

ABSTRACTS

Panel I: The Use of Force

**Heinz Gärtner**

***Transatlantic Relations and International Conflict Management: The Use of Force***

Recent analysis of threats and challenges by NATO and EU come to identical conclusions: First and foremost, there are dysfunctional states (e.g. failed or failing states) which pose a threat to international and European security. These states are the source of humanitarian disaster, breeding ground for organized crime and terrorism, areas for illicit arms trade and sometimes even the home of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), lost areas for good investment and trade, and they produce large refugee flows. Simultaneously, new areas of cooperation emerge: the civil-military coordination and cooperation (CIMIC) and the EU civil protection mechanism. States and international organizations have a "responsibility to protect" their citizens, particularly in cases of genocide, massive human right violations, famine, poverty, and, in the long run, consequences of climate change. This development entails an entirely new concept of security and new perspectives toward the use of force in the field of international security. The leading paradigm is not the destruction of state enemies but it is about the protection of people and about saving lives. In which cases shall force be used and who can justifiably make such a decision? One possible answer to this question could be applying criteria of a just war such as 'just cause' or 'right intention.' Finally, the paper argues that there should be a division of labour between Europe and North America: The Europeans should concentrate more on smaller-scale operations at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, but there should also be a European contribution to the management of conflict and crises where higher intensity enforcement capabilities are required (as the battle group concept proposes).

**Stéphane Roussel and Samir Battis**

***ESDP, Canada and International Conflict Management***

The European Union's Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has frequently been criticized for not contributing to and fostering the international security system, sometimes even for weakening traditional security institutions such as NATO. To tackle the problem of division of labour between the European Union and NATO, this paper aims at analysing certain trends that strengthen international security and increase Europe's role and importance as an independent actor on global stage. These trends also provide new opportunities for Canada. The paper focuses on the emerging concept of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) with its strong emphasis on non-combat operations in international crisis management as well as on recent developments in this policy field.

As ESDP expands to new areas in order to meet the new challenges of today's evolving security environment, it is also exploring new domains of the security and defence sphere, some of which mark a break with traditional defence aspects and therefore call for new political approaches. This development also provides Canada with a number of new political opportunities in many different areas: aspects of the security

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sector reform (SSR); closer cooperation in training activities towards third states in Africa and Latin America; creation and deepening of institutional relations between all national actors involved in SSR actions; law police; rule of law; civil administration; civil protection; monitoring missions; and, finally, support for EU special representatives.

Fostering Canadian – European cooperation in these fields could also mobilise bi-and multilateral instruments and guarantee more efficiency and better coordination in international crisis management. Undoubtedly, such efforts could contribute towards a) more efficiently integrating the objectives of peace, democracy and political and social stability into assistance programmes; b) ensuring that aspects of political and social exclusion, social and regional marginalisation and environmental degradation are taken into account; and c) adding value to international initiatives on cross-cutting issues which are potential sources of conflict.

**David Last**

***Sharing Ideas: Conflict Management and Professional Security Education in Transatlantic Relations***

Police and military ties across the Atlantic have evolved along different lines over the course of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, because the organizations have been responsible for different functions. The common requirement for professional education and the sharing of models for curricula, institutions, and career patterns has created what might be described as distinct epistemic communities for police and military forces. Both the ‘war on terror’ and a new generation of security challenges test the bounds of these communities. Using primary data on institutions and curricula, and secondary information about the evolution of institutions, this paper compares the forms of transatlantic engagement of police and military institutions.

**Bastian Giegerich**

***The Terrorist Threat in Europe***

Successful terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, the murder of Theo van Gogh as well as other failed or foiled terrorist activities have made clear that radicalized members of Europe’s Muslim communities pose a threat in the form of jihadist terrorism. While several explanations regarding paths of radicalization compete, this paper will examine the following hypothesis: Radicalization is driven by the politicization of a transnational religion, Islam, used by extremists to construct a narrative of Islamic hegemony and world order leading to confrontation with the ‘West’ and ‘Europe’ in particular.

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**Panel II: Intelligence Cooperation**

**Jeremy Littlewood**

***Cooperation, Complexity and Change: Canada's Transatlantic Intelligence Relationships in the early 21st Century***

Canada is involved in long-standing intelligence relationships with its transatlantic partners. These relationships have been subject to the vicissitudes of events over the last 50 years and have endured and evolved to a point where Canada meets its needs but not necessarily its own expectations or those placed upon it. Threats to Canadian security and national interests are varied: Canada's role in the world is subject to debate at home; and to the North, South, East, and West Canada faces challenges and opportunities. The central contention of this paper is that Canada plays an important role in transatlantic intelligence cooperation, but the complexity of the relationships and the demands to meet various threats to Canadian National Security interests suggest Canada will have to tread a difficult path of maintaining cooperation with its allies while retaining the ability to protect its core national interests in a complex world.

**Michael S. Goodman**

***Joined-Up Intelligence: The Approach in the United Kingdom***

The paper will focus on the United Kingdom's approach to joined-up intelligence. It will briefly describe the origins of the British intelligence machinery, but will focus primarily on the contemporary British approach. Particular reference will be made to the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), the first unified structure focussed on one topic, and where its members are all seconded from their parent departments. The paper will conclude by considering whether we should have specialist intelligence structures to look at other important issues, proliferation being perhaps the most obvious.

**James Walsh**

***Conflict Management and Intelligence Sharing in the European Union***

Sharing intelligence is an important tool in the management of internal and external security threats to the European Union. The European Union has developed a number of institutions to facilitate intelligence with Union institutions and among its member states. These provide useful technical mechanisms for the diffusion of intelligence. But they do not tackle the problem of mistrust, which is the key barrier to fully effective intelligence sharing. I show that mistrust of the interests of other member states inhibits intelligence sharing, that existing institutions fail to overcome this mistrust, and suggest changes that could lead to more effective sharing.

**Panel III: Human Security**

**Mary Martin**

***From the 'War on Terror' to Human Security: A European approach to conflict***

The EU has reached a pivotal point in its development as a global security actor. Its willingness to intervene in difficult and dangerous locations, such as the Middle East, Africa and Afghanistan, its proprietary approach to crises, and the accumulation of capabilities which increasingly underpin its preparedness to act, even using coercive force where necessary, marks a change in the evolution of its external policies. However the nature of EU external interventions remains ambiguous. In the wake of the recently signed Lisbon Treaty, setting out institutional reforms, and disenchantment with the 'Global War on Terror' the EU has the opportunity to resolve this ambiguity and articulate a distinctive European Way of Security, based on human security principles. This paper explains what such an approach might look like, and suggests three ways in which it might enhance transatlantic co-operation in crises, through redefining multilateralism, improving the coherence of crisis management and in recalibrating the dialogue of external intervention.

**Don Hubert**

***Human Security: The Next Generation***

For more than a decade, the debate on human security has been dominated by questions of appropriate breadth and definition. Many have argued that the time has now come to move beyond these definitional debates and to make the concept operational. In fact, the concept has been the basis for a series of public policy initiatives (negotiations of new legal convention, creation of new international institutions, reorientation of prominent policy tools designed to maintain peace and security etc.). This paper will argue that we are now coming to the end of a first generation of work on human security – norm and institution building designed to enhance the physical safety of people and their communities – and that attention should now turn in broad measure to monitoring, compliance and enforcement. The paper will also argue for a third, albeit more speculative, generation of work focused on enhancing physical safety outside of what we currently understand as "armed conflict."

**Iztok Prezelj**

***The Role of Asymmetric Perceptions in Providing Human Security***

Human security was conceptualized and presented to the global public in the Human Development Report of 1994. Since then, the concept has evolved in many ways. This paper compares different conceptualizations, according to the perceived referent object, identified human values at stake, identified threats and means for providing human security. The concept of human security is inherently related to the concept of human development. While many international approaches, policies and programs for providing human security exist and the concept of human security is theoretically attractive and modern, because it embraces almost everything it is difficult to implement, inconsistently developed and conceptually incoherent.

The paper considers the key forces and problems of today's transatlantic cooperation in responding to human crises. The concept and practice of human security are the subject of asymmetric perceptions from either side of the Atlantic. Yet transatlantic cooperation is one of the keys for achieving a critical political and operational weight in effectively providing human security. Most of the problems are related to different or asymmetric perceptions of the human security problems and threats and slightly different prioritizations of human security agendas (read: different national interests). The Western Balkans, as still the most threatened and risky region in Europe, is an excellent example of international inconsistencies in providing human security.

**Panel IV: Afghanistan**

**Steven Staples**

***Canada in Afghanistan: The Manley Report and Beyond***

The Manley Panel report has been submitted to the government. Canada's war in Afghanistan is moving into its seventh year, and the prospect of achieving the government's goals seems as elusive as ever. Meanwhile, the conflict is costing \$100 million per month, casualties are rising, and the need for a diplomatic end has never been more important. The presentation will evaluate the Manley Panel report and the future of the military mission, and suggest new options for Canada, NATO, and the United Nations in Afghanistan.

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**Markus Kaim**

***Germany, Afghanistan, and the Future of NATO***

On October 12, the German parliament voted to extend the Bundeswehr's 3,000- strong military deployment in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan for another year. While the extension passed by a 453 to 79 vote, the Bundestag debate highlighted the growing public opposition to what is increasingly viewed by Germans as a lost mission with an at least questionable moral and political legitimacy. For Chancellor Angela Merkel and the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU), who form a governing coalition with the Social Democrats (SPD), the public opposition is becoming a political headache. Public opinion in Germany has turned against the ISAF mission in Afghanistan in its present form. For Chancellor Merkel and the Christian Democrats, the Bundeswehr's seemingly open-ended Afghan engagement is a political time bomb that could easily blow up in the run-up to elections in several German states in 2008 and the next federal elections to be held by the fall of 2009.

**Łukasz Kulesa**

***Polish Involvement in Afghanistan: Navigating Between Policy Priorities, Realities on the Ground, and Reluctant Public Opinion***

In 2007, Poland sharply increased its military presence in Afghanistan – from about 100 military engineers serving in Bagram to more than 1,200 troops, including special forces and a mechanized infantry battle group. The internal debate concentrated on the importance of the ISAF deployment for the future of NATO and for the transatlantic relations. As Poland adjusted the modalities of its deployment to the realities on the ground, it had to cope both with the strategic and operational dilemmas of the ISAF operation, and with explaining its role in Afghanistan to the reluctant public opinion.

**Alison Weston**

***The EU and Crisis Management: Multidisciplinary Approaches and Lessons Learned***

This paper examines the EU's approach to crisis management with a particular emphasis on the new civilian structures, as a potential model for international action for the future in the context of more sophisticated and multi-disciplinary (i.e. non-military) interventions. Given the recognition of the need to deploy a range of different instruments in peacekeeping and stabilisation operations, states and international actors are reorganising themselves in different ways to try to achieve this. The paper considers how the EU is addressing these issues and identifies key challenges for the future.

Panel V: The Middle East

Sven Biscop

***For a 'More Active' EU in the Middle East: Transatlantic Relations and the Strategic Implications of Europe's Engagement with Iran, Lebanon and Israel-Palestine***

The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) calls for the EU to be 'more active' in pursuing its strategic objectives. The two probably most salient examples of a 'more active' EU are to be found in the Middle East. The 'EU3' (France, Germany and the UK) are leading nuclear negotiations with Iran. The EU has taken the lead in reinforcing the UN peacekeeping operation in Lebanon, UNIFIL, as authorized by UNSC Resolution 1701 of 11 August 2006. Over 70% of the enlarged force or 7,600 troops out of 10,800 are provided by the EU27. This engagement clearly fits in with the EU's interests as defined in the ESS, notably the need 'to promote a ring of well governed countries [...] on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations', and to avoid 'a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East'. The cases of Iran and Lebanon can be seen as positive examples of an EU that is more united and hence 'more active'. Yet, they also provoke fundamental strategic questions on the ambitions and potential of EU policy towards the region, and of the EU as a global strategic actor.

Costanza Musu

***40 Years of EU Involvement in the Middle East Peace Process***

The paper analyzes and evaluates the long history of Europe's involvement with the Middle East peace process. The Arab-Israeli conflict in fact, and the subsequent peace process, has been among the most strongly debated issues by Member States, not only since the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in 1991, but since the establishment of European Political Co-operation in 1970. The peace process has been the subject of innumerable joint declarations and joint actions on the part of the EC/EU, and has always remained a high priority issue in the European foreign policy agenda. The Middle East has represented a problematic issue in EU-US relations. On the one hand, Europe has a double dependence, on the US as a security guarantor and on Middle East oil. On the other, the strategic American interests in the region and the United States' desire to maintain control over the development of the peace process has frequently clashed with Europe's attempts to cut a role for itself in the negotiations.

The events of the last two years (e.g. the election of Hamas in the Palestinian parliamentary elections in January 2006, the Hezbollah-Israel war of summer 2006, the protracted tensions with Iran further complicated by Mr Ahmadinejad's aggressive declarations against Israel, the attempts of the international community at revitalizing the peace process marked by the Annapolis Conference of December 2007) have once again underlined the importance of the issue for the European Union, while highlighting all the difficulties that the member states face when attempting to elaborate a coherent – and effective – policy towards the peace process.

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**Mira Sucharov**

***Lobbing Thoughts onto the Hill: Tracing the Path of Ideas in America's Israeli-Palestinian Policies***

This paper will investigate the determinants of US foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian nexus. Much has been made within academic and policy circles about the role of the so-called Israel Lobby. Yet recent treatments conflate the workings of the lobby with White House neoconservatism. Others write of more enduring ideals shaping US foreign policy over decades. This raises the question of how we can trace the role of domestic versus elite factors when discussing values and ideas, and, more fundamentally, how we know whether a given policy results from domestic politics, or is a function of worldviews already held by elites, or reflects some other, less conscious national *Zeitgeist*. And within interested communities (e.g., the Jewish community and other Israel advocacy groups), how do certain policy ideas prevail? The paper will examine the tension between liberalism and neoconservatism within the American Jewish community, and the relationship between religion, ethnicity, values and foreign policymaking more broadly.

**Panel VI: Transatlantic Relations**

**Benjamin Zyla**

***More NATO than NATO: Canada's devotion to a reluctant alliance in Afghanistan.***

Most discussions on the impact of Afghanistan on the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) focus on transatlantic relations between the United States and the European allies. But for Canada, which is one of the few NATO allies that voluntarily deployed into the south facing heavy resistance and fighting from Taliban insurgents, the Afghanistan operations have become the most salient dimension of its continued involvement in the Atlantic Alliance. While this may seem surprising given the cut-backs in Canadian defence spending in the 1990s, and the withdrawal of Canada's standing forces from Germany, it should not be. For during that the so-called 'dark decade,' Canada continued to make major contributions to the NATO and European security, especially Balkans where its forces were engaged in continuous operations to secure and maintain the peace. This presentation argues that Ottawa's multi-faceted military and political support of the 'new' NATO of the post-Cold War era continued when the Alliance undertook its involvement in Afghanistan. Indeed, in its efforts in support of NATO's mission in Afghanistan, Canada has demonstrated a dedication to the Alliance that seems stronger than NATO's collective commitment to itself.



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**Arnold Kammel**

***Democracy, Energy Security and Climate Change: New Challenges and Prospects for Future Transatlantic Cooperation***

The USA and Canada are the oldest and closest partners of the European Union. After starting out in the 1950s as a purely economic relationship, the transatlantic partnership has evolved over the years to become a close strategic alliance in various fields. This essay analyses the developments in the transatlantic partnership and tries to identify new ways and fields for future cooperation to face the new challenges, mainly in the areas of democracy, energy security and climate change. Looking at these challenges, it is imperative that the transatlantic partners find the flexibility to adapt to this new environment, co-operate and maintain the core values that bind them together.

**Gunther Hauser**

***NATO and EU – New Role and Missions in the Global Security Architecture***

Crisis management today is forward defence. NATO, PfP and EU are directed to overall crisis management and disarmament supports, ranging from NATO PfP and Petersberg tasks via civil-military co-operation to the destruction of MANPADS and small arms and light weapons. Since the early 1990s, NATO and EU member states have been transforming their security forces in order to design them for new roles and missions. In Europe, declining defence and security budgets have also increase the need for military and security force transformation by co-ordinating national military and civilian security forces for multinational peace support operations worldwide. A key message of the recent transformation processes has been that interoperability, deployability and usability are major requirements for Europe’s military forces. Today, the emphasis is clearly put on non-military security instruments. This paper focuses on the new role and new missions for European security forces and their appropriate role related to different security risks and challenges.

**Charles Pentland**

***Canada and Conflict Management: Prospects for Transatlantic Partnership***

Canada’s participation in international conflict management will almost always be multilateral. While the UN Security Council will normally provide authorization (the one exception so far being the 1999 Kosovo war), Canada’s preferred mission partners are likely to continue to be found in the Atlantic community, whose institutional expression is in NATO, the OSCE and the EU. In their capacities for conflict-management these three bodies range across a continuum from the regional ‘soft-power’ instruments of the OSCE to the global military reach of NATO (currently being tested in Afghanistan). The EU’s capabilities are the most diverse, lying between and overlapping those of NATO and the OSCE. Where does Canada fit in this transatlantic framework? It works easily with the OSCE in the margins of smaller European conflicts. In NATO’s Afghan mission it has demonstrated an aptitude for counter-insurgency war and reconstruction. In the longer run, however, the types of action available to the EU under the auspices of its ESDP may prove to be a good fit for Canada’s interests and capabilities. But access and participation will pose problems.