

Conflict Vulnerability Analysis

Issues, Tools & Responses

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STEP 1:	CONFLICT MAPPING
STEP 2:	ASSESS INDICATORS OF CONFLICT RISK <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Structural Risk• Social Tension and Fragmentation• Viability of State
STEP 3:	POPULATION CONFLICT RISK ASSESSMENT
STEP 4:	ASSESS POPULATIONS CAPACITY TO MANAGE CONFLICT <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Post-Conflict Peace-building• Capacity to Contain Conflict• Capacity to Manage Tension
STEP 5:	DETERMINE POPULATIONS ANTICIPATED VULNERABILITY TO VIOLENCE
STEP 6:	IDENTIFY AND ASSESS RESPONSE OPTIONS
STEP 7:	DEVELOP CONFLICT POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

**Africa Bureau's Office of Sustainable Development
Crisis Mitigation and Response**

ConflictWeb <http://www.usaid.gov/AFR/conflictweb/index.html> (internal)

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This version of the Conflict Vulnerability Analysis Workbook should be treated as a work in progress. considered as a work in progress that requires further revision and field-testing before being adopted as a full-fledged assessment tool. Tulane University's Payson Center for International Development and Technology Transfer and the USAID Bureau for Africa, Office of Sustainable Development, Crisis Mitigation and Recovery Division (AFR/SD/CMR) prepared this present version based on a dissemination/ feedback workshop, field input, and current mission experience with CVA. The draft seeks to meet the needs of USAID mission personnel for a practical tool to prepare a vulnerability analysis and integrate conflict perspectives into the strategic planning, project implementation, and monitoring/evaluation processes for their respective countries. This document and should not be interpreted as being reflective of the US government position.

PREFACE

Lessons learned since the end of the Cold War demonstrate that internal conflict and other sources of instability are critical problems affecting both development investments made by the Agency on behalf of the American people and the lives of the individual members of population groups receiving US assistance. In response to this reality USAID's development policy and portfolio include integrated interventions aimed at addressing the effects of underlying social economic and political problems that contribute to the erosion of order and the outbreak of violent internal conflict (USAID Vision Statement on Conflict, Executive Message, October 2000).

Given the reality that nine of the 22 countries in Sub-Sahara Africa with USAID bilateral missions are currently involved in or have been involved in internal conflict within the past five years, USAID missions are integrating conflict prevention, mitigation, and recovery (CPMR) perspectives more fully into its programming strategies. This challenge, however, is not just restricted to Mission countries or Sub-Sahara Africa. Approximately, 50 countries receiving USAID assistance worldwide are currently experience violent collective conflict to various degrees. By region, the numbers are as follows:

- Nine of 22 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with USAID bilateral missions are currently involved in or have been in an internal conflict within the past five years.
- The Bureau for Asia and the Near East assists 24 countries (13 presence, 11 non-presence) and nine are currently in conflict with another eight having been in one during the past 5 years.
- The Bureau for Europe and Eurasia assists 15 countries (14 presence, 15 non-presence) with 13 in “dust-ups” and another 14 did so in the past five years.
- The Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean assists a total of 19 countries (17 presence, two non-presence) and 14 are engaged in an internal conflict with another 16 having been so involved in the past five years.

USAID Missions have taken the lead in responding to this reality with a range of conflict analyses, conflict monitoring and conflict programming. In all, missions have examined ways in which its resources can help mitigate or prevent these conflicts, even as it seeks to achieve broader development aims. The initial guidance for conflict prevention and strategic planning has been aimed at institutionalizing such an approach.

USAID Conflict Prevention Guidance for Strategic Planning (ADS 201, June 1999)¹

USAID policy on conflict prevention states that “The Agency remains committed to developing more preventive country and/or regional strategies that address the root causes of deadly conflict and economic and political crises where these threaten USAID strategic objectives or broader US national interests. Our goal is to improve the use of development assistance to mitigate and to the extent possible prevent potential economic and political crises” (*USAID/ General Notice on Conflict Prevention for Strategic Planning, June 1999*). USAID policy on conflict prevention indicates that the US will seek to reduce regional conflicts in part by finding ways to “address the root causes of conflict both multilaterally and bilaterally, using development assistance and support to democracy.”

USAID Conflict Prevention Guidance for Strategic Planning (ADS 201) provides guidance on the topic of conflict prevention to field missions for the purpose of preparing new country strategic plans and providing inputs to Mission Performance Plans (MPPs) prepared by

¹ This document was issued as a General Administrator Notice on 06/21/99. It became effective the same day. It was last revised on 09/21/2000. The mandatory reference is 200-203.

country teams. As part of preparing new USAID country strategies, operating units are being asked to:

1. Prepare an appropriate vulnerability analysis that addresses the potential for conflict,
2. Summarize the findings of such analyses in the strategy document, and
3. Indicate when and how these findings affect the proposed strategy.

The objective of the analysis is to:

1. Help safeguard the achievement of USAID strategic objectives and development investments, and
2. Make the need for costly post-conflict humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and reconstruction less likely.

Mission Experience in Conflict Vulnerability Analysis

USAID is already making a unique contribution to foreign policy deliberations of the U.S. Government by improving the ways in which information and analysis of the causes and effects of instability are integrated into our decision-making processes. We have already begun the process of integrating conflict prevention/management into many of our country strategic plans (Executive Message October 3, 2000).

USAID Missions in Sub-Saharan Africa have integrated conflict vulnerability analyses that address the potential for conflict and indicates how conflict may affect the proposed strategy. USAID Missions that have completed conflict vulnerability analyses (CVAs) include Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, REDSO and WARP. Mission countries have also commissioned a range of specific conflict analyses, including Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Sudan, Mozambique, and Somalia.² A sample of CVA summaries is provided below:

Uganda: Conflict is nearly endemic to Uganda, occurring with various degrees of severity in the northeast, the north, the northwest, and the southwest. Conflict is part and parcel of the post-Protectorate legacy. To date, every change of political regime has been accompanied and accomplished by conflict. Although conflict in Uganda for the past fifteen years has been particularly brutal, none of the current conflicts appear to have the ability to topple the current regime. They are armed insurgencies rather than popular uprisings. At least two of the conflicts carry state-to-state cross-border significance, while a third involves warring tribal groups striking across borders. Armed conflict is a hugely important factor in the impoverishment of the East and North of Uganda.³ (12/2000)

Kenya: Incidences of violent conflict in Kenya are essentially isolated (though not completely unrelated) local incidents. The current level of conflict is sufficient for serious concern, as it comes at great cost to much of the country. It leaves some areas impoverished and destroys gains made in others, while costing many lives and adversely affecting economic and political confidence in the country. Of real concern is the possibility that these regional conflicts could become national in scale. Worthy of attention are the actors and issues that might have the power to trigger such an aggregation, and the factors that can help to preserve at least a semblance of stability. (06/2000)

² Completed CVAs and Conflict studies are available on ConflictWeb.

³ Uganda: Promise, Performance and Future Challenges, The United Nations System in Uganda, September 2000, p.58

Namibia: Namibia can be classified as a situation of *currently occurring conflict*. This conflict is due to two principal reasons -- continuing bursts of instability and security problems in the Caprivi region, and Angolan on-going excursion on to Namibian territory. The ramifications of the present political and military situation could be regarded as a potential threat to USAID's ability to meet planned activity schedules in given time frames. (02/2000)

Guinea: Widespread poverty and gross wealth and social disparities weigh heavily on Guinea's development prospects. The ethnic divides at work in Guinea are also worrisome, as are the concentration of political power in the presidency and the continued strong role of the military. Neighboring violent conflicts and massive refugee flows make a large part of Guinea unstable. This latter aspect makes Guinea a special assistance case, complicating the process of economic and political liberalization. Exceptional, well coordinated development, humanitarian and military assistance approaches will be required to maintain Guinea's position as a vital island of stability in the sub-region. This will entail the transfer of a much higher level of resources from donor nations than is currently the case. (11/1998)

In varying degrees of depth, completed CVAs included an analysis of the root causes of actual or potential conflict, potential triggers and capacities to manage tension. In the process of integrating the analyses into the strategic plan, mission countries were realistic in what missions can and cannot do to affect change, the important consideration of manageable interests, and the importance of flexibility, as the following passages indicate:

- USAID/Kenya must distinguish between those factors causing violent conflict that it can affect and those it cannot. Unfortunately, many of the key factors that are contributing to the rise in violent conflict are unlikely to be amenable to USAID influence. But there are many ways in which the Mission can have an impact, particularly through strengthening the many "voices for peace" in Kenyan society and by strengthening institutions that can balance power and channel conflict. (Kenya, 06/2000)
- Conflict, by its very nature, is volatile and unpredictable. To forecast a continuous operating scenario in the conflict arena over the six-year period of the Integrated Strategic Plan is simply not possible. In a field of such fluidity and fragility, flexibility must be the order of the day to respond to rapidly changing events. (Uganda, 12/2000)

Programmatically, given the volatile nature of our operating environment, missions such as USAID/DROC have organized their activities by spelling out a range of possible country scenarios. Activities are then reprogrammed and shifted according to the dominating current scenario. USAID/Zimbabwe has developed a conflict-monitoring framework in which activities are changed according to the local situation. A crisis modifier has been developed in USAID/Eritrea in which DA resources could be used for disaster activities should the situation warrant. Other missions such as USAID/Senegal, and the USAID/West Africa Regional Program (WARP) have developed cross-cutting, innovative conflict activities.

Africa Bureau's Conflict Vulnerability Analysis Manual

As several missions have demonstrated, a CVA can be used to help pinpoint appropriate areas for programming or re/design strategic plans. In order to help consolidate lessons learned to date and to translate current state of practice of early warning, vulnerability and conflict risk assessment, Tulane Payson Center and Africa Bureau have developed this working document in order to be a practical tool for undertaking conflict vulnerability analyses. Using the workbook as a methodological guide can help to profile the nature, geographic distribution and likelihood of violent conflict. The conceptual framework and several-step process facilitates the following:

- Identify significant groups within their mission countries and the current level of conflict and to anticipate points of tension within the country (conflict risk)
- Assess the country's capacity to manage current and anticipated conflict (conflict vulnerability)
- Consider USAID's response options to this analysis in order to lessen the country's vulnerability (policy/program response)

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION TO CONFLICT

Overview

- **What is Violent Conflict?**
- **Causes of Conflict**
- **Conflict Indicators**
- **Levels and Phases of Conflict**
- **Impact of Conflict**

Conflict Vulnerability Assessment (CVA) deals with **collective violent conflict** and attempts to assess how vulnerable the particular entity – country, region, state, community – is to violent conflict. It is not easy to forecast violent conflict, and once violence erupts it can be difficult to contain. Thus the challenge of CVA is to detect early signs of potential violent conflict so that effective preventive and remedial measures can be taken. This chapter will briefly discuss the nature, causes, levels, stages, indicators and impact of conflict.

A. WHAT IS VIOLENT CONFLICT?

We define conflict, as “perceived incompatibility of goals or aspirations. Conflict is an inherent part of human existence.” Conflict occurs between individuals, groups, and countries – even ones that normally get along famously. It is a normal, even healthy dynamic. A certain amount of conflict can be constructive, inspiring creativity in thought, communication, and action. Even violent revolutionary conflict, viewed from the longer perspective of history, may be a force for progress. The American War of Independence and the Civil War, India’s fight for independence from the British, and the struggle of the South African blacks against apartheid fall into this category.

Collective conflict is generally associated with distinct groups self-identified as such with separate interests, values and aspirations. Collective conflict may be motivated by a desire for constructive change. The violence used by those who fought the apartheid regime in South Africa is arguably defensible. In general, however, there is a widely shared belief that desirable change should be brought about by non-violent means. When conflict catapults into violence, it not only becomes destructive but also may undercut the desired goals of a just peace and sustainable development. Hence regime transitions achieved through violent means are far less likely to achieve these goals than those through non-violent means. .

Violence is normally understood as the use of physical force so as to cause injury or death. However, in conflict analysis it is useful to take a somewhat broader view of violence to include what is called “structural violence” where current institutional structures prevent or inhibit people from satisfying human development needs such as security, acceptance, or effective participation in a just and equitable manner. If people feel thus deprived, as black and other non-white South

Some notes on the nature of conflict (CVA Kenya, 06/2000)

It is widely recognized that conflict is an inherent part of modern, complex society, especially when interests are organized and self-seeking. Conflict is more intense when interests seeking fulfillment or redress meet stubborn resistance. The latter situation is generally more likely when resources are scarce or where contesting parties view their efforts to advance or maintain the status quo as zero-sum affairs.

Conflict can take many forms, some violent, others not. People find that their ideas, their preferences, their interests vary from those of their neighbors every day. Those ideas, preferences, and interests are in conflict, but they are normally either sublimated or acted upon and resolved in peaceful ways. The means of resolving daily conflict include negotiation, compromise, and reliance on institutions like village councils, courts, or the police. Violence often reflects the failure of institutions to allow for the pursuit of particular interests. Sometimes, e.g. in southern Sudan, it may continue unabated without institutional response or transformation.

Conflict, violent or not, may be restricted to local groups without wider intention or impact. But conflict can also aim at and involve national-level issues and participants. In still other cases, actors beyond national borders are engaged, either indirectly, through proxies, or directly. The impact of violent conflict varies greatly, according to several factors, including: its duration, the number of people involved and their geographic location, the resources (especially weapons) at the disposal of competing parties, and their various perceptions of the stakes.

Africans did under apartheid, it can motivate the victims to resort to direct physical violence in the absence of more peaceful options.

All cultures have developed mechanisms to prevent, mitigate, and punish violent and destructive behavior. Anthropologist Carolyn Nordstrom's (1995) discussion of traditional Mozambican healers developing rituals to "take the violence out of people" so that combatants might be reintegrated into communities is an example of how violent actions are incompatible with traditional community life in that war-torn country.

Under certain circumstances described later in this chapter, **collective violent conflict** may erupt. At local levels, forms may include blood feuds, vengeance killings, or a communal riot. This kind of conflict may be spontaneous, but is usually organized in some fashion. This is why leadership plays a very important role, even for "mobs." One of the principal tasks of a vulnerability assessment is to analyze the circumstances of such conflict.

When such conflict is organized and sustained, it may be considered rebellion, insurgency, or war. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 1998 only two of the world's 26 major armed conflicts were between states (Ethiopia/Eritrea and India/Pakistan). Conflicts in the world today are overwhelmingly intrastate – although international actors continue to play critical roles in many of these internal conflicts.

BOX 1: TYPOLOGY OF VIOLENT CONFLICTS

By Level of Violence

- **War or High Intensity Conflict** - violence characterized by fatality rates averaging >1000/year or extensive (>5%) population dislocation, or both. (Schmid 1998)
- **Low Intensity Conflict** – violence characterized by fatality rates <1,000/year (but >100), and <5% population dislocation. If either threshold is exceeded it is counted as a high-intensity conflict. (Schmid 1998)

By Nature of Conflict

- **Civil War** - armed conflict between groups within the same country where the warring factions each control territory, have a functioning government, identifiable regular armed forces, and the allegiance of a significant portion of the nation's citizens.
- **Insurgency** – organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (US DOD)
- **Protracted Social Conflict** - ongoing conflict centered on religious, cultural, or ethnic communal identity, which in turn is dependent upon the satisfaction of basic needs such as those for security, communal recognition and distributive justice. (Cited by Schmid 1998)
- **Revolutionary War** – sustained military conflict between insurgents and central governments aimed at displacing the regime. (Esty et al 1995)
- **War of Secession** - violent conflict in which a regionally based ethnic, religious or cultural group attempts to secede from an existing state. (Gurr and Harff 1994)

There are, of course, different kinds of conflicts (e.g. insurgency, war of secession, civil war, etc.), each with their own dynamics and characteristics. When assessing a country's risk for conflict, it may be helpful to consider some of the categories of conflict in order to respond most effectively (See Box 1). Note that the typology by nature of conflict does not suggest mutually exclusive categories. Thus, for example, a "protracted social conflict," "war of secession" and a "war of secession" could well be a "civil war."

B. CAUSES OF CONFLICT

Socio-political and economic issues have been often held to be at the root of violent conflict.

Similarly, the “basic human needs” approach which dominated development strategies in the 1970s placed economic issues first in the “hierarchy of needs” and therefore most important for achieving development and preventing conflict. Some have argued that racial, ethnic, cultural and religious identity issues could act as independent “primordial” factors that induce conflict or be closely connected to political ideology or can be politicized, particularly when states are weak or economies are stressed. In recent years environmental factors have been increasingly looked at as well -- both in terms of competition over increasingly scarce resources, as well as the deleterious effects that conflict can have on the environment itself.

It is also useful to note that the causes of any given conflict may change over time. As a conflict evolves “new” causes could emerge and the old recede to the background or even fade away. This is particularly true when violence takes a firm grip on the conflict and new actors, both national and international, enter the scene.

It is also important to recognize that many violent conflicts are directly sponsored or incited by national governments. In short the causes of conflict are dynamic and highly complex.

B.1 Social Fragmentation

In ethnic conflict the goals of the contenders and the dynamics of the process varies significantly depending who is in conflict and for what reason. Gurr (2000) identifies several such distinct categories. “Ethnonationalists” are regionally concentrated groups interested in greater autonomy or independence rather than supremacy over others. The people of Southern Sudan are a classic example of an ethnonationalist group that is fighting for autonomy or independence. In practice, however, autonomy or independence for an ethnonationalist group also may result in supremacy of the victors over other minority groups living in its territory. In such a situation another may replace one form of domination.

“Communal contenders” are groups with a distinct ethnic, cultural or religious identity that vie for supremacy over, or a share in, the institutions of state power. If power is shared successfully sometimes at the center and sometimes through devolution or some combination of both violent conflict can be avoided. Otherwise such violence may not only erupt but also result in wars of secession as has happened in Somalia, Liberia, Sudan and Nigeria in 1967 in the Biafran war of secession.

Two chronically disadvantaged groups are “Ethnoclasses” and “indigenous” groups. Both are culturally distinct groups. Ethnoclasses are ethnically or culturally distinct minorities that have a specialized economic niche in society and form a distinct social strata. In general they are economically and socially disadvantaged. However, some may not be so. For example, the Indian trading community in post-colonial East Africa and the Lebanese community in West Africa have been economically strong. The Tutsi ruling class in Burundi has been politically dominant.

Indigenous groups typically occupy peripheral areas of modern states. The cattle-herding Masai of East Africa are an example.

Some assert that ethno-nationalism motivates “irrational or unreasonable” behavior. This viewpoint however, does not help to gain a proper appreciation of the conflict or potential for conflict. The task of good vulnerability assessment is to understand the culturally relative premises and rationality of the different actors. Ethnic, cultural or religious differences alone are *never* the sole source of violent group conflict. In contrast ethnic *rivalries* may be. Such rivalries generate real or perceived incompatibilities in aspirations.

Ethnic conflict is a symptom of other social forces, such as competition over scarce resources, modernization, and state collapse, as well as reflective of the ancient roots of these hostilities. Typically, elements of both are true. Ethnic differences alone are rarely the sole source of communal conflict. It should also be noted that in Africa, some of the most terrible and intractable

conflicts have been among those that share great cultural similarities. Somalia is one of the most ethnically homogenous states in Africa. Tutsis and Hutus share the same language, religion, and culture.

Ethnic rivalries are thus often a source of tension, but to understand and address “ethnic conflict,” one must take a balanced approach that is sensitive to many different factors. In many instances, the parties to conflict are driven by perception that may not always accord with the *objective* reality (structural factors) such as concrete economic conditions or governmental structures. Ethnicity is more of a “mobilization factor” than a cause of conflict per se. It is not the differences that cause conflict, but the politicization of those differences.

B.2 State Failure and Collapse

Predatory, failing or weak states as the major cause of such conflict. A predatory state is one which fails to perform the normal service functions of a state for common benefit but which utilizes state power to exploit the resources of the country largely for a narrow section interest. A failing state is one which is moving towards being dysfunctional in regard to the normal duties of the state. A weak state is one which shows an inability to perform its normal functions over the territory it is supposed to command. That predatory, weak or failing states may be the cause rather than the effect of conflict may be somewhat counterintuitive. The scenario is something like this:

When agents who pursue personal or group rather than public goals capture the state, the stage is set for conflict. (This phenomenon is sometimes called a **predatory** state.) Those at the helm of government lack legitimacy so must increasingly rely on coercion and an increasingly narrow political base of well-rewarded followers to maintain their position and power. Meanwhile, the organs of the state are diverted towards serving the interests of the few individuals in control economically as well as politically – indeed, one of the characteristics of this kind of rule is the use of the state apparatus for the accumulation of private wealth.

Five Stages of State Collapse (Zartman 1995)

1. Devolution of power to the periphery as the center becomes mired in infighting.
2. Government loss of its power base as it withers at the center.
3. Avoidance of necessary but difficult choices on the part of leadership, resulting in a crisis of governance.
4. Practice of only defensive measures by incumbents, with a marked absence of any policy agenda.
5. The center’s loss of control over its own agents.

Politics becomes an all-or-nothing, zero-sum game rather than an exercise in compromise and consensus building. Performance of the functions of governance serve no purpose to those in control of the state and so wither away; meanwhile, people seek security, education, and other “public goods” through other forms of social organization, such as ethnic groups and NGOs. As the state disintegrates, competing groups become ever more exclusive and are sometimes dominated by “warlords.” Conflict becomes the inevitable outcome if the process continues unchecked.

There is, of course, no easy template formula for state collapse; however, this scenario does follow a common pattern. Box 2 outlines the stages of collapse. One of the most notable features in the process of state collapse is the absence of clear turning points or thresholds.

B.3 Structural Factors


More recently, researchers have been analyzing **structural** sources of conflict, long-term conditions of a society that are embedded in its social, political, economic, and institutional arrangements. Such factors as poverty, inequality, or economic dependence may not cause

conflict in and of themselves, but they create the conditions that make a country ripe for its emergence. From USAID’s policy and program point of view these factors are especially pertinent because it is precisely in such areas that the agency is able to make an effective intervention to avoid or mitigate conflict.

C. CONFLICT INDICATORS

One typology of conflict indicators⁴ distinguishes between *long-term* (general enabling, structural, or pre-disposing) factors and *shorter-term* (specific dynamic, proximate or situational) factors. Moreover, one can distinguish between *conflict accelerators* (mobilizing) factors and *conflict decelerators* (disabling) factors. With these distinctions, we create a 2-by-2 grid of conflict indicators as shown in the figure below, along with examples of each type.

Figure I.C – A Typology of Conflict Indicators



Note: Economic growth is generally helpful to decelerate conflict since it increases the size of the pie that can be shared. But this is not always the case. Economic growth may well destabilize establishes structures and institutions and generate intense competition, breakdown traditional cultural norms and relationships, destabilize society and create conditions for conflict. Major changes in the economic structure, such as that happened in Yugoslavia can be an important accelerator of conflict.

D. LEVELS AND PHASES OF CONFLICT


FIGURE I.2 (below) shows a simplified model for five levels and five phases of conflict. **Levels** are defined by the impact of violence (number of deaths, percentage of population involved), while **phases** occur over time as conflict escalates and diminishes. The nature of violence in conflict situations can take many forms. However, widespread bloodshed may not take place until conflict reaches a fairly mature stage; for this reason, the “early warnings” of violence are often misinterpreted or ignored until it is too late for prevention.

The model shown here is uni-modal, i.e., it has “one hump.” In reality, some conflicts escalate, subside, and again re-escalate; showing a cyclical pattern. The dotted curve indicates the possibility of the rekindling of conflict.

⁴ Schmid (1998)

Note that there are two **thresholds**; the first is a **political crisis** as the conflict escalates from political tension (level 2) to violent political conflict (level 3). The second threshold is a **humanitarian crisis** as the conflict escalates from low-intensity conflict (level 4) to high-intensity conflict (level 5).

Figure I.D. LEVELS AND PHASES OF CONFLICT



D.1 Levels of Violence⁵

- Level 1: Peaceful Stable Situation** – There is a high degree of regime legitimacy. There is no political violence or, at worst, only rarely.
- Level 2: Political Tension Situation** – There are growing levels of systemic strain and increasing social and political cleavages, often along factional lines. Sporadic violence results in fewer than 50 fatalities from political violence per year.
- Level 3: Violent Political Conflict** – There is an erosion of political legitimacy of the national government and/or rising acceptance of violent factional politics. Assassinations, terrorist acts, and violent government repression occur, but fatalities from political acts remain below 100 per year.
- Level 4: Low-Intensity Conflict** – There is open hostility and armed conflict among factional groups, regime repression and insurgency. Fatalities from political are below 1,000 but more than 100 per year and population displacement or dislocation must be below 5% of the total. If either threshold is exceeded it becomes a high-intensity conflict.
- Level 5: High-Intensity Conflict** – There is +open warfare among rival groups and/or mass destruction and displacement of sectors of the civilian population. Fatalities exceed 1,000 per year and/or population displacement or dislocation exceeds 5% of the total.

⁵ Adapted from Schmid (1998). Note that the fatalities are absolute figures. Thus the impact of a given number would be inversely related to the size of the population.

D.2 Phases of Conflict

- a. **Pre-Conflict:** The pre-conflict phase represents conditions that are normal to the society concerned. At this stage disputes between groups do not result in violence. If the country has democratic institutions such as a freely-elected legislature with minority representation and a free media, protest will be channeled peacefully through such institutional channels. However, in countries where such democratic institutions do not exist, protest will be more informal and monitoring of dissent more difficult. Ideally, early warning must occur at this stage. Ideally early warning *should* occur when political tensions emerge within this stage. Development policies should examine structural causes of potential violent conflict and address them. Development strategies should be designed to reinforce mechanisms that channel normal disputes through non-violent means.
- b. **Conflict Emergence:** In this phase disputes become more evident, protesting groups become more vocal and militant, and group interactions become polarized. Protest can take many forms including boycotts, strikes, and mass demonstrations. The degree of violence that such protest entails would depend on the specific conditions that prevail in the country. If the country has a democratic tradition, less violence can be anticipated. If the political conditions are more authoritarian, a higher level of violence can be anticipated. However, in this second phase violence is sporadic and random rather than organized and regular. At this stage, early warnings signal that proactive conflict prevention strategies should be deployed.
- c. **Conflict and Crisis:** In this phase violence intensifies and becomes the principal tool in the conflict for one or more of the parties to the conflict. The level of violence reaches crisis levels. At this stage the state may lose control over some parts of the country. More and more resources are devoted to the conflict, and positions of the warring parties begin to harden.

Chaos and Complex Emergencies: A chaos and complex emergency situation may be reached within this phase when the level of violence passes a threshold that causes state collapse in at least parts of the country where essential institutions such as the police, judiciary, and regular civil administration cease to function. Long-term development initiatives are overwhelmed by short-term needs for humanitarian relief. At this stage of the conflict, interventions typically require the most money and have the least impact; however, in part due to the “CNN effect,” political will to address the conflict often occurs only once a country has descended into crisis.

- d. **Conflict Settlement:** In this phase efforts are made to mitigate the conflict and seek a lasting resolution. The initiative for the settlement could come from one of a number of sources, internal, regional, or international. The scale of violence has lessened considerably, accompanied by an improvement in socioeconomic and political conditions. Although the settlement phase is depicted here in terms of a smooth decline in the level of violence, the actual path will depend on the speed and success of negotiation. At this stage, humanitarian relief needs are reduced, refugee re-integration can begin, and medium or long-term development projects again become feasible.
- e. **Post-Conflict Transition and Development Phase:** This phase signifies the end of violence, and return to peace. Refugee resettlement is complete and humanitarian relief is no longer necessary in the absence of natural disaster. This stage signifies a time for rehabilitation, reconstruction, and initiating a course towards sustainable development.

E. IMPACT OF CONFLICT

One of the findings to emerge most strongly from participatory poverty research in Uganda is that insecurity and conflict are amongst the most urgent concerns expressed by the poor themselves. Armed conflict is a hugely important factor in the impoverishment of the East and North of Uganda.⁶

The impact of conflict on affected populations is staggering. Even “minor” outbreaks with relatively few direct deaths are accompanied by socio-economic crises, humanitarian emergencies, famines and epidemics, and terrible suffering.

Direct Human Impact	Indirect Socio-economic Impact	Opportunity Costs
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Death by violence, famine or disease • Stress and distress • Migration • Environmental destruction 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Erosion/degradation of social networks – school, clinics, family • Destabilization of economic networks – marketing, crediting • Degradation/destruction of infrastructure – housing, transport, irrigation • Loss of human capital –skills, knowledge 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crops not grown • Goods not traded • Skills not learned • Development not improved

When we think of the impacts of conflict, we almost always think about its victims, who endure tremendous loss and suffering. Those most vulnerable – the poor, women, children, and minorities bear the burden of these affects, although some still erroneously assume that those most at risk are combatants. Women and children account for up to 80% of Africa’s displaced and represent the most vulnerable populations in times of crisis. Stresses placed on women are immense and encompass not only war-related physical and sexual violence, but also increasing levels of domestic abuse, which result from the breakdown of traditional community and family life and the ensuing erosion of cultural mechanisms that protect and support women. Their weak status also makes them particularly vulnerable to shortages of food and medicine; meanwhile, the burdens on women increase as they shoulder the responsibility of safeguarding the well-being of children while being forced to cope with the new demands of daily life in a crisis situation. Meanwhile, the horrific and escalating phenomenon of child soldiers lays bare how the lines between victims and victimizers becomes blurred during times of war; the ferocity displayed by half-grown killers lays bare the intense traumatization of society and the immense psychological wounding that takes place. As Elizabeth Rubin (1998) comments, “Perhaps one of the most terrifying sights in the dozens of post-Cold War insurgencies around the world is that of a thirteen-year-old with a loaded Kalashnikov.”

The war in Somalia...is a war on the woman. Any woman between the ages of 18 and 40 is not safe from being forcibly removed to the army camps to be raped and violated. If her husband finds out, he kills her for the shame of it all; if they know that he has found out, they kill him too; if he goes into hiding instead and she won't tell where he is, they kill her.” *Somali woman quoted by Martin (1992), cited by Dirasse (1999)*

At the same time, we must also consider the fact that there are some who benefit from war. Indeed, many leaders (e.g. “warlords”) may stand to lose more from peace than continued conflict. During times of chaos, some benefit through economic monopoly guaranteed by military might and total impunity for their actions. These figures have extensive patronage networks which can be relied upon to defend this arrangement. Furthermore, if the only experience communities have with state structures has been coercive, they may react to attempts to re-institute even democratic structures with suspicion and hostility. When devising conflict prevention, mitigation, or recovery strategies, these issues must be fully recognized and these stakeholders considered in strategic planning.

⁶ Uganda: Promise, Performance and Future Challenges, The United Nations System in Uganda, September 2000, p.58

CHAPTER II: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR CONFLICT VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT (CVA)

In conflict studies a clear conceptual distinction must be made between *Risk Assessment* (RA) and *Early Warning* (EW). RA is a more long-term to medium term exercise. It attempts to evaluate the potential for violence in a given country or community. It is essentially a probability analysis although it is generally not possible to give a precise quantitative assessment of the risk. The focus is primarily though not exclusively on structural variables (see Figure 1-C).

EW is applied to a more limited number of situations already singled out through RA as high-risk. EW aims at anticipating and tracking escalation in the shorter term from high risk—usually political tension or sporadic violence—to open or high hostility conflict. Early Warning (EW) refers to "the systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crises for the purpose of anticipating the escalation of violent conflict" (cited by Schmid 1998).

Conflict Vulnerability Assessment (CVA) includes RA, but adds to it a studied judgment of the capacity of the country or community to cope with risk factors - to manage tensions, to contain violence, and to rebuild the torn social fabric after violence has been contained. For example, both Malaysia and Sri Lanka are countries with deep ethnic and religious divisions, but Malaysia has successfully been able to cope with this risk factor whereas Sri Lanka has experienced a protracted civil war. They share a similar *risk* but their *vulnerability* to that risk has been quite different. It should be noted, however, that both risk and vulnerability can change over time, and in some cases can be transformed quite rapidly.

EW, RA and CVA initiatives should be pro-active. They are undertaken in the hope that accurate assessments would lead to policy and program initiatives that would help to minimize or avoid conflict and improve coping capacities. Foreign assistance outside of humanitarian emergency assistance essentially focuses on long-term sustainable development. Thus for a donor, points of intervention to reduce the risk of conflict and increase the coping capacity of conflict must be integrated into long-term development programs. However, diagnosing a problem is only the first step towards formulating an appropriate response. EW, RA and CVA can help inform the strategic planning process, but analyzing vulnerability is a different analytical problem than determining the most effective course of action.

A. Conceptual Issues

CVA approaches are based on some theory of conflict that identify the causal factors or early stages of new, continuing or renewed conflict. This manual draws upon a variety of sources, especially those of the Development Research Group (DECRG) of the World Bank and the Interdisciplinary Research Program on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations (PIOOM) of The Netherlands, to develop three overlapping frameworks or perspectives for understanding the dynamics of conflict:

- Social Fragmentation
- State Collapse
- Structural Factors

For example, the University of Maryland's Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project focuses upon social fragmentation, tracking the status of ethno-political conflict amongst some 270 politically active communal groups worldwide. The CIA-commissioned State Failure Task Force in McLean, Virginia, has tracked variables associated with state collapse from 1954-1996. Last year DECRG

began coordinating a large-scale research program into the structural (particularly economic) factors contributing to conflict.

Broadly there are two categories of EW and CVA models (Davies and Gurr 1998). The first are interpretive models that are generally favored by policy makers who normally have to operate under institutional and time constraints. Interpretive models de-emphasize the use of explicit analytical methods or sources in favor of expert opinion from field officers, and tend to be sensitive to the needs of decision-makers.

The second category is analytical models. They probe more systematically into structural (causal) factors, look for complex patterns in dynamic (event) data, or combine both in sequential models for both long-term risk assessments and short-term early warnings as needed. As with interpretive models, they need to be linked carefully to the needs of decision-makers and potential respondents.

EW and VA models can differ in their focus. Such as “crisis” in general, human rights violations, political instability, refugees, food crises, health emergencies and environment-related conflict to ethno-political wars.

[A review of various CVA/EW Models, Frameworks, and initiatives]

B. A Framework for CVA and Policy Response

This draft framework includes interpretive and analytical components without resorting to complex analytical techniques. The conceptual framework is designed to assist in the process of undertaking a CVA through a series of steps to guide through the development of the CVA and identify the possible implications for mission programs and policy. (See the figure on the following page.) This framework integrates the three perspectives on conflict – social fragmentation, state collapse, and structural factors - in the conflict risk assessment in the belief that the three perspectives complement each other, conflict is a very complex phenomenon, and that all three sources of conflict can be - and often are - present.

First identify significant identity (ethnic, political, religious, etc.) groups within the population and map the current level of conflict amongst these groups. Next, Assess indicators of structural conflict as well as social fragmentation and state failure. Using this information, assess conflict *risk* within the population. Following the risk assessment, there is an instrument to help evaluate the population's coping capacity. These exercises are the two components of the CVA.

The ultimate point of CVA is to inform policy and program choices. Thus, the final steps of the framework assess USAID's options to respond in order to prevent or mitigate conflict or to support recovery once conflict has been contained.

There are two categories of data used for the analysis. One is “hard” data such as population, GNP, income distribution and so forth that are specific and quantifiable although the mere quantification of data does not necessarily guarantee reliability. The second category of data used is “soft” data that deal with, for example, perceptions and opinions. While there are scales for such items as “level of democracy”, this manual extensively uses checklists adapted from PIOOM. Throughout, we have tried to avoid a simplistic number-crunching approach and tried to ensure that we utilize your informed judgment and expertise.

Appendix to Chapter II

Review of Available Tools for Conflict Vulnerability Analysis

By John Davies

Given the rapid developments in this field, it is not possible to provide a complete or authoritative listing of early warning related projects. We have identified a number of significant or potentially significant open-access projects, but new projects are constantly created, and existing projects are changed or completed. This review is intended as a point of entry, to be expanded, corrected and updated over time (** and * indicate the more useful sites).

I. Monitoring Systems:

A. Major Information Centers for Current and Potential Crises

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>**1. ReliefWeb
UNOCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs)
Geneva, New York</p> | <p>Internet-based information management system on <i>current complex emergencies</i>, including broad array of country background profiles, maps, and current situational and analytical information from IOs, NGOs, governments, universities and news sources—open access, aimed to support humanitarian relief operations directly and through raising public awareness. Internet: www.reliefweb.int.</p> |
| <p>**2. Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)
UNOCHA</p> | <p>Internet based system to provide information on <i>emergency situations</i> in Africa and Central Asia, including daily updates and weekly roundups, extra reports, maps, and graphics—open access, English and French. Internet: www.reliefweb.int/IRIN</p> |
| <p>**3. Contemporary Conflicts in Africa (ownership not clear)</p> | <p>Provides links to wide range of IOs and NGOs providing information on <i>current conflicts, conflict prevention, refugees, arms control, peace initiatives, country profiles, maps</i>, and other conflict related data. Internet: www.synapse.net/~acdi20/</p> |

B. Armed Conflicts—Analytical Data

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>*1. PIOOM
University of Leiden
Netherlands
pioom@rulfsw.leidenuni
v.nl</p> | <p>Annual global inventory of <i>all armed conflicts</i>, including issues, actors, civilian and military casualties, refugees, human rights violations—limited access database with annual publication of PIOOM's <i>World Conflict and Human Rights Map</i>. Also provides “checklists” for monitoring and generating country profiles on tensions, conflict escalation and recovery. Internet: www.fsw.leidenuniv.nl/www/w3_liswo/pioom.htm.</p> |
| <p>*2. SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), Solna, Sweden and Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research, University of Uppsala
Uppsala, Sweden
sipri@sipri.se</p> | <p>Annual global inventory of <i>major armed conflicts</i>, including issues, actors, and military casualties. SIPRI yearbooks also include information on <i>conflict management initiatives</i> and on <i>production and transfer of weapons and military technology</i>, including chemical and biological weapons and overall military expenditure—published/open access database. Internet: www.sipri.se. (See also FIRST.)</p> |

- **3. FIRST (Facts on International Relations and Security Trends)
first@sipri.se
- FIRST is a joint project of the International Relations and Security Network (ISN), SIPRI and other institutes, providing an integrated on-line database from several research institutes on *armed conflicts and peace keeping, arms production and trade, military expenditure, armed forces and weapons holdings; indicators of development, political and economic stability, IDPs, human security, human rights, environment, diversity, political violence and terrorism*, along with *maps, chronologies* and other data helpful for conflict vulnerability analysis. Internet:
<http://first.sipri.org>

C. Human Rights Violations

- *1. Amnesty International
London, New York
amnesty@amnesty.org
- Field reports/assessments and annual country reports on individual and collective *human rights violations*—open access. Internet:
www.amnesty.org
- *2. Human Rights Watch
New York
hrwnyc@hrw.org
- Periodic country reports and annual world report on individual and collective *human rights and humanitarian law violations*. Its Arms Project investigates the link between the arms trade and human rights abuses and analyzes weapons systems (e.g., landmines) under humanitarian law. Open access, based on field reports/assessments. Internet: www.hrw.org
- *3. U.S. State Department
- Annual country reports on overall *human rights status*—open access, based on field reports/assessments. Internet:
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
4. Human Rights Internet
Ottawa, Canada
hri@hri.ca
- Internet-based global information-sharing system for NGOs concerned with human rights. Includes reports on current *human rights issues or crises*. Internet: www.hri.ca
5. HURIDOCS
Geneva, Switzerland
- Irregular reports on *specific human rights violations*—open access, based on standard format field reports. Internet:
<http://photon-17.iprolink.ch/~huridocs>

II. Current Risk Assessment and Early Warning Systems

A. Public Sector

1. Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS), UNOCHA
New York
shiawl@un.org
- Database of background conditions for most countries, with more intensive monitoring of accelerating factors for countries identified as vulnerable to *humanitarian crises*, drawing quantitative and qualitative information from UN field offices and agencies and other sources. Used to support interpretive analyses and reports for decision makers in UN operational agencies—access limited to relevant UN agencies and member states. Internet:
www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/programs/pad/hews.html
2. Conflict Prevention Center, OSCE (Org. for Security and Cooperation in
- The CPC provides support for OSCE negotiating and decision-making bodies in the areas of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation. Its Operations Centre identifies potential crisis areas and plans for future missions

- Europe), Vienna.
pm-cpc@osce.or.at
- and operations. Primary focus on the former USSR and Yugoslavia. Access limited to internal agencies and member states. On-line reports on prevention initiatives available. Internet: www.osce.org
- *3. Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET) Washington, DC info@few.net
- Current vulnerability assessments of potential *food emergencies* for 17 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, based on in-country reports by networked field representatives taking into account harvest, internal factors (economic, social, demographic, health, environment), external hazards (conflict, natural disasters, price shifts etc.) and coping capacity. Used as basis for crisis prevention planning and related development work strengthening host country capacity. Regular country, regional and topical reports available on-line, along with data on prices, natural disasters, weather imaging etc. Internet: www.fews.net
4. Global Information Early Warning System (GIEWS) Food and Agricultural Organization, Rome giews1@fao.org
- Global monitoring of food demand and supply for all basic foods, and early warning alerts of imminent *food crises*, drawing information from governments, news sources, NGOs and in-country assessments by FAO field representatives. Open access—monthly, bimonthly, quarterly and ad hoc reports. Internet: www.fao.org/giews
5. Genoa Project, DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency)
- The Genoa Project is a vehicle for systematic integration of expert knowledge among US intelligence agencies to develop early pre-crisis understanding and mitigation. Limited access to USG agencies. Internet: www.darpa.mil/ato/programs/genoa.htm
6. State Failure Project USG with Science Applications International Corp. and University of Maryland (CIDCM) mmarshall@cidcm.umd.edu
- Empirically derived indicators of state failures (including revolutionary or ethnic war, regime collapse, genocide). Structural models about 70% accurate in predicting new failures five years in advance; dynamic models about 78% accurate six months in advance. Genocide early warning application is currently real-time. Limited access for USG agencies. Retrospective data and papers available on Internet: www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm

B. Private Sector—Model-Based Analyses

- **1. Minorities at Risk Project, CIDCM University of Maryland College Park, MD mmarshall@cidcm.umd.edu
- Model-based risk assessments of potential *ethnopolitical conflicts*, supported by profiles of 275 minority groups considered politically significant (based on relative size and risk levels). Assessments accessible in “Peace and Conflict 2001” report on-line. Five-year risk assessments show 70% success rate in predicting outbreak of ethnic war. Open access: profiles, chronologies (1990–2000, updated periodically), manual and very detailed indicator data (zipped) available via internet: www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm
- **2. Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) London secretariat@fewer.org
- A global network of NGOs, research institutions, UN/IO agencies and governments for information exchange and partnership for early warning and prevention of violent conflicts. Regionally based networks are operational in the Caucasus, Central Asia, South East Asia, African Great Lakes and West African regions, with a new network being planned for Latin America. Regular early warning reports, including future scenarios and recommendations for preventive action, accessible via Internet: www.fewer.org

3. FUGI Global Early Warning System
Soka University
Tokyo, Japan
onishi@t.soka.ac.jp
- Model-based risk assessments of potential *refugee flows or forced migrations* from/in 200 countries/territories based on environment, economic development, security, and human rights indicators. Open access, irregular publication (beginning with Asian countries), available via internet: <http://suissgate.t.soka.ac.jp>
- **4. Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP), Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Canada
- Provides model-based risk assessments and country rankings, along with data on indicators of *human security, terrorism, human rights, diversity, environment* and other variables. Several of these are also included in the FIRST project at SIPRI (above). Internet: www.carleton.ca/cifp
5. The Fund For Peace
- FFP has developed a Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) which uses economic, social and political indicators to assess risk of state crisis or collapse and to track trends during conflict and recovery. Internet: www.fundforpeace.org
- **6. FAST Project, Swiss Peace Foundation, Bern
fast@swisspeace.ch
- SPF's conflict early warning system (FAST) incorporates model-based risk assessments in combination with indicator measurement, events monitoring and qualitative analysis from field reports and a network of local experts. Annual country risk profiles on African and Central and South Asian cases. Internet: www.swisspeace.ch
- **7. Network of Ethnological Monitoring on Early Warning of Ethnic Conflict (EAWARN) Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow and Krasnodar
anthpub@iea.msk.su
umara@eawarn1.msk.su
kritski@eawarn.kuban.su
- Network of leading experts in CIS countries on *ethnic conflict*, monitoring CIS ethnopolitics, generating conflict early warnings to facilitate early response particularly in Caucasus and Central Asia. Combination of local expert- and model-based early warnings, including future scenarios and recommendations for preventive action. Publishes reports in English via FEWER. Internet access in Russian via www.eawarn.ras.ru; and see www.fewer.org for English language reports.

C. Private Sector—Interpretive Analyses


1. Center for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations
New York
- Sends expert teams to make in-country interpretive analyses based on interviewing as basis for *conflict* early warnings, and advocates appropriate early preventive actions. Limited to African Great Lakes, Nigeria, Central Asia (Ferghana Valley) and Balkans. Preventive Action Reports and regional case studies published and on Internet: www.cfr.org/public/resource.cgi?prog!97
- **2. International Crisis Group
Brussels, Belgium
ICGBrussels@crisisweb.org.
- ICG's CrisisWeb reports and briefings provide expert analyses and ideas to head off impending *crises*, drawing on in-country field assessments, and networking with governments to promote preventive action. Internet: www.intl-crisis-group.org

- **3. ACCNET
 ACCORD
 University of Durban-
 Westville, SA.
 info@accord.udw.ac.za
- ACCORD (African Center for Constructive Resolution of Disputes) is developing ACCNET, an early warning system for Africa utilizing primary and secondary data sources from the region to increase awareness of current and potential conflict situations. The monthly Conflict Trends magazine provides overviews of current conflicts and conflict management/development initiatives. Internet: www.accord.org.za
4. Refugees International
 Washington, DC
 ri@refintl.org
- In-country emergency assessments of *refugee flows* for selected countries, used for refugee advocacy and support globally. Early warning bulletins available via Internet: www.refintl.org
5. Comprehensive Risk
 Analysis and
 Management Network
 (CRN), ETH Zurich
- CRN, linked with the International Relations and Security Network (IRN), will provide risk profiles for countries and locations, including political, environmental, terrorism, migration, technological and natural disaster risks. Internet: www.isn.ethz.ch/crn

III. Early Warning Networks

- **1. Forum on Early
 Warning and Early
 Response (FEWER)
 London
 secretariat@fewer.org
- A global network of NGOs, research institutions, UN/IO agencies and governments for information exchange and partnership for early warning and prevention of violent conflicts. Regionally based networks are operational in the Caucasus, Central Asia, South East Asia, African Great Lakes and West African regions, with a new network being planned for Latin America. Regular early warning reports, including future scenarios and recommendations for preventive action, accessible via Internet: www.fewer.org
2. Conflict Prevention
 Network (CPN)
 EU and Stiftung
 Wissenschaft und
 Politik (SWP)
 Ebenhausen &
 Brussels
 cpn@swp.extern.lrz-
 muenchen.de
 swp-cpn@linkline.be
- The CPN is a network of academic institutions, NGOs and independent experts, and it forms part of the European Union Analysis and Evaluation Centre (EUAEC), managed by SWP in Ebenhausen for the European Commission. It aims to provide analytical and operational input to the EU system to facilitate preventive action. Limited Internet access via www.swp-berlin.org/cpn/
3. European Platform for
 Conflict Prevention
 and Transformation
 The Netherlands
 euconflict@euconflict
 .org
- Facilitates networking, education, information exchange, and advocacy on conflict prevention drawing on European NGOs. Publications include: "The Conflict Prevention Newspaper," monitoring global advances in conflict prevention; "People Building Peace" with case studies of conflict management and peace building; "Women Building Peace" and "Searching for Peace in Africa" (1999 overview of conflict prevention and management activities). Internet: www.euconflict.org.
4. Conflict Watch-Africa
 Inter Press Service
 (Africa HQ)
 Harare, Zimbabwe
 ipshre@gn.apc.org;
 isodec@mantse.ncs.c
 om.gh
- Joint initiative to share information on potential and actual *conflicts* among organizations working in Africa to aid conflict prevention and peace building. Briefings, news reports and related papers on current conflicts in Africa available on-line. Internet access via www.ips.org (under "critical issues")

5. Ethnobarometer Project
Rome, Italy
cssroma@rmnet.it
- A network of European institutes and researchers, monitoring *interethnic relations* in Europe. Provides a link between researchers and policy makers at various levels. Produces an annual report on the state of interethnic relations in Europe. Internet: www.ethnobarometer.org



STEP 1: CONFLICT MAPPING

INSTRUMENT A: DEFINE POPULATION GROUPS AND CURRENT CONFLICT

- A.1. Identifying Broad Geographic Population Clusters
- A.2. Identifying Broad Socio-Cultural Identity Groups
- A.3. Identifying Broad Socio-Economic Groups
- A.4. Identifying Major Stakeholders
- A.5. Relevance of Gender Issues and Gender-based Constraints
- A.6. Constructing a Current Conflict Map

The purpose of this instrument is to identify and describe population groups by both their geographic location and the basis of the group's identity. Major population groups can be characterized by one or more differentiating variables -- geographic location, ethnicity, political affiliation, membership of a special interest group, etc. By clustering the population by these differentiating variables, that assist in identifying who is or might be in conflict and where they are located and developing a Current Conflict Map.

Group identity is not a static concept. It is dynamic; there are situations where group identity changes over time. This could happen particularly in situation of conflict when population segments feel the need to assert – or even create – their own identity and to politicize it to protect their special interests.

A.1. Identifying Broad Geographic Population Clusters

Identify the location of the population clusters or geographic regions, the cities or administrative units within that region, and (whenever possible) the approximate population of those clusters.

Geographic Region	Administrative Unit (Province)	Population

A.2. Identifying Broad Socio-Cultural Identity Groups

Conflict groups often define themselves by a socio-cultural identity. They may or may not have a clear geographical base. In many cases, race, religion, ethnicity, language, and political beliefs can overlap. Determine which categories best describe the important identity groups. When multiple identities overlap, select the most salient one to classify the population first (in left column), then follow with further classification. The table below demonstrates one way in which to categorize broad socio-cultural identities.

Race or Nationality (%)	Religion (%)	Ethnic Groups (%)

A.3. Identifying Broad Socio-Economic Groupings

Determine broad socio-economic categories based upon sources and/or levels of income, assets, urban/rural location, education level, etc. As with socio-cultural identities, categories may overlap. If so, place the most salient category in the left-hand column.

Rural or Urban (% of population)	Source of Income	General Level of Education	Population (% of primary category)

A.4. Identifying Major Stakeholders

1. Who are the major stakeholders in terms of organized political groups?
2. Who are the major stakeholders in terms of communal groups?
3. Which groups are *excluded* from the political process?
4. Which groups dominate the political process?
5. Are dominant groups likely to use force to maintain their positions? (Yes, No, Unable to determine)
6. Are marginalized groups likely to turn to violence to better their positions? (Yes, No, Unable to determine)
7. Are any major stakeholders likely to *benefit* from conflict? (Yes, No, Unable to determine. If so, do they have the capacity to incite it?)
8. What are the issues that divide opposing groups?
9. What are issues that opposing groups can agree upon?
10. What stakeholders are or can serve an intermediary role between opposing groups, or otherwise serve as a "conflict neutralizer"?
11. If conflict breaks out, list which groups are most vulnerable? Why are they the most vulnerable?
12. What local factors may serve to mitigate the suffering of vulnerable populations? Examples may be social ties, market networks, etc.

A.5. Relevance of Gender Issues and Gender-based Constraints

1. Are there signs of shifting gender dynamics that reflect potential and/ or actual conflict?

2. Are there signs of gender-specific abuse that reflect potential and/ or actual conflict?
3. In what types of situations do men and women most express themselves freely regarding security and livelihood concerns?
4. Which stakeholders effectively take account of and represent the interests of women and men?
5. How does potential and/ or actual conflict(s) interact with gender and influence how important gender roles and relations may be?
6. How does potential and/ or actual conflict(s) affect control over land, labor, capital, produce, tools, knowledge, institutions, social networks?
7. In particular, how does the context of potential and/ or actual conflict(s) affect the following categories:
 - Gender inequality?
 - Roles of men and women?
 - Needs of men and women?
 - Constraints of men and women?
 - Opportunities of men and women?
 - Relationships and balance between men and women?
 - Institutional structures that support men and women impacted?
 - Responsibilities, opportunities, and/ or burdens shift?
 - Participation in decision-making processes?

A.6. Constructing a Current Conflict Map

Based upon the categories identified above, awareness of recent or existing conflicts, it is possible to construct a Current Conflict Map, identifying groups in recent or ongoing conflict by geographic region and the basis of group identity. To add specificity, it is important to identify the level of conflict in each case, as well as its time frame. Sample data is provided in the table below.

		Basis of Group Identity		
		Race/Ethnicity/ Nationality	Socio-Economic Differences	Religion
GEOGRAPHIC REGION	South		Pastoralists vs Agriculture, Mining & Tourism Interests	
	West Coast	Black Urban Laborers vs South Asians	Level 2 1996→	
	Central & Northeast	Rural Peasants vs Acifa Refugees	Levels of Conflict (Schmid, 1998) 1 = Stable Peaceful Situation 2 = Political Tension, property damage and/or <50 deaths/year 3 = Violent Political Conflict, <100 deaths/year 4 = Low Intensity Conflict, 101-1,000 deaths/year 5 = High Intensity Conflict, >1,000 deaths/year	

Suggested Steps to a Broader, Ongoing Analysis

- Maintain a Conflict Monitoring Map, noting identity and size of conflict groups and color-coding levels of conflict (and conflict risk).
- Update the map as conflict flashpoints erupt and review it at least semi-annually to reassess conflict situations to inform response policies.

STEP 2: ASSESS INDICATORS OF CONFLICT RISK

- **Framework for Assessing Structural Conflict Risk Factors**
 - □ Opportunities for Gain from Rebellion
 - □ Opportunities for Successful Rebel Action
 - □ Opportunities for Rebel Recruitment

- **Framework for Assessing Social Tension and Fragmentation Factors**
 - □ Social Fragmentation
 - □ Economic and Political Inequality
 - □ Politicization of Differences / Repression of Groups

- **Framework for Assessing Viability of State**
 - □ State Formation
 - □ State Legitimacy
 - □ State Dependency
 - □ State Capacity/Stability
 - □ Abuse of State Power

INSTRUMENT B: STRUCTURAL RISK FACTORS OF CONFLICT

Political, social, and cultural fissures have long been identified as sources of conflict. Conflict theory identifies several structural factors ranging from the geography of a country or region, racial and ethnic composition of population and the structure of the state and government to the basics of the economy including resource allocation pattern and income distribution as being fundamental “background conditions that constitute the *root causes* (our emphasis) of tension and crises.” (Davies and Gurr 1998:05) There is a growing body of research into the structural dimensions of countries that make them susceptible to rebellion and consequent violence.

This approach asserts that rebellions against the established order are most likely to emerge in situations where such structural factors that are conducive to the propagation of violent conflict are present. They create opportunities for groups, usually ones with a distinct cultural (racial or ethnic), social or political identity to mobilize to develop a fighting force, organize and wage a war of rebellion against the established order, and may capture power and resources for their own ends.

Understanding the role of structural factors in conflict is of crucial importance to donor agencies such as USAID whose policies, strategies, programs and projects are mostly designed to influence the long end of that development process.

The purpose of Instrument B is to guide you through a framework that leads to data analysis to determine a country’s structural risk of conflict. This instrument is based on a large-scale data-driven research project by the World Bank’s Development Research Group (DECRG) into the structural (particularly economic) factors contributing to conflict. It divides major risks into three main categories:

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Opportunities for Gain from Rebellion | valuable resources that can be captured |
| 2. Opportunities for Successful Rebel Action | against established authority and current resource holder(s) |
| 3. Opportunities for Rebel Recruitment | to build a fighting force |

This approach holds that when opportunities to benefit from violent conflict present themselves, groups (which may have a cultural, political, or social identity) are most likely to emerge to take advantage of them.

The instrument below provides a framework for assessing (as high, medium, or low risk) indicators that are significant risk factors for internal conflict over a period of time. This allows us to identify not only risk but also trends. Here we have chosen three time periods through the 90s as our basis for analysis.

It must be noted that there exists no definitive formula for conflict risk from any or all sources. These indicators should be considered risk factors. All structural risk factors cannot be considered equally important. Research cannot establish that any are either necessary or sufficient by themselves. However, by assessing the full list of risk factors one can develop an overall profile of conflict risk from structural sources.

B.1 Opportunities for Gain from Rebellion					
The World Bank's Development Research Group (DECRG) has identified the single most important structural factor associated with conflict risk to be the percentage of a country's GDP that is derived from the export of primary products. These are attractive for two reasons: (1) their productive assets are geographically fixed (trees, land, mines) and thus convey to whoever controls the area, and (2) their export makes them exposed at "choke points" within the country en route to market. Further, the types of products exported matters. <i>Point resources</i> – non-renewable extractions such as oil or minerals – are more accessible than <i>diffuse resources</i> – agricultural products – because they are more geographically concentrated and require less labor.					
Indicator	Source	Year & Value Risk			Risk ↑ or ↓ ⇒ or ⇐
a. (Value of Primary Exports / GDP) x 100% <15%=Low, 15-22%=Med, >22%=High	ADI 2000 ⁸	1990=20% Med	1994=19% Med	1997=21% Med	⇒
b. Value of Agricultural Exports x 100% Value of Primary Exports >67%=Low, 34-66%=Med, <33%= High	(a) above & ADI 2000	1990=18% High	1994=21% High	1997=18% High	⇐ or ⇒

B.2 Opportunities for Successful Rebel Action			
Successful rebel forces need relative strength, cohesion, and motivation. There are three significant risk factors for successful rebel action: (a) Population centers geographically dispersed from the center of government, resulting in weak government control over territory; (b) Grievances created by previous conflicts to motivate them; and, (c) Ethnic and/or religious homogeneity, making cohesion more or less likely			
Indicator	Source	Year = Value Risk	Risk ↑ or ↓ ⇒ or ⇐
c. Ethnic and/or religious homogeneity 1-3 =Low, 4-6 =Med, 7-9 =High	CIFP ⁹	1998 = 6 (eth) / 7 (rel) Med	↑

B.3 Opportunities for Rebel Recruitment					
A young male who has little to walk away from is an easy recruit, particularly in combination with a history of grievances. Thus, an economic or demographic environment that provides little opportunity will increase the risk of internal conflict. Low secondary school enrollment rates for males, an economy that is not keeping pace with an expanding population, and lack of political freedom are risk factors for internal conflict.					
Indicator	Source	Year = Value Risk			Risk ↑ or ↓ ⇒ or ⇐
d. Male Secondary Gross Enrollment (%) >40%=Low, 20-40%=Med, >20%=High	ADI 2000	1990 = 26% Med	1994-96 = 29% Med		⇒ or ⇐
e. Population Growth – % Income Growth <-1%=Low, -1 to +1%=Med, >1 =High	ADI 2000	1985-89 = 0.6% Med	1990-98 = .06% Med		⇒
f. Autocracy Index – Democracy Index ¹⁰ >-2=Low, -2 to +5=Med, >5=High	Polity98 ¹¹	1990=4.4 Med	1994=0.4 Med	1998=0.4 Med	⇒ or ⇐

⁷ Merchandise exports – Manufactured goods exports = Primary product exports. If there is no figure for manufactured exports, it might make sense to assume they are zero, appreciating that this assumption would underestimate the risk somewhat, if indeed there are considerable manufactured exports.

⁸ World Bank, [African Development Indicators 2000](#)

⁹ Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project Dataset.

¹⁰ The Autocracy Index (from 1 to 10, with 10 being the highest) is a composite measure of the general closeness of political institutions. The Democracy Index (from 1 to 10, with 10 being the highest) is a

Summary/ Conclusions:

INSTRUMENT C: SOCIAL TENSION AND FRAGMENTATION

The purpose of Instruments C & D is to identify the sources and intensity of conflict between and amongst groups in society or between social groups and the state. Here we identify two general types of conflict:

- Conflicts that grow out of competition between groups -- usually based on national, ethnic, religious, or linguistic grounds – in which the political elites either takes sides or are too weak to enforce the peace, or
- Conflicts between such groups and political elites over control of the state.

Instrument C is a checklist of social tension and fragmentation, including the following categories:

- Social Fragmentation
- Economic and Political Inequality
- Politicization of Differences / Repression of Groups

Directions:

Indicate the presence or absence of the following factors by marking the appropriate category.

5 = clearly and positively/strongly present
 4 = considerable evidence of presence
 3 = somewhat present but not predominant
 2 = weak or emerging signs of phenomenon
 1 = no visible or significant presence of factor

Social Fragmentation	Ranking
1. Different “nations” live uneasily under one state.	1 2 3 4 5
2. Ethnic and linguistic fragmentation in the country is high and perceived as such.	1 2 3 4 5
3. Religious divisions in the country are deep and perceived as such.	1 2 3 4 5
4. It would be an exaggeration to state that all citizens in the country share a common political culture with the same core norms and basic values.	1 2 3 4 5
5. Marriage between members of different ethnic or religious groups is exceptional.	1 2 3 4 5
6. There is a rise or continuing existence of factionalized elites.	1 2 3 4 5
7. Civil society is weak (=5) compared to the state’s social control.	1 2 3 4 5

Economic and Political Inequality	Ranking
1. Regional differences in levels of economic development are very marked.	1 2 3 4 5
2. One group in society has been in an economically dominant position for many years.	1 2 3 4 5
3. One group in society has been in a politically dominant position for many years	1 2 3 4 5
4. Some groups of the population are highly discriminatory and intolerant towards other groups in society.	1 2 3 4 5
5. Patronage and nepotism rather than talent and hard-work determine most individual and business careers in society.	1 2 3 4 5
6. There is uneven economic development along group lines.	1 2 3 4 5
7. Social class divisions in the country are very sharp and perceived as such.	1 2 3 4 5

composite measure of general openness of political institutions. Autocracy minus Democracy is an indicator of lack of political freedom and ranges from –10 (highest rights) to +10 (lowest rights).

¹¹ Polity98 Dataset: <http://geds.umd.edu/geds/>

8. Those holding state power have a different ethnic, linguistic, or religious affiliation than the majority of the population.	1 2 3 4 5
9. The military is largely dominated by a particular social group.	1 2 3 4 5
10. There is no large middle class in society, bridging the interests of the rich and the poor.	1 2 3 4 5
11. The regime's attitude towards social and economic discrimination in society is one of turning a blind eye to it.	1 2 3 4 5
12. The (ethnic, religious, linguistic, regional, tribal or clan-based) gap between the political elite and ordinary members of society is considered wide (=5).	1 2 3 4 5

Politicization of Differences / Repression of Groups	Ranking
1. Cleavages in society along linguistic, religious, class, ethnic or other lines tend to fall together with political cleavage.	1 2 3 4 5
2. A proliferation of hate- and threat-speeches by leading politicians of government and/or opposition has been noted recently.	1 2 3 4 5
3. The state is not (=5) effective at balancing the interests of majority and (dominant) minority groups within society.	1 2 3 4 5
4. Those holding state power do not rule by dialogue and pragmatic compromise between social groups but foment divisions in society.	1 2 3 4 5
5. There is considerable popular support for political parties or armed groups advocating a violent social revolution.	1 2 3 4 5
6. There is considerable popular support for political parties or armed groups advocating secession.	1 2 3 4 5
7. Citizens try to leave the country due to ethnic, religious, or political persecution; there are already refugees abroad.	1 2 3 4 5
8. There is considerable popular support for racist and xenophobic parties.	1 2 3 4 5
9. There is a legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia	1 2 3 4 5
10. Some groups have gained international support for their grievances against other groups.	1 2 3 4 5

Source: Adapted from PLOOM Social Integration/Fragmentation Meter

	Total Score / # of Questions	Overall Assessment (H/M/L)
Social Fragmentation (7 questions)		
Economic & Political Inequality (12 questions)		
Politicization of Differences/Repression of Groups (10 questions)		

Summary/ Conclusions:

INSTRUMENT D: VIABILITY OF STATE

The purpose of Instruments C & D is to identify the sources and intensity of conflict between and amongst groups in society or between social groups and the state. Here we identify two general types of conflict:

- Conflicts that grow out of competition between groups -- usually based on national, ethnic, religious, or linguistic grounds – in which the political elite either takes sides or is too weak to enforce the peace, or
- Conflicts between such groups and political elites over control of the state.

Instrument D is a checklist of the viability of the state, including the following categories:

- State Formation

- State Legitimacy
- State Dependency
- State Capacity/Stability
- Abuse of State Power

Directions:

Indicate the presence or absence of the following factors by marking the appropriate category.

- 5 = clearly and positively/strongly present
- 4 = considerable evidence of presence
- 3 = somewhat present but not predominant
- 2 = weak or emerging signs of phenomenon
- 1 = no visible or significant presence of factor

State Formation	Ranking
1. The state is independent since 1990 (=5), 1965,(=4), 1945 (=3), 1918 (=2), gained independence before 1918 (=1).	1 2 3 4 5
2. The state contains a few highly competitive ethnic, national, religious, linguistic, tribal or other communities and minorities and indigenous peoples.	1 2 3 4 5
3. The sovereignty of the state and its territoriality and borders have not been fully recognized by all other states.	1 2 3 4 5
4. There are groups in the country which wish to join a neighbouring country.	1 2 3 4 5
5. There are groups in the country which wish to form a state of their own.	1 2 3 4 5
6. In recent years there have been attempted coups/revolutions.	1 2 3 4 5

State Legitimacy	Ranking
1. The legitimacy of the present <i>government</i> is contested (=5) by significant groups in society	1 2 3 4 5
2. The legitimacy of the <i>state</i> itself is contested (=5) by significant groups in society.	1 2 3 4 5
3. The state has (not = 5) seen much democratic rule for most of its history.	1 2 3 4 5
4. The state is not (=5) ruled by impersonal power (i.e. the public and private affairs of those governing the state are not fully separated).	1 2 3 4 5
5. The currently ruling party has been uninterruptedly in power for >4 (=1) years, >8 year (=2), >12 (=3) years, >16 (=4) years, >20 (=5) years.	1 2 3 4 5
6. Since independence, the state had been most of the time (=5) in the hands of the military or presidents/prime ministers rising through the armed forces.	1 2 3 4 5
7. Sovereignty rests not (=5) really with the people; rather, a strongman, a hereditary ruler (monarchy), representatives of a deity (religious elite), or an ideological single (avant-guard) party determines state policies.	1 2 3 4 5
8. There is no (=5) consensus among the various groups in the state about the rules of the political game, i.e. appropriate and unacceptable ways of obtaining office and using the instruments of the state.	1 2 3 4 5
9. There are no (=5) periodic free and fair elections to establish who is to rule the country in a democratic way which are not marred by violence, exclusion, manipulation and fraud.	1 2 3 4 5
10. There are not effective checks and balances to control state power (=5): those governing the country cannot really be held accountable by parliament or the judiciary.	1 2 3 4 5
11. Those holding state power do not command authority and loyalty based on appreciation of their service and dedication to the common good; rather fear, manipulation and selective rewards and punishments are their instruments to control state power (=5).	1 2 3 4 5

State Dependency	Ranking
1. The state depends for its continued existence strongly (=5) on the military protection or assistance of another state.	1 2 3 4 5
2. The state has, in recent years, been subject to intervention, occupation or other forms of external attack on its territory, leading to a (temporary) loss of sovereignty or territory.	1 2 3 4 5

3. The state is currently threatened by (a coalition of) (an)other state(s).	1 2 3 4 5
4. There is intervention of other states or external political actors.	1 2 3 4 5

State Capacity / Stability	Ranking
1. In recent years there has been a state of emergency, martial law or a major curfew, or the government has used special powers that short-circuited due process.	1 2 3 4 5
2. The state does not hold an effective monopoly of violence; its control does not cover the entire country (part of the state's territory is subject to either foreign occupation, is in the hands of guerrillas or regional warlords (= 5)).	1 2 3 4 5
3. The political stability of the state can be said to be solid (=1), is satisfactory (=2), is challenged (=3), appears to be declining (=4), is rapidly deteriorating (=5).	1 2 3 4 5
4. The state is not effective in providing law and order, i.e. it is not able in preventing and controlling crime and in preserving public security.	1 2 3 4 5
5. The state is not (=5) effective in providing its citizens with basic schooling, basic health care and basic welfare.	1 2 3 4 5
6. The current rulers fear that even limited reform would lead to loss of power (=5)	1 2 3 4 5
7. The state is on the verge of bankruptcy and unable to pay salaries and pensions to its (former) civil servants and soldiers in time.	1 2 3 4 5
8. There is a growing or continuing high level of deterioration of public services	1 2 3 4 5

Abuse of State Power	Ranking
1. The state lacks a non-corrupt and effective bureaucracy devoid of nepotism and patronage and many holders of state power are in fact forming a predatory kleptocracy (=5)	1 2 3 4 5
2. The media are tightly controlled by those holding state power and critical journalists are harrassed, jailed or even killed (=5).	1 2 3 4 5
3. Abuse of power by those holding state power is widespread and agents of the state are suspected to be frequently involved in torture, disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and death squad activities (=5).	1 2 3 4 5
4. Agents of the state have been involved in deportations, forced assimilation, ethnic cleansing and massacres in recent years (=5).	1 2 3 4 5
5. The rule of law does not apply equally to the ruler and the ruled and justice is selectively applied or denied for political reasons.	1 2 3 4 5
6. Some of those holding state power are in various ways involved in (organized) crime.	1 2 3 4 5
7. Politics in the state is a zero-sum game between regime and opposition; state control is sought to protect group, not national, interests by rival elite factions (=5).	1 2 3 4 5
8. There is a growing or high level of criminalization and delegitimization of the state	1 2 3 4 5
9. There is a suspension or arbitrary application of the Rule of Law and widespread human rights violations.	1 2 3 4 5
10. The Security Apparatus operates as a 'State within the State.'	1 2 3 4 5

Source: Adapted from PIOOM State Strength/Failure Meter

	Total Score / # of Questions	Overall Assessment (H/M/L)
State Formation (6 questions)		
State Legitimacy (11 questions)		
State Dependency (4 questions)		
State Capacity/Stability (8 questions)		
Abuse of State Power (10 questions)		

Summary/ Conclusions:

Suggested Steps to a Broader, Ongoing Analysis

- Complete PLOOM Standard Checklist at http://www.fsw.leidenuniv.nl/www/w3_liswo/ploom.htm
- Assemble a focus group of conflict resource people (civic & military leaders, politicians, journalists, etc.) and work through the checklists to broaden the perspective.
- Using the Delphi technique¹², survey conflict resource people.
- Commission an in-depth study on potential risks.
- Develop a more formal endeavor to monitor and evaluate risks.

STEP 3: POPULATION CONFLICT RISK ASSESSMENT

Based on the identification of groups in conflict (Step 1) and indicators of conflict (Step 2), determine the population's risk of conflict over a defined period of time (e.g. over the next year).

- Which area(s) show the greatest risk for conflict? Which area(s) show the least risk?
- Are high risk categories repeated throughout the assessment instruments, or are they concentrated in particular areas? How would you interpret this?
- How fluid or static would you characterize the situation to be?
- Is the population moving *toward* or *away* from conflict? If the record is mixed, indicate which sectors seem to be most (and least) at-risk
- List major variables that are salient in assessing the locale's risk for conflict. List variables by Long-term Variables and Short-Term Variables.
- Have the risk factors been adequately captured by these instruments? What has been left out that is relevant to the situation in your country? How might these issues be incorporated into the framework?
- Prepare a summary of the locale's potential for new, continued, and/or renewed conflict.

STEP 4: ASSESS POPULATIONS CAPACITY TO MANAGE CONFLICT

After identifying the level of potential conflict in the population (conflict risk assessment), the purpose of Instruments E, F & G is to assess the population's capacity to manage that conflict. The instrument utilized depends upon the level of violence:

- When there has been a recent high intensity conflict, use Instrument E – Post-Conflict Peace Building. By recent, we mean conflicts which continue to directly impact the population.
- When there is anticipated open violence (low intensity/violent political conflict), use Instrument F – Capacity to Contain Violence.
- When there are anticipated political tensions that have the possibility of escalating to violence, use Instrument G – Capacity to Manage Tension.

It is, of course, possible that all three situations could be present with different population groups of the same country. If more than one such situation is present in the country you are assessing, work with the more serious level of conflict first and move on to less serious levels as time allows.

INSTRUMENT E: POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING

Directions:

¹² "The Delphi technique essentially refers to a series of intensive interrogations of samples of individuals (most frequently, experts) by means of mailed questionnaires concerning some important problem or question; the mailings are interspersed with controlled feedback to the participants. The responses in each round of questioning are gathered by an intermediary, who summarizes and returns the information to each participant, who may then revise his own opinions and ratings...However antagonistic the initial positions and complex the questions under analysis -- competing opinions apparently converge and synthesize when this technique is used." Rosenthal 1976:121, quoted in Patton 1997: 151.

Indicate the presence or absence of the following factors by marking the appropriate category. The time reference for this instrument is the past year.

- 5 = clearly and positively/strongly present
- 4 = considerable evidence of presence
- 3 = somewhat present but not predominant
- 2 = weak or emerging signs of phenomenon
- 1 = no visible or significant presence of factor

1. Repatriation and reintegration of refugees and displaced persons is progressing smoothly (=1) or stagnating (=5).	1 2 3 4 5
2. Demobilization and disarmament of warring parties is progressing (=1) or stagnating (=5).	1 2 3 4 5
3. Control and destruction of weapons is progressing (=1) or stagnating (=5).	1 2 3 4 5
4. Perpetrators of war crimes and gross human rights violations are still in positions of power (=5) or sidelined (=1).	1 2 3 4 5
5. (Re-)Training and screening of security forces (police) is progressing well (=1) or stagnating (=5).	1 2 3 4 5
6. Post-conflict economic reconstruction is progressing well (=1) or stagnating (=5).	1 2 3 4 5
7. Trust-building between previously warring parties is progressing well (=1) or stagnating (=5).	1 2 3 4 5
8. Armistice violations, terrorist bombings and assassinations are frequent (=5) or infrequent (=1).	1 2 3 4 5
9. Peace-dividends are reaching (=1)/not reaching (=5) the demobilized soldiers and fighters.	1 2 3 4 5
10. Rebuilding of infrastructures is progressing well (=1)/stagnating (=5).	1 2 3 4 5
11. Reconstruction assistance from abroad is inadequate or misappropriated (=5).	1 2 3 4 5
12. Peace accord is lived up to (=1)/considered to be a dead letter (=5) by a growing number of people.	1 2 3 4 5
13. Integration of former rivals into the political system is progressing (=1) or stagnating (=5).	1 2 3 4 5
14. Minimum degree of law and order guaranteeing personal security is still achieved (=1)/absent (=5) for large sectors of society.	1 2 3 4 5
15. Reintegrating uprooted youth and irregular fighters is no (=1)/big (=5) problem.	1 2 3 4 5
16. Restoration of the rule of law in this country is well underway (=1)/still far away (=5).	1 2 3 4 5
17. Few (=1)/Most (=5) media are still in the hands of former warmongers.	1 2 3 4 5
18. Corruption and personal enrichment in government is no longer (=1)/still (=5) flourishing.	1 2 3 4 5
19. Foreign aid goes into emergency and relief operations with little (=5)/much (=1) left for development.	1 2 3 4 5
20. Accountability and punishment for war crimes and atrocities leaves much (=5)/little (=1) to be desired.	1 2 3 4 5
21. Uncleared landmine fields still (=5)/no longer (=1) impede a revival of agriculture.	1 2 3 4 5
22. Poverty and un(der)development remain minor (=1)/major (=5) problems.	1 2 3 4 5
23. The roots of the armed conflict are finally addressed (=1)/still largely unaddressed (=5).	1 2 3 4 5
24. Government competence and authority is high (=1)/low (=5).	1 2 3 4 5
25. Exiled and local allies are still (=5)/no longer (=1) conspiring to retake power.	1 2 3 4 5
26. The extent to which criminal elements control considerable parts of the economy is low (=1)/high (=5).	1 2 3 4 5
27. Exclusion, discrimination and repression of minorities is still (=5)/no longer (=1) a problem.	1 2 3 4 5
28. Elections have (=5)/have not (=1) brought to power parties tainted by violence and crime.	1 2 3 4 5
29. The standard of living of much of the population is rising (=1)/stagnating (=3), or even falling (=5).	1 2 3 4 5
30. Polarization of society remains no longer (=1)/still (=5) a big problem.	1 2 3 4 5
31. International funding for reconstruction is at (=1)/well below (=5) minimum required levels in this country.	1 2 3 4 5
32. There is significant (=5) relative loss of educated and skilled personnel and entrepreneurial talent due to emigration.	1 2 3 4 5
33. Smuggling of weapons into the country and local arms trade continues (=5).	1 2 3 4 5
34. Forced evictions and ethnic cleansing have not ceased (=5).	1 2 3 4 5
35. Confidence in democracy among significant sectors of the population is low (=5)/high (=1).	1 2 3 4 5

36. Change from war to peace economy is stagnating and economic recovery is weak.	1 2 3 4 5
37. Renewal of political system is below what is required in the present situation.	1 2 3 4 5
38. Local conflict-management and peace-building capacities are weak.	1 2 3 4 5
39. Popular discontent with regime is growing.	1 2 3 4 5
40. Local Rebellion leaders and warlords are still active.	1 2 3 4 5

Source: *PIOOM Post-Conflict Peace-Building Meter*

Total Score / # of Questions	Overall Assessment (H/M/L)
Summary/ Conclusions:	

Go To Step 5

Suggested Steps to a Broader, Ongoing Analysis

- Complete the full *PIOOM Standard Checklist for Country / Post-Hostility Profiles* at http://www.fsw.leidenuniv.nl/www/w3_liswo/pioom.htm
- Assemble a focus group of conflict resource people (civic & military leaders, politicians, journalists, etc.) and ask them to do the checklists in order to broaden the perspective that informs the assessment process.
- Using the *Delphi technique*, survey conflict resource people.
- Conduct or commission an *in-depth study*.

INSTRUMENT F: CAPACITY TO CONTAIN CONFLICT

Directions:

Indicate the presence or absence of the following factors by marking the appropriate category. The time reference for this instrument is the past year.

- 5 = clearly and positively/strongly present
- 4 = considerable evidence of presence
- 3 = somewhat present but not predominant
- 2 = weak or emerging signs of phenomenon
- 1 = no visible or significant presence of factor

1. Increase or continuing high level of excessive use of force by government.	1 2 3 4 5
2. Increase or continuing high level of attacks by opposition forces.	1 2 3 4 5
3. Recent increase (up to 50%) in number of total direct and indirect fatalities.	1 2 3 4 5
4. Greater than 50 percent recent increase in the number of total direct and indirect fatalities.	1 2 3 4 5
5. Increase or continuing high level of number of people who disappeared.	1 2 3 4 5
6. Increase or continuing high level of killings of non-combatant civilians.	1 2 3 4 5
7. Widening of threatened victim groups.	1 2 3 4 5
8. Increase or continuing high level of use of sophisticated weapons.	1 2 3 4 5
9. Widening of theater of conflict (incl. spill-over to other countries).	1 2 3 4 5
10. Widening of the number of parties participating in conflict.	1 2 3 4 5
11. Increase or continuing high level of resettlement/deportation of people.	1 2 3 4 5
12. Increase or continuing high level of destruction of infrastructures.	1 2 3 4 5
13. Increase or continuing high level of forced migration/refugee outflow.	1 2 3 4 5
14. Increase or continuing high level of internal displacement of people (including ethnic cleansing).	1 2 3 4 5
15. Foreigners become scapegoats for economic or political problems.	1 2 3 4 5
16. Tensions in civil-military relations, including (attempted) coup d'etat.	1 2 3 4 5
17. Regime sets up one population group against the other.	1 2 3 4 5
18. Revolutionary ideology or religious project guides regime/major armed opposition.	1 2 3 4 5
19. Society still suffers from consequences of last (civil) war.	1 2 3 4 5
20. Economic crisis in country is deep or worsening.	1 2 3 4 5
21. Death (or attempted assassination) of major political leader.	1 2 3 4 5

22. Electoral irregularities by sitting regime in elections.	1 2 3 4 5
23. Increase or continuing high level of lawlessness (kidnappings, plundering).	1 2 3 4 5
24. Purges have occurred against elements disloyal to regime.	1 2 3 4 5
25. Government acts unconstitutionally and disregards rule of law.	1 2 3 4 5
26. Media control by government is tight or tightening sharply.	1 2 3 4 5
27. Increase or continuing high level in expenditures for security forces and/or arms.	1 2 3 4 5
28. Increase or continuing high level of bellicose language (hate speech) by political leaders.	1 2 3 4 5
29. Increase or continuing high level in anti-regime guerrilla and/or terrorism.	1 2 3 4 5
30. Increase or continuing high level of disregard for democratic rule and procedures.	1 2 3 4 5
31. Formation or existence of paramilitary groups among communal groups.	1 2 3 4 5
32. Increase or continuing high level of foreign support for groups challenging regime.	1 2 3 4 5
33. Increase or continuing high level of external support for regime.	1 2 3 4 5
34. Regime possesses or has recently assumed extraordinary powers.	1 2 3 4 5
35. Increase or continuing high level of threat of external intervention.	1 2 3 4 5
36. Increase or continuing high level in repression of segments of the population by regime.	1 2 3 4 5
37. Elite-majority of population difference in ethnic and/or religious background.	1 2 3 4 5
38. Increase or continuing high level of clandestine import of arms by opposition groups.	1 2 3 4 5
39. Increase or continuing high level in separatist and revolutionary activity.	1 2 3 4 5

Source: PIOOM Conflict Escalation Meter

Total Score / # of Questions	Overall Assessment (H/M/L)
Summary/ Conclusions:	

Go To Step 5

Suggested Steps to a Broader, Ongoing Analysis

- Complete the full PIOOM Standard Checklist for Country / Post-Hostility Profiles at http://www.fsw.leidenuniv.nl/www/w3_liswo/pioom.htm
- Assemble a focus group of conflict resource people (civic & military leaders, politicians, journalists, etc.) and ask them to do the checklists in order to broaden the perspective that informs the assessment process.
- Using the Delphi technique, survey conflict resource people.
- Conduct or commission an in-depth study.

INSTRUMENT G: CAPACITY TO MANAGE TENSION

Directions:

Indicate the presence or absence of the following factors by marking the appropriate category. The time reference for this instrument is the past year.

- 5 = clearly and positively/strongly present
- 4 = considerable evidence of presence
- 3 = somewhat present but not predominant
- 2 = weak or emerging signs of phenomenon
- 1 = no visible or significant presence of factor

1. Government has forced legislature to accept self-serving constitutional changes.	1 2 3 4 5
2. Government has forced the judiciary to accept self-serving constitutional changes.	1 2 3 4 5
3. Military has forced the government to accept self-serving political changes .	1 2 3 4 5
4. Last election was 'stolen' by fraud, exclusion or intimidation.	1 2 3 4 5
5. Since independence, the country has been ruled most of the time by the military or presidents rising through the armed forces;	1 2 3 4 5
6. Civilian control of the military is still a pressing problem; rumours of coup d'etat.	1 2 3 4 5
7. The territorial integrity of the state is challenged by a neighboring state.	1 2 3 4 5

8. There are local power centers outside the capital over which the government has little control.	1 2 3 4 5
9. Criminal organizations have managed to extent their influence into the halls of government.	1 2 3 4 5
10. The state is unable to protect most citizens against violent crime.	1 2 3 4 5
11. The military is mostly dominated by one ethnic or social group.	1 2 3 4 5
12. Nepotism and corruption are a big problem in this state.	1 2 3 4 5
13. Important groups of society are excluded from political participation.	1 2 3 4 5
14. The government has difficulties paying all its civil servants and security forces.	1 2 3 4 5
15. The rule of law in this country is weak while repression is strong.	1 2 3 4 5
16. Foreign debt servicing is a big problem for the government.	1 2 3 4 5
17. Direct or indirect censorship of the media is frequent.	1 2 3 4 5
18. There has been a rise or continuing high level of military and/or police expenditures (including weapon imports) recently.	1 2 3 4 5
19. Several civil and political liberties have been restricted and some political parties banned.	1 2 3 4 5
20. Resignations and dismissals of ministers and military commanders and other signs of leadership struggles have become more frequent.	1 2 3 4 5
21. There are more people emigrating than immigrating into the country.	1 2 3 4 5
22. The protection of minority group rights and non-discrimination towards its members in the country is a big problem.	1 2 3 4 5
23. Unemployment, underemployment and impoverishment is a big problem for the country.	1 2 3 4 5
24. Food shortages, and malnutrition are a big problem for the country.	1 2 3 4 5
25. Sharp price rises produced a sharp fall in the standard of living of large groups.	1 2 3 4 5
26. Unequal land and wealth distribution is a big problem in this country.	1 2 3 4 5
27. Labour and peasant strikes are a big problem in this country.	1 2 3 4 5
28. The rise of fanatical and intolerant groups is a big problem in this country.	1 2 3 4 5
29. Refugee warriors threaten the ruling elite.	1 2 3 4 5
30. Gross human rights violations (torture, disappearances, political killings, arrests without warrant) by the government or by pro-government forces are a problem.	1 2 3 4 5
31. There is an economic crisis which the present government cannot effectively cope with.	1 2 3 4 5
32. The opposition parties begin to form common fronts or have already done so.	1 2 3 4 5
33. Bashing of political opponents and propaganda of own views are frequent.	1 2 3 4 5
34. Popular discontent with regime is growing.	1 2 3 4 5
35. Regime perceives minority problem as threat to the unity of the state.	1 2 3 4 5
36. Regime regards one population group as disloyal.	1 2 3 4 5
37. Polarization in society is high or growing.	1 2 3 4 5
38. State toleration for ethnic, religious, linguistic or regional communities in the country is generally on a low level.	1 2 3 4 5

Source: *PIOOM Tension meter*

Total Score / # of Questions	Overall Assessment (H/M/L)
Summary/ Conclusions:	

Go To Step 5

Suggested Steps to a Broader, Ongoing Analysis

- Complete the full *PIOOM Standard Checklist for Country / Post-Hostility Profiles* at http://www.fsw.leidenuniv.nl/www/w3_liswo/pioom.htm
- Assemble a focus group of conflict resource people (civic & military leaders, politicians, journalists, etc.) and ask them to do the checklists in order to broaden the perspective that informs the assessment process.
- Using the *Delphi technique*, survey conflict resource people.
- Conduct or commission an in-depth study.

STEP 5: DETERMINE POPULATIONS ANTICIPATED VULNERABILITY TO VIOLENCE

Based on the determination of conflict risk (Step 3) and the Population’s Capacity to Cope (Step 4), assess the population’s vulnerability to violence over the next year. You may want to ask yourself the following questions:

STEP 6: IDENTIFY RESPONSE OPTIONS

INSTRUMENT H: DEVELOP EFFECTIVE CONFLICT PREVENTION & MITIGATION

- **A Systematic Approach**
- **Toolbox for Conflict Response**
- **Framework for Developing of Policy Options**
- **“Do No Harm” Questionnaire**

A Systematic Approach

Effective conflict interventions are based on *strategies* that specify objectives, policy tools and timeframes for action. While circumstances clearly vary from country to country, Creative Associates International (1998) offers a step-wise approach to devising a coherent conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategy.

1. Track National Transitions	Begin with a clear understanding of the sources and nature of local conflicts. USAID can institutionalize this process through ongoing Conflict Mapping.
2. Identify Conflict Vulnerability	Ongoing Conflict Vulnerability Assessment (CVA) identifies gaps in the population’s capacity to manage conflict.
3. Set Strategic Task Goals	Within USAID’s Six Goal Areas, identify conflict intervention task goals to enhance capacity to build peace, contain violence, and manage tension.
4. Choose Tools	Select the mix of policy options each goal requires, assessing what indigenous and outside efforts are doing harm and can do good, and determining where new initiatives must fill gaps.
5. Identify Implementing Partners	Identify both local and outside resources with capacity to enhance efforts.
6. “Do No Harm”	Question the possible unintended consequences of the strategy.
7. Prioritize Conflict Policy & Programs	Prioritize task goals, so as to best allocate resources.

Toolbox for Conflict Response¹³

Official Diplomacy		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mediation • Negotiations • Conciliation • Good offices • Informal consultations • Peace conferences 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conflict prevention or management centers • Special envoys • Diplomatic sanctions • International appeal/condemnation • Crisis and war diplomacy • Unilateral goodwill gestures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coercive diplomacy • Diplomatic recognition • Withdrawal of recognition • Certification/decertification • Hot lines
Non-Official Conflict Management Methods		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mediation • Support to indigenous dispute resolution and legal institutions • Conflict resolution or prevention centers • Peace commissions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civilian peace monitors • Visits by eminent organizations, individuals, or 'embarrassing witnesses' • 'Friends' groups • Non-violent campaigns 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-official facilitation/ problem solving workshops • Cultural exchanges • Civilian fact-finding missions • Humanitarian diplomacy
Economic and Social Measures		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development assistance • Economic reforms • Economic and resource cooperation • Inter-communal trade 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joint projects • Private economic investment • Health assistance • Agricultural programs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic sanctions • Humanitarian assistance • Repatriation or resettlement of refugee and IDPs • Aid conditionality
Political Development and Governance Measures		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political party building • Political institution building • Election reform, support, and monitoring • National conferences • Decentralization of power 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training of public officials • Human rights promotion, monitoring and institution building • Power-sharing arrangements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trusteeship • Protectorates • Constitutional commissions and reform • Civic society development
Judicial and Legal Measures		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commissions of inquiry/ war crimes tribunals • Judicial/legal reforms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Constitutional commissions • Police reform • Arbitration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adjudication • Support to indigenous legal institutions
Communication and Education Measures		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civic education • Formal education projects • Peace education 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exchange visits • Media professionalization • Journalist training 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training in conflict management, resolution, and prevention • Peace radio/television / International broadcasts

¹³ Adapted from Michael Lund and Susan Votaw West, 1998

Framework for Development of Policy Options – *Illustrative examples*

USAID GOALS	CONFLICT VULNERABILITY	CONFLICT INTERVENTION TASKS	TOOLS	IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS	PRIORITY
Humanitarian Assistance	<i>Refugees competing with local population for aid resources</i>	<i>Create channels for dialogue</i>	<i>Arbitration Committees</i>	<i>UNHCR & Local Mayors</i>	<i>Medium</i>
		<i>Equalize health resources</i>	<i>Shared access to clinics</i>		<i>High</i>
Human Development	<i>AIDS orphans ready recruits for extremist factions</i>	<i>Resettlement options for street orphans</i>	<i>“Boys Town” institutions</i>	<i>Faith-based NGOs</i>	<i>Low</i>
Environment	<i>Pastoralists compete with agricultural, mining, and tourism interests over land use</i>	<i>Get buy-in for most environmentally sound/ Economically efficient land use</i>	<i>Retraining of pastoralists</i>	<i>Tourism board Ecotourism NGOs</i>	<i>High</i>
			<i>Create employment opportunities in parks</i>		
Democracy/ Governance	<i>Government response to communal rioting intensifies grievances</i>	<i>Improve capacity to contain violence</i>	<i>Legislation to separate military & policing roles</i>	<i>Parliamentary leaders Peace NGOs</i>	<i>High</i>
			<i>Training of police in riot control</i>		<i>George Mason Univ’s Justice Department</i>
Education	<i>Government educational expenditure/services declining under structural adjustment → faith-based schools, exacerbating ethnic tensions.</i>	<i>Support rejuvenation of public primary schooling</i>	<i>Education-targed aid</i>	<i>Other bilateral donors</i>	
Agriculture	<i>Agriculturalists compete with pastoralists, mining, and tourism interests for land use.</i>	<i>See under Environment</i>			

DO NO HARM QUESTIONNAIRE¹⁴

DIRECT IMPACTS OF AID		
Topic	Explanation	Sample Questions to Ask Yourself
<i>Resource Transfers</i>	Introducing new resources can reinforce or reduce tension through such mechanisms as theft or skewing market prices.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are aid goods stolen, especially by those connected directly to a warring side? • What are the market impacts of aid in the given area? Specifically: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • are prices of goods connected to the war economy rising? • are incentives for engaging in the war economy rising? • are prices of goods connected to the peacetime economy falling? • are incentives for engaging in peacetime economic activities falling?
<i>Distributional Effects</i>	Targeting a particular group may exacerbate intergroup tensions, though some targets (e.g. youth) can cross groups.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is aid provided in ways that benefit one (some) sub-group(s) over others? • Does the aid agency employ people more from one group than others? • Do material goods go more to one group than others?
<i>Substitution Effects</i>	When outsiders assume responsibility for certain activities, it frees locals to concentrate their resources and energy on other efforts such as war.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is aid providing a sufficiently significant amount of material to meet civilian needs such that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • more local goods are freed up to be used in warfare/by armies? • local leaders take little or no responsibility for civilian welfare? What are the manifestations of this?
<i>Legitimization</i>	Aid can increase or decrease the legitimacy of certain actors.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is aid being given in ways that “legitimize”: • war-related individuals, giving them more power? • the actions of war (e.g. reinforcing patterns of population movements that warriors are causing)? • war-supporting attitudes (e.g. rewarding those who are most violent)?

IMPLICIT ETHICAL MESSAGES OF AID		
Topic	Example	Sample Questions to Ask Yourself
<i>Arms</i>	When armed guards are used to protect agency headquarters or personnel, the message is that it is legitimate to use arms to determine who gets access to resources.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Does the aid agency rely on arms to protect its goods and/or workers?
<i>Impunity</i>	When aid workers operate with impunity, or when they use agency vehicles for personal or recreational activities, the message is that it is okay to use these	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Do field staff separate themselves from the local people with whom they are working and do they frequently use aid goods, or the power they derive from them, for their personal benefit or pleasure?

¹⁴Adapted from Anderson 1999, Anderson undated and Local Capacities for Peace Project, undated.

	resources for individual purposes.	
"I'm just doing my job"	When aid workers rely on this excuse when their activities are inappropriate implies that an individual is not responsible for their actions if they are following the directions of superiors.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do the aid staff express discouragement and powerlessness in relation to their staff superiors, home offices or donors? Do they express disrespect for these people but often cite them as the reason why something is "impossible"?
Different values for different lives	When plans are made to evacuate expatriate but not local staff (or, worse yet, equipment but not local staff), this implies that there are different values placed on different lives.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Does the aid agency apportion its institutional benefits (salaries or per diem scales; equipment such as cars, phones, offices; expectations of time commitments to the job; rewards for work done; vacation, R & R, evacuation plans) in ways that favor one identifiable group of workers more than others?
Territoriality	When agencies refuse to cooperate, or even compete with each other, the message is that it is all right not to work with those whom you disagree with.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Does the aid agency refuse to cooperate or share information and planning functions with other aid agencies, local government or local NGOs? Does it openly criticize the ways that others provide aid and encourage local people to avoid working with other agencies?
Mistrust	When staff's interaction with locals is based on the assumption that "these people only understand power" or some such attitude, the message is that people with power act with hostility and belligerence.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are aid staff frightened and tense? Do they express hatred, mistrust, or suspicion for local people (any of the local people)? Do they frequently engage their local staff counterparts in conversation about violence, war experiences, the terrible things they have experienced (thus reinforcing the sense that these are the things that matter)? Does the agency promote or in other ways exceptionally reward staff members who have served in more violent places/situations?

"DO NO HARM" FOR DONORS AND AID AGENCY HEADQUARTERS		
Topic	Example	Sample Questions to Ask Yourself
Centrally-driven focus on and control of aid's inputs	<p>An over-emphasis on the quantity, quality, or timing of aid's resource deliveries can and does obscure, distort and undervalued aid's actual impacts.</p> <p>On the other hand, it is also important to note that "decentralization" can and is also used as an excuse for inaction.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are the inputs of aid (e.g. type, amount, timing) determined by headquarters? Is the decision-making process about what inputs to deliver effectively circumvent the ability of field-based staff to make appropriate decisions or arrangements? Are performance criteria based on aid's inputs rather than their actual impacts on recipients' lives and societies? Are rewards and promotions tied to getting and spending the most amount of money or delivering in the least amount of time, rather than actual impacts on recipients' lives and societies? Is the emphasis on finding or quantifying indicators of success feeding the mis-definition of effectiveness?
Over-specification of the identity of recipients	When aid agency policies or operational arrangements predetermine who shall be the recipients of aid, or which will be partners for aid delivery, such restrictions limit the ability of field staff to program without reinforcing intergroup tensions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Does the mandate of the organization or project specify a particular identity group (e.g. refugees, Christians, etc.) as the sole recipients of aid? Is aid inadvertently channeled toward a particular identity group? Do field staff have latitude to adjust the recipients of programs, such as

		<p>redefining target or partner groups?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is headquarters unwilling or unable to delegate decision-making to field staff? • Does headquarters favor (or insist upon) proposals that narrowly identify particular groups as recipients or local partners?
<p>Funding, fundraising, and publicity that over-simplifies complex issues</p>	<p>Agencies that over-simplify conflict miss critical opportunities to educate legislatures and the public about the nature and complexities of issues. More dangerously, some parties may exploit or manipulate this oversimplification to leverage more aid.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is the agency maintaining intellectual and ethical integrity about the situation in its external communications? • Does the agency cheapen either suffering or criminality for purposes of fundraising, publicity, or political sensitivity? <p>Specifically:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • publicity or fundraising materials facilely convey guilt or innocence? • do they demonize one group or portray another as victims? • is the agency inappropriately <i>avoiding</i> questions of authentic innocent suffering or genuine commission of atrocities altogether?

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