

Sanctions of the European Union: Evaluating effectiveness

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Part I

SANCTIONS OF THE EU: EVALUATING THE TRACK RECORD

Structure

1/ Introduction

2/ Research design and methodology: What is different?

3/ EU sanctions universe

4/ Findings: What accounts for success of EU sanctions?

Origins and Evolution

Two strands:

a) Implementation of UN sanctions

b) Autonomous practice

I. since early 1980s

II. boosted since CFSP 1991

- Evolved in parallel to UN sanctions

- Compliance = good, most active RO


III. Qualitative change 2010s: Iran, Cdl, Syria, Russia

a) Imply ec. costs to EU members

b) Mostly HR + democracy, also NPR/ conflict

EU (+UN) sanctions practice


Evolution of CFSP sanctions
(1991-2014)



EU autonomous sanctions (new)

(CFSP and ACP, excludes supplements to UN sanctions)
own elaboration


Number of sanctions imposed by EU



Increase in autonomous EU sanctions


(CFSP and APC) own elaboration

Cumulative number of sanctions regimes imposed by EU




Sanctions frequency by sender

(Borzyskowski and Portela 2016)



Number of sanctions by sender

(Borzyskowski and Portela 2016)



Question and Motivation

- Under which circumstances do sanctions imposed by the EU against third countries achieve their objectives?
- How to account for success and failure?
- Motivation: Little is known about
 - a/ Determinants of sanctions efficacy
 - b/ EU as a sender of autonomous SNS since 1980s
 - c/ instrument has changed

How to adjust measurement to TS?

Hypotheses by redefining Hufbauer et al. variables:

The effectiveness of sanctions increases with

- (1) Extent of harm caused by sanctions
- (2) Economic nature of harm
- (3) Degree of international isolation of target
- (4) Responsiveness by the sender
- (5) Whether they directly threaten permanence in office of incumbents

Methodology

I. Case studies

II. QCA

> expectation combination of factors

Necessary/ sufficient conditions

Sources:

interviews with officials (EU officials, member states)

experts,

NGO and scholarly assessment

Establishing Causality

How to obviate perennial problem ?

- Pape (1997) suggests 3 criteria to credit sanctions for success:

(1) the target state concedes to a significant part of the demands;

(2) sanctions are threatened or applied before the target changes its behaviour;

(3) no more-credible explanation exists for the target's change of behaviour.

EU SNS Universe: UN Autonomy

Classification depending on UN (in)action

- a) EU enacts sanctions in the absence of a UNSC mandate = AUTONOMOUS
- b) EU implements UN sanctions = no actor
ness; EU implementing agency
- c) EU implements UN sanctions and adds
own measures = supplementary sanction
ns

(Taylor 2010; Biersteker and Portela 2015)

EU SNS Universe: Types

- 1/ CFSP: Uzbekistan, Belarus, Transnistria, FRY
 - 2/ art. 96 Cotonou suspensions (development aid + trade preferences): Togo, CAR, Comoros , Rep. Guinea
 - 3/ GSP trade preferences: Burma, Belarus
 - 4/ Informal SNS: China, Cuba, Russia
- Zimbabwe: art.96 and CFSP
 - Decision-making processes differ: art.96 + GSP more structured, Commission-led.

(Simplified) Findings

- QCA inclusive: 3 combinations high consistency but low coverage
 - > suggesting that variables not key
- 1. Most effective: ACP
- 2. CFSP
- 3. Informal SNS
- 4. GSP
 - ACP: asymmetrical relationship, dependence
 - GSP: imposed on CFSP targets
 - Choice of framework depends on level of agreement in the Council

Findings: SNS theory

= Limited efficacy, limited explanatory power of the variables.

whenever they worked:

- a) by damaging prestige in the absence of ec. harm (Uzbekistan)
- a) Target not inconvenienced by disutility produced by SNS, but compelled by the prospective ec. benefits of enhanced trade and co-operation with the EU.
- Lifting was brought about by negotiation where both sides made concessions

Findings: determinants search

EU-ACP process conducive to compliance :

- SNS strategy reciprocates progress by target (= gradualism)

Open communication channels, agreed roadmap, monitoring, single negotiator

= Target assured of the possibility of lifting

Part II

SANCTIONS EVALUATION

Evolution of sanctions research

I. Negative

prior to 1985: inefficacious and no potential (Galtung, Doxey)

II. Multiple objectives of SNS:

signal disapproval, to impair ec./mil. potential of adversary (Barber, Lindsay, Baldwin, Elliot)

III. In search for the 'magic' formula

HSE: *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered* (1985)

- Inaugurated strand or research > identifying variables

INVERSE ORDER

2 logics of sanctions operation

1/ Classical "naive" theory; Galtung (1967)

eco. disintegration > pol. disintegration

➤ Until limit is reached > Leadership unseated

But:

economy adapts Leaders unaffected

2/ Targeted sanctions

- Affect key elites
- Connects w. autocratic survival - selectorate

Move to targeted sanctions

- Early 1990s UN sanctions practice deligitimised by severe humanitarian harm= Iraq, Yugoslavia, Haiti
 - Targeted sanctions
 - Free of humanitarian consequences
 - Hit responsible elites
 - = 'saved' the instrument
 - > comprehensive sanctions unlikely to be implemented

Functions of SNS

- Coercion: Compelling change in target's behaviour
- Regime change
- Preventing flow of arms, development of WMD
- weakening economic/ military potential of target
- supporting democratic opposition (bargaining chip)
- placating domestic audiences
- deterring similar behaviour by others (Miller 2014)
- identity-building
- preventing war
- supporting allies
- avoiding becoming an evasion hub

But scholarship evaluates coercive impact only

EU sanctions on Russia (2022)

- Combination of both logics
 - Comprehensive
 - Targeted logic

On top of 2014 measures -

2 sanctions regimes:

- Crimea + D+L
- Territorial integrity of Ukraine

www.sanctionsmap.eu

Objectives: Pres. von der Leyen

claimed they aimed to

'cripple Putin's ability to finance his war machine' .

'further isolate Russia and drain the resources it uses to finance this [...] war'.

'stop the group close to Putin and the architects of his war';

'hit a central sector of Russia's system, deprive it of billions of export revenues and ensure that our citizens are not subsidising Putin's war'

spoke of 'pressuring Russian elites close to Putin as well as their families and enablers';

Objectives HR/VP Borrell

'The political signal is now very strong: Europe is willing to take significant economic risks to coerce Russia for its invasion and to extend its political margin of manoeuvre vis-à-vis Moscow in the future'

'even if sanctions will not change the Russian trajectory, this does not invalidate their usefulness. Without sanctions, Russia would have its cake and eat it'

Economic impact

> downturn

- Limited impact on unemployment
- Long-term effect on living standards
- Specific industries: technology ban
- Budget: still in good shape
- Impacts on individuals

Political impacts

- No visible impact on elite support
- Decrease in popular support due to (partial) mobilisation

Assessment

- Discrepancy in pace
- Observable effects – timing
- Discrepancy in readiness/ preparation
- Increased centralisation of decision-making

Thanks!

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