
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy

Early Warning Methods



Background Report and Methodological Notes Summer 2000

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Foreword:

This report presents a framework to direct the future efforts of researchers working on the *CIFP* project to tailor it to the needs of foreign policy analysts and the early warning research community. It describes procedures to translate information from the internationally-recognized *CIFP* database, in combination with insights from foreign affairs personnel and field level specialists, into reports of imminent dangers. Additionally, since the research design is at the planning stage, this preliminary overview is intended to provide *CIFP* researchers and interested users with the opportunity to suggest improvements before its formal venture into early warning analysis. Ultimately, this endeavour is undertaken with the goal of presenting analyses and policy recommendations that will assist policy makers in taking action to prevent, contain and mitigate economic, humanitarian and environmental crises, and the outbreak of violent conflicts.

The Early Warning Framework

Introduction

In recent years, many sudden events have erupted (for instance, outbreaks of ethnic conflict, genocides and environmental disintegration) after which policymakers, and the research community tasked with keeping them abreast of current events, were faulted for failure to recognize the preconditions and preliminary events that culminated in situations of catastrophe. Though the degree of disenchantment varies, a general consensus exists that policy could have been more effective had preliminary signals been more inquisitively monitored and the teachings of history relied upon as a dependable guide. In broad terms, foreign policy critics have accused foreign ministries, international organizations and regional organizations of weakness on a variety of fronts. A brief list of their policy shortcomings includes that:

- a. policy failed to foresee the occurrence of imminent events;
- b. policy failed to prevent outcomes that, in hindsight, were avoidable;
- c. policy failed to anticipate the costs of preventable occurrences;
- d. the success of policy has not been adequately improving and shaped by history.

The term "early warning" emerged within the international affairs community in the early 1990s. Throughout the decade, it came to be used by academics, policy makers and research organizations like *GEDS*, the *State Failure Project* and *FEWER*, with more specific connotations than its ordinary use.

The motivations for exploring research of this sort are quite intuitive; it would be far more desirable and also less costly, in both resource and human terms, to *avoid* conflicts and disasters than to deal with their outbreak and aftermath.

Why the recent trend toward early warning research? A number of facilitating events have steered researchers in the direction of crisis prevention. The 1990s witnessed a variety of seemingly sudden outbreaks that caught the policy community off-guard. The decade opened with the outright disintegration of a number of long-established states, notably the former Soviet Union in 1991 followed by the entire Soviet Bloc. Subsequent years witnessed conflict outbreaks that again seemed quite sudden. Notably, the resurgence of ethnic strife in the former Yugoslavia and the ethnic rivalry in Rwanda. But in retrospect, these crises might have been foreseen by the policy community (and warnings did in fact exist), and possibly avoided, if history and present country situations were employed as a guide.

In some cases, accurate predictions existed that were overlooked by the policy community. Anderlini and Nyheim (1998) note:

"Rwanda was anything but spontaneous. . . It appeared that long before the tragedy, NGOs, UN agencies and other observers in the country were aware

and concerned about the impending violence. They'd watched and listened and reported on the heightening tension and extremist rhetoric. Grave warnings of a planned coup, an assault on UN forces, provocation to resume the civil war, and even detailed plans of genocidal killings in the capital, reached the UN secretariat in January 1994. The cable, documenting this information was placed in a separate 'black file', designed to draw attention to its content and be circulated throughout the UN Secretariat. But senior officials questioned its validity, and made no contingency plans to avert the crisis. Similar reports to the governments of France and Belgium were also ignored."

To cite another example, the *Transnational Foundation* stated in its 17 August 1998 Report:

"no outbreak of violence on earth was more predictable than the one in Kosovo." There were more early warnings about this conflict than about any other."

A lingering aftereffect of the weak collective performance of the policy community is the present preoccupation with early warning. Are there in fact commonalities in how emerge? In comparing the crises in Rwanda in 1994 and Kosovo, Howard Adelman (1999) comments:

"Well there are many similarities. Both countries were run by elected dictators. Both countries had a legacy of nationalist authoritarianism. The concept of a loyal opposition would have been odd to both systems. Both countries lacked a strong middle class. Both countries had well-developed oppositions that had put considerable pressure on the regimes for reform. The dominant extremist Hutu tried to eliminate the Tutsi from Rwanda. The dominant Serbs are trying to eliminate the Kosovars from Yugoslavia. In both cases, there was plenty of early warning of the intentions and activities of the dominant group actively abusing the human rights of the minority."

Indeed, by the mid-to-late 1990s, early warning research was perceived to be quite promising, both in terms of its ability to be accurate (as many disasters had already been preceded by warnings) and its potential to impose principals of cost-effectiveness in the resource allocation of external affairs departments.

Early Warning Methods

The Recipe for Crises

What is the formula for the outbreak of a crisis situation? Though researchers expected no easy answers in pinpointing where future hotspots would be, the challenge has turned out to be even more daunting than anticipated. What are the correlates of crises and conflicts? Can we in fact predict them based on measures that we are currently ignoring or not scrutinizing in sufficient detail?

To the uninitiated, the shortage of suggestive information preceding potentially risky situations by even high-level policy officials is a source of continual surprise. However, the complexity of acquiring meaningful and informative facts and accounts of country situations and translating them into admonitions of imminent possibilities presents a rather formidable challenge, one well-known to policy analysts and researchers alike. Our concern is that the recent lackluster success in forecasting crises is not rooted in an underlying indifference to crisis outbreak, but is largely attributable to the inherent practical and technical limitations in translating the overwhelming body of international information into meaningful signals. With the motivation of improving policy success, we explore how existing information can be translated into more useful policy analysis and advice.

The challenge of remaining eternally abreast of the events of consequence, significant developments and emerging risks in the international system is indeed a daunting task. Policy readiness demands a knowledge base that aspires to be complete and dynamic in conveying the most pertinent information that will be relevant to future outcomes. At present, it is quite difficult for analysts to meet the challenge of staying aware of all issues likely to be of future importance. This responsibility involves processing large volumes of information as it becomes available and deciphering only the most important among the myriad of noisy signals.

Why have important telltale precursors to important international events often been realized only too late and after the fact? This perpetually timely question merits an inquiry into the very nature of how the minds of experts process information in instances of successful (and even unsuccessful) forecasts. Naturally, specialists in a field, be it conflict prevention or environmental management, have an advantage over the layperson. An expert in a given area typically gathers a body of information drawing on a multitude of sources, often including news sources, publications and electronic databases. Forecasts and predictions of events involve more than familiarity with the splashy events that form the media universe but constitute only a small part of understanding future occurrences. For international outbursts, media reports tend to channel their efforts on significant events only after they have reached relatively advanced stages, if not full-blown crisis occurrence. Rather than being presented with a sequence of steps that culminate in an event like a genocide, the media client may not hear of an imminent event through reports until it actually erupts, by then, seemingly suddenly. However,

preventive policy requires focusing energies on information that can help predict events as early as possible before they occur, if not fending off their outbreak entirely.

Numerical data tends to provide a more steady and continual flow of information to policy makers than media reports, but at the same time also presents somewhat of an overweighted body of information since important and unimportant information are mixed together with little distinction between them. International time series data regularly delivers country information year by year, not all of which is useful to timely policy. Most data merely indicates that a country is well below the crisis threshold. In trying to make sense of information gathered, an expert on some form of crisis development typically neglects information of limited significance, or perhaps outright ignores some information, and focuses only on a handful of recognized barometers of crisis escalation. By filtering through the assortment of data collected, perceptions start to be formed, whether through rigorous conscious effort, or more informal generalizations as to what, when and where the greatest international risks are likely to be. For example, a fishery conservation expert might recognize when a country is reaching ecological limits based on a sustained escalation in annual landings comparable to countries that have experienced the collapse of a fish stock in the past. With less certainty, and more controversially, a political scientist might recognize a systematic pattern as to when economic depravity approaches critical levels at which social unrest of various forms increases in likelihood.

Early Warning Modeling in the *CIFP* Framework

Our investigation next turns to how the *CIFP* indicators might be incorporated into an early warning framework to improve policy readiness. There are a host of reasons to confidently expect that the already existing and publicly available *CIFP* indicators will have great value in this application. Indeed, there are reasons to anticipate that the inclusion of *CIFP* data could enhance the popularity, esteem and ultimate success of the complex art of early warning forecasting.

Most obviously, the *CIFP* is among the most comprehensive available international data sources containing a well-rounded assortment of indicators pertaining to economics, politics, social development, the environment and conflict histories. There are clear advantages to basing early warning reports on a large and diverse set of information. The development of many crisis situations is best perceived through a broad historical perspective. Take for instance the development of civil war. Which factors can we safely rule out as having no influence in the development of a civil war: economic conditions, human rights abuses, ethnic and age composition of the population, arms build ups, bureaucratic corruption, crime and black market activity? Indeed, it would be difficult to think of any country indicator of the sort in the *CIFP* that would have no conceivable linkage with the outbreak of this type of crisis.

How can we make early warning of crises a manageable task given the confluence of factors associated with any given type of crisis? Next, we describe the steps for making early warning possible in the *CIFP* framework. Our suggested approach would

collect, analyze and present information that can empower policy makers to take action in identifiable situations of risk within their sphere of influence. Though the discussion is descriptive at this stage, in the immediate future we intend to produce tangible predictions of where and when seven different types of crises are most likely to occur. The remainder of this paper proposes a four-step procedure to translate the *CIFP* indicators into meaningful measures of the degrees of the risk countries face with respect to the emergence of economic, political, humanitarian and environmental crises and the outbreak of conflict.

Understanding Crisis Development

To establish a framework for crisis development and management, we need to understand how each given type of crisis typically develops and which possible avoidance efforts can be effective. In general terms, we can categorize the contributors to crisis escalation according to whether we consider them structural factors (root causes), accelerators (precipitators/facilitators) or triggers (catalysing events). Definitions of these terms are drawn from *A Manual for Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER, 1998)* and (*Gurr and Harff, 1996*).

Structural Factors:

- background conditions that form the pre-conditions of crisis situations such as systematic political exclusion, inherent economic inequities, lack of adequate and responsive institutions, the presence of ethnic minorities, resource exhaustion, overdependence on international trade;

Accelerators:

- "feedback events that rapidly increase the level of significance of the most volatile of the general conditions, but may also signify system breakdown or basic changes in political causality" (Gurr & Harff, 1996);

Triggers:

- sudden events that act as catalysts igniting a crisis or conflict (e.g. the assassination of a leader, election fraud, a political scandal).

There has been much anticipation that an integrated approach combining all three types of information would create the long-sought robust framework for early warning analysis. However, many practical limitations have impeded the quest. Where would one find all the relevant indicators to crisis escalation? How can such quantitative and qualitative measures be combined to produce tangible early warning indicators?

The *CIFP* database is particularly well-suited to assist in the monitoring of structural factors. Indeed it already contains much of this information and can be expanded to include many of the others that are required. Furthermore, each indicator is already indexed on a nine-point scale according to its relevance to foreign policy. On the other

hand, timely information about the presence of accelerators and triggers may be better suited to country specialists and field level observations. We next discuss how the *CIFP* can be combined with the knowledge of experts producing a consolidated set of early warning indicators.

Steps for Early Warning

Step 1. Identifying Crises

What kinds of crises do foreign policy personnel need to predict? The initial step would simply identify where crises of foreign policy significance have occurred in the past. The international environment is characterised by a variety of risks of policy significance – the outbreak of conflict, natural disasters, abrupt regime changes, genocides, etc. Table 1 lists seven types of crises and provides a sample of information sources from which we can generate a list of the countries and dates when such crises have occurred in the past.

Table 1
Types of Foreign Policy Crises

Type of Crisis	Description	Information Source
I. Conflicts: 1. Internal 2. International	violent clashes within a country violent clashes between countries	KOSIMO, ICB, COW, State Failure Report, Gros, Licklider, Wallenstein and Sollenberg, Regan, Heraclides
II. Political Crises	abrupt collapse of a governing regime (violent or non-violent)	Europa Yearbook, Political Handbook of the World, the Economist
III. Economic Crises	large drops in living standards, currency collapse, collapse of exports	UN, UNDP, World Bank, IMF, ICB
IV. Humanitarian Disasters	natural disasters, food shortages, mass refugee flows	UNHCR, Relief Organizations
V. Environmental Collapse	unendurable pollution emissions	World Bank
VI. Resource Exhaustion	decline of resource stocks beyond recoverable levels	FAO, World Bank

Depending on the availability of information and number of instances of each type of crises, these broad categories may be specified in finer detail. For instance, internal crises could be broken down into instances of ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, genocides or politicides, or abrupt regime transitions (as reported in the *State Failure Report*). For each country, we would gather information regarding the types of crises that have occurred by year. The task sounds ambitious, however, we can be assured that a fairly substantial list would result since some of information sources have already aspired to gather a complete list of crises of a defined sort. For instance, the *International Crises Behaviour Project* (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1999) presents information regarding all international crises over the period 1918 to 1994.

Crisis Prevention Measures

What about emerging situations that would have developed into crises but were averted due to third party efforts (possibly grounded in some form of early warning analysis, either formal or informal)? While gathering the list of crises, we must also recognize that crisis outbreak is sometimes avoided by prevention measures, both domestically and from abroad. For instance, some imminent conflicts are averted before their outbreak by successful last minute negotiations. What are the practical implications for our early warning initiative? For any given crisis, we should take formal note of prevention efforts. Furthermore, we should extend our list of crises to include risky situations that fell short of full-scale disaster, but could have otherwise advanced into the crisis stage. Lund (1998) provides a list of types of preventive measures we might include as conflict prevention tools.

Table 2
Conflict Prevention Tools

Human Rights

Mediation
Negotiation
Conciliation
Informal consultation
Peace conference
Unilateral gestures of good will
Civilian fact-finding missions
Observers/ monitoring/ verification teams
Special envoys
Conflict prevention/ management centres
Human rights monitoring
Promotion/ advocacy of HR standards
HR institution building

Communication and Education

Support local conflict management/ resolution
Conflict management/ resolution training
Peace commissions
Non-official facilitation/ problem solving workshops
Civilian peace monitors
Internationally sponsored peace consultations
Exchange visits
Conflict resolution/ prevention centres
Peace education
Visits by eminent organisation/ individuals

Military Measures

Pre-emptive peacekeeping forces
Professionalise/ restructure military forces
Demobilisation/ reintegration
Military to military programmes
Military confidence building and security measures
Non-aggression agreements
Security guarantees
Targeted deterrence
Demilitarised zones
Arms embargo/ blockade
Threat/ projection of force
Crisis management

Economic and Social Development

Targeted economic assistance
Economic reform
Economic co-operation/ integration
Inter-communal trade
Private economic investment
Health assistance
Agricultural programmes
Conditionality for conflict prevention
Environment/ natural resource management

Judicial/Legal Process and Arrangements

- Commissions of enquiry/war crimes tribunals
- Constitutional commissions
- Judicial/legal reforms
- Police reforms
- Support local indigenous legal institutions
- Arbitration
- Adjudication

Media/ Journalism

- Peace Radio/TV
- Joint investigative reporting projects
- Media professionalisation
- International journalist training
- Civic education projects
- Peace education

Humanitarian Assistance

- Humanitarian aid
- Repatriation/ resettlement of refugees
- Capacity building for public welfare

Political Development Governance

- Political institution building
- Election monitoring
- National conferences
- Capacity building of civil society
- Power-sharing arrangement
- Sub-national devolution and autonomy
- Capacity building of authorities/ training public servants

Identifying when interventions have succeeded and failed would leave us well-poised to draw inferences about our ultimate question of concern: "Which types of foreign policy efforts are the most effective?" For instance, this can extend to peace analysis focussing on the opportunities for peacemaking and peacebuilding. What are the windows of opportunity for peacemaking? Who are the most potentially effective mediators and facilitators?

Step 2. Identifying Structural Factors

In order to monitor crisis development and dynamics, we must identify a set of indicators associated with their occurrence. Of course, most often a crisis has no single cause. Furthermore, the different contributing causes vary in importance; sometimes they reinforce each other, other times confounding influences neutralize one another. Analysis of crisis situations requires an assessment of the relative importance of different indicators and their inter-relationships.

How do we operationalize the notions presented here? A dilemma well-known to researchers of international affairs is that it is often difficult to make even popular everyday terms measurable in a universally accepted manner. For instance, though there

may be little disagreement that a factor like poor governance can contribute to the emergence of a crisis, what does the term poor governance in fact mean? How is it interpreted in terms of available measures, if it can be at all?

As the starting point, we identify a broad set of key structural factors that are alleged to be correlated with situations of crisis. These structural factors are later incorporated in a model of the most prominent and powerful crisis predictors, with a consciousness of their synergies and mitigating effects. Notably, to ensure that the *CIFP* methodology is consistent with the notions of the forerunners of the early warning research, we adopt the conceptual framework proposed *A Manual for Early Warning and Early Response (1999)* by Ed Garcia and David Nyheim of the *FEWER Secretariat* with input from a host of researchers from various institutions with an interest in early warning. By adopting the *FEWER* framework, we also integrate our efforts within this international research niche.

The first columns of Tables 3 and 4 present their categorization of early warning indicators with some minor reclassifications and a few additional indicators. Table 3 identifies the *structural causes* of crises while Table 4 lists the factors that act as *accelerators*. The second columns of each table present *CIFP* proxy variables that can be used to make the conceptual notions workable. The third columns complete each table by presenting sources from which we can draw these indicators for inclusion in the *CIFP* (though most are already included).

Table 2
Structural Factors Underlying Crisis Development

Structural Factors	Proxy	Source
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Political Performance</i></p> <p><u>Unwillingness to effectively govern</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • human rights abuses • constitutional abuses • abuses of power <p><u>Inability to effectively govern</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • systemic instability • illegitimacy • unconsolidated power • incomplete territorial control <p><u>Mismanagement</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • corruption <p><u>Unstable social structure</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • changing elites • pronounced social stratification 	<p>civil liberties index executive constraint index political rights index</p> <p>regime durability index competitiveness of participation perception of experts perception of experts</p> <p>bureaucratic corruption index</p> <p>perception of experts perception of experts</p>	<p>Freedom House Polity 2000 Freedom House</p> <p>Polity 2000 Polity 2000 country specialist survey country specialist survey</p> <p>Transparency International</p> <p>country specialist survey country specialist survey</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Economic Performance</i></p> <p><u>Economic Stability</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • prevalence of poverty • degree of unemployment • inflation/ price stability <p><u>Economic Inequality</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • disparity and inequality • land distribution • access to social security/welfare 	<p>fraction of population below poverty line unemployment rate inflation rate</p> <p>Gini coefficient, GEM, primary schooling perception of residents social program spending</p>	<p>UNDP World Bank World Bank</p> <p>UNDP country specialist survey UN</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Military and security</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • security expenditure • growing illicit arms trade • number of private security firms 	<p>military expenditure/GDP ratio arms imports estimates</p>	<p>SIPRI SIPRI country specialist survey</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Environment & Resource Management</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • agricultural failure • pollution • environmental disaster 	<p>crop yields ground level smog, safe drinking water resource stocks</p>	<p>FAO World Bank FAO</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Socio-cultural Factors</i></p> <p><u>Media and Propaganda</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • inflammatory statements • exploitation of divisions/tensions 	<p>perception of experts perception of experts</p>	<p>country specialist survey country specialist survey</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Institutions and Events</i></p> <p><u>Institutional</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • lack of civil institutions • link between populous-government <p><u>Religious institutions</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • antagonistic behaviour • propaganda <p><u>Police and judiciary</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • institutional bias 	<p>regulation of participation competitiveness of participation</p> <p>perception of experts perception of experts</p> <p>perception of experts</p>	<p>Polity 2000 Polity 2000</p> <p>country specialist survey country specialist survey</p> <p>country specialist survey</p>

Table 3

Crisis Accelerators

Accelerators	Proxy	Source
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Political</i></p> <p><u>Domestic insecurity</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • inability, on the part of the state, to deliver security and stability • security forces on the streets • inability to maintain territorial control • imposition of curfews <p><u>Population movements</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • civilian movement across border • restriction of movement into and out of the state • IDPs and refugees <p><u>Political opposition/ Government oppression</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • proliferation of opposition groups • frequency of political arrests • miniaturisation of dissent • problems processing dissent • disillusionment with security apparatus • dissatisfaction with the management of state affairs • unfulfilled expectations <p><u>Consolidation of opposition</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • increased opposition activity • increase in size and cohesion of opposition groups 	<p>perception of experts</p> <p>perception of experts</p> <p>perception of experts</p> <p>perception of experts</p> <p>perception of experts</p> <p>perception of experts</p> <p>number of refugees and IDPs</p> <p>executive recruitment competition</p> <p>perception of residents, human rights agency reports</p> <p>political influence of minorities index</p> <p>perception of experts</p> <p>perception of experts</p> <p>perception of experts</p> <p>perception of experts</p> <p>perception of experts</p> <p>perception of experts</p> <p>perception of experts</p> <p>perception of experts</p> <p>perception of experts</p>	<p>country specialist survey</p> <p>country specialist survey</p> <p>country specialist survey</p> <p>country specialist survey</p> <p>country specialist survey</p> <p>country specialist survey</p> <p>UNHCR</p> <p>Polity 98</p> <p>country specialist survey, Amnesty International</p> <p>Minorities at Risk</p> <p>country specialist survey</p> <p>country specialist survey</p> <p>country specialist survey</p> <p>country specialist survey</p> <p>country specialist survey</p> <p>country specialist survey</p> <p>country specialist survey</p> <p>country specialist survey</p> <p>country specialist survey</p> <p>country specialist survey</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Economic</i></p> <p><u>International confidence</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • capital flight • foreign debt • currency stability • foreign exchange reserves <p><u>Economic decline</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • increasing poverty/ economic disparity • food shortages 	<p>financial market credit ratings</p> <p>foreign debt to GDP ratio</p> <p>variance of exchange rate</p> <p>depletion of foreign exchange reserves</p> <p>change in fraction below poverty line</p> <p>perception of residents, calories per day</p>	<p>Financial Institutions</p> <p>World Bank</p> <p>IMF</p> <p>IMF</p> <p>World Bank</p> <p>country specialist survey, World Bank</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Socio-cultural</i></p> <p><u>Ethnicity</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ethnic tension/violence • historical rivalries • territorial disputes • antagonistic behaviour • institutionalised persecution • language laws 	<p>presence of ethnic disputes</p> <p>perception of experts</p> <p>number of territorial disputes</p> <p>perception of experts</p> <p>perception of experts</p> <p>perception of experts</p>	<p>Minorities at Risk</p> <p>country specialist survey</p> <p>CIA World Factbook</p> <p>country specialist survey</p> <p>country specialist survey</p> <p>country specialist survey</p>

The CIPF Survey of Country Specialists

Notably, some of the notions emerging from the Garcia-Nyheim framework have no obvious published sources from which we can gather them. Nonetheless, since such hard to find information is often the most vital to predicting crisis outbreak, we operationalize all the proposed indicators through a combination of existing *CIFP* indicators and a proposed survey of expert foreign affairs personnel, ideally including those working abroad. Gathering information via a survey has several advantages. First, it addresses the major factors proposed to be important to early warning research. Second, the model would incorporate field level observations of significant developments. Third, by confining field level observations to only the most difficult to observe crisis causes, we minimize the costs of gathering this key information. Fourth, survey questions can ask for numerical responses to our questions which will be comparable to our existing indicators.

The information that is required of the *CIFP* survey is both objective and subjective information. A thirty-question model survey of country experts that would provide the required information is included in the Appendix.

Step 3. Establishing Aggregate Indices of Well-Being

An important question that lingers is "What is the appropriate means to combine the various sub indicators into broadly-based indicators of country risk?" Conceptually, there is no end to the number of influences we could consider that are correlated to a given form of crisis. One means of determining causal links would be through multivariate regression procedures. However, the ability to identify causal links is somewhat limited. Indeed, in a binary regression framework, it' s hard to conceive of any model specification for which an analyst could not be accused of "omitted variable bias" in determining what factors culminate in crises. Researchers following this approach could fall into the trap of empiricism - the practice of identifying correlations, both causal and spurious, and subsequently adopting and then theoretically rationalizing only the strongest ones. This is not a recommended approach since meaningful theoretical relationships often have no support statistically (especially through misspecified regression models) while misguided notions sometimes are favoured by statistical grounding.

Our approach emphasizes the notion of tradeoffs in determining well-being. For instance, in developing an overall measure of economic well-being in a country, how should we weight the following measures:

- i. prevalence of poverty;
- ii. unemployment;
- iii. inflation;

It' s apparent that the various components of an index are not of equal importance. But how should we determine appropriate weights? Since scientific methods fail to

suggest an exact approach, one means to proceed would be to weight the individual indicators based on the expertise of those knowledgeable about the emergence of crisis situations in the international environment. A second survey, this one targeted at foreign policy personnel is included in the Appendix as a model for this procedure. Its objective is to have the *CIFP* indicators reflect the state of our understanding of the relative importance of the various subcomponents of each of our indices. Averages would be taken from those in the policy community which in turn would form the basis of our indicator weights.

Step 4: Modelling

This leads us to our final step in identifying risky situations and what preventive actions ought to be considered. At this stage in our collection effort, we will have a list of crises and near crises, a set of key indexed structural factors that have led to their development, a list of incidents that acted as accelerators and triggers, and finally a set of field surveys reporting where key conditions are currently present. Finally, by processing this information in a systematic fashion, we will finally be able to assess which countries are most at risk of the seven forms of crises.

Regression procedures, like those of the *State Failure Project*, can be useful for this purpose. Logit regressions could provide a practical form of linking the incidence of a given type of crisis (definitionally, a zero one variable) to a myriad of underlying factors.

$$\text{Crisis Occurrence}_i = \text{constant} + \beta_k \cdot X_i + \text{random error}_i$$

where i : number of observations;
 k : number of indices.

Of course, it won' t be obvious which among our indices should be included for a given type of crises. Should lagged variables be included? If so, from how far back? We will also need to include the factors that acted to prevent crisis occurrence among the explanatory variables. Additionally, we should include whether accelerators and triggers were present or absent. The specification of logit regression models for each of the crises will involve much trial and error before arriving at models that can reasonably be interpreted as having sufficient explanatory power. The degree of explanatory power could be judged by the percentage of correct predictions of crisis situations that a given set of independent variables produce in a least squares framework.

After estimating an empirical model of this sort based on past data, at last, we will be able to generate country risk assessments. By substituting current country variables into the given regressions, we could generate the estimated probabilities of crisis occurrence (the degree of risk) for the seven types of crises for every country. In the prevention domain, the coefficients of for our prevention tools variables can also lead us to recommend the strategies that have worked most effectively in the past at averting the given type of crisis.

Success Measures

Now that the procedure for how to incorporate the *CIFP* in an early warning framework has been fully described, how should we measure the success of a far-reaching research endeavour such as the one proposed in this report? The percentage of crises that would have been predicted before they happened provides an appealing measure. In a very real sense, the penultimate goal of early warning is a zero success rate; that is, the objective of such predictive analysis is to recommend actions to ensure that undesirable situations don't occur. Unlike a meteorologist, an early warning researcher can often have an influence on disaster avoidance. However, even if we were to fail to satisfy numerical measures of success, the *CIFP* early warning initiative would still reap dividends to policymakers through the presentation of the most important information from the various actors in the world of international affairs. The policy community would receive focussed reports for all countries grounded in the data provided by reputable organizations, the observations of country specialists and a combined analysis of both with an eye toward where similar conditions have produced problems in the past. The non-occurrence of a crisis need not signify that the underlying conditions should not merit attention.

Conclusion

The study has discussed the benefits of developing a carefully selected assortment of the most informative *CIFP* indicators, along with supplementary information, into an early warning framework. We hope to present these indicators to interested analysts of international affairs in a format that is readily interpretable, easy to use and available through the Internet.

The effectiveness and usefulness of our risk assessment modelling will ultimately be judged by its success as a predictive apparatus. The ultimate goal of the *CIFP* endeavour is to make foreign policy more effective and efficient by identifying areas where resources can have the largest effect. The data analysis proposed in this paper may prove helpful in this regard and can be used to develop scenarios for the purposes of policy planning on specific issues. Moreover, since a long-term goal for policymakers is to push for a stronger understanding of the root causes of crises and conflict and to relate aid directly to preventive initiatives, we can attempt to identify key cause-and-effect relationships through simple two-way correlation analyses of variables, or, in the presence of multiple influences, by controlling for various factors through regression techniques and assessments of goodness of fit. In applying the findings of the *CIFP's* venture into early warning analysis, those countries whose economies are declining, whose political institutions are failing, and where human rights are not respected will also become the ones experiencing the greatest foreign policy attention.

The *CIFP's* excursion into risk assessment modelling is still in its infancy. We hope to expand and further refine our methods in the very near future. Of course, all

feedback from policymakers and researchers will be minded. Additional variables can be incorporated, indexing methods can be enhanced, or entirely new directions can be explored. Ultimately, the success or failure of our early warning reports will depend heavily on our ability to convey country data in combination with field report information and the insights of our statistical forecasting techniques to produce sensible and accurate prognoses.

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Perceptions

Conflict Generating Factors

Stakeholders and their Agendas

-cards at their disposal - can' t say when

Peace Generating Factors

specify the limitations

Visit the EW in the field - draw out key indicators

Dynamic Indicators - Weapons availability, massacres,

Subsequent research

ACCELERATORS: Catalysts or triggers that can spark the outbreak of violence or the escalation of violence. Accelerators are "events outside the parameters of the model: they are essentially feedback events that rapidly increase the level of significance of the most volatile of the general conditions, but may also signify system- breakdown or basic changes in political causality" (Gurr & Harff, 1996:-47). Examples include: (1) New discriminatory policies by a regime; (2) Clashes between regime supporters and target groups; (3) Increased external support for politically active groups; (4) Threats of external involvement not backed by action; (5) Increase in size and cohesion of opposition group; (6) Violent opposition by kindred groups; (7) Aggressive posturing by opposition groups; and (8) Increase in life integrity violations. (Harff, 1996; cit. Leitenberg, 1997:3-6).

The manual reflects FEWER's definition and approach to early warning, where early warning is defined as "the collection and analysis of information about potential and actual conflict situations, and the provision of policy options to influential actors at the national, regional and international levels that may promote sustainable peace." Early warning is not only about assessing the possibility of conflict but also identifying the possible resurgence of conflict and the opportunities for peace. FEWER members see the goals of early warning as multiple:

- to identify and assess the most salient conflict indicators;
- to assess likely trends and scenarios;
- to formulate conclusions based on the interaction of conflict dynamics; and
- to translate these conclusions into policy recommendations for local, regional and international actors

There is little consensus in the field, however, as to what constitutes best practice in early warning and response development. There is little agreement among theoreticians and practitioners on practical methodology, sources, and objectives for early warning. Further, we

know little about the kinds of conflict prevention instruments that can be used to advance different approaches to peace.

The manual does not guarantee effective prediction of conflict, or the identification of the best approaches for conflict prevention. It is a framework which relies completely on the quality of information and analysis introduced, as well as the user's ability to ensure that the perspectives of different parties in a conflict are represented in the exercise.

i. Country/republic reports - providing background information, current situation, analysis of events related to conflict and peace, and policy recommendations.

ii. Regional reports - providing a wider perspective on stability and security issues in the region, and links between different groups and actors;

Countries:

Kenya

Uganda

Tanzania

Philippines

Malaysia

Regions:

West Africa

Sierra Leone

Nigeria)

Violent Conflicts

How do violent conflicts develop?

the dynamics of social conflicts

Environment

Human Security

Our goal is to draw together and support existing early warning networks to produce early warning reports containing analyses and policy recommendations which assist policy makers into taking action to prevent, contain and mitigate violent conflicts.

generating awareness and the political will to be proactive, not just reactive in the prevention of conflict.

3. regular monitoring, collection and analysis of information from open sources about the outbreak, resurgence or escalation of violent conflict;

4. identifying and assessing potential opportunities for conflict prevention and peace making; and

5. providing realistic and feasible policy options to influential actors at the national, regional and international levels that would support the building of sustainable peace.

i. Country/republic reports - providing background information, current situation, analysis of events related to conflict and peace, and policy recommendations.

ii. Regional reports - providing a wider perspective on stability and security issues in the region, and links between different groups and actors;

iii. Thematic reports - highlighting key issues which cross-cut the region and have a direct impact on conflict and peace dynamics.

Hot Spots

Rwanda

In January of 1993, an international human rights investigation team reported on what appeared to be a genocide in Rwanda, though the phrase was subsequently withdrawn in the published report.

-genocide of 1994 - the dominant extremist Hutu tried to eliminate the Tutsi from Rwanda.

run by an elected dictator

a legacy of nationalist authoritarianism

The concept of a loyal opposition would have been odd to the system

lacks a strong middle class
well-developed oppositions that had put considerable pressure on the regime for reform.
there were clear and unequivocal
warnings that peacekeeping forces would be targeted for reprisals. It cost 10 Belgian Blue Berets their lives.
a peace agreement was tantalizingly near - the Arusha Accords in the Rwandan crisis -
the delegation from the government side of Rwanda was divided and it faced a united and disciplined negotiating team representing the Rwanda Patriotic Front.

Zaire

1996

The Caucasus

The region is one of the most conflict-prone areas of the world.
Following the war in Chechnya, there has been great concern about other conflicts flaring up in the Caucasus.

- Ethno-political hostilities,
- disputes over ownership of land and territories
- weapons proliferation
- and increasing criminal and terrorist activities.

Because of its proximity to the oil fields of the Caspian, and the pipeline routes, the Caucasus are also of immense strategic importance.

Georgia

Georgia is strategically located on the eastern coast of the Black Sea between Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey. The country covers 69,700 square kilometres and is populated with 5.6 million inhabitants from a diverse number of religious and ethnic groups.

Ethnic Georgians form the titular majority at 70.1% of the population, but there are significant numbers of Armenians at 8.1% of the population. Russians comprise 6.3%, Azeri 5.7%, Ossetians 3.0%, Greeks 1.9%, and Abkhazians 1.8%.

Religiously, Georgia is split into three major groups. Orthodox Christians form the majority, but there are also significant groups of Armenian Gregorians and Muslims (Azeri, Meskhetian Turks).

During Soviet times, there were three autonomous regions within Georgia' s boundaries and these divisions have formed a major basis for the conflicts of the present. The borders of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic and the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast were drawn up according to ethnic divisions, while the Ajarian Autonomous Republic was constructed according to its confessional difference.

1991 AND BEYOND

Since the break up of the Soviet Union in 1991, Georgia has been riven with violent ethnic conflict. The demands of Abkhazia and South Ossetia for secession from the newly formed Georgian state have led to the escalation of ethno-territorial war in both regions. In military terms, both the Abkhazians and South Ossetians defeated the Georgian forces and they have both established de facto control over their regions. However, the lack of de jure control provides a continuing source of conflict.

In December-January 1991-1992 Georgia's first democratically elected leader, the populist/nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was ousted in a military coup, leading the country to the brink of civil war as the bitter split between the supporters and opponents of the charismatic leader deepened.

In the years that followed Georgia teetered on the edge of total anarchy and economic collapse. But peace agreements and cease-fires struck in 1994 have meant that Georgia has since achieved a degree of stability and economic development and progress has now been made towards democratic and market reform.

However, a number of vital problems remain and leave the way open for the re-emergence of serious conflict. The state building process has yet to be consolidated, security is still fragile and prosperity belongs only to a small elite.

In May 1998 the fragile peace in Georgia was broken by new outbreaks of fighting in the Gali region of Abkhazia. Abkhazian forces defeated Georgian guerrillas to gain full control of this former buffer zone, creating a new wave of 40,000 internally displaced people. There is now a risk that violence will spread into the volatile Megrelia region, a stronghold of supporters of the former nationalist president Zviad Gamsakhurdia. The Georgian government has begun to allocate more resources to military build-up, partly at the expense of the salaries of state employees.

In June 1998 agreement was reached by Georgia and Russia agreement to withdraw Russian troops from the outer CIS borders. But this may aggravate tensions in the Ajaria and Javakheti border regions. Locals object to the deployment of new Georgian border guards, and may see it as a move to increase central Georgian influence in their region.

In the run up to Georgian parliamentary elections in 1999 and presidential elections in 2000, tension is intensifying as political powers begin to form alliances. A major alternative power centre is developing around the Ajarian leader, Aslan Abashidze, who has repeatedly challenged the authority of the central Georgian government.

2. POPULATION AND POST-SOVIET TIMES

In the first half of 1998, the security situation deteriorated with the outbreak of renewed hostilities in Abkhazia. However, government intervention appears to have ensured that a major crisis was avoided. A major challenge for Georgia' s future is the strengthening of a democratic political culture and the empowerment of its democratic institutions.

Until now, its stability seems to have largely depended on the considerable balancing skills of its 70 year old president Eduard Shevardnadze.

African Great Lakes

This part of the world has been suffering from eruptions of violence and a resurgence of conflict for many years. Since 1994, the entire region has gradually become more unstable

In August 1998 factional disputes within Laurent Kabila' s erstwhile military alliance finally erupted into open conflict. The rebellion, primarily led by the Banyamulenge (ethnic Tutsis), started to the east, in Kivu, and spread.

Ethno-political tensions fuelled this conflict. The Banyamulenge, Kabila' s erstwhile supporters, are seeking the right to citizenship and land ownership. But in an effort to gain widespread popularity and counter criticism of foreign interference in the DRC, Kabila has resorted to nationalistic rhetoric, thereby alienating the minority group.

Incidences of ethnic persecution against the Banyamulenge have increased.

Conditions are further exacerbated by the continued presence of armed militia groups and the widespread availability of small arms. A number of local actors are committing gross human rights abuses.

The governments of Rwanda (supporters of the Banyamulenge) and Uganda have used this resurgence of conflict to further undermine Kabila' s government. However, their involvement into the internal affairs of the DRC has elicited both political and military responses from other nations in the region. Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad and Sudan have pledged their support and their troops to Kabila.

The danger of escalation into a regional conflict is great. The threat of a massive humanitarian disaster, characterised by food shortages, refugee flows, human rights abuses and killings is growing. As more states get involved and the situation grows more protracted, seeking a solution becomes more complex.

International response has been neither decisive nor effective.

Democratic Republic of Congo

The resurgence of conflict in August 1998 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was no surprise to analysts and observers in the region. It was well known that Kabila had failed to consolidate or establish his leadership effectively. His power base was further eroded when one-time allies in Rwanda and Uganda withdrew their support.

On August 2nd, Kabila's decision to expel Rwandese and Ugandan contingents from his army triggered the rebellion. These foreign contingents had assisted in ousting former president Mobutu Sese Seko. The expulsion was seen as an attempt to defuse increasing public criticism of the presence and dominance of foreign troops in the DRC armed forces. At the same time Kabila's relations with Uganda and Rwanda was deteriorating. This was largely due to Kabila's inability to pacify rebel movements based in eastern DRC and hostile to the Rwandese and Ugandan governments.

Furthermore, in a bid to 'integrate' the Banyamulenge (Tutsi minorities) with other sectors of Congolese society, Kabila attempted to relocate and transfer many of their soldiers and administrators away from Kivu and the east to other areas of the DRC. Yet this strategy was counter-productive. The Banyamulenge perceived it as a threat to their security and status in the DRC. Moreover threatened by Kabila's nationalistic rhetoric, relations between them soured and tensions mounted. Like Mobutu before him, Kabila has failed to tackle the status of minority groups in the DRC.

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INTERNAL REBELLION

For many, Kabila also betrayed the ideals of the rebellion against Mobutu. Within his own ranks there was growing discontent regarding the level of corruption, mismanagement, human rights violations and foreign and minority interference and control of power.

The seeds of the rebellion of August 1998 were planted twelve months earlier, just ninety days after Kabila assumed power in the DRC. Already at that time, there were disgruntled elements within his organisation, many of whom

opposed Kabila' s style of leadership.

They met in Goma and established the Congolese Rally for Democracy (CRD), with the following objectives:

i. seek ways of ending the emerging political dictatorship in the DRC by establishing a democratic system and the rule of law; ii. initiate a process of change that would address such issues like citizenship and minorities; and iii. review the deteriorating social welfare and dignity of all Congolese and pursue regional economic and political integration.

Spearheaded by the Banyamulenge, the armed campaign of August 1998 began with sweeping victories in eastern DRC. The southern and northern provinces of Kivu were overrun within days. By August 8th, plane load of rebel troops had landed in the south-west DRC (Bakongo Province) and overran the towns of Kitona, Moanda, Banana and Matadi, bringing them to within 150 km of Kinshasa.

Their advance to the capital was halted by the military intervention of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. Within days, the rebel insurgency was defeated on the western front. Their numbers running low, the rebels have allegedly recruited mercenaries from Serbia, Colombia, Somalia and South Africa.

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REBEL LEADERS

The leadership of the rebel faction, the Congolese Movement for Democracy (CDM), are former Kabila confidants who held senior positions in his government. Among them are former ex-foreign minister Bizima Karaha and senior government advisor Deogratias Bugera. Other key personalities in the rebel ranks are the long time opposition politician Z' ahidi Ngoma (coordinator of the rebellion), the exiled academic Wamba dia Wamba, the political activist Emile Ilunga, and Jean Pierre Ondekane, acting as the commander of the rebel armed wing, the Forces of the Future Party (FPP).

Kabila however, maintained and accused the governments of Rwanda and Uganda of masterminding the rebellion by supporting and manipulating the Banyamulenge. Although the Rwandeses and Ugandans denied these allegations,

there is little doubt that not only they have been supportive of the rebels, but also have used the opportunity to flush out insurgency movements based in the DRC, and active in their own countries.

THESAURUS AND GLOSSARY OF
EARLY WARNING AND CONFLICT PREVENTION TERMS
ABRIDGED VERSION

BY ALEX P. SCHMID
PIOOM

"...the terminologies presently used to distinguish types of inter-nal war vary greatly, are generally ambiguous, often define overlap-ping phenomena, or phenom-ena difficult to distinguish in practice, and rarely based on clearly discern-ible analytical needs. For few phenom-ena do social science, history, and conven-tional language offer so various and vague a vocabulary....:

(Eckstein, repr. 1972: 11).

INTRODUCTION

This is the abridged version of the Thesaurus and Glossary of Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Terms. The full text presents over 400 terms definitions of terms and con-cepts used in conflict analysis, early warning and conflict prevention. The terms chosen for this version are those used and inter-changed most commonly in conflict and peace research discourse.

Many of the terms have more than one defintion, but in this abridged volume, the aim has been to present the most comprehensive, and succinct definitions for each term. As a result, in some cases there are abbreviations and abridgements of the original definitions as well.

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THE RATIONALE

At present, NGOs, IGOs, and acade-mic research-ers use various terms for the same or similar under-lying concepts, but this causes confusion as there is:

- i. considerable conceptual diversity (i.e. alternative definitions are used for the same abstract idea); and
- ii. terminological diversity (i.e. alternative expressions are used for the same word content).

To minimise this confusion and bring greater analytical clarity, it is important to provide distinct definitions for these terms. I did this by reviewing over 200 books and articles and selecting the most preferable and comprehensive definitions. My hope therefore, is that this thesaurus gives the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) and other users a selection of conflict terms which will;

acquaint the reader with current conflict and negotiation terminology;
indicate the preferred terms when listing more than one definition (*)
illustrate some concepts and terms with empirical data;
occasionally offer a definition where none or no adequate one could be found; and
offer more specific explanations for some words, (e.g. the 'early' in early warning should refer to a 6-12 month period into the future, given that the UN requires approximately 6 months to mount an intervention force).

It is organised alphabetically, with sources indicated directly after the text.

When an entry is taken, in whole or in part, verbatim from the source listed between brackets (and fully listed in the bibliography) this is indicated by quotation marks [".".].

Where passages have been summarised from the works of two or more authors, there are no quotation marks but a source indication.

Where entries reflect no single source, the definition is my own, and is not annotated.

In all cases the best existing definitions are offered.

Compound terms are usually reversed (e.g. ' Conflict, ethnic' for ' Ethnic conflict')

For the Abridged version, where definitions have been shortened or edited together, there is an indication (+).

COMPLETE LIST OF TERMS

Accelerators
Adjudication
Advocacy
Agenda For Peace
Aggression:
Arbitration
Armed Conflicts
Balance of Power
Bargaining
Bargaining, Distributive
Bargaining, Integrative
Bargaining, Interest-Based,
Positional
BATNA
Capacity-Building
Carrot & Stick Approach
Causes of Internal Conflicts
Civic-Society Building:
Civil Society
Civil War
CNN-Factor
Coalition-building
Coercive Diplomacy
Complex Humanitarian
Emergency (CHE)
Conflict
Conflict Analysis
Conflict Among Democracies
Conflict, Asymmetry
Conflict, Dysfunctional
Conflicts, Costs of
(CIAS)
Conflict Prevention
Conflict Resolution
Conflict Transformation
Diplomacy
Diplomacy, Multi-Track
Diplomacy, Track Two
Early Action
Early Warning
Early Warning, When?
Early Warning, About What?

Early Warning, Whom?
Ethnic Cleansing
Ethno-nationalism
Ethno-political Conflicts
Fact-Finding
Facilitation
Genocide
Good Offices
Guerrilla warfare
 Homans' Theorem
 Humanitarian Action
 Hurting Stalemate
 Impartiality
 Indicators
 Intervention
 Justice (Legal)
 Law of War
 Mediation
 Monitoring
 Negotiation
 Negotiation Strategy
 Peace
 Peace-Building
 Peace-Enforcement
 Peace-Keeping Forces
 Peace-Keeping Mandate
 Peace-Making
 Post-Conflict Reconstruction
 Preventive Diplomacy
 Preventive Strategies
 Problem-Solving Approach
 Protracted Social Conflicts
 Provention
 Reconciliation
 Reconstruction
 Relief
 ReliefWeb
 Repression
 Risk
 Risk Assessment
 Scenarios
 Security
 Settlement Escrow
 Stalemate, (Mutual) Hurting
 State Failure
 Terrorism

Third Party
Tragedy of the Commons
Triggers
Truth Commission
Humanitarian Affairs
War
Win-Lose Outcome
Win-Win Outcome
Zero-Sum Outcome

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THE ABRIDGED THESAURUS & GLOSSARY ON CONFLICT PREVENTION & EARLY WARNING

ALPHABETICAL LISTING

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ACCELERATORS: Catalysts or triggers that can spark the outbreak of violence or the escalation of violence. Accelerators are "events outside the parameters of the model: they are essentially feedback events that rapidly increase the level of significance of the most volatile of the general conditions, but may also signify system- breakdown or basic changes in political causality" (Gurr & Harff, 1996:-47). Examples include: (1) New discriminatory policies by a regime; (2) Clashes between regime supporters and target groups; (3) Increased external support for politically active groups; (4) Threats of external involvement not backed by action; (5) Increase in size and cohesion of opposition group; (6) Violent opposition by kindred groups; (7) Aggressive posturing by opposition groups; and (8) Increase in life integrity violations. (Harff, 1996; cit. Leitenberg, 1997:3-6).

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ADJUDICATION: Instrument of conflict management where 1) the adversaries have no influence in choosing the third party, 2) only one party is needed for an intervention to occur, and 3) the decision-making authority is a judge. The focus of inter-vention is a binding, law-based result which is in the nature of a win-lose outcome (Kleiboer, 1997:9). Adjudication, either by court trial or arbitration can

be regarded as a "formal, coercive, backward-looking, adversarial, and rights-based" approach to solve a conflict. (Goodpaster, 1997: 204).

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ADVOCACY: Partial third party entreaties usually on behalf of one party to the conflict (often the weaker one) to external decision makers and power brokers. Advocacy campaigns raise awareness about particular issues (e.g. landmines) and conditions, and aim to bring about policy changes.

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AGENDA FOR PEACE: Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's entreaty on the need for more active UN involvement in the management of intra-state conflicts. "Preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peacemaking and peacekeeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is obtained. If successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peace building, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:11-12). The Supplement was completed in 1995.

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* **AGGRESSION:** "The armed attack of one state on another, an international crime. The UN definition adopted in 1974 lists actions taken by one state against another that are viewed as acts of aggression. In international law, the list includes, a first-strike armed attack by one state on the territory of another, or an attack on its armed forces. The term 'indirect aggression' refers to the dispatching by, or on behalf of a state, armed bands, groups, irregular forces or violent persons onto the territory of another state...to apply armed force on a large scale +." (Demurenko & Nikitin, 1997:113).

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***ARBITRATION:** Traditional method of dispute settlement whereby the conflicting parties voluntarily seek out a single arbiter or arbitration court to arrive at a final judgement. The arbiter is an authoritative and legitimate third party, superior in

strength to the parties to the dispute. The recom-men-da-tion reached by a (neu-tral) arbi-ter...is con-sidered bindi-ng (+) (Hamzeh,n.d.:18-19; Kleiboer, 1997:9). "...Arbitra-tion may be...' non-binding' (the parties agree only to consider it, sometimes as an aid to negotiation)...The arbitrating role of the third party is different from third-party facilitati-on...The essential difference [with negotiation] is that in arbitration the parties main or only communication is with the third-party arbitrator, on whose authority they rely. +" (In-terna-tional Alert, 1996, III:53-54).

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* ARMED CONFLICTS: Combat between forces both possessing weapons of war. "Hostilities of a kind which breach, or threa-ten to breach, interna-tional peace and security - such as invasions, interventi-ons, border clashes and incursions; and also civil strife with some external dimension (e.g. support from external patrons, or the threat of slip-over effects in neighbouring countries from refugee flows and the like +)." (Evans, 1993:7).

Armed Conflicts: "The use of armed force by two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state,[when it] results in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year. Armed con-flicts are grouped into three catego-ries: (1) Minor armed conflicts, in which the battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict are below 1000; (2) Intermediate conflicts, in which there are more than 1,000 battle-related deaths recorded during the course of the con-flict, and in which [at least] 25 but less than 1,000 deaths have occurred -du-ring a particular year; and (3) Wars, in which there are more than 1,000 battle-related deaths during one particular year. (The two latter categories are sometimes referred to as major armed conflicts.) (Wallenstein & Axell; cit. De Goor, 1996:3).

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BALANCE OF POWER: Conflict management method in international relations whereby the hegemonic tendencies of any single power is counter-balanced by an alliance or realignment amongst other states. A balance of an interstate

power system is generally regarded as being stable if:
(a) no single state achieves a dominant position;(b)
the independence of the great powers is assured; and
(c) major wars are avoided + (Levy, 1992:66).

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BARGAINING: Process of give and take during negotiations, beginning with a first offer (entry point) from each side and ending - if negotiations are not aborted - with final offers (exit points). Agreements may be reached by compromising on each single issue or by trading concessions on one issue for 'exchanging points' by the other side on another. Homan's Theorem states that "the more the items at stake can be divided into goods valued more by one party than they cost to the other, and goods valued more by the other party than they cost to the first, the greater the chances of successful outcomes." (Homans, 1961:62). 'BATNA' ; a bargaining process is aborted if one or both sides have a better alternative than a negotiated agreement. (Berridge, 1995:143). Bargaining, Distributive: competitive, power-based, zero-sum approach to negotiation, which seeks to achieve a better outcome than the opponent. Bargaining, Integrative: co-operative, non-zero sum approach to negotiation, whereby mutual gain and the promotion of common interests are sought by conflicting parties. Bargaining, Interest-Based, Positional: approach to negotiation whereby conflict parties focus on the basis of their underlying interests rather than on the basis of firm positions which are hard to leave without loss of face.

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CAPACITY-BUILDING: "The development of individual and collective abilities or capabilities to transform conflict from violence into a positive, constructive force. Collectively, capacity-building also includes the institutions (local government, judiciary etc.) which allow society to handle conflict without it turning into violence." (International Alert, 1996, III:1).

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CARROT & STICK APPROACH: Combined application of incentives (carrots) and negative

sanctions (stick) to bring about a compromise or change of mind amongst the conflicting parties.

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CAUSES OF INTERNAL CONFLICTS: Conflicts are rarely mono-casual. The most frequent underlying causes of post-1945 conflicts have been ethnic or identity-based (disputes arising out of ethnic, religious or linguistic differences); related to governance (efforts to change the form of government or the party in power); independence (either in the form of decolonization or separatist state formation); the control of natural resources (oil, water); strategic (to gain an economic or geopolitical advantage), or territorial.

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CIVIL SOCIETY: A collective entity existing independently of the state; a 'public space' between citizen and government, between economy and the state, composed of non-governmental organisations, social movements and professional and voluntary associations, that structures society and creates networks of influence and pressure groups able if necessary, to resist the holders of state power. (Seligman, 1992:5).

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CIVIL-SOCIETY BUILDING: Strengthening of "independent non-governmental and non-military organisations, including helping voluntary organisations develop legal, financial and regulatory frameworks." (Lund, 1997:3-240).

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CIVIL WAR: Large-scale armed conflict within one country fought either between the regime in power and challengers or, in failing states with no recognised authority, between warlords or communal groups (Weiss & Collins, 1996:21-7; Licklider, 1993:9). There are two basic variants of civil wars: 1) when the control of the state is the source of contest; 2) when one part of the population wants to form a new state or join a neighbouring state. Civil wars can be triggered by external factors (relatively rare). Most often they are the result of intra-elite conflicts.

Most civil wars involve more than one element of the following: 1. Secessionist civil war; 2. Revolutionary guerrilla war; 3. Conflicts bet. military and civilian authorities (including police vs. military); 4. Criminal gang wars, among themselves and against the state; 5. Terrorist campaigns; 6. Religious sects and fundamentalist movements; 7. Genocidal campaigns against, and ethnic cleansing of, minorities; 8. Conflict between the state and (sectors of) society; 9. Conflicts between two peoples or nations for control of one territory; 10. Conflicts between factions of parties or armed forces (warlordism); 11. Conflicts bet. religious, ethnic, communal or, linguistic groups, tribes or clans; 12. Wars between nomadic peoples and sedentary people; 13. Clashes between immigrants and natives.

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CNN-FACTOR: Alleged emotional influence of massive and direct television coverage and consequent mass arousal on governmental decision-making in humanitarian emergency situations ("CNN got us into Somalia, and CNN got us out"). Informed observers challenge this view and hold that media follow government policy steps rather than the other way round (Leitenberg, 1997:1-6).

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COALITION-BUILDING: Bringing together different parties and interest groups, who share an interest in one issue area, to prepare for confrontation with an adversary or to end a conflict.

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COERCIVE DIPLOMACY: Gunboat diplomacy or form of military-political strong-arm tactics to force an unwilling party to accept treaty or terms.

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* **COMPLEX HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCY (CHE):** Natural or manmade disaster with economic, social and political dimensions. "A profound social crisis in which a large number of people die and suffer from war, disease, hunger, and displacement owing to man-made and natural

disasters, while some others may benefit from it."

Four factors could be measured; 1) the fatalities from violence, 2) the mortality of children under five years of age, 3) the percentage of underweight children under five, 4) the number of external refugees and internal-ly displaced persons. (Väyrynen, 1998: 19).

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* **CONFLICT:** "A social factual situation in which at least two parties (individ-uals, groups, states) are involved, which a) strive for goals which are incompatible to begin with or strive for the same goal, which, however, can only be reached by one party, and/or b) want to employ means which are incompatible to begin with for the achieve-ment of a certain goal." (Wasmuth, 1996:180-181). "Conflict is present when two or more parties perceive that their interests are incom-patible, express hostile attitu-des, or... pursue their inter-ests through actions that damage the other parties. These parties may be individ-uals, small or large groups, and countries." (Lund, 1997:2-2). Interests can differ over 1) access to and distribution of resources (e.g. territory, money, energy sources, food); 2) control of power and participation in political decision-making; 3) identity, (cultural, social and political communities); 4) status, particularly those embodied in systems of go-vernment, religion, or ideology.+

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CONFLICT ANALYSIS: Identification and comparison of positi-ons, values, aims, issues, interests, and needs of conflict par-ties.

(Internatio-nal Alert,1996, III:16).

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CONFLICT, ASYMMETRY: Situation in which a significant position or power differen-tial (based on resources such as arms, popular support, allies, legit-imacy) exists be-tween the conten-ding parties.

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CONFLICTS, COSTS OF: Calculations of conflict costs are notori-ously hard to make and tend to be limited to direct material and human losses. A fuller assessment will have to take into consideration the

following categories: 1. the human toll with particular consequences for children; 2. the destruction of social fabrics and coping mechanisms; 3. effects on the economy as resource bases are devastated; 4. repercussions when traditional institutions and power relations are altered; 5. threats to regional stability if disputes spill over into neighbouring states; 6. humanitarian & reconstruction aid costs for rebuilding war-torn societies; 7. the price tag for peacekeeping; and 8. lost opportunities in development, trade and investment.+ (Lund, 1997:1-7).

CONFLICT IMPACT ASSESSMENT SYSTEM

(CIAS): Method to estimate and evaluate the negative effects of conflict escalation. Early Warning systems that alert potentially affected parties of increased conflict escalation risks should also inform their audiences of the costs that a wait-and-see policy is likely to incur. (Reychler, 1997:30-31).

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* CONFLICT PREVENTION: I "Actions, policies, procedures or institutions undertaken in particularly vulnerable places and times in order to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups as the way to settle the political disputes that can arise from the destabilising effects of economic, social, political and international change. Conflict prevention can also include action taken after a violent conflict to avoid its recurrence. II "Conflict prevention can occur at two points in a typical conflict's life history: 1) when there has not been a violent conflict in recent years, and before significant violence signals possible escalation, conflict prevention aims to keep a conflict from escalation; and 2) when there has been a recent violent conflict but peace is being restored, conflict prevention aims to avoid a relapse or re-igniting of violence.+" (Lund, 1997:3-2,3).

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* CONFLICT RESOLUTION (POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING): "Efforts to increase co-operation among the parties to a conflict and deepen their relationship by addressing the

conditions that led to the dispute, fostering positive attitudes and allaying distrust through reconciliation initiatives, and building or strengthening the institutions and processes through which the parties interact. Conflict resolution can be used to reduce the chances of violence or to consolidate the cessation of a violent conflict in order to prevent re-escalation." (Lund, 1997:3-2).

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CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION: "A particular approach which aims to recognise the grievances, needs and issues of all the parties. It focuses on the processes by which conflict develops into violence, rather than focusing exclusively on how to bring a violent conflict quickly to a cease-fire or settlement. It addresses the structural reality of inequality, rights and injustice in the societies involved, and offers alternative ways of addressing those realities.+" (International Alert, 1996, I:1-2, II:37). The intention is to transform the conflict from one being expressed through violence into one which is expressed non-violently and constructively.

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DIPLOMACY: "[T]he conduct of international relations by negotiation rather than by force, propaganda, or recourse to law, and by other peaceful means (such as gathering information or engendering good-will) which are either directly or indirectly designed to promote negotiation.(...)
Diplomacy is an activity which is regulated by custom and by law, though flexibility remains one of its vital features" (Berridge, 1995:1).

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DIPLOMACY, MULTI-TRACK: A synergy of peace-making efforts by several categories of actors, based on their comparative advantage and expertise: 1) Governments; 2) Professional organisations; 3) Business community; 4) Churches; 5) Media; 6) Private citizens; 7) Training and educational institutes; 8) Activists; and 9) Funding organisations (McDonald, 1996).

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DIPLOMACY, TRACK TWO: Unofficial negotiations between citizen, academic, religious or other (NGO) groups, usually supplementing peace seeking efforts by governments. (Montville:1987:7).
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EARLY ACTION: Often used in conjunction with 'early warning', the term refers to both 'preventive action' and 'early response action'. "[P]rocesses of consultation, policy making, planning, and action to reduce or avoid armed conflict. These processes include; (1) diplomatic/political; (2) -military/security; (3) humanitarian; and (4) development/economic activity." (Diller, 1997:7).
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*EARLY WARNING: "The systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crises for the purpose of: (a) anticipating the escalation of violent conflict; (b) development of strategic responses to these crises; and (c) the presentation of options to key decision makers" (FEWER, 1997:1).
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EARLY WARNING, WHEN?: PIOOM has selected a lead time of 6 to 12 months as the advance time needed for Early Warning (EW) to allow for UN action. 6 weeks to 6 months advance time as Timely Warning, and (6 weeks advance time as Late Warning).+
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EARLY WARNING, ABOUT WHAT?: A variety of situations in which an early response is deemed necessary, including the following: (1) Internal (intra-state) conflict escalation (PIOOM); (2) Genocide/Politicide/Democide (Fein/Harff/Rummel); (3) Refugee flows (across state borders) (UNHCR); (4) Internal displacement of persons (within borders of a state) (GEWS); (5) Complex Humanitarian Crises (HEWS); (6) State failure (CIA); (7) Minority at risks (University of Maryland/Gurr); (8) Famine (GIEWS). There is much to be said for emphasis on 'Early Prevention'. In that case, 'early detection' should focus on emerging 'political tension situations'. Current Early Warning Systems tend to

register only upper levels of conflict manifestations.
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EARLY WARNING, WHOM?: The recipients of early warning can be (a combination of): 1. The prospective victims and groups at risk; 2. The perpetrators (in order to deter them); 3. Intergovernmental organisations and UN agencies 4. Regional governments willing and able to provide their good offices; 5. The secretary-general and Security Council of the United Nations; 6. Non-governmental organisations concerned with relief. 7. The mass media and public 8. Eminent persons who can lend credence to the warning. Warnings have to be ' customised' . Early warning researchers should "provide the international community with a set of different messages, coded with different degrees of reliability and urgency, and to provide these messages at different points of what may become a humanitarian emergency." (cit. Gurr & Harff, 1996:80).

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ETHNIC CLEANSING: Expulsion of ' alien' people by terror, massacres and other methods bordering on, or constituting genocide. "The systematised elimination of a targeted ethnic group for political purposes. Ethnic cleansing can be carried out through genocidal acts or forced migration." (Weiss & Collins, 1996:219).

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ETHNO-NATIONALISM: A political movement which aims to secure a sovereign state for the ethnic group in question. (Lawson, 1995:125).

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ETHNO-POLITICAL CONFLICTS: "[O]pen conflicts in which groups that define themselves using ethnic criteria make claims on behalf of their collective interests against the state, or against other groups-(...) The ' ethnic criteria' used... may include any combination of shared culture, language, religious belief, nationality, place of residence, race, and collective experiences, past or present. The term ethnic group is loosely synonymous with peoples,

communal group, minority and identity group." (Gurr & Harff, 1996:11).

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FACT-FINDING: Attempt of an independent expert or research commission (working on behalf of IGOs, NGOs, governments or the UN) to get controversial facts straight in a dispute or conflict, often in the context of political polarisation, suspicion and propaganda. Investigation can include the taking of witness testimony, exhumations at sites of massacres, etc. Findings are reported to an appropriate authority and/or public media. In 1991, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted a Declaration on UN Fact-Finding that states "[t]he Secretary General should monitor the state of international peace and security regularly and systematically in order to provide early warning of disputes or situations which might threaten international peace and security." (cit. Leitenberg, 1997:4).

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FACILITATION: A "means of helping the conflict-parties to reach a mutually satisfying agreement. It may be communication between the parties which the third party facilitates, and/or private analysis of the conflict-situation and possible outcomes." Facilitation indicates a lesser degree of involvement than mediation. Facilitators may be invited to help with one particular meeting, providing their technical skills, but they seldom become the integral part of the whole process as mediators do.+ (International Alert, 1996, III:67)

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GENOCIDE: "[A]ny of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, such as: a) killing members of the group; b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."

(UN 1948 Convention on Genocide). The terms 'Politicide' refers to lethal mass violence against unarmed people for political reasons. Other terms coined have been 'democide' and 'ethnocide' .

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GOOD OFFICES: Low-key third party facilitating actions (e.g. offer of transportation, security, site of venue) in a conflict to establish direct contact for the starting of negotiations in a conflict. The 'third party' can be a government that is on friendly terms with conflict parties, or a trusted international organ prepared to counsel the antagonists and suggest ways of coming to negotiations or a settlement (Hamzeh, n.d.:10). 'Good offices' usually stop short of conducting or participating in, negotiations. (Demurenko & Nikitin, 1997:115-116). The UN secretary-general's mandate for "Good Offices" includes the following types of activities: 1) "informal contacts and consultations to facilitate communications between parties; 2) diplomatic action to express international concern, privately or publicly, and assist parties in finding peaceful solutions; 3) mediation, conciliation and the coordination of assistance to alleviate humanitarian needs, growing economic crises, or to support reconstruction; 4) fact-finding or electoral verification." (UN Charter, art. 99; cit. Diller, 1997, Annex A:8).

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GUERRILLA WARFARE: Irregular, usually protracted, warfare by non-uniformed combatants not connected to large military organisation. Guerrilla (Spanish term for 'small war') fighters often avoid direct clashes with regular government forces, engaging in one or several of the following tactics: partisan warfare behind enemy lines, hit-and-run operations, sabotage, ambushes, urban terrorism. Violations of laws of war and criminal activities are not uncommon and often prevent guerrilla groups from gaining the moral highground which could induce the people (or the minority group they purport to represent) to side with them rather than with the sitting regime.+ (Parkinson, 1979: 149-152).

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HUMANITARIAN ACTION: The range of activities, all of which are designed to reduce human suffering in emergency situations, especially when local authorities are unable or unwilling to provide relief (Weiss & Collins, 1996:2-19). Actions include: the provision of food, shelter, clothing medication through organised facilities; evacuating the innocent and vulnerable from conflict or emergency zones; restoring basic amenities (water, sewage, power supplies); and burying remains. (Demurenko and Niki-tin 1997:119-120).

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(MUTUALLY) HURTING STALEMATE: A situation in which the cost (physical and financial) of sustaining or escalating a conflict is too high for either side, but where neither is strong enough for an outright win. It is regarded as an opportune time for third party mediation (Zart-man & Touval, 1985).

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IMPARTIALITY: Third-party attitude that is more active than (passive) neutrality. Equidistant behaviour of a third party when it deals with conflict parties or acts in a conflict zone; even-handedness in mediation, usually linked to the mediator having no stake in the substance of the conflict issue.+ (Klei-boer, 1997:2-9).

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INDICATORS: Predictors, precursor events or other telling signals used in forecasting. One of the sets of indicators used is divided into three categories. 1) systemic causes: general, underlying, structural, deep-rooted, back-ground pre-conditions; 2) proximate causes: specific situational circumstances; and 3) immediate catalysts: idiosyncratic contingent triggers.+ (Schmid, 1997:50).

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INTERVENTION: "[A] move by a state or an international organisation to involve itself in the domestic affairs of another state, whether the state consents or not." (Hoffman, 1993:88). Intervention can include: (1) preventive interventions before the

outbreak of a conflict; (2) curative intervention aims at the solution, limitation, control or regulation of an existing conflict; (3) de-escalating intervention aims at reducing tension and must be based on insight into the factors and mechanisms that led to escalation ; and (4) escalating interventions: it can be in the interest of a permanent conflict resolution to escalate a ' cold' conflict (one in which the parties avoid both contact and confrontation). (Glasl, 1997:148-149). An emerging global consensus about the permissibility of multilateral coercive actions covers the following situations: 1) "to prevent and punish aggression by one state against another; 2) in a civil war, to re-impose peace terms on one party that has reneged, provided their terms had originally resulted from UN peacemaking; 3) to enforce violations of international agreements banning the possession, manufacture, or trade of weapons of mass destruction; 4) to enforce agreements banning or limiting trade in conventional arms, and trade in dual-use and forbidden technologies; 5) to prevent an event certified by experts as an impending ecological catastrophe; 6) to prevent genocide; 7) to protect an established democratic polity from antidemocratic armed challenges, but not to protect a dubious or fictitious one; and 8) to prevent and alleviate famine and mass epidemics". (Ernst B. Haas 1993:81).

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JUSTICE (LEGAL): The minimum form of justice is fair and equal treatment before the law - a system of rule of law, rather than rule by (arbitrary) men, through legal procedures which can also call the rich and the powerful to order. **Justice, Social:** A situation characterised by rule of law (procedural justice) and fair distribution of resources and opportunities in society (substantive justice). Distributive justice principles that reduce inequality in the resource field vary between cultures and societies as fairness principles and power realities vary. The ' benefits and burdens of social co-operation' (J. Rawls) can be distributed in a number of ways: 1) objective equality: equal amounts to each recipient; 2) subjective equality: equal amounts based on perceived need or ' deserving-ness' ; 3) relative equality: allocation

based on the ' fitness' ~~de~~'deservingness' of the recipient; 4) rank order equality: allocation according to the status or rank of the recipient in the social system; and 5) equal opportunity: the allocation of equivalent opportunities to obtain the valued outcome to each recipient. (T. Eckhoff, cit. K. Cook in Kuper & Kuper, 1985:205).

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LAW OF WAR: Guidelines and laws on the conduct of combat and the protection of victims contained in the Paris Declarations (1856), the Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907, 1923), the St. Petersburg Convention (1868), the Geneva Conventions (1864, 1906, 1909, 1929, 1949) and others. Often disregarded in practice - rules cover: combat; the treatment of wounded and surrendering enemy combatants and civilians.+ (IMCR, Summary for Commanders, 1987:1).

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* **MEDIATION:** "A problem-solving negotiation process in which an outside, impartial, neutral party works with disputants to assist them to reach a satisfactory negotiated agreement. Unlike judges or arbitrators, mediators have no authority to decide the dispute between the parties; instead, the parties empower the mediator to help them resolve the issues between them. ' The assumptionis that a third party will be able to alter the power and social dynamics of the conflict relationship by influencing the beliefs and behaviours of individual parties, by providing knowledge or information, or by using a more effective negotiation process and thereby helping the participants to settle contested issues.' " (Goodpaster, 1997:203-204 quoting Chr. W. Moore, 1996). Mediation Process, Stages: typically a mediation proceeds through four stages: 1) creating the forum or bargaining framework; 2) information gathering and sharing; 3) problem-solving bargaining; 4) decision-making. (Goodpaster, 1997).

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MONITORING: Standardised collection and organisation of information based on regular or continuous observation of, and reporting on,

controversial events in conflict- and crisis-zones. It is done in the framework of prevention and damage limitation, often by impartial outside observers.+ (Jongman & Schmid, 1994:3, 258).

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MUTUAL-GAIN NEGOTIATING: Non-threatening, constructive negotiation style, which aims at joint problem-sharing and problem-solving by identifying the needs underlying each party's position, and by seeking solutions which accommodate them adequately. (International Alert, 1996, III:62).

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NEGOTIATION: Negotiation is a standard diplomatic technique used by states to harmonise their interests, or to live with their differences by taking into account respective needs and power potential. (Secret) negotiations often precede, accompany, or follow other, more violent forms of interaction. *Negotiation takes place with a view to achieving [either] identification of common interests and agreement on joint or parallel action in their pursuit; recognition of conflicting interests and agreement on compromise; or, more often than not, some combination of both." (Berridge, 1995:119).

"Initially at least, negotiations may not be face-to-face."+ (International Alert, 1996, III:53).

' Principled Negotiation' is based on the following four principles: 1) people: separate the people from the problem; 2) interests: focus on interests, not positions; 3) options: generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do; and 4) criteria: Insist that the result be based on some objective standard.+ (Fisher/Ury, 1983:11).

Negotiation Phases: negotiations pass through phases, whereby both external factors (e.g. a change of fortune on the battlefield) and internal constraints (e.g. upcoming election campaign) can create or break impasses in the course of negotiation. The pre-negotiation phase and the post-negotiation, or implementation-, phase are often underrated in importance and the possibility of a re-negotiation at a later date is frequently missed. The phase following the pre-negotiation stage is sometimes divided into a ' formula' -stage and a ' details stage'. (Berridge,

1995:119).

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NEGOTIATION STRATEGY: Three basic negotiation strategies include: 1) Competitive bargaining (also called hard-bargaining, distributive, positional, zero-sum, or win-lose bargaining): a domination strategy in which the competitive bargainer tends to treat negotiations as a kind of contest to be won. It focuses on immediate gain and is less concerned with the future relationship with the opponent; 2) Compromising (co-operative) bargaining (also called soft-bargaining, win-some-lose-some, or give-and-take bargaining): While the competitive bargainer only compromises because he has to, the compromising negotiator does so as a matter of principle, as s/he is concerned with the future relationship with the opponent. He or she trades off something in order to get something and is concerned with both outcome and process; 3) Collaborative bargaining (also called integrative or problem-solving bargaining, interest bargaining or positive-sum or win-win bargaining). Both parties seek to maximise creatively not only their own gain but the one of the other parties as well by exploring mutual action that can satisfy their respective interests without amounting to compromise if possible (Goodpaster, 1997:17-19).

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PEACE : I. Political condition other than one of organized armed conflict (war), and often distinguished from a situation of non-war (= neither war nor peace) (Evans & Newnham, 1992:250). Positive definitions of peace are based on four concepts; 1) peace as harmony (stressing the absence of conflict; 2) peace as order (stressing stability and 'peace through strength'); 3) peace as justice (stressing the absence of domination and poverty); and 4) peace as conflict management (stressing peace as process for obtaining interests and needs, rather than as an end in itself). (Banks, 1987; cit. Burgess & Burgess, 1997:230-231). II. Peace: "A process pattern of the international system, characterized by a tendency toward; a) preservation of individual existence on the basis of

declining violence; and b) continuation of individual self-realization on the basis of increasingly equal distribution of development chances" (Czempiel, 1996:107).

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* PEACE-BUILDING: "The employment of measures to consolidate peaceful relations and create an environment which deters the emergence or escalation of tensions which may lead to conflict" (International Alert, 1995). More often, however, Peace-building refers to post-hostility actions, military and civilian, taken to forestall future eruptions by strengthening structures capable of consolidating a political settlement. "Durable peace-building can only be achieved by the establishment of local, state, regional and international systems of procedural and distributive justice which are responsive to basic human needs and which give adequate decision-making 'voice' to individuals and identity groups - thus providing constructive ways for needs and grievances to be expressed and addressed." (Evans, 1993; cit. Peck, 1996:75).

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PEACE-ENFORCEMENT: "The use or threat of armed force as provided for in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter aimed at restoring peace by military means such as in Korea (1950-1953) or Iraq (1991). It can take place without the agreement and support of one or all the warring parties. It can refer to both an inter-state or an intra-state conflict, to [serve] the mitigation of a humanitarian emergency or in situations where the organs of state have ceased to function. Peace enforcement actions include: 1) carrying out international sanctions against the opposing sides, or against the side that represents the driving force in the armed conflict; 2) isolating the conflict ones and preventing arms deliveries to the area, as well as preventing its penetration by armed formations; 3) delivering air or missile strikes on positions of the side that refuses to halt its military actions; 4) rapid deployment of peace forces to the combat zones in numbers sufficient to carry out the assigned missions, including the localising of the

conflict and the disarming or eradicating of any armed formations that refuse to cease fighting. (Demurenko & Nikitin, 1997:-118 - 119).

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PEACE-KEEPING MANDATE: "The UN' s interpretation of the use of force in self-defence is ambiguous. PK has traditionally been described as a non-coercive instrument, but since 1973, the guidelines approved by the Security Council for each PK force have stipulated that self defence is deemed to include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent the PK force from discharging its duties". + (British Army, 1997, chapter 4: 5).

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*PEACE-KEEPING (OPERATIONS): "Common terms for [various] types of activity carried out: to resolve conflict; to prevent conflict escalation; halt or prevent military actions; to uphold law and order in a conflict zone; to conduct humanitarian actions; to restore social and political institutions whose functioning has been disrupted by the conflict; and to restore basic conditions for daily living. The distinctive feature of peace-keeping operations is that they are conducted under a mandate from the United Nations or regional organizations whose functions include peace support and international security.(...).

Tasks undertaken by peacekeeping forces can include: military support to maintain agreements and armistices including systems of cease-fire lines, demilitarized and buffer zones, reduced-arms zones; assisting in the exchange of territories; helping to set up refugee camps and assembly points for displaced persons; maintaining law and order to help to organize the activities of civilian authorities within their zones of responsibility; investigating complaints and claims in regard to armistice violations or violations of conflict settlement agreements; organizing the collecting and monitoring of certain categories of weapons, primarily heavy weapons. "As a rule, peacekeeping operations last as long as there exists the possibility that armed combat might resume or that any other form of conflict might

arise." + (Demurenko & Nikitin, 1996:115, 117-118).
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PEACE-KEEPING FORCES: "Civilian and military personnel designated by the national governments of the countries participating in the peace operation. These personnel are placed at the disposal of the international organization under whose mandate the given operation is being conducted. Generally, peacekeeping forces are made up of national contingents under international command. Each national contingent is assigned either a zone of responsibility or specific functional duties."
(Demurenko & Nikitin, 1997:123-124).
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PEACE-MAKING: 1) "This is best understood as a close relative of preventive diplomacy, involving 'negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or agreements, or other peaceful means' - but applied after a dispute has crossed the threshold into armed conflict (Evans, 1993:11). 2) Military and diplomatic action after a conflict has broken out, conducted at the request, or with the consent of, the warring parties, to halt hostilities and initiate negotiations. It can include "separating the armed combatants, establishing demilitarised or buffer zones; monitoring cease-fires; maintaining law and order; assisting with the conduct of humanitarian actions; and guarding strategic facilities. Citizen-based Peace-making; "is the process of establishing peace constituencies within conflict areas. These constituencies comprise people from different sectors of civil society whose prevailing interest is the development of sustainable peace"(International Alert, 1995).
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POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION: A generic term referring to the rebuilding of society in the aftermath of conflict. Physical infrastructures have to be repaired or re-built, governmental institutions have to be reformed, psychic traumas of civilians and combatants have to be treated, the economy has to be restarted, refugees to be repatriated,

reconciliation between the belligerents has to be initiated, justice has to be delivered. Such efforts require sustained support from the international community.

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PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY: The term was first used by UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld in the 1950s and was revived by Boutros Boutros Ghali in the 1990s. It refers to a variety of bilateral and multilateral non-military official and unofficial efforts, which are preferably taken at the early stages of conflict by third parties (states, international organisations, NGOs, and others (see Multitrack Diplomacy') to mobilise forces of moderation against a deteriorating security situation in a target country.

1) "[A]ction to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur." (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:5). Early preventive diplomacy; "the provision of skilled assistance through good offices, mediation and the like in order to resolve disputes well before eruption into armed conflict appears likely." Late preventive diplomacy; "attempts (often involving the secretary-general himself) to persuade parties to desist when such eruptions seem imminent." (Evans, 1993:10). 2) Preventive diplomacy in contrast with ' traditional diplomacy' , involves unilateral and multilateral efforts "to pressure, cajole, arbitrate, mediate, or lend "good offices" to encourage dialogue and facilitate a non-violent resolution of the crisis." + (Carnegie Commission, 1997:xx-ii). 3) Preventive diplomacy represents measures which are taken to prevent the breakdown of peaceful conditions. It aims to prevent existing tensions from escalating into violence and to contain the spread of conflict when it occurs." (International Alert, 1995).

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PREVENTIVE STRATEGIES: According to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflicts, effective preventive strategies rest on three principles: 1) early reaction to signs of trouble which requires early detection and skilled analysis of

developing trends; 2) a comprehensive, balanced approach to alleviate the pressures that trigger violent conflict. An effective response requires a co-ordinated range of political, economic, social, and military measures; 3) an extended effort to resolve the underlying root causes of violence.+ Two broad categories can be identified; 1) operational prevention - measures applicable in the face of immediate crisis; 2) structural prevention - measures to ensure that crises do not arise in the first place or, if they do, that they do not recur.

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*** PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACH:** An integrative workshop technique whereby the adversaries are brought together at a [neutral] location, for a period of time and are encouraged to reflect on 1) the causes of conflict, 2) to arrive at a common definition and joint solutions that satisfy the basic needs of all sides. "In a problem solving approach, the focus of negotiation and the starting point for generating possible solutions are the party's interests. Interests represent the real motivation of parties - the needs, wants, fears and concerns of each side which lie behind their positions (...) Interests may... have multiple layers, with more superficial interests as well as deeper concerns representing basic human needs, common to all (...) It is these deeper interests which must be understood and addressed if conflict resolution is to be effective." (Peck, 1996:38-39).

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PROTRACTED SOCIAL CONFLICTS: Conflicts which last for years and even generations, characterised by 1) enduring features such as economic and technological underdevelopment, an unintegrated social and political systems producing insecurity and distributive injustice; 2) the inability or unwillingness to fulfil societal requirements for individual and social development: security, identity, recognition and participation; 3) the fears and insecurities that emerge produce social cleavages around issues such as ethnicity and religion; 4) they exist within and across state boundaries, making distinctions between domestic

and interna-tional politics artifi-cial". + (Azar, 1986, 1990; cit. Interna-tional Alert, 1996:I-I:11)

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PROVENTION: The proactive rather than reactive remo-val of the sources of conflict and the promotion of conditions that create co-operative relati-onships [before tensions mount]. (Burton, 1993:60).

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RECONCILIATION: Associative peace strategy that brings together former adver-saries into a forgiving dialogue consisting of guilt admissions (e.g. in the form of a truth commission), and a recon-struction and healing period to start a new phase of mutual tolerance or co-operation.

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RECONSTRUCTION: Economic, political and social re-building of post-conflict state and society, including, inter alia, de-mining, disarmament, re-integration of combat-ants, return of refugees, resettlement of inter-nally displaced persons, revi-ving politi-cal processes, restoring physical infrastruc-tures, re-starting economic life, conver-sion to civilian produc-tion, re-establis-hing civilian author-ity, and conducting new (super-vised) elections.

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RELIEF: Dispatch of vital material goods and services (clean water, blankets, tents, medicine, food, etc.) to victims of disaster.

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RELIEFWEB: An INTERNET-based information dissemination system devel-oped by the United Nations Department of Humanita-rian Affairs' Geneva office. ReliefWeb compiles and dissemina-tes informati-on for conflict preven-tion, prepared-ness, and rapid response. ReliefWeb "seeks to improve access by the humani-tarian relief commun-ity to timely, relia-ble information for enhanced decision making and assistan-ce....ReliefWeb carries two main types of information: country situation reports and emerg-ency/logistical reports." + (Diller, 1997, Annex

A:11).

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REPRESSION: Actions, usually taken by a regime or vigilantes, to restrain a political opponent from mobilising. It involves both non-lethal and lethal coercive measures. Repression is not the exclusive prerogative of state actors; national liberation movements, resistance groups and terrorist actors also use it for internal disciplining. 'Repressive crimes' are illegal acts "committed to maintain, strengthen - or above all - defend privileged positions, in particular those of power and property" (Hess, 1976:1-22). The repertoire of repressive tactics of governments is broad and includes:

... Entry and search of home without warrant; ... Destruction of private property; ... Suppression of press, media and political parties; ... Physical attacks on opposition party rallies; ... Beatings, assaults and the excessive use of force ... Arbitrary arrests and incarceration; ... Threats and reprisals against family of political opponent; ... Forced exile or domestic house arrest; ... Disappearance, torture, mutilations, and assassinations; ... Pogroms against opposition groups by paid provocateurs; ... Premeditated massacres of opposition groups ... Extermination of persons in slave labour camps and Death marches ... Mass terror for the purpose of 'ethnic cleansing' . + (Chishom, 1948:29).

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RISK: Degree of danger associated with a given operation, course of action, or failure to act in crisis situation. For conflict forecasting, it makes sense to distinguish between levels of risks, for example: 1) high risk; 2) high moderate risk; 3) moderate risk; 4) low-moderate risk; 5) low risk.

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RISK ASSESSMENT: Calculation and/or simulation of degree of danger attached to a course of action for the purpose of uncertainty reduction. "[R]isk assessment and early warning are distinct but complementary activities. Risk assessments are based on the systematic analysis of remote and

intermediate conditions. Early warning requires near-real-time assessment of events that, in a high risk environment, are likely to accelerate or trigger the rapid escalation of conflict." (Gurr, 1996b: 137).

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* **SCENARIOS:** "A description of a possible or probable future. The scenario defines a set of future events or circumstances in the organisation's environment that would likely have bearing on the organisation's performance. In describing possible future environments, scenarios provide a means of understanding the long-term consequences of existing or potential trends or policies. Scenario planning/building is the process of constructing the possible alternate futures in order to effectively prepare for the future and to test the resiliency of an action plan. The process forces managers to think about the "un-think-able" and to even plan for it. More importantly, it shows how important it is that strategic plans be adaptable to a variety of future conditions" (United States, 1995: 255).

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SECURITY: ' Internal security' includes 1) having a corpus of laws that is legitimately derived and widely promulgated and understood; 2) a consistent, visible, fair, and active network of police authority to enforce laws; 3) an independent, equitable, and accessible grievance redress system, including above all an impartial judicial system; 4) a penal system that is fair and prudent in meting out punishment. + (Carnegie Commission, 1997:xxx). ' National security' - the relative immunity of a nation from possible military attack. Within alliances there can be ' collective security' . The Carnegie Commission identifies three main sources of insecurity today: 1) the threat posed by nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction; 2) the threat of conventional military confrontation; 3) sources of internal violence, such as terrorism, organised crime, insurgency, and repressive regimes. +

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SETTLEMENT ESCROW: Technique used in negotiations where parties are afraid to disclose the

extent to which they are willing to make concessions for fear of being considered weak: a third-party (mediator) is caucusing with each of the parties and receives in private the information withheld from the other party. If the mediator finds overlap in the potential concessions, he announces to the parties that a deal is possible. If the offers of both sides fall short of meeting, s/he announces that no deal is possible, without disclosing the maximum concessions each side was willing to make (Goodpaster, 1997:236-237).

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STATE FAILURE: The collapse of central authority in post-conflict situations. State failure can be manifested by: 1) revolutionary wars: sustained military conflicts between insurgents and central governments, aimed at displacing the regime; 2) ethnic wars: secessionist civil wars, rebellions, protracted communal warfare, and sustained episodes of mass protest by politically organised communal groups; 3) genocides and politicides: sustained policies by states or their agents, and in civil wars, by contending authorities, that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of members of communal or political groups; 4) adverse or disruptive regime transitions: major, abrupt shifts in patterns of governance, including state collapse, periods of severe instability, and shifts towards authoritarian rule. + (The American State Failure Project). PIOOM assesses state strength and failure) on the basis of nine variables: (1) Monopoly or control of the means of violence: (2) Territoriality: no serious disputes over borders or regions; (3) Sovereignty: not challenged internally or externally; (4) Constitutionality: government adheres to rule of law; (5) Impersonal power: state power not in hand of ruling dynasty; (6) Public bureaucracy: meritocratic and non-corrupt; (7) Authority/legitimacy: degree of acceptance by population; (8) Citizenship: ratio of citizens to non-citizens; and (9) Taxation: its effectiveness (PIOOM derived from Pierson, 1988:-8).

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TERRORISM: There is no overall consensus on the

strict definition of this term. In academic circles terrorism is widely defined as "an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-)clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Through threats, fear, violence, coercion, intimidation or propaganda, the aim is to manipulate adversaries into meeting the demands of the perpetrators." (Schmid, 1997b:22). In terms of international law, acts of terrorism can best be conceptualized as 'peace-time equivalents of war crimes.' (Schmid, 1997b:22).

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THIRD PARTY: In conflicts and (pre-)negotiations, outside parties often play a role as intermediaries (arbitrators, facilitators or mediators) to induce or coerce the contestants to cease fire and enter talks. Third parties can be insiders or outsiders, and they may be impartial or partial with regard to a party or issue. Neutrality of a third party might be helpful but the possession of powerful levers by the third party towards one or both sides can be more decisive. "The third party is not a go-between negotiator or mediator. The third party acts as a mirror, an overview, a provider of provocation and creativity. The third party also organises the mapping of the situation and is an integral part of the design thinking required for conflict resolution" (De Bono, cit. Ryan, 1990:59).

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TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS: Situation in which the short-sighted pursuit of individual self-interest leads to a depletion of collective resources on which all depend and which leaves everybody poorer in the end. It is based on the idea that the calculating herdsman who adds extra sheep to the common grazing ground to maximise his personal gains will find others copying his non-co-operative behaviour in

a situation of 'dif-fusion of responsibility' .

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TRIGGERS: Immediate event that accelerates the outbreak of a conflict. A sudden catalyst or spark (e.g. the assas-sin-a-tion of a leader, election fraud, a political scandal) can ' ignite' the con-flict.

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TRUTH COMMISSION: A non-judicial temporary fact-finding body which focuses on bringing to light past human rights violations and war crimes. The Truth Commission is usually entitled to grant (partial) amnesty in exchange for full testimo-ny. By bringing alleged perpetrators from all conflict parties together in the presence of former victims or their relatives, a healing and reconciliation process is assumed to become possible. Approximately twenty such commissions have been initiated. (Ash, 1997:35).

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UNITED NATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS: Since 1992 humanitarian relief efforts have been coordinated in the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (New York & Geneva). The DHA mission, under the leadership of the Emergency Relief Coordinator, is to mobilize and coordinate the relief efforts of the international community. DHA also seeks to reduce vulnerabilities and promote solutions to root causes and link humanitarian relief with development. DHA priorities include: (1) Establishing and advocating humanitarian principles and concerns; (2) Coordinate humanitarian actions; (3) Strengthen capacity at local, national and international levels; (4) Mobilize resources, and (5) Collect, analyse and disseminate information.

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***VIOLENCE:** The concept of violence is contested, and definitions generally reflect, moral and political motivations. A relatively neutral definition is "psychological or physical force exerted for the purpose of injuring, damaging, or abusing people or proper-ty" (U.S. Department of Justice, 1996:D-3). Violence, Cultural: (introduced by J. Galtung, and

criticised for being too broad); "those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence - exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) - that can be used to justify, legitimise, or direct structural violence" (Galtung, 1996:196). Violence, Psychological: Indirect acts of negative influence that aim to affect or arouse fear or break mental resistance of a target audience by indoctrination (brain-washing), misinformation, propaganda, blackmail or terror. Violence, Structural: (another broad concept introduced by J. Galtung), concealed violence in unjust, unequal and unrepresentative social structures, and to situations in which the "actual somatic and mental realisations of human beings are below their potential realisations." (cit. International Alert, II:5).

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* WAR : "The continuation of politics with an admixture of other means." + (Clausewitz, 1972:212). "Collective, direct, manifest, personal, intentional, organised, instrumental, institutionalised, sanctioned, and sometimes ritualised and regulated, violence" (v.d. Dennen, 1995).

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WIN-LOSE OUTCOME: In game theory, it is the result that leaves one party in distributive negotiations victorious and the other empty-handed (also termed: zero-sum outcome as the loss of one party subtracted from the gains of the other equals zero). There are also all-lose outcomes in which none of the conflict parties reach their goals (also termed: negative-sum).

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WIN-WIN OUTCOME: Mutually agreeable negotiating outcome in which the interests of both parties are satisfied, and which is often the result of joint problem solving. Also called ' positive-sum' . Such outcomes are likely when the future relationship between the conflict parties matters to both, when the interests of the parties are interdependent and when the parties are prepared to co-operate in joint problem-solving.

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ZERO-SUM OUTCOME: Game theory situation in which the winner's gain is the loser's loss. Also possible are 'positive-sum' outcomes (see: win-win) and 'negative-sum' outcomes (both sides lose).

ACCELERATORS: Catalysts or triggers that can spark the outbreak of violence or the escalation of violence. Accelerators are "events outside the parameters of the model: they are essentially feedback events that rapidly increase the level of significance of the most volatile of the general conditions, but may also signify system-breakdown or basic changes in political causality" (Gurr & Harff, 1996:47). Examples include:

- (1) New discriminatory policies by a regime;
- (2) Clashes between regime supporters and target groups;
- (3) Increased external support for politically active groups;
- (4) Threats of external involvement not backed by action;
- (5) Increase in size and cohesion of opposition group;
- (6) Violent opposition by kindred groups;
- (7) Aggressive posturing by opposition groups; and
- (8) Increase in life integrity violations. (Harff, 1996; cit. Leitenberg, 1997:3-6).

* **CONFLICT:** "A social factual situation in which at least two parties (individuals, groups, states) are involved, which a) strive for goals which are incompatible to begin with or strive for the same goal, which, however, can only be reached by one party, and/or b) want to employ means which are incompatible to begin with for the achievement of a certain goal." (Wasmuth, 1996:180-181). "Conflict is present when two or more parties perceive that their interests are incompatible, express hostile attitudes, or... pursue their interests through actions that damage the other parties. These parties may be individuals, small or large groups, and countries." (Lund, 1997:2-2). Interests can differ over 1) access to and distribution of resources (e.g. territory, money, energy sources, food); 2) control of power and participation in political decision-making; 3) identity, (cultural, social and political communities); 4) status, particularly those embodied in systems of government, religion, or ideology.†

CONFLICT ANALYSIS: Identification and comparison of positions, values, aims, issues, interests, and needs of conflict parties. (International Alert, 1996, III:16).

* **CONFLICT PREVENTION:** I "Actions, policies, procedures or institutions undertaken in particularly vulnerable places and times in order to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups as the way to settle the political disputes that can arise from the destabilising effects of economic, social, political and international change. Conflict prevention can also include action taken after a violent conflict to avoid its recurrence. II 'Conflict prevention can occur at two points in a typical conflict's life history: 1) when there has not been a violent conflict in

recent years, and before significant violence signals possible escalation, conflict prevention aims to keep a conflict from escalation; and 2) when there has been a recent violent conflict but peace is being restored, conflict prevention aims to avoid a relapse or re-igniting of violence.†" (Lund, 1997:3-2,3)

*EARLY WARNING: "The systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crises for the purpose of:

- (a) anticipating the escalation of violent conflict;
- (b) development of strategic responses to these crises; and
- (c) the presentation of options to key decision makers" (FEWER, 1997:1).

EARLY WARNING, WHEN?: PIOOM has selected a lead time of 6 to 12 months as the advance time needed for Early Warning (EW) to allow for UN action. 6 weeks to 6 months advance time as Timely Warning, and (6 weeks advance time as Late Warning.†

EARLY WARNING, ABOUT WHAT?: A variety of situations in which an early response is deemed necessary, including the following:

- (1) Internal (intra-state) conflict escalation (PIOOM);
- (2) Genocide/Politicide/Democide (Fein/Harff/Rummel);
- (3) Refugee flows (across state borders) (UNHCR);
- (4) Internal displacement of persons (within borders of a state) (GEWS);
- (5) Complex Humanitarian Crises (HEWS);
- (6) State failure (CIA);
- (7) Minority at risks (University of Maryland/Gurr);
- (8) Famine (GIEWS).

There is much to be said for emphasis on ' Early Prevention' . In that case, ' early detection' should focus on emerging ' political tension situations' . Current Early Warning Systems tend to register only upper levels of conflict manifestations.

EARLY WARNING, WHOM?: The recipients of early warning can be (a combination of):

1. The prospective victims and groups at risk;
2. The perpetrators (in order to deter them);
3. Intergovernmental organisations and UN agencies
4. Regional governments willing and able to provide their good offices;
5. The secretary-general and Security Council of the United Nations;
6. Non-governmental organisations concerned with relief.
7. The mass media and public
8. Eminent persons who can lend credence to the warning.

Warnings have to be 'customised' . Early warning researchers should "provide the international community with a set of different messages,

coded with different degrees of reliability and urgency, and to provide these messages at different points of what may become a humanitarian emergency." (cit. Gurr & Harff, 1996:80).

FACILITATION: A "means of helping the conflict-parties to reach a mutually satisfying agreement. It may be communication between the parties which the third party facilitates, and/or private analysis of the conflict-situation and possible outcomes." Facilitation indicates a lesser degree of involvement than mediation. Facilitators may be invited to help with one particular meeting, providing their technical skills, but they seldom become the integral part of the whole process as mediators do.† (International Alert, 1996, III:67)

INDICATORS: Predictors, precursor events or other telling signals used in forecasting. One of the sets of indicators used is divided into three categories. 1) systemic causes: general, underlying, structural, deep-rooted, background pre-conditions; 2) proximate causes: specific situational circumstances; and 3) immediate catalysts: idiosyncratic contingent triggers.† (Schmid, 1997:50).

PEACE : I. Political condition other than one of organized armed conflict (war), and often distinguished from a situation of non-war (= neither war nor peace) (Evans & Newnham, 1992:250). Positive definitions of peace are based on four concepts; 1) peace as harmony (stressing the absence of conflict; 2) peace as order (stressing stability and 'peace through strength'); 3) peace as justice (stressing the absence of domination and poverty); and 4) peace as conflict management (stressing peace as process for obtaining interests and needs, rather than as an end in itself). (Banks, 1987; cit. Burgess & Burgess, 1997:230-231). II. Peace: "A process pattern of the international system, characterized by a tendency toward; a) preservation of individual existence on the basis of declining violence; and b) continuation of individual self-realization on the basis of increasingly equal distribution of development chances" (Czempiel, 1996:107).

* **PEACE-BUILDING:** "The employment of measures to consolidate peaceful relations and create an environment which deters the emergence or escalation of tensions which may lead to conflict" (International Alert, 1995). More often, however, Peacebuilding refers to post-hostility actions, military and civilian, taken to forestall future eruptions by strengthening structures capable of consolidating a political settlement. "Durable peacebuilding can only be achieved by the establishment of local, state, regional and international systems of procedural and distributive justice which are responsive to basic human needs and which give adequate decision-making 'voice' to individuals and identity groups - thus providing constructive ways for needs and grievances to be expressed and addressed." (Evans, 1993; cit. Peck, 1996:75).

PEACE-MAKING: 1) "This is best understood as a close relative of preventive diplomacy, involving ' negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or agreements, or other peaceful means' - but applied after a dispute has crossed the threshold into armed conflict (Evans, 1993:11). 2) Military and diplomatic action after a conflict has broken out, conducted at the request, or with the consent of, the warring parties, to halt hostilities and initiate negotiations. It can include "separating the armed combatants, establishing demilitarised or buffer zones; monitoring cease-fires; maintaining law and order; assisting with the conduct of humanitarian actions; and guarding strategic facilities. Citizen-based Peace-making; "is the process of establishing peace constituencies within conflict areas. These constituencies compromise people from different sectors of civil society whose prevailing interest is the development of sustainable peace"(International Alert, 1995).

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State Failure Project

State failure is a new label that encompasses a range of severe political conflicts and regime crises exemplified by events of the 1990s in Somalia, Bosnia, Liberia, Afghanistan, and Congo-Kinshasa. This web site lists comparative information on cases of total and partial state failure that began between 1955 and 1996 in independent countries with populations greater than 500,000. The list was compiled from multiple sources by researchers at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), University of Maryland and has been updated and revised with input from area and subject-matter specialists. The information is presented in two forms: (1) a description of 128 consolidated cases in tabular form (click on the "Table" button above) and (2) a series of four datasets, based on type of event, with estimates of annual magnitudes for each of the 231 events that were used in compiling the table (click on the "Data" button above). The data sets can be downloaded and viewed by importing them into a standard spreadsheet or statistical software, such as Microsoft Excel or SPSS.

The types of events included are revolutionary wars (48 cases), ethnic wars (61), adverse and disruptive regime transitions (87), and genocides and politicides (35). The accompanying codebook provides definitions of each type of event and describes the scales used to estimate magnitudes of each type (click on the "Code Book" button above).

GEDS has provided support for CIDCM senior associate Barbara Harff's ground-breaking work in developing and testing dynamic early warning models which identify accelerating and de-accelerating factors for the outbreak of genocide, ethnic conflict, and state failure. Harff has developed a sequential model for early warning of genocides and politicides, which

distinguishes background and intervening conditions for assessing long term risk, together with accelerator and decelerator events for dynamic early warning. Similar accelerator models have been developed for ethnic conflict (with Ted Robert Gurr) and state failure. Results from retrospective analyses indicate that the models were effective, for example, in anticipating genocide in Rwanda in April 1994 and Bosnia in May 1992, and regime collapse Liberia in 1990.

CIDCM distinguished scholar Ted Robert Gurr's Minorities at Risk Project is one of the most innovative datasets in modern political science. It includes profiles of 268 ethno-political groups in 112 countries, with chronologies of significant events in the 1990s, an overview of their political status and activities, and assessments of their prospects for future conflict or accommodation. Such assessments complement dynamic early warnings such as those generated by GEDS. The Minorities at Risk data help researchers develop and test models of factors linked to conflict escalation and to identify groups that are at greatest risk of future conflict or repression.

Scholarly thought on the manner has produced some degree of consensus that is summarized next.

We need to consider the following questions:

- *What* factors contribute to a crisis (e.g. an ethnic conflict, an economic crisis)?;
- *Where* does the conflict emerge (e.g. within a country, among neighbouring countries in a region)?;
- What is the *chronology of events* that ultimately results in crisis outbreak?;
- *Who* are the crisis actors?

We can categorize *who, what, when and where* in terms of political, economic, and socio-cultural issues, as well as in institutional terms. Likewise, we can identify key actors (*who*) in the conflict, and their agendas (*why*) or reasons why the parties have taken actions that have led to crisis situations. In so doing, we create a starting point for more rigorous analysis.

for weighing and drawing relationships between different indicators

There is already a burgeoning body of research on indicators, accelerators and underlying causes which is being used to provide timely and accurate country risk assessments. It is possible that with the rise of new communications technology (for instance, news wire services), risk analysis based on quantitative and qualitative

approaches could be more fully integrated into foreign policy decision-making, perhaps eventually even in real time. Political risk models could be updated continually and cross-referenced with other modes of analysis such as qualitative assessments and field reports from either field officers or NGOs.

A blend of analytical skills will be essential in explaining dynamic patterns of behaviour - those that combine in-depth analysis and regional and country expertise with statistical modelling and index number creation.

, and Table 4 presents the *triggers* or immediate events that act as catalysts to the outbreak of a crisis