

nothing -- upon nothing.³ Accordingly, we could conclude. However, in order to set forth the proof that Hegel only preaches atheism, and that he has made self-consciousness into the grave of both religion and the whole universe, and in order to uproot the prejudice that he has secured and supported Religion through Philosophy, we must now give ourselves over to his Philosophy of Religion, and by so doing to expressly demonstrate that he has set up self-consciousness as the singular power of the world, as its Creator, as its Lord, and as its Tyrant.

Up to now, since we have focused particularly upon his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, it might well appear that he has been profane and Titanish only within the godless company of Philosophers: bad company perverts good morals. Or again, it might appear that he would have felt free to speak from the heart in only the company of Philosophers, as they would be both attentive and open to his views, and thus when in the Holy Realm of Religion he would feel himself more reverent and restrained, and so be less freely forthcoming in his talk. If such an appearance should be presented, it is only an appearance: He is always and everywhere the same devastator, destroyer and enemy of the Holy!

And so, we now present his understanding of Religion in general and Christianity in particular as the work and product of self-consciousness. It will be most difficult in this exposition to hold back our deep inner abhorrence, and it will force us to the extreme of self-restraint -- but let it be! We want, in one steady, clean sweep, to elucidate Hegel's development. The atheism of the system must finally be revealed so that the Christian Church and the government can come to a decision. We herewith solemnly call forth the followers of the system to step forth and confess it we have not grasped the sense of their Master. But they will not be able to respond. Well, let us listen.

³Here, Bauer's phrase "Wo er keine Sache -- das Nichts -- auf Nichts stellt" [where he has set his concern -- nothing -- upon nothing] is modeled after the first line of Goethe's poem *Vanitas! Vanitatum Vanitas!*: "Ich hab' Mein' Sach' auf Nichts gestellt." Max Stirner begins and ends his major work, *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum* (1845) with the same line from Goethe.

Chapter 11

Religion as the Product of Self-Consciousness

What is God? Hegel answers: "The absolutely True, the Universal in and for itself." But this Universal, which is God, is nothing other than thinking. Thinking is "the activity of the Universal, the Universal in its activity or operation." It is the energy of the Universal (*Philosophie der Religion* [Philosophy of Religion], I, 104; S.S., I, 94).

This, however, is not to be understood as if thinking stood over and against the Universal as a completed object, but rather that the Universal, as this "undivided, continuous, self-sufficing One" exists only in the activity of thought. The Universal is the activity, elevation, and essence of self-consciousness itself.

The Universal as such is pure unity and pure transparency, for which nothing finite can be impenetrable, for there is for it nothing simply and absolutely other, and in this it is thereby the Universal which is self-identical and self-related in all things. This is to say that the Universal is that act, and only in that act, in which self-consciousness thinks of the whole natural and spiritual universe, and lifts it up to its own essence. All differences are encompassed and subsumed in this act, even the distinction between the Universal itself and the Ego as thinking subject. In that it thinks this One, this Universal, the Ego itself has denied its own particularity and has cast it forth from itself. A distinction in the Universal is not as yet to be suffered, or at least not to be posited.

This Universal now remains simply this unity out of which all differences proceed, the absolute womb, the infinite impulse and source out of which everything emerges — naturally! — for this unity is that which subsumes the full riches of the world of the Ego, and now has — out of itself and within its inner development — to prove this world as its own. As self-comprehending, all differences which it develops out of itself remain enclosed within it, and as the self-encompassing unity there is nothing outside of it of either truth or worth. Further, the distinction of the Ego remains enclosed within the Universal, for the Universal is just the activity and the essence of the Ego itself. It is — therefore how can the Ego abandon itself, lose sight of itself, or estrange itself from itself after it has experienced itself as the Universal essence, as Universal act, as infinite transcendence and extension? (P.R., I, 108-9; S.S., I, 94-5).

But difference must develop within this Universal, for it contains in itself infinite Universality, self-identity, and the empirical particularities of the Ego. Difference, which however will always remain enclosed within the universality of the Ego, must nevertheless reveal itself, and so sustain the appearance that the Ego — as a particular consciousness — is set over and against its own universality which now has been taken as a particular, with this Universal then becoming an object of consciousness for the Ego.

First of all, the difference appears as a tautology, then as a difference which displays itself in every instant as no difference.

... here thought has the merely Universal for its object, as the undetermined or indeterminate Universal; that is, has a quality, a content, which it itself is, in which it is, in fact, in immediate or abstract content with itself. It is the light which illumines, but has no other content than just light (P.R., I, 117; S.S., I, 121).

The relationship is nothing other than the simple extension and effulgence of the Ego itself.

Now furthermore, this content of thought is an existent, this product is. However, its being has objectivity only in my consciousness. Only the Ego is, the Object is not; it exists only as known, its being only as known being. In this knowledge the "double being" is not as

yet posited, the specific character of the object is of myself. The form of appearance of the Universal is feeling. The I, which receives its determinate character in feeling, takes up an immediate attitude to the Universal, and as I am this single empirical Ego, so then the determination of the Universal belongs to this empirical self-consciousness — hence, *distinction* is implicitly contained in feeling. This distinction appears thusly:

On the one side am I, the Universal, the Subject, as this transparent, pure, and all-dissolving fluidity, and the object appears rather as a determinate other, of which I, in my Universality, make limpid, so that it is made my own... The distinction in feeling is, in the first place, an inner one in the Ego itself; it is the distinction between me in my pure fluidity, and me in my definite character (Cf. P.R., I, 117ff.; S.S., I, 121, 126).

Now, if feeling be the essential religious attitude, this attitude is identical with my empirical self. Determinateness, representing the eternal thought of the Universal, and I as wholly empirical subjectivity, are in me comprised and comprehended in feeling. I am the immediate reconciliation and resolution of the strife between the two. But just because I thus find myself determined on the one hand as a particular empirical subject, and am of the other raised into a wholly different region, and have the experience of passing to and from the one to the other, and have the feeling of the relation of the two, do I find myself determined as against myself, or as distinguished from myself. That is to say, in this very feeling of mine I am driven by its content into contrast or opposition — in other words, to reflection and to the distinction of subject and object (Cf. P.R., I, 123-24; S.S., I, 127-28).

This passage to reflection and real difference is not grounded in the character of religious feeling, but rather this character itself is the actuality of the opposition, and, consequently, reflection:

For the substance or content of the religious relation is just the thought of the Universal, which is itself, indeed,

reflection, and therefore the other moment of my empirical consciousness, and the relation of both. Therefore in religious feeling *I am alienated from myself*, for the Universal, the Thought which has an absolute existence, is the negation of my particular empirical existence, which appears in regard to it as a nullity which has its truth in the Universal only. The religious attitude is unity, but it involves the power of judgement of differentiation. In feeling the moment of empirical existence, I feel the universal aspect, that of negation, as a *determinateness which exists entirely outside of me*; or, to put it otherwise, while I am in this last *I feel myself estranged from myself in my empirical existence*, I feel I am renouncing myself and negating my empirical consciousness.

Now the subjectivity which is contained in religious feeling, being *empirical* and particular, exists in feeling in the shape of some particular interest, or in some particular determinate form in fact. Religious feeling contains just this definite (twofold) character, that of empirical self-consciousness, and that of universal thought, and their relation and unity. It therefore hovers between their opposition and *their unity and harmony*, differing in character with the attitude of individual subjectivity to the Universal, as it determines itself in accordance with the particular shape assumed by the interest in which I happen at the time to be absorbed. Accordingly, their relation of the Universal and the empirical self-consciousness may be of a very varied kind. There may be the *utmost tension and hostility of the extremes*, or the most entire unity. When the condition is that of separation, in which the Universal is the Substantial in relation to which the empirical consciousness feels that it exists, and at the same time feels its essential nothingness, but desires still to cling to its positive existence and remain what it is, we have the feeling of fear. When we realize that our own inner existence and feeling are null, and when self-consciousness is at the same time on the side of the Universal and condemns that exist-

tence, we get the feeling of contrition, of sorrow on account of ourselves... The higher unity of my self-consciousness generally with the Universal, the certainty, assurance, and feeling of this identity, is love, blessedness.

If now the determinate character of the Ego, which constitutes the content of feeling, is not only distinguished from the pure Ego, but also from the Ego in its particular activity as well, then the Ego finds itself determined against itself, so that it declares this difference to be an actual difference — but this difference yet remains, however, merely one in the world of self-consciousness. Hence, the activity of the Ego comes into operation, and sets *its own* determinate character at a distance, as if it were *not* its own, and so make it objective. Further, the Ego is implicitly estranged from itself in feeling, and has, in the Universality which it contains, potentially the negation of its particular empirical existence. Now, in putting its determinateness outside of itself, the *Ego estranges itself*, does away, in fact, with its immediacy, and has entered into the sphere of the Universal (Cf. P.R., 133-34; S.S., 138).

At first, however, the determinateness of Spirit appears as the external object in general, and gets the entirely objective character of externality in space and time. And the consciousness which places it in this externality, and relates itself to it, is *perception* — in its perfect form as *Art-perception*.

And so now, in positing the inner determination of the Spirit, the Universal, as an object for perception, self-consciousness is the creative force, and proves that the religious relationship is but the dialectic and movement of self-consciousness itself. As sensuous appearance is "necessarily the product of the Spirit," and as the work of art is contained within the spirit of the artist, so "in this one" the union of the Notion and of reality has taken place. However, "when the artist has let his thought emerge into externality, and the work is completed, he soon retires from it."

But now, when the work of art is set forth for the perceiving subject and appears as an external object of a quite common sort, one un-

aware and unfeeling of itself, then it displays itself in another manner, one in which the religious relationship is the act of self-consciousness.

The form, the subjectivity, which the artist has given to his work, is external only; it is not the absolute form of what knows itself, of self-consciousness. Subjectivity, in its complete form, is wanting to the work of art. This self-consciousness belongs to the subjective consciousness, to the perceiving Subject.

In relation to the work of art, therefore, which in itself is not something having knowledge, the moment of self-consciousness is the Other, but a moment too, which belongs to it absolutely, and which knows the object represented, and represents it to itself as the substantial truth. The work of art, since it does not know itself, is essentially incomplete, and since self-consciousness belongs to the Idea it needs that completion which it acquires by the relation to it of what is self-conscious. It is in this consciousness that the *process* takes place by which the work of art ceases to be merely object, and by which self-consciousness posits that which seems to it as an Other, as identical with itself. This is the process which does away with that externality in which truth appears in art, and which annuls these lifeless relations of immediacy, and it is through it that the perceiving subject gives itself the conscious feeling of having in the object its own essence (P.R., I, 133-36; S.S., 139-40).

Conceived in the Spirit, created from the Spirit, the work of art as the presentation of the essential definition of the Spirit is again taken back into self-consciousness.

This revelation of the universal characteristic of self-consciousness is nevertheless immanently defective. Indeed, the truth is here no longer merely subjective as in feeling, and is set forth in its objectivity, but it yet holds itself in direct and sensible independence, that is, in an independence which — because of its sensibility — cannot endure, and must therefore once again cancel itself. On the other hand, this revelation of the truth is produced from the subject, and is

so intrinsically dependent upon it that it only obtains its subjectivity and self-consciousness in the perceiving subject.

In perception the elements of the totality of the religious relation — namely, the object, and self-consciousness — have got separated. The religious process belongs, indeed, to the perceiving subject only, and yet it is not complete in the subject, but needs the object perceived by sense. On the other hand, the object is the truth, and yet it needs, in order to be true, the self-consciousness which lies outside of it.

The advance now necessary is this, that the totality of the religious relation should be actually posited as such, and as unity. Truth attains to objectivity, in which its content as existing on its own account is not merely something posited, but exists essentially in the form of subjectivity itself, and the entire process takes place in the element of self-consciousness. The Object is, to subjectivity, and independent and divinely perfected world, but this world no longer exists in sensibility, but rather in imagined independence, that is, in the element of self-consciousness (P.R., I, 157; S.S., 141ff.).

Hence, the religious relationship is in the *imagery of the mind*. The *picture* perceived in art is now elevated out of its sensibility into the form of *Universality*, of thought. But yet, as a universality and thought-picture, it has not yet been stripped of its sensuousness; it has not yet become real thought, and self-consciousness as such has not really been affirmed, but rather it, and its world, are still so objectified and their general characteristics still so entangled with sensuous appearance, that they appear to it as *externally* independent forms. This mental-imagery is the struggle against the sensuous, but only the struggle, and exists only as this struggle, and as such is still not free from sensibility, but rather in need of this struggle simply in order to exist.

Hence the Universal, the World of the Essential, is presented in pictorial forms drawn from the sensible and natural: God is a father, who has begot a Son. Or, it is presented as having happened in

the past, as a Divine History. Or, its determinations, as taken up in the form of independent entities, are represented simply in this form, and these independent determinations are to be connected to one another in an external manner: God is Wise, Good, Righteous, etc. (Cf. P.R., I, 151; S.S., 145-48).

Actual self-consciousness places itself under the form and manner of contingency, disposition, and externality into union with this supposedly independent world, so as to grasp it as its *own*. It is instinct which connects self-consciousness with this abstract, immediate objectivity of the Divine World and Holy History. But human instinct is not infallible, and it can be deceptive. But when reflection awakens, so can I think that the world would be deprived of all support, that all morality, the state, and the whole of life would waver, if religion be taken from this world — for religion today treats of such things, and because such imagery is the perfection of religion. This fear, however, can also proceed out of my short-sightedness, and the strength with which I turn away from reflection back to religion is merely an act of despair, to which others, perhaps stronger, need not necessarily employ in order to understand. Or, I can thereof reflect upon how many millions have found their comfort, satisfaction, and dignity in religion. "But the consolation lies only in the supposition that the manner in which millions have regarded the matter must probably be right, and the possibility remains that, on being looked at once more, it may turn out to be otherwise." Or if I once, or up until now,

with the needs impulses, and sorrows of my heart have found comfort and tranquility in the content of religion, it is a mere accident that this has taken place. This result depends on the fact that this very standpoint of reflection and inner feeling has not as yet been disturbed and has not yet aroused in itself the presentiment of the existence of a Higher Being. It is therefore dependent on an *accidental sense of defect*.

And finally, one calls upon miracles and the witness of the Holy Scripture. But here one must distinguish through which *medium* this testimony is to come to us.

I, however, do not consist merely of this heart and feeling, or of this good-natured reflection which shows itself complaint to the apologetics of the understanding, and naively welcomes it and is only too glad when it perceives reasons which are adequate, and suitable to it, but I have other and higher needs besides (Cf. P.R., 158ff.; S.S., 153ff.).

In a word, I am not merely fortuitously determined from without, but rather through myself insofar as I am, as though, simply universal. I am thought determining itself in itself, I exist as the Notion. All content, which should exist for me, must be the determinations of the Notion, and when I am self-conscious of the Notion, so must the content harmonize with my ego, so that all determinateness is of myself, and the mind therein has its essentiality as object. And so not self-consciousness rises up against positive authority and, on the other side, against externality which has a content in itself.

Now the Critic turns himself against the received testimony, and examines the medium through which it has arrived to us. On the other side, the clarification, the *Aufklärung*, turns against the content itself, and dissolves the mental images with their own inner contradictions.

And thus it now follows that when the full content of these images is corrupted and fallen into that subjectivity which knows itself to be in self infinite, then "the principle of subjective freedom has as a consequence to be consciously known." When subjectivity has become concrete in itself, and has become "its own Object," then even in the decay of the positive character of the images, faith and salvation are "realized." Subjectivity no longer knows the Universal as being external to it, as a presented Object, but rather as in itself. It is its own universality. This completion of the subjective side to the Idea in itself is yet to be established as such — an act with which we are already acquainted.

This is to say, that in the beginning the Ego has to explicate the totality of its inner differentiation. It posits itself as self-consciousness in fact when it distinguishes its universality from its individuality, with each positing itself as consciousness. But finally, self-consciousness recognizes itself in its own differentiations, and so becomes absolute for itself, actualized self-consciousness.

But in this process self-consciousness leads itself through every positive form of mental-imagery. It comprehends them as but stages and appearances of itself. This comprehension is expressed in the following manner:

I am myself the relationship of both sides of the religious condition, the extremes of universality and of consciousness in its particularity or the subject according to its immediacy.¹ I who think, who am that which lifts myself up, the active Universal, the Ego, the immediate subject, are *one and the same 'I'*. And further, the *relation* of these two sides which are so sharply opposed — the absolute finite consciousness and being on the one hand, and the infinite on the other — exists in religion for me. I thinking, I lift myself up to the Absolute above all that is finite, and am infinite consciousness, while I am at the same time finite consciousness, and indeed am such in accordance with my whole empirical character. Both sides, as well as their relation, exist for me. Both sides seek each other, and both flee from each other. At one time, for example, I accentuate my empirical, finite consciousness, and place myself in opposition to infiniteness; at another I exclude myself from myself, condemn myself, and give the preponderance to the infinite consciousness. The middle term contains nothing else than the characteristics of both the extremes. They are not pillars of Hercules, which confront each other sharply. I am, and it is *in myself* and for myself that this conflict and this conciliation take place. In myself, I as infinite am against or in contrast with myself

¹Of all the chapters in the *Trumpet*, this one in particular evidences Bauer's use of variant texts and his habit of summarizing a number of passages from Hegel with little exact citation. There is, however, no instance of Bauer making any citations that run counter to the material found in the second edition of Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*. For the interested reader, the best advice is simply to read pages 90-100 in the Sanderson and Speir's translation, or the relevant, and not concurrent, pages dealing with "The Concept of Religion" found in *Hegel: Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: Vol. 1. Introduction and the Concept of Religion*, ed. Peter C. Hodgson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

as finite, and as finite consciousness I stand over against my thought as infinite. I am the feeling, the perception, the idea alike of this unity and this conflict, and am what holds together the conflicting elements, the effort put forth in this act of holding together, and represent the labor of heart and soul to obtain the mastery over this opposition.

I am thus the relation of these two sides, which are not abstract determinations, as 'finite and infinite'. On the contrary, each is itself totality. *Each* of the two extremes is *itself 'I'*, what relates them; and the holding together, the relating, is itself this which is at once in conflict with itself, and brings itself to unity in the conflict. Or, to put it differently, I am the conflict, for the conflict is just this antagonism, which is not any indifference of the two as different, but is their being bound together. *I am not one of those taking part in the strife, but I am both the combatants, and am the strife itself*. I am the fire and the water which touch each other, and am the contact and union of what flies apart, and this very contact itself is this double, essentially conflicting relation, as the relation of what is now separated, severed, and now reconciled and in unity with itself (P.R., I, 80-1; S.S., I, 64).

How many well-disposed persons has not Hegel deceived (if they permitted themselves to be deceived) by the oft-spoken phrase "the reconciliation of the thinking spirit with religion?" How many have been cast under the spell of these magical words — which, some years ago, were a cliché in the mouth of everyone — and so drawn away from the True God and led before atheism?! What mirror-tricks! If one looks into what Hegel means by the reconciliation of reason and religion, it is that there is no God and that the Ego has only to deal with itself in religion, whereas, in religion, it means to deal with a living, personal God. Realized self-consciousness is that play in which the Ego is doubled as in a mirror, and which, after holding its image for thousands of years to be God, discovers the picture in the mirror to be itself. Accordingly, the wrath and punishing righteousness of God is nothing other than the Ego threatening itself, in the mirror,

with its balled fist; again, the mercy and grace of God is nothing more than the mirrored Ego offering its hand. Religion takes that mirror image for God, philosophy casts off the illusion and shows man that no one stands behind the mirror, that it is but the reflection of the Ego with which, until now, he has negotiated, to which he has offered prayers, homages, and sacrifices.

Is there a greater and more dreadful scorn than this play with the holy and religious word "reconciliation"? Is the reconciliation of the spirit with religion the overthrow, denial and destruction of religion? Only a Satan could be reconciled with it in this way. Hegel is also frank enough to admit that the introduction of thought into religion is its "decline," but he is pleased to assign this role in having overthrown to the *Aufklärung* and reflection. But he himself has even said that the *Aufklärung* understanding contains in itself reconciliation, and is "in itself the perfecting of the subjective extremes toward the Idea!" (Cf. P.R., II, 354; S.S., III, 145-51).

We should think that Hegel's presentation to be so clear, his atheism so glaring and open that all of the Hegelians must have long known and taught what we have shown. But this is not the case, for it is well-known that a great faction among them firmly hold that Hegel is a theist. Their religious concern has deceived them. But now, even the left-faction, although they hold atheistic views, assert the same, and not infrequently even chide their Master. They immediately rushed to the public press to spread the story that the second edition of Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* had been falsified in the interest of religion. No one stepped forth to show that it was in principle the same as the first edition, and but differed through a sharper development of its atheism. Finally, a reviewer appeared in the *Hallische Jahrbücher* and all-too-cleverly complained that one could not know and also could not see that all this was possible either in the new edition or in the system itself. This can only be explained on the grounds of a deep and secret conspiracy, in which, in a word, through such insinuations, complaints, and trifling silliness, the book would be even more surely smuggled into the hands of well-disposed and religious Germans.

We now finally show how Hegel has dissolved Christianity.

Chapter 12

The Dissolution of Christianity

It is true that Hegel terms the Christian Religion "*Absolute*", but in what sense? Only in that it is the purest presentation and development of the religious self-consciousness, that is, because all living moral and artistic interests, which give other religions charm and value, are here lacking. As Hegel views the matter, the Christian Religion has allowed the natural expression, the fire and the tension of the folk-spirit, the beauty of art, and the moral determination of the state and family found in religious consciousness to reduce and exhaust itself, so that the religious relationship as such is fully articulated and developed, and thereby, for the Philosopher, made more easy to dissolve.

The Christian Religion is taken by Hegel as *the Abstract Religion*.

It would indeed be foolish of us, if we were to imagine, that Hegel speaks of the Trinity of Christian faith when he speaks of the Kingdom of the Father and of the features of the Father, Son, and Spirit. Has he not clearly enough said that God, this image of Religion, is nothing but the universality of self-consciousness, nothing than that Thought which is conscious of its universality, nothing but that active universal which, as consciousness, or as determinate appearance, is set over and against the particularity of the "I"? He keeps to this when he develops his view of the Trinity.

He asserts that the determinate feature of the Heavenly Kingdom

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**THE TRUMPET OF THE LAST JUDGEMENT
AGAINST
HEGEL THE ATHEIST AND ANTICHRIST**

An Ultimatum

by
Bruno Bauer

Translated by
Lawrence Stepelevich

**Studies in German Thought and History
Volume 5**

**The Edwin Mellen Press
Lewiston/Lampeter/Queenston**

(p. 98-131)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Bauer, Bruno, 1809-1882.

[Posaune des jungstenn Gerichts uber Hegel, den Atheisten und Antichristen. English]

The Trumpet of the last judgement against Hegel the atheist and antichrist: an ultimatum / by Bruno Bauer ; translated by Lawrence Stepelevich.

p. cm. -- (Studies in German thought and history ; v. 5)

Translation of: Posaune des jungsten Gerichts uber Hegel, den Atheisten und Antichristen.

Bibliography: p.

Includes index.

ISBN 0-88946-356-5

1. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831--Views on religion.

2. Religion--Philosophy--History--19th century. I. Title.

II. Series.

B2949.R3B3613 1989

193--dc19

88-1785
CIP

This is volume 5 in the continuing series
Studies in German Thought and History
Volume 5 ISBN 0-88946-356-5
SGTH Series ISBN 0-88946-351-4

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The Edwin Mellen Press
Box 450
Lewiston, NY
USA 14092

The Edwin Mellen Press
Box 67
Queenston, Ontario
CANADA L0S 1L0

The Edwin Mellen Press
Mellen House
Lampeter, Dyfed
Wales, U.K.
SA48 7DY

Printed in the United States of America

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Translator's Introduction

I

A Justification

It seems appropriate that some justification be given for this translation. Three reasons come to mind that might recommend this text to scholars. The first is that the *Trumpet* is an excellent example of the type of writing which characterized the radical school of Hegelianism in the late 1830s and early 40s, in the period in which the growing hostility of both the Prussian state and the orthodox churches against the recently "official" philosophy of Hegel had reached a point in which any further accommodation was deemed impossible. The *Trumpet* mirrors the arguments and irritable temper of both the liberal Hegelians and their conservative opponents during the period between the French revolution of 1830 and the general revolutions of 1848. The work is an excellent "period piece" whose reading cannot but enhance an appreciation of the Hegelian involvement in the theological and philosophical argumentation that characterized the German "Vormärz." As David McLellan has noted, the *Trumpet* is "the *locus classicus* for the Young Hegelian view of Hegel, and a small masterpiece of their particular style of writing."¹

A further reason would be evident to anyone who knows the importance of Bauer and the fact that as yet not one of his major works has been completely translated into English.² That this is the case

¹David McLellan, *The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx* (London: Macmillan, 1969) p. 19.

²Indeed, only two of his minor works have been translated: *The Jewish Prob-*

Chapter 1

The Religious Relationship as Substantial

If only Schleiermacher had known in advance, if only the hordes of his disciples and mindless devotees had considered the philosophical sacrilege they must have been — if not perpetrating, for anything could have been its cause — but at the very least glossing over! And what disgrace for Christian Theology that it had to lend itself to this outrage, thus making it possible for Philosophy to claim agreement with the principle of Christian Godly Learning, to mock Christian Theology, and under the mantle of legitimacy — by accurately assessing the implications of the Theology of Feeling [*gefühlstheologie*] — to proceed on its blasphemous path. It was not enough that Schleiermacher sometimes took jabs at Hegelian Philosophy, it is also not enough when his present followers make faces as if they would have the Hegelians feel the superior power of Christian principles, and that they accuse them to the government and keep them out of university posts:¹ all of this is quite something, and is a proper indemnity for the disgrace which Schleiermacher's false moves has cast upon Theology, but it is still only a small thing, and it would have been better if Schleiermacher had left Christian belief its purity and objectivity, and if, among his numerous students at least one would step forth, who had insight into the criminality of Philosophy, who knew generally something about Philosophy and yet had enough Christian sense

¹ As was evidenced in Bauer's case at the University of Bonn.

that he could, at the same time, warn himself and his brother of this worldly wisdom and thus lead them back again to Christian Truth. But there was not one. They are all fallen in the same way from the strait and narrow path, they are all unfit (Ps. 14:3).

But again, as it has been said, Hegel's indictment of Schleiermacher and the Theology of Feeling is only a superficial display, a deception, which merely serves to introduce Hegel's own understanding of religion. For, as the *Phenomenology* illustrates, his viewpoint was already completed before Schleiermacher had perfected and worked out his theological system and the Christian Teaching of Faith [Glaubenslehre]. Again, for such an agile mind, knowing all that would be helpful to introduce his spirit, Hegel knew that Schleiermacher's Theology of Feeling had already been given in Jacobi's Philosophy.² Further, Hegel deals only with the principle of immediate knowledge because it was a most widespread doctrine of the time, and thus it came opportunely, for he had proved that "in the cultivated thought of the present time... Christian knowledge returns to primary elements," and now he can hope that "the philosophical principle" would "all the more easily" obtain "the consent of the generally educated" (P.R., I, 44, 48; S.S., I, 47, 44). At the time, he only wanted to tread for a moment upon the highroad of Theological Processions, so that he could draw into his course those which he evaluated as being wayward and possessed of a devilish instinct. But other than this, he had no need to seek a redress of the principle of immediate knowledge. Finally, he wanted — with sufficient malicious pleasure! — to utilize the opportunity to deride Theology, and to reproach it for its "boundless lack of consciousness" (P.R., I, 48; S.S., I, 44) — of which they themselves were guilty — if they either entered the field against Philosophy, or permitted themselves to make the smallest imputation against it. Most certainly, he rightly opposed the Schleiermachian theory, but a Theology, which once again has become conscious of itself and once again comprehends its Holy Mission, will make good

²Bauer's note: In particular, Hegel always and only speaks "of immediate knowledge," as developed by Jacobi, and not once does he mention Schleiermacher, although he does polemicize against the *Glaubenslehre*. Not once does he give the Theologian the honor of mentioning him, and prefers to go back to the simpler philosophic base of Jacobianism.

restitution for that derision.

Now Hegel had polemicized against the Theology of Feeling, unbraiding it for blandly persisting in subjectivity, while, on the other hand, challenging it to acknowledge the Objective — what he also calls that "awe-inspiring Object." Hence, under these circumstances, he would outwardly cultivate the impression that he would know a universal, a substance, apart from self-consciousness.

But now let us look into this, and not allow ourselves to be deceived. We will now present the documents relevant to this proceeding.

If one says: Belief in God is given to us in feeling, then Hegel would explicate this proposition and understanding of feeling thusly: The certitude of belief, upon which it glories, rests upon the fact that two forms of being (I am and It is God!) are posited in reflections as One Being (P.R., I, 120–21; S.S., I, 125). "I am" is the certainty which is immediately certain, for I cannot doubt my own existence. Being thus belongs to me, and as such it has fallen from the Object, and in that it is lost to the Object, the two forms of Being vanish. Now, the Object only exists in me as *my inward determination*, and further reflection upon it, as if it were a self-sufficient entity, *vanishes*.

Against this understanding of religion, according to which the Divine is seen not as an independent power over and against me but only as a determination of myself, Hegel now observes, "It is one-sided to conceive of religion as something only subjective, and thus to make the subjective aspect the only one" (P.R., I, 68–9; S.S., I, 68). This one-sidedness fails itself when it comes to worship. This would be impossible if God were not premised as an actual self-subsistent Object: without this premise worship would be "absolutely barren and empty; its action is a movement which makes no advance, its attitude toward God a relation to a nullity, an aiming at nothing." Of itself, however, this merely subjective activity is impotent, and it must seek to solve this impotency. That is, if I am limited or determined, so must I, as a necessarily conscious spirit, know of this determination. I must differentiate it from the pure and simple Ego so that, to reflection, it will be related to me as an *object of consciousness*. Henceforth, religious feeling should become infinite, for its Object is all the more rich and universal as I am finite and determined, for it has been projected

by me to me out of my inner being for my reflection and contemplation. Yes, the religious feeling should be absolute, substantive — but yet the *substantive* is that in which my chance peculiarity and my particular subjectivity happens, is an accident. Therefore, the substantive must be separated from my contingent subjectivity, and so becomes acknowledged as that which “is in fact something permanent and fixed in and for itself, *independent* of our feeling and experience. It is the *Objective*, which *exists in and for itself*.” The Substantial should not and cannot remain in the heart, for as that which is set over and against the Ego, as the Higher Being superior to this contingent entity, it must be expressly recognized and declared to infinitely transcend me. If one does want to accept this understanding of the Substantive, “so is God Himself only something subjective, and the efforts of subjectivity will remain at most the drawing of lines into empty space” (Ibid.). That is, it can occur that the ego does intend to proceed forth from the standpoint of subjectivity, and so speaks of an infinite to which it will raise itself, or to which its longing extends — but this universal being recognized is simply and purely an indeterminate entity: “these lines which are to be drawn in accordance with such recognition, possess no support, no connecting element derived from what is objective but are and remain merely *our* act, our lines — something subjective.”

Shortly, Hegel describes the necessity of the elevation by which the subjective surrenders itself to the objective and so sacrifices itself to the universal substance: In this, the rising movement onto a Higher, onto the Infinite, is not to be taken as if it developed while I remain fixed in myself, in my finiteness, and in my secular being. If this would be then “this reaching out towards something beyond the actual is absolutely and solely *mine*. It is my deed, my aiming, my emotion, my desire and endeavor” (P.R., I, 172–74; S.S., 177). What I ascribe to that Higher and Infinite Being has no objective meaning, says nothing of the substantial, but is rather merely the explication of that which I do, how I am determined, and how I inwardly move myself. “If I (as, for example, in Schleiermacher’s *Glaubenslehre* make use of the predicates ‘all good’, ‘almighty’, as characterizing that ‘something’ beyond, they have a meaning in *me* only, they have a subjective and not an objective meaning, and they belong absolutely and solely to

that aiming of mine.” In short, if I, in aiming at the Higher, would set it from myself as infinite from finite, this separation is only an illusion. It is not intended that I should fall under the infinite, for it is really only a duplication of myself that “has its seat in the Ego.” I would distinguish self as finite from self as infinite, and move in the direction that goes beyond and so turns against my finiteness only to prove my unlimited nature as against my finiteness. It is an illusion played with mirrors. The infinite is of me, and if there seem different directions from myself, one inward in which I consider myself as finite, against the infinite, the other outward to the infinite, yet even this latter direction is only of myself, and there is only one self, “my tendency to reach out toward what is beyond and my finiteness, are determinations in me; in them I remain self-contained or at home with myself” (P.R., I, 188; S.S., I, 178).

This error — of the Schleiermachian principle — displays itself when man is considered from a moral point of view. That is, I remain in myself and have everything — as possessed in feeling — in myself, so I require nothing outside of myself. As thus I have what I should have, so also am I what I should be — I am good by nature, and I am, insofar as I am, simply good. It can be, that I would fall into error, but this would only be something accidental, for nothing can enter or disturb my inner nature, for it is good. Now in that God is nowhere to be encountered in my aim to the infinite — since the infinite aim is to myself — God has nothing more to do with the removal of my faults. As my inner nature is good, I need but set aside, in short order, the momentary and accidental trouble caused by an error of my superficial ego “and I am reconciled to myself.” I am the Reconciler of myself. Further, as the aim to the infinite is but to myself, and the infinite only exists in this aim, then if a chance fault is to be removed, it requires only that I look to my good nature, that is, I must have the *conviction* that my inner nature is perfectly pure and good, and “that reconciling mediation consists merely in the consciousness, this knowledge that I am by nature good, and is consequently a worthless and empty see-saw system. I swing myself, so to speak, over into a longing for and in the direction of the ‘beyond’, or, it may be, into a recognition of the faults I have committed; and again I swing myself within the limits of this longing and emotion which have their place

purely within me, back to myself, and in all this I never travel beyond myself" (P.R., I, 190; S.S., 179).

How then, exclaims Hegel over this Theology of Feeling, would the finite being want eternal life? Does it wish to sacrifice itself and recognize a higher objectivity? Does this vain reflection want to continually play court to itself, and never posit the finite as a nullity in itself? Does this reflection of foppish theology not even go as far as nature itself? Can it not leave that which is mortal die, or is nothingness immortal? Nature itself advances enough into Reason that it proves the finite as such neither exists in itself nor posits itself. In nature, the finite frees itself from itself and renounces itself — it dies. "This first natural, simple self-emancipation of the finite from its finiteness is death" (P.R., I, 192; S.S., 179).

Now, what will it be? Does the finite actually want to once and for all separate itself from itself? Does it finally want once to maintain its right, i.e., to become truly abrogated and absorbed, to infinitize itself, or does it want to remain fixed in its finiteness?

With an expression of the deepest contempt — be ashamed you Theologians of Feeling, and take it to heart! — with a boundless contempt Hegel answers that it is only a sham and hypocrisy if the finite merely acts as if it would negate and transcend itself, for then it rather would maintain itself. The Ego which holds fast to itself and does not give up its finiteness thereby would only make itself into an infinite subjectivity, into an "active, operative infinite," that is, it takes of the Power, Meaning, and indeed the Production of the Infinite which alone allows and maintains being" (P.R., I, 198ff.; S.S., 187).

This is the culminating point of subjectivity which clings fast to itself, the finiteness which remains and (in that it is the only one which remains and maintains itself) renders itself infinite in its very finiteness, the infinite subjectivity, which has done with all content. But this very subjectivity, this culmination of finiteness still maintains itself: *in it all content evaporates, and is rendered vain; the only thing that does not vanish, however is vanity*" (P.R., I, 198ff.; S.S., 187).

Must it therefore have had to come to pass with the Christian

World and Theology that a Philosopher — and certainly the most dreadful and frightful one — must tell them the truth, must bring them to their senses, and must reproach them for their sins, their vanity, their haughtiness, their hypocrisy, and their boundless pride? Must a philosopher have said to the Priests and Prophets that they "are fools in wisdom and vomit their judgement out?" (Jcs. 28:7).

And so then a Philosopher — frightful! — must tell the Theologians that "the finite, which exalts itself to the infinite, is mere abstract indentity, inherently empty, *the supreme form of untruth, falsehood and evil?*" (P.R., I, 204; S.S., 193).

And so then a Philosopher! Most assuredly a Philosopher! But what good can a Philosopher bring us? He has overthrown the Theology of Feeling: now what will he give us in its place? *Timeo Danaos!* I fear the Greeks! We must now really fear the Philosophers when they cast down an error, for we can be assured that they only do so in order to set up a more frightful one in place of the old. *Timeo Danaos and dona ferentes!* — and their gifts! — Now the Christian must fear the Philosopher who would want to, and actually does, free him from heresies. Are we frightened of him? No, — yet, when we observe how Hegel overthrows the principle of the Theology of Feeling, and now sets up his own (certainly quite more terrible) principle — we look to our defenses.

He would draw the proper consequence of the former standpoint — it is, in fact, actually necessary to take the annulling of the finite seriously, but for that to happen, he says, the Ego, in its individuality, must renounce "itself in deed and in truth" (P.R., I, 204; S.S., I, 193); so that in this act "particular subjectivity is annulled [aufgehoben], objectivity is acknowledged, regarded as true, recognized as the Affirmative, as posited for the Ego, and taken as that in which I am annulled." Religion is now to be this activity in which the universal is acknowledged and the Ego, although distinguished from the universal, is yet posited in relation to it. In this relationship, I can have my consciousness only in a manner that I "in this relation to the universal Substance am reflected upon myself. I distinguish myself from this Object (the universal)" (P.R., I, 208; S.S., I, 197). So, I surrender myself to the universal. But then how can I, if I am reflected out of this relationship upon myself make a determinate appearance? How

am I determined or fixed within this relationship? —

Here I am determined as finite in the true manner, finite as distinguished from this Object, as the particular over against the universal, as the *accidental in reference to the Substance*, as a "moment", as something distinguished, which at the same time is not independent, but has renounced itself and knows itself to be finite (P.R., I, 208; S.S., I, 197).

But what does it mean, that I am a moment in the Object? "The Universal Object," answers Hegel, "... is substance in motion within itself, and as inward process within which it creates its content, it is not empty" (Cf. *Ibid.*). Whenever the Ego, from the standpoint of immediate knowledge, is everything and that into which everything vanishes, so, on the other hand, the Universal, which is now the Object, will be taken as the Totality into which falls the complete content as well as the complete relationship which it entails. The Universal, the "Substance," is not empty, but rather "absolute fullness." Everything, all *particularity*, there "I" as well, belong to the Universal. It comprehends and includes me, it proves through its own movement the finiteness of myself, but as I am finite, so yet I am now a "moment in this life, a moment which has its particular being, its permanent existence in this Substance only, and in its essential moments" (P.R., I, 208; S.S., I, 197).

What now lies at the basis of the Hegelian view of the Religious Concept is but this Pantheism and this understanding of the substantial-relationship. This Pantheism steps openly and without shame into the light of day, when Hegel allows the Substance to perfect itself through inner development. When, that is, the finite spirit is itself a moment of the Universal. Its knowledge and consciousness of that can not be thought of as a relationship in which both — the Object and the Ego — would be separated. It would rather be the case that consciousness falls within the movement and development of the Universal itself — that same Universal which Hegel terms "Absolute Spirit" when its course is completed and it has arrived at a consciousness of itself. It is that Universal, first disclosed to finite consciousness,

which raises the finite spirit out of its finiteness and draws it into inner movement. It is the Absolute Spirit, which, in the finite spirit, draws itself to itself, that is, relates to itself. In short, religion is the *Self-consciousness of the Absolute Spirit*. Finite consciousness is a form of appearance, which the Universal, the Substance, has given to itself. It is an inner differentiation, which the Universal itself posits and which it must posit, for it is only through that consciousness -- of the finite spirit — that it reconciles itself to itself, and it is only through this self-imposed annulment that it can come to itself, and so will arrive at a knowledge of itself. Accordingly, religion is not merely a human affair, but is rather the highest determination and the concern of the Absolute Idea itself (Cf. P.R., I, 200).

In religion, the full Kingdom of the Natural and Spiritual World has gathered itself together into its own substance. This substance elevates itself, in and through finite spirit, to the self-consciousness of itself as that Being, and knows all determinate beings as but moments of itself.

This Substance is but the essence of everything created, developed and obtained by the Historical Spirit in its world. Accordingly, as this Object, it is "no foreign object, no object which is for consciousness something other than and beyond it, but it is its own anticipation, its essence" (Cf. P.R., I, 206-7; S.S., I, 195ff.). If thereby the finite spirit has the Absolute Essence as Object, so it knows it as its essence, and as substantial consciousness it is necessarily self-consciousness. If the Universal knows itself in the finite consciousness, and the finite spirit observes its essence in the Universal, it is one act, one movement. It is the one and the same self-consciousness of the Substance.

"So come then and let us reason together" (Jes. 1:18). All those Hegelians, who yet live in the dream that the Philosophy of their Master is in accord with, or can be brought into accord with Christian Belief in a personal God and a Savior for fallen Man, all those set in this self-deception, we challenge to come forth and prove to us that our presentation of the Hegelian position be not true, and prove to us that Christ and Belial, Pantheism and the biblical truth, death and life can agree with one another.³ The proof will not be given.

³It might be pointed out that the Catholic Theologians at Tübingen, particularly

But indeed, do not come to us only with your talk of the Absolute Spirit, or of the overlapping Subjectivity, and call not upon the often and misused words of your Master — that Substance is to be taken as Subject. Oh you short-sighted imposters! Did your Master then say that the Substance was a definite, a unique subject? Has he said it to be the Prime Subject, the Prime Individual who had created Heaven and Earth? Did you not notice that your soul-murdering Father had merely said, and set forth in his system, that Substance was generally only to be taken in the category of subjectivity? — i.e., its inner process would lead it to the point where it would reveal itself to self-consciousness in the finite spirit, that it would draw itself out of its black abyss and take its dark and dreadful obscurity into the light-point of subjectivity? Could this Substance, if it would bring its Infinite Kingdom into consciousness, be satisfied with but One Subject?⁴ One is not enough! Infinity spews forth only out of the chalice of the Whole Kingdom of Spirit. It must bestow itself upon many, infinitely many subjects, and give itself over to finiteness so therewith it can display its inner treasure. Many a finite spirit must be crushed and pressed,⁵ a world of spirits must bring themselves to sacrifice, if substance would become subject.

Fitting perfumes to prepare,
And to raise they rapture high,
Must a thousand rosebuds fair,
First in fiery torments die.

One small flask's contents to glean,
Whose sweet fragrance aye may live,
Slender as thy finger e'en,

in the person of Franz Anton Staudenmaier (1800–56), were convinced that Hegel was a covert Pantheist. Contemporary Catholic Theologians are less convinced that this is the case, but the issue still remains unresolved.

⁴Here reference can be made to the argument of D. F. Strauss, whose conclusion that mankind was the real Christ of history rested upon a premise similar to that being presented by Bauer, i.e., that the Absolute would not “squander” itself upon only one individual, e.g., Jesus.

⁵Cf. with Hegel's remark in the introduction to his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* — “the mighty form of the hero must trample down many an innocent flower.”

Must a world its treasures give;
Yes, a world where life is moving
Which, with impulse full and strong,
Could forebode the Bulbul's loving,
Sweet, and spirit-stirring song.
Since they thus have swelled our joy,
Should such torments grieve us, then?
Does not Timur's rule destroy
Myriad souls of living men?⁶

“Myriad souls!” Do you hear that? Myriad of souls must be expended, a world of life-impulses must be crushed and bruised and cast into the sacrificial fire if the Substance would gain its *Timur's* [Tamerlaine's] Dominion. Oh, be not deceived! rather hear how your Master sings you his siren's song so as to sweeten your sufferings — no! — but in order to drown out your cries, as all cry, when they offer up their children to Moloch!

Why should that trouble us,
Since it makes our pleasure more?

“The sorrow” — now hear this! — “the sorrow which the finite experiences in being thus annulled and absorbed, does not give pain, since it is by this means raised to the rank of a moment in the process of the Divine” (P.R., II, 282; S.S., III, 72).

It is of the very nature of Spirit to know itself as eternal, to liberate itself so as to form those *finite flashes of light which make the individual consciousness*, and then to collect itself again out of this finitude and comprehend itself, and in this way the *knowledge* of its essence and *consequently* the divine self-consciousness appear in finite consciousness. Out of the ferment of finitude, and while it changes itself into foam, Spirit rises like a vapor (P.R., II, 30; S.S., III, 124).

⁶Goethe's *To Sulika*. Although Bauer refers to P.R., II, 282 in referencing this poem to Hegel, Hegel himself employs only the first two lines of the final quatrain in the P.R.

Why should that trouble us,
Since it makes our pleasure more?

Now, can it still be denied? Either you submit to this sweet suffering, or turn away from the Antichrist! "Blessed is the man that walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly, nor standeth in the way of sinners, nor sitteth in the seat of the scornful" (Ps. 1:1). Draw back, before it "shall rain snares, fire and brimstone, and a horrible tempest; this shall be the portion of their cup" (Ps. 11:6). Do not imagine that you can somehow avoid the suffering and yet secretly take pleasure in the sweetness! Think upon the words: "Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter" (Is. 5:20). We implore thee to look within thyself, to smite thy breast, for ye be not so deeply fallen as the rabble of his young disciples! Deny no longer the true nature of the system, for until this time we have held that your impotency and confusion came forth from a still and secret working of Christianity and piety. We still, at this moment, believe this — but would you yet now not admit to the true nature of the system, then we must assume that you take an inward pleasure and joy in this diabolical art — so begone!

We will proceed further into this matter in order to show how Hegel will annul this former understanding of religion as a substantial-relationship in which the Universal, as an autonomous and absolute power, stands over and against the finite Ego, and will now deliver this Universal over to the Ego as a prize to be drawn into self-consciousness. The wickedness completes itself. It would indeed be cause to wonder if a man, who grasped all of the arts of dialectic, had not availed himself of the superiority and the advantage of which the finite — but yet living and active — consciousness possessed over an impersonal substance. As once Prometheus had deceived his God about the flesh of the sacrificial animals, and had relegated Him to a mere onlooker of human feasting, so then can we expect from the modern Titans⁷ who in fact do not care for a living God, but would

⁷In 1853, Robert Giesecke's novel *Moderne Titanen: Ein Roman der Gegenwart* (Leipzig), portrayed, with fictional names, the various members of the Berlin "Free Ones."

only treat of a substance dead in itself? So now all will belong to human self-consciousness, all which earlier had been ascribed to the Substance, will belong to it, the Universal. Hegel always had this cunning in mind when he polemicized against immediate knowledge and the Theology of Feeling. He did not struggle against these forms of consciousness because they had taken all truth and actuality into the Ego — on the contrary, as he expressed it himself, this standpoint "borders on the philosophical" (P.R., I, 200; S.S., 189). It contains "the subjectivity and unity of the finite and infinite" — all of the determinations which are the "true and essential moments of freedom and Idea." Hegel only charges it with not drawing the consequences that it should free itself from the finiteness of the Ego just as it has freed itself from God and objectivity. It is perfectly correct, from the attitude of that standpoint, that subjectivity is all, that it "develops all objectivity out of itself," and just as a fire it draws up and annihilates everything of objective character, everything established and positive. The only defect of this standpoint is that the fire has not drawn up and consumed everything. There is yet one enemy remaining — the finite Ego, I, this singular reality which yet values its immediacy and naturality; all else is burned, but not the finite Ego. Would it, thunders Hegel threatening it with fire and flame, thus always and ever remain? As it has been cast into the universe will it not cast itself into the funeral pyre? It is not a coward if it values its finiteness? It must cast itself into the flames, or set the torch to itself, to its own inner and natural being, so that it would rise forth out of this sacrificial fire as the Absolute, as the Unique One,⁸ omnipotent in the place of the God which it had earlier denied.

It is clear that Hegel values the substantial-relationship for only a moment, namely, only as a moment within the movement in which finite consciousness resigns its own finiteness. Here, Substance is only the momentary fire in which the Ego sacrifices its finiteness and limitation. The conclusion of the movement is not Substance but self-consciousness, which really posits itself as the infinite and takes up

⁸This "Unique One" [Der Einzige] recalls the title of Max Stirner's major work, *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum* (1844). Stirner, who considered himself an "Einziger," was as Bauer, quite willing to accept some of the attributes usually accorded only to God.

the Universality of Substance in its *own* essence. Substance is only the power which consumes the finiteness of the Ego and then falls prey itself to infinite self-consciousness. Those who believe that Hegel will lead them back to the Living God because he fought and destroyed the miserable subjectivity of the Theology of Feeling, have badly misunderstood the Master, even as those who are of the opinion that he has remained standing within the Pantheism of the substantial-relationship. They "have not known the depths of Satan" (Rev. 2:24). For him, only the Ego is Substance, it is the All. However, this Ego, which has a diabolical pride, now would posit itself as the universal and infinite self-consciousness. The only reason he struggled against those who hold feeling for the Highest was that they — as he saw them with the craftiness of the Evil One — were but stupid devils, for whom the final revolt against God and the World was too much, and beyond their power.

Now we could immediately go on to illuminate the satanic depths of Hegel's Philosophy of Religion. It would be very easy for us, given all of the particulars which here have been presented, to prove that religion is to be taken as but the work and expression of self-consciousness. We will, however, embark upon another course, namely, to show, through an examination of the other works of Hegel, that they all consider and elaborate upon religion, the Divine Essence, and Revelation in the same way, and thus, we will convince those who yet doubt that we have grasped the sense of this Philosophy. After this, we will return again to the Philosophy of Religion.

"Arise, for the Lord hath delivered into your hand the host of Midian" (Jud. 7:15). First, we will look carefully at a Ghost which gives a great deal of trouble to the oldest of Hegel's followers who believe in it, and to the present enemies of the system — who fight it. We will look carefully in order to show that Hegel himself did not consider it to be a reality, and that he only used its name at times when he spoke metaphorically.

Chapter 2

The Ghost of the World Spirit

Hegel often speaks of the World-spirit, and it appears that he takes it for an actual power. "The World-spirit," he says, "has nations and individuals enough and to spare" (*Geschichte der Philosophie* [History of Philosophy], I, 50; H., I, 36). It is therefore a sort of World Timur-Tamerlain. "The long procession of Spirits" — namely those treated in the history of philosophy — "are the individual pulses which the One Spirit expresses" (G.P., III, 691; H., III, 553). This World-spirit appears to guide history to certain ends: "The World-spirit reserved to the Jewish nation the highest consciousness that it should once more rise from thence as a new Spiritual force" (G.P., I, 4; H., I, xii) — namely, as a rising Christian consciousness. Hegel even directs his followers to believe in this chimera: "What takes place is reasonable. With this belief in the World-spirit we must proceed into the study of history" (G.P., I, 32; H., I, 19).

Only that should we hold of this deity if it goes forth as the gods of the Chaldeans, "which their worshippers did not hold to be great?" (Baruch 6:39). What can Hegel expect from a deity against which he rails, just as the Negro chides and beats his fetish? What respect can the philosopher have before a divinity which so often bears rebuke? (Bar. 6:32). How he burlesques the World-spirit when he labels it a "mole!" (G.P., I, 120; H., I, 101). How frivolous when he says that this Demon will sometimes put on "seven-league boots!" (G.P., III, 691;

Chapter 4

Hatred of the Established Order

Pride is the only feeling which Hegel can instill into his disciples. That meekness and humility which alone can give honor to the Lord and modesty to man is foreign to him.

The first thing to which he calls forth his disciples is a profane travesty of the *sursum corda*: "Man cannot think highly enough of the greatness and power of his mind" (*Geschichte der Philosophie* [History of Philosophy], I, 6; H., I, xiii). But one must be a philosopher to think in such an unlimited manner concerning oneself. To Hegel, all men other than philosophers are oxen, and the philosopher among those who have knowledge are in opposition to the oxen: "It was a celebration, a festival of knowledge — *at the cost of the oxen*" (G.P., I, 279; H., I, 238). The ordinary folk, the decent citizens are said to lie once and for all "in the ditch" — in the trench of finiteness (G.P., I, 196; H., I, 172). Hegel speaks, with inward satisfaction, of the boundless contempt which Heraclitus had against the people, and for this calls him a "noble character" (G.P., I, 329; H., I, 279). He lacks all love for the common and honest man.

Philosophy is, for him, the "*Temple* of self-conscious reason," a temple which is quite other than the temple of the "Jews" in which the Living God resides (G.P., I, 49; H., I, 35). The philosophers are the architects of this temple, in which the cult of self-consciousness is celebrated, that unity of God, Priest and Community. Philosophers

are the Lords of this World, and create the destiny of mankind, and their acts are the acts of destiny. They "write the executive orders of World History as originally received," and people must obey them, and the King, by acting in accord with these directives, is but as a secretary *copying* the directives written originally by philosophers. What pride! What a basis for revolution if a royal decree would not have the good fortune to please the philosophers. The philosophers are always "obligated to begin" if an "advance" in history is to occur. They direct the whole, and have always the whole in sight, while "others have their *particular* interests — this dominion, these riches, this girl" (G.P.,III,96; H.,II,453).

But not only when an advance is to occur do philosophers have hands in the affair, but whenever the established order is to be disturbed, and here the positive forms, the institutions, the constitution, and religious statues are to collapse and fall. The philosophers are truly of a singular danger, for they are the most consistent and unrestrained revolutionaries. "Philosophy begins with the decline of the actual world." That has a somewhat ambiguous ring about it, and might in any case be yet so understood that Philosophy requires the actual world to be put into confusion for it to exist. The same ambiguity is yet also present when it is said

the Philosophy first commences when . . . a gulf has arisen *between inward strivings and external reality*, and the old forms of Religion, etc., are no longer satisfying; when Mind manifests indifference to its living existence or rest unsatisfied therein, and moral life becomes dissolved. Then it is that Mind takes refuge in the clear space of thought to create for itself a kingdom of thought in *opposition* to the actual world (G.P.,I,66; H.,I,52).

But then Hegel goes on to say that the Mind "*lays hold of and troubles* this real, substantial kind of existence, this morality and faith, and thus the period of destruction commences" (G.P.,I,66; H.,I,51-2). Furthermore, "the definite character of the standpoint of *thought* is the *same* character which permeates all the other historical sides of the spirit of the people, which is most intimately related to them, and which constitutes their *foundation*" (G.P.,I,68; H.,I,53). Now

then, is it not evident that Philosophy insidiously removes the foundations of real life, of the State, of the religious community whenever it withdraws the soul, pure and simple, which infuses all forms of life? Whenever the Idea is seized and raised to self-consciousness, and so develops "as the thought and knowledge of that which is the substantial spirit of its time?"

Now once Hegel has placed knowledge and theory so infinitely high, so must he then assert that Philosophy, as the knowledge of the substantial, "in form stands *above its time*" (G.P.,I,69; H.,54).

The mob of Young Hegelians would like to convince us that Hegel has sunk himself within the folds of theory, and has not thought to lead this *theory to praxis*. As though Hegel had not attacked religion with a hellish rage, as if he had not set forth upon the destruction of the established world. But his *theory* is *praxis*, and for that very reason most dangerous, far-reaching and destructive. It is the revolution itself. Why then are these dissolute disciples acting so foolishly concerning their Master? It cannot be believed that they have not recognized the destructive rage of this system, for they have taken their principle only from their Master. It is possible that they so act — even to reviling Hegel himself — so as to insure that these extensive and most dangerous writings are quietly left to circulate undisturbed in all hands, so that the government would not finally detect their criminality and so forbid these writings, teachings and preachings. The devil is clever! He certainly is! But these tactics can no longer help him! It must be openly and publicly declared: Hegel was a greater revolutionary than the total of all his disciples. The ax must be laid to him, he must be uprooted!

Of that wisdom which has been set over time and place,¹ Hegel says "it is what a new form of development has brought forth. Philosophy is the inner birthplace of the Spirit, which will later step forth into real form" (G.P.,I,70; Cf. H.,I,55). This then is the crucial point to which Philosophy has led; that every knowledge not only develops a new form, but a new content as well. At one time substance, self-affirming, lay at the foundation of reality, directly dominating it, and expressing itself in outward laws. Hence, the mind was not radically

¹Hegel is discussing the emergence of Christianity.

free. But now, knowledge has been freed, and the mind and its related determinations have taken upon a new form — the form of freedom and self-consciousness. And so, Philosophy becomes the critic of the established order: "Through knowledge, Mind makes manifest a distinction between *knowledge* and that which is." That which is and that which should be are now distinguished. However, only the *should* is true and justified, and must be brought to authority, domination and power. It must pass through to "its opposite." — "Whenever a principle is set forth which is determined upon giving birth to a new and higher actuality, so it appears in a direct and even hostile and destructive relation to reality, and not merely as opinion and doctrine" (Cf. G.P., II, 118; H., I, 445). And so, a theoretical principle must not merely play a supportive role, but must come to the act, to practical opposition, to turn itself directly into praxis and action. "This practical relationship lies even in the principle; that it contains this is its true status." Hence it is not enough that the incitement to general revolt and "excitation is the highest service and highest activity of a teacher," but the opposition must be serious, sharp, thoroughgoing, unrestrained, and must see its highest goal in the overthrow of the established order.

And so philosophy must be active in politics, and whenever the established order contradicts the self-consciousness of philosophy, it must be directly attacked and shaken. Servitude, tutelage, is unbearable to the free spirit:

To sleep, to live, to have a certain office, is not our real Being, and certainly to be no slave is such (G.P., I, 118; H., I, 100).

Every nation in course of time makes such alterations in its existing constitution as will bring it nearer to the true constitution. The nation's mind itself shakes off its leading-strings (its childhood shoes), and the constitution expresses the consciousness of what it is in itself — the form of truth, of self-knowledge. If a nation can no longer accept as implicitly true what its constitution expresses to it as the truth, if its consciousness or Notion and its actuality are not at one, then the nation's mind is torn asunder (G.P., II, 276; H., II, 97).

A government must, however, recognize that the time for this has come; should it, on the contrary, knowing not the truth, cling to temporary institutions, taking what — though recognized — is unessential, to be a bulwark guarding it from the essential (and the essential is what is contained in the Ideal), that government will fall, along with its institutions, before the force of the mind (G.P., II, 277; H., II, 98).

[Bauer continues this with a sentence not found in the passage he cites.] It lies in the Idea of a constitution that a temporal institution, which has lost its truth, and is as *impudent* as to want itself to continue, must be dissolved.

And who should it be who is to declare when a temporal institution, a regulation, is no longer to be allowed validity? To whom is it given to pass final judgment upon the "impudence" of the established and positive order? Who is to give the signal for the ruin of the actual state of affairs? Now, you know that well enough yourself! Only the philosopher! "This insight (into the emptiness of the given state) can be reached through Philosophy alone."

Hear! Hear this self-recognition of the philosopher! Have the Young Hegelians proclaimed anything more criminal or more treasonable? As yet they have not gone so far — as shameless as they are, as insolent, yet they have not spoken out. It is time that we, the elders, fasten our eyes once again upon their father and turn ourselves against him!

Hegel not only is set against the state, the Church and religion, but opposes everything firm and established, for — as he asserts — the philosophical principle has in recent times become general, all-encompassing and without limit.

In this new period the universal principle... the independently existent thought, this culminating point of inwardness, is now set forth and firmly grasped as such, the dead externality of authority is set aside and regarded as out of place (G.P., III, 328; H., III, 217).

Indeed, we can no longer be amazed when Hegel envisions the French Revolution, this work of an atheistic Philosophy, to be the

greatest event in history, when he envisions it as the salvation of Mankind, and considers it to be the deed in which the calling of Philosophy to world-domination has been perfectly proven. He says:

The conception, the idea of Right asserted its authority *all at once*, and the old framework of injustice could offer no resistance to its onslaught. A constitution, therefore, was established in harmony with the conception of Right, and on this foundation all future legislation was to be based. Never since the sun had stood in the firmament and the planets revolved around him had it been perceived that man's existence centers in his head, i.e., in Thought, inspired by which he builds up the world of reality. Anaxagoras has been the first to say that *vous* governs the world: but not until now had man advanced to the recognition of the principle that Thought ought to govern spiritual reality. This was accordingly a glorious mental dawn. All thinking beings shared in the jubilation of this epoch. Emotions of a lofty character stirred men's minds at that time; a spiritual enthusiasm thrilled through the world, as if the reconciliation between the Divine and the Secular was now first accomplished. (*Philosophie der Weltgeschichte* [Philosophy of History], 441; Sibree translation, 447.)

Again, Hegel's atheism reveals itself even more clearly and displays itself in its full nakedness, when we observe how this Antichrist extols the French — since they have made an insurrection against God — and scorns the Germans, since even in the time of Godlessness, in the time of the *Aufklärung*, they lacked the brashness to deny God, and could not totally set aside God and religion. The French are to him the true men, the Germans but beasts of burden; the former are spirited people, the latter but lazy drones; the former true philosophers, the latter but mere complainers; the former are the discoverers of the true Kingdom of the Spirit, the latter but weaklings who first ask their guardians and beg permission from their bureaucrats so that they might be allowed to enjoy the fruits of knowledge; the former are the heroes of freedom, the latter but slaves, who tremble should

they become free. In sum, the French are everything for him, the Germans less than nothing.²

²A particularly damning charge. As Treitschke, the historian of the period observed, a "war fever" directed against the French gripped all of Germany in 1840, a fever first occasioned by Prussia's support of English Mediterranean interest against the French. The wide appeal of such vehemently patriotic poetry as Becker's 1840 *Sie sollen ihn nicht haben*, or Schneckenburger's *Die Wacht am Rhein*, which appeared in the same year, was a sign of the popular resentment over stubborn French territorial claims in the Rhineland.