Schiller’s Aesthetic Republicanism

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In his lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel connects the development of post-Kantian thought with the dynamics of the French Revolution.¹ His aesthetics lectures commend Schiller, in particular, for moving decisively beyond Kant in tracing the effects of freedom on the self and on the world, anticipating Hegel’s own view of the effectiveness of reason in reshaping objectivity.² Schiller’s account of beauty as freedom in appearance³ can be read as paralleling Hegel’s idea of the intuition of freedom in art and in objective spirit, and the causal power of freedom in the world of the senses.⁴ Yet Schiller has often been described pejoratively as a utopian and an aesthete, isolating himself from the decisive struggles of his day. The purpose here is to revisit Schiller’s political conceptions in light of recent debates, to determine more closely the specific quality and aim of his republicanism, and to ascertain how aesthetics contributes to that specific end. These themes will be pursued with reference to Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man,⁵ begun in summer 1793 and published in 1794-95, contemporaneously Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre.

In 1846-47, the young Engels, echoing the connection Hegel had made between German philosophy and revolution, accentuates rather the pallor and languidity of this reflected movement. In an unfavourable comparison of Schiller with Goethe, he credits the latter with a keener insight into “die deutsche Misère” or German political backwardness and incompetence, even though Goethe himself was unable to overcome these limits in his own work. Engels accuses Schiller, in contrast, of lacking Goethe’s hard realism. Schiller, he claims, seeks flight into the abstractions of Kantian idealism, retreating into an illusory inner freedom that leaves intact the structures of political and economic oppression. Schiller thus
becomes an early spokesman of the German ideology in its derogatory sense. Engels depicts Schiller’s idea of aesthetic education as an apolitical utopianism, masking the “prosaic wretchedness” of material conditions in Germany with a pretentious and vacuous intellectual wretchedness. Such was the canonical Marxist reading for over a century.

While this image of a quietistic and abstractly utopian Schiller also figured in Georg Lukacs’ assessments, he qualified the prevailing judgement in important ways. Lukacs stressed Schiller’s serious engagement with issues of modern artistic creativity and political freedom; but conceded that Schiller’s response was vitiated by his idealistic starting point, and by insuperable contradictions within the revolutionary movement unleashed by the French and by emergent bourgeois society. Other dissident voices were raised against the predominant view, notably by Popitz and Marcuse, who credited Schiller with anticipating Marx’s theory of alienation, and with recognising the emancipatory potential of aesthetically oriented activity. Marcuse attributes an “explosive quality” to Schiller’s reconfiguring of labour and freedom, and describes Schiller’s reflections on the possibilities for radical transformation of modern culture as “one of the most advanced positions of thought.”

The thesis of the anachronistic character of German thinking in the revolutionary period, and of Schiller’s thought in particular, has been advanced recently from very different quarters. In her contribution to an important study of comparative republicanism, Fania Oz-Salzberger propounds a thesis of German exceptionalism (a distinct course of development receptive to modern ideas only belatedly, or in highly attenuated forms). Her reflections are especially relevant here, because she wishes to contest the depth and modernity of the republican commitments held by Schiller and his German contemporaries. Other very recent
studies stress Schiller’s tendential anti-modernism, or conclude, by tracing the evolution of his political ideas from 1789 to 1793 (from *Don Carlos* and *The Legislation of Lycugus and Solon* to the letters to Augustenburg, the first version of *Aesthetic Education*), that Schiller’s political hesitancy prior to the French Revolution comes to be replaced by an explicit refusal of political engagement by 1793.15

Schiller’s connection to the revolutionary transformations of modernity has also been seen in many different and more positive lights. According to Wilkinson and Willoughby, his English translators, Schiller’s aim was not at all a repudiation of politics in favour of a solitary, individualistic self-cultivation, but “a better society of interrelated human beings,” in which aesthetic education was a necessary but far from sufficient condition for promoting a more comprehensive ethical life. Walter Jaeschke describes Schiller’s objective, in common with that of his contemporary early romantics and the early German idealists, as an ambitious cultural revolution in which religion, science, and social life, as well as politics, would be profoundly transformed. In a probing bicentennial study, Frederick Beiser gives an extensive account of Schiller’s ideas of freedom, and outlines his republicanism, defined as the idea that virtue is an essential precondition for freedom and citizenship. For Beiser,

“Schiller’s fundamental principle—that civil freedom must derive from moral character—ultimately derives from the modern republican tradition, the tradition of Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Rousseau and Ferguson…All these thinkers stressed that a republic is possible only if its citizens first possess virtue, a concern for the public good over their private interest.”

While republicanism views civic education as essential to promoting virtue, Beiser concludes that “Schiller’s distinctive contribution to that tradition is his insistence on the pre-eminent importance of *aesthetic* education.” The intellectual and political context in which
Beiser situates Schiller is the defence of the heritage of Enlightenment reason against conservative critics like Rehberg and Gentz.\(^{21}\)

Stressing that the aesthetic ideal is of universal applicability, Beiser also refutes the frequent criticisms of Schiller’s elitism:\(^{22}\) namely, that he completely disregards the fate of the lower classes, or that he confines his solutions to a sterile salon culture;\(^{23}\) or that his proposals amount to an admission of political impotence;\(^{24}\) such that the aesthetic condition appears akin to that of the beautiful soul, celebrated by Schleiermacher but castigated by Hegel for its constricted inwardness, its unwillingness to sully its inner purity with worldly entanglements. Beiser provides textual support for Schiller’s concern with ameliorating poverty and resisting oppression,\(^{25}\) and defends Schiller’s philosophical achievements as marking significant advances upon Kant, though in ways that differ from Hegel’s reading, to which Beiser is resistant. While other authors\(^{26}\) find an unresolved contradiction in Schiller’s account of personality between permanent anthropological features and historical mutations, Beiser recognises two distinct but complementary methods, employed consistently at different levels: the transcendental plane of pure practical reason, or the exposition of the idea of freedom itself, and the empirical plane on which the historical expressions or phenomena of freedom appear.\(^{27}\) Beiser’s distinction obviates the need to appeal to a fixed human nature, and allows us to situate Schiller more readily in the post-Kantian tradition. This will emerge in comparison with Rousseau.

The voluminous recent work on republicanism throws new light on the problems of modernity and politics as Schiller saw them, and helps to specify the nature of his own contributions. Republican themes of Kantian origin abound in Schiller: the idea of individuals as co-legislators, not simply as bearers of exclusive rights; and the critique of
social orders that treat persons as mere means, not as ends-in-themselves. These ideas find expression in both dramatic and philosophical writing. Schiller’s theatrical works critically portray the blandishments and seductions of power: correcting Montesquieu, he shows that it is not honour that is the principle of monarchy, but honours as privileges or preferments. This idea reflects traditional republican criticisms of luxury as corrupting, both in the form of chrematistic or acquisitiveness (already the object of Aristotle’s censure), and as ensnarement to arbitrary or tyrannical rule. The critique of privileges is a weapon in the older republican arsenal, prior to the changes that result from an engagement with modern civil society. An essential recent criticism of Schiller’s thought is that he fails to observe these changes, so that his republicanism falls below the threshold of modernity. This is not considered as an individual failing on Schiller’s part, but is taken to be an aspect of a generalised cultural situation. While Beiser situates Schiller within the general contours of a modern republicanism, Oz-Salzberger identifies a nodal point in this tradition, a fundamental revision of virtue and its material conditions, that she claims Schiller misses entirely. This is the nub of the problem.

To illustrate her thesis of German exceptionalism, Oz-Salzberger argues that the republican problematic is recast and modernised in eighteenth-century Scotland, when theorists like Ferguson enquire into the possible compatibility of commercial economy with redefined republican virtue. She takes as a hallmark of republican modernity the refurbishment of virtue under the impact of political economy. “The Scottish debate between modernised republicanism and political economy did not, however, succeed in crossing the linguistic and cultural borders into German political and economic discourse.” The new Scottish approach is in stark contrast to the earlier republican aversion to commercial
relations as undermining the solidarity and virtue of citizens. She contends, however, that this debate about the effects of the market is not taken up in Germany until the early nineteenth century, and then only outside the ambit of republican political thought. In making her case, she observes briefly how the republic, as a distant ideal, does emerge in German thinking in the wake of the American and French Revolutions. This revival is reflected in themes of anti-despotism and pluralism that occur in Herder, Schiller, etc.; but she claims, “They did not develop a whole republican scheme.” Following these assertions, she immediately reverts to an analysis of thinkers of an earlier period, especially the 1760’s and 1770’s, such as Iselin, to whom her critical reflections apply more adequately.

Here I want to follow Beiser in vindicating Schiller’s republican credentials, but also to take up the challenge posed by Oz-Salzberger in showing how his aesthetic programme is predicated on a new understanding of the demands of modernity. The Scottish debate involves adjusting virtue to the requirements of the market. In Germany, where commercial relations were far less developed, the phenomena of the market and emergent forms of civil society appear as a culture of diremption, of fragmentation or separation among and within individuals. The economic aspects of this process do not go unrecognised, by Schiller, by Fichte, or by Hegel. The critique of fragmentation is accompanied by the thought of a possible resolution, not as a Romantic nostalgia for past forms, but as a new idea of emancipation and autonomy, a redefined sense of virtue. To this extent, the Germans and the Scots share a common problematic. Among the German idealists, with Schiller in the vanguard, the political problem of reconciling difference and unity is posed with great acuity.

Wilkinson and Willoughby state succinctly the basic problem of Schiller’s political thought: to discover connections without eliminating differences. These ideas of
connectedness and difference are the keys both to Schiller’s appreciation of modernity, and to the specific character of his republicanism. Schiller’s understanding of the contemporary world is neither anti-modern\textsuperscript{39} nor anachronistic. For Schiller, as for other proponents of German idealism, it is the tension between analytical and synthetic moments, between difference and unity, which defines the political trajectory of modernity. Modern culture offers simultaneously the prospects of diremption or intractably opposed interests, and a new emancipatory potential, a new capacity for autonomous construction of social relations.\textsuperscript{40} Hegel and Marx will restate this claim in their own distinctive ways: Hegel, in his conception of the modern free and infinite personality, characterised by the extensive unfolding of particular wants and the means to satisfy them, but also by the intensive unity of citizenship in the rational state;\textsuperscript{41} Marx in the dialectic of dispersion and fusion enacted in struggles within civil society itself.\textsuperscript{42} For Schiller, the analytical moment appears in the modern division of labour and the recognition of particularity (but not in the differentiations of juridical status which characterise the antiquated order of estates). Synthesis is effected not instrumentally through self-interest (the mechanism of social contract theories), nor directly through imposition by the state (as in the Jacobin phase of the French Revolution, or among the ancient Greeks),\textsuperscript{43} but, at least in part, by aesthetic education as a conscious self-making.

Despite his repugnance at the course that the French Revolution assumed in 1793,\textsuperscript{44} Schiller does not renounce politics, but advocates a new kind of politics compatible with modern individuality and its differentiated forms. How is it possible to secure harmony without producing uniformity, and without suppressing spontaneity? Schiller seeks a logic appropriate to the relation of universal and particular interests in modern political and social life, and finds its outline in the aesthetic sphere. In unifying the manifold forms of
individuality, he resists the application of a single model of theoretical reason. The determinative judgement, or subsumption under general rules, is appropriate to cognition, as *Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason* had demonstrated, but, because it eliminates or abstracts from particularities and differences, it is not applicable to the work of practical reason in shaping the political sphere. Its political implications would be a repressive unity. The forms of determinative or cognitive judgement are concepts as abstract universals, and they achieve unity by freezing movement. There are alternative ways of understanding unity, however, as *Kant’s Critique of Judgement* had shown. The aesthetic or reflective judgment, ascending from the particular to the universal, opens a more promising path. In the aesthetic approach, the universal is not merely imposed, but evolves in spontaneous movement. Form and matter can be related either by suppressing diversity in favour of stable, undifferentiated unity; or by producing more plastic forms, a process of rising to universality while retaining reference to the underlying diversity. This idea of diversity integrates the particular and the universal in a dynamic synthesis, wherein form achieves pliancy and responsiveness to its content, and matter ceases to be chaotic and self-annulling. The aim of aesthetic education is to produce these supple new forms of individuality and of association.

To cite Schiller’s own formulation: “A political constitution will still be very imperfect if it can bring about unity only by the suppression [*Aufhebung*] of multiplicity.” Further, he affirms, “The state ought not to honour only the objective and generic, but also the subjective and specific character of the individuals” who are its citizens. This inability to accommodate diversity is among the failures of the French Revolution, in Schiller’s assessment. Previous republicanism had often demanded uniformity; the new republicanism acknowledges difference, and seeks to balance diverse interests with a commonality of
purpose. According to his political ideal, “the triumphant form rests just as far from uniformity as from confusion.”\footnote{48} Aesthetic education is part of the process which reconciles the particular and the universal, both within subjects and in their interrelationships. The changes wrought by the onset of modern civil society mean that the older republican ideal of an undifferentiated citizenry is no longer apposite. Unity can neither be assumed, nor imposed, but must emerge as a synthesis of differences. This does not amount to the celebration of mere multiplicity or diversity for its own sake, nor to the affirmation of a particularistic politics of identity. Instead, Schiller attends to the movements whereby new, polyphonic harmonies can be achieved.

Schiller is particularly attentive to the conditions of modern subjectivity and freedom in which the problem of difference is posed. The concord of particular and universal interests can no longer simply be presupposed, but must be created. In engendering unity, however, it is necessary not to extinguish particularity, but to allow it to elevate or transform itself.

Schiller makes several important distinctions. He contrasts order as given with order as produced; and within the latter category, he further distinguishes order as imposed unity, and order as achieved harmony. He lays this out in a historical problematic of three dimensions.  
1. The wholeness and harmony of the Greeks represents a beautiful, given unity, largely undifferentiated in interest and function, and thus is no longer an attainable modern ideal. The Greek attitude is what Schiller characterises as naïve, in that the oppositions typical of modernity have not yet appeared. Its antonym, the sentimental, refers to a yearning or striving for unity as a goal, rather than as a given. The sentimental is the modern attitude.\footnote{49}  
2. In modern conditions, the attempt to restore this unity directly is repressive, as in the efforts to establish the uniformity and identity of citizens in the French Revolution.\footnote{50} Were
uniformity desired, it could now only be attained either by suppressing diversity or by illegitimately taking the part for the whole (a synecdoche whose effect is to deny recognition of legitimate differences).

3. Not all differences, however, are equally legitimate and entitled to recognition. Where conditions of generalised unfreedom prevail, as under feudalism and despotic absolute monarchy, freedom emerges only as an immunity or an exemption from specific forms of domination. The diversity characteristic of the ancien régime, based upon the differential rights and privileges of a hierarchical social order, must be distinguished from the emergent new forms of diversity created by the modern division of labour. The problem of differential rights and of the arrogance of power provides the themes for Schiller’s dramatic works, such as Die Räuber and Wilhelm Tell, but he does not raise the issue directly in Aesthetic Education. The German states lagged far behind the revolutionary French in eliminating juridical distinctions, and it remains unclear in Aesthetic Education how these inequalities should properly be treated. Schiller’s theoretical writings stress instead the newer forms of social distinction. This new diversity is highly problematic, but contains elements of resolution, the new synthetic capacities made available by modern social relations.

The recognition of modern forms of diversity is central to the transformation of republicanism in this period, and it is to this change of perspective that Schiller directly contributes. Many republican sources, earlier in the eighteenth century, had invoked the ideal of a homogeneous citizenry, whose economic functions and interests were largely uniform. This idea originates in Aristotle’s description of the polity as the best practicable form of state, free from the deviations (παρεκβάσεις) introduced by excessive wealth or poverty. There were notable exceptions like Ferguson, who positively valued conflict, arising from
opposed interests, as a guarantor of freedom. In this respect (though he innovates with regard to the market), Ferguson reflected Renaissance republican thought, which had not been so insistent on uniformity of interest as a condition for preventing domination. Machiavelli had argued that republican freedoms were best preserved where struggles between rich and poor (provided they remained within appropriate internal limits) motivated the latter group, against its natural inclinations, to undertake political activity in order to avoid domination by *i grandi*. Rousseau, however, for all his idiosyncrasies, is more typical than Ferguson of eighteenth-century attitudes, in that he rejected factional struggle (for complex reasons deriving from his understanding of particular and universal interests), and contended that the general will could best be discovered where there existed minimal differences of wealth or status. Many eighteenth-century British republicans shared this idea of non-differentiation, though with a distinct theoretical basis more favourable to private interests; some of these figures still sounded, whilst others revised, the classic republican theme of the opposition of virtue and commerce. In general, however, this homogeneity among citizens could still be taken for granted; its production becomes a central question of the French Revolution.

The problem of unity as a forceful suppression of difference struck Schiller as especially acute in the political conflicts of his day. The French revolutionaries, and not only the Jacobins among them, stressed the common identity and interests of citizens, and viewed diversity as a differentiation in rights and privileges (literally, private laws), thus as a bulwark of the old order and of despotic rule. This kind of diversity meant a distinction of juridical status among estates, or among holders of exemptions from taxes or legal prescriptions. It was to be effaced before the common identity of citizens endowed with
equal rights. In contrast to some of the earlier eighteenth-century sources, however, this political identity could no longer be presupposed, but had to be constructed, by forcible imposition if necessary.

By the end of the eighteenth century, differentiations of a new kind were, however, appearing, based upon the collapse of the estate order, the appearance of modern civil society, and the onset of manufacturing. Just as in classical antiquity the solidity of citizenship in the polis had been shattered by the intrusion of exchange relations, now new networks of commercial transactions, prospects of mobility, and new kinds of economic differentiations acted as solvents and catalysts of social relations. The new division of labour in manufacturing broke up and redistributed skilled artisanal and other forms of handwork into its simplest and most repetitive components, thereby maximising the volume of production. It is this modern diversity to which Schiller responds. Admittedly, there is little direct reference to economic causes in the *Aesthetic Education*. Schiller presents the problem of specialisation of work as a result of the growth of scientific knowledge, and of new political and administrative arrangements, but his illustrations evoke the emergent technical division of labour. If contemporary Scottish sources like Ferguson, and most famously Adam Smith, pose the same problem more clearly in its economic dimensions, Schiller is nonetheless prominent and precocious among German theorists in grasping these processes and their consequences. The Scots raise a challenge, the task of reconciliation in the new conditions of modern particularity. It is to this challenge that Schiller rises in his aesthetic and political thought.

To appreciate the German reception of the Scottish Enlightenment, it is important to recognise Schiller’s early familiarity with Ferguson. His teacher at the Karlsschule in
Stuttgart, Jacob Friedrich Abel (1751-1829), communicated the importance of recent developments in Scottish philosophy to his pupils, who were required to debate its merits. Ferguson’s influence, as mediated by his German translator Christian Garve (1742-1798), has been traced in Schiller’s views of freedom, despotism, and rights, as well as of modern society itself; this influence dates back to the period prior to Schiller’s encounter with Kant. These views evolve in the context of lively discussions of the nature of civil society, and distinctions among tutelary, despotic, and social [gesellschaftliche] state forms in Germany, at least since the 1770’s. It is implausible to conclude that Schiller was unattuned to the Scottish debate, or inattentive to its consequences.

Schiller’s contribution to this debate lies in his recognition that new kinds of diversity, rooted in the dynamics of civil society, make it necessary to rethink the political bonds among citizens, not as a question of uniformity or identity of interest, but as a question of the malleability or determinability of interests and of the self. Among the variety of German responses, Schiller proposes an account of autonomy, according to which private interests must not be assumed as immediately decisive for political action, but must be consciously examined and reshaped. Only in the mutual adjustment by the particulars of their limited private ends can a genuine universal interest be attained; though this change can occur in significantly different ways (nobly or sublimely), as we will see. This self-transformation is the essence of aesthetic education.

Schiller’s Sixth Letter is particularly important in this context. If Plato favoured a strict division of labour among artisans, his objective had been to perfect both producer and product, allowing the former to develop the requisite skills and discipline, and the latter to attain qualitative excellence (whereas Adam Smith will stress the quantitative expansion of
production ensuing from a refined technical division of the labour process in large manufacturing units). In Schiller’s account (as indeed in Smith), the modern fragmentation of labour is to the detriment of the individual producer, whose activity and perspectives on self, society, and the world are truncated and deformed. In Wilkinson and Willoughby’s translation, we read, “Everlasting chained to a single little fragment of the Whole, man himself develops into nothing but a fragment.”68 If such specialisation is advantageous to the species in promoting a quantitative advance in knowledge, it is still injurious to the mutilated individuals who are the agents of the process. Hence arises an imperative to redress this state of diremption, to discover a kind of wholeness and integrity compatible with the discriminations of modern life.

Among German contemporaries, Herder too examines the new division of labour, but offers a diagnosis significantly different from Schiller’s. Here is still another perspective on diversity, more favourable to some of the older kinds, though not to hierarchy and submission. Herder also distinguishes the organic vitality of ancient Greek life from the divisiveness and mechanical interactions of the moderns, but he is particularly alert to the contrast between modernity and the mediaeval world, of which he gives a highly positive account. Herder argues that compared with the richly-textured and variegated relations of mediaeval communities, and its more Platonic distribution of work among artisans, society is becoming less, not more, differentiated through the modern organisation of labour. He celebrates not differences in juridical status but functional differentiations within the community, manifesting an organic wholeness. The consequence of modern simplification, repetitiveness, and loss of skills in manufacturing is that workers are reduced to identical, interchangeable units, no longer self-directing but responding to pressures from without, 69
like parts of a mechanism. These are the conditions in which the oppressive politics of the modern centralising state thrive. Tyrannical rule inheres in modern society as connections and relationships among members of communities break. Deprived of communal support and the buffering of corporate bodies, isolated individuals are thrust back on their own resources and narrow self-interest. Encountering the naked power of the state, they fall into the deplorable domination that Hobbes had prescribed as a necessary restraint upon modern individualism. Herder rejects this solution, and the account of human nature on which it is based. Unlike the authoritarianism to which some romantics later succumb, and to which Herder’s thought has been incorrectly likened, he favours a broad diffusion of power rather than centralisation and hierarchy, but tends to idealise the popular life of the mediaeval commune and village.

Schiller disagrees with this assessment, accepting the greater multiplicity inherent in modern conditions. In his analysis of modern individuality, Schiller offers a strikingly different appreciation of the relation of universal and particular than does his British contemporary Joshua Reynolds; it is the latter who is more traditionalist in his views. Reynolds sees the particular as a deviation or accidental variation from the pure universal form, which it is the task of art to represent. Schiller rather appraises the ability of particulars to transform themselves, to raise themselves to the standards of universality. What matters is not the suppression of the particular, but the autonomous process of self-fashioning which particulars undertake, through the medium of aesthetic education. Pursuing a comparison with Fichte, Beiser criticises Friedrich Meineke, who thought that Schiller’s ethics only admits individuality insofar as it is a bearer of universality or totality. On Meineke’s reading, individuality for Schiller retains no independent value as a moment of the
totality. Meineke thus misses the essential question of how this totality is to be brought about in conditions of modernity.

Schiller examines the effects of fragmentation through the concept of determinability, derived from Kant and Fichte. This concept emphasises the malleability of the self, its infinite potential, and its ability to determine itself and the objective forms of its appearance. The self is not the bearer of fixed ends set by a natural order, as in the classics, nor a creature of fixed natural attributes, as in Enlightenment materialism, but is potentially free and spontaneous. The modern division of labour occasions a certain loss of malleability, but cannot entirely suppress the potential for spontaneous self-creation (though material issues must be resolved as a prerequisite for further transformations). The political implications lie in the critical ideal of an aesthetic state of beautiful and harmonised life-conditions, and in the idea of aesthetic action. Schiller thus distinguishes on the one hand the dynamic state of rights based upon individual self-assertion and disjunctive reciprocity, or mutual exclusion. On the other, borrowing from Fichte’s reworking of the idea of reciprocity, Schiller describes the aesthetic state as an ideal of collaborative action and mutual recognition. This designates not a final, utopian condition, but a process of constant renewal, with invigorating effects on ethical life. It is order as produced, not given; but produced by free play, not under duress. Stressing the importance of subjective assent and collaboration, this idea also stands in opposition to the uniformity and identity of previous republican thought, permitting a more complex account of the general will. Here there is no regression to past forms, but a higher unity that preserves diversity while enhancing cooperation.

Schiller rejects the subordination of beauty under usefulness, one of the maladies of the age: the exclusive focus on utility obscures the presence of disinterested freedom, of
which art is the symbol. He also rethinks the perverse effects attributed to both art and sciences by Rousseau.\textsuperscript{77} He modifies Rousseau’s account of the detrimental role of science; like Smith, Schiller distinguishes the historically progressive function of the division of labour for the species as a whole, and its debilitating consequences for the individual. He also distinguishes the arts and sciences in the ways in which their potential emancipating effects operate: the sciences seem to advance cumulatively, with a kind of necessity, while the benefits of art flow from its free adoption and application, and from its remedial effects in countering the one-sided development promoted by science. Schiller’s view of aesthetic education as generating unities within and among persons recalls Renaissance ideals of art as restorative of wholeness.\textsuperscript{78}

This wholeness to be attained through aesthetic education presupposes divided interests; it is not the naturally existing unity of the Greeks, but the capacity to act autonomously, and thus consciously to conceive and bring about a general interest. The reciprocal relation of virtue and freedom, as characteristic of republicanism, can be illustrated with reference to Rousseau.\textsuperscript{79} Rousseau is famously averse to the burgeoning of particular interests, and yet there are deeper similarities. Both Schiller and Rousseau hold that virtue is not an existing natural property of a particular group, or of a people as a whole,\textsuperscript{80} but must be acquired. Some interpretations\textsuperscript{81} view the difference between Rousseau and German idealism (and its progeny) to lie in the following consideration: that Rousseau thinks it a sufficient condition of emancipation to release the people from its bonds, whereas Schiller, Marx, etc. argue for the necessity of a transformation or cultural revolution in the political subjects themselves, which can be described as the cultivation of virtue. But this comparison is misleading. Rousseau does not think that the people remains virtuous and uncorrupted in the
modern age; the historical process has had as its effect that original *amour de soi* or self-preservation has been radically vitiated, and turned into competitive *amour propre* or hubristic self-affirmation, while *pitié* (or reference to other) becomes the basis not of empathy but of invidious comparison, hypocrisy, and conflict. The consequence is the loss of original authenticity and transparency (that is, of the availability of healthy *amour de soi* and *pitié* as regulators of interactions), and the appearance of a generalised corruption. Rousseau has here historicised the Stoic distinction between *oikeiosis*, or being at home in the world, and *allotriosis*, otherness or alienation. For the Stoics, this alternative represents different attitudes that the individual will can spontaneously take up toward the objective and social realms, and is unconditioned by material causes. Rousseau roots the distinction in history, particularly the history of the division of labour, and traces the perverting effects on the will of fragmentation and the expansion of false needs. Schiller’s view of alienation is similarly historicised, but it is linked to the emergence of new kinds of particular interests as a historically progressive development, though one fraught with ill effects. For Rousseau, the social contract is intended to reactivate the original tendencies of human nature, but these are long submerged, and have to be retrieved. The general will involves two acts: to refer to the common interest, determining it as one’s own—*pitié* revived— and to do so consulting only one’s own judgement—*amour de soi* or independence rendered sound again; but this is only possible under definite social and political conditions (e.g. rough equality of material possessions, or an undifferentiated citizenry), and involves civil freedom as an act of self-transformation. Civil or political freedom represents the recovery of a partially lost essence, and is not simply the realisation of an already-present and effective cultural content.
Like Schiller, then, Rousseau advocates transformation, and not merely unbridling. The fundamental distinction between them is that Rousseau wants to revert to or retrieve putatively natural sentiments, which have been perverted through history. There is thus a fixed human essence, which has been crippled by the historical process, but which can be rehabilitated in the right circumstances. This is very much an Enlightenment idea (other contemporaries like Smith might substitute a different essential property, such as the propensity to trade, which has been thwarted by irrationalities of feudalism, etc.). To the extent that it relies on an ahistorical idea of essence or anthropological constants, this idea puts Rousseau at odds with the post-Kantians, for whom the human essence evolves and is practically constituted, and is not a given set of traits. But Rousseau does insist that this retrieval is also a self-transformation, and not simply a loosening of bonds, since the present existence-form of mankind does not correspond to its essence. Some versions of subsequent romanticism and expresivism will hold that the essence of the people remains undiluted, and that this essence will emerge intact once the purely contingent restrictions of feudal or foreign domination are removed; but Rousseau does not advance this view. Schiller shares with Rousseau the idea that political and cultural self-transformation is necessary for any possible overcoming of the modern relations of diremption. Virtue must be acquired; but for Schiller, this transformation does not mean recourse to a permanent, but submerged, essence. It is rather the acquisition of new abilities and forms of interaction through aesthetic education, based on the determinability or malleability of individuals to the insights of reason, and not on any fixed attributes or determinations.

In the corresponding idea of aesthetic action, the spontaneous, active, reciprocal relation to the world, creation or formativity is not to be understood as mimesis or
Nachahmung,\textsuperscript{87} the replication of a natural order, an idea still underlying earlier eighteenth-century classicism; there is spontaneity, and not only receptivity. Nor can activity be understood through the scientistic idea of the subject wholly caught in a causal nexus, whereby actions are entirely predetermined by laws of cause and effect (Hobbes); there is (spontaneous) teleology, as well as causality. Nor, finally, can freedom be equated with the satiation of naturally given ends (Enlightenment materialism), though these must be attended to. There is pure practical reason, aiming at rational freedom, as well as empirical practical reason, aiming at satisfaction. The task is to reconcile these apparent antinomies.

The synthesis promoted by aesthetic education yields a new concept of the individual, as the willed and conscious unity of universal and particular, or the general interest, thought, interpreted, and applied from a particular vantage point. The self becomes an aesthetic artefact, a self-fashioning. This synthesis is as far from the uniformity of abstract or imposed universality (the result feared by Meineke) as it is from the confusion of unbridled particularism. This is also a typically Hegelian idea, and it is here that the affinity between the two philosophers is most clear. Modernity has liberated individuals from the grasp of traditional relationships; the task of modern virtue, in the guise of aesthetic education, is to moderate and adjust particular interests, but not to suppress them utterly.

One final distinction among types of republicanism, as this was worked out in the German states up till 1848, helps to specify further what is distinctive in Schiller’s position. Kant, for example, holds that the political problem can be solved even for a population of devils.\textsuperscript{88} It requires no change of self, but only an intelligent partition of the external world. With his distinction of right and morality, Kant offers a defence of rights, the compossibility of freedoms in their external usage, independent of the motivations of legal subjects. This is a
juridical form of republicanism, stressing freedom as non-domination by external forces, though in Kant’s thought requiring completion in another (apolitical) structure, that of morality, with an emphasis on maxims, intent, and duty. A second, rigoristic form of republicanism emerges somewhat later from this same intellectual context. This form demands that subjects eliminate all heteronomous influences, internal as well as external, and enjoins a stringent positive self-transformation. In Bruno Bauer, for example, political actions must be governed by universalistic maxims, not by private interests or identities; hereby the difference between right and morality is effaced, or politics becomes moralised. This entails the suppression of private interest, an attitude that can be described in the language of Kant and Schiller as sublime.91

In Schiller we find a third variant, an aesthetic republicanism. “Man,” he says, “must learn to desire more nobly, so that he may not need to will sublimely.” He explains further that if we distinguish the empirical individual from Man as a rational Idea, there are two ways for these levels to coincide: either the ideal suppresses the empirical individual, or individuals elevate themselves to the stature of the idea. In the first case, unity can either be imposed from without, though at the high price of suppressing particularity and of causing permanent inner rifts, or else compulsively from within, leading to a uniformity and repetitiveness of results. The outer imposition of unity is the Jacobin model; the compulsive inward imposition is his description of the Schwärmer or enthusiast, but it equally characterises the rigoristic version of republicanism which represses the particular identity. Schiller’s option is the elevation of the self to the idea, in a new and emancipated ethical life. Letter XIII distinguishes uniformity and harmony, the former entailing a one-sided subordination and persistent internal divisions, the latter a mutual exchange, recalling
Aristotle’s definition of political power as the power of equal over equal, or reciprocal rule. Active reciprocity now designates the aesthetic condition, the remaking of the self in the light of the universal.

This is an attractive ideal, based on a powerful diagnosis of modernity. Schiller’s Aesthetic Education does not provide a fully articulated republican scheme, as Oz-Salzberger is right to declare. It lacks the concreteness of the proposals of Condorcet, Payne, or even Rousseau. But it is no mere utopian flight, no evasion of modern realities. Like Hegel, Schiller does not prescribe the future, but offers a compelling critique, identifying the conditions of emancipatory action. He recognises the fundamental characteristics of the culture of diremption, and upholds the possibility of its transcendence.

In the formulation of Letter XV, “Let there be beauty.” Beauty appears here as an imperative, a telos to be realised. Beauty cannot derive in modern society from an immediate intuition of wholeness, as for the Greeks, but is for us an acquisition. Schiller’s concepts of freedom respond to both the Kantian beautiful and the sublime: a beautiful (though never fully secured) harmony of the faculties of mind within the individual (understanding and sensibility), with external nature, and with others; and dignity, the sublime elevation of the self above natural causality in the determination of ends, though without the ruthless eradication of particularity and difference. Together these ideals outline — but only outline — a programme of self-formation which is highly politically charged. It is intended to wed spontaneity and law, unity and diversity, and to do so in ways compatible with modern selfhood. It voices an imperative that still resounds.
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4 Frederick Beiser, *Schiller as Philosopher: A Re-Examination* (Oxford, 2005), p. 11 and ch. 2, contests Hegel’s reading. However, Schiller’s stress on the acquired rather than natural sentiments as bearers of freedom (on which Beiser, *Schiller*, pp. 158-9 n. 66, also insists, against R.D. Miller, *Schiller and the Ideal of Freedom. A Study of Schiller’s Philosophical Works with Chapters on Kant* [Oxford, 1970]), seems perfectly compatible with Hegel’s own


12 Ibid., 173, 171.


14 David Pugh, “Schiller as Citizen of His Time,” in Jane V. Curran and Christophe Fricker, eds., *Schiller’s “On Grace and Dignity” in its Cultural Context. Essays and a New Translation* (Rochester NY, 2005), pp. 37-54. Pugh (p. 45) sees Schiller’s pre-Kantian period of the 1780’s as more progressive, or at least less ambivalent about Enlightenment ideals. The role of Schiller’s early anthropological views in his later political thought merits further study.


16 For a very useful review of the older literature, see Lesley Sharpe, *Schiller’s Aesthetic Essays: Two Centuries of Criticism* (Columbia, SC, 1995).


19 Beiser, *Schiller*, pp. 124-25. See also pp. 163-64. In my view, Schiller does not claim that virtue must precede freedom in time, but that freedom and virtue are reciprocal concepts, developing together and sustaining each other. The claim for the temporal priority of virtue will be advanced by what I describe below as republican rigorism, in contrast to Schiller’s aesthetic republicanism.

20 Beiser, *Schiller*, p. 126.


22 Beiser, *Schiller*, p. 209


26 Hammermeister, *German Aesthetic Tradition*, pp. 53-54.

27 Beiser, *Schiller*, p. 163; but this parallel undercuts Beiser’s assimilation of Kant to liberal individualism, p. 125. Schiller’s idea of the republic, castigated in Pugh, “Schiller as Citizen,” pp. 46-47, is similar to Kant’s own conception. See Wolfgang Kersting, “Kant’s Concept of the State,” in Howard Williams, ed., *Kant’s Political Philosophy* (Cardiff, 1992), pp. 143-65.

29 This is particularly evident in Schiller’s play *Don Carlos*, in King Philip’s attempts to lure Posa.

30 This is the formulation of Mondot, « Schiller et le Révolution française », p. 97.

31 Similarly, Pugh “Schiller as Citizen,” pp. 42-43, distinguishes two phases in German cultural development, prior to and following the Napoleonic occupation (1806-13). While exonerating Schiller from the romantic and nationalistic excess of the latter period, he describes the earlier phase, in which he places Schiller, as still highly traditional in character. An alternative view is advanced by Terry Pinkard, *German Philosophy 1760-1860. The Legacy of Idealism* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 9-10, who stresses the deep crisis of the traditional order in the German states in the latter decades of the eighteenth century. This idea accords more closely with the present account.


34 Oz-Salzberger, “Scots, Germans,” p. 211.


36 Ibid., pp. 217-18

37 Ibid., p. 218.


44 Mondot, « Schiller et le Révolution française », pp. 87-103.


46 Schiller, Aesthetic Education, Letter IV. 3 [my translation.]

47 ibid, Letter IV. 3 [my translation.]

48 ibid., Letter IV. 7 [my translation.].

49 Friedrich Schiller, „Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung“, Sämtliche Werke, Bd. V (Munich, 1962), pp. 694-780, esp. p. 716. These terms do not appear in the Aesthetic Education, but the text on naive and sentimental poetry was begun while Schiller was still composing the latter work (Rüdiger Safranski, Schiller oder die Erfindung des Deutschen Idealismus [Munich, 2004], p. 418), and the two texts are taken here to be in conformity. In this interpretation, modernity breaks the immediate unity and harmony with nature characteristic of the Greek experience, and then strives to approximate these unities, but without suppressing the new differentiations. Schiller’s views on the Greeks are not always consistent, however. For other expressions, see Friedrich Schiller, „Die Götter Griechenlands”(1788), Sämtliche Werke, Bd. I, Munich, 1962, pp. 163-169; for a discussion, Joseph Chytry, The Aesthetic State. A Quest in Modern German Thought (Berkeley, 1989), p. 92, 96, 103.
Several of Schiller’s judgements on the French revolution are cited and analysed in Mondot, « Schiller et le Révolution française », pp. 87-93. The present interpretation of these judgements reflects especially Schiller’s analysis of multiplicity and unity in *Aesthetic Education*, Letter IV.7.


Carl von Dalberg, *Grundsätze der Ästhetik, deren Anwendung und künftige Entwicklung* (Erfurt, 1791), offers an interesting anticipation of Schiller’s argument. He contends that aesthetics is a guide to the political unification of multiplicity. While he refers to an articulated arrangement of *Stände* or estates (pp. 76-79, 91-94), he is clearly describing a functional differentiation of occupations, rather than the old hierarchical order of privileges and immunities. Dalberg’s relations with Schiller require closer study.


56 Hont and Ignatieff, eds., Wealth and Virtue, Introduction, as well as Oz-Salzberger, “Scots, Germans,” pp. 197-226, discuss the revision of this approach through accommodation with the market.


59 For a survey of some of these issues, see Douglas Moggach, “The Social Question and Political Struggles in 1848: The Case of Germany,” in Moggach and Browne, eds., The Social Question, pp. 21-42.

60 e.g. Schiller, Aesthetic Education, Letter VI. 8.


Safranski, ed., *Schiller oder die Erfindung*, p. 93, 101. See also Dushan Bresky, “Schiller’s Debt to Montesquieu and Ferguson,” *Comparative Literature*, vol. 13, no. 3 (1961), 239-53; and Norbert Waszek, “The Scottish Enlightenment in Germany, and its Translator, Christian Garve (1742-98),” in Tom Hubbard and R.D.S. Jack, eds., *Scotland in Europe* (Amsterdam, 2006), pp. 55-72. Waszek, “Aux sources,” p. 113, notes that Garve develops an original position in respect to his Scottish sources, as well as disseminating these views widely in German. Waszek offers the following summary of his argument: “Schiller, like them [Ferguson and Garve], perceives the specific modern conditions in which the division of labour develops as a *threatening crisis*, on the one hand, but on the other as an *occasion for a new beginning*, or at least as a challenge: not an insurmountable challenge, but one to which individuals must rise.” [Emphasis in original. My translation. DM.] While endorsing Waszek’s conclusion, the present text seeks a closer specification of Schiller’s republicanism.


Plato, *Republic*, Bk. II.


71 Barrell, *Political Theory of Painting*, pp. 69-162


73 Schiller, *Aesthetic Education*, Letter XX.

74 Hans-Georg Pott, *Die schöne Freiheit* (Munich, 1980), p. 54. Beiser, *Schiller*, pp. 144-47, 228-29, identifies an implicit critique of Fichte in Schiller’s insistence on the principle of individuality. On Beiser’s reading, Fichte's ethics aims at the suppression of individuality, in the sense that each person qua exemplar of the moral law would be indistinguishable from all others. While Fichte so describes an ideal of perfected rationality in his *Bestimmung des Gelehrten* of 1794, he revises this idea in his later ethical and juridical writings, the *Grundlage des Naturrechts* (1796) and *System der Sittenlehre* (1798). In these texts, Fichte places multiplicity and unity in patterns of distinct relationships which constitute the domains of right and morality. Right is predominantly analytical, establishing individual entitlement to separate spheres of activity, though this is undergirded by relations of mutual recognition. Morality is predominantly synthetic, seeking concord in adherence to the moral law, but also establishes the need for each individual to will this law autonomously, and to this extent retains an analytical component. J. G. Fichte, “Some Lectures Concerning the Scholar’s Vocation,” in Daniel Breazeale, ed. and trans., *Fichte. Early Philosophical Writings* (Ithaca,

75 e.g. Schiller, Aesthetic Education, Letters XIV. 1, and XVI. 1. The aesthetic state [Staat] is to be distinguished from the equilibrium of the aesthetic condition [Zustand] as this exists within the individual, described in Letter IX. The latter refers to a psychic harmony or balance among conflicting drives. See Chytry, The Aesthetic State, pp. 81-85, 101-02.


79 Since he does not focus on the importance of difference for Schiller’s politics, Beiser, Schiller, pp. 156-61, highlights other contrasts with Rousseau, while stressing, as here, the opposition between natural and acquired (moral and aesthetic) sentiments.

80 The concept of the people, though vitally important for republican thought, cannot be examined here. The idea that the people is not simply a natural, or a racial, given, but is of historical origin, precisely in the crisis of the estate order and the emergence of the new civil society, remains central to later German republicanism. While the collapse of the estate order with its irrational differentiations has emancipated the individual from the restraints of tradition, this is an insufficient condition for the existence of a people as a political actor. Bruno Bauer’s republicanism of the 1840’s insists on a political self-constitution, setting oneself against the privileges and irrationalities of the ancien régime. In the absence of this
political movement, the result would be the *Masse* as the immediate form of dissolution of the old order. The achievement of the Jacobins, for Bauer, is to catalyse the formation of the people as a revolutionary subject, in opposition to exclusive privileges. See Massimiliano Tomba, *Crisi e critica in Bruno Bauer. Il principio di esclusione come fondamento del politico* (Naples, 2002); Douglas Moggach, *The Philosophy and Politics of Bruno Bauer* (Cambridge, 2003).


82 Henrich, *Between Kant and Hegel*, pp. 89-97.

83 Beiser, *Schiller*, p. 11, 158 and n. 66.

84 Corresponding to what Hegel calls the infinite judgement, this would read: ‘mankind is not free’, in contrast to the negative judgement (‘mankind is not-free’, i.e. a member of the class of non-free beings), or to the apodeictic judgement, or judgement of necessity: ‘mankind must be free’. G.W.F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A.V. Miller (London, 1969), pp. 636-43, 661-63. For a concise summary and comparison of these forms, see Burbidge, *Logic*, pp. 85-87. On the role of the infinite judgement in Enlightenment thought, see H.S. Harris, *Hegel's Ladder*, vol. 2: *The Odyssey of Spirit* (Indianapolis, 1997), p. 364, 384, 494.

85 While Tamas, “Class,” 229-35, counterpoises Rousseau to Marx as sources of divergent views of the emancipation of the working class (as mere liberation unchanged, or as transformation), the better comparison would be between Marx and Jules Michelet, *Le peuple* [1846] (Paris, 1974). Michelet describes the moral rectitude and creativity of the poor and the working strata in ways that anticipate E.P. Thompson’s account, *The Making of the English Working Class* (London, 1963), of which Tamas is critical. Michelet’s thought has
similarities with the type of romanticism derived in the nineteenth century from Herder, based on an expressivist idea of freedom. Here collective subjects, nations, or peoples translate into objectivity their unique understanding of the world, as a facet of a composite human personality. On Herder, see Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge MA, 1989), pp. 368-90.


94 Schiller, *Aesthetic Education*, Letters VI. 7, VI.10, and XXVII. 11


96 The relation among the concepts of sublimity, dignity, and beauty is extremely complex, and these difficulties must be skirted here. See, in Schiller, *Sämtliche Werke*, Bd. V: “Über

97 For his comments on Schiller’s earlier work, see Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, ed. Allen Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 48-49n. (vi. 23-25 n.).