Lessons Learned from Transatlantic Electoral Assistance in the Palestinian Territories

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In January 2013, Ashgate published a book by Rouba Al-Fattal Eeckelaert [1] titled *Transatlantic Trends in Democracy Promotion: Electoral Assistance in the Palestinian Territories*. The main objective of the book is to provide an operational analysis and a systematic comparison of the EU's, the US's and Canada's democracy promotion policy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, while focusing on the Palestinian Territories (PT) as a case study.

At a time when an unprecedented wave of democratization is rippling through the Arab world, it is very important to reevaluate the actors' commitment to democracy promotion and to examine the challenges which they must overcome if they seriously want their efforts to succeed.

Three of the significant questions raised in the book, which this policy paper highlights, are: Why is it important to rethink electoral assistance when dealing with democracy promotion policy? What instruments and approaches did the EU, the US, and Canada employ while implementing their electoral assistance policy in the PT? How effective were the actors' policies in the democratization process of the PT and why? Addressing the actors' policy successes and shortfalls is necessary before providing valid proposals to the policy-makers who are pioneering the democracy promotion programs in the MENA region.

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Electoral Assistance: Definition and Significance

Before defining electoral assistance, it is important to make a distinction between *democracy promotion/assistance* and *electoral assistance*. Although both electoral assistance and democracy promotion are part of the foreign policy instruments used by actors to influence changes in the recipients' environment,[2] and in spite of the fact that democracy assistance is sometimes mistakenly used to indicate electoral assistance, the latter should be recognised as only a small and distinct part of the more general approaches of democracy promotion.[3]

Democracy promotion can be considered an umbrella term which includes many direct and indirect instruments, both positive (incentive) and negative (coercive), exercised at different levels (national and/or sub-national) with different targets (including elections, human rights, rule of law, development, good governance, etc.). Electoral assistance, on the other hand, is more specific. With its direct and more empirically oriented (observable) instruments, electoral assistance is actually the substance (the actual practice rather than the conception) of democracy promotion and is part of the wider democratic development of the partner country.[4] Despite these limitations, electoral assistance is about much more than helping countries hold elections, it is also about what happens between these elections.[5]

Electoral assistance, therefore, can broadly be defined as the direct 'political, legal, technical and logistic support provided to electoral laws, processes, institutions and groups,'[6] that can be employed during the three electoral periods (pre-elections, during the elections and post-elections).[7] It includes different stakeholders (such as parties, leaders, government institutions, civil society organisations, women, minorities, and the media).[8] It also uses a broad spectrum of instruments, both positive

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[2] Karen Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (Cambridge: Polity, 2008): 122–44.

[3] Peter Burnell, *Democracy Assistance: International Co-Operation for Democratization* (New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000): 3.

[4] George Perlin, "International Assistance to Democratic Development: A Review (2003–04)," (Institute for Research on Public Policy - Working Paper Series, 2005).

[5] Benjamin Reilly, "International Electoral Assistance: A Review of Donor Activities and Lessons Learned," in Democratic Transition in Post-Conflict Societies Project *(Working Paper 17)* (The Hague Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2003).

[6] Domenico Tuccinardi et al., "Focus on Effective Electoral Assistance," (The Electoral Knowledge Network (ACE), 2007).

[7] Perlin, "International Assistance to Democratic Development: A Review (2003–04)."

[8] Larry Diamond, "Advancing Democratic Governance: A Global Perspective on the Status of Democracy and Directions for International Assistance," (U.S. Agency for International Development, 2002), Jorgen Elklit and Andrew Reynolds, "A Framework for the Systematic Study of Election Quality," *Democratization* 12, no. 2 (2005), Andrew Ellis, Paul Guerin, and Ayman Ayoub, "Ottawa Conference Report and Conclusions: Effective Electoral Assistance Moving from Event-Based Support to Process Support," (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2006), Jeroen Zeeuw, "How to Make Democracy Assistance More Effective? Recommendations for Doing It Differently," (The Hague: Conflict Research Unit, Clingendael Institute, 2004).

(incentive) and negative (coercive), which include various democracy benchmarks discussed in the following section.[9]

The importance of studying electoral assistance lies in the fact that elections are a basic pillar of any modern representative system of democracy. Democracy, by definition, is "the rule of the people" from the Greek words "demos" (people) and "kratos" (rule). The will of the people is manifested most effectively through the electoral process and voting.[10] For this reason, there is no democracy without fair, free and regular elections in which the people choose their representatives. Consequently, representatives in a democratic system obtain their legitimacy through the very act of elections, and use these elections as a barometer to monitor their popularity over time. This is not to say that democratic elections are sufficient to have a democracy. But it is to say that elections are one of the necessary pillars of democracy along with the rule of law, human rights and good governance. Although we have established that democracy is about much more than just elections, this aspect of democracy cannot be underemphasized and must be examined.

Knowing how important elections are in the democratization process, transatlantic actors have always been keen on assisting the electoral processes of democratizing countries. Since the launch of the peace process in 1993, the EU, the US and Canada have all participated, to some degree or another, in assisting the Palestinian elections. That said, very few studies have focused on electoral assistance as a measure of democracy promotion, nor has there been a systematic comparative research done on the topic. However, examining the electoral assistance of transatlantic actors is likely to give us a representative glimpse into their broader democracy promotion strategy and approach. That is why this research also focuses on examining electoral assistance, because if the promoters fail in fostering the basic pillar of democracy, then most likely the other pillars will also suffer.

Electoral Assistance: Instruments, Dimensions and Time Frame

In order to systematically compare the EU's, US's and Canada's electoral assistance in the PT, it is first important to operationalize the concept by dividing their electoral assistance instruments into four dimensions and to examine them over four different time periods.

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[9] The list presented here of the electoral assistance instruments is constructed from a combination of those found in the following sources: Diamond, "Advancing Democratic Governance: A Global Perspective on the Status of Democracy and Directions for International Assistance.", Elklit and Reynolds, "A Framework for the Systematic Study of Election Quality.", Ellis, Guerin, and Ayoub, "Ottawa Conference Report and Conclusions: Effective Electoral Assistance Moving from Event-Based Support to Process Support.", Zeeuw, "How to Make Democracy Assistance More Effective? Recommendations for Doing It Differently."

[10] Rouba Al-Fattal, "Why the Arab Uprising Will Not Lead to Democracy Any Time Soon." (The Métropolitain, May 2013 [cited 16 November 2013]); available from http://www.themetropolitain.ca/articles/view/1285.

The four dimensions identified are political, legal, social and technical. Some of the instruments used in the political dimension include building a strategy for democracy promotion, signing bilateral agreements under which elections assistance can be launched and organized, establishing and reforming the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), creating the Palestinian Central Electoral Commission (PCEC), encouraging the development of competitive political parties and their platforms, encouraging broad-based party participation and candidates including women and ethnic minorities. The legal dimension includes actions such as: providing advice on drafting constitutions, helping to write electoral laws, consultations on drawing electoral districts based on population density and ethnic composition, and establishing a fair electoral system, whether Proportional Representation (PR), single member districts, or a mix of both. The social dimension involves activities such as voter education and media training to enhance participation, including among women and ethnic/religious minorities. The technical dimension is actually the most visible, and it includes providing funds and expertise to support the administration, logistics, and set-up of the elections. This dimension also includes sending election monitors and reporting on the elections.

The four different time periods identified in the research coincide with three critical junctions in the history of the PT that has changed the course of elections and actors' electoral assistance:[11] the Oslo-II Agreement, the Second *Intifada* (Uprising), and Hamas' electoral win. The first period (1995-2000) follows the signing of the Oslo-II Agreement in 1995, which established the first PLC, called for the launch of the democratization process, fixed a date for the first elections to take place in the PT in 1996, and mobilized external electoral assistance. The second period (2001-2004) started with the second *Intifada*, which was marked by mass Palestinian disillusionment with the peace process and the rise of violence. It was shortly followed by 9/11 attacks in 2001 that (negatively) impacted relations between the West and Islam.[12] But it ended with the death of Arafat, which for some was seen as an opportunity for democratic reform in the PT.[13] The start of the third period (2005-2006) was signaled by the first Palestinian local elections (2004), the establishment of a new PA President (2005), the withdrawal of Israeli settlements from the Gaza Strip (2005), Hamas' rise to power after the

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[11] A term utilised by Ruth and David Collier indicating periods in the history of fundamental political reorientation, in which actors make contingent choices that set distinct trajectories of institutional developments and changes that are difficult to reverse. See Ruth Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
[12] Ron Geaves, *Islam and the West Post 9/11* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004).
[13] International Crisis Group (ICG), "Middle East Briefing N°16: After Arafat? Challenges and Prospects," (2004).

second PLC elections (2006), and the aftermath reaction to this unexpected development. The fourth period (2007-2010) was marked Hamas' takeover of Gaza in 2007, the continuation of sanctions against the Hamas-led PA, the transatlantic support for the Abbas-led PA, the growing rift between Hamas and Fatah, the Gaza War between 2008–09, and the start of a right-wing coalition government in Israel in 2009. This period also ends right before the 'Arab Spring', which is expected to change how transatlantic actors regard electoral assistance in the MENA region.

Electoral Assistance: the EU, the US and Canada

In order to compare the similarities and contrast the differences between the three transatlantic actors' electoral assistance policies in the PT, it is important to first look at their strategies towards democracy promotion in general and the existing agreements under which actors can provide their electoral assistance to the PT. Next, we must look at the instruments employed at the political, legal and social levels. Then, we should examine the bodies which were used to channel funding, in addition to their technical assistance which includes the amount of money they spent on assisting the elections, the number of election monitors who were sent on long and short-term bases, and the reports produced for the general and local elections (See Table 1).

Strategy

Despite the availability of funding and a framework for cooperation, the EU's *Common Strategy for the Mediterranean* – which included democracy promotion and electoral assistance in the MENA region – took a long time to develop and, yet, was very short-lived. It was adopted in 2000, extended in 2004 until 2006, but it has not been extended or renewed since then.[14] The US, on the other hand, has a long-established strategy of promoting democracy since the end of the Second World War. But it was under the Reagan administration in the 1980s that democracy promotion became central to US foreign policy and has gradually shaped the *National Security Strategy*.[15] There have, however, been some shifts in it under the G.W. Bush administration, which linked it for the first time with 'counter-terrorism' efforts and broadened it to other places in the Middle

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[14] EUROPA: Summaries of EU Legislation, "EU Common Strategy for the Mediterranean," (2000).
[15] Alexander Lennon et al., "Democracy in U.S. Security Strategy: From Promotion to Support," (Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2009).

East.[16] Canada, by contrast, does not have a strategy on democracy promotion or electoral assistance. Its actions on that front are merely demand and event driven at an ad hoc basis.

Agreement framework

The EU has a bilateral framework (e.g., Association Agreement and Action Plan) and a multilateral framework (the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy) with which it can engage with the MENA region. However, it is through the bilateral track, and mainly through the Action Plan signed between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the EU, that the EU's electoral assistance was implemented.[17] The US also has a bilateral framework (the Free Trade Agreement) and a multilateral framework (the Middle East Partnership Initiative and the Broader Middle East and North Africa) with which it engages the region. But here again its electoral assistance was handled through the bilateral track, where both the PA and the US have an agreement on cooperation under which electoral assistance is covered.[18] By contrast, Canada does not have a multilateral framework through which it can deal with the MENA region. It only dealt with the PA on a one-to-one basis through a bilateral track for engagement which was implemented in 1999.[19] So, when it comes to electoral assistance, all three actors favour dealing bilaterally with the Palestinian Authority.

Funding channels

Although the EU decision to assist the Palestinian elections was taken at the Council level (in a Joint Action), the budget was decided on by both the Council and the European Parliament. The implementation and management of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) instruments, which fall under the European Commission pillar, is, however, carried out by the Commission – through EuropeAid Cooperation Office in Brussels and the ECTAO office in the PT (using the financial instruments of MEDA-I&II and EIDHR-I&II) – and/or by the interested

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[16] The White House, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," (2002), 21-24.

[17] Roy Ginsberg, *The European Union in World Politics : Baptism by Fire* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001) 105-09.

[18] See United States Department of State, "Middle East Partnership Initiative" (n.d. [cited 7 October 2010]); available from http://mepi.state.gov/.; and United States Department of State, "BMENA" (n.d. [cited 7 October 2010]); available from http://bmena.state.gov/.

[19] The Canadian-Palestinian Framework for Economic Cooperation and Trade (CPFECT) between Canada and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) on behalf of the PA. See Government of Canada, "Bilateral Relations: Canada-West Bank/Gaza Strip Relations" (n.d. [cited 3 November 2010]); available from http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/west_bank_gaza-cisjordanie_bande_de_gaza/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/canada-wbg-cg.aspx?lang=eng.

member states with the help of European and local actors.[20] In the US, the budget was decided by the President and approved by Congress, while the State Department was responsible for implementing the various activities. USAID Democracy and Governance Unit, in particular, was in charge of administering the programme, but it did so with the help of American NGOs which were active on the ground, such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the Carter Center working jointly and, to a lesser extent, with the International Republican Institute (IRI).[21] In the case of Canada, the electoral assistance budget was decided by the Prime Minister on the advice of his Foreign Minister and passed Parliament as part of the budget proposal. Canada's electoral assistance activities in the PT were implemented by the ministry of Foreign Affairs and/or the ministry of International Cooperation, through Canadian and international bodies including: CIDA, IDRC,[22] CANADEM, IDEA, the EU and the UNDP.[23]

What we can take from all this, is that more players are involved in decision-making and implementation in the EU and the US than in Canada. Also, we can see that the US relies more than the other two actors on American NGOs to channel funds. Although this might be done to avoid showing that the USAID is involved in funding the elections in a place where there is a lot of scepticism against the US, involving NGOs – even if American and not local ones – fosters better understanding of local needs at the donors side.

Technical assistance: financing, monitoring and reporting

In terms of money provided over the fifteen years for electoral assistance in the PT, approximately the EU gave $75 million,[24] the US gave $50 million and Canada gave $5 million.[25] As for the number of election monitors deployed, including short and long-term, the EU sent nearly 860, the US sent about 357, while Canada sent around 95 monitors which, for the

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[20] At that period EuropeAid was operating under the guidance of the Commissioner for External Relations and in coordination with DG-RELEX. This, however, changed after the Lisbon Treaty where EuropeAid is now under the guidance of the Commission for Development.

[21] Interview, USAID-DG Policy Officer, at the United States Consulate, Jerusalem, September 2009.

[22] IDRC, "Projects in West Bank and Gaza: Technical Support to the Palestinian Legislative Council (Plc) in the Fields of Trade, Employment and Competitiveness," (2001).

[23] Abbreviation list: European Commission Technical Assistance Office (ECTAO), Mediterranean Assistance (MEDA), European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), US Agency for International Development (USAID), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Canada's Civilian Reserve (CANADEM), International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

[24] EU financial contributing does not include funds given for electoral assistance by individual member states, which is done on a bilateral basis.

[25] These final figures are compiled by the author from the separate data found for each actor individually over fifteen years. They are approximate and relate only to elections assistance and do not include money given for other democracy building initiatives, which was very difficult to discern from the available reports.

most part, joined the EU or US monitoring missions. And concerning the reports produced on these elections, which is the best means available for feedback for all parties involved in this process, the US was the only actor which produced reports on national as well as local elections. The EU focused mainly on reporting the national elections, while Canada did not produce any of its own reports – relying mainly on the reports of the other two actors.[26] So, in comparing the actors' technical assistance we can say that the EU has been the biggest financial contributor, but the US paid more attention to local elections and to involving NGOs, while Canada was lagging far behind on all fronts. (See Table 2)

Instruments used at the different dimensions

The EU, the US and Canada all used positive (incentive) as well as negative (coercive) instruments at the political, legal, social and technical dimensions to influence electoral changes in the PT. But what is also striking about the three actors' electoral assistance instruments is that they changed over time: between 1995–2002 positive instruments were mostly used; between 2003–2005 a mix of positive and negative instruments were used; and since 2006 negative instruments have been used most often (where coercive instruments include adding conditionality, imposing economic sanctions and boycotting parties).

Approach to electoral assistance

The research identifies three approaches to tackle electoral assistance: the top-down, the bottom-up and the balanced/mixed approach. Each actor is considered to follow one of these approaches depending on the instruments it employs while assisting elections. Top-down instruments focus on national elections and leadership, and also on institution building. By contrast, bottom-up instruments focus on local elections and leadership, decentralization, party development, and civil society capacity building – through voters' education, women and minorities enhanced participation and media training.

The approach employed by the EU in assisting elections in the PT was an unbalanced one, leaning more towards the top-down than the bottom-up. Despite the EU's efforts in funding and monitoring local elections and their work on voters' education, empowering minorities and training the media, the EU did not help decentralisation efforts because they neglected engaging

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[26] For details and resources on the EU case see Rouba Al-Fattal, *Transatlantic Trends in Democracy Promotion: Electoral Assistance in the Palestinian Territories* (London: Ashgate, 2013) 90-100., for the US case see Ibid: 149-164, and for Canada see Ibid: 207-212.

with local leadership, reporting on local elections or working with local NGOs. Instead, EU's efforts were mainly focused on the PA and on national institutions. Also, most of the electoral assistance funds were channelled through the European Commission office in the PT, and mainly benefited EU personnel working locally. Moreover, the EU did not get involved in party development, perhaps for the sensitivity this might raise among parties at the European Parliament (although EU member states, through their parties or party foundations, did have such programmes). In addition, the EU did not provide training to think-tanks on performing reliable elections opinion or exit polling, which would have been beneficial in predicting Hamas' win in 2006.

This comes as a contrast to the US approach which was quite balanced employing both top-down and bottom-up instruments. The US worked on funding, monitoring and reporting both national as well as local elections. Actually, it was the only actor to report on local elections. And it was fully engaged with national and local leaders. Indeed, a significant amount of its funding went into decentralisation projects through local NGOs to support local leadership development. The US was also involved in party development and in training local institutions to carry out elections opinion and exit polls (and it is worth noting that these polls predicted a victory for Hamas before the elections, but were nevertheless neglected).

Canada, on the other hand, seems to be the least balanced with much more emphasis on the top-down approach. Although, it did channel some of its funding to assist local elections and voter's education, it did not do much as far as monitoring or reporting on local elections. It also did not get involved in supporting local NGO's, party development, think-tank training, or for that matter empowering local leadership – this is despite the country's own experience with decentralisation. (See Table 3)

Recommendations

Although the external and internal factors which influence the decision of the transatlantic actors might differ they all seem to have followed a similar policy trajectory and reaction to Hamas during the 2006 Parliamentary elections.

At first sight, their reaction to Hamas' electoral win and their sheer refusal to have any dealings with the winning party may tell a story of contradiction (or divergence) between the transatlantic actors' normative and strategic interests in promoting democracy. For instance, the actors wanted to uphold their normative image and matching rhetoric towards supporting

democracy and the right for people to choose who they want to represent them. However, they were unwilling to deal with Hamas once it won the democratic elections which they had helped fund and support. This reaction not only tarnished the image of the transatlantic actors as honest democracy promoters, but it also left many wondering about the fate of democracy promotion in the Arab world.

The book, nevertheless, argues that there was no real divergence between the actors' normative interests (upholding democratic values) and strategic interests (favoring a more predictable and peaceful partner in power). The problem seems to lie, instead, in the transatlantic actors' misguided democracy promotion strategy and their unclear vision of the type of democracy they are willing to promote.

Concerning the actors' democracy promotion strategy we can say that it ranged from non-existent (in the case of Canada) to myopic (in the case of the EU and US) by focusing mainly on the short-term goals instead of the long-term objective of democracy. Therefore, in order to have a successful long-term strategy, this policy paper suggests that all transatlantic actors must rethink their democracy promotion strategy in the MENA region, and this strategy must focus on an action plan that is process-driven – focusing on what happens between elections– and steer away from an action plan that is event-driven – focusing mainly on the day of the elections (see Figure 1). Moreover, it is very important for the transatlantic actors to specify their action plan for electoral assistance through clear guidelines so that they do not mix up electoral assistance actions with other actions that are actually intended to help different aspects of democracy (such as rule of law, good governance and human rights). The absence of this has created a great deal of confusion in the long run for the providers, the recipients and the analysts of electoral assistance.

One of the ways to effectively shift to a process-driven approach is by striking a balance between the bottom-up and the top-down approaches to electoral assistance. Therefore, instead of focusing solely on national elections (presidential and parliamentary), it is vital to encourage decentralization by assisting local elections which includes funding, monitoring and reporting these elections. Moreover, instead of dealing only with government officials and providing technical assistance through International Organizations, it is equally important to strengthen local leadership and to channel funds through local NGOs, which would provide capacity building from the bottom-up. Also, instead of relying on officials' take on elections, it is recommended that local academic institutes and think-tanks be trained in providing reliable

opinion and exit polls that would steer the campaign in the right direction. Furthermore, instead of working only with the strongest party, the external actors' parliaments and political parties should connect with a wide array of local parties across the political spectrum. Their engagement will help local parties and candidates to develop a better policy platform on which to run. By using this mixed-approach, transatlantic actors can help the recipient countries in achieving a democratic system that is responsive to different strata in society, sustainable for a long period of time, and consolidated in a manner that is not easy to tumble.

As for the other problematic factor, which is the actors' vision of democracy, the concept was vaguely defined. The lack of clarity led to several policy inconsistencies. For instance, had the actors been clear from the beginning that they are promoting their type of *liberal* democracy (based on respect for individual liberty, human rights and the rule of law), their reaction towards Hamas, which lacks all three criteria, would *not* have been surprising. What is definitely needed, and was missing in the actors' democracy promotion policy, is a clear definition of the democracy being promoted. Although transatlantic actors, with their liberal democratic systems, might intuitively understand what they mean when they use the word democracy, this is not necessarily the case for the recipients of electoral assistance, who are generally new to the democratic game. Thus, it is very important to clarify to the recipients that liberal democracy, which is being supported here, is *not* about the tyranny of the majority – even if that majority gained its power through democratic elections (free, fair and regular); but to the contrary, it is more about the limitations put on the majority by law in order to protect the various rights and freedoms of *all* citizens.

One last aspect relates to policy coordination. The actors have been accused of mismanagement and inefficiency, due mainly to duplications and overlaps during the implementation phase. The EU, the US and Canada would benefit from a joint electoral assistance committee which could provide oversight as to what each actor is contributing in terms of political, legal, technical and social assistance to external elections. This joint body could also be used to assign and divide tasks between the three actors, depending on their capabilities and strength. Understanding that need, the European Commission (EC) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have recently created the EU-UNDP Joint

Task Force on Electoral Assistance, but what is needed now is for the US and Canada to join them.[27]

Conclusion

This paper demonstrates that there are many similarities but also many differences which dominate the electoral assistance policies of the EU, the US and Canada. By looking at the broader picture concerning their relations with the PT, these actors share similar normative and strategic interests. They also tend to support similar efforts, use similar instruments, deal with the same institutions, and focus on similar themes (empowering women, minorities and the media). However, we can also find striking differences. For one, their strategies are different, with the US having the longest standing democracy promotion strategy in the region. And their approaches, although mixed, remain more balanced in the US case compared with the EU or Canada, which tend to lean more towards the top-down approach.

The unfortunate fact, however, is that more than fifteen years have passed since the launch of the transatlantic programme of promoting democracy and assisting elections in the PT with very little to show for it. Despite some preliminary progress in the domain of electoral politics, the decision to boycott the 'democratically elected' Hamas party in 2006 has not only rolled-back previous efforts to institutionalise democratic elections in the PT, but also damaged previous developments and pushed the Palestinian authority to abolish elections and adopt an authoritarian-style of governance by Presidential decrees.

But this is not a paper which debates whether the reactions of transatlantic actors towards Hamas were right or wrong; instead, it is one which explains the shortfalls in the EU's, US's, and Canada's electoral assistance policy which led to Hamas' election, and based on these observations, provides recommendations for the way forward.

At this point in time, when the MENA region is facing unprecedented revolutions for the sake of democracy, what would be of interest to researchers and practitioners in the democracy promotion field is to see whether transatlantic actors have actually learned any lessons from their mistakes during the 2006 elections in the PT. That is indeed the subject of the author's forthcoming book on EU's Electoral Assistance in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya after the Arab Spring.

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[27] European Commission-United Nations Development Programme (EC-UNDP), "Partnership on Electoral Assistance" (n.d. [cited 11 December 2010]); available from http://www.ec-undp-electoralassistance.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=53&Itemid=27&lang=en.

Annex

TABLE 1. Electoral assistance over the different dimentions and time periods[28]

Periods / Dimensions	1995-2000	2001-2004	2005-2006	2007-2010
Political	Bilateral agreements signed PLC established PCEC established First national elections (presidential + Parliamentary) Took place in 1996	PMO and PLC reforms First local elections took place	Encourage Hamas participation in local and PLC elections PCEC re-established Presidential elections announced Local elections continued PLC elections took place in 2006	No Elections No electoral assistance
Legal	Local Council Election Law & Palestinian Elections Law established in 1996: Presidential elections by PR PLC elections by Districts	Amending the Basic Law in 2003 to have PMO Local Elections Law amended in 2004 to District based	Local Elections Law amended in 2005: From districts to PR Elections Law amended in 2005: PLC from Districts to Mixed system (of 66 districts/ 66 PR)	Emergency Government since 2007 ruling by presidential Decree Fatah in WB Hamas in Gaza
Social	Encouraging PLC religious minority participation: 6 Christian 1 Samaritan Jew Encouraging PLC women presence : 5/88 (6%)	Local religious presence established Local women quota set: 2 per Council	Local religious quota in certain areas: 53 % Christians PLC religious quota: 2 for some districts PLC women quota: Increased to 20%	PLC religious minorities and women representation are on hold
Technical	Elections setup National election monitoring National election reporting Building democratic network	Assistance for local elections, and other micro projects for building democracy network Monitoring local elections Reporting local elections	Elections Setup Elections reporting at PLC/local level Election monitoring of PLC/local levels Democracy-building projects (e.g., voters education and media training)	Aid for micro projects (related to WB security & economic reforms but not for democratic governance)

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[28] *Source:* Rouba Al-Fattal, *Transatlantic Trends in Democracy Promotion: Electoral Assistance in the Palestinian Territories* (London: Ashgate, 2013) 90-100., for the US case see Ibid: 149-164, and for Canada see Ibid: 207-212.

TABLE 2. EU, US and Canada's technical contribution to electoral assistance in the PT[29]

		1995-2000 (Presidential + PLC together)	2001-2004 (Local Elections)	2005-2006 (Local, PLC, Presidential)	2007-2010 (No elections)
EU	Instrument	EuropeAide and ECTAO administered Using MEDA-I	EuropeAide and ECTAO administered Using MEDA-II & EIDHR-I	EuropeAide and ECTAO administered Using EIDHR-I	EuropeAide and ECTAO administered Using EIDHR-II
	Fund	€7.5 million/year for elections setup & €10 million for Election Unit	€2.5 million for local elections and other micro projects	€2.5 million for presidential EOM & €3 million for PLC EOM	(€3 million For micro projects
	Monitors	300	35 unites[30]	PLC EOM 260	NA
	Report	Yes	No	Yes	NA
US	Instrument	USAID DG Using NDI, IRI, Carter-Center	USAID DG using NDI, IRI, Carter-Center	USAID DG using NDI, IRI, Carter-Center	USAID DG using NDI, IRI, Carter-Center
	Fund	~$8.6 million/year for elections setup	~$9 to 13 million/year for democracy building and $300.000 for elections assistance	~$23 million for democracy building of which $4 million for election assistance	*Since 2008:* $18-24 million for democratic governance
	Monitors	41	10 teams	Local: 6 teams Presidential EOM: 150 PLC EOM 150	NA
	Report	Yes	Yes	Yes	NA
CAN	Instrument	Using EU, IDEA, CIDA, CANADEM	Using IDRC	Using EU, UNDP, CIDA, CANADEM	Using IDRC
	Fund	~C$770.000 For electoral assistance, building democratic network	~C$700.000 for two projects	~C$3.9 million for electoral assistance and PCEC setup	~C$260.000 on a four year project with PCPSR
	Monitors	#? with the EU EOM	?	Local: 0 Presidential EOM: 16 with EU EOM PLC EOM 79	NA
	Report	No	No	No	NA

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[29] *Source:* Rouba Al-Fattal, *Transatlantic Trends in Democracy Promotion: Electoral Assistance in the Palestinian Territories* (London: Ashgate, 2013) 90-100., for the US case see Ibid: 149-164, and for Canada see Ibid: 207-212.
[30] It is not clear from the literature or the interviews if this number means 35 members unite or 35 unites with many people in each unit. The former interpretation is more likely according to interviews with EuropeAid officers.

TABLE 3. Approaches of electoral Assistance[31]

	Electoral Assistance Instruments	EU	US	CAN
Top-Down	Funding and monitoring national elections	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Reporting on national elections	Yes	Yes	No
	Enhancing voters' education through media and campaigns	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Giving technical or logistical assistance (e.g. equipment, material, etc)	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Providing legal consultancy on formulating Elections Laws	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Building democratic state institutions (e.g. PLC, PMO, and PCEC)	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Attaching conditionality to funding in order to entice reforms	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Sanctioning & boycotting political parties that are seen as undemocratic	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bottom-Up	Supporting voters education, women/minorities participation, and the media	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Funding local elections	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Monitoring local elections	Yes	Yes	No
	Reporting on local elections	No	Yes	No
	Helping decentralisation through local elections, leadership and NGOs	No	Yes	No
	Developing parties through funds and consultancy	No	Yes	No
	Training think-tanks in conducting elections opinion or exit polling	No	Yes	No

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[31] The highlighted instruments are the coercive ones, as opposed to the incentive instruments.

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