Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 1-74, 336-50, 458-80.

Discussion:
So is liberal internationalism also a particular form of empire? The term "informal empire" came to describe those aspects of British 19th century economic influence that did not necessarily involve the political control of another territory. Thus, the volume of British manufactured textiles or the power of British banking investment could overwhelm competitors and come to dominate the economies of other places without "formal" control. The term was also loosely linked to the idea that a world governed by the British Empire would bring a global "Pax Britannica". The United States was seen as the 20th century successor to this idea. Is it an accurate account of American economic dominance? Did it bring peace to Europe? Did "Americanization" (another popular and related term) help erode the class conflict of "old" Europe after the Second World War? What's your sense of whether U.S. economic and cultural power forced itself on other states or was willingly invited because of the extraordinary appeal of America goods and lifestyles?

Extra perspective:
+ Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945* (1982)
+ Ian Tyrell, "American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History," *American Historical Review* 96 (October 1991): 1031-1055
+ Mary Nolan, *Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany* (1994)
+ Reinhold Wagnleiter, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (1994)
+ Richard Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II* (1997)

Archive:
Extract from W. T. Stead, *The Americanization of the world* (1898)

WEEK 9 (M.9)
THE COLD (AND HOT) WAR

Required:
+ John Lewis Gaddis, "On Starting All Over Again," Melvyn P. Leffler, "Bringing it Together," Geir Lundestad, "How (not) to Study the Origins of the Cold War," and Anders Stephanson, "Liberty or Death,"

in Odd Arne Westad, ed., *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory* (2000), pp. 27-102.

Discussion:
This week we examine the post-Cold War debate on the origins of the Cold War. Along with the original "imperialism" debate spurred by William A. Williams, and the Vietnam War debate, this one has probably generated the most literature in the historiography of U.S. foreign policy. It started in the wake of Williams, was energized by the social and political conflicts of the 1960s, descending into name-calling in the 1970s and then staggered to the end of the Cold War under some weak compromises. In a nutshell, there were radicals (the US was to blame because it was an Empire), nationalists (the US was only trying to defend the world from another more malevolent Empire), and realists (the ideological morality of one side or the other's got nothing to do with it, because the Cold War was simply a superpower struggle like all others). The attempt at a "post-revisionist synthesis" worked but didn't satisfy everybody. This collection of post-Cold War essays revisits the entire debate after the U.S. seemed to have won. Who's the most convincing and why? What do they use for evidence?

Extra perspective:
+ Anders Stephanson, "The United States," in David Reynolds, ed., *The origins of the Cold War in Europe: international perspectives* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 23-52.
+ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chaps, 1 and 4, pp. 8-38 and 73-109.

Archive:
"Speech Delivered by Stalin at a Meeting of Voters of the Stalin Electoral District, Moscow," February 9, 1946
George F. Kennan's "Long Telegram," February 22, 1946
Truman Doctrine, March 12, 1947
National Security Council Report, NSC 68, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," April 14, 1950

► Your **Research Essay** is due in three weeks

WEEK 10 (M.16)
MODERNIZATION AS EMPIRE

Required:
+ David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), chaps. 1-3, and 5
+ Michael Adas, *Dominance by Design: Technological Imperatives and America's Civilizing Mission* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), chaps. 4, "Foundations of an American Century", and 5, "Imposing Modernity"), pp.185-279

Discussion:
This week pivots slightly away from issues of private consumption and business and more toward broad conceptions of modernization through rational planning, the use of experts from the social sciences, and the use of technology to bring about social and economic progress around the world. A great deal of U.S. thinking about "nation-building" developed as a liberal-capitalist response to the challenge of Soviet-led communist models of modernization. Here again, the question is to what extent this represents a kind of "soft-power" (before the term came into usage) way of expanding U.S. interests or whether the United States was simply responding to a global demand for technological development. As Ekbladh explores, many of these impulses stemmed from the state-technocracy models developed by Roosevelt's New Deal in the 1930s, which, at the time, was a vision of greater economic equality. Did this appear to work for other countries or was it subverted by the security imperatives of the Cold War? How was it any

different from the 19th European claims that their benevolent empires were meant to bring civilization to the uncivilized parts of the world? Is there one model of development, and does the U.S. have it?

Extra perspective:
+ David Engerman, *Staging Growth: Modernization, development, and the Global Cold War* (2003)
+ Kiran Klaus Patel, *The New Deal: A Global History* (2016)

Archive:
W.W. Rostow, "The Stages of Economic Growth," *Economic History Review* 12:1 (1959), 1-16.
Henry R. Luce, "The American Century," *Life,* 17 February 1941, 61-65
Henry R. Luce, "How to Think About 'Civilization,'" *Life*, 23 February 1948, 34-35
Albert Einstein, et al., "The Militarization of America," pamphlet by the National Council Against Conscription (1948)

WEEK 11 (M.23)
AMERICA, RACE, AND DECOLONIZATION

Required:
ONE of the following:
+ Tim Borstelman, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), chap. 1-3, pp. 1-134.

OR

+ David Ryan, "By Way of Introduction: the United States, Decolonization and the World System," (pp.1-23), John Kent, "The United States and the Decolonization of Black Africa," (pp. 168-87) and Michael H. Hunt, "Conclusions: the Decolonization Puzzle in U.S. policy: Promise versus Performance," (pp. 207-229) in David Ryan and Victor Pungong (eds.), *The United States and Decolonization* (London: Macmillan, 2000)

Discussion:
The United States' response to postwar African and Asian decolonization captures many of the dilemmas of its imperial past. On the one hand, it wanted to see itself as a liberator of humanity, but the Cold War's security imperatives seemingly compelled to back its European allies and their desire to retain their empires, as well as some brutal but pro-American dictatorships. But the legacy of race in America's own imperial experience as well as its toleration for racial segregation at home, made decolonization a perfect storm. There are two sets of readings this week. Borstelman's focuses more on how American globalism played out in its own racial conflicts; the three essays from Ryan and Pungong provide a brief tour America's internal colour line affected its foreign policy worldview?

Extra perspective:
+ Penny M. Von Eschen, *Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-1957* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997)
+Nico Slate, *Colored Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in the United States and India* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012)

Archive:
TBA

WEEK 12 (M.30)
9/11 AND THE EMPIRE DEBATE REVISITED

Required:
+ Max Boot, "The Case for American Empire," *The Weekly Standard* (Oct. 15, 2001)
+ Robert Kagan, "Neocon Nation: Neoconservatism, c. 1776," *World Affairs* (Spring 2008)

+ John Lewis Gaddis, "An evening at Yale," *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 115-118
+ Andrew Bacevich's introduction to William Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life: An Essay on the Causes and Character of America's Present Predicament Along with a Few Thoughts About an Alternative* (1980, 2006 edition), pp. v-xi
+ Marilyn B. Young, "Imperial Language," in *The New American Empire: A 21st Century Teach-In on U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York, 2005) pp. 32-49
+ Anders Stephanson, "A Most Interesting Empire," in *The New American Empire*, pp. 253-75
+ Colin Mooers, "Nostalgia for Empire: Revising Imperial History for American Power," *The New Imperialists: Ideologies of Empire* (Oxford, 2006) pp. 111-35.

Discussion:
This week we have a variety of articles, mostly small, but some longer. This is a taste of the most recent debate on American empire in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent U.S. led invasions of Afghanistan and, in 2003, Iraq. That the war prompted a furious national argument is only correct, but at its heart was a renewed battle over whether or not the United States is an empire, only this time the (neo)conservatives said yes, and it was a good thing. The father of Cold War post-revisionism John Lewis Gaddis became a unabashed patriot, Some critics tried to retreat into old exceptionalist tropes (the U.S. should *not* be an empire) that on occasion drew inspiration from Bill Williams. With the Cold War over it was final possible for Americans to be honest about having an empire without fear of Soviet propaganda, but as the debate raged over Iraq (and elsewhere), the American public became badly polarized about its global role. What do you believe was the reason (or reasons) for the U.S. invasion of Iraq and how much was it justified on ideological grounds that drew from America's past?

Archive:
George W. Bush's National Security Strategy, 2002

► **Research Essay Stream: Essay** is due this week Monday at midnight.
► **Reading and Review Stream: Second Short Paper** is due this week Monday at midnight.

WEEK 13 (A.6)
HOW DOES THE EMPIRE STRIKE BACK?

+ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (2000), Part 1 ("The Political Constitution of the Present") and Part 2.5 ("Network Power: U.S. Sovereignty and the New Empire") and 2.6 ("Imperial Sovereignty").

Discussion:
In the late 1990s, just before 9/11, two post-Marxist intellectuals, one an Italian sociologist, the other an American literary theorist, produced a fat, dense tome of nearly 500 pages titled *Empire*. Despite its often arcane philosophical language, the book was a surprise hit (maybe one of those books people put on their shelves but never get around to reading). It stimulated a global debate about the face of global capitalism after the Cold War, without any of the triumphalism of Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992). We'll read a few selections from it, including a couple of chapters that point to the historic role played by the United States. Try to find out what it is!

❑

OFFICIAL COURSE OUTLINE AND WEBSITE

The course outline posted to the BGInS website is the official course outline. This course also has content on cuLearn (referred to as the "course website"). Please check this website regularly as some of the instructions and extra readings may change.

ASSIGNMENT REGULATIONS: or, HOW TO SUBMIT YOUR WORK

Please submit all assignments electronically on the cuLearn site's assignment folders. I ask, if at all possible, that they also be submitted as Word Documents and not as PDFs so that I can use track changes to make comments more easily.

LATE PENALTY

Papers will be docked **3% per day**, starting the minute the paper is officially late. In other words, the submission time on cuLearn is 11.59 p.m. of the due date. A paper submitted 10 minutes later, at 12.09 a.m. is technically a day late, so you might as well keep working on it until 11.55 the next day!

ACADEMIC ACCOMMODATION, GRADING, AND OTHER GENERAL REGULATORY INFORMATION

Need help? We're here to help you. If you're struggling with assignments, deadline pressures, anxiety, or are just feeling overwhelmed by university life, please don't hesitate to get in touch with us. Your professor and your teaching assistants are on your side—even if we are the ones assigning your work—and we can refer you to services on campus for counselling, or medical needs. It is also always best to talk to us first, before an assignment is due, to give us a head's up that you might need accommodation. If you have a genuine medical need, please make sure you get a Medical Certificate signed by a licenced physician.

Academic Accommodations for students with disabilities: The Paul Menton Centre for Students with Disabilities (PMC for short) provides services to students with Learning Disabilities (LD), psychiatric/mental health disabilities, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD), chronic medical conditions, and impairments in mobility, hearing, and vision. If you have a disability requiring academic accommodations in this course, please contact PMC at 613-520-6608 or pmc@carleton.ca for a formal evaluation. If you are already registered with the PMC, contact your PMC coordinator to send me your *Letter of Accommodation* at the beginning of the term, and no later than two weeks before the first in-class scheduled test or exam requiring accommodation (if applicable). After requesting accommodation from PMC, meet with me to ensure accommodation arrangements are made. Please consult the PMC website for the deadline to request accommodations for the formally scheduled exam.

Accommodation for Religious Observance: Students requesting accommodation for religious observances should apply in writing to their instructor for alternate dates and/or means of satisfying academic requirements. Such requests should be made during the first two weeks of class, or as soon as possible after the need for accommodation is known to exist, but no later than two weeks before the compulsory academic event. Accommodation is to be worked out directly and on an individual basis between the student and the instructor(s) involved. Instructors will make accommodations in a way that avoids academic disadvantage to the student. Instructors and students may contact an Equity Services Advisor for assistance (www.carleton.ca/equity).

Equity and class conduct: The Carleton University Human Rights Policies and Procedures affirm that all members of the University community share a responsibility to:

- ❑ promote equity and fairness,
- ❑ respect and value diversity,
- ❑ prevent discrimination and harassment, and
- ❑ preserve the freedom of its members to carry out responsibly their scholarly work without threat of interference.

Carleton University Equity Services states that, "every member of the University community has a right to study, work and live in a safe environment free of discrimination or harassment". [In May of 2001 Carleton University's Senate and Board of Governors approved the Carleton University Human Rights Policies and Procedures. The establishment of these policies and procedures was the culmination of the efforts of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Human Rights and a Human Rights Implementation Committee.]

Accommodation for Pregnancy: Pregnant students requiring academic accommodations are encouraged to contact an Equity Advisor in Equity Services to complete a letter of accommodation. Then, make an appointment to discuss your needs with the instructor at least two weeks prior to the first academic event in which it is anticipated the accommodation will be required.

Plagiarism: The University Senate defines plagiarism as "presenting, whether intentional or not, the ideas, expression of ideas or work of others as one's own." This can include:

- reproducing or paraphrasing portions of someone else's published or unpublished material, regardless of the source, and presenting these as one's own without proper citation or reference to the original source;
- submitting a take-home examination, essay, laboratory report or other assignment written, in whole or in part, by someone else;
- using ideas or direct, verbatim quotations, or paraphrased material, concepts, or ideas without appropriate acknowledgment in any academic assignment;
- using another's data or research findings;
- failing to acknowledge sources through the use of proper citations when using another's works and/or failing to use quotation marks;
- handing in "substantially the same piece of work for academic credit more than once without prior written permission of the course instructor in which the submission occurs.

Plagiarism is a *serious offence* that cannot be resolved directly with the course's instructors or teaching assistants. The Associate Deans of the Faculty conduct a rigorous investigation, including an interview with the student, when an instructor suspects a piece of work has been plagiarized. Penalties are not trivial. They may include a mark of zero for the plagiarized work or a final grade of "F" for the course.

Intellectual Property: Student or professor materials created for this course (including presentations and posted notes, labs, case studies, assignments and exams) remain the intellectual property of the author(s). They are intended for personal use and may not be reproduced or redistributed without prior written consent of the author(s).

Submission and Return of Term Work: Papers must be submitted directly to the instructors according to the instructions above (i.e. to cuLearn and your TAs). For essays not returned in class please attach a **stamped, self-addressed envelope** if you wish to have your assignment returned by mail. Final exams are intended solely for the purpose of evaluation and *will not* be returned.

Grading: Standing in a course is determined by the course instructor, subject to the approval of the faculty Dean. Final standing in courses will be shown by alphabetical grades. The system of grades used, with corresponding grade points is:

Percentage	Letter grade	12-point scale	Percentage	Letter grade	12-point scale
90-100	A+	12	67-69	C+	6
85-89	A	11	63-66	C	5
80-84	A-	10	60-62	C-	4
77-79	B+	9	57-59	D+	3
73-76	B	8	53-56	D	2

70-72	B-	7	50-52	D-	1

F Failure. No academic credit
WDN Withdrawn from the course
ABS Absent from the final examination
DEF Official deferral (see university regulations for "Petitions to Defer")
FND Failure with no deferred exam allowed, assigned only when the student has failed the course on the basis of inadequate term work as specified in the course outline.

Approval of final grades: Standing in a course is determined by the course instructor subject to the approval of the Faculty Dean. This means that grades submitted by an instructor may be subject to revision. No grades are final until they have been approved by the Dean.

Carleton E-mail Accounts: All email communication to students from BGInS will be via official Carleton university e-mail accounts and/or cuLearn. As important course and University information is distributed this way, it is the student's responsibility to monitor their Carleton and cuLearn accounts.

ADDRESSES (613-520-2600, phone ext.)
BGInS Main Office (x7575) 2404R, Richcraft Hall
Registrar's Office (x3500) 300 Tory
Academic Advising Centre (x7850) 302 Tory
Paul Menton Centre (x6608) 500 Unicentre
Centre for Student Academic Support: Study Skills, Writing Tutorials, Bounce Back (x3822) 4th floor MacOdrum Library

Andrew M. Johnston
Department of History
November 2019