Facing the Russia Challenge: European and Canadian Perspectives

Workshop Summary Report

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Introduction

Russia's unprovoked attack on Ukraine has turned into a war that arguably marks the collapse of the European security system as we have known it since the end of World War II. Fundamental principles of that security system, such as respect for territorial integrity and protection of civilian populations in wartime situations, have been upended. A primary motivation for the post-war European integration project was to create conditions that would prevent the eruption of a new war in Europe, based on principles of economic interdependence, liberal democratic values, rule of law, and good governance. These principles, and the European Union's efforts to apply them in its relations with Russia, have proven inadequate to secure peace in the EU's immediate neighbourhood.

Accordingly, the conflict has challenged the European Union (EU) to reinforce its capacity as a security actor, and to adopt more assertive policies to defend the geopolitical interests of the Union, its Member States, and partner countries. While NATO and the United States have taken a lead role is supporting Ukraine in its defense against Russian aggression, the EU and its member states have also stepped forward with military and humanitarian assistance, a broad-ranging and coordinated set of sanctions against Russia, the reception of millions of Ukrainians fleeing the conflict, diplomatic efforts to help lay the groundwork for a negotiated solution, and acceptance of Ukraine and Moldova as EU candidate states. Some of the EU's responses have required substantial sacrifices and introduced significant uncertainties, particularly in the field of energy security.

The attack by Russia on Ukraine beginning on February 24, 2022, has produced a dramatic geopolitical shift in Europe, and has presented new challenges for the European Union. Indeed, the attack has evoked a paradigm change in EU-Russian relations. Whereas previously there was a hope that economic and trade cooperation could provide a basis for peaceful relations with Russia, Russia's annexation of Ukrainian territory, namely Crimea, made this increasingly unlikely, and Russia's full-scale military aggression against Ukraine in 2022 produced a deep and likely enduring deterioration of relations between the EU and Russia across most spheres. These events require a rethinking of the entire foundation of the relationship. However, many potential outcomes to the ongoing war are possible, and the future EU-Russia relationship will be largely determined by how the war will end. The EU has some ability to shape the future outcome of the war, and its approach to providing economic and military assistance to Ukraine should be strategic, not incremental.

This report explores implications of the Russia's war against Ukraine for the European Union and its Member States. Part I examines explanations for the collapse of the European security system. In Part 2, attention is given to debates about EU strategic autonomy as well as efforts to reinforce the EU's capacity as a strategic international actor. The perspective of small nations, including the Baltic states and Belgium, are given particular attention. Part 3 explores the logic and efficacy of the sanctions regime against Russia, while Part 4 looks at challenges involved in Europe's efforts to reduce its energy dependence on Russia. Part 5 includes reflections by two experts on European security regarding possible routes forward for EU-Russia relations and European security. In the final section of the paper, some policy considerations and, where possible, recommendations are put forward by the editors.

Video recordings of most of the conference presentations at the workshop upon which this volume is based are available here.

Part 1 – The Collapse of the European Security Regime: How did we get here?

Introduction, *by Toms Rostoks and Joan DeBardeleben*

Has Russia's attack on Ukraine marked the end of the European security order as we have known it since the end of World War II? In answering this question, one might consider that, following the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the European security order was undergoing a process of transformation, the outcome of which was already uncertain. Critical events in this transformation included the accession of many central and east European countries to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), beginning in 1999, and the enlargement of the EU between 2004 and 2013. With the collapse of the USSR Russia saw its sphere of influence reduced, and with the expansion of both NATO and the EU, this dynamic was reinforced. The Russian Federation, on the other hand, was seeking new vehicles to secure its own influence in the region, laying the groundwork for the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015.

While Russia joined a number of international organizations or agreements after 1991, including the Council of Europe (signing the European Convention on Human Rights), the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, at the same time a number of arms control agreements collapsed. In 2002 the US withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. While the New Start Treaty between the US and Russia was extended to 2026, Russia had withdrawn from the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty in 2009 and the US withdrew from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Agreement in 2019. This mix of events suggests that the European security order was already unstable when Russian annexed Crimea and the more so when Russia attacked Ukraine in 2022. Russia's actions were both a symptom of the system's instability as well as trigger for a further weakening of the principles on which the post-war order was based.

Nonetheless, key elements of the post-war security order remained intact. Until 2014, generally states had respected post-war European borders and no major war had broken out in Europe since the conclusion of World War II. Most international organizations continued to function, with Russia's participation, including the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Arctic Council, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), to name but a few.

The strong response by NATO and the EU to Russia's attack on Ukraine represented an attempt to preserve those functioning elements of the post-war security order and to safeguard the ground rules for security in Europe that many of these organizations had been created to defend.

There are many roots of the crisis that has emerged between the West and Russia since 2014. On the one hand, Western leaders and experts were probably not paying enough attention to developments in Russia. Attention shifted toward the threat of terrorism after 9/11. Russia's actions to challenge the underpinning of European security since the 1990s were overlooked or given inadequate attention. Evidence of the challenge Russia posed to European security were visible in Russia's response to frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space, in Nagorno-Karabakh (involving Armenia and Azerbaijan), in separatist regions of Georgia, and in the Transnistrian part of Moldova. While Russia exercised significant influence in these regions and participated in various international mechanisms directed at addressing the conflicts, the Russian Federation never acted in good faith to resolve these conflicts; their maintenance served Russia's interests by giving Russia a foothold of influence in countries hosting the conflicts, also making it more difficult for these countries to realize their aspirations to join organizations like NATO and the EU. Since 2008 this type of errant behavior has accelerated. Russia's actions in Georgia in 2008 and its aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 brought this problem

to a head. Without a strong stand to support Ukraine, there will likely be further such violations of borders, and other international actors, wishing to extent their own spheres of influence, might be encouraged to follow suit.

As relations between Russia and the West progressively deteriorated since Putin's Munich speech in 2007, neither of the two sides has been willing to give up on its essential interests. NATO could not shut its door to aspiring members, and NATO membership has grown. So has the EU membership. Both NATO and the EU ascribed to the important principle that European states could choose their partners for economic and security purposes, while Russia rejected this idea. Russia's actions suggest that the viewpoint of the Russian leadership identifies just two types of states, sovereign states, and vassal states. In this view, great powers can interfere in the domestic and foreign policy affairs of those vassal states as great powers see fit. This clash of principles between the West and Russia came to a head in the conflict over Ukraine.

Clearly there were misperceptions of intentions and capabilities on both sides. Russia overestimated its power and underestimated Ukraine's power and readiness to fight for its survival. On the other hand, in the West we largely misperceived Russia's intentions. We didn't think that the things Russia is doing in Ukraine would be possible in the 21st century. Misperception is a clear element of what got us here. Many of Russia's direct neighbours have understood what Russia represents but leaders of many other European states have not. For many people and analysts in the West, the behaviour of Russian troops and the way they treat Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilians comes as a surprise, while people in the Baltic states have memories of that, even though even most experts in the Baltic states also didn't believe this type of behaviour would be possible in the 21st century. But it has occurred.

There is a tendency to shy away from studying the aggressor country because it seems reprehensible to honour its actions with attention. But studying Russia remains highly important under current circumstances. Russia is a very complex society – multiethnic and complex sociologically. We're observing the tip of this diversity and complexity in the exodus of citizens and media, many of whom have moved to the Baltic states. Understanding the aggressor is necessary in order to respond. Our failure to adequately understand dynamics inside Russia contributed to our complacency in preparing for the aggression that we are now seeing in Ukraine. We should not make this mistake again.

The New Age of Insecurity in the Euro-Atlantic Area, *by Alexandra Gheciu*

The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, represents a major historical turning point that will have profound implications not only for European security but also, more broadly, for the normative fabric of international society. To understand the nature of the challenges facing us, it is important to place our analysis in a broader historical perspective. In particular, we need to understand Moscow's aggression against Ukraine as the culmination of a process of violating key norms within the global rules-based order as well as specific provisions of the post-1989 Euro-Atlantic security regime. That process started years ago, prompting a series of policymakers and analysts—particularly from the former communist bloc—to advocate, long before the 2022 invasion, a decisive Western-led response to President Putin's aggressive discourse and policies. Yet that response was delayed and complicated by a series of factors, including weaknesses and problematic political developments within the area known as the Western security community.

Russia's vision of international order

The Russian invasion of Ukraine represents the culmination of President Putin's push to realize a specific vision of an illiberal, Russian-led "Eurasian order." That vision, inspired by the thinking of influential ideologues like Alexander Dugin, should not be a surprise to anyone because Putin presented it directly to the liberal international order's top establishment—at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, among other forums.

Putin's articulation of a vision of Eurasian order and, as a corollary, his rejection of established global and regional norms and rules arguably started with low-key statements surrounding his apparent desire to redress the consequences of the collapse of the USSR in 1991. In his state-of-the-nation address in April 2005, Putin called the demise of the Soviet Union the most "major geopolitical disaster of the century," and set out on a mission to change it.[1] On the international stage he intended, as his main objective, to "ensure security of our borders."[2] Within those borders, he believed Russia "should continue its civilizing mission on the Eurasian continent," ensuring that "democratic values" [as defined by Moscow], combined with national interests, "enrich and strengthen our historic community."[3] Initially, few Western policymakers paid attention to the ominous ideas embedded in his statement. Yet that vision was re-stated loudly and clearly on several occasions after 2005, including during Putin's stately address on February 21, 2022, before the invasion of Ukraine. As he put it: "Ukraine is not just a neighbouring country for us.... It is an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space... Ukraine was entirely created by Russia."[4] In this context, "for our country, this is ultimately a matter of life and death, a matter of our historical future as a people. And this is not an exaggeration – it is true. This is a real threat not just to our interests, but to the very existence of our state, its sovereignty. This is the very red line that has been talked about many times. They crossed it."[5]

Putin has cast the conflict as a clash between a virtuous, defensive Russia and an aggressive West—represented in particular by NATO, which according to his discourse, poses an existential threat to the Russian people, territory, and values. In his words, NATO allies have not only threatened Russia's

[1] RTR Russia TV, via BBC Monitoring: "Russian President Putin Delivers State of the Nation Address," April 25, 2005. At: https://irp.fas.org/news/2005/04/putin042505.html (accessed September 5, 2022).
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Reuters, "Extracts from Putin's speech on Ukraine", February 21, 2022. Available at**:** https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/extracts-putins-speech-ukraine-2022-02-21/ **(**accessed September 5, 2022).
[5] Bloomberg News. **"**Transcript: Vladimir Putin's Televised Address on Ukraine**",** February 24, 2022. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-24/full-transcript-vladimir-putin-s-televised-address-to-russia-on-ukraine-feb-24 **(**accessed September 5, 2022).

territorial integrity but have also "sought to destroy our traditional values and force on us their false values that would erode us, our people from within, the attitudes they have been aggressively imposing on their countries, attitudes that are directly leading to degradation and degeneration, because they are contrary to human nature." [6]

Putin's determination to act in support of that vision of international order became visible long before the February 2022 invasion. Notable developments included: moves to reinvigorate the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO); the use of military force in 2008 during Russia's brief war with Georgia, which resulted in two break-away republics of North Ossetia and Abkhazia and thus undermining Georgia's ambition to Europeanize and potentially join NATO; and especially the carving up of Ukraine in 2014 via the annexation of Crimea and the emergence of two separatist republics of Donetsk and Luhansk.

Normative violations: global and regional

By engaging in these actions, Russia has repeatedly violated both foundational norms of the global rules-based order (including key articles from the UN Charter, the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, and the Geneva Conventions) and specific norms and rules embedded in the post-1989 Euro-Atlantic security regime. These include: the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe; the 1994 Budapest Memorandum; the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership signed between Ukraine and Russia in 1997; and key provisions underpinning the post-1989 cooperation between NATO and Russia, including the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, and the NATO-Russia Council.

Addressing the Russian Challenge: Delays and Complications

Yet, as many policymakers and academics now admit, the international community in general and EU/NATO states, in particular, were slow to respond to Moscow's violations of global and regional norms and acts of aggression. While it would be impossible within the space of this memo to provide a full account of the factors responsible for this situation, a few key issues deserve to be mentioned as having significantly complicated the response to President Putin's actions, including problems regarding transatlantic burden-sharing and the relationship between the EU and NATO, as well as energy issues are important, addressed in another part of this report.

Here, I would like to briefly highlight some additional, broader dynamics concerning the Western response. These are important not only because they have shaped and complicated EU and NATO actions vis-à-vis Russia until now, but also because they are likely to continue to affect responses in the future. First, we should mention diverging threat perceptions in the transatlantic area; most notably, for years there was a significant gap between prevailing definitions of a threat in many of the former communist states (who identified Russia as an existential threat) and perceptions of that threat in key West European states. In addition, one cannot ignore challenges to Western unity caused by the rise of illiberal political forces in several EU and NATO member states. Those developments translated into a decline in inter-allied trust (most notably, though not exclusively, linked to President Trump's unilateralism and critique of NATO), and a weakening of allied solidarity associated with

[6] Ibid.

rapprochement between Moscow and several allied states currently led by illiberal governments (in particular, Hungary and Turkey).

The persistence of these illiberal ideas and political forces within the EU and NATO space raises interesting and difficult questions about the extent to which the West will succeed in maintaining a united front against Russia in the future. The situation is rendered more complicated by the fact that, in its confrontation with the Putin regime, the West does not enjoy universal support on the international stage. While few countries explicitly support Russia, it is important to keep in mind that many countries have chosen to 'sit on the fence' (as illustrated, for instance, by abstentions from key UN votes). All these developments suggest that the process of reaching international agreement on an acceptable outcome of the Ukraine war and (re)defining relations with Moscow in the post-war era will be highly complex and potentially dangerous.

Understanding the Kremlin's Reasoning Behind the War Against Ukraine, and its Impact on the EU, *by Tom Casier*

When it invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022, Russia broke a major taboo, the linchpin of the European post-World War II security order: that of the inviolability of borders and the territorial integrity of states. The lesson learnt from two destructive world wars was that territorial expansion by force poses the biggest threat to security and easily spills over into uncontrollable war. The principle of the inviolability of borders is one of the most fundamental principles of international law. It obtained a central place in the UN Charter and was at the heart of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. Most crucially, it was also the core principle behind the 1994 Budapest memorandum, in which the Russian Federation– together with the US and the UK – guaranteed the territorial integrity of newly independent Ukraine. The principle has been violated before, most notably with Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, but it was never violated so blatantly and so violently as with Russia's 2022 invasion, triggering the biggest inter-state war in Europe since World War II.

Self-evidently, the violation of this cornerstone of Europe's security order, the scale and the brutality of the war left the EU and the transatlantic community no choice but to respond. This happened in a largely coordinated way across the Atlantic. The US, the EU, and NATO adopted the similar position that the war is a regional conflict, to which they are not a party. At the same time, far-reaching sanctions were imposed on Russia and each engaged in extensive support for Ukraine.

In order to assess the EU's position, we need a better understanding of the reasons for Russia's intervention. Ultimately, this determines the options and challenges Brussels is facing. Some analysts have explained Russia's war against Ukraine as the result of increasing tensions with the West and the security concerns it implied for Russia. John Mearsheimer is the most famous proponent of this view.[7] His argument states that Russia had no choice because of the West's policy of making Ukraine 'a Western bulwark on Russia's borders' and that the West is therefore to blame. This view overlooks two crucial elements. First, there is a strong disconnect between two central narratives of the Russian regime. A first narrative, that was systematically built up and propagated over the course of 2021, referred to Russia's security concerns and spoke of 'red lines' that could not be crossed. While it was initially left vague what these red lines represented, they were by the end of 2021 translated into three unconditional demands: no further expansion of NATO to the post-Soviet space, no deployment of offensive weapons in the proximity of Russia, and the withdrawal of NATO military infrastructure from countries that joined NATO after 1997. The Kremlin was well aware that these demands were unrealistic and would never be met by the US, which reinforces the view that the rhetoric mainly served as a distraction. A second narrative was about Ukraine as 'Russian lands,' stating it had always lacked stable statehood; thus Ukraine was denied the right to exist as an independent state. It is a discourse with older roots, drawing on deeply rooted paternalistic attitudes, which was expressed strongly by Putin in his article[8] of 2021 and became the dominant narrative in his speeches right before the invasion.

A second problem with Mearsheimer's explanation is the disconnect between Russia's assumed security concerns and today's reality. The war against Ukraine has dramatically increased Russia's security issues. NATO is fully re-legitimized and sees Finland and Sweden joining. With Germany's 'historic shift,' one of the axes of reconciliation in Europe that started with Brandt's Ostpolitik, has been destroyed. Sanctions inhibit Russia's access to vital technology. War developments have no doubt

[7] Mearsheimer, J. (2014) 'Why the Ukraine crisis is the West's fault. The Liberal delusions that provoked Putin', *Foreign Affairs*, Sep/Oct.; and Mearsheimer, J. (2022) John Mearsheimer On Who Gains The Most From The Ukraine-Russia War & What Could End Putin's Assault. *Crux* online interview. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XgiZXgYzI84

[8] Putin, V. (2021b), Article by Vladimir Putin "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians", 12 July 2021, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181

damaged its reputation as a great, strong power. Moreover, Russia is fairly isolated and its credibility among partners and allies threatened.

Instead of seeing the invasion of Ukraine as a proxy war, we need to understand the Kremlin's particular view of the world and Russia's place within it. This view is based on a sense of entitlement to great power status, going hand-in-hand with an identity of itself as a country that is bigger than the actual borders of the Russian Federation. What makes the position unique is that the geopolitical and identity arguments are inseparable: in the Kremlin's world view, great power Russia can only exist if it is also greater Russia, i.e., when it includes Ukrainian and Belarusian lands. In the absence of critical reflection about its imperial past, this narrative has always continued to exist in Russia's collective memory, but debates around Russia's identity got a new boost after the events of 2014, when the perceived 'loss' of Ukraine was very much felt as an 'existential crisis' in Russia. The failure of Moscow's post-2014 Ukraine policy further contributed to an escalation of scenarios, eventually aiming at the dissolution of the Ukrainian state.

The invasion of Ukraine has greatly impacted on the EU's position and policy. First of all, it has reached an unseen degree of unanimity on a radical package of sanctions and even on decoupling itself from Russian energy. Second, the EU has taken on a new security role. Using the European Peace Facility, it has provided 2.5 billion EUR in military assistance to Ukraine. Moreover, it has engaged in arms deliveries, a fundamentally new fact for the EU. French president Macron seized the window of opportunity to reinforce the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy with the Versailles declaration of 11 March 2022, seeking to bolster the EU's defence capabilities. It is interesting to note that this revitalized role is doomed to unfold in 'coopetition' with NATO, which finds itself re-invigorated because of this war. Third, the war inevitably changes the EU's policy towards its eastern neighbours. Brussels has returned to an enlargement policy, not only for the Western Balkans, but it has also granted Moldova and Ukraine candidate member state status and Georgia a conditional perspective. Ukraine's candidate status is a powerful, symbolic recognition of Ukrainian statehood at a time when it is bluntly denied by Russia. The Eastern Partnership (EaP) was a policy that kept membership deliberately off the table. With three of the six EaP countries on their way to membership, Belarus under sanctions over the war in Ukraine, Armenia dependent on Russia in a precarious security situation and Azerbaijan choosing an autonomous course, the EaP is unlikely to survive in its current form.

When taking office, Von der Leyen vowed to lead a 'geopolitical Commission'.[9] Circumstances have left her little choice but going even beyond the highest expectations. The EU plays a security role it has never played before, and geopolitical arguments have taken a central place in its discourse. Yet, the challenges are tremendous. In the short term, there are the concerns about a further escalation of the war, in particular after Moscow's decision on partial mobilization. In the longer term, under different circumstances, the challenge of establishing a new, stable European security order will under any scenario be colossal. With the possibility of a nuclearization of the conflict more real than ever, arms control will inevitably return to the top of the international agenda at some point. However geopolitical the EU may have become, it is unlikely it will play the leading role in this process.

[9] Von der Leyen, Ursula (2019), Speech by President-elect von der Leyen in the European Parliament Plenary on the occasion of the presentation of her College of Commissioners and their programme, 27 November 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_19_6408

Part 2 – The War in Ukraine and European Strategic Autonomy

Introduction, *by Toms Rostoks*

This section looks at the willingness of capability and willingness of the EU to become a more autonomous security actor. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale attack on Ukraine in 2014 brought increasingly intense discussion within Europe about the gaps in the EU's capacity to assure its own security and put a sharp point on these debates about European strategic autonomy.

While the EU, the United States, and Canada have put in place unprecedented sanctions on Russia and have provided military equipment and supplies as well humanitarian aid to Ukraine, there are some limitations. NATO and the EU have also been reluctant to provide some heavy equipment such as tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, despite the many voices calling for this. Ukraine will badly need these assets with the aim of liberating the temporarily occupied territories. Even though much attention is being paid to military supplies to Ukraine, the political will and readiness to take measured risks will also be needed to support Ukrainian efforts to take back its territory. However, this process will be followed by constant threat of escalation from Moscow.

The EU's ability to get its act together will be just as important as the material help. Therefore, European strategic autonomy is not just about countering Russian aggression again Ukraine. One of the more demanding definitions of strategic autonomy is about institutional capacity to independently plan and conduct military operations across the full spectrum of conflict, including in high intensity military operations such as expeditionary warfare and territorial defense mission. Strategic autonomy is also about the EU being able to autonomously develop the related defensive capacity with no or limited military assistance from the United States. If the EU is to develop this capability it will require decades of investment. It will also require further defense integration among the member states and defense spending that goes well beyond the 2% benchmark set by NATO. It will also require leadership and political will not just to have these capabilities but to use them if necessary. With regard to the latter, the track record is less than stellar.

Since Russia's attack on Ukraine in February 2022, voices for stronger measures to demonstrate the EU's readiness to exercise not only its economic might and but also to develop its military capacities have been particularly strong in the Baltic states. As front-line nations with direct borders with Russia, the importance for the Baltic states and Poland of a strong defensive capability on the part of the EU in the face of potential Russian aggression is self-evident. While these states may look to NATO for their primary security guarantees, evidence of a strong commitment from other EU countries, particularly Germany and France, is also important. The heart of the debate about strategic autonomy, as noted, concerns the extent to which the EU can assert its interests autonomously of other actors as well as in concert with them. As developments during the Trump presidency in the United States illustrated, commitments of key allies can waver and may be subject to electoral outcomes, factors beyond the control of the EU. While, in the real world, strategic autonomy will always be relative rather than absolute, the Ukraine war provides an evidence for its importance in times of crisis.

Positions of Small EU Members Towards European Strategic Autonomy: Favouring Stronger Defence Without Autonomy[10]

By Giedrius Česnakas

The concept of the European strategic autonomy became the pinnacle of discussions among European Union member states, EU institutions, think-tanks, and scholars after it was published in the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy. The lack of a clear definition of the concept led to heated discussions because EU member states wanted to shape it according to their national interests. European strategic autonomy provided possibilities for member states to Europeanize their interests. This should not come as a surprise because it was pushed by the French, who saw it as an instrument in their national interests rather than a genuine European defence integration policy. Other EU member states just followed suit. For this reason, European strategic autonomy is reminiscent of a compass that does not show one direction but shows individual directions depending on who is holding it.

This paper aims to review how the small EU member states perceive European strategic autonomy and what the primary interests of these states are. This paper does not provide a detailed analysis of what European strategic autonomy is, its evolution, or related initiatives; it focuses only on general perceptions of the European strategic autonomy in EU small states. This paper focuses on the analysis of Belgium, Estonia, Denmark, Hungary, Greece, the Netherlands, Latvia, and Lithuania. It must be noted that each member state has somewhat different interests in European strategic autonomy, but some main vectors can be generalized.

The first thing that already forced small EU member states to question the necessity of the European strategic autonomy was its title. Global Strategy indicated that European strategic autonomy should strengthen the European pillar of NATO – contributing to European military capabilities (material and operational), but also "to act autonomously if and when necessary."[11] In this case, autonomy means greater independence from NATO and essentially from its core member, the United States of America.

The US remains the core security provider for the Baltic states, Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Moreover, the focus of European strategic autonomy after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014 was an additional source of anxiety among eastern EU members because of their interest in maintaining a strong Transatlantic bond. Strategic autonomy implied that this bond might weaken or not be as essential as it once was.

Donald Trump's presidency, his doubts about NATO viability, disrespect for the allies and conflicts with leaders of the largest EU members justified the focus on European strategic autonomy. The proponents of European strategic autonomy suggest that the plan is worth implementing. It cannot be denied that European security depends on the voters in Arkansas or any other US state who primarily focus on their local interests. However, US institutions (institutional memory) and the US strategic culture mitigated the crisis between President Trump and the European Union and its member states, as exemplified by the delay of withdrawal of US troops from Germany. It is worth underlining that EU members who were especially interested in keeping a strong Transatlantic bond managed to approach Trump's administration and mitigate issues (Poland and the Baltics).

[10] This paper is based on the edited volume by Giedrius Česnakas and Justinas Juozaitis, *European Strategic Autonomy and Small States' Security: In the shadow of power*, published by Routledge, 2023, https://www.routledge.com/European-Strategic-Autonomy-and-Small-States-Security-In-the-Shadow-of/Cesnakas-Juozaitis/p/book/9781032350073#sup.

[11] "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy," June 2016, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf, p. 19.

Finnish and Swedish decisions to join NATO, as an outcome of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine in 2022, perfectly indicates that despite article 42.7 of the Treaty of European Union (Mutual defence clause) and the initiatives which originated because of European strategic autonomy (EDF, PESCO, CARD, EPF, and EI2), NATO remains perceived as the core security provider. Small EU states are not interested in autonomy from the US, quite the opposite.

The reluctance of the small states to support European strategic autonomy emerges from several European Union security and defence issues. First – EU member states lack military capabilities. The EU's average military expenditure declined from 2.1% of GDP in 1992 to 1.4% in 2019.[12] Among the EU member states whose population is greater than 10 million, only France, Poland, Romania, Greece, and Portugal spent more than 2% of GDP on defence in 2020. In this context, the ambition of building military capabilities in the EU seemed to contradict the actual defence policies of most EU member states. Capabilities need resources, and the EU has a vision of pooling resources, but the problem is that it is necessary to have resources that can be pooled. At the same time, the militaries of many EU member states are understaffed, undersupplied, and lack combat readiness. European strategic autonomy and various initiatives under its umbrella have to be adequate to deal with the issues outlined. The aspirations of strategic autonomy contradicted declining funding and defence policy decisions among many EU member states. At the same time, the dominant NATO state, the US, provided the greatest military power in the world, with global power projection and military technologies which can hardly be matched. Small states knew very clearly on whom they should rely.

Second, NATO provided functioning security and defence cooperation, while strategic autonomy was not capable of defining its future. The discussion in the EU and the Strategic Compass does not suggest a precise vision of the EU military capabilities.[13] The Strategic Compass even avoids the term strategic autonomy. Small states do not risk certainty for an idea that might not materialize.

Third, small states could directly address the US and expect significant results when dealing with practical defence and security. On the other hand, strategic autonomy suggests a laborious diplomatic activity with many EU institutions and member states and uncertain outcomes or the scope of outcomes.[14] So, the cost-benefit approach favours NATO and the US, not the European strategic autonomy initiatives.

Fourth, small states wanted to avoid duplication of responsibilities, which might lead to a clash with NATO responsibilities. Lithuania is sceptical about developing the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (EU Headquarters), which still relies on NATO capabilities. Small EU member states also lack military personnel which should be delegated to MPCC, as they prioritize NATO.

Fifth, the member states have their national militaries. There are no NATO or EU militaries within the states, so strategic autonomy does not contribute to additional manpower. As a result, the same officers and soldiers will have only more hats to wear.

A few reasons must be discussed to explain why the European strategic autonomy idea is still alive despite scepticism from small EU member states.

First, European strategic autonomy, to some extent, can be shaped for national interests. For example, some small EU member states see the benefit of strengthening protective measures against third

[12] Military expenditure (% of GDP) – European Union, World Bank. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?name_desc=false&locations=EU.
[13] A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, The Diplomatic Service of the European Union, March 2022, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/strategic_compass_en3_web.pdf.
[14] Ukraine Support Tracker, Kiel Institute for World Economy, https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/.

countries' imports and lower reliance on strategic goods or services from outside the EU, like the People's Republic of China (5G, medical equipment) or the Russian Federation (energy). Increased self-sufficiency would decrease political and economic vulnerability both nationally and regionally.

Second, the idea was suggested and pushed by the major EU power – France. Paris and Berlin are the two principal actors shaping EU policies, including financial (structural funds, financial support, etc.). There is an assumption that discarding French ideas might hurt the national interests of small states because they will have to deal with France in the future on many policies and issues. Therefore, respect and consideration of its initiative is a sign of goodwill. Simultaneously, small states consider France a major EU military power that must be respected, and all options should be kept on the table.

Third, small EU states expect financial benefits from participating in developing the defence industry. The EU policies to reinvigorate the defence industry and military capabilities open opportunities for small states to reap the economic benefits in the defence sector. Such policies also open opportunities to network with dominant defence conglomerates and increase small states' strategic importance for EU members with powerful defence industries. Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Belgium are especially focused on such opportunities.

Fourth, strategic autonomy for some smaller states might be attractive because of problems in relations with other NATO member states, for example, Greece. Greece sees strategic autonomy as a way to defend its interests by consolidating cooperation within the EU if it has significant problems with fellow NATO member Turkey.

In most cases, small EU member states are willing to increase cooperation in defence matters, but cooperation should primarily focus on building defence capabilities. Cooperation in the defence industry is a welcomed prospect. Small EU states support policies aimed at increasing the capabilities of the European pillar of NATO, but NATO – i.e., the US, must remain the core security provider.

To sum up, autonomy from the US is incomprehensible for most small EU states. Moreover, EU member states' reactions to Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine (2022) would suggest that most EU member states prefer strengthening the Transatlantic bond rather than becoming autonomous. Simultaneously, small EU member states generally favour open strategic autonomy and the development of EU self-sufficiency in technologies, strategic goods, and energy while supporting a market-based approach with partners that do not create security issues.

Latvia's View on European Strategic Autonomy, *by Toms Rostoks*

Latvia's approach to the European strategic autonomy (ESA) has been at best cautious and sometimes outright suspicious and unenthusiastic. This is puzzling because Latvia's allies play a key role in ensuring its security. After all, Latvia is a small state with limited ability to defend itself against external military aggression. Since it shares an almost 250 km long border with Russia and a 160 km border with Belarus, Latvia has since the mid-1990s prioritized becoming part of Euro-Atlantic security organizations, such as NATO and the EU, which would protect it from Russia. Thus, it is somewhat surprising that Latvia has been hesitant regarding the ESA. This essay seeks to explain this puzzle by first looking at Latvia's security needs, and then to its response to the ESA and European defence integration efforts. The analysis below is largely based on interviews with foreign and defence officials and from the Latvian foreign minister's annual reports on foreign policy to Parliament.

Latvia's security needs

To understand the extent to which the EU defence integration can meet Latvia's security needs, one must look at what those needs are. For Latvia, there is no security without alliance membership. Latvia tried neutrality in the 1930s, but that strategy failed. Latvia's fate, alongside that of its Baltic neighbours, was sealed in August 1939 when Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia concluded the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. As the result, Latvia was incorporated into the Soviet Union against its will. The terrible consequences of not having powerful allies was a key lesson that Latvian policymakers took into consideration after regaining independence in 1991. The availability of powerful allies in the form of NATO largely determined Latvia's quest for the membership in the Alliance in the mid-1990s. That objective was achieved in 2004.

Although initially NATO membership was enough to ensure Latvia's security, Russia's greater assertiveness since 2007 has elevated the significance of defence planning and military capabilities in protecting Latvia against Russia's revisionist policies. While the combined military power of NATO member states exceeds that of Russia, military power is contextual, and Russia certainly has a military edge over NATO in the Baltic region. This did not matter as long as the relationship between Russia and NATO was largely cooperative, albeit difficult at times, but Russia's annexation of Crimea and excessive military involvement in the Donbas region fundamentally changed that relationship. NATO increasingly perceived its relationship with Russia in terms of the need to deter Russia from initiating a military conflict with a member state of the Alliance, and the Baltic states were particularly vulnerable in that regard because of their geographical proximity with Russia, their small militaries, and their lack of certain high-end capabilities such air-defence systems, coastal-defence systems and long-range artillery. The presence of large Russian-speaking communities in Estonia and Latvia further compounded the problem.

The solution to the problem of NATO's deterrence credibility problem in the Baltic states was partially solved in 2017 by deploying multinational battlegroups, which demonstrated alliance solidarity. The logic behind enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) deployments was that these military tripwires would be involved in any large-scale military conflict in the Baltic region from the very beginning, thus ensuring further conflict escalation. While Russia is well-positioned to gain ground in a military conflict initially, it would eventually lose in a major conventional conflict against NATO. The deployment of military tripwires was deemed the middle ground between unnecessarily provoking Russia by deploying a larger force while also signalling NATO's determination to defend the Baltic states against Russia. Although Russia was increasingly regarded as a revisionist power, its revisionism was seen as opportunistic and limited to windows of opportunity such as the political turmoil in the aftermath of the fall of Viktor Yanukovich's regime in Ukraine in February 2014. The image of Russia and its intentions was revised in the aftermath of its all-out attack on Ukraine in February 2022.

Russia's attack on Ukraine did not make much sense militarily, and most analysts found the brutality of its armed campaign repulsive. Although Russia might be preoccupied with Ukraine and thus might have little interest in challenging NATO militarily, NATO's deterrence posture in the Baltic can no longer assume that a severely weakened Russia would have little interest in threatening Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Hence it was decided during the NATO Madrid summit in June 2022 that the battalion-sized units in the Baltic states would become multinational brigades.

As the Baltic states' security needs have gradually increased over time, their national military contributions have increased accordingly. At the time of Russia's annexation of Crimea, Estonia was already spending 2 per cent of GDP on defence, while Latvia's and Lithuania's contributions were lagging. Since then, Lithuania and Latvia have rapidly increased military spending. Baltic states' military spending is well above the 2 percent threshold, and the three states have increased readiness of their armed forces and filled gaps in the military capabilities which they formerly lacked. Much remains to be done in this regard because military procurement takes time, and certain high-end military systems might be beyond what the Baltic states could realistically afford. Baltic states have also tried to increase the military reserve, that is, the total number of individuals who have undergone military training. Lithuania reintroduced conscription in 2015, and Latvia is slated to follow suit in 2023.

To conclude, the security of the Baltic states has primarily been addressed via measures taken by NATO member states collectively, and the Baltic states themselves individually. For the Baltic states, the core element of security is military, and this is where the EU did not have much to offer. Facing an existential threat, being preoccupied with improving its military, and ensuring the presence of NATO allies on its territory meant that Latvia placed a particular emphasis on NATO. The ESA barely figured in Latvia's security calculations.

Latvia's response to the ESA

Latvia's security needs were primarily addressed by NATO, but what has been Latvia's approach to the ESA? In short, Latvia's position on the ESA has been cautious, and there are four reasons for that. First, a key concern for Latvia has been that the ESA would undermine US involvement in European security. True European strategic autonomy would, in fact, require a lesser US involvement in European security because it would imply that the EU can take care of its own security and become an actor on global stage. This has been regarded as a potentially dangerous idea by Latvian policymakers because the US has been a key pillar of its national security. After all, the US played a key role in the withdrawal of Russia's troops from Latvia in early 1990s. The US signed the Baltic Charter with the Baltic states in 1998, after Latvia and Lithuania were not invited to start accession negotiations with the EU. US support has been critically important to ensuring a consensus within NATO for the Baltic states' membership in the Alliance. Moreover, US military power is the key component of NATO's deterrence posture in the Baltic region, even though the US has taken the back seat when it comes to NATO eFP battlegroups. US troops are present in the Baltic states, and active US participation is a prerequisite to organizing allied cooperation. Thus, any indication that the EU defence integration efforts would undermine US contributions to European security would be met with skepticism in Latvia.

Second, EU member states simply do not have the military capabilities to meet the security needs of the Baltic states. Latvian policymakers understand that a more militarily capable EU is in their best interest, but the problem is that EU states have not been serious about their militaries after the end of the Cold War. Their militaries are depleted, and there is a shortage of personnel and military equipment that would be needed for high intensity warfighting, which incidentally is the type of war that Russia is waging in Ukraine. Recent defence spending increases in EU/NATO member states are regarded as a welcome development in Riga, but it will take decades and a much higher level of sustained defence

expenditure for the EU to emerge as a global actor with the ability to fight a major military conflict with a peer or a near-peer competitor. If the US disengaged from European security before the EU emerged as a capable military actor, it would considerably decrease Latvia's security. The EU's defence integration ambitions for the foreseeable future seem to be limited to crisis management operations. There is no question that the EU needs to have the ability to do crisis management operations, but this does not really contribute to Latvia's security needs.

Third, it is one thing to have military capabilities (although the EU's capabilities for high intensity warfighting are limited) and another to have the political will to use them. The foundations of the EU's lack of political will are twofold. One part of the problem is that the member states' security concerns are too different, and it would be hard to find a consensus among the member states to use military force. The other part of the problem is more delicate. Over the years, Russia has developed a working partnership with many political actors in EU member states. Russia has sought influence by rewarding its partners. Above all, it has tried to ensure that its interests would be respected and that its partners would concur with its worldview that great powers should have separate spheres of influence. In other words, great powers (that are sovereign) should be able to determine the fate of smaller powers (that are not sovereign). Although Russia has not fully succeeded in convincing its western partners that this is how the world should work, it has not fully failed either. Also, Russia has tried to create interdependencies with EU member states that would considerably limit the freedom of maneuver of Russia's western partners, whilst not limiting Russia's room for maneuver. Energy has been the key instrument of Russia's influence in the EU, but it has not been the only one. Could Latvia fully trust its EU allies that it will enjoy full support of EU member states in a potential case of a military conflict with Russia? Such support could not be taken for granted in the absence of US and UK involvement.

Finally, Latvia is a small state with a small military. Thus, it has limited resources that it can allocate to EU military integration projects. Latvia's defence budget has more than doubled since 2015, but the number of military personnel has only increased slightly. The intensity of military exercises have also grown considerably. This means that Latvia would find it problematic to allocate sufficient resources to fully participate in EU defence integration efforts because of limited financial means and the availability of military personnel. In fact, Latvia would be hard-pressed to participate in EU defence integration because everyone else is involved, and a certain degree of influence on collective decisions and actions is only possible if you show up well-prepared. As a result, Latvia has delegated its military personnel to EU military institutions; and while it participates in few PESCO projects, the bulk of Latvia's effort is aimed towards strengthening its military and strengthening NATO efforts to deter Russia in the Baltic region.

Conclusion

So where does Latvia stand on the ESA? Latvia prioritizes its NATO membership when it comes to military security, but what does that mean for its involvement with the ESA? Overall, Latvia's approach to the ESA has been cautious because it has concerns that European defence integration might reduce the role of the US in European security. Also, it is possible that either the ambition would outstrip reality in Europe's effort to become a global actor or its defence integration would primarily aim at policies and activities with little potential contribute to Latvia's security in a positive way. However, in the long run, Latvian policymakers recognize that further European defence integration and greater emphasis on having the practical ability to pursue military objectives without US involvement is necessary.

Russian War Against Ukraine: Estonian Fears, Hopes and Efforts, *by Viljar Veebel*

Introduction

To choose an effective strategy to stop Putin and Russia's aggressive ambitions in Ukraine and in wider Eastern Europe, European political and military leaders need to understand Russia's modus operandi and strategic logic. In February 2022, European leaders were challenged with a trilemma when choosing a strategy to stop Putin's aggressive ambitions. The first option was to employ a rational choice approach, which relies on the idea that even the Russian leadership makes calculated, rational decisions for their success and survival.[15] According to this model, we should keep following credible deterrence logic and continually increase the pain on Russia to persuade the Russian political elite to comply with Western rules.[16] The second option was to consider President Putin (along with his closer comrades) as having a medical or psychological condition that drives him into decisive but irrational decisions, and look for solutions from the tool-box of psychologists and psychiatrists. The third option was to treat President Putin as a rational person who is purposely behaving like the Russian version of a "mad man" to gain strategic advantage against rational European powers by discouraging them from challenging him or testing his limits. As the continuing war brings huge human casualties and threatens the world with many related problems, it would be a rational choice for the EU leaders to try to end the conflict sooner rather than later.

Estonia and the War in Ukraine

Before the Russian attack against Ukraine on 24th February 2022, it was considered that a Russian-initiated imperial war could expand from Ukraine to Moldova or even involve Belarus, but that it would not reach NATO territory. However, during the conflict this position has changed based on Russian aggressive rhetoric, and now it is believed that Putin could target NATO territory knowingly (however not by nuclear assets). The current Estonian prediction is that if Russia is not defeated in Ukraine, an attack against the Baltic States will follow in upcoming years. Accordingly, Estonia is preparing for a possible full-scale conventional conflict with Russia. Its current deterrence level is not seen as enough against current Russian ambitions. In parallel, Estonia is supporting Ukraine as much as possible by hoping that Russian losses there will at least postpone if not cancel Russian military plans against the Baltic States. The Russian war against Ukraine is not expected to end before the close of 2022, and it may well last to the end of 2023. Estonian predictions on this question are mostly following US and UK official sources. The main question for Estonia in September 2022 is, if and when after the end of war in Ukraine, Russia might be ready and motivated to challenge NATO in Baltic states.

The best possible outcome in the current situation from the Estonian perspective is that war will cause regime change in Russia and bring democratic forces to power. Moreover, the military and economic weakening of Russia might be sufficient to secure the Baltic states for up to 3-5 years. The impact of economic sanctions is there, but it is slow, and it only begins to have a visible effect on Putin's popularity towards the end of 2022.

Meanwhile, Estonia is doing as much as it can in terms of delivering military equipment, medical aid, and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. Different types of arms have been sent to Ukraine, with 155mm howitzers and Javelin anti-tank systems being the biggest part of the package. Estonia is also encouraging other states to give as many weapons as possible to Ukraine as this is seen as the only way to keep Ukraine successful in their fight against Russia.

[15] Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, "Russian Strategic Deterrence," *Survival* 58, no. 4 (2016): 7–26.
[16] Viljar Veebel, "Russia and Western concepts of deterrence, normative power, and sanctions", *Comparative Strategy* 40, no. 3 (2021): 268−284.

Views on the future European relationship with Russia differ widely between both ethnic groups and political parties. The current governmental coalition and most Estonian speakers would prefer that Russia lose the war in Ukraine, and this combined with sanctions would cause regime change in the Kremlin. However, what obligations should or could be imposed on a new and hopefully liberal Russian government. Should it take the blame and be liable for reparations, or should the West accept that stable democratic change is more important?

From the Estonian perspective, there is hardly any unity among the EU member states and the UK. In practical terms, the UK´s position is seen most sympathetically and is followed by the Estonian governmental coalition. Together with the U.S., the UK has dedicated itself to the attrition and bankrupting of Russia. Its difference from the U.S. lies in its public signalling that the UK is ready to enter the war should the Kremlin start winning in Ukraine. The UK has likewise been ready to call the bluff of Putin's tactical nuclear threats. In the end, the UK has for now been the ultimate backer keeping Ukraine in the game.

The competing approach of France, Germany, Italy, and Spain receives criticism both from the media and the governmental coalition. France and Germany are perceived to be ready to give up their values and principles in exchange for the opposing party's cooperation. France's president Macron appears to be following Kaplan's balance of powers theory, which argues that in spite of the behaviour of an actor, no one should be thrown out of a security system; instead, everyone within the system needs to find a role and forgiveness. Germany has largely followed the French line in aiming at cooperation, but due to historical and economic reasons it has assumed an even more humiliating role than France.

Aside from big EU member states, Poland has suffered the brunt of the side-effects of the on-going war in Ukraine (primarily related to migration). By ensuring that Ukraine has no ultimate shortage of tanks, howitzers and ammunition, Poland has been doing its fair share to undermine Putin's expectations for a quick and decisive victory. In this way, Poland has been successful in creating hesitation in the Kremlin.

Proposals and suggestions

It is abundantly clear that the measures taken so far by Western allies have proven ineffective in achieving the desired effect of deterring Russia's aggressive actions in Ukraine. And, as to the future dynamic, there is a hope in the Kremlin that the sanctions might end one day. Also, the hesitation in strengthening the response and solidarity by some larger EU member states would be interpreted by the Russian political elite as a strategic victory over the West and would be exploited locally in a "rally-around-the flag" process to consolidate support for the regime of President Putin. Even when there is Western unity in many aspects in terms of supporting Ukraine, Russia seems to believe that the West is fragile and can be broken once Ukraine loses its willingness to fight. Hence, it would appear that Russia will not change its behaviour should the West continue to use its existing "toolbox" in the current way.

For the European countries, the most desirable strategic outcome has been keeping Ukraine outside of Russia's direct or indirect control and, if possible, weakening Russia to the degree where its potential to cause serious instability and harm to regional security is neutralized during the coming years. The latter goal of the West can be seen as emerging out of the situation caused by the bravery of the Ukrainians and from the military failure of Russians to execute their plan. Due to these two factors, the EU and NATO have an opportunity to push Putin to a slow but steady attrition of Russia by losses and costs already incurred, and the systematic support and resupply of Ukraine. This strategy presumes donations to Ukraine that will help it stay alive but not allow it to achieve a quick and decisive victory. On the other hand, the main risk with active and successful Western engagement would be that Putin,

feeling trapped, might withdraw too early for attrition or, even worse, use nuclear weapons and thus step over a line that has not been crossed since the Second World War.[17]

In practice, the West (and the EU in particular) has not taken the initiative in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. This concerns both the evaluation of the conflict and the measures implemented. Instead of asking how to resolve the current conflict, the focus of the West has been on the question of why things are as they are and how to reduce risks for their own communities[18].

[17] Keir Giles "Putin need a drawn-our war, the West's timidity gives him one", (2022). *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/jun/28/putin-ar-the-west-zelenskiy-ukraine-russia

[18] Viljar Veebel, Raul Markus. "European Normative Power during Ukrainian-Russian Conflict. *Baltic Journal of Law & Politics* 11, no. 1 (2018): 1−20

Lithuania's Approach to European Strategic Autonomy and Russia's War Against Ukraine,

by Ieva Karpavičiūtė

Russia's war against Ukraine was a real wake-up call for the EU. The EU states demonstrated cohesion and solidarity; mobilized military support for Ukraine; and launched new cooperation initiatives in areas of industry and procurement. The war in Europe tested the EU and proved that EU strategic autonomy is adaptable and flexible enough even in times of crisis or conflict. Indeed, the EU took very practical measures in support of Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and safety of the civilian population. Russia's war against Ukraine, along with implications on regional security, energy prices and resources, and migration, has a direct impact on the EU's security and defence. Russia's aggression encouraged speeding up the development of defence procurement, industry, and new technologies. Also, the EU recognised the need to restore and replenish the resources that were provided as assistance to Ukraine against the backdrop of Russia's war.

When it comes to Lithuania's approach towards the European strategic autonomy, Lithuania attempts to strike a balance between a normative and national interest driven security and foreign policy. Similarly, Lithuania's approach towards the EU Common Security and Defence Policy and its perception of the strategic autonomy concept reflects the same goal. Lithuania and the other Baltic States positively view attempts to strengthen the EU military, capabilities, and the security dimension; however, these countries consistently link their security to a strong Transatlantic bond. These are the pivotal principles that provide the foundation for Lithuania's attitude toward strategic autonomy in the defence and security domain.

Lithuania takes a strong stand regarding Russia's war against Ukraine, and also regarding China's growing power and assertive behaviour in the economic and cyber spheres, and also in relation to new disruptive technologies. In Lithuania's view, the important factor is that the EU should acknowledge Russia as posing a long-term threat to European security and at the same time recognise the Transatlantic link along with the US security assurances as most critical for European security.

From its inception, a concept of strategic autonomy was a rather vague idea, which had to be filled with the policy content, be it practical projects, institutional arrangements, or broader normative adaptation of the EU. Indeed, strategic autonomy was never a static concept. Its evolution marks a reactive adaptation to a broad range of internal and external challenges and reflects the consensus which merges different national interests of the EU states. It combines policy issues, ranging from security and defence to a broad spectrum of policy domains such as trade, climate, innovation, resilience, technology, and healthcare. The analysis of Lithuania's national position on strategic autonomy reflects and contributes to studies on a broader Lithuanian approach towards security and defence. It indicates the consistency of national policies regarding regional security and helps to evaluate the interconnections between national and regional levels of security.

Lithuania acknowledges the European strategic autonomy's practical contribution to EU autonomy from negative rival states impact. Lithuania highlights strategic responsibility to prevent the EU from harmful technological and industrial influences stemming from the rival states, including the autonomy related to energy policy and protection of supply chains. It also includes strategic responsibility vis-à-vis Transatlantic and eastern European partners. European strategic autonomy also has a potential to contribute to improvement of the defence capabilities of the EU states, to enhance investment in defence and minimize the negative impacts of strategic dependencies.

It is evident that Russia's war against Ukraine is testing a lot of regional and national material and normative systems, and that European strategic autonomy is no exception. How the EU will retain its respectability and cohesion will determine the future direction of strategic autonomy. Without any doubt, this war will have a strong and direct impact on the future of the EU security and defence policy.

The EU is moving towards greater responsibility in filling the defence expenditure, defence industrial and capability gaps. It might encourage CSDP to move towards a better, streamlined, more ambitious and less fragmented policy.

Lithuania supports the Eastern Partnership necessary to ensure sustainable security in the region. In fact, Lithuania looks quite pragmatically toward improving regional security by engaging in particular projects without limiting NATO collective defence. Lithuania recognizes that EU Member States must first increase defence spending and invest in capabilities. This will allow the EU to act when needed and strengthen the EU's position as a reliable NATO and transatlantic partner.

The EU imposed sanctions on Russia and Belarus, demonstrated the EU's commitment to help Ukraine in its self-defence against Russia, and also showed the usefulness of the European Peace Facility (EPF). EPF assistance, in the context of Russia's war against Ukraine and the deteriorating security environment, was turned into a meaningful multinational assistance framework for Ukraine. The first military assistance package of 500 million Euro was approved at the end of February 2022; it was followed by another four subsequent packages and the total support for the time-being constitutes around 2,5 billion Euro to support EU member states' supply of equipment to Ukraine and to support the capabilities and resilience of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Lithuania consistently supported Ukraine and aimed to ensure the continuity of the EU support to Ukraine.

Lithuania's position on strategic autonomy is two-fold. On the one hand, when it comes to abroad set of "soft" security domains such as cyber, civil technologies, innovation, healthcare, resilience, or response to rivalry states such as Russia or China, Lithuania looks at strategic autonomy pragmatically and supports EU independence in the aforementioned areas and relations. On the other hand, Lithuania subscribes to a more open approach when it comes to the Transatlantic dimension and Eastern Partnerships, highlighting the need to include the US in EU security and defence-related initiatives, thus underscoring that the EU's defence and capabilities must be developed and synchronised with NATO.

Lithuania prioritizes the PESCO military mobility projects and strongly supports the Eastern Partnership-related defence projects and missions. However, the most problematic are fragmentation and proliferation of the EU defence initiatives and the liquidity of the very concept of strategic autonomy. The concept is changing more frequently than the EU member states are willing to make decisions to adapt and allocate sufficient resources that can contribute to stronger EU defence capabilities.

Belgium and European Strategic Autonomy: A Multi-balanced Political-Military Approach

by Alain De Neve

When I was invited to write a contribution about Belgium's stance toward European strategic autonomy, few people would have imagined that the growing tensions between Russia and Ukraine would result in a ground invasion of the Ukrainian territory. I can't help but think that our leaders have not yet fully grasped what this event means for the future of European security. Of course, we can have never-ending debates about the deep, historical sources of this conflict, but the fact remains that we have witnessed, for the first time since the Second World War, a deliberate attack against a European state by another state. As of February 24, 2022, everything that until then was either pure political intention or conceptual debate suddenly collided with strategic reality. History issued an unprecedented "wake-up call" for Europe. And such a concept as European strategic autonomy is now approached from a completely different angle.

For Belgium, the question of European strategic autonomy stems from the recognition of an obvious fact: the country does not have sufficient political, economic, and military support to operate alone on the international scene. However, the country has never been comfortable with the concept of "strategic autonomy" as its neighbours (Germany, France, or the United Kingdom) have conceived it. I mean: a concept aimed at providing the nation with a freedom of action against its adversaries or opponents. Moreover, at the domestic level, the permanent search for balanced political solutions and compromises in order to manage cross-cutting cleavages, even as foreign policy is concerned, has often constituted an obstacle to the expression of a coherent policy. Last but not least, given the country's institutional instability – Belgium is a country where federalism is, above all, a process of detachment – the concept of "strategic autonomy" has never had a real echo among the country's political leadership.

For all these reasons, according to Belgium, strategic autonomy has to be developed in a multilateral – and very balanced – approach. In Belgium's view, a strong link exists between strategic autonomy, multilateralism, and interdependence. This is truly a very structural element of Belgian foreign policy that should not be neglected; the temptation toward multilateralism does not only find its source in an idealistic aspiration but also in a realistic approach to international relations that stems from the geopolitical context in which the country had to evolve throughout its history.

Yet historically, and somewhat paradoxically, Belgium has been reluctant toward the idea that a supranational entity in charge of a collective security mission could guarantee the defence of the country against potential aggressors. It was not until the second half of the 20th century that a certain change in Belgium's foreign policy took place. In practice, Belgium's foreign policy in terms of security and defence has kept a delicate balance between transatlantic loyalty and the European ideal. If one looks closely at Belgium on the international scene, its situation has been more challenging than it seems.

However, this does not mean that Belgium has always delivered the required efforts to favour the emergence of a European strategic autonomy. Since the Cold War, the prospect of the emergence of a European defence based on ever more advanced integration of military capabilities has long been considered as a solution for the country to reduce its defence expenditures. It is only recently that the political elites realized that although it is time to spend better in defence, it is also mandatory to spend more.

How can we explain that Belgium invests so little in its defence and security policy while strongly supporting multilateral defence cooperation? Belgium's behaviour is anything but irrational. Small states have good reasons to support international security organizations: their participation within multilateral security regimes allows them to significantly increase their security at a relatively low cost. However, they have little incentive to shoulder an equal share of the burden within these organizations

and prefer to benefit from the efforts of larger partners. Small states adopting such behaviour regimes are often labelled "free riders". From Belgium's point of view, weak investments in defence budgets can be compensated through contributions to crisis management operations: a domain where the country is clearly a more reliable partner.

However, things are about to change. In its general policy note of 4 November 2020, the Minister of Defence mentions that it will favour ESA. Moreover, the general policy note suggests that "Belgium will pursue and strengthen its commitment to an effective European defence. Europe's strategic autonomy requires a military intervention capability and a solid industrial base. In this context, [the Ministry of Defence] will continue to invest in [order to solve] European capability gaps and will continue to embed its capabilities with privileged European partners."[19] This will must be achieved through concrete decisions. At a budgetary level, the Strategic Vision for Defence foresees, in 2030, a budgetary trajectory that reflects a certain alignment with the average defence expenditure of the non-nuclear European member states of NATO. Belgian defence efforts should reach 1.24% of GDP by 2024. (This percentage is expected to rise to 1.30% of GDP by 2030). However, for diverse reasons, many uncertainties weigh on the feasibility of this objective. On the "collaborative" side, Belgium has been implicated in many cooperation frameworks (with the Dutch Navy but also with the French Naval Group, within the EU or NATO). On the industrial front, Belgium is trying to catch up in the defence sector. The recently adopted STAR plan is intended to ensure better coordination between the Ministry of Defence, the armed forces, academic centres of excellence and the country's leading-edge industries. Regarding immediate military capabilities, the war in Ukraine has confirmed Belgium's choice in favour of the acquisition of F35s to replace its aging F16s. Such a decision nevertheless raises doubts about the future of Belgium's involvement in European capacity development projects at a time when events in eastern Europe call for urgent decisions.

European defence cooperation is envisaged to contribute to NATO commitment. This is also true for Belgium. NATO is and will remain the cornerstone of European security, according to Belgium.

To conclude, Belgium's stance towards European strategic autonomy has long depended on multiple factors that were not only determined by international relations or world systemic imperatives. Domestic politics have repeatedly influenced decisive choices regarding military issues. Notwithstanding these considerations, Belgium has traditionally figured as one of the most resolute advocates of European cooperation in the field of defence. Yet, such a "European activism" sometimes suffers from realpolitik, especially regarding political choices that must be made about critical capabilities. Today, Russian aggression against Ukraine has led Belgium to fundamentally revise its approach to European defence. The only question that needs to be asked is whether this awakening is too late.

[19] Note de politique générale – Affaires étrangères, Affaires européennes et Commerce extérieur [General Policy Note–Foreign Affairs, European Affairs and Foreign Trade]. (2020, November 6). Brussels: Chambre des Représentants de Belgique. Retrieved from https://www.sophiewilmes.be/expose-introductif-de-politiqueetrangere-affaires-europeennes-et-commerce-exterieur/.

Part 3 – The Sanctions Regime: Assessing the Effectiveness

Introduction, *by Joan DeBardeleben*

The unprecedented sanctions regime that has been implemented by the European Union, the United States, Canada, and other partner countries since 2022 has thus failed to achieve the objective of halting Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine. This section includes two pieces that clarify reasons for this, by assessing the current sanctions against Russia in a comparative perspective and by examining the nature of the sanctions and some of the difficulties involved with maintaining unity around their implementation.

Even if the sanctions have not yet achieved the goals intended, they have had an impact on Russia. However, to a significant extent the Russian economy has shown a short-term capacity to adapt to the hardships created by the sanctions. This ability to adapt has been reinforced by the fact that Western countries had already implemented a set of more moderate sanctions after Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea. Russia's ability to adapt gradually to the Western sanctions, even if they were dramatically intensified in 2022, has likely weakened their immediate economic impact. Furthermore, the manner in which sanctions were scaled up over time may have allowed the Russian leadership to better manage public expectations. Whether sanctions will, over time, make it more likely that significant segments of the Russian population will change their attitude toward the war against Ukraine remains unclear. So far there is also little evidence that the sanctions targeted at particular members of the elite have resulted in a leadership split or will result in leadership change. However, this does not mean that this will not occur. What does seem clear is that this process will take some time.

Nonetheless, the impact of sanctions on the Russian economy has been significant, reinforced by the exit of several Western firms from the Russia market. Imports from the West have declined, and this has directly affected Russian consumers and businesses, including military production. On the other hand, import substitution, which began already after implementation of the first sanctions in 2014, has helped Russia to address some of the gaps resulting from import declines. The ruble has also recovered and to some extent Russia has been able to find new markets for some of its exports, including efforts to enhance energy exports to China. Nonetheless the sanctions have reduced the ability of Russia to replace depleted military equipment reserves.

EU unity in support of the sanctions regime against Russia has been impressive. However, it may become increasingly difficult to maintain this unity as the domestic costs increase in some EU member states. This makes it particularly important for political leaders to continue to explain to the public the reason for the sacrifices. There is no doubt that the EU has achieved much more with the sanctions regime than could have been achieved had these decisions been left to individual member states. Those member states that have been more reluctant to take strong action have been pulled along by the collective will of the EU, while those more committed to strong action have been able to supplement the sanctions with additional means of support to Ukraine. Transatlantic cooperation, in which Canada has also played an active role, has also reinforced the potential longer-term efficacy of sanctions.

The Theory and Empirics of Sanctions Regimes: Applications to the Case of Russia,

by Dane Rowlands

There has been a lot of discussion, and sometimes confusion, about the use of sanctions against Russia as a consequence of its invasion of Ukraine. Economic sanctions have been an instrument of foreign policy for centuries, and disrupting an enemy's international commerce is a common practice during wartime. After the First World War, the threat of sanctions imposed by the League of Nations was supposed to deter countries from using military power against one another; it did not work then, and clearly has not worked now. It is useful to consider why the threat of sanctions did not deter Russia, why they have not yet brought an end to the horrific violence in Ukraine, and what their current application means for the future.

To work, any deterrence must be credible (the target must know it will be punished in response to a transgression) and effective (the target must assess the punishment as being worse than any gain from the transgression). In this case it is likely that Russia knew it would face some form of sanctions, but probably calculated that they would not be extensive, which was their experience after annexing Crimea and its "proxy invasion" of Eastern Ukraine. The U.S., and to a lesser degree Europe, did clearly signal that extensive economic sanctions would be imposed if Russia carried through with its threat of invasion, but the details were vague. The damage of sanctions depends critically on their form, how many countries implement (or avoid implementing) them, and the dependence of the target country on international commercial relations. In addition, sanctions are a two-edged sword in that they damage the economies of both the target and the countries that impose them. The Russian government may well have calculated that many important countries (China, India) would not join in the sanctions, and that European dependence on Russian hydrocarbons would dilute the extent of the economic punishment. A quick win in Ukraine may well have discouraged Russia's opponents from implementing severe and enduring sanctions, discounting their expected impact even further. The failure to deter Russia does not mean that sanctions, or their logic, are faulty. It just means that in this instance the threat was, correctly or not, deemed insufficient.

The list of general economic sanctions against Russia, and those targeting specific individuals, has been extensive. Why then have they not brought the Russian economy to its knees and stopped the war? Economic sanctions work according to a cycle. The initial impact is often muted, as the target country uses up inventories and financial reserves to avoid disruption. As these disappear, and substitute sources become harder to find, firms and consumers are forced to adjust their behaviour and the pain increases. While adaptation can take some time, eventually domestic producers can shift activity to fill in some of the space left by foreign suppliers, leading to a respite. However, if the target economy is dependent on key foreign inputs that are harder to replace, there may well be further economic decline as missing parts or other production inputs become scarce. Finally, if sanctions are imposed for an extended period (such as in the case of Iran) the economy adjusts further to compensate for the loss of traditional suppliers and markets, reducing the effectiveness of the punishment. Russia is probably somewhere in the middle of this cycle, running out of some key inputs and seeking alternatives. Calculating these costs ex ante, though, is incredibly challenging, as it entails knowing the level of inventories, the dependence on key inputs, and the availability of substitutes.

The financial aspect of the sanctions caused considerable confusion in so far as the initial collapse of the Russian currency was eventually reversed, despite the lack of access to its foreign reserves. Part of the reversal was due to capital controls that limited the amount of foreign currency Russians could buy with their roubles. Ultimately, however, Russia was in an advantageous position of having a large current account surplus due to a high volume of hydrocarbon exports that were only modestly affected

by sanctions. As prices for this commodity increased, and as imports of foreign goods declined under sanctions, Russia's external position remained strong, as has its hydrocarbon-based government budget. If the volume of exports collapses more quickly than the price rises, Russia's financial situation will soon deteriorate again.

One of the most comprehensive assessments of sanctions during the Cold War period[20] identified nine key lessons, almost all of which point to the likely failure of sanctions to achieve an end to the Ukraine conflict (at least on their own). Sanctions rarely succeed when used to restrain military operations by the target, when many key states do not participate in the sanctions, when the target country is strong, when the target is already on unfriendly terms, when imposed incrementally, and when the costs are high for the implementing states. While these lessons suggest that sanctions will likely be ineffective on their own in this instance, that does not mean that they are not necessary, and in conjunction with military setbacks in Ukraine could help tip the balance against Russia.

The current tragedy also highlights serious deficiencies in the international system, such as it is. One of the key problems with economic sanctions as a tool has been the ad hoc nature of sanctions regimes, making it difficult to predict which countries will participate, how extensive the sanctions will be, and how long they will be maintained. As Ukraine's allies have attempted to ratchet up the economic pressure on the Putin regime, sanctions have broken new, and potentially troubling ground. Seizing sovereign assets, or those of foreign citizens, is understandably popular in states that impose sanctions, but may need to be more clearly defined and circumscribed by courts. More problematic, however, is whether the imposition of sanctions by large groups of countries on primary targets (and possibly secondary states that refuse to participate) will hasten the fracturing of the global economy and community into adversarial blocs.

Until recently, and due to humanitarian concerns, broad-based economic sanctions were eschewed in favour of targeted ones. However, not all of the catastrophic effects of war are due to sanctions. The threat of an imminent global food crisis caused by the invasion of Ukraine is a reminder of how tragic the consequences of war can be for the countries involved, as well as for non-participants, and especially for the poor. There is no upside to the invasion of Ukraine, but it would be beneficial to learn from its horrors to reconsider the place sanctions should have in the international system, the rules that govern their use, and how to protect vulnerable people from the violence and disruption of war.

[20] See Hufbauer, G. C., Schott, J. J., & Elliott, K. A. (1990). Economic sanctions reconsidered: History and current policy (Vol. 1). Peterson Institute.

EU Sanctions Regime: The Role of the Member States, *by Crina Viju-Miljusevic*

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led to a fast response from the EU and its member states, which translated first and foremost into the imposition of sanctions (or "restrictive measures", as they are officially named in the EU) on Russia and Belarus. The sanctions on Russia added to the already existing sanctions regime in place since 2014 as a result of the illegal Russian annexation of Crimea. The new package of sanctions on Russia have been described by EU leaders and policymakers as "without precedent." Thus, the speed and extensive nature of the EU sanctions regime came to many as a surprise given the EU's system of governance, where national and EU policy towards Russia coexists, and considering the important economic interdependence between the EU and Russia.

Sanctions have become one of the core instruments of the EU's foreign policy and their use has increased by more than 3 times in the past 30 years (Giumelli et. al., 2020). The EU can impose sanctions in three main ways: multilaterally, in which sanctions imposed by the UN are transposed in EU law (9 regimes as of 2021); autonomously and supplementary to UN sanctions (10 regimes as of 2021); and autonomously outside the UN framework (25 regimes).

The development of the EU's sanctions regime (autonomous outside the UN framework) is a complex process which involves several actors. The proposal of new restrictive measures comes from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP). However, the decision to impose, amend, lift, or renew sanctions is taken by the Council of the European Union once examination by various Council working groups is finalized. The Council makes decisions regarding sanctions based on unanimity voting; thus, all EU member states' foreign ministers need to vote for the adoption of the sanctions regime. EU member states are also in charge of the implementation of sanctions. The European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission assist the Council in the preparation of the legal texts, and they also support member states in the implementation of sanctions. The European Parliament has no formal role in adopting sanctions, and can, at best, use its political influence to push for tougher measures. Once enacted, sanctions are subject to periodic renewal, which must be agreed to unanimously by the Council of the European Union. Thus, as each member state enjoys veto power, a sanctions regime can be discontinued on account of a single negative vote. However, in the past few years, the European Council has taken a much more important role in the imposition of EU sanctions and the sanctions regimes on Russia (both in 2014 and 2022) were one of the very first examples where the EU Heads of State and Government decided that sanctions must be imposed against third actors, with the strong expectation that other EU institutions, notably the Council of the EU and the European Commission, follow their guidance and draft the necessary legal acts (Szép, 2020).

Thus, the EU sanctions' decision-making process is complex, while decisions can be delayed due to necessary negotiations between member states. The imposition of a sanctions regime is the result of a coherent and coordinated decision of all 27 EU member states.

The Russian annexation of Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine in 2014 led to the imposition of a set of sanctions which, despite the diverse levels of support from the EU member states, were consistently renewed. Three different regimes were put in place from February 2014 to 2022. The sanctions imposed after the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 had important economic impacts. The termination of the sanctions was decided only in 2015 and it was tied to the implementation of the Minsk Agreement II adopted between Ukraine and Russia. As a response, Russia imposed countersanctions which included a ban on EU food imports. The strong supporters of sanctions among the EU member states included the Baltic states, Poland, the Nordic countries, Romania, and the UK (Dobbs, 2017), while at the opposing end we found Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Slovenia, Portugal, Spain, Hungary, and Austria (Webber, 2019). A middle position was taken by France and

Germany originally. Leaders of certain EU member states voiced scepticism about the effectiveness of sanctions and thus their continuation (Giumelli, 2017). Some of the EU member states continued their partnership with Russia despite the sanctions regime, such as by allowing Russian naval ships to use their ports (Cyprus), signing a gas pipeline deal with Russia (Greece), signing a loan deal which made Russia the only supplier of nuclear fuel (Hungary), and using the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline infrastructure (Germany).

The economic impacts of the sanctions and countersanctions were negative for the EU as a whole. However various evaluations have shown that the impacts on EU member states were mixed. For example, Giumelli (2017) shows that Germany, Italy, Finland, and Hungary were hit hard by sanctions, while Luxembourg, Greece and Sweden did not suffer from the sanctions. However, based on these results, trade, and more generally, the economic relations, cannot explain on their own the national choices regarding Russia, but they indicate the importance of bilateral relationships and the economic benefits which are at stake during political controversies. For example, Germany has been a supporter of sanctions, but one of the hardest hit economies by the sanctions, while Greece is at the opposing end of the spectrum. Thus, how can we explain the continuous consensus on sanctions since 2014? Some possible explanations are the following:

- The severity of the Russian threat. This enabled the EU to come together, especially with a sudden change in the German foreign policy towards Russia.
- Leadership and support by the three most powerful member states (Germany, France, and the UK) plus an alliance of front-line states (Poland, Baltic states, and Sweden).
- Slight alteration of the decision-making process with a direct mandate from the European Council, rather than various working groups of the Council of the EU. The renewal process remained with the European Council rather than the Council of the EU, which mandated RELEX (Council Working Party on External Relations) to prepare the necessary legal acts.
- Domestic politics: the existence of a domestic group that favours sanctions in dovish member states and one that opposes sanctions in hawkish member states (Portela et al., 2020).
- Use of usual techniques for consensus-building: providing side-payments and logrolls to win over member states opposing the sanctions (e.g., Greece bailout funds, Cyprus banking support; the European Commission implemented a series of emergency measures to deal with the impacts of Russian countersanctions such as aid packages, buying of certain agricultural products from the EU market, redirecting trade and investment by creating new market opportunities in third parties).

For the European Union, the question of its internal cohesion will be essential in the coming years. Since the Russian recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk's independence on February 21, 2022, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the EU has imposed a series of new sanctions on Russia and Belarus in addition to existing measures. In June 2022, the sixth package of sanctions on Russia and Belarus was adopted, which includes, among other measures, an import ban on all Russian seaborne crude oil and petroleum products, which will be applied gradually, within six months for crude oil and within 8 months for other refined petroleum products. Given that 27% of European crude oil was imported from Russia prior to the war, the new sanctions will have important effects on the EU's economy. However, Germany, the Netherlands and Poland were the EU's largest importers of Russian oil by volume in 2021, while 7 EU member states rely on Russia for more than half of their oil imports. While Germany and Poland supported the decision to ban all imports of oil, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic raised concerns about such a ban due to their dependence on oil delivered through pipelines. Thus, the final decision included only seaborne oil which means that the

three countries will be temporarily exempted. Additionally, Bulgaria and Croatia obtained temporary derogations until the end of 2024 and the end of 2023 respectively.

Discussions about a seventh package of sanctions have started in light of the Russian annexation referendums in four Ukrainian regions. The proposal of imposing further sanctions on energy (fossil fuel and nuclear) is not accepted by the dovish member states. The political disagreements on this topic are deepening. Lessons can be learned from the previous sanctions regime: there is growing support for nationalist and Eurosceptical platforms in some of the EU founding member states (such as Italy, given the elections results of September 25, 2022) and in most of the dovish member states. For example, on September 23, Hungary's governing party, Fidesz, announced that it plans to call for a "national consultation" on energy sanctions that were imposed by the "Brussels' elite" and which "destroy Europe's economy" (Euronews, 2022). Additionally, national polls on various topics related to the war in Ukraine conducted by Eurobarometer show that in April 2022, more than 50% of the population of Slovakia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Bulgaria, and Greece are rather and not at all satisfied with the EU's response to the war in Ukraine, while the highest levels of disapprovals for economic sanctions are in Greece, Cyprus, and Bulgaria (European Commission, 2022). Thus, diversity is the defining characteristic of these discourses. Some of the scholarly literature outlines the importance of certain elements such as the Eurosceptic and populist platforms and their differences from the official EU's Russia position, the divergences between countries with only economic interests in relation to Russia and others with historic and geopolitical interferences with Russia and the deepening of the cleavages between various domestic interests and options about the future relationship with Russia (Naumescu, 2017). Thus, leadership, domestic politics and more extensive techniques for consensus-building are core elements in the EU sanctions negotiations.

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Part 4 – Energy Relations: Impacts of the War on Europe's Energy Security and Policy: The Transatlantic Element

Introduction, *by Joan DeBardeleben*

Measures taken by the European Union to reduce its dependence of Russian fossil fuel imports is one of the most dramatic effects of Russia's aggression against Ukraine. What began with Germany's decision to stop the certification process for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline has evolved into a commitment on the part of EU member states to, over time, wean itself almost completely off Russian energy imports. These decisions represent a sea change in EU policy toward Russia, and a recognition that economic interdependence does not necessarily breed political cooperation and peaceful relations. At the same time, these decision poses significant economic and societal challenges for the European Union and its member states. In the short-term, these problems are being managed through energy sharing between member states, reliance on energy reserves, and conservation measures.

This energy transition offers opportunities as well as challenges. Reduced reliance on Russian fossil fuel imports seems to be fuelling a more rapid transition to renewal energy production. However, this also requires a commitment of resources which may pose a challenge in the face of other economic costs imposed by the war, costs resulting from the pandemic, and the possibility of an impending economic recession.

Issues of EU unity also raise themselves in relation to this energy transition. Some states such as Hungary have been more reluctant to wean themselves off of Russian energy than others. However, notable has been German support for this transition, which is a significant indicator of a fundamental shift in perspective.

Other issues will also need to be addressed, including increasing interconnectivity of the European energy system to assure more stability, protection of energy infrastructure in general but particularly in a war environment (with the sabotage on the Nord Stream pipeline a case in point), and efforts to help Ukraine itself to deal with energy blackouts in the face of Russian attacks on Ukraine's energy system. Energy security is now on the agenda as a key element of overall European stability. The contribution of the United States and Canada to helping Europe to address some of these dilemma is also an important component of the current situation.

The Russian War on the Ukraine: Impacts on German and European Climate and Energy Politics, *by Miranda Schreurs*

The war Russia launched on Ukraine has led to tens of thousands of deaths, destroyed cities and basic infrastructure, and caused millions to flee the country in search of safety. The invasion has been received with widespread, albeit not universal, global critique and anger. After the 2014 Russian attack on Crimea, the West hit Russia with sanctions, but they were limited in scale and impact. The invasion which began on February 24, 2022, has led to a far more extensive and impactful response. Moved by the pleas of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Western states slowly at first, and then with increasing resolve began to retaliate by introducing sanctions on Russian oligarchs, prohibiting Russian flights in their airspace, and ending business relationships with Russia.

Russia is the world's largest exporter of gas and the second largest exporter of oil after Saudi Arabia. Russia's federal budget is heavily dependent on the exports of crude oil, petroleum products, and natural gas. Fossil fuel exports have provided the capital that Putin needed to launch his war on Ukraine. The Center for Energy and Clean Air estimates that the European Union alone paid Russia over 80 billion Euro for the fossil fuels it imported between the start of the war and August 10, 2022. While Russia has been able to use energy as an economic weapon against Europe, it is at the same time vulnerable. Russia's failure to diversify its economy over recent decades means its loss of a major trading partner will have long-term consequences for its economy and could set it back for years if not decades in its economic development.

The war has also resulted in a deep rift in western relations with Russia and has caused wide-scale shocks to global energy systems and disruptions of global food supplies. It has upended European security, economic, and energy policies and plans. For European countries, the war has forced a reckoning with past energy policy decisions. Europe produces only about 40-45% of its own energy and imports the remainder. In 2019, the EU imported somewhere over 60% of the energy it consumed, and much of that came from Russia. Russia supplied Europe with close to half of the solid fuels, over 40% of the natural gas and over a quarter of crude oil imports. Today, imports of Russian gas to Europe are below 10% -- the result of concerted efforts to reduce dependencies on Russia as well as Russia's restriction of gas flows to Europe.

The loss of trust in Russia is leading to new geopolitical arrangements and alliances. It is also having major implications for future energy directions and thus also for climate change policies and programs. Crises can be turned into moments of technological and social change. For the European Union, the changes being brought about by the Russian assault on Ukraine are dramatic. After years of increasing talk of a fragmented and destabilizing Europe, and the painful experience of Brexit, the European Union has united in defence of democracy and in mutual abhorrence of the use of war to address territorial disputes. This is visible both with the expansion of NATO through membership applications from Finland and Sweden, and through the increasingly closely coordinated energy policies of the EU.

To give just a few examples, after the war began, the European Commission decided to amend the REPowerEU legislation. The legislation is focused on helping Europe make it through the next winter by saving energy, diversifying fossil fuel and especially gas supplies, speeding up the deployment of renewable energy, and replacing gas with other sources of heating and power generation. The legislation's initial target to reduce demand for Russian gas by two-thirds by the end of 2022 has already been met and even surpassed. REPowerEU now sets a 45% target for renewables as a share of power generation for 2030. It further recommends that member states speed up permit-granting procedures for renewables deployment.

Germany has been by far Europe's biggest importer of Russian gas. The German government passed emergency legislation in June which will permit the equivalent of about 8 GW of domestic hard coal and lignite plants to restart operations and replace gas plants in electricity production should the country experience a gas shortage. This reserve capacity is to be built in large part from the coal-fired power plants that were scheduled to be shut down in 2022 and 2023 under the pre-Ukraine war plan to shut down all of the country's coal-fired power plants by around 2030. Germany is also rushing to build new LNG terminals, with 12 approved so far. While environmentalists are worried that this will lead to an increase in greenhouse gas emissions at the same time major steps are being taken to decarbonize the energy system.

The "Easter Package" is a set of legislative initiatives intended to expand the use of renewable energy and to accelerate renewable energy capacity development that was introduced in April 2021, approved by the parliament in summer 2022, and will enter into force in January 2023. By 2030, Germany aims to achieve an 80% share of renewables in its electricity sector. It will also open the first wind to hydrogen fuel auctions. The war in Ukraine is thus speeding up an energy transition that was long overdue. It is also pulling Europe closer together and leading to new and expanded energy partnerships within and between European states as well as with other countries, including Canada, Norway, the United States, and several Middle Eastern countries. Europe and Canada for example, are planning joint development of green hydrogen and the United States aims to expand exports of liquid natural gas to the continent.

The War in Ukraine and Canada's Transatlantic Energy Relations, *by Petra Dolata*

In a March 2022 joint statement in response to the Ukraine war and Europe's energy supply problems, the EU and Canada committed to "deepen [their] cooperation towards net-zero energy transition, including by taking concrete steps in [their] energy cooperation to enhance security of supply and work to eliminate the EU and its Member States' dependence on Russian energy."[21] A few weeks later, Canadian Natural Resources Minister Jonathan Wilkinson pledged that Canada would help its allies "with energy security." However, he also reiterated that his government was "committed to fighting climate change" adding confidently that "[y]ou can do both. You have to be able to walk and chew gum at the same time. We have to be able to think about how we help our allies at a time of great crisis."[22]

Doing both encapsulates the inherent policy dilemma Canada is currently facing in its transatlantic energy relations. And while it has become more urgent during the current energy crisis, it is not a new dilemma. As energy security and climate action have increasingly become interlinked policy objectives since the late 1990s, Canada has to find ways to reconcile its hydrocarbon energy production and pledges to net-zero carbon emissions. In its external energy relations, it also needs to balance short- and long-term horizons of a decarbonizing EU and world economy. It finds itself navigating between immediate responses to the energy crisis by providing LNG, and longer-term plans to become an exporter of lower carbon energy such as hydrogen. Yet most of these decisions are dependent on corporate actors as well as provincial priorities. While the federal government may create a favourable investment climate and regulatory regime (for example, for interprovincial pipelines), the decision to build LNG terminals and hydrogen facilities stays in the hands of private firms. In addition, an overwhelming majority of energy trade still remains with the United States. For example, in 2021, 97 per cent of Canadian crude oil exports were destined for Canada's southern neighbour and only 2 per cent for Europe.

It is important to keep this context in mind as we follow recent news and discussions of increased transatlantic energy trade and Canada helping out the EU in its current energy crisis. Despite a lot of talk in the media about the construction of two east-coast LNG export terminals in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, which was further fuelled by the news in June that German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau discussed these at the G7 meeting in Bavaria, at this moment, there is no LNG export terminal operating in Canada. The earliest one to be operational is located in Kitimat on the Pacific coast in British Columbia and is expected to export LNG to Asia from 2025 on. In contrast, the U.S. has a number of functioning LNG export terminals and has already increased its exports to the EU and the UK by 63 per cent during the first half of 2022. At the moment, there may be a strong appetite for LNG in Europe, but existing LNG producers cannot simply increase shipments, nor can new facilities be built quickly. In the future, new facilities may go online; however, the EU and EU member states may not be interested in long-term supply agreements and locking in what can only be considered a short- to medium-term solution and a bridging technology to cleaner energy solutions. This may have been one of the reasons why LNG was superseded by hydrogen as a discussion topic when German Chancellor Scholz visited Canada in August 2022 to meet again with Prime Minister Trudeau.

Beyond these immediate trade links, transatlantic energy relations also include joint support of global energy security and energy governance as well as technological research collaboration, including in

[21] European Commission. (2022). *Joint Statement by President von der Leyen and Prime Minister Trudeau*. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_22_1989.

[22] Quoted in Brent Jang, (2022, May 6). Canada's problems getting LNG to a thirsty world are allowing U.S. competitors to thrive. *The Globe and Mail*. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-lng-canada-natural-gas-project/.

energy efficiency. These collaborations are easier to pursue as they reside with the federal government and the EU, and thus do not depend as much on corporate actors and their commercial agendas or decisions. Canada and the EU, as well as Canadian provinces and EU members states, have hydrogen policies and various fora to discuss joint initiatives, including the Canada-EU High Level Energy Dialogue. In August 2022, Canada and Germany signed a Canada-Germany Hydrogen Alliance. A year earlier, both countries pledged to establish an Energy Partnership. Canada and the EU work together in energy governance institutions such as the IEA. Earlier this year, declarations at the G7 summit in Germany, which promised to "increas[e] energy security through an accelerated energy transition,"[23] have also highlighted the nexus between energy security and climate action, and the complicated relationship between addressing geopolitical energy dependence and planetary climate change. This brings us back to Canada's dilemma: Canada has a history of portraying itself as a bastion of energy security and a potential saviour from Europe's energy woes. However, it becomes increasingly difficult to play that role through fossil fuel production. Recent transatlantic differences when talking about blue and green hydrogen, or clean- versus green-energy, highlight this dilemma.

It is unlikely that we see a further securitization of energy in the wake of the Ukraine war. Historically, Canada and EU member states such as Germany have been hesitant to expand NATO's scope to include energy security. The more recent linkage between energy security and climate action will make it more difficult to include it as a strategic objective. On the other hand, the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipeline system in the Baltic Sea may lead to renewed attention to energy infrastructure security and energy systems resilience. In any case, as the world slowly moves towards achieving net-zero emission goals, the international energy landscape and the nature of energy geopolitics is also likely to change; indeed, some of these transitions have been accelerated by the current energy crisis. Already, former EU peripheries are now taking on central significance as importers of LNG. Spain, for example, is the biggest importer of LNG in the EU.

Finally, the transatlantic energy security landscape has changed and is located somewhere between energy geopolitics and planetary climate change. While Canada may be a like-minded ally and reliable energy supplier and likes to play the energy security card in its transatlantic relations, that card can really only be effective in a global setting, in which Canada eases the situation by bringing more oil and gas to global markets. The most influential factor here, as is often the case, is the willingness of the United States to let Canadian energy products enter the U.S. to replace U.S. energy products which are then freed to be exported to Europe. After all, Canada's energy industry remains very much integrated in a North American energy space.

[23] G7. (2022, May 27). G7 Climate, Energy and Environment Ministers' Communiqué. https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/974430/2044350/84e380088170c69e6b6ad45dbd133ef8/2022-05-27-1-climate-ministers-communique-data.pdf?download=1 , p. 29.

Part 5 – The War in Ukraine and European Security: Which Way Forward?

Introduction, *by Joan DeBardeleben and Toms Rostoks*

There have been many kinds of conceptual frames to try to understand the position we find ourselves in in our relations with Russia. None is completely adequate. What is clear is that we're in a period of paradigm change. Already with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia had embarked on a paradigmatic shift which involved a willingness to use force to achieve its objectives and a redefinition of the rules of the internal order to allow stronger states to coerce weaker ones. This shift to geopolitical competition and adversarial relations was resisted by the European Union in the period after 2014, despite the institution of economic sanctions and a general freezing of relations with Russia. European leaders still maintained a hope that cooperative relations with Russia could prevail; the acceptance of continuing dependence on Russia for a large portion of Europe's energy supplies was evidence of this willingness to put faith in the possibility of peace through economic interdependence.[24] Russia's attack on Ukraine in February 2022 changed everything, and a paradigm shift took firm hold. We've seen a very radical shift in terms of the conception and framework for understanding the relationship with Russia and the geopolitical situation in Europe. The scope of the paradigm change was only matched by what happened at the end of the Cold War, which was, however, a shift in a positive rather than a negative direction.

Various conceptual frames have been suggested to understand the current security situation in Europe. Some draw on historical analogies. One of those is the idea of a new Cold War, similar to what existed between the USSR and the West in the period up to 1991. While this type of analogy may have some value, it is also limited in many ways. Unlike in the Cold War period, there is actually a hot war present on the European continent. Another element of that paradigm was the existence of proxy wars such as the Viet Nam war. The war in Ukraine cannot be considered a proxy war because it is propagated directly by Russia. One area where the Cold War experience may offer lessons is related to strategic stability. During the Cold War a certain strategic stability developed, however not immediately; it took effort and time. The current situation lack strategic stability, nor is there a roadmap to move in that direction. Most of the post-Soviet arms control agreements have collapsed and there is little immediate prospect for their revival. A lesson from the Cold War period may be the importance of developing such agreements, even in the midst of significant tension.

Are we in some kind of similar period to what preceded World War W II? If we see a parallel here, the question arises of whether we can learn from history to prevent escalation to a full-scale war in Europe or even to war on a global scale. Unlike in the period leading to up to World War II, the West has responded to Russia's aggression against Ukraine quite rapidly, with a radical, coordinated, and escalating package of economic sanctions, as well as with provision of military aid and assistance to Ukraine. Will this be enough? The context is quite different from the early 1940s because now nuclear weapons play a possible, role. This has made the West, and NATO, thus far unwilling to engage in a full military sense, for fear of the consequences. The aftermath World War II may also provide some historical guidance. A transformation occurred in Germany after World War II, under international tutelage, so that now Germany is a key linchpin of the Western alliance and of support for a law-based international order. Is it possible that the current conflict will lead to an equally dramatic transformation in Russia? The formula for achieving this result is elusive. International assistance after the collapse

[24] See Joan DeBardeleben, "Crisis response, path dependence, and the joint decision trap: the EU's eastern and Russia policies after the Ukraine crisis," *East European Politics*, 36:4 (2020), 564-585, DOI: 10.1080/21599165.2020.1832474.

of the USSR did not help put Russia on a sustained liberalizing trajectory. Clearly a different strategy would be required this time.

A third kind of conceptual frame might be the fall of empire. Other empires have collapsed and sometimes this has heralded in a difficult period of transition as the former imperial power adapts to (and resists) the new reality. Should we understand Russia as a country that is having a great deal of difficulty, over a prolonged period of time, in giving up its empire? It is striking that thirty years after the collapse of the Soviet empire, the dominant force in that empire, namely Russia, maintains an aspiration to restore that empire in an altered form. Perhaps the largely peaceful collapse of the USSR in 1991 was a bit a mirage, and we're now seeing that collapse playing out in slow motion, in a violent form. The persistence of authoritarian tendencies in Russia and the underdeveloped capacity of Russian civil society to resist those authoritarian tendencies has perhaps frozen in place a set of elite interests that maintain a psychological, economic, and geopolitical commitment to restoring empire. The idea that elements of empire (specifically as this relates to Ukraine) should, and perhaps could, be restored seems to have taken hold in Russian society as well. Unfortunately, the ability of the European Union or other Western actors to influence the direction of Russian domestic politics or the population imagination in Russia is limited.

While it may be difficult at this moment to foresee how the current military conflict in Ukraine will end, this should not prevent us from considering challenges that will arise in the post-war period, both in Ukraine itself, but also in terms of the larger European geopolitical order.

What are likely to be the problematic issues after the war? One will be Russia itself, because by starting this war and mobilizing conscripts and society behind it, the Russian president has set in motion processes that will be difficult to contain. Eventually the misery and brutality of the war, also the casualties, will evoke some sort of reaction domestically. There will be a day of reckoning. It is likely that there will be infighting in Russia, although the extent and outcome is unclear. Russia may become more erratic, more isolated, more violent (even domestically). This could pose a renewed and potentially even more dangerous situation for Russia's neighbours.

Eventually the issue of economic sanctions will need to be addressed. Under what conditions can some or most of them be lifted? It is easier to impose them than to lift them, as the conditions of the sanctions are unlikely to be met. Should, or could, the lifting of some sanctions, selectively and gradually, still serve as a potential incentive for Russia to change its behaviour? Would this be morally justifiable or politically acceptable to Ukraine, to the European public, or to other members of the alliance?

There will be the issue of reparations. This would amount to hundreds of billions of Euros, likely closer to a trillion. The human and economic costs are enormous. Ukrainians are preparing the bill. We also know that reparations are problematic. It is one thing to impose them, and even that would be very difficult, but they would also have an impact on the aggressors' population, who would see this as the responsibility of the leadership. Reparations could evoke a strong reaction from Russians, even if they would eventually acknowledge that this was a war of aggression. The fear that they might be asked to pay the bill would be so strong that they would never admit they did something wrong, just to avoid paying the bill.

War crimes would have to be prosecuted. Some kind of tribunal would be necessary. Unless this happens, Ukraine might take justice into its own hands, pursuing war criminals around the world. There have been so many war crimes committed by the Russian troops. What about Ukrainian children who have been taken to Russia? Will they be given the chance to return or held as hostages?

Future energy relations with Russia pose other issues. The source of energy and the 'temptation' is still there. It seems now that restoring some of an energy relationship with Russian would be impossible, but would that be considered if the leadership in Russia changed?

Ukraine's EU and NATO membership is another question. Ukraine is now an EU candidate state and simply the prospect of membership provides a boost to Ukraine. But in reality achieving EU membership will be a long and difficult path for Ukraine, given the types of reforms that will be necessary to meet accession conditions. Furthermore, these decisions must be unanimous.

And what about NATO membership? Given the difficulties Sweden and Finland are facing with NATO accession, the situation with Ukraine's membership would likely be even more contentious. If Ukraine is not offered NATO membership, what kind of credible security guarantee can be offered to Ukraine. And if this is not offered, how could Ukraine be expected to agree to any terms for an end to the war, short of a total return of all territory to Ukraine, including Crimea?

Finally, how should Russian citizens be treated after the war? This is not just Putin's war. All evidence points to the conclusion that large parts of Russian society are fairly supportive of the war and view Ukrainians as ungrateful. Of course, Russia's society is not uniform, but the sense of imperial greatness is deeply entrenched and there is no way to change that from the outside. In this nuclear era, a definitive defeat is not possible, so external influence on the transformation of Russian society, in the way Germany society was transformed after WW II, will not be possible. Trying to engage to bring change will be a difficult task.

At some point we may look back and see winning the war as the easier part, but of course not for Ukrainians.

Europe, Ukraine, and Russia: Pathways to a Secure Future, *by Edward Hunter Christie*

Governments across the European Union and NATO are in full agreement. The war that Russia launched against Ukraine in February 2022 is a war of aggression: the very term that the victorious powers of the Second World War used to describe Nazi Germany's wars of conquest, and a term that embeds the notion of aggression in the sense of International Law. To the dismay of European decision makers, Russia's aggression has included a very wide range of war crimes as well, ranging from illegal forms of military deception (such as fighting while wearing an opponent's uniform) to the deliberate and systematic targeting of civilian structures and buildings with artillery and other weapons of war – as well as more individualized crimes, such as the systematic torture, rape, and murder of civilians in temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. The latter crimes, and some of the former, should be viewed as crimes against humanity.

It is important to have this reality firmly in mind, because at least as far as Ukraine and other neighbours of Russia are concerned, including several EU and NATO member states, it will remain etched in the memories of decision-makers for a generation. In other words, the normalization of relations with Moscow even after a favourable conclusion to the current war should be viewed as extremely unlikely, unless very significant changes occur inside Russia, including root-and-branch regime change and a slew of credible assurances that something like the Russian aggression of 2022 will never happen again.

As of early October 2022, Russia is losing ground inside Ukraine. It has lost tens of thousands of men and thousands of items of heavy military equipment. The momentum of the war favours the Ukrainians, largely thanks to their exceptional courage and skill, but also thanks to pivotal military supplies that have come to them from the United States and Europe.

We do not know the ultimate outcome of the war. A Russian military defeat is a realistic possibility, with or without a palace coup or a more violent form of regime change inside Russia. Indeed, a partial fragmentation or even disintegration of the Russian Federation cannot be ruled out: uprisings in the North Caucasus are within the realm of the possible, as well as a rollback of Russian presence – or instead status quo – in Georgia, Moldova, or Belarus. Assuming the Russian Federation remains intact, the regime could fall, but it could also survive and double down as a partially isolated and heavily sanctioned pariah state with a tyrannical hand upon its people. The worst-case scenario would be a Russian offensive use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine. The United States has signaled it would not let this go unanswered, but the contingency plans are not publicly known. However, David Petraeus, a retired U.S. Army general and former CIA Director, has opined that the United States would, in that scenario, effectively enter the war and carry out a campaign of strikes against Russian military targets across Ukraine. Under that scenario, a losing Russian force would lose catastrophically in a matter of a few weeks, at most. Should Putin escalate further or wider, his only trump card would be the use of strategic nuclear weapons against the West, which I will assume he will not choose.

Experts have a range of views as to the most likely scenario, but the goal in this presentation is to consider a deliberately broad range of futures – likely ones, and less likely ones – with the aim of formulating robust policy recommendations.

Scenarios:

Pathway:	**Policy recommendation in a medium- to long-term perspective:**
1: Russian conventional military defeat, without further Russian escalation, without regime change in Russia Russian forces in Ukraine partly collapse, other elements are withdrawn. Ultimately, the entire territory of Ukraine is liberated. Russia finds itself with weak and demoralized armed forces which require many years to reconstitute. The Putin regime survives partly through terror, partly through ongoing inducements to internal security forces. The nation is demoralized, but the regime rewrites history and pretends that the war was necessary and that the armed forces somehow "saved Russia" from a far worse outcome.	Strong containment and deterrence policy akin to early Cold War era
2: Russian conventional military defeat, without further Russian escalation, with regime change in Russia Military calamity and high casualties lead a critical mass of well-informed military, intelligence, and foreign policy officials to speak the truth about the unnecessary nature of the war and Mr. Putin's ultimate responsibility for a disaster of national proportions. Sufficient elements turn against him, leading to a coup d'état, highly likely with an immediate execution of Mr. Putin for fear of forces that could remain loyal to him. It is assumed that the follow-on regime is less aggressive because the driving motivation for change is the recognition that the war was reckless by design, not merely incompetently waged. A pivotal assumption is that the new regime would genuinely decide to stick to Russia's internationally recognized borders and to take concrete measures to assure Europeans and North Americans that a repeat of the 2022 war will not occur.	Slow, conditional re-engagement, based on strict and asymmetric arms control obligations on Russia
3: Partial collapse of the Russian Federation Under this scenario, discontent and rebellion in the North Caucasus region increases significantly. A critical mass of the local security forces also turn against Moscow. Meanwhile, the centre also undergoes turmoil, desertions, and betrayals. A process somewhat akin to the dissolution of the Soviet Union plays out at the scale of the Russian Federation, with the emergence of newly independent states such as Chechnya. A new regime in Moscow tries to keep the country together but, as it deliberately moves away from Putinism, it uses less force and ultimately lets nations like Chechnya go their separate ways. Western powers decide to support that process, while trying to mitigate and manage the disorder.	Slow, conditional re-engagement, based on strict and asymmetric arms control obligations on Russia

4: Russian military rebound, coupled with a loss of will in the West Russia's mobilization efforts lead, after some time, to a larger and more competent force. Ukraine suffers from general attrition, militarily and economically, and it becomes costly to sustain for Western governments which face domestic tensions and agitation. A brief Western surge in support, perhaps with a partial intervention, is decided in order to try to reach a military stalemate inside Ukraine that Ukraine can live with, given the looming loss of Western support. An outcome akin to that of the Korean War emerges, with Russia holding on, after all, to some part of Eastern Ukraine and/or Crimea. To avoid a "frozen conflict" or "simmering conflict" outcome that nobody can trust, a demilitarized zone is installed. Both sides decide to reduce tensions elsewhere.	Strong containment and deterrence policy akin to early Cold War era
5: Escalation and bloody stalemate In this scenario, either Putin or other extreme elements who replace him become convinced that Russia can prevail with multiple uses of nuclear weapons in Ukraine and that course of action is pursued. This draws the United States and some European nations into a direct shooting war against Russian forces in Ukraine. Russia's expeditionary force and Black Sea fleet are completely destroyed. Allies experience losses from retaliatory attacks. Ukraine rapidly leverages facts on the ground and recovers its pre-2014 borders. Rational fear, on both sides, of full nuclear escalation leads to an armistice, similar to the outcome of the Korean War, as with scenario 4, but based on Ukraine's internationally recognized borders, which are turned into a Korean-style Demilitarized Zone with U.S. and EU assistance.	Strong containment and deterrence policy akin to early Cold War era

Facing the Russia Challenge: Transatlantic and European Responses, *by Luca Ratti*

This brief summary will focus on transatlantic responses to the war in Ukraine. It will be structured into three main parts. I will first discuss the impact of the war on NATO. Secondly, I will debate the implications of the war for the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Thirdly, I will try to sketch out potential future scenarios for the transatlantic partners.

A revamped transatlantic Alliance

Russia's invasion of Ukraine represents a watershed moment for NATO. The conflict has undermined the Euro-Atlantic security architecture that was established at the Cold War's end. As the war has enters its seventh month, the prospect of an escalation or expansion of the conflict appears more likely every passing day. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has cemented transatlantic cohesion after a turbulent decade in U.S.-European relations, which were marred by allied disengagement from Libya in 2011, a disorderly withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, and bitter disputes about defence spending.

More specifically, Russia's aggression has sidelined burden-sharing issues, European fears of Washington pivoting to Asia, and U.S. threats of 'agonizing reappraisals' during the Trump administration, thus concealing NATO's crisis management troubles and triggering the biggest allied increase in defence spending since the end of the Cold War. It also revamped the Alliance's core mission of deterrence and defence. Right after the beginning of the invasion, the Alliance significantly strengthened its posture and increased the number of forces on its eastern flank. The U.S. and its European allies committed significant resources by agreeing to contribute to four additional multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia.

This measure effectively doubled the number of battlegroups that were deployed on the Alliance's Eastern flank in the aftermath of Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea, in the context of the European Reassurance/Deterrence initiative. At the Madrid Summit in June 2022, NATO approved a New Strategic Concept (NSC), which describes Russia as the most significant threat to allied security. The allies also agreed to upgrade the strength of the forces deployed on the Eastern flank from battalions to brigades. This should lead to a major increase in NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence, from 40,000 to 300,000 troops. The allies also agreed to ensure a substantial and persistent presence on land, sea, and air, including through strengthened integrated air and missile defence, and committing to increased defence spending and investment in major equipment through the creation of a new NATO innovation fund. 2022 will be their eighth consecutive year of increased defence spending, with European allies' and Canada's cumulative investment of almost USD 350 billion since 2014.

Nonetheless, the availability of troops at high readiness will require concrete pledges of national contributions similar to those that were announced by U.S. President Biden on 29 June. The European allies will have to quickly implement their pledges for increased defence spending and plan for the possibility of large-scale conflict in Europe. This appears to be a much more likely prospect after Russia's announcement of partial mobilization in late September. The Alliance's firm response leaves ground for hope. Russia's aggression has not tested the credibility of NATO's Article 5. Thus far, its existence, coupled with a form of deterrence by denial rather than punishment and based on a beefed-up forward defence, has offered a degree of dissuasion. Substantial and persistent military presence, backed by the prepositioning of equipment and strategic pre-assigning of combat forces, has now become part of the new NATO Force Model.

The allies have also made no ambiguity on the continued role played by nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantee of their security. Only the certainty of retaliation can dissuade the Kremlin from seriously contemplating such an option. The war has also strengthened the Alliance's 360th degree approach to security. This is particularly important for a country like Italy, which feels exposed to regional

instability stemming from the Mediterranean and North Africa. The NSC did not overlook NATO's southern neighbourhood, particularly the Middle East, North Africa, and Sahel, stressing the importance of the interconnectedness between NATO's Eastern and Southern flank.

The Impact of the War on the CSDP

What does this imply for the European Union and its CSDP? Like NATO, the European Union responded swiftly and decisively by imposing seven sanction packages on Russia (an eight is being discussed) and adopting several support measures to support Ukraine. Measures span from widespread financial assistance, to granting EU candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova. For the first time, the bloc is also funding the delivery of weapons and military support to the tune of €2.5 billion under the newly created European Peace Facility. EU countries were quick to tear down old taboos: Germany decided to spend more on defence and providing military assistance to a country at war; Denmark reversed its 30-year opt-out from the CSDP; and Sweden and Finland applied for NATO membership. Finland and Sweden's accession will bring two additional EU members into the alliance, strengthening NATO's European pillar. As a result, 23 members of the Union will also be members of the Alliance, while only four EU members will formally retain a neutral status, further easing coordination between the two organizations.

However, the war has put talks about European strategic autonomy on the back burner, stifling the illusions of part of the European political and cultural elite. The notion of European strategic autonomy has been debated within the Union since the result of the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump to the White House in 2016, and given widespread consideration in the European Union Global Strategy that the former President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, endorsed in the same year. The war reversed this debate, making clear that NATO remains the indisputable bedrock of European security and firmly enshrined the prospect of closer European security cooperation within the boundaries of transatlantic solidarity.

Unlike the Alliance, the EU is neither equipped to dissuade or deter Russia nor face the prospect of an escalation or expansion of the conflict. Russia's nuclear threats and announcement of partial mobilization have put under scrutiny the Western strategy of "Boiling the frog" – namely, increasing military, intelligence, and economic assistance to Ukraine step by step, without provoking Moscow into large-scale retaliation. However, it is also testing transatlantic and European unity and resilience. Until now Russia largely fought the war with his military at peacetime strength, despite rapidly mounting casualties. Putin's decision may reverse this, thus raising a new set of issues in terms of transatlantic and European solidarity to Ukraine. There is also the remote prospect that Moscow might be tempted to strike at supply hubs outside Ukraine — located in NATO countries like Poland and Romania — that have channelled huge quantities of arms, ammunition, and military equipment into the country. The EU does not have the political and military strength to deal with an escalation or expansion of the war (in May, Boris Johnson, rather than Emmanuel Macron, promised to resort to the UK's nuclear arsenal to defend Finland and Sweden against Russia's aggression in the run-up to their formal inclusion into the Alliance). The CSDP will therefore merely complement NATO, which remains the foundation of Euro-Atlantic security. This was made patently clear in the Union's new Strategic Compass, which was approved last April.

Which Way Forward for the transatlantic partners?

Nonetheless, there are still many question-marks and grey areas. In total, the United States has committed more than $13.5 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden administration. However, the U.S. has also put guardrails on the conflict, signalling that it does not want a broader war with Moscow. The refusal to provide Ukrainians with tactical missile systems

(ATACMS) is a clear indication of the attitude prevailing in Washington (until the war escalates any further). The Pentagon has instead provided thousands of satellite-guided rockets and 16 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System launchers, or HIMARS, to fire them. It is unlikely that the mid-term elections might impact the U.S. attitude. However, should the war continue to drag on, the 2024 presidential elections might affect the American position.

Similarly, the European nations have also clearly signalled their lack of appetite for a wider confrontation or to risk an escalation. After failing to dissuade Putin in the run-up to the invasion, France and Germany pledged to support Ukrainian resistance. Nonetheless, the degree of their support has come under intense scrutiny, particularly when compared to that offered by the UK, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and the three Baltic states. The degree of support for Ukraine has thus rekindled a never overcome distinction between New versus Old Europe. Despite an apparent show of unity in the aftermath of the invasion, a strategic cacophony somehow persists among EU members, while European military aid for Ukraine has witnessed a downward trend since the end of April.

In the following years, the EU and NATO will have to continue to coordinate and find a division of labour that avoids duplication. Close coordination and permanent dialogue between the EU and NATO should also support efforts in defence spending. It will be particularly important to make sure that levels of troop commitments and readiness are not mutually detrimental, all while avoiding waste and duplication, especially as the consequences of the war are hampering economic growth and fuelling higher inflation in Europe. For a country like Italy, this is particularly important also to guarantee the security of the Western Balkans, the Mediterranean, and North Africa.

Equally relevant in this context are troop commitments and levels of readiness by both organizations. While not much is yet known about NATO's new goal of 300,000-strong rapid reaction troops and their level of readiness to be deployed, questions remain: what will be the impact of such a commitment to the CSDP's crisis management force? What consequences will that have for the EU's Rapid Deployment Capacity of 5,000, which was envisioned in the Compass?

Finally, China represents another potential enigma for the future of transatlantic unity. While Asian partners attended NATO's Madrid summit and Europeans (Italians included, particularly after the last elections) have hardened their views on China in the last few years, the country is still perceived by many EU members as an economic opportunity. There is no guarantee that the U.S.' European allies will be willing to engage in a military conflict with China for the defence of Taiwanese sovereignty.

Future prospects are rather bleak. For different reasons, both the Russians and the Ukrainians have showed no intention of engaging in serious negotiations, let alone reaching an agreement. While the war has demonstrated both Europe's inability to dissuade Russia and its ongoing dependence on NATO, it has also highlighted the need for closer European political and defence cooperation. However, this remains a rather remote prospect. The winter is fast approaching and there is widespread uncertainty about the success of the Ukrainian counteroffensive (particularly in the south), the impact of the referendums, the true nature of Russia's threats, and the consequences of the war on the European economies and public opinions. As more significant tests lie ahead and there is utter uncertainty about the Kremlin's ultimate intentions, European nations should strengthen their cooperation with the U.S. but also advance proposals to rekindle and deepen integration to prevent the descent from the post-Cold European War order to the post-Ukrainian European disorder.

Policy recommendations, *by Joan DeBardeleben and Toms Rostoks*

The ensuing policy recommendations represent the views of the editors of this report, drawing guidance from the contributions by academics and practitioners who took part in the workshop on a variety of issues such as European security, economic sanctions, and energy security[25]. These policy recommendations are based on certain expectations of how Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine will proceed. In this regard, analysts may be proven wrong, as it happened at the time of the invasion in February 2022, when many analysts were too pessimistic regarding Ukraine's ability to defend itself against the Russian military. Ukraine's ability to weather the initial onslaught and stop Russia's offensive in late spring and summer, however, offered grounds for a more optimistic view of what Ukraine can accomplish. Ukraine's later successes in liberating Kharkiv region and Kherson city were testimony of what can be achieved with the combination of a highly motivated Ukrainian military and Western-supplied modern military equipment and weapons systems. In late 2022, however, Ukraine's military lost the momentum, the Russian military managed to stabilize their defensive lines, and there is little evidence that Russia would be willing to abandon its expansionist aims. The policy recommendations are largely based on several implicit assumptions. First, Ukraine can prevail in the war, but its success depends on sustained Western economic and military help that goes beyond the weapons systems that have already been supplied. Second, the extent to which Ukraine will be able to retake the territories occupied by Russia remains unclear. Also, the sequence in which Ukraine will pursue military offensives is not known. Third, Russia still possesses sufficient human and material resources to pursue maximalist aims in Ukraine. Also, Russia still has capacity to escalate the military conflict. The war is being fought under Russia's nuclear threats. Although the use of nuclear weapons remains unlikely, it cannot be discounted entirely, and the intensity of Russia's nuclear messaging is likely to increase if it faces military defeat in Ukraine. Fourth, there is some uncertainty regarding the domestic factors in Russia, and there is considerable potential for political protests and political instability due to the heavy losses that Russian military suffers. But domestic political factors may also hinder Ukraine's ability to fight the war and the political will of the Western powers to provide Ukraine with assistance that it badly needs. Finally, the Ukrainian military can absorb Western military technologies quickly, use them to good effect on the battlefield, and maintain them.

1. The European Union, in coordination with its allies and also through NATO, must maintain a continuing high resolve to support Ukraine in its defense against Russia's unprovoked aggression. Possibilities of division in the alliance must be resisted through a continual process of consultation, including reinforced public outreach to ensure that the public clearly understands the reasons that strong measures and unity are required. While various partners in the alliance can provide different sources of support (e.g., training, military equipment, intelligence, humanitarian aid, institution of sanctions), each one of these should be calibrated to meet conditions on the ground and to respond to needs as articulated by the Ukrainian leadership. Assistance to Ukraine should not be limited to just making sure that Ukraine is able to defend itself but also should be aimed at liberating the lands illegally occupied by Russia. The European Union should support Ukraine's decisions about terms for negotiating with Russia on these issues. Although the ultimate outcome of the war is uncertain, Ukraine should be provided with military capabilities, such as Western-made main battle tanks, that would allow it conduct effective military offensives.

2. It is unclear whether much is left in the toolbox in terms of sanctions against Russia. Furthermore, current sanctions packages may become increasingly contested in certain parts of

[25] These recommendations have not been reviewed by contributing authors of this report and therefore cannot be assumed to be endorsed by them.

Europe and in the United States as the war drags on. Therefore, it is increasingly important to work to bring other important global actors on board with sanctions regimes or to win their support in pressuring Russia to reverse course. Particularly important are China and India. The Western allies should set as an important priority the development of a strategy to seek avenues of cooperation with these countries in an effort to bring an end to Russia's aggression. Other actors, such as Turkey, can also play a role. Achieving this end may require compromise with these actors in other arenas. Importantly, if Russia uses nuclear weapons, a significant part of the response to Russia breaking the nuclear taboo should be aimed at ensuring concerted international response to such escalation.

3. While the alliance between countries of the European Union, the United States, and Canada, both through NATO and outside of NATO, is critical to current efforts to defend Ukraine, the European Union should not abandon the aspiration for a higher degree of strategic autonomy. With the activation of PESCO, the adoption of the Strategic Compass, and the unanimous support for actions to sustain Ukraine's fight for sovereignty, important steps have been taken in realizing elements of strategic autonomy. This process should be continued. If anything, the war in Ukraine should cement the EU's commitment to developing more elements of an independent defense capacity. This should, however, be done in concert with NATO and the United States. Also, all EU member states should be fully included, and this includes those that have thus far been hesitant and those for whom European defence integration has been a secondary concern. Such unity and commitment would help to persuade the EU's frontline allies that their security needs are taken seriously. This would require not just a demonstration of political will, but also considerable investment in military capabilities.

4. The EU must cement its commitment to avoid over-dependence on any single energy supplier of energy resources in the future. Once the war ends there may be economic temptations to restore some degree of energy interdependence with Russia. This should be resisted. Furthermore, the reduction of dependence on Russian energy sources should be utilized as a positive opportunity to fuel the green transition and the shift to renewable energy resources. It is important that the EU continue to work in this direction with international partners, including the United States and Canada.

5. The capacity for analysis of Russian domestic development should be reinforced both in Europe and North America. Clearly misperception of Russia's intentions by policymakers played a role in the West's failure to adequately anticipate Russia's actions. A new generation of experts on Russia should be educated now, and policy makers should regularly consult with existing experts. Such support should be sustained regardless of the various twists and turns in Russia's relations with the West. Government support for studying Russia decreased manifold after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and this mistake should not be repeated because Russia will remain an influential actor in international affairs. Adequate understanding of Russia also requires knowledge of the Russian language, which should receive government support.

6. Consideration should be given already now to challenges that will arise once the war ends. While the manner in which the war ends will affect the nature of these challenges, some key questions should be given attention even now. It would make sense for the European Commission and appropriate agencies in various member states to initiate brainstorming processes around these issues so that the parameters for action may be laid out once the war ends. These challenges include the following:

a. Now that Ukraine and Moldova are candidate states, the European Union work with these countries in developing a concrete path to membership. This would include attention to potential problems that may obstruct this progress once the war is over. Clearly a systematic program of financial aid will be required, on the scale of the Marshall Plan after World War II. This should be done in concert between the EU, the US, and Canada, as well as other partners. But this will need to be accompanied by the structuring of a set of incentives to assure that self-interested elites do not gain undue control over the reconstruction process and that corruption does not place a stranglehold on economic progress that works in the interests of the population as a whole. If Russia emerges significantly weakened once the war in Ukraine ends, this may represent an opportunity to facilitate and perhaps even fast-track Ukraine's and Moldova's integration into the EU. Depending on the outcome of the war, there might be an opportunity to facilitate resolution of the conflict over Transnistria and perhaps other frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space as well.

b. Consideration should be given to conditions that might lead to a gradual wind-down of the sanctions regime against Russia. While it seems premature to consider this now, as Russian aggression continues, it is important to remember that sanctions are not an end in themselves but are intended to achieve concrete objectives such as changing Russian behaviour, reducing Russia's capability to execute its war measures, and strengthening Ukraine's position in any future negotiations. With these objectives in mind, advance consideration should be given to the conditions under which a reduction in sanctions might help to achieve any of these objectives. For now, sanctions primarily serve as an instrument to weaken Russia because they have been unable to deter Russia from invading Ukraine and exert sufficient economic pressure that would force Russia to stop the war and withdraw its troops from Ukraine. After the war, the debate over economic sanctions may threaten cohesion of the EU and prevent effective policies towards Russia and Ukraine, so consideration of how to address these potential problems should occur in advance.

c. How can the credibility of assurances offered to countries that commit to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons be restored? This discussion will need to be considered on a global scale, cognizant of the damage done by the failure of the Budapest Memorandum to protect Ukraine's sovereignty when it gave up nuclear weapons after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This may seem to be a largely academic debate because the break-up of the Soviet Union in late 1991 represents a historically unique event, but the Russia's aggression against Ukraine may have far-reaching implications for the international non-proliferation regime. Great powers may conduct military aggression while threatening the victim with nuclear weapons, but, more importantly, states that do not possess nuclear weapons may seek to acquire them because they represent the ultimate security guarantee. States would rather rely on their own military capabilities than on security guarantees provided by major powers. Security guarantees outside an alliance framework are likely to be regarded as less effective. These factors need to be taken into consideration when discussing how to sustain the non-proliferation regime.

d. For now, it is unclear in what form Russia will emerge from its war against Ukraine. What would be the implications of a further economic or political decline of Russia? What dangers would this pose for the European Union and the West? This is a particularly difficult problem because, unlike previous world wars, an unconditional

surrender that could herald in an era of guided transformation in the defeated country is hardly likely in the current situation. In this case, what kind of scenarios for future post-war relations with Russia should be considered? In undertaking this analysis, the failures of Western approaches to Russia in the 1990s should be considered.

Russia's reconciliation with Ukraine and the West may only become possible if Russia undergoes a major political transformation, agrees to pay reparations for the war damages, and agrees that its citizens (including political decision-makers) will be prosecuted for the war crimes. Although this outcome is the most desirable, it is also the least likely. On the other hand, Russia may emerge from the war militarily weakened but politically stable and largely unreformed. In this case, it is likely that hostility between Russia, on the one hand, and Ukraine and the West, on the other hand, could be perpetuated for decades. Although this scenario is the least desirable, it is also quite likely. In this case Russia's aggression against Ukraine will mark a fundamental turn in its relations with the West, giving little ground for optimism about the post-war security order in Europe. How to manage an outcome of this type, as well as other possible variants, warrants advance thought.

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