



**fewer**

forum on early warning  
and early response  
fewer secretariat  
old truman brewery  
91-95 brick lane  
london E1 6QN, uk  
tel: +44 20 7247 7022  
fax: +44 20 7247 5290  
[secretariat@fewer.org](mailto:secretariat@fewer.org)  
[www.fewer.org](http://www.fewer.org)

**ANALYTICAL REPORT**

**RESPONDING TO TERRORISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL AND  
GLOBAL STABILITY**

**30 September 2001**

**With contributions from the Centro de Estudios Internacionales (Nicaragua),  
Gaston Z. Ortiga Peace Institute (Philippines), Norman Paterson School of  
International Affairs/Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (Canada), Peace  
Mission to the North Caucasus (Russia), Russian Academy of  
Sciences/Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology (Russia), Swiss Peace  
Foundation/FAST (Switzerland), and West Africa Network for Peace-building  
(Ghana).**

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# 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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*Prepared by the FEWER Board of Directors*

On 11 September 2001, the United States suffered the most devastating terrorist attack in Western history since the Second World War. Four aircraft were hijacked, one crashed in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, and three others hit targets in New York (World Trade Centre) and Washington, D.C. (Pentagon).

The terrorist attack was condemned by leaders world-wide. The U.S. President called the attacks “acts of war” and NATO invoked Article Five. All statements issued by NATO governments and U.S. indicate preparations for a campaign against terrorism that involves diplomatic, military, intelligence and law enforcement actions.

It is clear that Western responses to the terrorist attacks will have far reaching consequences for regional and global stability. It is out of grave humanitarian concern that the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) – a global network of organisations specialising in detecting early stage conflicts, warning against them, and preventing them – have produced this report.

As a global coalition of leading organisations involved in early warning and conflict prevention, FEWER is able to evaluate the consequences of possible measures planned by the U.S. and NATO governments in their anti-terrorism campaign. Thus, the perspectives provided here reflect FEWER’s expertise in such areas as:

- root causes of violent conflict, civil wars and wars between nations
- international policies and the prevention of violent conflict
- military, political, economic and social responses to violence
- regional dynamics in Central and West Africa, Caucasus, Central and South Asia, as well as Southeast Asia

FEWER favours the peaceful resolution of conflict. The following analysis presumes that a peaceful resolution to the threat of terrorism is possible. The organisations responsible for this report hope to stimulate critical thinking on the consequences of a “war” against terrorism and the development of non-violent responses to terrorism. Thus, the report gives an overview of possible responses to the attacks, shortcomings in the most likely approaches, and regional and global implications of any U.S.-NATO campaign against terrorism.

Unlike other FEWER reports that are targeted to a limited audience of policy makers regionally and internationally, this report is oriented to a broader set of policy makers, the media, as well as the general public.

Five key messages follow from the analysis:

- The failure to recognise that terrorism sometimes has a popular base in society raises the possibility that the anti-terror campaign will move ultimately against civilians who – for good or bad reasons -- support terrorists. Neglect of the popular basis of different terrorist

## *Caveats*

The preparation of this report does not constitute a “buy in” to any of the agendas of the parties involved in a “war” on terrorism.

Nor is its purpose to make it easier to carry out such a “war” by highlighting the possible fall-outs.

Specific policy and events are fast unfolding. As such, this report may be premature. However, the broad parameters of a response offer some basis for reflection.

The report strives to present multiple perspectives in a balanced manner. The presentation of any given perspective does not constitute an implicit endorsement.

A key tension in the report is the need to address (and give credence to) policy, and the question of its legitimacy. For example, are attacks on Afghanistan legitimate, and can one demand extradition without adequate evidence and legal procedure?

It is reactive reflection on policy directions. As such, it does not explore some fundamental questions. For instance, what is the international legal basis for a U.S./NATO campaign? What constitutes a “legitimate” target when dealing with terrorism? Other groups with more insights on these topics should be encouraged to share their perspectives.

groups is disconcerting. Civilian casualties may be high in those places where civilian support for terrorism is high.

- Terrorism cannot be defeated militarily. In fact, military action may bolster support for terrorist groups and destabilise governments. Military action may bring about uncontrolled conflict, forcing politicians and civil society to “solve” a set of emerging problems that eluded the grasp of soldiers.
- The political, economic and social costs of the war on terrorism will be high. A lack of attention, for example, to the effect of a “war” on business interests is worrisome because such inattention will trigger, or perhaps deepen, a global recession. Economic hard times can in turn stimulate conflict.
- The regional and global implications of a “war” on terrorism will be severe. Regional instability in several parts of the world is likely, massive humanitarian disasters may follow, and new security risks will emerge.
- Any campaign against terrorism should involve restraint, the rule of law, attention to the root causes of conflict that perpetuate terrorism, avoidance of political backlashes, and increased attention to socio-economic consequences of measures taken. Alternative responses need to be considered in the political/diplomatic, legal, humanitarian, and socio-economic sectors.

## **2. RESPONSES TO THE TERRORIST ATTACKS**

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*Prepared by the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs/Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (Canada)*

Although citizens of over 80 countries were victims of the attacks, the United States and the remaining NATO member states will orchestrate an immediate response. Over 120 countries, including Russia, have declared their political solidarity with the US approach.<sup>i</sup> For its part, NATO has demonstrated the willingness, capability and resolve to use force in non-traditional conflict arenas such as Bosnia and Kosovo in support of oppressed minorities (Muslim in both instances) against loosely organised paramilitary forces. Statements by U.S. and European officials and media reports give some indication of the parameters, targets and strategies envisaged in a military response that entails, most likely, the threat of an air and ground war in Afghanistan.

### **PARAMETERS**

In the immediate aftermath of the attack President Bush won bipartisan support from both houses of Congress, which passed a resolution declaring that United States was “entitled to respond under international law”<sup>ii</sup>. Bush called the attacks “acts of war” and vowed to “hunt down and punish” those responsible. Bush has made it clear that “this war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the war above Kosovo, two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat.”<sup>iii</sup> Nor is the response likely to be anything similar to NATO’s support and aid to the Muslim minorities at the height of the conflict in Bosnia – when Sarajevo among other cities were besieged by Serb forces.

In response to the attacks, NATO immediately invoked Article Five of its charter, which states that an armed attack against one of its members is considered an attack against all. By invoking Article Five, NATO members agreed to aid the U.S. in any response it may make to the attacks. The agreement provides for the use of airspace by the allies and makes other kinds of assistance available, such as intelligence sharing<sup>iv</sup>.

## TARGETS

The Guardian newspaper (of London) reports that intelligence sources ranging from the CIA to Britain's MI6, the French, Germans, Russians and Israelis are unanimous "in pointing the finger of suspicion at supporters of Osama bin Laden" (see also *Box 1: bin Laden's "Declaration of War Against the Americans Who Occupy the Land of the Two Holy Mosques"*). Leads followed in Boston, Maine and Florida seem to point to the involvement of *Al-Qaeda* (bin Laden's organisation) in the attacks<sup>v</sup>. President Bush's address to the houses of Congress (20 September 2001) indicates that the initial U.S. aim will be to destroy *Al-Qaeda*.

Media reports indicate that primary nation-state targets are countries believed to be harbouring terrorists, initially against Afghanistan<sup>vi</sup>. Afghanistan has been asked to hand over Osama Bin Laden or risk the consequences of an invasion. On 25 September, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan shut down their diplomatic missions in Afghanistan three days after the United Arab Emirates (the only other nation to recognise the Taliban) withdrew its support. Isolated and alone, the ruling Taliban of Afghanistan remains steadfast – accusing Saudi Arabia of joining the side of the infidels. Taliban spiritual leader Mullah Mohammed Omar asked that the Americans accept blame for the 11 September incident: "The American people must know that the sad events that took place recently were the result of their government's wrong policies."<sup>vii</sup>

## APPROACH

Secretary of State Colin Powell said he expected a "long term conflict" and that the U.S. response would far surpass a single reprisal raid. "This is going to take a multifaceted attack on many dimensions – diplomatic, military, intelligence, law enforcement..."<sup>viii</sup>. He also said that the coalition being formed will not stop at getting the people responsible for the attack, but will go after terrorists wherever they are found<sup>x</sup>. President Bush reiterated this message during his address to the houses of Congress<sup>x</sup>. British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, said that a sound response should also remove the financial basis for terrorism by seizing bank accounts and other assets<sup>xi</sup>.

President Bush also warned during his speech to the houses of Congress that the struggle against terrorism could "take years"<sup>xii</sup>. Senior analysts agree. Bill Nash of the Council on Foreign Relations said: "This will not be a short-duration, six cruise missiles, two stealth bombers, then read about it in the morning paper. It's a war and it's going to go back and forth"<sup>xiii</sup>. The U.S. seems bent on forcing other countries to choose sides between it and the Taliban. President Bush has highlighted this by emphasising that: "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make ... either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists."<sup>xiv</sup>

As the United States prepared agreements from neighbouring states surrounding Afghanistan to use their air spaces for a possible military campaign, the United Nations warned that a severe attack on Afghanistan could lead to a "humanitarian disaster of stunning proportions."<sup>xv</sup> In anticipation of the war to come approximately 1.5 million refugees and internally displaced

*Box 1: bin Laden's "Declaration of War Against the Americans Who Occupy the Land of the Two Holy Mosques"*

"Muslims burn with anger at America. America should leave [Saudi Arabia] ... There is no more important duty that pushing the American enemy out of the holy land. [...] The presence of the USA Crusader military forces on land, sea and air of the states of the Islamic Gulf is the greatest danger threatening the largest oil reserve in the world. The existence of these forces in the area will provoke the people of the country and induces aggression on their religion, feelings and prides and pushes them to take up armed struggle against the invaders occupying the land. [...] Due to the imbalance of power between our armed forces and the enemy forces, a suitable means of fighting must be adopted, i.e. using fast-moving, light forces that work under complete secrecy. In other words, to initiate a guerilla war, where the sons of the nation, and not the military forces, take part in it." October 1996.

See the full Declaration on [http://msanews.mynet.net/MSANEWS/19610/19961012\\_3.html](http://msanews.mynet.net/MSANEWS/19610/19961012_3.html)

people are moving within Afghanistan and across to Pakistan, a stable although fragile nation itself on the verge of political collapse and economic ruin.

Below follows a matrix of responses to the New York and Washington, DC attacks.

<b>Diplomatic</b>	<b>Military</b>	<b>Intelligence</b>	<b>Law enforcement</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Creation of a coalition against terrorism</li> <li>• Strong pressure on countries harbouring terrorists to hand them over</li> <li>• Isolation and diplomatic sanctions on supporting nations</li> <li>• Refugee camps along the Pakistan/Afghanistan border</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Air strikes and missile attacks on terrorist bases and countries harbouring terrorists</li> <li>• Deployment of Special Forces for "search and destroy" missions in target countries</li> <li>• Military aid to opposition groups acting against regimes that harbour terrorists</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Substantial increase in counter-terrorist intelligence work</li> <li>• Emphasis placed on uncovering networks, and financial basis</li> <li>• Full sharing of intelligence among core allies (US/NATO) and selective sharing with external governments</li> <li>• Covert operations against terrorist groups</li> <li>• Increased intelligence efforts nationally and internationally</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Arrests of suspects</li> <li>• Increased border controls and security at key sites</li> <li>• Seizure of suspected terrorist assets</li> <li>• Action on terrorist funding sources (e.g. drugs)</li> <li>• Tightened Immigration Controls</li> <li>• Use of the International Criminal Court to bring terrorists to justice.</li> </ul>

### ALTERNATIVE VOICES

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan condemned the "deliberate acts of terrorism" but called for "cool and reasoned judgement". The UN Security Council passed unanimously a resolution condemning the attacks and urging all nations to work together to bring the perpetrators to justice and prevent future terrorism<sup>xvi</sup>. Mary Robinson – Head of the UN Human Rights body declared the attacks "a crime against humanity".

A number of countries have made their support for U.S./NATO anti-terrorist actions conditional on endorsement by the UN Security Council<sup>xvii</sup>. Several nations, among them Iran and China have called on the UN to take a lead role in the antiterrorism effort.

Several non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have called for restraint. Amnesty International issued a statement urging calm in the weeks ahead: "it is important for us all to see that hatred does not become the order of the day; that fear does not become an excuse for the violation of rights, and that we all remember our common humanity."<sup>xviii</sup> In an unprecedented joint statement, British NGOs warned against a "descent into a spiral of violence"<sup>xix</sup>. Petitions to world leaders, drafted by staff at the University of Jerusalem and University of Maryland also warned against military retaliation, as "it carries with it a terrible risk"<sup>xx</sup>.

Nobel Laureates, from Mikhail Gorbachev to the Dalai Lama, also urge caution. Oscar Arias, stressed that hatred and violence is what the terrorists seek and expect. "I pray that the United States and its allies collectively pause and take a deep breath before responding to this violence in kind," Arias said after the attack on the U.S. "It is essential that justice be done, and it is equally vital that justice not be confused with revenge, for the two are wholly different."<sup>xxi</sup>

### 3. KEY RESPONSE ASSUMPTIONS AND PITFALLS

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*Prepared by the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs/Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (Canada) and the Centro de Estudios Internacionales (Nicaragua)*

The current debate on U.S./NATO responses to the terrorist attacks is faces several important and potentially dangerous assumptions/pitfalls.

#### **POLITICAL ASSUMPTIONS/PITFALLS**

***A focus on the management of symptoms, rather than prevention.*** Political leaders in the U.S. and NATO countries are focused on “eliminating” terrorism. Emphasis is placed on perceived immediate solutions to the terrorist threat, while prevention of future threats is a lesser priority. However, some leaders, such as James Wolfensohn of the World Bank, call for attention to the conditions that enable terrorism to thrive, including poverty, political marginalisation, and inequality.<sup>xxii</sup>

***The potential for political instability in allied countries.*** There is increasing evidence (e.g. Pakistan) to suggest that countries offering support to the campaign against terrorism may be destabilised. The regional implications of such instability will be significant.

***Serious implications for democratisation.*** Making the military a preferred partner of co-operation may upset civil-military relations in various countries (e.g. Colombia). The implications for countries with fragile or emerging democracies are serious. Hard-won civilian control over the military may be compromised.

#### **DIPLOMATIC ASSUMPTIONS/PITFALLS**

***Implications of the terms for a “coalition” against terrorism.*** The radical statements of “either with us, or against us” give little scope for informed debate and constructive discussion of responses. Some countries are forced into difficult positions (e.g. Pakistan): either they will be de-stabilised as a result of not helping the U.S. (perhaps because of direct U.S. reprisals); or they will support the U.S. alliance and be de-stabilised from domestic opposition to their position. As the anti-terror campaign unfolds, those nation-states that choose to criticise or oppose the U.S.-led position may be perceived as siding with extremist groups, further polarising the world.

***The survival prospects of an anti-terrorist alliance.*** War alliances are fragile. This is the lesson from the alliances formed to oppose Iraq, for instance. These alliances have been formed in the face of a clearly defined enemy and a demonised leader and yet have faced strains. In the war against terrorism, the enemy is unclear, the moral and tactical justifications for the campaign are contested, and the domestic pressures on U.S. allies will force constant revisions in the terms of any alliance.

#### **SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS/PITFALLS**

***Serious economic consequences.*** A negative impact on the industrialised economies may be seen with a shift of surpluses to shore up the defence and security sectors. International flows of goods, people and finance may decline as a result of security barriers and concerns. Further shocks to the financial markets may also be seen.

***The rise of domestic social problems.*** More warnings may be issued to ordinary citizens who become fearful of further attacks. This may lead to a conflict spiral involving: (a) the persecution/harassment of minorities (both Muslim and other) in North America, Europe and elsewhere; and (b) increased refugee flows from zones of conflict.

***A crack-down on human rights?*** New legislation and power to law enforcement agencies may lead to rollbacks in human rights. In the West, asylum seekers and immigrants may

suffer, as well as radical groups that pursue legal non-violent means. In places where the counter-terrorist “war” is fought, human rights violations are likely to be widespread.

#### **MILITARY ASSUMPTIONS/PITFALLS**

***Can terrorism be defeated militarily?*** Terrorism cannot be defeated by militarily as its causes cannot be tackled by the use of military measures. History shows that military responses strengthen the resolve terrorist groups and their supporters. This is particularly true when the group and its supporter feel the cause is just.

***An unmanageable “war”.*** The emerging approach to the “war” on terrorism may give “free license” to alliance members to attack groups not directly involved in the attacks on 11 September. By acting against legitimate dissidents, under the cover of attacking terrorism, the U.S. and its allies may spawn a backlash that they cannot contain.

#### **INTELLIGENCE ASSUMPTIONS/PITFALLS**

***The knowledge base.*** Very little is known about the location and identity of terrorist cells within North America and Europe where it now appears the operatives/sleepers may have been active for some time.

***Tradeoffs between privacy and security.*** A massive increase in intelligence efforts and the use of new and intrusive technology may infringe on individual freedom and privacy. As the scale of operations mounts, civil-rights groups may increase their objections to anti-terror methods.

#### **KEY MESSAGES**

- The failure to recognise that terrorism sometimes has a popular base in society raises the possibility that the anti-terror campaign will move ultimately against civilians who – for good or bad reasons -- support terrorists. Neglect of the popular basis of different terrorist groups is disconcerting. Civilian casualties may be high in those places where civilian support for terrorism is high.
- Terrorism cannot be defeated militarily. In fact, military action may bolster support for terrorist groups and destabilise governments. It may also spiral the conflict in ways that make it uncontrollable.
- The political, economic and social costs of the war on terrorism will be high. A lack of attention, for example, to broader business interests is likely and worrisome because such inattention will trigger, or perhaps deepen, a global recession. Economic hard times can in turn stimulate conflict.

### **5. SCENARIOS FOR REGIONAL AND GLOBAL STABILITY**

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This section provides an overview of possible scenarios (regional and global) that may follow the war on terrorism. However, four important caveats should be noted:

1. A number of other regions not presented in this analysis (notably, Israel-Palestine, Indonesia, North Africa, Colombia, India, Great Lakes of Africa, etc.) will also be affected.
2. The scenarios are based on the terms of a U.S.-NATO led coalition, and its focus on fundamentalist movements. Islam, and particularly fundamentalist Islam, is not the cause of conflict in these regions.

#### *Background Information and Maps*

For background information on the countries presented here, see AlertNet at:  
<http://www.alertnet.org>

Additional information and reports on the regions can be accessed on the regional pages of the FEWER web-site at:  
<http://www.fewer.org>

For maps of the regions, see the Map Centre of ReliefWeb at: <http://www.reliefweb.int>



3. The focus on terrorism in this report does not mean that the non-state actors mentioned are solely or even partially terrorist in nature.
4. The intent of our scenarios is not scare mongering, but the stimulation of creative thinking about alternative strategies around “possible futures,” depicted according to standard early warning methods.

## **REGIONAL SCENARIOS**

Regional stability in several parts of the world will be affected by a U.S./NATO campaign against terrorism. Below follow scenarios drawn by key FEWER analysts for the Caucasus (Chechen epicentre and Daghestan), Central Asia (Ferghana Valley), South Asia (Afghanistan-Pakistan), Southeast Asia (Philippines), and West Africa (Nigeria).

### ***Caucasus (Chechen epicentre and Daghestan)***

*Prepared by the Russian Academy of Sciences/IEA (Moscow) and the Peace Mission to the North Caucasus (Pyatigorsk).*

*Worst case scenario.* A war in Afghanistan will not reduce support for armed separatists fighting against the Russian government in Chechnya. Their alliance with the “irreconcilable” Chechen separatists will be strengthened. The Chechen armed groups will attempt to seize Grozny, Gudermes, Argun, Shali, or other major cities in Chechnya. Alternatively, the rebels will aim to regionalise the conflict through terrorist acts in Georgia and throughout the North Caucasus. The Russian Federal army will deploy more troops and mount large-scale offensives against the “irreconcilable” armed groups.

The settlement process will become impossible, the Chechen independence movement will become radicalised, The Russian government will mount media campaigns will aim to change public opinion to support the renewed escalation of fighting by linking it to the global counter-terrorist struggle, and a large part of the remaining non-fighting population of Chechnya will flee the republic. The number of people displaced may exceed 100,000.

The influence of radical Islamic ideologies will continue to spread throughout the region. In the run-up to elections in Daghestan in 2002, Islamic ideology may become the most important mobilisation tool used by the opposition to counter-act the oligarchic political elite. The use of violence in the struggle for power is highly likely.

*Realistic scenario.* U.S.-led strikes in Afghanistan and a wider regional war may lead to reduced funding for separatist and terrorist activities in Chechnya. Chechen fighters will continue to be influenced by the radical Islamic ideology, but the number of the Arab fighters in the region will decrease. The Russian army will continue operations to end the resistance and eliminate Chechen leaders, especially those who are believed to receive support from Osama bin Laden. These operations may be accompanied by intense population screenings with the co-operation of the local Chechen authorities. The remaining forces of the irreconcilable fighters will shift to isolated terrorist attacks throughout the North Caucasus.

After at least a partial success of this strategy is assured, the federal authorities may explore settlement options and seek to negotiate acceptable terms of surrender with some groups of fighters in the Chechen resistance movement. Elections to a representative power body may be organised after a settlement is reached and the situation stabilises. Reconstruction of the Chechen Republic then receives a new impetus, but the threat of the terrorist acts in the region remains high.

### ***Central Asia (Ferghana Valley)***

*Prepared by the Russian Academy of Sciences/IEA (Moscow).*

*Worst case scenario.* Protracted war in Afghanistan and subsequent response measures by the Taliban lead to activation of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) fighters and large-scale incursions in the Ferghana Valley where they will aim to establish fuel, arms and ammunition transportation routes. Many would argue that violent and oppressive responses by regional governments may lead the Hizb ut-Tahrir to rethink their non-violent stance and attempt a mobilisation of supporters for armed struggle. Presently unidentified groups may

seek to assassinate the leaders of the three countries that border the Ferghana Valley, especially if the U.S. troops are allowed to enter the territory of the three states.

Ethnic minorities will move in large numbers (the Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan total about 700,000 at the moment, the Kyrgyz in Uzbekistan of around 220,000, the Uzbeks in Tajikistan, approximately one million people, the Russian speaking community in the region is estimated at 200 - 240,000). There will be a flow of refugees from each side to their ethnic homeland, a chaotic, disorganised, and panic-stricken exodus of large numbers of people. The population of the enclaves will be pressured to leave as well.

*Realistic scenario.* Anti-terrorist alliance attacks in Afghanistan are targeted, effective and restrained, while the Northern Alliance (Afghan opposition) conducts most ground operations. Regional governments, supported by Russia, seek to neutralise the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, or the Movement loses its legitimacy through incidents of bloodshed that seriously undermine the *mujaheddin's* image and cut off the bulk of their supporters and sympathisers.

Drug trafficking is likely to grow along with greater instability. Regional governments and law enforcement agencies may put a break to instability, as may the drug traffickers themselves, as the threats of instability to the shadow economy are also significant.

The relationship between different ethnic groups will remain, despite serious challenges, largely positive. At the same time the Russian-speaking community will continue to leave the region. Possible refugee flows from Afghanistan and border destabilisation will adversely affect the internal situation in Tajikistan.

### **South Asia (Pakistan, Afghanistan)**

*Prepared by the Swiss Peace Foundation/FAST (Bern).*

*Worst case scenario.* Afghanistan has been destroyed after over 20 years of war and three consecutive years of drought have accentuated the current humanitarian crisis:

*More than five million people currently require humanitarian assistance to survive, including more than one million people who have been displaced from their homes. Tens of thousands of people are now on the move in search of safety and assistance and UNHCR believes that many more are unable to move. Already, 3.8 million Afghans rely on UN food aid to survive. By November 1, WFP estimates that 5.5 million people will depend on its food shipments. Nearly 20 per cent of those in need are children under the age of five, according to UNICEF, many of whom are already struggling to survive.*

*(UN Interagency Statement on Afghanistan, press release of 24 September 2001)*

It is very likely that the present situation will deteriorate further unless the U.S. course of action changes. Considering the current rhetoric, however, this seems unlikely. It appears that the U.S. is set to strike against the Taliban. While many Islamic governments deplore the attacks on the U.S. and support a targeted fight against terrorism they (governments and civilian population alike) may interpret an act of aggression against the Taliban – regardless whether they agree with the Taliban regime – as an act of aggression against the Islamic world. This may create the worst case scenario of Huntington's "clash of civilisations", evoked by the West. The call for a *jihad* gathers momentum. The eight imprisoned foreigners of Shelter Now International are executed by the Taliban in Afghanistan, hardening Western determination to topple the regime. According to Afghanistan experts Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid, a major mistake of the U.S. would be to act without co-ordinating with the Afghan resistance as this may alienate the last possible allies left on the ground.

In Pakistan, President Musharraf succumbs to Western pressure and allows the U.S. to operate from Pakistan. This would further accentuate the already deep divide between secular and extremist forces in the country. A major backlash by Islamic groupings sympathetic to Afghanistan is very likely as recent assassination rumours against Musharraf have shown. This could lead to a reshuffling in the army with Musharraf being ousted as president and/or a civil war between secular and extremist elements in the country. However, if Musharraf does not allow the U.S. to operate from its territory, the U.S. could consider striking at Pakistan at

the same time it strikes against Afghanistan. Such actions would infuriate even secular elements in the country. In the instability that follows, India takes advantage and the Kashmir peace process collapses. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is compromised by instability and/or civil war, giving rise to new security threats.

*Realistic scenario.* In Afghanistan, the worst case scenario is probably the most realistic one, unless the U.S. practices restraint and carefully co-ordinates its actions with the UN and other international and local actors. However, regardless of U.S. action, the worst humanitarian case scenario is still likely.

Similarly to Afghanistan it is also difficult to reject either of the worst case scenarios put forth for Pakistan, as President Musharraf is literally caught between "a rock and a hard place". Appeasing the West and offering logistic support to the U.S. will infuriate the country's ultra-Islamic groups, while non-compliance may lead to international action against Pakistan. However, if the U.S. does not push Pakistan too hard for tangible support, domestic violence can be kept at a minimum. Nevertheless, Musharraf's popularity will diminish. The Pakistani leader may not last until the elections in 2002 and it may become visible who really controls politics in Pakistan. The possibility of a civil war still looms.

### ***Southeast Asia (Philippines)***

*Prepared by the Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute (Manila).*

*Worst case scenario.* The situation in the Philippines would follow from the scale and nature of the U.S. led coalition's responses in a worst case scenario. Links between Osama bin Laden and the local Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) are said to have been cut after 1995, and the ASG has deteriorated to a few hundred armed men but with the capacity to wreak havoc mainly through kidnap for ransom activities. However, these links could be activated and resources poured to strengthen the ASG. If anti-Muslim rhetoric and attacks are stepped up, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), now in alliance with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and currently engaged in peace negotiations with the Philippine government could again take up its secessionist struggle through armed conflict. The National Democratic Front, reacting to possible use of Philippine facilities by the US and/or presence of US troops, or to the deployment of Philippine forces with the coalition, would also step up its armed attacks.

If the conflict spreads in the Middle East, a substantial segment of the 1.4 million Filipinos working in Middle East countries might have to be repatriated. The huge losses in dollar revenues as well unemployment crisis would deepen the current economic crisis and delay recovery. The poverty situation and volatile atmosphere would provide fodder to forces linked to former president Estrada that are still trying to destabilise and topple the Arroyo government.

*Realistic scenario.* Although the Philippine government has declared full support to the "war on terrorism", actual action will more likely be limited to: (a) intensified intelligence work and co-ordination; (b) a final push to get most of the leaders of the Abu Sayyaf; and (c) allowing U.S. use of Philippine facilities (for stopover, refuelling, staging area, etc.).

The MILF with the MNLF will not take up the call for jihad, but most Muslim Filipinos will feel aggrieved by any attack on Muslim populations. On the other hand, anti-Muslim sentiments have again been stoked among Christians especially in Mindanao and this will provide a difficult atmosphere for the GRP-MILF peace talks. However, if the Government is finally successful in routing the Abu Sayyaf with least civilian casualties and damage, the sense of security provided would be good for the talks as well as for economic normalcy.

The GRP-NDF peace talks will remain stalled, not only because of opposing views on the role of the Philippines in the U.S. led response to terrorism, but also because the situation bolsters the military's dominant role in the Arroyo administration. Security measures being proposed tend to curtail human rights, including those of foreigners in the Philippines even while the country protests the recent arrests of Filipinos in Belgium.

Some return of Filipinos working in the Middle East countries at risk of war is likely. With the US as the major market for exports of the Philippines and other Asian countries, an economic

slowdown will worsen. Budgets for the military and the police will continue to increase despite the severe budget deficit.

### **West Africa (Nigeria)**

*Prepared by the West Africa Network for Peace-building (Accra).*

*Worst case scenario.* The 11 September terrorist attacks in the United States occurred the day after the Federal Army in Nigeria suppressed a weekend-long bloody clash between Christians and Muslims in Jos Plateau State. Immediately following the U.S. attacks, it was reported that Islamic extremists stepped up violence on Tuesday evening chanting *Allah-u-akballu* (God is great), with more killings, as well as the burning houses and churches. By the end of Tuesday, over 500 persons (both Muslims and Christians) were reported dead in the three-day attacks in Jos Plateau State. Jos is believed to be predominantly Christian.

The spontaneous link of the inter-communal and inter-religious violence in Nigeria to the terrorist attacks in the United States could intensify if a violent reprisal begins on any perceived or real Islamic state.

Already, threats of war in Afghanistan have received sharp reactions from a number of states, especially in Northern Nigeria (Kano, Jos Plateau, Zamfara, etc). An interview with the BBC Network Africa Program (September 21, 2001) by an Islamic scholar in the Northern Nigerian city of Kano shows the general perception held by a majority of the Muslim community in Nigeria and other parts of West Africa. The scholar declared:

*The Islamic Community will declare a Jihad if Afghanistan is attacked and Osama bin Laden is unlawfully arrested and prosecuted by the West. Don't be deceived by so-called Islamic moderates like the presidents of Egypt, Saudi, and Kuwait. They do not represent the Islamic community. Afghanistan is now regarded as the icon for the struggle against those who impose their civilisation on us and Osama bin Laden is the embodiment of that struggle. We will fight. After all there is a better world awaiting us in paradise where beautiful women with pointed breasts await our arrival.*

In Nigeria, a nation of immense oil wealth and widespread poverty, promises of a happy death – meeting pointed-breasted women in paradise in the after-life – is deadly serious because ordinary people respond profoundly to myths and beliefs. This tendency may only be intensified by a U.S.-led military strike against Muslims, even though the attacks come outside of Africa. Many Muslims in Nigeria already feel threatened by the rule of a Southern Christian believed to be the president closest to Western powers in Nigerian history<sup>1</sup>. Christian fundamentalists in Nigeria are already victimised by frequent violence, imposition of Shari'ah law, and other threats. Christians liken their situation to 'Armageddon' and call for a crusade. Inter-communal violence increases<sup>2</sup>.

President Obasanjo, perceived to be sympathetic to the West, is overthrown and a northern extremist installed, similar to the late dictator Sani Abacha. Islamic rule by Shari'ah expands. Southeastern, oil-rich states, responding to Islamic militancy, revive their secessionist struggle (ended in the 1970s by the Biafran War) and the Nigerian nation-state begins to unravel.

Fleeing refugees of the most populous state in Africa overwhelm smaller neighbouring states like Benin, Togo, Niger and Cameroon. Instability widens as Christians and Muslims are pitting against one another throughout the region. The peace processes in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Cote d'Ivoire collapse. West African 'Christian' leaders, winning sympathy from the West, intensify their rhetoric and link it to the counter-terrorist effort. U.S.-sponsored agents try to assassinate those who support terrorists and appear to side with Christians in West Africa. Libya's Qaddafi responds by arming Islamic groups in the region.

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<sup>1</sup> It is public knowledge that Nigeria's President, Olusegun Obasanjo, is a personal friend of British Prime Minister Tony Blair and other Western leaders.

<sup>2</sup> Religious fanaticism and solidarity is so demonstrated in Nigeria such that any issue with a religious connotation quickly generates violent hostility among Muslims and Christians.

The African Union (successor to the Organisation of African Unity and promoted by Libya) collapses.

*Realistic Scenario:* The U.S. global campaign against terrorism remains extremely difficult to define. As a result, the proliferation of conflicting goals provokes more conflict. The Islamic and Christian population in West Africa choose sides. The 2003 general elections in Nigeria are disrupted. Shari'ah conflicts are intensified BY U.S.-led strikes. West Africa, highly dependent on aid, could get less aid, thus increasing poverty and regional instability.

All but three countries in West Africa will hold general elections in 2002 and 2003. Dictators who were usurped by the growth of democracy in the sub-region could seize the opportunity of Western shift of focus to the fight against terrorism, and return to dictatorial tendencies, similar to those seen in the Cold War era. Hard-earned achievements towards democracy, progress, and regional integration could be lost.

## **GLOBAL SCENARIOS**

Several global scenarios can be envisaged. These are provided below under the headings of worst case, realistic, and best case scenarios.

### ***Worst Case Scenario***

*Strategic scenario.* A military campaign is launched initially against terrorist bases in Afghanistan, then Sudan, and Syria, including targeted air strikes and "search and destroy missions" by Special Forces of the assembled alliance. Afghanistan, Syria and Sudan retaliate with attacks on the neighbouring countries (Pakistan and Israel, for instance) that support the U.S.-NATO alliance. The Taliban mount a crushing offensive against the Afghan opposition (Northern Alliance), which is defeated. Taliban forces are subsequently mobilised for action elsewhere. A counter-attack is launched by *Al-Qaeda* against Western targets in the countries where it has operatives.

*Political and social scenario.* The "Holy War" called for by the Talibans gathers momentum, anti-Western demonstrations are organised, and pressure mounts on moderate Islamic groups and governments. The Pakistani government is overthrown, and its nuclear technology is made available to a range of countries and terrorist groups. Terrorist and fundamentalist rebel groups increase attacks in the Middle East, Central, South and Southeast Asia, West and North Africa, North Caucasus, with attacks on Western targets in other parts of the world. The war escalates, with U.S.-NATO attacks not only on terrorist groups, but also on different rebel movements. A series of conflict prevention efforts collapse -- in Israel-Palestine, India-Pakistan, Chechnya, Nigeria, and Sudan). Xenophobia against Muslims and other minorities reaches unprecedented levels in Western Europe, Russia and North America. Muslim groups in different parts of the world (e.g. Indonesia and Malaysia) launch jihads and internal conflicts increase. A counter-alliance is formed among moderate and extremist governments and groups, and Huntington's "clash of civilisations" starts to unfold. The world splits along religious lines.

*Economic scenario.* Shock to confidence leads to reduced household and business spending and provokes a more serious and prolonged recession. International flows of goods, people and finance decline as a result of security barriers and concerns. The world becomes increasingly divided along North-South and religious lines, leading to a disruption in economic relations, financial crisis in emerging markets, and oil price increases.

*Humanitarian scenario.* Instability caused in different parts of the world by the fall-out of U.S.-NATO attacks leads to massive refugee and migration flows in an excess of five million people. With the onset of winter in many parts of the world, delivery of aid becomes impossible. Suffering among civilians reaches untold of proportions. Humanitarian agencies are overwhelmed and chaotic relief operations follow. Shifts in priorities among international organisations, pressured by an anti-terrorist alliance to support the campaign, leads to further suffering and the loss of hard-gained advances in poverty alleviation, debt relief, human rights and democratisation, and the protection of the environment.

### **Realistic Scenario**

*Strategic scenario.* The U.S. and NATO countries, with selected allies (Pakistan, Russia) launch targeted military strikes (air and special ground forces) against Bin Laden and Afghanistan. The Afghan opposition (Northern Alliance) receives unprecedented support and mounts an offensive against the Taliban, and pressure mounts on the regime to hand over Bin Laden. Alliance members initiate increased intelligence gathering and sharing efforts in order to uncover terrorist networks, hideouts, and assets. A series of arrests follow in Europe and North America.

*Political and social scenario.* Afghanistan retaliates against Pakistan, and the Pakistani government is increasingly destabilised, plagued by domestic violence and dissent in the military. The U.S.-NATO alliance launches air strikes against terrorist targets in Syria, Iraq and Sudan, with joint military efforts in other countries. After breaks in the cease-fire, Israel launches a series of attacks in the Palestinian Territories and Lebanon. Hamas and Palestinian counter-attacks follow on Israel, backed by Syria. The Middle East peace process collapses. Terrorist attacks are staged in different parts of the world against European and North American targets. Anti-Western demonstrations follow in the Muslim world. As in the worst-case scenario, xenophobia against Muslims increases in Europe, Russia and North America. A counter-movement emerges of moderate and extremist states, and the potential for Huntington's "clash of civilisations" increases.

*Economic scenario.* Minor, temporary, and largely undetectable effect on eventual economic recovery. Normal economic relations resume with new security measures imposing only moderate inconvenience. No major rifts appear in the international community, though there is some deflection of attention away from, and subordination of, international economic issues to discussions on terrorism.

*Humanitarian scenario.* Attempts are made to reduce instability in different parts of the world that follows U.S.-NATO attacks. Significant refugee and migration flows are nonetheless seen, however, below a level of four million people. With the onset of winter in many parts of the world, delivery of aid becomes increasingly difficult. As in the worst case scenario, suffering among affected civilians reaches unprecedented levels. Humanitarian agencies struggle to cope, and are overwhelmed in some regions. Pressure remains limited on international organisations to modify priorities and support the campaign. Some set-backs are nonetheless seen in poverty alleviation, debt relief, human rights and democratisation, and the protection of the environment.

### **Best Case Scenario**

*Strategic scenario.* U.S. and NATO political leaders, in consultation with the U.N., agree on a set of political, economic, social and military measures. These include the use of selected embargoes, identification and seizure of terrorist assets in banks, narrow military strikes against clearly defined targets where terrorist activities are evidenced, and expanded programs aimed at addressing the conditions that make terrorism thrive.

*Political and social scenario.* Pakistan and Tajikistan are not drawn on for operational support and remain stable. The role of the UN is increased, and anti-terrorist efforts are sanctioned by the UN Security Council. Conflict prevention activities in key hot spot areas are bolstered. Security measures are stepped up in Europe and North America to prevent further attacks. Xenophobia is tackled through popular awareness-raising, responsible journalism, and constructive statements by politicians in Europe and North America.

*Economic scenario.* New investment in security measures coincides with expected general economic recovery. The international community unites in combating terrorism, and this spirit of co-operation prevails in international economic discussions. Security concerns are alleviated, and commercial and financial markets continue to become more integrated.

*Humanitarian scenario.* With a bolstering of conflict prevention efforts, the instability in different parts of the world that follows U.S.-NATO attacks is reduced. Significant refugee and

migration flows are nonetheless seen. With the onset of winter in many parts of the world, delivery of aid is increasingly difficult, but humanitarian aid agencies are strengthened in order to manage the crisis. International organisations increase efforts to eliminate poverty, reduce debt, and expand human rights and democracy, and environmental protection.

## KEY MESSAGES

- Several regions will be affected by a U.S.-NATO campaign against terrorism. Worst case scenarios are grim with resurgence and escalation of violence, governmental instability, regional polarisation, massive migration flows, and severe economic consequences.
- On a global level, the choices made for a U.S.-NATO campaign will change to political, social, economic and humanitarian landscape everywhere. In a best case scenario, the United Nations becomes an integral force in any campaign against terrorism and volatile states are not enlisted to support any targeted strikes against terrorist camps. A number of strategic socio-economic measures are implemented, and the global drive to eliminate poverty, tackle debt, strengthen human rights and democracy, and protect the environment, is bolstered.

## 6. GLOBAL RISKS

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A number of risks can be identified with a U.S./NATO campaign against terrorism:

***New security threats.*** Instability in South Asia (notably in Pakistan and Afghanistan) will yield new security threats. Instability in Pakistan, for example, may result in nuclear weapons being shared with Islamic terrorist groups. Several Islamic governments already stockpile chemical weapons; so if the war on terrorism progresses to a worst case scenario -- with a polarised world along Christian and Muslim lines -- terrorist and non-state actors may use weapons of mass destruction. Terrorists may attack with chemical and biological weapons.

***Multiethnic societies may witness the rise of xenophobia.*** As the war on terrorism progresses, multiethnic societies will experience a rise of xenophobia and attacks on Muslim communities. Unless decisive action is taken, including awareness-raising, political leadership, societies will become more polarised and the incidence of racist acts will rise.

***Business world-wide is affected.*** The financial costs of coping with a less secure world may increase. Travel and transportation may become more expensive and slower. Some people may become less likely to enter international markets. A marked trend towards isolation could hurt developing countries and emerging markets by making it harder for them to attract foreign investment or financing. Finally, businesses may be subjected to new regulations and seek to strike a new balance between operating efficiency and security.

***The mandate and activities of international institutions are adversely affected.*** International institutions must now take terrorism into account both in terms of protecting themselves and in terms of their operational goals. They will be under pressure to launch anti-terrorism programmes. The IMF and the World Bank, for example, may be called on to assist certain countries, in certain ways, simply because they are participating in a "war" on terrorism. Similarly the Paris Club may deal with debt rescheduling on a similar basis. Organisations such as the OECD or the IMF, and BIS may be called on to assist in establishing regulations that cut off the financing of terrorist organisations. The G-7 will need to be alert to any adverse financial or trading effects caused by terrorist attacks, and will need to co-ordinate official responses to defend and open trading and investment system. A balance will need to be struck between the proper activities of these organisations, and the *realpolitik* of fighting terrorism.

***Business becomes a target of terrorism.*** As the attacks on the World Trade Centre show, business is a prime target of terrorism. Oil pipelines, air travel and tourism, and American/British brands may be next. Further attacks will affect stock markets and economic stability world-wide.

**Major setbacks are experienced in conflict prevention and resolution efforts.** Efforts to prevent and manage crises in the North Caucasus, Middle East, Central Asia, Horn of Africa, West Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and Latin America may be adversely affected by an all-out war on terrorism. It is likely that the war is seen by a number of governments as a license to eliminate rebel and dissident groups through force, rather than through negotiation.

**Major humanitarian disasters arise.** Anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan will immediately affect conflicts in the North Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. Increased refugee flows and mass exodus will follow operations. Humanitarian organisations will be overwhelmed.

**Reversals on human rights world-wide.** The war on terrorism is likely to have severe human rights implications both in the West and in the regions of counter-terrorist operations. In the West, xenophobia and anti-terrorist activities will infringe on individual freedoms. Regions affected by the war may see the radicalisation of moderate regimes, giving rise to increased human rights abuses.

**Setbacks for democracy.** The bolstering of military forces in countries where democracy is nascent may compromise hard-won civilian control over the military. The military may take advantage of the legitimacy given by a U.S.-NATO campaign and increasingly influence democratic institutions.

## 7. WAYS FORWARD

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The U.S. response to the events of 11 September represents a defining moment for the advocates and practitioners of early warning and conflict prevention. The methods and aims of early warning apply as readily to U.S. interventions in the world as to interventions of any other power, large or small. We need clear principles to guide any response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September. The final section seeks to make a modest start on this task.

There is no easy way forward. No “magic formula” exists to “eliminate” terrorism (see Appendix 1 for the range of options). In this section, principles for action, as well as alternative measures, are presented. These are based on FEWER’s values and areas of expertise, namely humanitarian concern and conflict prevention. Hence, options that deal with use of military, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts are not presented.

### PRINCIPLES

**Show restraint and avoid a spiralling of violence.** The aim of the terrorist attacks was to cause instability through a violent response. A violent response will lead to regional instability in different parts of the world and the emergence of a series of acute global risks. Research shows that the best way of combating terrorism is not to use tactics that are perceived as similar to those used by terrorism.

**Ensure the rule of law.** Any responses to the terrorist attacks should be firmly grounded in international law. Particular attention should be placed on humanitarian and human rights law for the protection of civilians and their rights.

**Pay attention to the root causes that enable terrorism to thrive.** Combating terrorism will require the use of a wide range of measures, particularly those that give rise to the phenomenon. Increased attention has to be given to the elimination of poverty, prevention of conflict, the peaceful resolution of existing conflicts through power- and wealth-sharing, limited autonomy, and support for good governance.

**Avoid political backlashes.** Any significant military responses to terrorist attacks against the U.S. will potentially destabilise sympathetic Muslim governments. It can produce massive suffering among civilians and, so, cannot be ignored.

**Study the social and economic consequences of a U.S./NATO campaign against terrorism.** Unless more attention is paid to xenophobia, social backlashes against moderate



Muslims and Islamic governments will follow. In addition, the economic costs for countries (the Philippines, for instance) and business (becoming an increasingly important terrorist target) of a violent response has to be addressed fully. These backlashes will increase regional and global tensions.

### ALTERNATIVE RESPONSE OPTIONS

Below follows a matrix of possible response options.

<b>Economic</b>	<b>Political/Diplomatic</b>	<b>Social</b>	<b>Legal</b>	<b>Humanitarian</b>
<p>Bolster financial transparency. Enable the United Nations to address financial movements of terrorist groups, crime syndicates, drug cartels, and the Mafia.</p> <p>Review economic policy that provides the foundation a growth of terrorism (e.g. debt, structural adjustment, etc.).</p> <p>Multilateral agreements relating to debt relief and the environment should be ratified and upheld by all parties, including the United States.</p> <p>Prepare contingency plans for the management of economic instability nationally and globally.</p>	<p>Acts against the sovereign rights of states should be ratified by the United Nations.</p> <p>International sanctions should be imposed on countries providing sanctuary to terrorist groups. Laws relating to sanctions should be strengthened.</p> <p>Review foreign policy that provides the foundation for a growth of terrorism (e.g. support for oppressive regimes, sanctions causing undue civilian suffering, etc.) and learn lessons from experience.</p> <p>Multilateral agreements relating to disarmament should be ratified and upheld by all parties, including the United States.</p> <p>A balanced "carrot and stick" approach should be defined in order to induce the extradition of terrorist groups from the states that harbour them.</p>	<p>International policy towards the Rights of Peoples and Minority Rights should be made more robust. A United Nations Committee should be appointed to examine these and the legitimate aspirations of peoples and their rights.</p> <p>Multilateral agreements relating to racial discrimination should be ratified and upheld by all parties, including the United States.</p> <p>Research should be conducted into the roots of hate and violence should be bolstered.</p> <p>Awareness-raising measures to counter-act xenophobia world-wide should be strengthened.</p> <p>Preventive strategies should be developed that target young people who may be potential recruits of terrorist organisations.</p> <p>Strategies should be developed and implemented to counter-act extremist propaganda, support moderation, and reach out to young people who may be influenced by such propaganda.</p>	<p>Bring those responsible for the terrorist attacks before the International Criminal Court under charges of Crimes Against Humanity.</p> <p>Ensure that all counter-terrorist action is implemented within the frameworks of international law, and particularly humanitarian and human rights law.</p>	<p>The just resolution of outstanding internal disputes and civil wars should be accelerated. The United Nations, governments, and non-governmental organisations should be supported in their efforts.</p> <p>Contingency plans should be prepared for humanitarian crises in different parts of the world.</p> <p>Resources of relief agencies should be bolstered significantly.</p> <p>The monitoring of developments in both visible and forgotten "hot spots" should be sustained.</p>

## APPENDIX 1: OVERVIEW OF COUNTER-TERRORIST MEASURES<sup>3</sup>

Political/Diplomatic	Military/Security	Economic	Judicial/Legal	Social
<p>Address specific political grievances of terrorists</p> <p>Engage in conflict resolution: (a) by means of public dialogue; (b) in (secret) negotiations</p> <p>Offer political concessions: (a) to terrorists; (b) to parties sharing terrorists' goals but using less objectionable tactics</p> <p>Participation in broader political process: (a) invite terrorists to participate in mass-based movements aimed at political change; (b) encourage the formation of opposition group that reduces the constituency of terrorist movements; (c) enter new coalition with other opponents of terrorist movement; (d) declare political and/or military wing of terrorist groups illegal; (e) ban membership of terrorist groups and/or front organisations</p> <p>Offer amnesty: (a) partial; (b) conditional</p> <p>Diplomatic pressure on state sponsors to decrease their support: (a) expel diplomats from states which support terrorist organisations; (b) break diplomatic relations with</p>	<p>Use of strikes/ operations: (a) pre-emptive strikes against base of terrorists; (b) commando action against headquarters of terrorists; (c) punitive retaliatory action against location or community hosting Terrorists; (d) rescue operations for liberation of kidnap victims or hostages</p> <p>Use of armed forces for protecting potential victims and objects: (a) persons; (b) facilities, e.g. nuclear power plants, electricity grids, etc.</p> <p>Put on high alert: (a) counter-terrorist special reaction force teams; (b) bomb disposal teams; (c) commando units; (d) private security forces that deal with terrorist threats</p> <p>Enhance operating procedures and policies: (a) existing martial law/state of emergency law; (b) rules of Engagement; (c) controls of uniforms, weapons and munitions of security Forces; (d) supervisory mechanisms to investigate complaints of alleged abuses of power by security forces; (e) use of lethal force and on arrests by security forces; (f) authority of military</p>	<p>Address specific socio-economic grievances</p> <p>Engage in socio-economic policies that reduce inclination to engage in political violence: (a) employment schemes; (b) anti-discrimination measures; (c) poverty-reduction schemes (e.g. land redistribution); (d) opening legal economic alternatives to black-market activities</p> <p>Address financial/monetary aspects of terrorism: (a) ban fundraising (and transfer f funds from potential front organisations); (b) freeze assets of families of kidnap victims (to prevent paying of ransom); (c) boycott/sanction state supporters of terrorists; (d) place sanctions on companies that invest in countries alleged to be state sponsors of terrorism; (e) trace terrorist funds (e.g. by lifting bank secrecy); (f) information exchange between states on movements of funds suspected to support terrorism; (g) offer financial rewards for information leading to the arrest of terrorists</p> <p>Decrease capacity of terrorist groups to obtain assistance</p>	<p>Bolster international efforts: (a) sign and ratify international conventions and protocols, as well as regional instruments for combating terrorism; (b) expand extradition treaties; (c) comply with well-founded extradition requests of alleged terrorists; (d) enhance mutual legal assistance with other states; (e) enhance information exchange with judiciary in other countries</p> <p>Domestic legislation: (a) review and update emergency legislation; (b) adopt successful legislation from other countries; (c) review existing rules and laws on terrorism, i.e. counter-productive effects; (d) introduce new legislation to specifically address terrorism and its evolution; (e) adjust (i.e. increase/decrease), where appropriate, sentences for terrorist crimes; (f) use of political offence exception</p> <p>Use witnesses: (a) crown witnesses where necessary (but avoid undue inequality before the law); (b) provide witness protection; (c) provide repentant terrorists protection; (d) protect fact-finders (e.g. lawyers and jury members)</p> <p>Strengthen the courts: (a) increase</p>	<p>Attempt to establish a common value base with political opponents, such as: (a) value of dignified life; (b) value of prosperity; (c) value of treating others as you would like to be treated; (d) value of not becoming a victim</p> <p>Provide forums for freedom of expression</p> <p>Use of media: (a) ban (live) broadcast of interviews with terrorists; (b) ban publication of terrorist texts/manifestos; (c) provide publicity to terrorists in return for release of hostages; (d) publish terrorist texts/manifestos; (e) provide training to journalists on responsible coverage of terrorist events (e.g. show the harmful effects of premature or full disclosure of information on terrorist activity); (f) provide precautionary guidelines for the eventuality of a serious terrorist threat (especially use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear [CBRN] materials)</p> <p>Initiate a counter-terrorism public relations campaign: (a) initiate/strengthen public awareness programs and activities on</p>

<sup>3</sup> Source: Alex P. Schmid. *Towards Joint Political Strategies for Delegitimising the Use of Terrorism*. ISPAC, Countering Terrorism through International Co-operation. Proceedings of the International Conference on Countering Terrorism through Enhanced International Co-operation, Courmayeur Mont Blanc, Italy, 22-24 September 2000, pp. 260-273.

<p>sponsors of terrorist organisations; (c) ostracise states and other entities which sponsor terrorists</p> <p>Offer concessions/deals: (a) limited; (b) negotiated; (c) substantive (e.g. release of prisoners); (d) symbolic/tactical</p> <p>Take immigration measures: (a) tighten visa restrictions; (b) harmonisation of visa policies with neighbouring countries; (c) tighten border controls; (d) spot checks; (e) profiling; (f) deportation/banishment/expulsion; (g) introduce counterfeit-proof passports; (h) database of suspected terrorists; (i) curb abuse of asylum</p>	<p>courts in anti-terrorist matters to areas allowed by international law and human rights</p> <p>Enhance intelligence efforts: (a) use of technology (traditional and newly developed) and human intelligence (HUMINT); (b) decryption; (c) eavesdropping/interception; (d) surveillance; (e) satellites</p> <p>Engage in exchange of intelligence: (a) with sister intelligence agencies; (b) with security agencies abroad</p> <p>Other intelligence efforts: (a) infiltrate terrorist organisations; (b) turn members of terrorist groups into informers; (c) use of defectors; (d) establishing/use database on all alleged terrorists and the context in which they operate</p> <p>Protect targets: (a) high-risk activities (e.g. sporting events, public appearances by High-profile politicians); (b) perimeters of high-risk targets (e.g. embassies); (c) public utilities, infrastructures, communication systems, transport systems (incl. aviation security); (d) weapons and explosive storage areas (e.g. nuclear facilities, liquid gas storage tanks, etc.); (e) air, residences, vehicles</p>		<p>speed of judicial process against terrorism; (b) introduction of special courts to deal with terrorist crimes; (c) trials in absentia Police and Prison</p> <p>Enhance international police co-operation: (a) by stating liaison officers abroad; (b) participation in multinational forums</p> <p>Enhance capacity of law enforcement officials: (a) provide training (initial and upgrading) opportunities to ensure preparedness, particularly in the case of a CBRN attack; (b) engage in joint simulation exercises (e.g. with military forces); (c) engage in contingency planning</p> <p>Ensure police behaviour: (a) lawful police behaviour; (b) put in place procedures for investigating charges of police brutality and Torture; (c) regulate use of (potentially) deadly force</p> <p>Revise police powers: (a) increase powers of arrest; (b) expand powers/period of detention; (c) increase power for (electronic) surveillance of suspected terrorists; (d) suspension of certain civil rights</p> <p>Implement measures to inhibit the formation and perpetuation of terrorist networks in prisons</p>	<p>illegitimacy and human/economic costs of terrorism; (b) use highly-respected personalities and/or popular (movie/sport) 'heroes' to condemn terrorist acts in the media; (c) use and support former (repentant) terrorists for counter-terrorist campaigns; (d) use 'wanted' posters and invite the public to denounce terrorists; (e) use former victims of terrorism in counter-terrorism campaigns</p> <p>Provide victim support: (a) victim group support; (b) post-incident debriefing; (c) support 'ex-victims-help victim' programs</p>
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## APPENDIX 2: ABOUT THIS REPORT

This report is part of a reflective exercise among FEWER members on the implications of a U.S./NATO campaign against terrorism for the peace-building community. Compiled by the FEWER Secretariat, it draws primarily on input and material from the following organisations:

Centro de Estudios Internacionales (Nicaragua)  
Gaston G. Ortiga Peace Institute (Philippines)  
International Alert (UK)  
Peace Mission to the North Caucasus (Russia)  
PIOOM Foundation (Netherlands)  
Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (Canada)  
Russian Academy of Sciences/EAWARN (Russia)  
Swiss Peace Foundation/FAST (Switzerland)  
West Africa Network for Peace-building (Ghana)

Additional comments has been received from a number of external experts, including Kumar Rupesinghe (QMSI), Michael Page (International Alert), and Dane Rowlands (Carleton University).

The methodology adopted for the preparation of the report has included the following elements:

- The use of FEWER's standard formats for reporting.
- Media monitoring and analysis.
- Policy analysis.
- Direct regional input on scenario-building.
- Iterative discussion and debate among key network members.
- Peer-review and the incorporation of comments.

Comments on the report are welcome. Please e-mail the Secretariat at: [secretariat@fewer.org](mailto:secretariat@fewer.org). For access to the experts that have contributed to this report, please also contact the Secretariat.

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>i</sup> The Globe and Mail September 26<sup>th</sup> 2001, A7.  
<sup>ii</sup> CNN.com, 13 September 2001.  
<sup>iii</sup> Ottawa Citizen Saturday September 22, 2001 B4  
<sup>iv</sup> CNN.com, 13 September 2001.  
<sup>v</sup> ABCnews.com, 12 September 2001.  
<sup>vi</sup> International Herald Tribune, 17 September 2001.  
<sup>vii</sup> The Globe and Mail September 26, 2001 A1.  
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