

# CONFLICT RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT:

## *CAMBODIA, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES*

Prepared by:  
George Conway and Nozomi Kishi

With the generous support of the Canadian International Development Agency.

**David Carment – Principal Investigator**

November 2001.  
Feedback is welcomed, and may be sent to <[cifp@carleton.ca](mailto:cifp@carleton.ca)>.

**OVERVIEW** ..... 4

**INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY** ..... 6

    CIFP WITHIN THE FEWER NETWORK ..... 6

    METHODOLOGICAL NOTES ON ASSESSING STRUCTURAL INDICATORS OF CONFLICT POTENTIAL ..... 6

    OPERATIONALIZATION OF INDICATORS: CIFP RISK INDEX ..... 7

**RISK INDICES FOR CAMBODIA, INDONESIA AND THE PHILIPPINES**..... 9

**KEY ISSUES UNDERLYING CONFLICT POTENTIAL IN CAMBODIA, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES** ..... 11

**I. HISTORY OF ARMED CONFLICT** ..... 12

    REVOLUTIONARY AND SECESSIONIST STRUGGLES IN THE PHILIPPINES ..... 13

    RESURGENT CONFLICTS ACROSS INDONESIA ..... 14

    REFUGEES AND INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT ..... 14

**II. POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE** ..... 16

    DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS ACROSS SOUTHEAST ASIA ..... 16

    WEAKNESSES IN THE INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES OF DEMOCRACY ..... 17

    POLITICAL INSTABILITY, GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT POTENTIAL ..... 18

**III. MILITARIZATION**..... 20

    THE DEMOBILIZATION OF CAMBODIA’S ARMED FORCES ..... 20

    INDONESIA’S MILITARY TRANSFORMATION ..... 21

    CIVILIAN SUPREMACY IN THE PHILIPPINES ..... 22

**IV. POPULATION HETEROGENEITY** ..... 24

    ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY ..... 24

    MINORITIES AT RISK ..... 25

    VIETNAMESE IN CAMBODIA ..... 25

    MOROS AND IGOROTS IN THE PHILIPPINES ..... 26

    ACEHNESE, PAPUANS AND ETHNIC CHINESE IN INDONESIA ..... 27

    ASSESSING RISK OF ETHNIC REBELLION ..... 28

**V. DEMOGRAPHIC STRESS**..... 30

    POPULATION AGE STRUCTURE ..... 31

    POPULATION DENSITY AND REGIONAL IMBALANCE ..... 31

    INTERNAL MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION ..... 32

**VI. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE**..... 34

    CAMBODIA’S STEPS TOWARDS POST-CONFLICT ECONOMIC RECOVERY ..... 34

    ONGOING ECONOMIC REFORM IN THE PHILIPPINES ..... 36

    INDONESIA’S PROFOUND ECONOMIC CRISIS ..... 37

    ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND CONFLICT POTENTIAL ..... 37

**VII. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT**..... 39

    POVERTY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN CAMBODIA ..... 40

    THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF CRISIS AND REGIONAL DISPARITIES IN INDONESIA ..... 41

    CONSOLIDATING THE GAINS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES ..... 42

**IX. ENVIRONMENTAL STRESS** ..... 43

    CIVIL WAR AND TIMBER EXPORTS IN CAMBODIA ..... 43

    INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION, FOREST FIRES AND DEFORESTATION IN INDONESIA ..... 44

    DEFORESTATION, LAND DEGRADATION AND INSURGENCY IN THE PHILIPPINES ..... 45

**IX. INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES..... 47**  
    BILATERAL RELATIONS AND DISPUTES ..... 48  
    MULTILATERAL RELATIONS AND LINKAGES ..... 49  
    TRANSNATIONAL CRIME AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM ..... 50  
**DEFINITIONS OF INDICATORS ..... 52**  
**DATA SOURCES..... 58**  
**REFERENCES..... 60**

**OVERVIEW**

This report provides an indicators-based assessment of conflict risk in the three Southeast Asian countries of Cambodia, Indonesia and the Philippines. The analysis crosses nine interrelated issue areas identified as underlying potential for conflict development. These areas are: History of Armed Conflict; Governance and Political Instability; Militarization; Population Heterogeneity; Demographic Stress; Economic Performance; Human Development; Environmental Stress; and International Linkages.

CIFP risk assessment reports are regional in focus, under the premise that “risk potential” is a relative term, and that a regional comparative focus allows not only the identification of areas of concern within target countries but provides a means of assigning relative priority to different areas of concern on a regional basis.

CIFP assesses country risk by means of an overall country “risk index.” The higher the risk index, the greater the assessed risk of conflict development, escalation, or continuation that country faces. The risk index consists of the weighted average of nine composite indicators, corresponding to the nine issue areas outlined above, each of which consists of the average of its composite lead indicators. In all, 44 lead indicators are assessed as part of this index.

Risk indices occur on a scale of 0 to 12, where 0 to 3 are considered low risk, 4 to 6 are considered medium risk, 7 to 9 are considered high risk, and 10-12 are considered very high risk. The assessment provided in this report has determined the following overall country risk indices for Cambodia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

<b>Cambodia</b>	<b>5.7</b>	<b>Medium Risk</b>
<b>Indonesia</b>	<b>6.0</b>	<b>Medium Risk</b>
<b>Philippines</b>	<b>5.1</b>	<b>Medium Risk</b>

The assessment identifies the following issue areas as being of particular concern for the respective countries.

<b>Cambodia</b>		
• Weak Governance and Political Instability	<b>8.4</b>	<b>High Risk</b>
• Low Levels of Human Development	<b>7.2</b>	<b>High Risk</b>
• Weak International Linkages	<b>7.8</b>	<b>High Risk</b>
<b>Indonesia</b>		
• Weak Governance and Political Instability	<b>7.1</b>	<b>High Risk</b>
• Heterogeneous Population with Prominent Cleavages	<b>7.0</b>	<b>High Risk</b>
• Unstable Economic Performance	<b>7.6</b>	<b>High Risk</b>
<b>Philippines</b>		
• Significant Environmental Strains	<b>7.7</b>	<b>High Risk</b>

These results from the indicator-based analysis serve to focus analytical attention on high-risk issue areas, in order to continue with more in-depth qualitative elaboration. In doing so, this report highlights a series of issues for attention within each of the high-risk issue areas, as indicated in the table on the following page.

## Cambodia

### Weak Governance and Political Instability

- New and unstable democratic institutions & processes may compound potential for political violence or mismanagement of conflict.
- Faulty electoral system, weak rule of law, elite-based political system lacking pluralism, and poor respect for political rights and civil liberties may create grievances, or disincentives to following legal or other institutional channels to address and resolve grievances.

### Low Levels of Human Development

- Low human development, including health and education, and significant HIV/AIDS problem, risk decreasing popular confidence in the state and leading to political instability and social unrest.  
Economic disparities in access to education and health services result in marginalization of the poor and create incentives for violent behaviour or rebellion.

### Weak International Linkages

- Sensitive bilateral relations with neighbours resulting from decades of conflict & cross-border refugee flows risk resulting in continued border clashes and high tensions.
- History of isolation resulting in poorly developed international linkages, decreasing opportunities for constructive engagement that may have mitigated potential for conflict.
- Cross-border issues including narcotics and human trafficking risk giving rise to violent behaviour by criminal elements.

## Indonesia

### Weak Governance and Political Instability

- New and unstable democratic institutions and processes may compound potential for destabilization, political violence, or mismanagement of conflict.
- Pervasive corruption & nepotism reproduce elite privilege, resulting in disenfranchisement and grievances.
- Poor law enforcement and judicial institutions, with little progress on human rights issues, creates disincentives to following legal or other institutional channels to address and resolve grievances.

### Heterogeneous Population with Prominent Cleavages

- High ethnic diversity, and prominent religious differences, combined with destabilizing population movements, political and economic disparities, and political mobilization create high risk for continued or intensified secessionist or communal conflict, or ethnic victimization.

### Unstable Economic Performance

- Weak regulatory framework warding off productive investment resulting in depressed living standards and livelihoods.
- Highly impacted by economic crisis, including large drop in growth rates, increase in poverty, and slow recovery compound frustrations and risk of scapegoating and victimization.
- Regional disparities compel secessionist sentiments.

## Philippines

### Significant Environmental Strains

- Deforestation, land degradation & other environmental stress caused by industry & migration marginalize indigenous groups & the rural poor and create incentives for violence or rebellion.
- Declining access to freshwater creates competition and rivalry.

## INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

### CIFP within the FEWER Network

The CIFP project was initiated by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs in 1997. The project represents an on-going effort to identify and assemble statistical information conveying the key features of the political, economic, social and cultural environments of countries around the world.

The CIFP database currently includes statistical data, in the form of over one hundred performance indicators for 196 countries, spanning fifteen years (1985 to 2000) for most indicators. These indicators are drawn from a variety of open sources, including the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and the Minorities at Risk and POLITY IV data sets from the University of Maryland.

Currently, with the generous support of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), CIFP has begun work on a pilot project in partnership with the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER). The pilot project is intended to establish a framework for communications, information gathering and sharing, and operational co-ordination between CIFP, the FEWER Secretariat, and FEWER network members in the field, and to work towards a "good practice" conflict early warning system involving the various members of the FEWER network.

As part of its contribution to these new networks, CIFP is producing conflict risk assessment reports for two target regions, Southeast Asia and West Africa. CIFP risk assessment reports are regional in focus, under the premise that "risk potential" is a relative term, and that a regional comparative focus allows not only the identification of areas of concern within target countries but provides a means of assigning relative priority to

different areas of concern on a regional basis. These reports are intended to precede and serve as a ground for subsequent country-specific early-warning reports that will integrate various analytical methods and data sources (local analysis, events data, structural data) available from within the FEWER network.

Within the framework employed by CIFP and FEWER, "risk assessment" and "early warning" are viewed as complementary but distinct modes of analysis that can be distinguished in several important respects. Risk assessments identify background and intervening conditions that establish the risk for potential crisis and conflict. In doing so, they precede and complement early warning efforts through focusing monitoring and analytical attention on high risk situations as they develop, and through providing a framework for interpreting the results of real-time monitoring of events.

While the primary goal of risk assessment is to diagnose a situation rather than devise solutions, early warning is a process designed to pinpoint appropriate, forward looking, preventive strategies. Accordingly, FEWER defines early warning as the systematic collection and analysis of information for the purposes of anticipating the escalation of violent conflict, developing strategic responses to these crises, and presenting options to critical actors for the purposes of decision making and response.

### Methodological Notes on Assessing Structural Indicators of Conflict Potential

In order to establish a framework for analyzing the emergence of violent conflict, it is necessary to understand how crises typically develop and which possible avoidance efforts can be effective. In general terms, the factors that contribute to conflict escalation are categorized as "structural factors," "accelerators," and "triggers."

- "Structural factors" or "root causes" are those factors that form the pre-conditions of crisis situations, such as systematic political exclusion, shifts in demographic balance, entrenched

- economic inequities, economic decline and ecological deterioration;
- “Accelerators” or “precipitators” are factors that work upon root causes in order to increase their level of significance; and,
- “Triggers” are sudden events that act as catalysts igniting a crisis or conflict, such as the assassination of a leader, election fraud, or a political scandal.

Within FEWER, CIFP is positioned to provide data and analysis focusing on the “structural” level, in order to assess the degree of risk in given country-contexts, and to assess whether shifts in country performance indicators (such as ameliorating or worsening economic performance) are increasing or mitigating the severity of this risk. Local analysis and events-monitoring systems are best positioned to monitor and provide analysis on “triggers” or “catalysing events” that are likely to precipitate the onset of conflict in high-risk situations.

In order to assess the “structural factors” or “root causes” underlying conflict potential, it is necessary to identify a set of associated indicators. Often a crisis has no single cause and furthermore the different contributing causes vary in importance – variables may at times reinforce each other, while at other times they may neutralize one another. Thus, analysis of conflict potential requires an assessment of the relative importance of different indicators and their inter-relationships.

The selection of structural indicators for the CIFP risk assessment reports was informed by a number of factors. It is based largely on the results of FEWER’s collaborative work with local early warning analysts and their understanding of the type of information needed to effectively assess conflict potential. In addition, indicators have been included on the basis of evidence in the conflict analysis literature of their being strong crisis predictors.

The structural indicators included in the CIFP risk assessment reports cross nine interrelated issue areas identified as underlying potential

for conflict development: History of Armed Conflict; Governance and Political Instability; Militarization; Population Heterogeneity; Demographic Stress; Economic Performance; Human Development; Environmental Stress; and International Linkages.

CIFP rates a country’s degree of “risk” in terms of this set of structural indicators. “Risk” is considered high in cases where a country has an enduring history of armed conflict, is politically unstable or has unrepresentative or repressive political institutions, is heavily militarized, has a heterogeneous and divided population, suffers from significant demographic and environmental stresses, has had poor economic performance and low levels of human development, and is engaged with the international community in ways that detract from, rather than contribute to, peaceful conflict management.

On the other hand, “risk” is considered low in countries that have a history of successfully managing conflict without resorting to violence, that have developed stable democratic political institutions, that respect fundamental human rights, that are less heavily militarized, that lack profound ethnic or religious cleavages or demographic stresses, that have achieved sustainable levels of economic development as well as healthy social and environment conditions, and that are free from serious external conflicts and threats.

**Operationalization of Indicators: CIFP Risk Index**

CIFP assesses country risk by means of an overall country risk index. The higher the risk index, the greater the assessed risk of conflict that country faces. The risk index consists of the weighted average of nine composite indicators, corresponding to the nine issue areas outlined above, each of which consists of the average of its composite lead indicators.

“Risk potential” is a relative term that has meaning only with respect to a country’s performance and risk vis à vis other countries in the international system. Accordingly, each

lead indicator is converted to a 9-point score on the basis of its performance relative to a global sample of countries. This global sample of countries is ranked from highest to lowest level of performance, divided into nine equal categories, then assigned score numbers ranging from 1 to 9 based on their rank position within the sample. This scoring procedure is intended to facilitate the identification of key areas of concern, and as a way of directing attention to potential problem areas.

In general, a higher score (in the 7 to 9 range) indicates that the country is performing poorly relative to other countries (i.e. high levels of armed conflict, autocratic governments, poor economic performance, low levels of human development) or that a country's standing is a cause for concern (i.e. significant youth bulge, high levels of ethnic diversity). A lower score (in the 1 to 3 range) indicates the country is performing well relative to other countries (i.e. no or little armed conflict, democratic governments, strong economic performance, high levels of human development) or that a country's standing is less of a cause for concern (i.e. no youth bulge, low levels of ethnic diversity). Values in the middle 4 to 6 range indicate moderate levels of performance approaching the global mean.

Since relative country performance can vary significantly from year to year (as in the case of economic shocks), averages are taken for global rank scores over a five-year time frame. The most recent five years contained in the CIFP data set are used for this index (generally 1996 to 2000). The 1 to 9 Global Rank score forms the "base scale" upon which individual indicator risk scores are calculated. This score is then adjusted with a "trend and volatility modifier," which can raise or lower a global rank score on the basis of whether an indicator is assessed as improving (-1 to the global rank score), worsening (+1), or demonstrating a high degree of volatility that is deemed to have a particularly destabilizing effect (+1 to +2, depending on the degree).<sup>1</sup>

The trend and volatility modifier allows the analyst a degree of freedom in qualitatively adjusting the global rank score to allow for

observations of significant trends or destabilizing changes. The direction of change, whether worsening or improving, indicates whether a country's performance for a given indicator is even more likely to contribute to conflict potential (i.e. increasing restrictions on civil and political rights, worsening economic conditions, increasing demographic or environmental stresses) or detract from it (i.e. greater respect for civil and political rights, improving economic conditions, decreasing demographic or environmental stresses). So too is the degree of volatility an important component of the risk assessment calculation, considering that instability across a given indicator (i.e. regime transitions, a massive influx of refugees, fluctuations in military expenditure or foreign direct investment) can have a profoundly destabilizing effect and sharply increase the potential for conflict.

Indicator risk scores on a 13-point scale (0 to 12) are derived for each leading indicator within each of the nine issue areas. In order to arrive at composite indicators for each of the nine issue areas, leading indicator risk scores within each area are averaged. These nine composite issue area scores are themselves averaged to determine a country's overall risk index. However, in order to further elaborate the relative impact of each of these issue areas upon the conflict development process within a country, composite indicators are assigned weights. CIFP has derived these weights deductively, based on inferences about the causal relationships between issue areas. The weight assigned to each composite indicator is based on the number of direct causal linkages it is postulated to have with the others, thereby reflecting the magnitude of each issue area's impact upon overall risk.<sup>2</sup>

The following table present the scores for each of the individual lead indicators, the composite issue area ratings, and the overall risk indices for Cambodia, Indonesia and the Philippines.

<sup>1</sup> Indicators for which only a single year is available are measured only in terms of global rank, without trend and volatility modifiers.

<sup>2</sup> For a detailed explanation of the weighting scheme, refer to the CIFP Risk Assessment Template, August 2000.



**RISK INDICES FOR CAMBODIA, INDONESIA AND THE PHILIPPINES**

<b>Issue Areas and Lead Indicators</b>	<b>Years of Measure</b>	<b>Cambodia</b>	<b>Indonesia</b>	<b>Philippines</b>
<b>History of Armed Conflict (Weight = 8)</b>				
Armed Conflicts	1995-1999	2.4	3.8	4.6
Refugees Produced and Residing Outside Country	1995-1999	6.4	6.2	6.0
Refugees Hosted, IDPs, and Others of Concern	1996-2000	6.2	7.5	0.6
<b>Composite Issue Area Risk Rating</b>	--	<b>5.0</b>	<b>5.8</b>	<b>3.7</b>
<b>Governance and Political Instability (Weight = 5)</b>				
Level of Democracy	1995-1999	8.0	8.0	3.0
Regime Durability	1995-1999	10.2	5.4	4.6
Restrictions on Civil and Political Rights	1996-2000	8.3	6.3	5.0
Restrictions on Press Freedom	1996-2000	7.0	6.2	3.4
Level of Corruption	1996-2000	[No Data]	9.6	6.8
<b>Composite Issue Area Risk Rating</b>	--	<b>8.4</b>	<b>7.1</b>	<b>4.6</b>
<b>Militarization (Weight = 5)</b>				
Military Exp. (% of GDP, Constant 1995 US\$)	1995-1999	6.6	2.8	2.6
Fraction of Regional Military Exp. (% of Known Total Spending for Decade)	1990-1999	2.0	7.0	5.0
Total Armed Forces (per 10,000)	1995-1999	6.0	4.0	3.0
<b>Composite Issue Area Risk Rating</b>	--	<b>4.9</b>	<b>4.6</b>	<b>3.5</b>
<b>Population Heterogeneity (Weight = 4)</b>				
Ethnic Diversity	1990s	3.0	9.0	3.0
Religious Diversity	1990s	2.0	4.0	4.0
Risk of Ethnic Rebellion	c. 1998	2.0	8.0	6.0
<b>Composite Issue Area Risk Rating</b>	--	<b>2.3</b>	<b>7.0</b>	<b>4.3</b>
<b>Demographic Stress (Weight = 5)</b>				
Total Population	1995-1999	6.0	9.0	9.0
Population Growth Rate (Annual %)	1995-1999	6.2	4.4	5.0
Population Density (People per Sq Km)	1995-1999	5.0	7.0	8.0
Urban Population (% of Total)	1995-1999	1.0	3.2	5.0
Urban Population Growth Rate (Annual %)	1994-1998	7.3	7.0	5.8
Youth Bulge (Pop. Aged 0-14 as a % of Total)	1995-1999	5.8	3.0	5.0
<b>Composite Issue Area Risk Rating</b>	--	<b>5.2</b>	<b>5.6</b>	<b>6.3</b>
<b>Economic Performance (Weight = 8)</b>				
GDP Growth Rate (Annual %)	1995-1999	5.6	6.8	5.6
GDP Per Capita (PPP, Current International \$)	1995-1999	9.0	8.0	6.0
Inflation (Consumer prices (Annual %))	1995-1999	7.0	8.6	6.8
FDI (Net inflows (% of GDP))	1995-1999	6.2	6.4	4.4
Total Debt Service (% of GNI)	1995-1999	2.0	10.6	8.0
Trade Openness (Trade as a % of GDP)	1995-1999	5.0	8.0	4.2
Inequality (GINI Coefficient)	1996. 1997	6.0	5.0	7.0
<b>Composite Issue Area Risk Rating</b>	--	<b>5.8</b>	<b>7.6</b>	<b>6.0</b>

<b>Human Development (Weight = 3)</b>				
Access to Improved Water Source (% Total Pop.)	1990, 2000	9.0	5.0	4.0
Access to Sanitation (% Total Pop.)	1990, 2000	9.0	5.0	3.0
Life Expectancy (Years)	1997-1998	8.0	6.0	5.5
Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000 Live Births)	1997-1998	8.0	5.0	5.0
Maternal Mortality Rate (per 100,000 Live Births)	1995	7.0	7.0	6.0
HIV/AIDS (% of Adult Population)	1997-1998	9.0	2.0	2.0
Primary School Enrollment (% Relevant Age Group)	1993-1997	2.4	3.4	1.8
Secondary School Enrollment (% Relevant Age Group)	1993-1997	7.6	6.0	4.0
Children in Labour Force (% Children Aged 10-14)	1995-1999	5.0	3.0	2.3
<b>Composite Issue Area Risk Rating</b>	--	<b>7.2</b>	<b>4.7</b>	<b>3.7</b>
<b>Environmental Stress (Weight = 5)</b>				
Rate of Deforestation (Percent)	1990-1995	8.0	6.0	9.0
People per Sq. Km. of Arable Land	1993-1997	4.0	8.0	8.0
Freshwater Resources (Cubic Meters per Capita)	1998	2.0	4.0	6.0
<b>Composite Issue Area Risk Rating</b>	--	<b>4.7</b>	<b>6.0</b>	<b>7.7</b>
<b>International Linkages (Weight = 5)</b>				
Economic Organizations	2000	9.0	2.0	4.0
Military/Security Organizations	2000	9.0	9.0	9.0
UN Organizations	2000	6.0	4.0	2.0
Multipurpose and Miscellaneous Organizations	2000	7.0	3.0	3.0
International Disputes	2000	8.0	5.0	9.0
<b>Composite Issue Area Risk Rating</b>	--	<b>7.8</b>	<b>4.6</b>	<b>5.4</b>
Unweighted Sum of Composite Issue Areas Ratings	--	51.3	53.0	45.2
Unweighted Average of Composite Issue Areas Ratings	--	5.7	5.9	5.0
Weighted Sum of Composite Issue Areas Ratings	--	272.2	288.8	243.4
<b>Risk Index (Weighted Average)</b>	--	<b>5.7</b>	<b>6.0</b>	<b>5.1</b>

**Table Notes:** Risk scores are colour-coded according to a "stop light" scheme, where Green (0-3) indicates low risk, Yellow (4-6) indicates medium risk, and Red (7-12) indicates high risk. Risk scores for individual indicators are derived from a global rank score adjusted to reflect trends and volatility, as described in the previous section. Composite Issue Area Risk Ratings are an average of the indicator risk scores in each issue area. Details on each of the above issue areas and lead indicators, including data sources, global rank scores and trend and volatility modifiers, are available in the chapters that follow. The final country "Risk Index" is based on the weighted average of the nine of Composite Issue Areas Ratings. For a detailed explanation of the weighting scheme, refer to the CIPF Risk Assessment Template, August 2000.

**KEY ISSUES UNDERLYING CONFLICT POTENTIAL IN CAMBODIA, INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES**

Issue Area	Cambodia	Indonesia	Philippines
History of Armed Conflict	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Long history of civil war that has had debilitating effects on human development, the economy, the environment &amp; governance.</li> <li>• Residual refugee issues with neighbouring States.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Resurgent &amp; emerging secessionist &amp; communal conflicts in the post-Soeharto era.</li> <li>• Significant internal displacement &amp; refugee problems.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ongoing, entrenched revolutionary &amp; secessionist conflict.</li> <li>• Internal displacement &amp; refugee problems.</li> </ul>
Political Instability & Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• New and unstable democratic institutions &amp; processes, including electoral system &amp; rule of law.</li> <li>• Elite-based political system lacking pluralism.</li> <li>• Poor respect for political rights &amp; civil liberties.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• New and unstable democratic institutions &amp; processes.</li> <li>• Pervasive corruption &amp; nepotism.</li> <li>• Poor law enforcement &amp; judicial institutions, with little progress on human rights issues.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pervasive corruption &amp; nepotism.</li> <li>• Elite-based political system.</li> <li>• Worsening political rights &amp; civil liberties performance.</li> </ul>
Militarization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inadequate demobilization of armed forces.</li> <li>• Politicization of military.</li> <li>• Excessive military spending relative to social spending.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Popular resentment from historical focus of military on internal security.</li> <li>• Politicization of military.</li> <li>• Military privilege declining due to political &amp; economic crisis creating resentment among armed forces.</li> <li>• History of military human rights abuses.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Human rights abuses committed by military.</li> <li>• Limited capacity to address internal or external security threats.</li> </ul>
Ethnic Heterogeneity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ethnic victimization of Vietnamese.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High ethnic diversity, &amp; prominent religious differences, combined with destabilizing population movements, political &amp; economic disparities, &amp; political mobilization.</li> <li>• Ethnic victimization of Chinese.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Political &amp; economic cleavages between religious groups.</li> <li>• Marginalization of indigenous groups by economic encroachment.</li> </ul>
Demographic Stress	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High population growth rates.</li> <li>• Young population.</li> <li>• High urban population growth rate resulting in increased strains on urban infrastructure.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High population density in some regions, resulting in migration that has destabilizing effects.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High population growth rates.</li> <li>• High population density, with uneven distribution, resulting in destabilizing migration.</li> <li>• High urbanization rate resulting in strains on urban infrastructure.</li> </ul>
Economic Performance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Poor &amp; uneven economic performance.</li> <li>• High levels of poverty, with low income security.</li> <li>• Weak regulatory framework warding off productive investment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Weak regulatory framework warding off productive investment.</li> <li>• Highly impacted by economic crisis, including large drop in growth rates, increase in poverty, &amp; slow recovery.</li> <li>• Regional discrepancies.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Highly unequal distribution of income.</li> <li>• Regional discrepancies.</li> </ul>
Human Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Low human development, including health &amp; education.</li> <li>• Significant HIV/AIDS problem.</li> <li>• Economic disparities in access to education &amp; health services.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High regional disparities in human development, including discrepancies along group lines.</li> <li>• Inadequate &amp; inequitable service provision.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High regional disparities in human development, including discrepancies along group lines.</li> <li>• Inadequate &amp; inequitable service provision.</li> </ul>
Environmental Stress	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capture of illegal forestry profits fuelling corruption &amp; conflict.</li> <li>• Deforestation, land degradation &amp; other environmental stress impacting indigenous groups &amp; the rural poor.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deforestation, land degradation &amp; other environmental stress caused by industry &amp; migration impacting indigenous groups &amp; the rural poor.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deforestation, land degradation &amp; other environmental stress caused by industry &amp; migration impacting indigenous groups &amp; the rural poor.</li> <li>• Declining access to freshwater.</li> </ul>
International Linkages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sensitive bilateral relations with neighbours resulting from decades of conflict &amp; cross-border refugee flows.</li> <li>• History of isolation resulting in poorly developed international linkages.</li> <li>• Cross-border issues including narcotics &amp; human trafficking.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Residual tensions over East-Timor issue.</li> <li>• Illegal transborder migration &amp; human trafficking.</li> <li>• Piracy generating funds for rebel groups.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tensions over sovereignty in the Spratly Islands.</li> <li>• Piracy generating funds for rebel groups.</li> <li>• Transnational support for secessionist groups.</li> </ul>

**I. HISTORY OF ARMED CONFLICT**

Lead Indicators	Country	Global Perfor. Rank	Trend and Volatility Modifiers	Risk Score
<b>Armed Conflicts (Avg. 1995-1999)</b>				
(Total Conflict Intensity Level)	Cambodia	3.4	Improving (-1)	2.4
Source: Conflict Data Project /	Indonesia	2.8	Worsening (+1)	3.8
SIPRI	Philippines	3.6	Worsening (+1)	4.6
<b>Refugees Produced and Residing Outside Country (Avg. 1995-1999)</b>				
(Number of)	Cambodia	5.4	Improving (-1), High Volatility (+2)	6.4
Source: UNHCHR	Indonesia	3.2	Worsening (+1), High Volatility (+2)	6.2
	Philippines	5.0	Worsening (+1)	6.0
<b>Refugees Hosted, IDPs, and Others of Concern (Avg. 1996-2000)</b>				
(Number of)	Cambodia	5.2	Improving (-1), High Volatility (+2)	6.2
Source: UNHCHR	Indonesia	4.5	Worsening (+1), High Volatility (+2)	7.5
	Philippines	1.6	Improving (-1)	0.6
<b>COMPOSITE HISTORY OF ARMED CONFLICT SCORE</b>				
	<b>Cambodia</b>			<b>5.0</b>
	<b>Indonesia</b>			<b>5.8</b>
	<b>Philippines</b>			<b>3.7</b>

While “violent conflict” is the dependent variable of conflict analysis, a country’s history of armed conflict also operates as a causal factor underlying the potential for continued or future violence. An enduring history of violent conflict can itself serve as an incentive for parties to continue to resort to violence as a means of airing and attempting to resolve grievances. Such a history can also indicate a greater inclination for armed forces to use repressive means to address disputes or civil unrest, and an inability or unwillingness of the state to resolve disputes through institutional channels. Flows of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) produced by past or ongoing violent conflict can also have destabilizing effects within affected regions and countries, potentially spiralling into larger problems. Furthermore, the impact of conflict on material living standards, levels of human development, the environment and other issue areas, can create further incentives for violence.

While it is the task of this report to elaborate upon the myriad factors underlying conflict potential in Cambodia, Indonesia and the Philippines, this section briefly outlines the experiences of these three countries with

violent conflict over the past decade. All three countries have seen flare-ups in violent conflict of varying intensities and types, many of which have long histories. Revolutionary conflicts over the control of government structures, and fuelled by deep political and ideological differences, date back decades in the Philippines and Cambodia, and continued well into the 1990s. Secessionist struggles initiated soon after independence by groups in both the Philippines and Indonesia have seen recent flare-ups. Communal violence between ethnic and religious groups and has also been on the rise in Indonesia.

**The Khmer Rouge in Cambodia’s Long Civil War**

Cambodia has endured decades of civil war. The revolutionary struggle of the Khmer Rouge in the early 1970s, their subsequent rise to power, and the ensuing decade of Vietnam’s occupation have had a profound impact on Cambodian society. Though the Khmer Rouge signed the Paris Peace Accords of 1991, during the period of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) the Khmer Rouge refused to disarm their soldiers, and denied the UN admission to the territories they occupied in

the north and north-west. When a brief period of amnesty was declared, large numbers of Khmer Rouge forces either returned to civilian life or integrated into the new state army. Although the remaining forces kept fighting and violent clashes continued to claim victims, the Khmer Rouge continued to fragment and disintegrate. Following the reported capture of Pol Pot in 1997 and his subsequent death, the Khmer Rouge ceased to be considered a military threat by 1999.

**Revolutionary and Secessionist Struggles in the Philippines**

In the Philippines, the Communist New People's Army (NPA), the military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), has been fighting the Philippine Armed Forces and National Police for political control of the country since 1969. High levels of violent conflict in the 1980s dropped in the early 1990s following a 1992 negotiation process. Levels of violence remained relatively low throughout the mid-1990s, and the number of NPA troops reduced by over 50% by mid-decade. In 1998, a human rights accord was

signed between the government and the rebels, and periodic peace talks have continued since that time. Nonetheless, sporadic clashes continued, and have intensified in the past few years.

Since the 1970s, the government of the Philippines has faced armed opposition from several Muslim separatist groups seeking independence for the island of Mindanao in the Southern Philippines. These have included the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and two breakaway groups, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf. In 1996, the government and the MNLF signed a peace agreement, but the breakaway groups opposed the settlement, as did Christian militia groups in the region. Sporadic clashes between government forces and rebel groups continued alongside government peace talks with the MILF. However, Philippine President Estrada called off the talks in 2000 and mobilized additional troops to counter rebel attacks, significantly heightening tensions and resulting in a sharp increase in the level of violent conflict.

Major Parties	Conflict Type	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
<b>Cambodia</b>											
Gov. vs. Khmer Rouge	Government	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0
<b>Indonesia</b>											
Gov. vs. Fretilin	Territory: East Timor	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	2	--
Gov. vs. GAM	Territory: Aceh	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Gov. vs. OPM	Territory: West Papua	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Philippines</b>											
Gov. vs. NPA	Government	3	3	3	2	2	0	0	0	0	2
Gov. vs. MILF, Abu Sayyaf	Territory: Mindanao	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1

**Conflict Intensity Scale:** 0 – No conflict activity (fewer than 25 battle-related deaths per year); 1 – Minor armed conflict (at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict); 2 – Intermediate armed conflict (At least 25 battle-related deaths per year and an accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths, but fewer than 1,000 per year); 3 – War (At least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year). Armed conflict is defined here as a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory, and where there is the use of armed force between at least two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state. Accordingly, this tabulation does not include communal conflicts in which the state was not a direct party. **Source:** Uppsala Conflict Data Project: States in Armed Conflict, Uppsala University, Sweden.


**Resurgent Conflicts across Indonesia**

The post-Soeharto years in Indonesia have seen have a resurgence of long-standing separatist struggles, particularly in East Timor, Aceh and West Papua (Irian Jaya). East Timorese rebels led by the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin) have waged a struggle to regain autonomy since the forced annexation of the territory in 1975. Following the resignation of Soeharto in 1998, and in the face of significant international pressure, President Habibie agreed to allow a referendum. In 1999, an overwhelming majority of East Timorese voted for independence. However, a violent backlash by pro-Jakarta militias, widely regarded to be backed by the army, prompted the deployment of a UN multinational force to restore order. The militias have continued to operate out of West Timor, targeting both refugees and humanitarian aid workers.

Fuelled by the vote in East Timor, secessionist sentiments have flared up in both Aceh and West Papua (Irian Jaya). The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) began its struggle for an independent Islamic state in the 1970s, and levels of violence reached their highest historical levels between 1989 and 1992 when Soeharto declared the region a Military Operational Zone (DOM). The newest phase of the conflict has resulted in sharp increases in violent clashes between the GAM and Indonesian security forces, which have continued despite the signing of a formal cease-fire in May 2000. In West Papua, the Free Papua Movement (OPM), itself dating back decades, has also redoubled its struggle for independence, and security forces have increased their presence in the region resulting in more frequent and intense clashes. The Indonesian government has refused demands for independence in both Aceh and West Papua, and has demonstrated no intention of letting the East Timor vote for independence be repeated.

In addition to the secessionist struggles currently facing the Indonesian government, numerous cases of communal violence – along both ethnic and religious lines – have also flared in recent years. While there has been a

Strength of Opposition Armed Forces




Sources: SIPRI Yearbooks 1991 to 2000. Figures for GAM and OPM not available.

history of ethnic tensions in the Indonesian province of Kalimantan between indigenous Dayaks and settlers from the island of Madura for at least two decades, levels of conflict peaked when a series of violent clashes broke out in 1997 and 1999 in West Kalimantan, and in 2001 in Central Kalimantan. Since January 1999, the Indonesian provinces of Maluku and North Maluku have also been the scenes of violent clashes between Muslim and Christian communities. In June of 1999, the government declared a civil emergency, but government security forces deployed to dispel the fighting were often accused of fighting alongside militant groups. Communal violence similar to that on Maluku has appeared on surrounding islands, including Lombok and Sulawesi.

**Refugees and Internal Displacement**

Cambodia has a long history of destabilizing population movements. During the four-year rule of the Khmer Rouge, the regime expelled foreigners and evacuated major cities and towns. Although a substantial number of refugees managed to escape to the neighbouring countries of Thailand, Vietnam and Laos, the number was small compared to the hundreds of thousands of Cambodians who were displaced internally. Following the Vietnamese invasion that ended the rule of the

**Refugees by Country/Region of Origin**  
(Source: UNHCR, Statistical Overview 2000)



Khmer Rouge, tens of thousands more Cambodians fled to Thailand. While the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) sought to organize the repatriation of Cambodian refugees from Thailand throughout the Vietnamese occupation in the 1980s, little was accomplished until the signing of the Paris Accords in 1991. As part of the settlement, all Cambodian refugees were to be permitted to return to Cambodia in time to register and vote in the elections.<sup>3</sup>

UNHCR co-ordinated the repatriation of the majority of refugees from Thailand back to Cambodia, and by 1993 Cambodia had its


least number of refugees outside the country in over a decade. The relative stability of the period in and around the 1993 elections, however, was short-lived, with new displacements caused by both Khmer Rouge activities against ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia, and then by political violence accompanying Hun Sen’s coup in 1997.

Indonesia hosted more than 120,000 refugees and asylum seekers at the end of 2000. The vast majority were East Timorese who had fled violence by militias following the referendum for independence in 1999. In addition, over a million Indonesians are estimated to be internally displaced, the result of ongoing or newly intensifying conflicts in West Papua, Aceh, the Maluku, and Kalimantan. The areas most profoundly affected by IDPs have been the Maluku, Sulawesi, West Kalimantan, and North Sumatra. The area most profoundly affected by East Timorese refugees has been West Timor.

At the end of 2000, an estimated 150,000 Filipinos remained internally displaced as a result of conflict in the country. Estimated add that as many as 650,000 others became displaced in 2000, but returned home by year’s end. An estimated 57,000 Filipino refugees were living in Malaysia, almost all of which were Muslims who fled fighting between the Armed Forces and Muslim groups.<sup>4</sup>

**Major Directions of the Flow of Refugees 1990-1999**

Source: Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR, 1999 Statistical Overview.



<sup>3</sup> See UNHCR, “State of the World’s Refugees 2000,” for a discussion.

<sup>4</sup> See U.S. Committee for Refugees Country Reports for Cambodia, Indonesia, and the Philippines <<http://www.refugees.org/>>.

**II. POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE**

Lead Indicators	Country	Global Perfor. Rank	Trend and Volatility Modifiers	Risk Score
<b>Level of Democracy (Avg. 1995-1999)</b>				
Source: Polity IV Data Set	Cambodia	6.0	High Volatility (+2)	8.0
	Indonesia	7.0	Improving (-1), High Volatility (+2)	8.0
	Philippines	3.0	No Change	3.0
<b>Regime Durability (Avg. 1995-1999)</b>				
(Years since Regime Change)	Cambodia	8.2	High Volatility (+2)	10.2
Source: Polity IV Data Set	Indonesia	3.4	High Volatility (+2)	5.4
	Philippines	4.6	No Change	4.6
<b>Restrictions on Civil and Political Rights (Avg. 1996-2000)</b>				
Source: Freedom House	Cambodia	8.3	No Clear Trend	8.3
	Indonesia	7.3	Improving (-1)	6.3
	Philippines	4.0	Worsening (+1)	5.0
<b>Restrictions on Press Freedom (Avg. 1996-2000)</b>				
Source: Freedom House	Cambodia	7.0	No Clear Trend	7.0
	Indonesia	7.2	Improving (-1)	6.2
	Philippines	4.4	Improving (-1)	3.4
<b>Level of Corruption (Avg. 1996-2000)</b>				
Source: Transparency International	Cambodia	No Data	No Data	..
Corruption Perceptions Index	Indonesia	8.6	Worsening (+1)	9.6
	Philippines	6.8	No Clear Trend	6.8
<b>COMPOSITE HISTORY OF ARMED CONFLICT SCORE</b>				
	<b>Cambodia</b>			<b>8.4</b>
	<b>Indonesia</b>			<b>7.1</b>
	<b>Philippines</b>			<b>4.6</b>


Regime characteristics are associated with conflict potential in myriad ways. Democratic institutions, for example, encourage a relationship between state and society that fosters pluralism, inclusion, and ultimately peaceful conflict resolution. Alternately, the lack of accountable and transparent institutions through which to channel grievances can aggravate the risk of outbursts of violent conflict. So too can the denial of civil and political liberties, such as the rights of expression, assembly and association, or the censorship of media, increase the likelihood dissenting views will be expressed through violence. Endemic corruption of political elites can also result in the loss of popular confidence in state institutions and undermine their legitimacy, providing incentives for expressing grievances through extra-institutional means.

**Democratic Transitions Across Southeast Asia**

Since the mid-1980s, political liberalization in Southeast Asia has been as unmistakable as it has been tumultuous. All three target countries have undergone major democratic transitions within the past 15 years. Beginning with the overthrow of the Marcos regime in the Philippines 1986, followed by the UN-supervised introduction of a multiparty liberal democratic system in Cambodia in 1993, and the dramatic resignation of Indonesian President Soeharto in 1998, significant gains have been made across the region in introducing democratic norms and institutions.



Democracy - Autocracy Scale  
(Source: Polity IV Data Set)



Where "10" indicates full Democracy and "-10" indicates full Autocracy. See Appendix 1 for details on the coding of the Democracy-Autocracy scale.

Improvements have been visible across most key areas of performance. First, new institutions have been put in place in all three countries through which citizens can express more effective preferences about leaders. Second, all three countries have introduced or strengthened constraints on the exercise of executive powers. Third, political processes have been at least partially opened in all three countries to competition and participation by a greater variety of actors.

However, democracy remains a recent phenomenon across the region, and the new regimes remain unstable and unconsolidated. Their durability remains to be tested. Cambodia's liberal democracy lasted only a few short years before Hun Sen's coup in 1997, and new elections the subsequent year were tainted by violence and intimidation. Despite Hun Sen's drive to achieve international legitimacy, and the ostensible democratic elements of Cambodia's current government – a power-sharing arrangement between Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party (CPP) and FUNCINPEC, with the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) in opposition – his regime nonetheless remains largely authoritarian in character.

In Indonesia, the transition from autocracy to democracy occurred very rapidly, and its

prospects remain highly uncertain. There is certainly potential for further political transformation, including the risk of a relapse into authoritarian patterns. President Wahid's own presidency was short-lived, lasting just a year and a half, before he was impeached after hearings into allegations of corruption and incompetence. His political demise demonstrates the destabilizing effects of shifting alliances. While Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputi has initially had very strong support from the Indonesian Parliament, there is certainly the risk that those same alliances that brought her to power may – as was the case for Wahid – remove her from it as well.

Even the Philippines, often considered to have had a longer experience with the formal structures of democracy than any other South-Asian country, has also hit stumbling blocks. Impeachment proceedings initiated against President Estrada in late 2000, only a year and a half after his 1998 election, which alleged charges including corruption, bribery, and betrayal of public trust. In January 2001, following the shifting of the armed forces' support to the anti-Estrada movement, and the resignation of most of his cabinet, the Philippine Supreme Court declared the presidency vacant, and Estrada's former vice president, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, was sworn in as president.

**Weaknesses in the Institutions and Processes of Democracy**

The allegations laid against both Estrada and Wahid testify to an endemic problem across much of the region. Countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia have ranked in the highest quartile of countries in terms of perceptions of corruption. Perceptions of the misuse of public funds for private gain have increased in both these countries over the last couple of years. In 2000, Transparency International ranked Indonesia 5th out of 90 countries surveyed in terms of extremity of corruption.

As the case of corruption indicates, critical institutions and processes of democracy remain weak, particularly in Cambodia and

Indonesia. In Indonesia, while significant governance reforms are underway, much of the political system established under Soeharto's New Order remains in place. For example, while the president holds key executive powers, s/he is only indirectly elected, and the military continues to hold seats in parliament, although the number of seats has been reduced.

So too has the rule of law in Indonesia remained weak. The legacies of a corrupt legal system have created widespread cynicism about the efficacy of following legal processes. Serious human rights violations by the Indonesian armed forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI), particularly in conflict zones such as Aceh and West Papua, have gone unpunished, and progress on holding those accountable for post-referendum violence in East Timor has been slow. Victims of past abuse have obtained little satisfaction from the legal system, and many have as a result turned instead to extra-legal action.

The transitions to formal structures of democracy in Indonesia have, however, resulted in moderate improvements in basic civil liberties such as freedoms of expression, assembly, association, and religion. This has certainly been the case in Indonesia, which has been characterized by successive shifts away from the restrictive political and civic atmosphere of the Soeharto regime. Restraints on freedom of expression and on the freedom of the press were largely, though not completely, lifted during Habibie's transitional administration (1998-1999), and the subsequent administrations of Wahid and Soekarnoputri have striven to capitalize on these gains.

In the case of Cambodia, the development of institutions of democratic governance has been stymied by decades of civil war. The rule of law, the judiciary, electoral processes, the national legislature, are all in need of institutional strengthening. As the events of 1997 demonstrated, perhaps one of the greatest obstacles to democracy in Cambodia is the anti-democratic behaviour of the country's political elite, and the lack of an entrenched democratic political culture. While

slight gains in indicators such as political rights and civil liberties occurred in the early years of the new liberal regime, they were soon lost, and the civic climate has since remained highly restrictive.

While Philippines has among the most well-developed democratic institutions and processes in the region, the case of President Estrada's removal from power is indicative of continuing weaknesses in Philippine political institutions. In the end, it was neither a proper constitutional process nor expression of sovereign will via electoral processes that removed Estrada from power, but rather mass protests and a defection of military support – in short, a failure of due process, and an indication that the streets will remain a prominent site for political action.

Other challenges confront the Philippines as well, including pervasive corruption, a weak and inefficient legal system, and a political system that remains elite-based and exclusive. In addition, while the Philippines has remained the most liberal country in the region, recent years have not seen the high degree of civic liberties characterized by the first few years of the Aquino administration following Marcos' removal from power in 1986. In fact, Freedom House has defined declining trends in political rights and civil liberties indicators due to worsening levels of civil conflict in the southern Mindanao region and credible allegations of high-level official corruption.

### **Political Instability, Governance and Conflict Potential**

Despite the gains in democracy across the region, considerable risks remain, primarily with respect to the instability brought about by the political liberalization process itself. Entrenched patterns of authority have yet to be replaced with sound institutions capable of reliably channelling discontent and managing the potential for conflict. In fact, there is strong evidence to suggest that countries undergoing democratic transitions are more conflict-prone than either stable democracies or autocracies. This risk, combined with the prospect of reversals in the democratization

process, remains quite present across the region, though particularly in the cases of the Cambodia and Indonesia.

Elite-dominated or exclusive political systems, as are found in all three countries, will continue to contribute to the potential for violence by denying citizens opportunities to

participate equitably in political processes. So too will weak or biased law enforcement and judicial institutions likely continue to compound feelings of the futility of expressing and seeking to resolve grievances through institutional channels, compelling other kinds of actions instead.

**III. MILITARIZATION**

Lead Indicators	Country	Global Perfor. Rank	Trend and Volatility Modifiers	Risk Score
<b>Military Expenditure (Avg. 1995-1999)</b>				
(% of GDP, Constant 1995 US\$)	Cambodia	7.6	Declining (-1)	6.6
	Indonesia	2.8	No Clear Trend	2.8
Source: SIPRI	Philippines	3.6	Declining (-1)	2.6
<b>Fraction of Regional Military Expenditure (1990-1999)</b>				
(Percent of known total spending for decade)	Cambodia	2.0	Single Measure	2.0
	Indonesia	7.0	Single Measure	7.0
Source: Calculated from SIPRI	Philippines	5.0	Single Measure	5.0
<b>Total Armed Forces (Avg. 1995-1999)</b>				
(per 1,000)	Cambodia	6.0	No Clear Trend	6.0
Source: IISS Military Balance	Indonesia	4.0	No Clear Trend	4.0
	Philippines	3.0	No Clear Trend	3.0
<b>COMPOSITE HISTORY OF ARMED CONFLICT SCORE</b>				
	<b>Cambodia</b>			<b>4.9</b>
	<b>Indonesia</b>			<b>4.6</b>
	<b>Philippines</b>			<b>3.5</b>

The size, quality and readiness of a country’s military forces affect a country’s ability, not only to defend itself from external threats, but to manage internal violent conflicts, and to prevent them through having a deterrence effect. A country’s degree of militarization can impact its capacity, but also potentially its inclination, to address and resolve potential conflicts through use of armed force. However, high levels of military expenditure can also indicate a privileging of the security forces in the domestic political arena, and indicate increased potential for military involvement in political affairs. Of course, considering limited spending capabilities, investments in the military can result in decreased investments in social capital and productive sectors. But so too can high levels of military spending relative to social spending, combined with high numbers of military personnel, indicate that state priorities are focused upon military rather than developmental solutions to potential crises.

**The Demobilization of Cambodia’s Armed Forces**

Hun Sen’s long-time power base has been in the security forces, including the Royal

Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF), the police, and paramilitary police forces. Cambodia’s armed forces totalled about 140,000 personnel in 2000, and average of 6 members per 1000 population, compared to 4 in Indonesia and 3 in the Philippines. Military spending has averaged at over 3.5% of GDP since the UN sponsored elections in 1993. As a percentage of public expenditure, military spending in Cambodia accounted for around 40% of public expenditure.

In the years following the UN sponsored elections in 1993, international donors considered paring back Cambodia’s military as being essential to the country’s development. They called for reforms to public finances that included shifting public expenditure away from the military and police in favour of under-funded social services such as education and health. With the subsequent decline of the Khmer Rouge and a lack of external threats, the government has acknowledged that there is no longer a need for such a large force, especially in light of its minimal spending commitments in areas such as education and health care.


There have been indications that Hun Sen is beginning efforts to reduce the prominence of the military. However, it remains an open question whether the government is really committed to following through with promised reductions in military spending. This is particularly the case in so far as Hun Sen's CPP still very much derives its support from the military, and there are risks that paring down the military could threaten its loyalty to the CPP. Hun Sen's decision to step down as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces in 1999 was intended to depoliticize the military and make it more neutral. However, measures taken subsequently to consolidate the military's support, through for example reshuffling top leaders such that the three branches of the military are all now headed by CPP loyalists, have resulted in an ongoing politicization of the military for at least the near future.<sup>5</sup>

The question of demobilization of Cambodia's large military (relative to the country's size) will remain a significant issue in Cambodia for some time to come. This issue is particularly important from the point of view of creating a durable solution that provides social and economic opportunities for ex-soldiers, in order to ward off the potential risks of a large, marginalized population of military veterans. A General Secretariat of the Council for Demobilization was established in 1998, but tensions between the Secretariat and the military have arisen over various issues. There are also concerns that if the demobilization programme is not implemented effectively, it will create the conditions for ongoing or future violent conflict. For example, there have been concerns that weapons are not being properly confiscated, and that inadequate severance packages will cause ex-soldiers to turn increasingly to crime.

**Indonesia's Military Transformation**

Over the past decades, Indonesia has steadily build up its armed forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI). The country's military is sizeable, with approximately 297,000 total members in 2000, including the army, navy, marines, and air force. While in relative terms, given the country's large population, the size

of the military remains modest, the country has the fourth largest military force in the Southeast Asian region in absolute size (following Thailand, Myanmar and Vietnam), and accounts for approximately 15% of regional military spending. While defence spending in the national budget has averaged below 1.5% across the last decade, it has been supplemented by revenue from many military-run businesses.



Without any prominent external threats in the region, the primary mission of the TNI has historically been the maintenance of internal security. Accordingly, the Indonesian National Police were for many years a branch of the armed forces. The military also maintained a prominent role in the nation's political and social affairs, with a set number of seats being reserved for the Military in the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). The TNI also commanded a territorial structure that reached down to the village level, with the effect of the military having a prominent role in provincial and district level politics as well.

However, the 1997-1998 economic crisis substantially curtailed the military's privilege. The military has received decreased funding, and has been forced to cancel or indefinitely defer new procurement to drastically reduce training and operational expenses. The military's role has been further confused by the country's political liberalization in the post-Soeharto era. The military's long association

with the Soeharto regime, and its long history of history of repression and human rights abuses, has impacted its reputation and credibility in the post-Soeharto period, and have resulted in a deep-seated resentment of the military by much of the population.

As a result, the military itself is in the midst of a profound transformation, with numerous reforms underway. Civilian and military leaders have advocated removing the military from politics through reducing and/or eliminating military representation in the MPR. The military is also striving to develop a new doctrine that shifts its focus from internal security to external defence, and accordingly is undertaking measures to dismantle its territorial structure, as well as formally separating the Indonesian National Police from the armed forces. Nonetheless, it is assumed that this process will take time, and will also require significant technical assistance support and assistance from outside actors.

However, while the reduction of the military's prominence in political and domestic affairs is a welcome affair for most observers, the decline of the military's authority and capacity has likely contributed to the outbreak or intensification of communal and separatist conflicts across the country in the post-Soeharto era. Reduced funding, combined with declining morale and failing lines of authority, have resulted in both diminished incentives and reduced capacity and to prevent or manage conflict. So too have concerns about prosecution for human rights abuses weakened the willingness of the armed forces to intervene in communal conflicts. Rumours also abound of military attempts to undermine the reformist governments in Jakarta, and to perpetuate conflicts in order to maintain its privilege.

### **Civilian Supremacy in the Philippines**

Unlike in Cambodia and Indonesia, where the military has been involved in politics, the military in the Philippines has been effectively removed from political power. The process of removing the military from political power was relatively straightforward in the Philippines compared to the difficulties that both

Cambodia and Indonesia have faced. This is due in large part to the fact that the military in the Philippines never established a regime, but was rather brought into the government by a civilian, President Marcos, who needed military support to back his own regime. While some military officers did become politicized, the concept of civilian supremacy continued, and the government remained under civilian control throughout Marcos' authoritarian period.<sup>6</sup>

Several attempted coups were, however, staged by disaffected members of the Philippine military during the Aquino era, which contributed to the destabilization of her rule. Ramos's subsequent presidency saw the signing into law in 1994 of a general conditional amnesty covering groups that had been involved in the country's conflicts, including the Philippine military and police personnel accused of crimes committed while fighting the insurgents, which contributed to Ramos' declared priority of "national reconciliation" and resolved some tensions with the military.

The current Philippines military is modestly sized relative to its neighbours. The total size of its armed forces in 2000, some 106,000 total active forces, was approximately one third that of Indonesia, and approximately three quarters that of Cambodia. The modest size of the armed forces, however, and in particular the lack of modern air and naval capabilities, has meant that the Philippine Armed Forces has had only limited capability to monitor the archipelago's vast air and sea spaces, or to defend the country's 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and its claims in the Spratly Islands (see Section IX). These factors have also contributing to rampant piracy, smuggling, and illegal fishing.

Insecurity within the country's EEZ, combined with naval activities by countries such as China in the Spratly Islands, led the Philippines to plan a Modernization Program to revive its military, in particular naval and air capabilities. The 1997 financial crisis, however, was a serious setback for the planned Modernization Program, and procurement plans were deferred as a result.

These factors have contributed to an interest in revitalizing its security relationship with the United States,<sup>7</sup> which had fallen by the wayside when the Philippine Senate had refused to renew a comprehensive bases agreement with Washington in 1991, and which had led to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Subic Bay and Clarke Air Field.

---

<sup>5</sup> International Crisis Group, "Cambodia: The Elusive Peace Dividend," ICG Asia Report N° 8, Phnom Penh/Brussels, 11 August 2000.

<sup>6</sup> Harold Crouch, "Establishing Civilian Supremacy in Southeast Asia," IN Uwe Johannsen and James Gomez, Eds., "Democratic Transitions in Asia," Singapore: Select Publishing, 2001.

<sup>7</sup> Zalmay Khalilzad, David Orletsky, Jonathan Pollack, Kevin Pollpeter, Angel Rabasa, David Shlapak, Abram Shulsky, Ashley Tellis, "The United States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture," RAND, 2001.

**IV. POPULATION HETEROGENEITY**

Lead Indicators	Country	Global Perfor. Rank	Trend and Volatility Modifiers	Risk Score
<b>Ethnic Diversity (1990s)</b>				
(Calculated Index)	Cambodia	3.0	Single Measure	3.0
Source: Calculated on the basis of	Indonesia	9.0	Single Measure	9.0
CIA World Factbook 2000	Philippines	3.0	Single Measure	3.0
<b>Religious Diversity (1990s)</b>				
(Calculated Index)	Cambodia	2.0	Single Measure	2.0
Source: Calculated on the basis of	Indonesia	4.0	Single Measure	4.0
CIA World Factbook 2000	Philippines	4.0	Single Measure	4.0
<b>Risk of Ethnic Rebellion (c. 1998)</b>				
(Calculated Index)	Cambodia	2.0	Single Measure	2.0
Source: Minorities at Risk Data Set	Indonesia	8.0	Single Measure	8.0
Gurr (2000)	Philippines	6.0	Single Measure	6.0
<b>COMPOSITE HISTORY OF ARMED CONFLICT SCORE</b>				
<b>Cambodia</b>				<b>2.3</b>
<b>Indonesia</b>				<b>7.0</b>
<b>Philippines</b>				<b>4.3</b>

The degree of ethnic and religious diversity in a country can significantly influence its potential for conflict. In some heterogeneous societies, the competing demands of different ethnic and religious groups result in failures to achieve political consensus, contributing to tensions and in some cases the outbreak of violent conflict. This is especially the case in situations where there are high incentives for group action, such as a historical loss of group autonomy, long-standing or widening political and economic disparities between communal groups, or restrictions on cultural practices. In addition, the capacity for collective action also depends in large part upon the strength of a group’s identity, and its level of political mobilization.

**Ethnic and Religious Diversity**

Indonesia is by far the most ethnically diverse country in the region. Different experts place the number of indigenous ethnic groups in Indonesia between 200 and 300, and ethnic identity is marked by location (such as a specific island or region of an island), language, and various customs (“adat”). Experts also believe that as many as 700 languages are spoken across the country.

While Bahasa Indonesian is the official language, and is the language of government, education and the media, it is the first language of only about 7% of the population.<sup>8</sup>

The largest and dominant ethnic group in Indonesia is the Javanese, who make up about 45% of the population. While the Javanese are concentrated on the island of Java, they are the only group spread across the entire archipelago. Other major groups include the Sudanese in West Java, which account for 14% of the population and are closely related to the Javanese, the Madurese on the island of Madura, which account for 7.5% of the population, and the Coastal Malay, which includes various related groups found on Sumatra and the coast of Kalimantan, accounting for another 7.5% of the population. Smaller but regionally important ethnic groups include the Acehnese on Sumatra, the Papuans in West Papua, and the Dayaks on the Indonesian part of Borneo, each accounting for less than 2% of the total population. Indonesia also has a significant ethnic Chinese presence, constituting about 2.7% of the total population, including both Chinese born in Indonesia and those who have come to Indonesia more recently.



The majority of Indonesians are Sunni Muslim, although in many communities traditional indigenous animistic beliefs have heavily influenced Islam. Islam is strongest on the islands of Sumatra and Java. Estimates place the Christian population at approximately 8%, with Roman Catholicism prevalent on particular islands, including Flores, Timor and the Moluccan Islands. About 3% of the population are Hindu, found mainly on the island of Bali, while most Buddhists are of ethnic Chinese origin.

By comparison to Indonesia, the populations of the Philippines and Cambodia are far more ethnically and religiously homogeneous. About 90% of the population of the Philippines are classified as Filipinos, who are also sometimes collectively labelled Christian Malays. While a minority of Christian Malays are Protestant, the majority are Roman Catholic, an effect of Spanish colonialism, making the Philippines the only predominately Catholic country in Asia. Muslim Malays, sometimes referred to as Moros, make up about 5% of the population, although this label covers a range of groups that are culturally distinct. The Moros are primarily geographically concentrated in the southern islands of the Philippines, including Mindanao and Palawan. In addition to the Christian and Muslim Malay, the third major ethnic grouping – indigenous peoples – includes the Negritos and several dozen other groups collectively labelled hill tribes. The Philippines also has a large number of ethnic Chinese, comprising approximately 1.5% of the population.

Cambodia's population is divided into three major ethnic groupings: the Khmer, accounting for approximately 90% of Cambodians; the "hill tribes," a collective name for a variety of tribes that live primarily along the borders of Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, and have populations across these borders as well; and minorities of foreign origin, including ethnic Chinese, Vietnamese and Cham. The national language is Khmer, and most non-Khmer primarily speak their own languages. About 95% of the population is Buddhist, while the remainder are Muslim (including most Cham) or Christian.

### Minorities at Risk

The Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project at the University of Maryland has assembled a wide range of data on ethnic groups world-wide that have been subjected to various kinds of cultural, political, and/or economic discrimination. Minority Groups are identified by the MAR Project as being "at risk" if the country in which they reside has a population greater than 500,000, the group itself has a population larger than 100,000 (or 1 percent of the country population), and it meets at least one of four criteria. These four criteria are: that the group is subject to political, economic or cultural discrimination; that the group is disadvantaged from past political, economic or cultural discrimination; that the group is politically, economically or culturally advantaged, and that advantage is being challenged; that the group supports political organizations advocating greater group rights. On the basis of these criteria, the MAR project has identified as Minorities at Risk the Vietnamese in Cambodia, the Moros and Igorots in the Philippines, and the Acehnese, Papuans and ethnic Chinese in Indonesia.<sup>9</sup>

### Vietnamese in Cambodia

The last thirty years of Cambodia's history have profoundly altered ethnic relations in the country. A major effect of decades of conflict has been a decrease in the overall size of minority ethnic groups, since groups such as the Chinese, Vietnamese and Cham were considered enemies of the state by the Khmer Rouge in the 1970s and many were killed or driven out. The long legacy of conflict has also disrupted the ways of life of hill tribes, as have various government programmes over the years aimed at assimilating hill tribes into Khmer society, through literacy programmes, resettlement, and government supervision of village life.

Ethnic tensions in Cambodia continue, however, particularly with respect to the ethnic Vietnamese minority. Much of this tension is a consequence of the war in Vietnam in the 1960s and 70s, the coming to power of the Khmer Rouge with an anti-

Vietnamese agenda, and of the subsequent Vietnamese occupation in the 1980s, throughout which period the Khmer Rouge continued its anti-Vietnamese aggression. Khmer Rouge attacks against ethnic Vietnamese continued well into the 1990s, despite assurances by the Cambodian government that it would make every effort to protect ethnic Vietnamese.

The status of ethnic Vietnamese living in Cambodia has continued to be a volatile issue throughout the 1990s, profoundly affected by domestic politics and the struggle for power of political factions. Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party (CPP), which ran Cambodia's Vietnam-backed government in the 1980s, was obliged by the Paris Peace Agreement to form a domestic coalition government its rivals, which promulgated anti-Vietnamese rhetoric. Hun Sen's coup in 1997 and provoked strong popular anti-government and anti-Vietnamese sentiments, and the ensuing election in 1998 was marked by anti-Vietnamese propaganda by opposition parties.

### **Moros and Igorots in the Philippines**

In the Philippines, the major line of ethnic division has been between Christian Filipinos and Moros groups in the South. Government sponsored economic development programmes following World War II opened Moro lands, especially Mindanao, to extensive migration by mostly Christian settlers. Indigenous Muslim groups saw their status quickly erode due to the central government bias toward the Christian settlers in competition for land and resources. Communal conflicts broke out, and by the 1970s developed into organized opposition groups seeking independence for the island of Mindanao in the Southern Philippines. The most prominent of these groups have been the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and two breakaway groups, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf.

In 1989, the Philippine government granted limited political autonomy in designated Moro provinces, and in 1996, the government and the MNLF signed a peace agreement that created a special zone of peace and

development (ZOPAD). However, the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf opposed the settlement, as did Christian militia groups in the region. While the government subsequently began formal peace negotiations with the MILF, sporadic clashes continued and the talks were called off in 2000. The period since the 1996 agreement has also seen an intensification of activities by the Abu Sayyaf, particularly in the form of hostage taking, resulting in the mobilization of additional troops to counter rebel attacks, significantly heightening tensions and resulting in a sharp increase in the level of violent conflict.

The south continues to be the poorest region in the Philippines and expectations of economic growth that followed the 1996 agreement have not been met. The regional government has alleged that Manila has not provided adequate funds for development, and in April 2001, a MNLF congress passed a resolution to establish an independent Republic, effectively abrogating its 1996 agreement with the Philippine government on regional autonomy and reverting back to its original demand for independence.

In addition to the cleavages in the south, ethnic groups elsewhere across the country have suffered from differing degrees of marginalization, including several hill tribe groups living in the mountains of north-central Luzon, collectively known as "Igorots." Increasing economic encroachments into tribal lands over the past three decades, particularly the expansion of logging into mountain forests and the central government's plans to build a series of hydroelectric dams, have forced the Igorots to mobilize in defence of their communal interests. While the Philippine government has enacted measures to address the concerns of these groups, including the 1997 Indigenous Peoples Rights Act and the establishment of a National Commission charged addressing ancestral land claims, tensions persist between advocates of traditional lifestyles in the region and those who encourage a more modern way of life.

## **Acehnese, Papuans and ethnic Chinese in Indonesia**

The Acehnese rebellion against Jakarta dates back decades. The Acehnese have a long history of struggle for autonomy predating Indonesian independence, which has provided a set of Acehnese “national myths” and strengthened its sense of being a pre-existing political entity. Following independence, many Acehnese became disillusioned by Jakarta-centred national politics, and by what they saw as Jakarta’s control and exploitation of resources in such a way that local Acehnese reap few rewards. Aceh is a comparably rich province, with valuable natural resources (particularly oil and natural gas), most of the revenue from which has gone to the national government and foreign contractors.<sup>10</sup>

There is also a widespread sense that Acehnese are stauncher in their religious beliefs and practices than other Indonesians, and have advocated for example the adoption of Sharia Law. While this provides a source of identity and cohesion for Acehnese, combined with a long history of struggling for autonomy and a sense of economic injustice, it also provides strong mobilizing factors for many Acehnese to support the separatist movement espoused by the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). So too has a history of human rights abuses by the Indonesian armed forces against both the GAM and ordinary Acehnese contributed to the grievances of the Acehnese.

As in Aceh, the Indonesian province of West Papua has been the site of a longstanding separatist struggle which has significant ethnic and religious elements. The current struggles has its contemporary roots in resistance to the incorporation of West Papua into Indonesia in 1963, a political affair that was orchestrated by Jakarta. Since West Papua did not achieve independence with the rest of the country, nor was it part of the Indonesian nationalist movement, it has weak ideological linkages with Indonesia as a whole. This is compounded by felt differences in both culture and religion from the rest of the country – Papuans are Melanesian peoples and primarily Christian, in contrast to the Muslim Malayo-

Polnesians who populate much of the rest of Indonesia.

As is the case with Aceh, West Papua is host to valuable natural resources (particularly copper and gold mines), most of the revenue from which has gone to the national government and foreign contractors. These resources have also attracted waves of migration from other parts of Indonesia the decades. This migration resulted in changes in the composition of the region’s demography, but it also resulted in land and resources being lost to outside investors and immigrants, with little compensation. Migrants have also had greater access to services such as health and education, and have come to dominate positions of authority in the province, with comparably few Papuans being represented in positions of authority in major enterprises or local government.

The majority of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia are concentrated in urban centres, and, as a group, they enjoy relative economic advantages (although this privilege is not evenly distributed, and many ethnic-Chinese are very poor). Much of this economic advantage was accrued under the Dutch colonial administration when ethnic-Chinese were encouraged to assume a “comprador” role between the Dutch authorities and the indigenous population. At independence, Indonesian government policy demanded the assimilation of the ethnic Chinese, and Chinese schools were either closed or converted to government schools and Chinese language media were banned.

Across Indonesia, ethnic-Chinese are socially stigmatized, and have suffered from periodic violent attacks and racial riots directed mainly against their property. During the 1997-1998 economic crisis, however, ethnic-Chinese were targeted and became victims of widespread violence, particularly during the May 1998 riots that deposed Soeharto from power. Many ethnic-Chinese were killed, hundreds of ethnic-Chinese women were targets of sexual assault and rape, and approximately 150,000 Chinese fled the country, many of whom have still not returned.

While not included in the MAR data set, ethnic and religious cleavages have also contributed to the development of conflict in both the Maluku and Kalimantan. In the former region, competition between religious groups for economic and political power has a long history. While Christians were favoured for positions of authority under the Dutch colonial administration, since independence the relative political power of the two groups has been reversed. Muslim migrant communities came to dominate local government and commerce, causing some Christian groups to perceive themselves as increasingly disenfranchised and vulnerable. These factors, combined with a breakdown of traditional social structures caused by migration and modernization, contributed to the outbreak of conflict in the region over the past few years.<sup>11</sup>

In Kalimantan, the abundant natural resources of the region have brought waves of migration to the region over the years, which have created tensions between migrants, particularly Muslim Madurese, and the mostly Christian indigenous Dayaks. With the expansion of commerce and industry, indigenous Dayak communities have become dispossessed of their traditional forest lands, and government development policies advantaged migrant groups. In Kalimantan, sharp religious and ethnic differences were exacerbated by economic differentials, and by comparably low levels of Dayak political representation.<sup>12</sup>

**Assessing Risk of Ethnic Rebellion**

In his analysis of the characteristics of Minority groups at Risk as coded in the MAR data set, Gurr (2000) identified six risk factors that according to tests correctly identified 88% of existing ethnic rebellions.<sup>13</sup> These factors are: the persistence of protest in recent past; the persistence of protest in the recent past; government repression; territorial concentration; group organization; regime instability; and transnational support from foreign states. Based on data from the 1998 for each of these key variables, and using logistic regression analysis, Gurr calculated scores for the risk of future rebellion for each

minority at risk group. The key variables and resulting risk scores for Minority at Risk groups in Cambodia, Indonesia and the Philippines are indicated in the accompanying table.<sup>14</sup>

**Minority Groups at Risk: Factors Underlying Risk of Ethnic Rebellion (circa 1998)<sup>15</sup>**

	Vietnamese Cambodia	Acehnese Indonesia	Chinese Indonesia	Papuans Indonesia	Igorots Philippines	Moros Philippines
Persistent Past Rebellion	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Persistent Past Protest	No	No	No	No	No	No
Government Repression	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Territorial Concentration	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Group Organization	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regime Instability	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Transnational Support from Foreign States	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
<b>Risk of Ethnic Rebellion</b>	<b>LOW</b>	<b>HIGH</b>	<b>MED.</b>	<b>HIGH</b>	<b>LOW</b>	<b>HIGH</b>

<sup>8</sup> Data are from David Levinson, "Ethnic Groups Worldwide: A Ready Reference Handbook," Oryx Press, Westport, Conn., 1998.  
<sup>9</sup> While the MAR Project also identifies East Timorese as Minorities at Risk in Indonesia, given the current status of the territory of East Timor, this group is not considered in this analysis. The MAR project has recently added the Dayaks of Kalimantan as another Minority at Risk in Indonesia, but data for this group has not yet been coded. For information and sources on all Minority at Risk groups, see the MAR Project web-site at <<http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/list.html>>.  
<sup>10</sup> Michael Malley, "Social Cohesion and Conflict Management in Indonesia," Paper Prepared for the Asia Regional Consultation on Social Cohesion and Conflict Management, Manila, March 16-17, 2000.  
<sup>11</sup> Chris Wilson, "Internal Conflict in Indonesia: Causes, Symptoms and Sustainable Resolution," Government of Australia, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group, 7 August 2001.  
<sup>12</sup> Michael Malley, "Social Cohesion and Conflict Management in Indonesia," Paper Prepared for the Asia Regional Consultation on Social Cohesion and Conflict Management, Manila, March 16-17, 2000.  
<sup>13</sup> Ted Robert Gurr, "Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century," United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000.  
<sup>14</sup> CIFP has converted Gurr's risk scores to a "high-medium-low" scale on the basis of a ranking of the

Minorities at Risk cases. The country scores for "Risk of Ethnic Rebellion" included in the overall CIPF risk index are based on a global ranking of scores for all countries with identified Minorities at Risk (a rank score of "1" being reserved for countries with no identified Minorities at Risk), totaling for each country the individual risk scores for Minorities at Risk groups within each country.

<sup>15</sup> Note that as this data for regime durability in Gurr (2000) is dated prior to the 1998 regime change in Indonesia, "Regime Instability" rates and in here as "No."

**V. DEMOGRAPHIC STRESS**

Lead Indicators	Country	Global Perfor. Rank	Trend and Volatility Modifiers	Risk Score
<b>Total Population</b>		<b>(Avg. 1995-1999)</b>		
Source: World Bank, World Development	Cambodia	6.0	(Natural increase)	6.0
Indicators	Indonesia	9.0	(Natural increase)	9.0
	Philippines	9.0	(Natural increase)	9.0
<b>Population Growth Rate</b>		<b>(Avg. 1995-1999)</b>		
(Annual %)	Cambodia	7.2	Decreasing (-1)	6.2
Source: World Bank, World Development	Indonesia	4.4	No Change	4.4
Indicators	Philippines	6.0	Decreasing (-1)	5.0
<b>Population Density</b>		<b>(Avg. 1995-1999)</b>		
(people per sq km)	Cambodia	5.0	(Natural increase)	5.0
Source: World Bank, World Development	Indonesia	7.0	(Natural increase)	7.0
Indicators	Philippines	8.0	(Natural increase)	8.0
<b>Urban Population</b>		<b>(Avg. 1995-1999)</b>		
(% of Total)	Cambodia	1.0	(Natural increase)	1.0
Source: World Bank, World Development	Indonesia	3.2	(Natural increase)	3.2
Indicators	Philippines	5.0	(Natural increase)	5.0
<b>Urban Population Growth Rate</b>		<b>(Avg. 1994-1998)</b>		
(Annual %)	Cambodia	8.3	Decreasing (-1)	7.3
Source: World Bank, World Development	Indonesia	8.0	Decreasing (-1)	7.0
Indicators	Philippines	6.8	Decreasing (-1)	5.8
<b>Youth Bulge</b>		<b>(Avg. 1995-1999)</b>		
(Pop. Age 0-14 as % of Total)	Cambodia	6.8	Decreasing (-1)	5.8
Source: World Bank, World Development	Indonesia	4.0	Decreasing (-1)	3.0
Indicators	Philippines	6.0	Decreasing (-1)	5.0
<b>COMPOSITE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE SCORE</b>				
	<b>Cambodia</b>			<b>5.2</b>
	<b>Indonesia</b>			<b>5.6</b>
	<b>Philippines</b>			<b>6.3</b>

The size, density, distribution and composition of a country’s population can contribute greatly to the potential for violent conflict. Changes in these factors, such as rapid rates of growth and urbanization, can also accelerate the conflict development process through heightening competition for access to physical and social resources, due to increasing scarcity, growing inequality, and environmental degradation.

Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world. While its population growth rate is relatively moderate, and has been declining steadily over the past decade, the immense size of the population has meant that even such moderate levels of growth pose

significant risks, especially when combined with recent poor economic performance and declining environmental indicators.


Population growth rates have begun to decline in both the Philippines and Cambodia as well, and the long-term trend across the region is towards continued decreases. Nonetheless, the Philippines and Cambodia are not as far along the “demographic transition” from high to low birth and death rates as is Indonesia. In Cambodia and the Philippines, while both fertility and mortality rates have fallen, the rate of the former has outpaced the latter, resulting in growth rates that remain among the highest in the region.

**Population Projections to 2025**

	Total Population in Millions - 2000 (% of Regional Total)	Projected Population in Millions - 2025 (% of Regional Total)
Indonesia	212.1 (40.9%)	273.4 (40.0%)
Philippines	76.0 (14.7%)	108.3 (15.8%)
Cambodia	12.2 (2.1%)	16.5 (2.4%)
South-East Asian Region	518.5 (8.6% of World Total)	683.5 (8.7% of World Total)


Source: UNFPA (2001) State of the World's Population.

**Continued Declines in Population Growth Rates Expected**



Source: ESCAP (2001) Population Data Sheet.

**Population Age Structure, 2000**



Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects, The 2000 Revision.

**Population Age Structure**

The age composition of a population is a powerful element in its tendencies to violence. Evidence suggests that the younger the population and the higher the level of unemployment, for example, the greater the potential for violence. Young, unemployed populations can also be political volatile constituents, placing far less trust in political institutions and patterns of authority.

As a result of the “baby boom” following the reign of the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1979, Cambodia’s population is very young – the youngest in Southeast Asia – with an estimated 43% of the population in the under-15 age bracket. Bearing in mind current high population growth rates, some estimates project that by 2020 the number of children aged under 15 will surge from today’s 5 million to almost 7 million, and that the number of adults in the economically active age group will double to 9.7 million. These demographic shifts will dramatically raise demands on the education system, as well as doubling the demand for employment in one of the poorest countries in the region.

The Philippines is also currently experiencing a “youth bulge,” though not to the same degree as Cambodia, with 37% of the population in the under-15 age bracket. In Indonesia, where fertility rates began to fall earlier, the percentage of the population in the 0-14 age bracket age structures is lower than the Southeast Asian regional average of 32% in 2000. (In East Timor, however, the age structure is far closer to that of Cambodia, with 42% of the population in the under 15 age group.)

**Population Density and Regional Imbalance**

The population density of the Philippines ranks 15th in the world (of countries greater than 5,000 km<sup>2</sup>), with some 250 people per square kilometre on average. The distribution of the population is highly uneven even as well, with far higher population densities on the island of Luzon than in outlying areas such as Mindanao

and the Batan Islands, which are considerably lower than the national average.

While the overall national population density of Indonesia is moderate – reaching levels just over 100 people per square kilometre in the last few years – the country also has a highly uneven population distribution. The island of Java, together with the adjoining smaller islands of Bali and Madura, account for just over 7% of the Indonesia land area, but these islands are populated by some 60% of the total Indonesian population, resulting in population densities of over 800 persons per square kilometre.


By comparison, the population density of Cambodia is quite low, at 67 people per square kilometre in 1999. Regionally, the distribution of the population is highly skewed towards the region around the capital and the central plains, which contain close to 60% of the total population. Factoring in other provinces (Battambang and Banteay Meanchey bordering Thailand in the West, and Svay Rieng bordering Vietnam in the Southeast), an estimated 80-90% of the population lives on, and derives its income from a third of the country's total area.

**Internal Migration and Urbanization**

Trends in internal migration continue to make population mobility a critical demographic issue for all three countries, especially considering the degree to which internal migration may increase the potential for cultural and religious conflicts in cases where there are economic and social discrepancies between migrants and locals. Historically, governmental population-regulating policies across the region – often advocated as a means of reducing the potential for conflict by striving to reduce overcrowding pressures – have had the effect of creating new population-related conflicts.

Overcrowding in the Indonesian islands of Java and Madura led the Soeharto government to undertake programmes encouraging selective transmigration to other provinces such as West Kalimantan, laying the ground for the ongoing flare-ups between indigenous

**Regional Population Density (Java, Bali and Madura) Compared to Indonesia's National Average**



Source: Based on Population Census figures (1971, 1980, 1990) and Intercensal Population Census figures (1995). Percentages following years indicate regional percentage of total population.

Dayaks, ethnic Malays, and migrant Madurese populations. So too in the Philippines, where the early post-Colonial government fostered migration of Catholics into the predominantly Muslim island of Mindanao, increasing competition for land and resources, and fuelling social tensions between settler populations and the Moros and indigenous groups.

Another concern related to internal migration are rates of urbanization. Across all three countries, urban areas persists in attracting workers from agricultural areas, contributing to the pace of social transformation and to the already large burdens on urban infrastructure, including sanitation and waste management. While the growth rates of urban populations have been dropping in all three countries across the last decade, as have national population growth rates overall, urban growth rates remain markedly higher than national averages. In Cambodia and the Philippines, urban population growth rates are almost twice that of national averages. In Indonesia, urban growth rates are almost triple the national averages. In fact, since the mid-1990s, rural population levels in Indonesia have been shrinking in absolute terms.

In Cambodia, while the vast majority of the population (some 84%) remains rural, the urban population growth rate (at 4.56% in 1998) is the highest in the region and remains



a cause for concern. While the population growth rate in the Philippines is slightly lower (at 3.85% in 1998), the Philippines is far more urbanized than either Cambodia or Indonesia with almost 3/5 of the population located in urban areas, creating enormous pressures on urban infrastructure.

**VI. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE**

Lead Indicators	Country	Global Perfor. Rank	Trend and Volatility Modifiers	Risk Score
<b>GDP Growth Rate</b>		<b>(Avg. 1995-1999)</b>		
(Annual %)	Cambodia	4.6	Post-Crisis Recovery; Moderate Impact (+1)	5.6
Source: World Bank	Indonesia	4.8	Post-Crisis Recovery; High Impact (+2)	6.8
World Development Indicators	Philippines	4.6	Post-Crisis Recovery; Moderate Impact (+1)	5.6
<b>GDP Per Capita</b>		<b>(Avg. 1995-1999)</b>		
(PPP, Current International \$)	Cambodia	8.0	Post-Crisis Recovery; Moderate Impact (+1)	9.0
Source: World Bank	Indonesia	6.0	Post-Crisis Recovery; High Impact (+2)	8.0
World Development Indicators	Philippines	5.0	Post-Crisis Recovery; Moderate Impact (+1)	6.0
<b>Inflation</b>		<b>(Avg. 1995-1999)</b>		
(Consumer prices (annual %))	Cambodia	5.0	Post-Crisis Recovery; High Impact (+2)	7.0
Source: World Bank	Indonesia	6.6	Post-Crisis Recovery; High Impact (+2)	8.6
World Development Indicators	Philippines	5.8	Post-Crisis Recovery; Moderate Impact (+1)	6.8
<b>Foreign Direct Investment</b>		<b>(Avg. 1995-1999)</b>		
(Net inflows (% of GDP))	Cambodia	4.2	Post-Crisis Recovery; High Impact (+2)	6.2
Source: World Bank	Indonesia	4.4	Post-Crisis Recovery; High Impact (+2)	6.4
World Development Indicators	Philippines	3.4	Post-Crisis Recovery; Moderate Impact (+1)	4.4
<b>Total Debt Service</b>		<b>(Avg. 1995-1999)</b>		
(% of GNI)	Cambodia	1.0	Post-Crisis Recovery; Moderate Impact (+1)	2.0
Source: World Bank	Indonesia	8.6	Post-Crisis Recovery; High Impact (+2)	10.6
World Development Indicators	Philippines	7.0	Post-Crisis Recovery; Moderate Impact (+1)	8.0
<b>Trade Openness</b>		<b>(Avg. 1995-1999)</b>		
(Trade as a % of GDP)	Cambodia	5.0	No Clear Trend	5.0
Source: World Bank	Indonesia	6.0	Post-Crisis Recovery; High Impact (+2)	8.0
World Development Indicators	Philippines	3.2	Post-Crisis Recovery; Moderate Impact (+1)	4.2
<b>Inequality</b>				
(GINI Coefficient)	Cambodia (1997, Exp.)	6.0	Single Measure	6.0
Source: World Income	Indonesia (1996, Income)	5.0	Single Measure	5.0
Inequality Database V1.0	Philippines (1997, Exp.)	7.0	Single Measure	7.0
<b>COMPOSITE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE SCORE</b>				
<b>Cambodia</b>				<b>5.8</b>
<b>Indonesia</b>				<b>7.6</b>
<b>Philippines</b>				<b>6.0</b>

The linkages between economic performance and potential for violent conflict are strong. Low or declining incomes, high inflation, exchange rate fluctuation or collapse, and volatile levels of foreign investment significantly impact material living standards, and can create or aggravate dissatisfaction with government performance, undermining government credibility. High levels of economic inequality contribute to social fragmentation, declining state legitimacy, and can cause scapegoating of economically privileged minorities. Low involvement in

international trade is also associated with higher risk of state failure, given that the conditions that inhibit high levels of international trade and foreign investment (such as rampant corruption and poor infrastructure) also contribute to the risk of political crises.<sup>16</sup>

**Cambodia’s steps towards Post-Conflict Economic Recovery**

Cambodia’s transition to a pluralistic political system, and its struggle for domestic peace

and security, have been accompanied by a move from a centralized command economy to a more open, free market economy. Nonetheless, the country's economy continues to suffer the effects of decades of civil war, and economic performance remains highly influenced by political events.


In the decade following the 1991 Paris Accords, annual economic growth rates have fluctuated between 1% and over 7%. While Cambodia experienced high growth rates in the mid-1990s, partially as a result of the political upheaval in 1997 the economic situation subsequently deteriorated and GDP growth dropped significantly. The years following have seen a partial recovery, with growth rates returning to approximately 5% annually, though not yet to their mid-decade levels. While the country's per capita GDP steadily increased across the 1990s, it remains low compared with most neighbouring countries. So too have the gains of growth generally failed to improve the living standards of the poor, and Cambodia remains one of the poorest countries in the region, with 36% of the population living under the National Poverty Line in 2000.

The Cambodian economy is highly agrarian-based with agriculture contributing 37.1% to GDP, and services and industry accounting for 42.4% and 20% respectively. In 1998, less than 12 percent of the labour force was engaged in wage employment, with the majority of Cambodians engaged in self-employment and informal sector activities. Given the nature of employment, the Cambodian workforce suffers from underemployment, low productivity and low incomes, in particular in the rural areas of the country. The highest incidence of poverty is encountered among those with agriculture as the primary source of income.<sup>17</sup>

Cambodia was less severely hit by the Asian economic crisis of 1997-1998 than were its neighbours. Nonetheless, the financial crisis has had a moderate impact on inflation rates, which were already somewhat unstable across the decade, as well as on exchange rates. Levels of foreign investment, which grew substantially in the three years following the

**GDP Growth Rate (Annual %)**


(Source: World Development Indicators)



**GDP Per Capita**


(PPP, Current International \$)

(Source: World Development Indicators)



**Rate of Inflation**

(Consumer prices (annual %))



UN supervised elections, were affected by both the economic crisis and the political instability caused by Hun Sen's coup; foreign direct investment's portion of GDP halved in value between 1996 and 1999. Openness to, and levels of, international trade have increased significantly across the decade, with trade

accounting for less than 20% of GDP in 1990, and more than 75% in 1998.

Despite gains in macroeconomic stability across the decade, there remain structural weaknesses in the economy. Poor economic governance, including a weak and unpredictable regulatory framework and uncertain land and property rights, has exacerbated Cambodia's economic performance. Low public revenues have resulted from tax evasion, poor enforcement of tax laws, and customs exemptions granted to foreign investors. Of particular concern is the forestry sector, where royalties collected from timber correspond to only a fraction of the economic value of resource exploitation.<sup>18</sup> These factors and others have kept Cambodia heavily dependent on aid for financing the provision of basic goods and services.


**Ongoing Economic Reform in the Philippines**

While economic reforms were initiated under the Aquino administration to open up the relatively closed Philippine economy, political instability dampened economic activity resulting in low levels of growth. A continuation of liberalization and market-based reforms under the administration of President Ramos provided a firmer base for sustainable economic growth, and contributed to a period of increasing growth rates.

While the Asian financial crisis slowed economic growth, the Philippines was less severely affected than many other countries in the region, and growth reverted to more normal rates in 1999. Optimism about prospects for continued economic reform under President Estrada diminished amidst concerns of governmental corruption, which shook confidence the of the business community and investors and led to successful efforts to impeach Estrada. Under Macapagal-Arroyo, the pace of economic reform is expected to accelerate, improving the climate for economic growth and investment.

Per capita GDP in the Philippines is relatively high by regional standards, more than doubling that of Cambodia in 1999. The

Philippines was less severely affected by the Asian financial crisis than its neighbours. This was due in considerable part to remittances of approximately \$5-\$6 billion annually from overseas workers.<sup>19</sup> World Bank estimates indicate that poverty increased from 25.1% in 1997 to 27.8% in 1998, but that the subsequent recovery reduced the incidence of poverty to 26.3% in 1999. Despite its relatively high level of economic development, the Philippines also continues to have one of the most unequal distributions of income in Southeast Asia, gauged in terms of the GINI co-efficient.



**GINI Index, 9-point global rank by CIPF**  
**Source: World Income Inequality Database**

Unlike both Cambodia and Indonesia, annual rates of inflation have remained in the single-digits since early in the decade, including throughout the crisis. The Philippine peso, however, has lost much of its value in the years following the crisis, and in August 2001 was trading at about 51.00 to the US dollar, compared to 26.22 in 1996. Levels of foreign direct investment dipped following the economic crisis, and have remained low due to low investor confidence in the Estrada administration. Across the 1990s, the Philippine economy has relied increasingly upon trade. While imports declined along with exchange rates following the economic crisis, exports remained strong, particularly to the US, which likely mitigated much of the impact of the crisis itself.

Considering the gains of the decade-long macro-economic and structural reforms, and the fact that the economy weathered the Asian economic crisis better than most of the

countries in the region, the economic outlook for the country is promising. Nonetheless, further economic recovery efforts rely on maintained macroeconomic stability, and enhanced investor confidence, which require further efforts to improve economic governance and, in particular, combat corruption.

### **Indonesia's Profound Economic Crisis**

During the 30 years of Soeharto's New Order government, Indonesia experienced significant economic growth, and impressive gains in per capita incomes and poverty reduction. In the mid-1980s, the government began eliminating regulatory obstacles to economic activity, in the interest of stimulating diversified employment and growth in export sectors. By the early 1990s, Indonesia was a shining example of the "Asian miracle," and the country's macroeconomic and fiscal policies were deemed sound by international financial institutions.

However, these high levels of economic growth masked a number of structural weaknesses in Indonesia's economy, including weak banking and legal systems, ineffective contract enforcement and bankruptcy legislation. In addition, economic distortions were created by rent-seeking behaviours of state-owned enterprises, and by endemic nepotism and corruption. The Asian economic crisis hit Indonesia hard, and the crisis quickly took on social and political dimensions, leading to outbursts of popular protest, and ultimately to the Soeharto's resignation in 1998.

The effects of the crisis were severe. In 1998, GDP contracted by an estimated 13.01%, and per capita GDP likewise shrunk by a comparable amount. Average annual inflation reached 57.64%. The value of the rupiah plummeted to one fifth of its value prior to the crisis. Foreign investment drained from the country. Imports dropped precipitously in the early stage of the crisis in response to the unfavourable exchange rate and reduced domestic demand. While the measured unemployment rate did not rise dramatically, this was likely due to a large shift in employment from the formal sector to the

informal sector, and from urban to rural sectors.<sup>20</sup> Official figures estimate that the incidence of poverty doubled from 19% in 1996 to 37% at the height of the crisis.

While Indonesia has seen a partial recovery from the crisis, the economic situation remains mixed. GDP growth is recovering, but not yet to pre-crisis levels. Per capita income levels remain depressed, inflation remains high, the rupiah continues to hover around 1998 levels, and foreign investment still lags far below pre-crisis levels. Much of this owes to the political instability following the end of the New Order regime, as well as slow progress on economic governance reforms and restructuring of the banking and corporate sectors. Endemic corruption and nepotism have similarly resulted in low investor confidence, hindering recovery efforts and prolonging the crisis of public expectations.

### **Economic Performance and Conflict Potential**

Many of the violent conflicts experienced in recent years owe much to economic conditions. In Cambodia, poor economic performance has been both an effect and a cause of decades of conflict. Under the Vietnamese occupation and subsequent administration of Hun Sen, poor economic conditions provided incentives for Cambodians to support the cause of the Khmer Rouge. Despite the recent decline of the Khmer Rouge, lingering poor economic conditions will continue to underlie dissatisfaction with government performance, and motivate unrest in the form of strikes and demonstrations against low wages and poor working conditions.

Despite years of pro-democracy activism in Indonesia, it was ultimately the financial and economic crisis and the ensuing crisis of public expectations that led to the May 1998 riots and set the stage for Indonesia's profound transformation. The economic crisis also brought with it scapegoating of the ethnic Chinese minority widely perceived to be economically privileged, who became victims of widespread violence during the riots. The restricted economic climate following the

crisis, and its affect on material living standards across the country, created fertile ground for the outbreak or intensification of communal clashes in the Malukus and Kalimantan. As long as communities in areas such as these remain economically depressed, the potential for such clashes to continue will be high.

Years of highly centralized and nepotistic economic management in Indonesia also contributed significantly to demands for independence in West Papua and Aceh. Both provinces are rich in natural resources such as oil and gas, most of the benefits of which have historically flowed to Jakarta. In response to the demands from the provinces for greater autonomy and a greater share of resource earnings, the government of Indonesia has launched a massive programme of fiscal decentralization and regional autonomy. While basic legislation has been passed, the implementation of the decentralization process is still in its early stages, and there are concerns that slow progress will compound frustrations in the provinces.

Whereas in Indonesia, separatist struggles are occurring in comparatively well-off provinces, the primarily Muslim south continues to be the poorest region in the Philippines. Expectations of economic growth that have followed the 1996 peace process have not been met, and the regional government has accused Manila of not providing adequate funds for development. An Asian Development Bank Survey in 1998 also reported that Muslim-majority provinces in Mindanao lagged behind other provinces on most development indicators.<sup>21</sup> As in the case of Indonesia's communal conflicts, as long as such disparities remain between communities, increased potential for conflict will continue.

<sup>19</sup> United States Department of State, Philippines Country Brief, 2001.

<sup>20</sup> Satish Mishra, "History in the Making: A Systematic Transition in Indonesia," UNSFIR Working Paper 13/01/02, 2001.

<sup>21</sup> Asian Development Bank, 1998.

<sup>16</sup> See in particular the University of Maryland's "State Failure Project" <<http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/stfail/>>.

<sup>17</sup> United Nations Common Country Assessment 1998, Office of the Resident Co-ordinator in Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

<sup>18</sup> United Nations Common Country Assessment 1998, Office of the Resident Co-ordinator in Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

## VII. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Lead Indicators	Country	Global Perfor. Rank	Trend and Volatility Modifiers	Risk Score
<b>Access to Improved Water Source</b>		<b>(2000)</b>		
(% of Total Pop.)	Cambodia	9.0	Single Measure	9.0
Source: Global Water and Sanitation Assessment Report	Indonesia	6.0	Improving (-1)	5.0
	Philippines	4.0	No Change	4.0
<b>Access to Sanitation</b>		<b>(2000)</b>		
(% of Total Pop.)	Cambodia	9.0	Single Measure	9.0
Source: Global Water and Sanitation Assessment Report	Indonesia	6.0	Improving (-1)	5.0
	Philippines	4.0	Improving (-1)	3.0
<b>Life Expectancy</b>		<b>(1997-1998)</b>		
(Years)	Cambodia	8.0	No Change	8.0
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Indonesia	6.0	No Change	6.0
	Philippines	5.5	No Change	5.5
<b>Infant Mortality Rate</b>		<b>(1997-1998)</b>		
(per 1000 live births)	Cambodia	9.0	Improving (-1)	8.0
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Indonesia	6.0	Improving (-1)	5.0
	Philippines	6.0	Improving (-1)	5.0
<b>Maternal Mortality Rate</b>		<b>(1995)</b>		
(per 100,000 live births)	Cambodia	7.0	Single Measure	7.0
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Indonesia	7.0	Single Measure	7.0
	Philippines	6.0	Single Measure	6.0
<b>HIV/AIDS</b>		<b>(1997-1998)</b>		
(% of Adult Population)	Cambodia	8.0	Worsening (+1)	9.0
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Indonesia	3.0	Improving (-1)	2.0
	Philippines	3.0	Improving (-1)	2.0
<b>Primary School Enrollment</b>		<b>(1993-1997)</b>		
(% of Relevant Age Group)	Cambodia	2.4	No Clear Trend	2.4
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Indonesia	3.4	No Clear Trend	3.4
	Philippines	2.8	Improving (-1)	1.8
<b>Secondary School Enrollment</b>		<b>(1993-1997)</b>		
(% of Relevant Age Group)	Cambodia	7.6	No Clear Trend	7.6
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Indonesia	7.0	Improving (-1)	6.0
	Philippines	4.0	No Change	4.0
<b>Children in Labour Force</b>		<b>(1995-1999)</b>		
(% of Children aged 10-14)	Cambodia	6.0	Improving (-1)	5.0
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Indonesia	4.0	Improving (-1)	3.0
	Philippines	3.3	Improving (-1)	2.3
<b>COMPOSITE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT SCORE</b>				
<b>Cambodia</b>				<b>7.2</b>
<b>Indonesia</b>				<b>4.7</b>
<b>Philippines</b>				<b>3.7</b>

As with overall levels of economic development, poor levels of human development correlate strongly with higher risk of violent conflict and state failure. The

lack of, or decline in, public services such as health care, education, safe water and sanitation indicate weak state capacity to provide and allocate vital services. This can

decrease popular confidence in the state, leading to political instability and social unrest. So too can unmet expectations regarding educational opportunities or other opportunities for social advancement increase discontent and the likelihood and severity of civil strife. Low levels of investment in human capital can also hinder the development of a skilled labour force, necessary for creating livelihoods and increasing incomes, and so on in a downward spiral.


**Poverty and Human Development in Cambodia**

Cambodia’s long history of war, political instability and slow economic progress have had pronounced effects on the country’s level of human development. In addition to being one of the poorest countries in the region, Cambodia has also had weak performance in health and education indicators. Over the past decade, defence has absorbed a large proportion of government resources, crowding out needed expenditures on health and education. Combined with inadequate tax collection and domestic revenue mobilization, this has meant that much of the Cambodian population lacks access to health and educational facilities, safe water and sanitation.

According to assessment questionnaires and household surveys conducted by UNICEF and WHO, only 30% of Cambodians had reasonable access to improved water sources (such as house connections, public standpipes, boreholes with handpumps, protected dug wells, or protected springs), and only 16% had access to sanitation facilities (such as a connection to a sewer or septic tank system, pour-flush latrine, simple pit or ventilated improved pit latrine) in 2000. Cambodia’s infant mortality rate is estimated at 102 per 1000 live births in 1998 – greater than one in ten – while its maternal mortality ratio was estimated at 590 per 100,000 live births in 1995. Among the many factors contributing to high infant and maternal mortality rates are the lack of prenatal care, low attendance by trained personnel during delivery, lack of qualified service providers, and high levels of adolescent pregnancy.

Life expectancy in Cambodia remains among the lowest in Southeast Asia. Major causes of morbidity and mortality include health problems such as malaria and tuberculosis. An immediate threat to the lives of many Cambodians is the prevalence of land mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), of which there are an estimated 4-6 million, and which claimed on average 110-130 victims per month in 1997. In addition, Cambodia has one of the most serious HIV/AIDS epidemics outside of sub-Saharan Africa. According to the Report on the global HIV/AIDS epidemic 2000, over 4% of the adult population (men and women aged 15–49) is infected with the HIV virus.<sup>22</sup> On the basis of infection rates, it has been estimated that anywhere from one-half to one million Cambodians will be infected with HIV by 2006. In addition to the human cost of the epidemic, estimates of the economic cost are sizeable. One analysis estimates that between 1997 and 2006, at least US\$ 2.8 billion of GDP will be foregone in lost productivity due to the epidemic, not including the cost of care and treatment.<sup>23</sup>

**Access to Water and Sanitation, 2000**  
(% of Total Population)  
Source: Global Water and Sanitation Assessment Report



While primary education rates are high, secondary education rates are quite low by both regional and global standards, with an estimated 24.3% of the relevant age group enrolled in secondary education in 1997. In addition, in Cambodia there are both significant gender and economic disparities in access to education, with differences in



enrolment rates widening in secondary school. At higher schooling levels, the disparity between economic groups increases substantially, with virtually no students from the poorest quintile attending upper secondary schools.

There are several reasons to explain the lower enrolment rates of the poor, including the cost of supplementary expenses such as uniforms and supplies, long distances particularly to secondary school, and poor quality of education and schools. So too has the need for children to work and bring in household incomes impacted enrolment rates. It is estimated that almost a quarter of Cambodian children aged 10-14 are active in the labour force, although it is believed that the numbers are much higher as informal child labour in home based enterprises is rarely properly recorded. These factors along with years of armed conflict and a history of purges of educated people have created disincentives among people for acquiring education, and have contributed to the very low skill profile of the Cambodian workforce. It is estimated that only 10 percent of the labour force can be classified as skilled.<sup>24</sup>

### **The Human Consequences of Crisis and Regional Disparities in Indonesia**

While decades of growth in Indonesia had a positive impact on human development, it remains to be seen how the economic crisis of 1997-1998 will affect human development in the country. Estimates indicate that the number of people living in poverty rose from 19% in February 1996 to 37% in September 1998 at the height of the crisis.<sup>25</sup> However, access to safe water and sanitation, basic healthcare and school enrolment did not seem to change much during the crisis, although it is too early to offer assessments of the long-term consequences of the crisis on these issues.<sup>26</sup>

Over the past decades, Indonesia has made significant progress in the area of health. Improvements in health infrastructure, such as access to basic services such as safe water and sanitation, have resulted in increased life expectancy. Over the past 40 years, the

infant mortality rate has dropped from over 130 to 43 per thousand live births, and life expectancy has increased from 42 to 65 years. However, maternal mortality rates (estimated at 470 per 100,000 births in 1995) have been persistently high.

Leading causes of mortality include circulatory diseases, tuberculosis, malaria, and periodic outbreaks of dengue fever.<sup>27</sup> So far, Indonesia has so far escaped the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS, and incident rates remain low, although there are indications that the actual level of AIDS/HIV infection is much larger than reported. In any case, many of the conditions favourable to the spread of HIV, are prominent in Indonesia, including poverty, high-risk sexual behaviour, and increase in injecting drug use.

The Indonesian government has been committed to achieving universal primary education, and has come a long way towards that goal over the past decades. Primary education has been compulsory since 1984, and the government has also taken steps to extend compulsory education to the first years of secondary school. Nonetheless, secondary school enrolment rates remain low, particularly at the higher years. The government has also been committed to pursuing gender equality in schooling, resulting in comparably higher rates of female enrolment than elsewhere across the region. However, gender disparities remain evident in the higher levels of secondary school. Official rates put the number of children in the labour force at around 8% of the 10-14 age group. However, it is likely that these estimates are low, and that considerable numbers of children are active in the informal sector or on farms in rural areas.

Despite its gains in human development over the past decades, one issue of perennial concern in Indonesia is the degree of discrepancy between regions. The Indonesia Human Development Report, which compares per capita income, educational attainment and life expectancy across provinces and districts, demonstrates wide disparities in poverty, health and education indicators across the country. Infant mortality rates, for example,

range from 24% in Jakarta to 52% in West Papua to 81% in West Nusa Tenggara. It is wide disparities such as these that, when combined with ethnic and other differences in locations like West Papua (which ranks 25<sup>th</sup> out of 26 provinces in the provincial human development index)<sup>28</sup> that have contributed to the ongoing potential for social conflicts.

### **Consolidating the Gains of Human Development in the Philippines**

The comparably high level of economic development in the Philippines has translated into gains in human development, including both health and education indicators. The country has achieved a steady decline in mortality over recent decades, including both infant mortality and maternal mortality rates. Nonetheless, despite the gains in human development indicators, the Philippines still ranks towards the middle of countries, indicating that there is still considerable room for further advancement.

Infectious disease such as malaria and dengue remain a threat in the Philippines, and the country has one of the highest prevalence rates of tuberculosis in the world, with a disproportionate number of the poor being affected by the disease. In addition to infectious diseases, however, cardio-vascular disease and cancer have emerged as significant causes of mortality. Like Indonesia, the Philippines has yet to be profoundly impacted by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. However, the risk of the epidemic becoming more serious is ever present.

Perhaps one of the most critical health issues in the Philippines is the prohibitive price of many medicines and medical treatment, as well as

inadequate facilities and staffing resulting from limited budgetary resources. So too for education. The Philippines takes pride in its achievements in education, including its high adult literacy rate and high enrolment rates. However, the commitment to universal access, combined with high population growth rates, and limited resources in the post-crisis environment, have resulted in a deterioration of the quality of education. In addition, in as highly unequal a country as the Philippines, access to education has been inequitable at all levels.

As in Indonesia, the Philippine Human Development Report for 2000 indicates that provincial and regional Human Development Indices have demonstrated regional inequalities, some provinces, including parts of Mindanao recording indices on par with the poorest countries of Asia or Africa.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>22</sup> UNAIDS, Report on the global HIV/AIDS epidemic, June, 2000.

<sup>23</sup> Myers, C. N., Sotharith, C., and Calabria, M., "Economic Costs of AIDS in Cambodia: Some Preliminary Estimates," Paper prepared for UNAIDS, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 1997.

<sup>24</sup> United Nations Common Country Assessment 1998, Office of the Resident Co-ordinator in Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

<sup>25</sup> Satish Mishra, "History in the Making: A Systematic Transition in Indonesia," UNSFIR Working Paper 13/01/02, 2001.

<sup>26</sup> Satish Mishra, "History in the Making: A Systematic Transition in Indonesia," UNSFIR Working Paper 13/01/02, 2001.

<sup>27</sup> WHO Indonesia, "Plan of Action 2000-2001," <<http://www.who.or.id>>.

<sup>28</sup> BPS-Statistics Indonesia, BAPPENAS, UNDP, "Towards a New Consensus: Democracy and Human Development in Indonesia," Indonesia Human Development Report, 2001.

<sup>29</sup> Human Development Network, UNDP Philippines, "Quality, Relevance and Access in Basic Education, Philippine Human Development Report," 2000.

**IIIX. ENVIRONMENTAL STRESS**

Lead Indicators	Country	Global Perfor. Rank	Trend and Volatility Modifiers	Risk Score
<b>Deforestation (Avg. 1990-1995)</b>				
(% Annual)	Cambodia	8.0	Single Measure	8.0
Source: World Development Indicators	Indonesia	6.0	Single Measure	6.0
	Philippines	9.0	Single Measure	9.0
<b>Arable Land (Avg. 1993-1997)</b>				
(People per Sq. Km. )	Cambodia	3.0	Worsening (+1)	4.0
Source: World Development Indicators	Indonesia	7.0	Worsening (+1)	8.0
	Philippines	7.0	Worsening (+1)	8.0
<b>Freshwater Resources (Avg. 1998)</b>				
(Cubic Meters per Capita)	Cambodia	1.0	Worsening (+1)	2.0
Source: World Development Indicators	Indonesia	3.0	Worsening (+1)	4.0
	Philippines	5.0	Worsening (+1)	6.0
<b>COMPOSITE ENVIRONMENTAL RISK SCORE</b>				
	<b>Cambodia</b>			<b>4.7</b>
	<b>Indonesia</b>			<b>6.0</b>
	<b>Philippines</b>			<b>7.7</b>

Across the Southeast Asian region, the range of current environmental issues is broad. Development challenges, expansion of industry and commerce, and ongoing conflicts in each of the three focus countries have resulted in policies and practices that have given short shrift to environmental sustainability, and have led to a number of common environmental problems. These have included deforestation, soil erosion and land degradation, loss of biodiversity, air and water pollution particularly in and around urban areas, and the degradation of marine and coastal resources. In addition, the economic crisis of 1997-1998 significantly interrupted environmental efforts already underway, as countries shifted their focus to economic recovery.

Of particular concern here, however, are those environmental factors that have contributed either indirectly or directly, or risk doing so, to the potential for violent conflict. The degradation and depletion of natural resources – particularly renewable resources, such as freshwater, arable land and forests -- can generate a variety of effects that underlie social or political instability, and increase the potential for conflict. Reduced stocks of

natural resources increase scarcity, heighten competition, and can result in increasingly unequal distribution of resources between communal groups or regions. The unequal allocation of resources in a climate of scarcity, or the capture of resources by dominant groups, can create or exacerbate cleavages within a society, creating incentives for violent conflict. Environmental degradation or depletion can also result in constrained economic productivity and growth, causing increased poverty and loss of livelihoods, leading to forced displacement or migration into ecologically-marginalized areas. Environmental factors interact powerfully with various other factors, including population pressures in the form of population growth and shifts in population density.

**Civil War and Timber Exports in Cambodia**

A particular issue of concern in Cambodia has been the widespread destruction of the country’s forests. Estimates indicate that the forest cover has been reduced from 73 percent of the country’s land area in 1969, to 58 percent in 1997.<sup>30</sup> Through the period of the Vietnamese invasion, all parties of the civil conflict financed their activities by selling

timber – the Hun Sen government through exporting logs to Japan and Vietnam, and the Khmer Rouge and other factions through selling logs to Thailand.

In the wake of increasingly evident environmental strains – including massive flooding contributed to by the intensive deforestation – a series of moratoriums have been put on the export of timber beginning in 1992. Nonetheless, illegal harvesting of forest areas continued, both on behalf of the Khmer Rouge and the Cambodian military.<sup>31</sup> Even following the decline of the Khmer Rouge, and government action to end Military sales of timber, illegal timber exports from Cambodia to neighbouring countries have continued, and have been reported to involve the collusion of the domestic and neighbouring officials.<sup>32</sup>

In addition to having fuelled the conflict itself, widespread deforestation has had pronounced effects on the livelihoods of the rural poor in Cambodia, who depend upon the natural environment for their livelihood. The increased pressure on land caused by the logging has led to shorter fallow periods between farming cycles, and a resulting loss of soil fertility and crop yields. In many cases, farmers have been pushed deeper and deeper into the forest to open new land for cultivation. Deforestation of traditional foraging lands has also impacted subsistence patterns of local communities, who have relied upon forests for food, fuel wood and construction materials for shelters. Among the most vulnerable groups are the many highlander tribes who have made their living in and around the forest for centuries. These groups have not historically received adequate compensation from last lands or proceeds from timber logging.

### **Industrial Expansion, Forest Fires and Deforestation in Indonesia**

Population pressures, transmigration and industrial expansion have created significant strains on Indonesia's natural environment, particularly with respect to deforestation and access to arable land. Indonesia possesses 10% of the planet's forest cover, and ranks third in its endowment of tropical rainforests,

but rapid deforestation has followed both widespread illegal logging activities and burning to clear land for agriculture and industry.<sup>33</sup> Traditional access to land and other natural resources has been lost to outside investors and transmigrants, as well as to large public and private development projects (such as government sponsored infrastructure and mining projects, as well as commercial timber plantations and tree crop plantations). This unrestrained exploitation of natural resources, associated environmental degradation, and the lack of appropriate compensation, have resulted in economic displacement and marginalization of indigenous groups in a number of areas across Indonesia, have severely interrupted livelihoods, and have created a sense of economic injustice arising from Jakarta's control and exploitation of valuable regional natural resources in such a way that local people reap minuscule rewards.

In Kalimantan, for example, factors such as these have exacerbated tensions between transmigrants, particularly Madurese, and indigenous Dayaks. When combined with sharp religious and ethnic differences, these factors provide powerful incentives for violent conflict. In Kalimantan, government policies to promote the development of large-scale logging, tree crop estates, and oil palm plantations have resulted in a highly systematic and devastating exploitation of Kalimantan's forests and have dispossessed Dayak communities of their traditional forest lands.<sup>34</sup> Logging and other enterprises also served to pollute rivers, deplete water and fish supplies, and reduce the amount of game in the forest, interfering with traditional subsistence patterns. As elsewhere across Indonesia, these factors have contributed significantly to the outbreak and intensification of violent conflict between communal groups.<sup>35</sup>

Burning of land has also exacerbated high levels of smog and air pollution that have affected neighbouring countries. The forest fires that beset Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, and to a lesser extent the Philippines in mid 1997, and intermittently thereafter, created some of the worst episodes of air pollution in recent global history. While

the Indonesian government blames traditional slash-and-burn farming by Dayak groups for the fires, others blame plantation and logging companies, who are believed to have started the fires with the purpose of clearing land in as cheap a manner as possible for industries such as palm-oil cultivation. In either case, the fires themselves devastated local livelihoods in fire-affected areas, and exacerbated tensions between indigenous communities and commercial companies.

In West Papua, the valuable natural resources (particularly copper and gold mines) have been appropriated by Freeport McMoran Copper and Gold, a New Orleans based transnational mining conglomerate, under contract with the central government. In addition to creating grievances through exploitation of resources in such a way that local communities profit little, environmental groups have cited Freeport's mines as emitting toxic chemicals, washing pollutants into rivers, expropriating land and uprooting indigenous communities.<sup>36</sup>

So too in Aceh, where Exxon Mobil's exploitation of oil and natural gas has resulted in dislocation of indigenous families, disruptions in traditional livelihoods, and environmental degradation, including large-scale pollution of both land and water, decreasing fish stocks, and airborne pollution resulting in respiratory ailments amongst villagers. In both West Papua and Aceh, such factors have contributed to the secessionist demands of the Free Papua Movement and the Free Aceh Movement, and have also prompted protests and demonstrations that have been responded to harshly by Indonesian armed forces.

### **Deforestation, Land Degradation and Insurgency in the Philippines**

As in Indonesia, high population densities, internal migration and industrial expansion have contributed to environmental degradation in the Philippines, particularly with respect to deforestation and diminishing access to arable lands, but also with respect to freshwater resources. Decades of uncontrolled logging and slash-and-burn agriculture the

Philippines have stripped forests, resulting in a decrease of 56 percent in forest cover over the post-war period.<sup>37</sup> These factors have resulted in the displacement of indigenous peoples, and created tensions between migrant and indigenous populations. While logging bans have been put in place in some regions such as Mindanao, ineffective enforcement has resulted in continued illegal logging.

Across the country, the long history of logging and land-clearing and have had pronounced environmental effects, including accelerated erosion, altered hydrological cycles, diminished crop production, and decreased ability of land to retain water during rainy periods, resulting in flash floods. Access to freshwater resources is becoming an issue of particular concern in the Philippines, and has resulted in water-based conflicts between communities. According to one report, in the past ten years, some 276 villages have been reported by the Philippine military as having fought over water rights, water boundaries, use and sharing.<sup>38</sup>

Studies have also demonstrated the linkages between renewable resource stress and conflict in Philippines.<sup>39</sup> In rural areas, the practice of slash-and-burn agriculture combined with population growth and migration have led to severe erosion and destruction of cropland. Previously, with lower population densities, burned land had time to regenerate while other land was cultivated, but with the rapid increase in population densities, this has become less and less the case. This has set in motion a cycle of falling food production, migration, the clearing of new plots, and further land degradation, resulting in increasingly difficult economic conditions for peasants. The deprivation of landless agricultural labourers and poor farmers displaced to the marginal lands is stoked by rebel groups such as the New People's Army (NPA), who shape the peasants' understandings of their situation and focus their discontent, motivating insurgency and violent conflict.

<sup>30</sup> United Nations Common Country Assessment, Office of the Resident Co-ordinator in Cambodia, Phnom Penh, October 1998.

<sup>31</sup> See the Inventory of Conflict and Environment (ICE), Case Study 63, Khmer Rouge and Wood Exports (November, 1997), American University, <<http://www.american.edu/TED/ice/>>.

<sup>32</sup> Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) and Telapak Indonesia, "Timber Trafficking: Illegal Logging in Indonesia, Southeast Asia and International Consumption of Illegally Sourced Timber," 2001.

<sup>33</sup> EIA, United States Department of the Environment, "Indonesia: Environmental Issues," October 2001.

<sup>34</sup> See the Inventory of Conflict and Environment (ICE), Case Study 11, Ethnic Conflict and Deforestation in Kalimantan (Indonesia), by Dianne Linder (November, 1997), American University, <<http://www.american.edu/TED/ice/>>.

<sup>35</sup> Chris Wilson, "Internal Conflict in Indonesia: Causes, Symptoms and Sustainable Resolution," Government of Australia, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group, 7 August 2001.

<sup>36</sup> See the Inventory of Conflict and Environment (ICE), Case Study 68, Irian Jaya Mine, by James Lang, American University, <<http://www.american.edu/TED/ice/>>.

<sup>37</sup> See the Trade and Environment Database (TED), Case Study 259, Philippine Wood Exports and Deforestation, by Kelly McKenna and Alyssa Bleck, American University, <<http://www.american.edu/TED/>>.

<sup>38</sup> Michael A. Bengwayan, "Water Conflict in the Philippines: Wars Loom Over the Philippines Due to Diminishing Water Resource," <[http://www.itt.com/waterbook/philippines\\_war.asp](http://www.itt.com/waterbook/philippines_war.asp)>.

<sup>39</sup> Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "Environment, Scarcity, and Violence," Princeton University Press, 1999.

**IX. INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES**

Lead Indicators	Country	Global Perfor. Rank	Trend and Volatility Modifiers	Risk Score
<b>Economic Organizations</b>		<b>(2000)</b>		
(Number of)	Cambodia	6.0	Single Measure	9.0
Source: CIA World Factbook	Indonesia	2.0	Single Measure	2.0
	Philippines	4.0	Single Measure	4.0
<b>Military / Security Organizations</b>		<b>(2000)</b>		
(Number of)	Cambodia	9.0	Single Measure	9.0
Source: CIA World Factbook	Indonesia	9.0	Single Measure	9.0
	Philippines	9.0	Single Measure	9.0
<b>UN Organizations</b>		<b>(2000)</b>		
(Number of)	Cambodia	6.0	Single Measure	6.0
Source: CIA World Factbook	Indonesia	4.0	Single Measure	4.0
	Philippines	2.0	Single Measure	2.0
<b>Multipurpose and Miscellaneous Organization</b>		<b>(2000)</b>		
(Number of)	Cambodia	7.0	Single Measure	7.0
Source: CIA World Factbook	Indonesia	3.0	Single Measure	3.0
	Philippines	3.0	Single Measure	3.0
<b>International Disputes</b>		<b>(2000)</b>		
(Number of)	Cambodia	8.0	Not Applicable	8.0
Source: CIA World Factbook	Indonesia	5.0	Not Applicable	5.0
	Philippines	9.0	Not Applicable	9.0
<b>COMPOSITE INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES SCORE</b>				
	<b>Cambodia</b>			<b>7.8</b>
	<b>Indonesia</b>			<b>4.6</b>
	<b>Philippines</b>			<b>5.4</b>

The form of a country’s engagement with outside actors – bilaterally with other countries or multilaterally through international or regional forums – can serve to reduce or, in some cases, contribute to the potential for violent conflict. On the one hand, international linkages can contribute positively to the mitigation of both intrastate and interstate conflicts, if external actors perform in a facilitating or supportive fashion, and have the operational capacity to contribute meaningfully in terms of mediation and support for reconciliation efforts. Constructive engagement – whether through diplomatic, political, commercial, trade or cultural relations – can contribute to interdependency and shared vested interests, and creates opportunity for a wide range of support mechanisms. Participation in international regimes and organizations can also help decrease security risks by codifying broad

rules and processes by which to resolve disputes peacefully.

On the other hand, weak linkages or harmful engagement with partisan actors can contribute profoundly to the potential for the outbreak or escalation of conflict. Countries with fewer diplomatic, political, commercial, trade or cultural linkages with neighbouring states, as well as international and regional organizations, and are less likely to profit from constructive engagement with outside actors, in areas such as developmental assistance, mediation, or support in peace processes. In addition, neighbouring countries might also contribute directly or indirectly to armed conflict by harbouring or supporting armed protagonists of a civil conflict. Furthermore, the interventions of neighbouring or regional actors can contribute to the potential of a civil

conflict becoming inter-state or regional in scale.

**Bilateral Relations and Disputes**

Cambodia's bilateral relations have been historically dominated by its relation with Vietnam, and current relations between the two countries have been complicated by historical events. In addition, ongoing ethnic tensions between Khmer and Vietnamese Cambodians, including anti-Vietnamese rhetoric, have further complicated the relationship of the two countries. Cambodian-Vietnamese border issues also remain highly sensitive. Many Cambodians claim that a large part of Southern Vietnam occupied by ethnic Khmer (which they refer to as "Kampuchea Krom") is part of Cambodia. Other portions of Cambodia's boundary with Vietnam have been disputed as well, such as the eastern Kampong Cham province, where Cambodia has alleged Vietnamese encroachment onto Cambodian lands.

Cambodia's bilateral relations with Thailand have also been complicated by a history of cross-border refugee movements and border disputes. From time to time there have been instances of tensions flaring up on the Thai-Cambodian land border, giving rise to occasional military skirmishes. There has been disagreement over disputed waters in the Gulf of Thailand, which has prevented both Thailand and Cambodia from producing oil and gas blocks in the Gulf, which could contribute sizeable earnings to Cambodia should the issue of sovereignty over the area be resolved.

As discussed in the previous section, illegal harvesting of Cambodian timber in border areas has irritated relations between the two countries, particularly following Thailand's banning of logging in 1988, after which time the Khmer Rouge, which controlled large parts of the Thai-Cambodia border zone, fuelled their armed campaign by exporting timber to Thailand. Despite the decline of the Khmer Rouge, illegal timber exports from Cambodia to Thailand, Laos and Vietnam have continued, and have been reported to involve the collusion of the Thai, Laotian, and Vietnamese authorities.<sup>40</sup>

**International Disputes**  
(Source: CIA World Factbook)

<b>CAMBODIA</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Offshore islands and sections of boundary with Vietnam are in dispute;</li> <li>• Maritime boundary with Vietnam not clearly defined;</li> <li>• Parts of border with Thailand are indefinite;</li> <li>• Maritime boundary with Vietnam not clearly defined.</li> </ul>
<b>INDONESIA</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sipadan and Ligitan Islands in dispute with Malaysia.</li> </ul>
<b>PHILIPPINES</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Involved in a complex dispute over the Spratly Islands with China, Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam, and possibly Brunei;</li> <li>• Claim to Malaysia's Sabah State has not been fully revoked.</li> </ul>

The Philippines' primary international disputes have involved the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, an area of rich fishing grounds and potential gas and oil deposits, which has been the object of claims by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines. While the strategy of the Philippines has been to rely on diplomacy to address the occupation of particular islands within the Philippines' 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (such as the establishing of an outpost by China in 1995 on Mischief Reef, which lies only 150 miles from the Philippines), there have been talks of expanding Philippine military capabilities to better defend its claims in the Spratlys and its 200-mile EEZ. It has also led to an interest in revitalizing its security relationship with the United States.<sup>41</sup>

The Philippines has also historically claimed Malaysia's Sabah state on Borneo island, on the grounds that it was ruled by a southern Philippine sultanate in the 15th century. Relations between Kuala Lumpur and Manila have twice broken off because of the dispute, first in 1963 and again in 1968. Tensions between the Philippines and Malaysia have also been affected by the latter's alleged past involvement in supporting the MILF in the southern Philippines, and rumours that this



support has continued into the present in the form of high-level contacts, even if in the absence of the overt provision of support.<sup>42</sup>

Indonesia’s most prominent international dispute was the question of its sovereignty over the territory of East Timor. The 1999 referendum for independence and the subsequent initiation of the United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor has largely resolved this issue. But the affair placed significant strains on Indonesia’s relations with countries such as Australia, as many Indonesia’s feel the affair has had much to do with Australia and Western countries trying to get a firm military and economic foothold in a strategically significant and potentially oil- and gas-rich territory. Other minor disputes include that concerning sovereignty over the islands of Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan in the Celebes Sea between Indonesia and Malaysia, a case which is currently pending before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

**Multilateral Relations and Linkages**

Following the Paris Peace Accords and the elections of 1993, Cambodia has taken significant steps to move out of its international isolation. The Cambodian government took its seat at the United Nations, replacing the previous government-in-exile, and the country began to join a number of major international organizations. Hun Sen’s coup in 1997 interrupted that process somewhat, with the UN deciding that Cambodia’s seat should remain vacant until the situation was resolved, which it did until the coalition government was formed in 1998. Cambodia’s expected entrance into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1997 was also delayed for the same reason until 1999. Cambodia hopes to join both Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) over the next few years.

The Philippines has sought to cultivate constructive relations with its regional neighbours through such forums as ASEAN and APEC. The Philippines also has amongst the most developed international institutional

<b>MEMBERSHIPS IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (2000)</b> Source: CIA World Factbook	<b>Cambodia</b>	<b>Indonesia</b>	<b>Philippines</b>
<b>Economic Organizations</b>			
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation	✓	✓	✓
Asian Development Bank	✓	✓	✓
Group of 15	✓	✓	✓
Group of 24	✓	✓	✓
Group of 77	✓	✓	✓
International Chamber of Commerce	✓	✓	✓
Islamic Development Bank	✓	✓	✓
OPEC	✓	✓	✓
<b>United Nations Organizations</b>			
ESCAP	✓	✓	✓
Food and Agriculture Organization	✓	✓	✓
International Atomic Energy Agency	✓	✓	✓
International Civil Aviation Organization	✓	✓	✓
International Development Association	✓	✓	✓
International Fund for Agricultural Development	✓	✓	✓
International Finance Corporation	✓	✓	✓
International Labor Organization	✓	✓	✓
International Monetary Fund	✓	✓	✓
International Maritime Organization	✓	✓	✓
International Telecommunication Union	✓	✓	✓
UN General Assembly	✓	✓	✓
UNCTAD	✓	✓	✓
UNESCO	✓	✓	✓
UNHCR	✓	✓	✓
UNIDO	✓	✓	✓
UN University	✓	✓	✓
Universal Postal Union	✓	✓	✓
World Bank	✓	✓	✓
World Health Organization	✓	✓	✓
WIPO	✓	✓	✓
World Meteorological Organization	✓	✓	✓
World Trade Organization	✓	✓	✓
<b>Security / Military Organizations</b>			
None	✓	✓	✓
<b>Miscel. &amp; Multipurpose Organizations</b>			
Agency for Cultural and Technical Coop.	✓	✓	✓
ASEAN	✓	✓	✓
Colombo Plan	✓	✓	✓
Customs Cooperation Council	✓	✓	✓
Int. Confederation of Free Trade Unions	✓	✓	✓
Int. Red Cross and Red Crescent Mvmt.	✓	✓	✓
Int. Fed. of Red Cross and Red Crescent	✓	✓	✓
Int. Hydrographic Organization	✓	✓	✓
Int. Mobile Satellite Organization	✓	✓	✓
Int. Telecommunications Satellite Org.	✓	✓	✓
Int. Criminal Police Organization	✓	✓	✓
Int. Olympic Committee	✓	✓	✓
Int. Organization for Migration	✓	✓	✓
Int. Organization for Standardization	✓	✓	✓
Nonaligned Movement	✓	✓	✓
Org. for the Prohib. of Chemical Weapons	✓	✓	✓
Organization of the Islamic Conference	✓	✓	✓
Permanent Court of Arbitration	✓	✓	✓
World Confederation of Labor	✓	✓	✓
World Federation of Trade Unions	✓	✓	✓
World Tourism Organization	✓	✓	✓

linkages amongst countries in the Southeast Asian region, particularly with respect to participation in the United Nations system organizations. It has played a key role in many of the organizations to which it is subscribed, and Philippine military and police forces have also participated in a number of multilateral peacekeeping and civilian police (CivPol) operations. The Philippines has sought to establish closer links with the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and its member countries, in order to ameliorate the disenfranchisement many Filipino Muslims feel in the predominantly Christian country.

Indonesia's size and regional prominence have historically placed it in a position of leadership in the Southeast Asian region. It was one of the founding members of both ASEAN and of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Indonesia has been a strong supporter of APEC forum, and has been instrumental in discussions towards the establishment of a regional free trade area. As the country with the world's largest Muslim population, Indonesia is a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), but since it remains a secular state, it is generally believed it have a moderating influence on the Organization. While it continues to be a prominent member

in all of these organizations and others, the country's domestic troubles have distracted somewhat from its full participation in international forums over the past few years.

**Transnational Crime and International Terrorism**

A number of transnational threats have become increasingly prominent in the Southeast Asian region over the past few years. Narcotics trafficking, for one, has been a long-standing problem in the region, particularly on mainland Southeast Asia. Cambodia has been a large producer of marijuana for the world market, and its proximity to the "Golden Triangle" combined with porous borders and weak law enforcement institutions have placed it in a position where it is becoming a major artery of distribution to third countries. The United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention has recently issued a warning that that the recent closure of Afghanistan's borders, putting an end to its status as the world's leading supplier of opium, means that Southeast Asia will need to brace itself for a possible explosion in the drug trade, and that Cambodia will likely be a weak link in regional drug control efforts.<sup>43</sup>

Illegal cross-boarder migration has also emerged as a significant transnational issue in Southeast Asia, and is increasingly viewed as a security problem. Illegal migration from Indonesia to Malaysia has occurred for decades, but became particularly acute in the aftermath of the 1997-1998 economic crisis. In Cambodia, ever greater numbers of humans are being trafficked into neighbouring Thailand for day-labour or prostitution. In fact, trafficking of women and children is an issue of major proportions across the region as a whole. The IOM has estimated that at least 200,000 to 225,000 women and children from Southeast Asia are trafficked annually, nearly one-third of the global trafficking trade. Weak laws, lack of capacities for enforcement and collusion of government, military and police officials have contributed to making human trafficking a serious issue in Cambodia, Indonesia and the Philippines.<sup>44</sup>

**Illicit Drug Production and Trafficking**

(Source: CIA World Factbook)

<b>CAMBODIA</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Possible money laundering</li> <li>• Narcotics-related corruption reportedly involving some in the government, military, and police;</li> <li>• Possible small-scale opium, heroin, and amphetamine production;</li> <li>• Large producer of cannabis for the international market.</li> </ul>
<b>INDONESIA</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Illicit producer of cannabis largely for domestic use;</li> <li>• Possible growing role as transshipment point for Golden Triangle heroin.</li> </ul>
<b>PHILIPPINES</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Exports locally produced marijuana and hashish to East Asia, the US, and other Western markets;</li> <li>• Serves as a transit point for heroin and crystal methamphetamine.</li> </ul>

Piracy has also been on the increase, both in the South China Sea and in the Malacca Strait, affecting the archipelagic countries of the Philippines and Indonesia in particular.<sup>45</sup> There has also been indications that rebel groups such as the MILF and Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, and GAM in Indonesia, are increasingly taking to piracy and other transborder crimes such as human trafficking and money laundering in order to generate funds to support their respective causes.

International Terrorism has come quickly to the forefront of international concern, and has become a primary topic of discussions at various forums for bilateral and multilateral co-operation and policy co-ordination. The Abu Sayyaf Group has been designated by the US Secretary of State as one of 29 Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), claiming that Abu Sayyaf members have developed ties to mujahidin and Osama Bin Laden's al-Qaeda, and that they have probably received support from Islamic extremists in the Middle East and South Asia. There is also concern that Abu Sayyaf has contributed to the development of regional terrorist networks and arms links involving Islamic radicals in Malaysia and

rebels operating in Indonesia's, such as in Aceh and the Maluku. Despite concerns of linkages between militant Islamic groups in Indonesia and al-Qaeda, these groups have routinely denounced these claims, and Indonesian intelligence reports have themselves indicated that there is little evidence of Indonesian groups being sponsored by international networks, or of such networks mounting operations in Indonesia.<sup>46</sup>

---

<sup>40</sup> Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) and Telapak Indonesia, "Timber Trafficking: Illegal Logging in Indonesia, Southeast Asia and International Consumption of Illegally Sourced Timber," 2001.

<sup>41</sup> Zalmay Khalilzad, David Orletsky, Jonathan Pollack, Kevin Pollpeter, Angel Rabasa, David Shlapak, Abram Shulsky, Ashley Tellis, *The United States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture*, RAND, 2001.

<sup>42</sup> Roger Mitton, "The New Crusade: In an Asia gripped by political and economic upheaval, radical Islam is on the march. Should we be worried?" *AsiaWeek*, March 2, 2001 VOL.27 NO.8, 2001.

<sup>43</sup> BBC News, "UN drugs warning for Asia," Wednesday, 26 September, 2001.

<sup>44</sup> International Organization for Migration (IOM), "Combating Trafficking in Southeast Asia: A Review of Policy and Programme Responses," 2001.

<sup>45</sup> See International Maritime Organization (IMO), "Reports On Acts Of Piracy And Armed Robbery Against Ships."

<sup>46</sup> BBC News, "Indonesia finds no al-Qaeda network," Monday, 12 November, 2001.

## DEFINITIONS OF INDICATORS

### Issue Area 1. History of Armed Conflict

**Armed Conflicts (Conflict Intensity Level) (Time Series: 1990-1999) (Source: Conflict Data Project and SIPRI Yearbook)** The "Conflict Intensity Level" describes the intensity of armed conflicts occurring within a country in a given year, based on data from the Conflict Data Project (CDP) at Uppsala University. The CDP defines an armed conflict as a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state. In order to be counted as an armed conflict, the CDP requires that there be a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths per year and per incompatibility. The scale for the Conflict Intensity Level is as follows: **1. Minor armed conflict:** At least 25 battle-related deaths per year and fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict; **2. Intermediate armed conflict:** At least 25 battle-related deaths per year and an accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths, but fewer than 1,000 per year. **3. War:** At least 1 000 battle-related deaths per year. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the "Armed Conflicts" variable, 1 is "no armed conflict" and 9 is "high degree of armed conflict."

**Refugees Produced and Residing Outside Country (Refugees by Country of Origin) (Time Series: 1990-1999) (Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), State of the World's Refugees)** The number of refugees originating in the country in question, but currently taking asylum outside the country. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the "Refugees Produced" variable, 1 is "Low number of refugees" and 9 is "High number of refugees."

**Refugees Hosted, IDP and Others of Concern (Time Series: 1995-2000) (Source: UNHCR, Annual Statistical Overview Reports)** The total number of displaced populations within a country, including Refugees (by Country of Asylum), Asylum Seekers, Returned Refugees, IDPs, Returned IDPs, and Other Populations of Concern. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the "Refugees Hosted, IDP and Others of Concern" variable, 1 is "Low number of displaced persons" and 9 is "High number of displaced persons." Note that whereas the "Refugees Produced Index" ranks the number of displaced persons produced by a country (and have sought or received asylum/residence elsewhere), the "Refugees Hosted, IDP and Others of Concern Index" ranks the number of displaced persons of various types within a country.

### Issue Area 2. Governance and Political Instability

**Level of Democracy (Overall Polity Score) (Time Series: 1990-1999) (Source: Polity IV)** The Overall Polity Score is on a 21 point scale ranging from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). In the definition of Polity IV, democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. Autocracy is defined operationally in terms of the presence of a distinctive set of political characteristics. In mature form, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. Their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite, and once in office they exercise power with few institutional constraints. For the global rank based index (nine-point scale) of the Overall Polity Score, 1 is "strongly democratic" and 9 is "strongly autocratic."

**Regime Durability (Time Series: 1985-1999) (Source: Polity IV)** The number of years since the most recent regime change (defined by a three-point change in the Overall Polity score over a period of three years or less). In calculating the Regime Durability Score, the first year during which a new (post-change) polity is established is coded as the baseline year "zero" (value = 0) and each subsequent year adds one to the value of the Durability variable. For the Global rank based index (nine-point scale) of the Regime Durability Score, 1 is "high durability" and 9 is "low durability."

**Restrictions on Civil and Political Rights (Time Series: 1985-1999) (Source: Freedom House, Annual Survey of Freedom)** Restrictions on Civil and Political Rights are scored on a 2 to 14 scale, where 2 is the highest degree of freedom and 14 is the lowest. The score is the sum of Freedom House scores for Political Rights (on a 1-7 scale) and Civil Liberties (on a 1-7 scale). In Freedom House's definition, Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, which is the system by which the polity chooses authoritative policy makers and attempts to make binding decisions affecting the national, regional, or local community. In Freedom House's definition, Civil Liberties include the freedoms to develop views, institutions, and personal autonomy apart from the state. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the combined score for Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1 is "free" and 9 is "not free."

**Restrictions on Press Freedom (Time Series: 1994-2000) (Source: Freedom House, Annual Press Freedom Survey)** Freedom House's Annual Press Freedom Survey assesses the degree to which each country permits the free flow of information on 1-100 point scale, where countries scoring 0 to 30 are regarded as having a free press, 31 to 60 as having a partly-free press, and 61 to 100 as having a not-free press. The Survey assesses a number areas of concern, including: the structure of the news-delivery system (the laws and administrative decisions and their influence on the content of the news media); the degree of political influence or control over the content of the news systems; the economic influences on news content exerted either by the government or private entrepreneurs; and actual violations against the media, including

murder, physical attack, harassment, and censorship. For the global rank based index (nine-point scale) of the Press Freedom Score, 1 is “free” and 9 is “not free.”

**Level of Corruption (Time Series: 1995-2000) (Source: Transparency International)** Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) provides a score of the perceptions of corruption within countries, ranging from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). The CPI has adopted the approach of a composite index, that averages the scores of multiple surveys concerning the perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general public. Transparency International focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. The surveys used in compiling the CPI tend to ask questions in line with the misuse of public power for private benefits, with a focus, for example, on the bribing of public officials or giving and taking of kickbacks in public procurement. As the same component surveys are not necessarily employed every year of the CPI, the comparison of CPI scores between different years is problematic. Global rank based index (nine-point scale) of the Corruption Score, where 1 is “highly clean” and 9 is “highly corrupt.”

**Issue Area 3. Militarization**

**Military Expenditure (% of GDP, Constant 1995 US\$) (Time Series: 1990-1998) (Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database)** SIPRI military expenditure figures as a percentage of GDP, expressed in US\$ Millions, at constant 1995 prices and exchange rates. Where possible, SIPRI military expenditure include all current and capital expenditure on: the armed forces, including peace keeping forces; defence ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence projects; paramilitary forces when judged to be trained, equipped and available for military operations; military space activities. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Total Military Expenditure (% of GDP, Constant 1995 US\$) variable, 1 is “low expenditure” and 9 is “high expenditure.”

**Fraction of Regional Military Expenditure (% of known total spending for 1990s) (Single Measure: 1990s) (Source: Calculated from SIPRI Military Expenditure Database)** The Fraction of Regional Military Expenditure was calculated through totaling known military expenditures for the West African Region, using SIPRI Military Expenditure data, then dividing the sum into the total expenditure for each country. The Southeast Asian Region is taken to include the following countries, which were figured into the regional total: Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei Darussalem, and the Philippines. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Fraction of Regional Military Expenditure variable, 1 is “Low fraction of Regional Military Expenditure” and 9 is “High fraction of Regional Military Expenditure.”

**Total Armed Forces (Per 1000 People) (Time Series: 1998-2000) (Source: CIFP score based on IISS Military Balance and World Development Indicators)** In order to assess and compare the portion of a country’s population involved in the operation of the military, the size of a country’s Total Armed Forces was calculated per 1000 people, based on Armed Forces data from the IISS Military Balance and Population data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Total armed forces includes both Active Forces and Reserves. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Total Armed Forces (Per 1000 People) variable, 1 is “Low number of armed forces” and 9 is “High number of armed forces.”

**Issue Area 4. Population Heterogeneity**

**Ethnic Diversity Score (Single Measure: 1990s) (Source: CIFP score based on CIA World Factbook, Levinson’s Ethnic Groups Worldwide: A Ready Reference Handbook)** The Ethnic Diversity Score is calculated on the basis of Shih’s  $D_1$  index of ethnic diversity. This measure is based on the number of ethnic groups in a country weighted by the fraction of the population each group represents. A primary strength of Shih’s measure is that both the number and the sizes of ethnic groups jointly determine the degree of ethnic diversity. The primary source of data is the CIA World Factbook, but where this source did not provide adequate percentage breakdowns of ethnic groups, CIA data was supplemented with information from Levinson’s *Ethnic Groups Worldwide: A Ready Reference Handbook*. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Ethnic Diversity Score variable, 1 is “low diversity” and 9 is “high diversity.”

**Religious Diversity Score (Single Measure: 1990s) (Source: CIFP score based on CIA World Factbook, Levinson’s Ethnic Groups Worldwide: A Ready Reference Handbook)** The Religious Diversity Score is calculated on the basis of Shih’s  $D_2$  index of religious diversity. This measure is based on the number of religious groups in a country weighted by the fraction of the population each group represents.<sup>1</sup> A primary strength of Shih’s measure is that both the number and the sizes of religious groups jointly determine the degree of religious diversity. The primary source of data is the CIA World Factbook, but where this source did not provide adequate percentage breakdowns of religious groups, CIA data was supplemented with information from Levinson’s *Ethnic Groups Worldwide: A Ready Reference Handbook*. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Religious Diversity Score variable, 1 is “low diversity” and 9 is “high diversity.”

**Risk of Ethnic Rebellion (Single Measure: 1990s) (Source: CIFP Score based on Minorities at Risk Data Set)** Minority Groups are identified by the Minorities at Risk Project as being “at risk” if the country in which they reside has a population greater than 500,000, the group itself has a population larger than 100,000 (or 1 percent of the country

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

population), and it meets at least one of the four criteria for inclusion as a "minority at risk." These four criteria are: that the group is subject to political, economic or cultural discrimination; that the group is disadvantaged from past political, economic or cultural discrimination; that the group is an politically, economically or culturally advantaged, and that advantage is being challenged; that the group supports political organizations advocating greater group rights. In his analysis of the characteristics of Minority groups at Risk as coded in the MAR data set, Gurr (2000) identified six risk factors that according to tests correctly identified 88% of existing ethnic rebellions. These factors are: the persistence of protest in recent past; the persistence of protest in the recent past; government repression; territorial concentration; group organization; regime instability; and transnational support from foreign states. Based on data from the 1998 for each of these key variables, and using logistic regression analysis, Gurr calculated scores for the risk of future rebellion for each minority at risk group. The CIFP rankings for "Risk of Ethnic Rebellion" are based on a global ranking of scores for all countries with identified Minorities at Risk (a rank score of "1" being reserved for countries with no identified Minorities at Risk), totaling for each country the individual risk scores for Minorities at Risk groups within each country. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Risk of Ethnic Rebellion Score variable, 1 is "low risk of ethnic rebellion" and 9 is "high risk of ethnic rebellion."

#### Issue Area 5. Demographic Stress

**Total Population (Time Series: 1985-1998) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship. Refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum are generally considered to be part of the population of their country of origin. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Total Population variable, 1 is "low population" and 9 is "high population."

**Population Growth Rate (Annual %) (Time Series: 1985-1998) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Annual growth rate of population from previous year. Population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of the country of origin. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Population Growth Rate variable, 1 is "low growth rate" and 9 is "high growth rate."

**Population Density (People Per Sq. km) (Time Series: 1985-1998) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Population density is midyear population divided by land area in square kilometres. Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship. Refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum are generally considered to be part of the population of their country of origin. Land area is a country's total area, excluding area under inland water bodies, national claims to continental shelf, and exclusive economic zones. In most cases the definition of inland water bodies includes major rivers and lakes. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Population Density variable, 1 is "low density" and 9 is "high density."

**Urban Population (% of Total) (Time Series: 1985-1998) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Urban population is the midyear population of areas defined as urban in each country and reported to the United Nations. It is measured here as a percentage of the total population. Data is sourced from the United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects: The 1998 Revision. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Urban Population variable, 1 is "low population" and 9 is "high population."

**Urban Population Growth Rate (Annual %) (Time Series: 1985-1998) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Annual growth rate of urban population from previous year. Urban population is the midyear population of areas defined as urban in each country and reported to the United Nations. Data is sourced from the United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects: The 1998 Revision. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Urban Population Growth Rate variable, 1 is "low growth rate" and 9 is "high growth rate."

**Youth Bulge (Pop. Aged 0-14 as a % of Total) (Time Series: 1985-1998) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Total population between the ages 0 to 14. Population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of the country of origin. Data based on World Bank staff estimates. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Youth Bulge variable, 1 is "low growth rate" and 9 is "high growth rate."

#### Issue Area 6. Economic Performance

**GDP Growth Rate (Annual %) (Time Series: 1985-1998) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 1995 U.S. dollars. GDP measures the total output of goods and services for final use occurring within the domestic territory of a given country, regardless of the allocation to domestic and foreign claims. Gross domestic product at purchaser prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. The residency of an institution is determined on the basis of economic interest in the territory for more than a year. Data derived from World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.

For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the GDP Growth Rate (Annual %) variable, where 1 is "high Growth Rate" and 9 is "low Growth Rate."

**GDP Per Capita (PPP, Current International \$) (Time Series: 1985-1998) (Source: World Development Indicators)** GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). GDP PPP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar in the United States. GDP measures the total output of goods and services for final use occurring within the domestic territory of a given country, regardless of the allocation to domestic and foreign claims. Gross domestic product at purchaser prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. The residency of an institution is determined on the basis of economic interest in the territory for more than a year. Data are in current international dollars. Data derived from World Bank, International Comparison Programme database. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the GDP Per Capita (PPP, Current International \$) variable, where 1 is "low GDP Per Capita" and 9 is "high GDP Per Capita."

**Inflation (Consumer Prices, annual %) (Time Series: 1985-1998) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a fixed basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. Data derived from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and data files. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Inflation (Consumer Prices, annual %) variable, 1 is "low inflation" and 9 is "high inflation."

**Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (% of GNP) (Time Series: 1985-1998) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Foreign direct investment is net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. Data are figured as a percentage of GNP. Data are derived from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and Balance of Payments databases, and World Bank, Global Development Finance 2000. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (% of GNP) variable, 1 is "high investment" and 9 is "low investment."

**Total Debt Service (% of GNI) (Time Series: 1985-1998) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Total debt service, figured as a percentage of Gross National Income, is the sum of principal repayments and interest actually paid in foreign currency, goods, or services on long-term debt, interest paid on short-term debt, and repayments (repurchases and charges) to the IMF. Data derived from World Bank, Global Development Finance 2000. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Total Debt Service (% of GNI) variable, 1 is "low debt service" and 9 is "high debt service."

**Trade Openness (Trade as a % of GDP) (Time Series: 1985-1998) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product. Exports and Imports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services provided to or received from the rest of the world. Included is the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. Labour and property income (formerly called factor services) is excluded. Data are in constant 1995 U.S. dollars. Data derived from World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Trade Openness (Trade as a % of GDP) variable, 1 is "high openness" and 9 is "low openness."

**Inequality Score (GINI Coefficient) (Single Measure) (Source: World Income Inequality Database)** The Gini index provides a convenient summary measure of the degree of inequality, ranging, in ideal terms, from 0 (absolute equality) to 100 (absolute inequality). Inequality in the distribution of income is reflected in the percentage shares of either income or consumption accruing to segments of the population ranked by either income or consumption (expenditure) levels. Data on personal or household income or consumption come from nationally representative house-hold surveys. The data included in the CIPF refer to different years between 1985 and 1999, and the rankings are based on either per capita income or consumption (expenditure). Because the underlying household surveys differ in method and in the type of data collected, the distribution indicators are not reliably comparable across countries. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Inequality Score (GINI Coefficient) variable, 1 is "low inequality" and 9 is "high inequality."

## Issue Area 7. Human Development

**Access to Improved Water Source (% of Total Population) (Time Series: 1990, 2000) (Source: UNICEF/WHO - Global Water and Sanitation Assessment Report)** Data were collected from two main sources: assessment questionnaires and household surveys conducted by UNICEF and WHO. The assessment questionnaires defined access to water supply in terms of the types of technology and levels of service afforded. This included house connections, public standpipes, boreholes with handpumps, protected dug wells, protected springs and rainwater collection; allowance was also made for other locally-defined technologies. "Reasonable access" was broadly defined as the availability of at least 20 litres per person per day from a source within one kilometer of the user's dwelling. Types of source that did not give reasonable and ready access to water for domestic hygiene purposes, such as tanker trucks and bottled water, were not included. For

the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Access to Improved Water Source (% of Total Population) variable, 1 is "high % with access" and 9 is "low % with access."

**Access to Sanitation (% of Total Population) (Time Series: 1990, 2000) (Source: UNICEF/WHO - Global Water and Sanitation Assessment Report)** Data were collected from two main sources: assessment questionnaires and household surveys conducted by UNICEF and WHO. The assessment questionnaires defined access to sanitation in terms of the types of technology and levels of service afforded. This included connection to a sewer or septic tank system, pour-flush latrine, simple pit or ventilated improved pit latrine, again with allowance for acceptable local technologies. The excreta disposal system was considered adequate if it was private or shared (but not public) and if it hygienically separated human excreta from human contact. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Access to Sanitation (% of Total Population) variable, 1 is "high % with access" and 9 is "low % with access."

**Life Expectancy (Years) (Time Series: 1987-1998 (87, 90, 92, 97, 98)) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a new-born infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. Based on World Bank staff estimates. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Life Expectancy (Years) variable, 1 is "high life expectancy" and 9 is "low life expectancy."

**Infant Mortality Rate (Per 1,000 Live Births) (Time Series: 1987-1998 (87, 90, 92, 97, 98)) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Infant mortality rate is the number of infants who die before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year. Based on World Bank staff estimates. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Infant Mortality Rate (Per 1,000 Live Births) variable, 1 is "low mortality rate" and 9 is "high mortality rate."

**Maternal Mortality Rate (Per 100,000 Live Births) (Single Measure: 1995) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Maternal Mortality Rate is the number of maternal deaths per 100,000 live births. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Maternal Mortality Rate (Per 100,000 Live Births) variable, 1 is "low mortality" and 9 is "high mortality."

**HIV/AIDS (% of Adult Population) (Time Series: 1997, 1999) (Source: UNAIDS Epidemic Reports)** To calculate the adult HIV prevalence rate, the estimated number of adults living with HIV/AIDS at the end of each year was divided by that year's adult population. UNAIDS estimates include all people with HIV infection, whether or not they have developed symptoms of AIDS, alive at the end of the year. Adult population is defined as men and women aged 15-49. This age range captures those in their most sexually active years. While the risk of HIV infection obviously continues beyond 50, the vast majority of those with substantial risk behaviour are likely to have become infected by this age. Since population structures differ greatly from one country to another, especially for children and the upper adult ages, the restriction of "adults" to 15-49-year-olds has the advantage of making different populations more comparable. This age range was used as the denominator in calculating the adult HIV prevalence rate. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the HIV/AIDS (% of Adult Population) variable, 1 is "low prevalence of HIV/AIDS" and 9 is "high prevalence of HIV/AIDS."

**Primary School Enrollment (% of Relevant Age Group) (Time Series: 1985-1997) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Net enrollment ratio is the ratio of the number of children of official school age (as defined by the national education system) who are enrolled in school to the population of the corresponding official school age. Primary education provides children with basic reading, writing, and mathematics skills along with an elementary understanding of such subjects as history, geography, natural science, social science, art, and music. Based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). Data derived from United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization Statistics. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Primary School Enrollment (% of Relevant Age Group) variable, 1 is "high enrollment" and 9 is "low enrollment."

**Secondary School Enrollment (% of Relevant Age Group) (Time Series: 1985-1997) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Net enrollment ratio is the ratio of the number of children of official school age (as defined by the national education system) who are enrolled in school to the population of the corresponding official school age. Secondary education completes the provision of basic education that began at the primary level, and aims at laying the foundations for lifelong learning and human development, by offering more subject- or skill-oriented instruction using more specialized teachers. Based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). Data derived from United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization Statistics. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Secondary School Enrollment (% of Relevant Age Group) variable, 1 is "high enrollment" and 9 is "low enrollment."

**Children in Labour Force (% of 10-14 Age Group) (Time Series: 1990-1998 (90, 95, 98)) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Children 10-14 in the labour force is the share of that age group that is active in the labour force. Labour force comprises all people who meet the International Labour Organization's definition of the economically active population. Data is derived from International Labour Organization statistics. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Children in Labour Force (% of 10-14 Age Group) variable, 1 is "low % of children in labour force" and 9 is "high % of children in labour force."



### Issue Area 8. Environmental Stress

**Rate of Deforestation (% Change) (Single Measure: 1990-1995) (Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank Atlas)** Definitions of forest area vary among countries. Land area is the country's total area, excluding the area under inland bodies of water. Annual Average Deforestation is calculated on the basis of the average annual percentage reduction in Total Forest Coverage. Data on land area and forests are from the Food and Agriculture Organization. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Rate of Deforestation variable, 1 is "low deforestation" and 9 is "high deforestation."

**People per Square km of Arable Land (1994-1998) (Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank Atlas)** People per Square km of Arable Land. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Rate of Deforestation variable, 1 is "high amount of arable land" and 9 is "low amount of arable land."

**Freshwater Resources (Cubic Meters per Capita) (Single Measure: 1998) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Cubic meters of freshwater resources per capita. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Freshwater Resources variable, 1 is "high amount of freshwater resources" and 9 is "low amount of freshwater resources."

### Issue Area 9. International Linkages

**Economic Organizations (Single Measure: 2000) (Source: CIA World Factbook)** The number of organizations, based on CIA World Factbook data on memberships, coded by the CIPF as having a mandate focusing primarily on economic matters. To construct an index of membership in economic organizations, the total GDP represented by each organization (based on the total GDPs of all member states [using 1998 GDP figures at Market Prices in 1995 US\$ millions]) was calculated. These organizational totals were summed for each country to provide an indication of the strength of the Economic Organizations to which the country belonged. Countries were sorted from highest to lowest, divided into nine equal categories, and then assigned numbers ranging from 1 to 9 based on the category to which they belonged (where 1 = High Membership and 9 = Low Membership).

**Military/Security Alliances (Single Measure: 2000) (Source: CIA World Factbook)** The number of organizations, based on CIA World Factbook data on memberships, coded by the CIPF as having a mandate focusing primarily on military and security matters. To construct an index of membership in Military/Security Organizations, the total armed forces represented by each organization (based on the total armed forces of all member states [using 2000 Armed Forces numbers from IISS's Military Balance]) was calculated. Then, these organizational totals were summed for each country to provide an indication of the strength of the Military/Security Organizations to which the country belonged. Countries were sorted from highest to lowest, divided into nine equal categories, and then assigned numbers ranging from 1 to 9 based on the category to which they belonged (where 1 = High Membership and 9 = Low Membership).

**UN Organizations (Single Measure: 2000) (Source: CIA World Factbook)** The number of organizations of which a country is a member, based on CIA World Factbook data on memberships, which are formally part of the United Nations System. To assess each country's stature within the United Nations (UN), the number of UN organizations to which a country belonged was used as the indicator of a country's relative dominance. Countries were sorted from highest to lowest, divided into nine equal categories, and then assigned numbers ranging from 1 to 9 based on the category to which they belonged (where 1 = High Membership and 9 = Low Membership).

**Multipurpose and Miscellaneous Organizations (Single Measure: 2000) (Source: CIA World Factbook)** Multipurpose organizations include those organizations, based on CIA World Factbook data on memberships, coded by the CIPF as having a mandate that crossed various sectors of activity. Miscellaneous organizations include those organizations coded by the CIPF as having a mandate focusing primarily on areas not included above, or otherwise not fitting into any of the above categories. A procedure similar to that of UN organizations was used to assess the strength of each country's memberships in multipurpose organizations or miscellaneous organizations (i.e. organizations that could not be classified as economic, military/security, UN, or multi-purpose.) The number of such organizations to which a country belonged was used as the indicator of a country's relative dominance. Countries were sorted from highest to lowest, divided into nine equal categories, and then assigned numbers ranging from 1 to 9 based on the category to which they belonged (where 1 = High Membership and 9 = Low Membership).

**Total International Disputes (Time Series: 1999-2000) (Source: CIA World Factbook)** To assess a country's relationship with its neighbours, CIPF examined the number of international disputes in which the country was involved. International disputes are defined by the CIA World Factbook to include a wide range of situations that range from traditional bilateral boundary disputes to unilateral claims of one sort or another. The Total International Disputes variable counts the total annual number of international disputes that appear annually in the CIA World Factbook. In cases where a country claims a territory that is also claimed by a number of other countries, disputes are counted for each of the other countries individually. If a country has multiple disputes with another country, again these are counted separately. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Total International Disputes variable, where 1 is "no disputes" and 9 is "many disputes."

## DATA SOURCES

### Freedom House

- Annual Review of Freedom  
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm>
- Annual Press Freedom Survey  
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/presssurvey.htm>

### International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

- Military Balance Annual  
<http://www.iiss.org/pub/milbal1.asp>

### Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)

- Epidemic Updates and Reports  
[http://www.unaids.org/epidemic\\_update/](http://www.unaids.org/epidemic_update/)

### Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

- Military Expenditure Database  
[http://projects.sipri.se/milex/mex\\_database1.html](http://projects.sipri.se/milex/mex_database1.html)
- SIPRI Yearbooks  
<http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/yearb.html>

### Transparency International

- Corruption Perceptions Index  
<http://www.transparency.org/documents/cpi/2001/cpi2001.html>  
Archive (1995 to 2000): <http://www.gwdg.de/~uwvw/>

### United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) / World Health Organization (WHO)

- Global Water and Sanitation Assessment Reports  
[http://www.who.int/water\\_sanitation\\_health/Globassessment/GlobalTOC.htm](http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/Globassessment/GlobalTOC.htm)

### United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

- Human Development Reports  
<http://www.undp.org/hdro/>

### United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

- Statistical Overviews  
<http://www.unhcr.ch/statist/main.htm>
- State of the World's Refugees Reports  
<http://www.unhcr.ch/sowr2000/toc2.htm>

### United Nations Statistical Division

- United Nations Statistical Yearbook  
<http://esa.un.org/unsd/pubs/>

### United Nations University (UNU) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

- World Income Inequality Database  
<http://www.undp.org/poverty/initiatives/wider/wiid.htm>

### United States Central Intelligence Agency

- World Factbook Annuals  
<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/>  
Archive (1992 to 1999): <http://www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/>

**University of Maryland, Centre for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM)**

- Polity IV Project Dataset  
<http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/polity/>
- Minorities at Risk Project Dataset  
<http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/>

**Uppsala University**

- Conflict Data Project  
<http://www.pcr.uu.se/data.htm>

**World Bank**

- World Development Indicators  
<http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi/home.html>

## REFERENCES

- BBC News, "UN drugs warning for Asia," Wednesday, 26 September, 2001.
- BBC News, "Indonesia finds no al-Qaeda network," Monday, 12 November, 2001.
- Bengwayan, Michael A., "Water Conflict in the Philippines: Wars Loom Over the Philippines Due to Diminishing Water Resource," <[http://www.itt.com/waterbook/philippines\\_war.asp](http://www.itt.com/waterbook/philippines_war.asp)>.
- BPS-Statistics Indonesia, BAPPENAS, UNDP, "Towards a New Consensus: Democracy and Human Development in Indonesia," Indonesia Human Development Report, 2001.
- Crouch, Harold, "Establishing Civilian Supremacy in Southeast Asia," IN Uwe Johannes and James Gomez, Eds., "Democratic Transitions in Asia," Singapore: Select Publishing, 2001.
- Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), United States Department of the Environment, "Indonesia: Environmental Issues," October 2001.
- Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) and Telapak Indonesia, "Timber Trafficking: Illegal Logging in Indonesia, Southeast Asia and International Consumption of Illegally Sourced Timber," 2001.
- Gurr, Ted Robert, "Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century," United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000.
- Homer-Dixon, Thomas F., "Environment, Scarcity, and Violence," Princeton University Press, 1999.
- Human Development Network, UNDP Philippines, "Quality, Relevance and Access in Basic Education, Philippine Human Development Report," 2000.
- International Crisis Group (ICG), "Cambodia: The Elusive Peace Dividend," ICG Asia Report N° 8, Phnom Penh/Brussels, 11 August 2000.
- International Organization for Migration (IOM), "Combating Trafficking in Southeast Asia: A Review of Policy and Programme Responses," 2001.
- International Maritime Organization (IMO), "Reports On Acts Of Piracy And Armed Robbery Against Ships."
- Inventory of Conflict and Environment (ICE), Case Study 11, Ethnic Conflict and Deforestation in Kalimantan (Indonesia), by Dianne Linder (November, 1997), American University, <<http://www.american.edu/TED/ice/>>.
- Inventory of Conflict and Environment (ICE), Case Study 63, Khmer Rouge and Wood Exports (November, 1997), American University, <<http://www.american.edu/TED/ice/>>.
- Inventory of Conflict and Environment (ICE), Case Study 68, Irian Jaya Mine, by James Lang, American University, <<http://www.american.edu/TED/ice/>>.
- Khalilzad, Zalmay, David Orletsky, Jonathan Pollack, Kevin Pollpeter, Angel Rabasa, David Shlapak, Abram Shulsky, Ashley Tellis, "The United States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture," RAND, 2001.

Levinson, David, *Ethnic Groups Worldwide: A Ready Reference Handbook*, Oryx Press, Westport, Conn., 1998.

Malley, Michael, "Social Cohesion and Conflict Management in Indonesia," Paper Prepared for the Asia Regional Consultation on Social Cohesion and Conflict Management, Manila, March 16-17, 2000.

Mishra, Satish, "History in the Making: A Systematic Transition in Indonesia," UNSFIR Working Paper 13/01/02, 2001.

Roger Mitton, "The New Crusade: In an Asia gripped by political and economic upheaval, radical Islam is on the march. Should we be worried?" *AsiaWeek*, March 2, 2001 VOL.27 NO.8, 2001.

Myers, C. N., Sotharith, C., and Calabria, M., "Economic Costs of AIDS in Cambodia: Some Preliminary Estimates," Paper prepared for UNAIDS, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 1997. United Nations Common Country Assessment 1998, Office of the Resident Co-ordinator in Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

Trade and Environment Database (TED), Case Study 259, Philippine Wood Exports and Deforestation, by Kelly McKenna and Alyssa Bleck, American University, <<http://www.american.edu/TED/>>.

UNAIDS, Report on the global HIV/AIDS epidemic, June, 2000.

United Nations Common Country Assessment, Office of the Resident Co-ordinator in Cambodia, Phnom Penh, 1998.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), "State of the World's Refugees 2000," for a discussion.

United States Committee for Refugees Country Reports for Cambodia, Indonesia, and the Philippines <<http://www.refugees.org/>>.

United States Department of State, Philippines Country Brief, 2001.

Wilson, Chris, "Internal Conflict in Indonesia: Causes, Symptoms and Sustainable Resolution," Government of Australia, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group, 7 August 2001.

World Health Organization (WHO) Indonesia, "Plan of Action 2000-2001," <<http://www.who.or.id>>.