

# CONFLICT RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT

## WEST AFRICA: MANO RIVER UNION AND SENEGAMBIA

Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Senegal

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Prepared by:  
Susan Ampleford, CIFP team members and Charity Wakaba\*

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\*David Carment, Principal Investigator © April 2002.  
Feedback is encouraged, and may be sent to <[cifp@carleton.ca](mailto:cifp@carleton.ca)>.  
<http://www.carleton.ca>

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**OVERVIEW**

This report provides an indicators-based assessment of conflict risk in the five West African countries of Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. The analysis crosses nine interrelated issue areas identified as underlying potential for conflict development: History of Armed Conflict; Governance and Political Instability; Militarization; Population Heterogeneity; Demographic Stress; Economic Performance; Human Development; Environmental Stress; and International Linkages.

CIFP risk assessment reports are regional in focus, under the premise that “risk potential” is a relative term, and that a regional comparative focus allows not only the identification of areas of concern within target countries but provides a means of assigning relative priority to different areas of concern on a regional basis.

CIFP assesses country risk by means of an overall country “risk index.” The higher the risk index, the greater the assessed risk of conflict development, escalation, or continuation that country faces. The risk index consists of the weighted average of nine composite indicators, corresponding to the nine issue areas outlined above, each of which consists of the average of its composite lead indicators. In all, 44 lead indicators are assessed as part of this index.

Risk indices occur on a scale of 0 to 12, where 0 to 3.4 are considered low risk, 3.5 to 6.9 are considered medium risk, 7 to 9.5 are considered high risk, and 9.5-12 are considered very high risk. The assessment provided in this report reflects the following overall country risk indices for Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Senegal.

<b>Gambia</b>	<b>5.0</b>	<b>Medium Risk</b>
<b>Guinea</b>	<b>5.4</b>	<b>Medium Risk</b>
<b>Liberia<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>6.4</b>	<b>Medium Risk</b>
<b>Senegal</b>	<b>5.3</b>	<b>Medium Risk</b>
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	<b>7.2</b>	<b>High Risk</b>

The assessment identifies the following issue areas as being of particular concern for the respective countries.

<b>Gambia</b>		
Low Levels of Human Development	7.4	High Risk
<b>Guinea</b>		
Weak Governance and Political Instability	7.7	High Risk
Low Levels of Human Development	7.7	High Risk
<b>Liberia</b>		
History of Armed Conflict	7.1	High Risk
Weak Governance and Political Instability	7.5	High Risk
Low Levels of Human Development	7.3	High Risk
<b>Senegal</b>		
No aggregate issue-area scores in High Risk category.		
<b>Sierra Leone</b>		
History of Armed Conflict	9.3	High Risk
Weak Governance and Political Instability	8.3	High Risk
Unstable Economic Performance	9.6	Very High Risk
Low Levels of Human Development	7.9	High Risk

These results from the indicator-based analysis serve to focus analytical attention on high-risk issue areas, in order to continue with more in-depth qualitative elaboration.

<sup>1</sup> Note that in the case of Liberia, there is a lack of available data. This lack of data reflects the absence of state capacity for much of the 1990s. While the calculations and the methodology indicate a medium level of risk, this must be interpreted with caution. If data were available, the estimation is that Liberia would be a High Risk rating.

## INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

### CIFP within the FEWER Network

The CIFP project was initiated by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs in 1997. The project represents an on-going effort to identify and assemble statistical information conveying the key features of the political, economic, social and cultural environments of countries around the world.

The CIFP database currently includes statistical data, in the form of over one hundred performance indicators for 196 countries, spanning fifteen years (1985 to 2000) for most indicators. These indicators are drawn from a variety of open sources, including the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and the Minorities at Risk and POLITY IV data sets from the University of Maryland.

Currently, with the generous support of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), CIFP has begun work on a pilot project in partnership with the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER). The pilot project is intended to establish a framework for communications, information gathering and sharing, and operational co-ordination between CIFP, the FEWER Secretariat, and FEWER network members in the field, and to work towards a "good practice" conflict early warning system involving the various members of the FEWER network.

As part of its contribution to these new networks, CIFP is producing conflict risk assessment reports for two target regions, Southeast Asia and West Africa. CIFP risk assessment reports are regional in focus, under the premise that "risk potential" is a relative term, and that a regional comparative focus allows not only the identification of areas of concern within target countries but provides a means of assigning relative priority to different areas of concern on a regional basis. These reports are intended to precede and

serve as a ground for subsequent country-specific early-warning reports that will integrate various analytical methods and data sources (local analysis, events data, structural data) available from within the FEWER network.

Within the framework employed by CIFP and FEWER, "risk assessment" and "early warning" are viewed as complementary but distinct modes of analysis that can be distinguished in several important respects. Risk assessments identify background and intervening conditions that establish the risk for potential crisis and conflict. In doing so, they precede and complement early warning efforts through focusing monitoring and analytical attention on high risk situations as they develop, and through providing a framework for interpreting the results of real-time monitoring of events.

While the primary goal of risk assessment is to diagnose a situation rather than devise solutions, early warning is a process designed to pinpoint appropriate, forward looking, preventive strategies. Accordingly, FEWER defines early warning as the systematic collection and analysis of information for the purposes of anticipating the escalation of violent conflict, developing strategic responses to these crises, and presenting options to critical actors for the purposes of decision making and response.

### Methodological Notes on Assessing Structural Indicators of Conflict Potential

In order to establish a framework for analyzing the emergence of violent conflict, it is necessary to understand how crises typically develop and which possible avoidance efforts can be effective. In general terms, the factors that contribute to conflict escalation are categorized as "structural factors," "accelerators," and "triggers."

- "Structural factors" or "root causes" are those factors that form the pre-conditions of crisis situations, such as systematic political exclusion, shifts in demographic balance, entrenched economic inequities, economic decline and ecological deterioration;
- "Accelerators" or "precipitators" are factors that work upon root causes in

order to increase their level of significance; and,

- “Triggers” are sudden events that act as catalysts igniting a crisis or conflict, such as the assassination of a leader, election fraud, or a political scandal.

Within FEWER, CIFP is positioned to provide data and analysis focusing on the “structural” level, in order to assess the degree of risk in given country-contexts, and to assess whether shifts in country performance indicators (such as ameliorating or worsening economic performance) are increasing or mitigating the severity of this risk. Local analysis and events-monitoring systems are best positioned to monitor and provide analysis on “triggers” or “catalysing events” that are likely to precipitate the onset of conflict in high-risk situations.

In order to assess the “structural factors” or “root causes” underlying conflict potential, it is necessary to identify a set of associated indicators. Often a crisis has no single cause and furthermore the different contributing causes vary in importance – variables may at times reinforce each other, while at other times they may neutralize one another. Thus, analysis of conflict potential requires an assessment of the relative importance of different indicators and their inter-relationships.

The selection of structural indicators for the CIFP risk assessment reports was informed by a number of factors. It is based largely on the results of FEWER’s collaborative work with local early warning analysts and their understanding of the type of information needed to effectively assess conflict potential. In addition, indicators have been included on the basis of evidence in the conflict analysis literature of their being strong crisis predictors.

The structural indicators included in the CIFP risk assessment reports cross nine interrelated issue areas identified as underlying potential for conflict development: History of Armed Conflict; Governance and Political Instability; Militarization; Population Heterogeneity; Demographic Stress; Economic Performance; Human Development; Environmental Stress; and International Linkages.

CIFP rates a country’s degree of “risk” in terms of this set of structural indicators. “Risk” is considered high in cases where a country has an enduring history of armed conflict, is politically unstable or has unrepresentative or repressive political institutions, is heavily militarized, has a heterogeneous and divided population, suffers from significant demographic and environmental stresses, has had poor economic performance and low levels of human development, and is engaged with the international community in ways that detract from, rather than contribute to, peaceful conflict management.

On the other hand, “risk” is considered low in countries that have a history of successfully managing conflict without resorting to violence, that have developed stable democratic political institutions, that respect fundamental human rights, that are less heavily militarized, that lack profound ethnic or religious cleavages or demographic stresses, that have achieved sustainable levels of economic development as well as healthy social and environment conditions, and that are free from serious external conflicts and threats.

### **Operationalization of Indicators: CIFP Risk Index**

CIFP assesses country risk by means of an overall country risk index. The higher the risk index, the greater the assessed risk of conflict that country faces. The risk index consists of the weighted average of nine composite indicators, corresponding to the nine issue areas outlined above, each of which consists of the average of its composite lead indicators.

“Risk potential” is a relative term that has meaning only with respect to a country’s performance and risk vis à vis other countries in the international system. Accordingly, each lead indicator is converted to a 9-point score on the basis of its performance relative to a global sample of countries. This global sample of countries is ranked from highest to lowest level of performance, divided into nine equal categories, then assigned score numbers ranging from 1 to 9 based on their rank position within the sample. This scoring

procedure is intended to facilitate the identification of key areas of concern, and as a way of directing attention to potential problem areas.

In general, a higher score (in the 7 to 9 range) indicates that the country is performing poorly relative to other countries (i.e. high levels of armed conflict, autocratic governments, poor economic performance, low levels of human development) or that a country's standing is a cause for concern (i.e. significant youth bulge, high levels of ethnic diversity). A lower score (in the 1 to 3 range) indicates the country is performing well relative to other countries (i.e. no or little armed conflict, democratic governments, strong economic performance, high levels of human development) or that a country's standing is less of a cause for concern (i.e. no youth bulge, low levels of ethnic diversity). Values in the middle 4 to 6 range indicate moderate levels of performance approaching the global mean.

Since relative country performance can vary significantly from year to year (as in the case of economic shocks), averages are taken for global rank scores over a five-year time frame. The most recent five years contained in the CIFP data set are used for this index (generally 1996 to 2000). The 1 to 9 Global Rank score forms the "base scale" upon which individual indicator risk scores are calculated. This score is then adjusted with a "trend and volatility modifier," which can raise or lower a global rank score on the basis of whether an indicator is assessed as improving (-1 to the global rank score), worsening (+1), or demonstrating a high degree of volatility that is deemed to have a particularly destabilizing effect (+1 to +2, depending on the degree).<sup>1</sup>

The trend and volatility modifier allows the analyst a degree of freedom in qualitatively adjusting the global rank score to allow for observations of significant trends or destabilizing changes. The direction of change, whether worsening or improving, indicates whether a country's performance for a given indicator is even more likely to contribute to conflict potential (i.e. increasing restrictions on civil and political rights, worsening economic conditions, increasing demographic or environmental stresses) or detract from it (i.e. greater respect for civil

and political rights, improving economic conditions, decreasing demographic or environmental stresses). So too is the degree of volatility an important component of the risk assessment calculation, considering that instability across a given indicator (i.e. regime transitions, a massive influx of refugees, fluctuations in military expenditure or foreign direct investment) can have a profoundly destabilizing effect and sharply increase the potential for conflict.

Indicator risk scores on a 13-point scale (0 to 12) are derived for each leading indicator within each of the nine issue areas. In order to arrive at composite indicators for each of the nine issue areas, leading indicator risk scores within each area are averaged. These nine composite issue area scores are themselves averaged to determine a country's overall risk index. However, in order to further elaborate the relative impact of each of these issue areas upon the conflict development process within a country, composite indicators are assigned weights. CIFP has derived these weights deductively, based on inferences about the causal relationships between issue areas. The weight assigned to each composite indicator is based on the number of direct causal linkages it is postulated to have with the others, thereby reflecting the magnitude of each issue area's impact upon overall risk.<sup>2</sup>

The following table present the scores for each of the individual lead indicators, the composite issue area ratings, and the overall risk indices for Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.

<sup>1</sup> Indicators for which only a single year is available are measured only in terms of global rank, without trend and volatility modifiers.

<sup>2</sup> For a more detailed explanation of the weighting scheme, refer to the CIFP Risk Assessment Template, August 2000.

**RISK INDICES**

<b>Issue Areas and Lead Indicators</b>	<b>Years of Measure</b>	<b>Gambia</b>	<b>Guinea</b>	<b>Liberia</b>	<b>Senegal</b>	<b>Sierra Leone</b>
<b>History of Armed Conflict (weight = 8)</b>						
Armed Conflicts	1995-1999	1.0	1.0	2.2	6.2	8.4
# of Refugees Produced	1995-1999	1.0	1.0	9.6	3.0	10.4
# of Refugees Hosted, IDPs, Others of Concern	1996-2000	7.6	9.0	9.6	7.0	9.0
<b>Composite Issue Area Risk Rating</b>	--	<b>3.2</b>	<b>3.7</b>	<b>7.1</b>	<b>5.4</b>	<b>9.3</b>
<b>Governance and Political Instability (weight = 5)</b>						
Level of Democracy	1995-1999	8.0	6.0	7.0	6.0	9.5
Regime Durability	1995-1999	6.6	7.0	7.8	3.0	10.8
Restrictions on Civil and Political Rights	1996-2000	7.4	8.0	7.0	4.8	7.6
Restrictions on Press Freedom	1996-2000	8.4	9.4	6.8	6.0	9.4
Level of Corruption	1997-1998	4.0	8.0	9.0	5.0	4.0
<b>Composite Issue Area Risk Rating</b>	--	<b>6.9</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>7.5</b>	<b>5.0</b>	<b>8.3</b>
<b>Militarization (weight =5)</b>						
Military Exp. (% of GDP, Constant 1995 US\$)	1995-1999	3.8	2.0	..	4.0	5.3
Fraction of Regional Mil. Exp. (% of known total spending for decade)	1990-1999	3.0	5.0	4.0	8.0	4.0
Total Armed Forces (per 10,000)	1995-1999	0.0	0.7	5.0	1.0	2.0
<b>Composite Issue Area Risk Rating</b>	--	<b>2.3</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>3.8</b>
<b>Population Heterogeneity (weight = 4)</b>						
Ethnic Diversity	1990s	8.0	8.0	9.0	8.0	8.0
Religious Diversity	1990s	3.0	4.0	8.0	3.0	7.0
Risk of Ethnic Rebellion (Single Measure)	c. 1998	1.0	4.0	1.0	2.0	5.0
<b>Composite Issue Area Risk Rating</b>	--	<b>4.0</b>	<b>5.3</b>	<b>6.0</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>6.7</b>
<b>Demographic Stress (weight = 5)</b>						
Total Population	1995-1999	2.4	5.0	3.0	6.0	4.0
Population Growth Rate (Annual %)	1995-1999	8.0	5.8	8.8	9.0	6.8
Population Density (people per sq km)	1995-1999	7.0	3.0	3.0	4.0	5.0
Urban Population (% of Total)	1995-1999	2.0	2.0	4.0	4.0	3.0
Urban Population Growth Rate (Annual %)	1994-1998	8.0	7.0	8.6	6.8	6.6
Youth Bulge (Pop. Aged 0-14 as a % of Total)	1995-1999	7.8	7.8	7.2	7.0	8.0
<b>Composite Issue Area Risk Rating</b>	--	<b>5.9</b>	<b>5.1</b>	<b>5.8</b>	<b>6.1</b>	<b>5.6</b>
<b>Economic Performance (weight = 5)</b>						
GDP Growth Rate (Annual %)	1995-1999	5.8	6.2	..	2.2	10.8
GDP Per Capita (PPP, Current International \$)	1995-1999	7.0	6.0	..	7.0	11.0
Inflation [Consumer prices (annual %)]	1995-1999	4.2	..	..	3.8	11.2
Official exchange rate (LCU/US\$, period avg.)	1995-1999	5.0	8.2	..	8.0	9.4
FDI [Net inflows (% of GDP)]	1995-1999	3.8	8.4	..	7.0	9.0
Total Debt Service (% of GNP)	1995-1999	6.8	5.0	..	6.4	6.0
Trade Openness (Trade as a % of GDP)	1996. 1997	1.6	8.0	..	6.0	10.0
Inequality Score (GINI Coefficient)	--	7.0	6.0	..	6.0	9.0
<b>Composite Issue Area Risk Rating</b>	--	<b>5.2</b>	<b>6.8</b>	<b>..</b>	<b>5.8</b>	<b>9.6</b>

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Issue Areas and Lead Indicators	Years of Measure	Gambia	Guinea	Liberia	Senegal	Sierra Leone
<b>Human Development (weight = 3)</b>						
Access to Improved Water Source (% Tot. Pop.)	1990, 2000	7.0	7.0	..	4.0	9.0
Access to Sanitation (% Tot. Pop.)	1990, 2000	8.0	6.0	..	5.0	9.0
Life Expectancy (Years)	1997-1998	8.0	9.0	9.0	8.0	9.0
Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000 live births)	1997-1998	7.0	8.0	8.0	6.0	8.0
Maternal Mortality Rate (per 100,000 live births)	1995	9.0	9.0	..	9.0	9.0
HIV/AIDS (% of Adult Population)	1997-1998	6.5	6.0	7.0	6.0	7.0
Primary School Enroll (% Relevant Age Group)	1993-1997	7.0	9.0	..	8.0	..
Secondary School Enroll (% Relevant Age Group)	1993-1997	7.0	8.0	..	10.0	..
Child Labour (% Children aged 10-14)	1995-1999	7.0	7.0	5.0	6.3	4.0
<b>Composite Issue Area Risk Rating</b>	--	<b>7.4</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>7.3</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>7.9</b>
<b>Environmental Stress (weight = 3)</b>						
Rate of Deforestation (Percent)	1990-1995	6.0	6.0	..	5.0	9.0
People per Sq. Km. of Arable Land	1993-1997	7.0	8.0	..	5.0	8.0
Freshwater Resources (cubic meters per capita)	1998	5.0	2.0	..	5.0	2.0
<b>Composite Issue Area Risk Rating</b>	--	<b>6.0</b>	<b>5.3</b>	..	<b>5.0</b>	<b>6.3</b>
<b>International Linkages (weight = 5)</b>						
Economic Organizations Index	2000	7.0	7.0	8.0	3.0	7.0
Military/Security Alliances Index	2000	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0
UN Organizations Index	2000	6.0	6.0	6.0	4.0	4.0
Multipurpose and Miscellaneous Orgs. Index	2000	6.0	5.0	7.0	3.0	6.0
International Disputes (# of)	2000	4.0	1.0	1.0	4.0	1.0
<b>Composite Issue Area Risk Rating</b>	--	<b>6.4</b>	<b>5.6</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>4.6</b>	<b>5.4</b>
Unweighted Sum	--	47.2	49.8	44.4	47.5	62.7
Unweighted Average	--	5.2	5.5	6.3	5.3	7.0
Total Weighted Sum	--	343.0	259.6	222.8	252.8	347.3
<b>Risk Index (Weighted Average)</b>	--	<b>5.0</b>	<b>5.4</b>	<b>6.4</b>	<b>5.3</b>	<b>7.2</b>

**Table Notes:** Risk scores are colour-coded according to a "stop light" scheme, where Green (0-3) indicates low risk, Yellow (4-6) indicates medium risk, and Red (7-12) indicates high risk. Risk scores for individual indicators are derived from a global rank score adjusted to reflect trends and volatility, as described in the previous section. Composite Issue Area Risk Ratings are an average of the indicator risk scores in each issue area. Details on each of the above issue areas and lead indicators, including data sources, global rank scores and trend and volatility modifiers, are available in the chapters that follow. The final country "Risk Index" is based on the weighted average of the nine of Composite Issue Areas Ratings. For a detailed explanation of the weighting scheme, refer to the CIFP Risk Assessment Template, August 2000.



**KEY ISSUES UNDERLYING CONFLICT POTENTIAL**

Issue Area	Gambia	Guinea	Liberia	Senegal	Sierra Leone
History of Armed Conflict	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Hosted refugees and IDPs.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Hosted refugees and IDPs.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Intervention and protracted conflict.</li> <li>Internally displaced persons.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Refugees hosted.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>History of armed conflict.</li> <li>Refugee outflows and potential for renewed conflict.</li> </ul>
Political Instability & Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Levels of democracy.</li> <li>Restrictions on Civil and Political Rights.</li> <li>Press freedoms.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Levels of democracy.</li> <li>Restrictions on Civil and Political Rights.</li> <li>Press freedoms.</li> <li>Corruption.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Pervasive corruption &amp; nepotism.</li> <li>Elite-based political system.</li> <li>Worsening political rights &amp; civil liberties performance.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Partial political freedoms.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Pervasive corruption &amp; nepotism.</li> <li>Elite-based political system.</li> <li>Worsening political rights &amp; civil liberties performance.</li> </ul>
Militarization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Military Expenditures.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Potential militarization of refugees.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Human rights abuses committed by military.</li> <li>Limited capacity to address internal or external security threats.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High spending within region.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Human rights abuses committed by military.</li> <li>Limited capacity to address internal or external security threats.</li> </ul>
Ethnic Heterogeneity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High ethnic heterogeneity.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High ethnic heterogeneity.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Political &amp; economic cleavages between groups.</li> <li>Marginalization of various groups through poor economic performance.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High ethnic diversity.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Political &amp; economic cleavages between groups.</li> </ul>
Demographic Stress	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High Population growth rates.</li> <li>High urban population growth rate resulting in increased strains on urban infrastructure.</li> <li>Youth bulge.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High Population growth rates.</li> <li>Youth bulge.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High population growth rates.</li> <li>High population density, with uneven distribution, resulting in destabilizing migration.</li> <li>Youth bulge.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Population growth rate.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Youth bulge.</li> <li>Moderate population density, with uneven distribution, resulting in destabilization.</li> </ul>
Economic Performance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High levels of poverty, with low income security.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Poor exchange rate.</li> <li>Low levels of investment.</li> <li>Lack of trade openness.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Highly unequal distribution of income.</li> <li>Regional discrepancies.</li> <li>Poor performance.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>GDP/capita.</li> <li>Low FDI.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Highly unequal distribution of income.</li> <li>Regional discrepancies</li> <li>Poor Overall Economic Performance</li> </ul>
Human Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Low human development, including health &amp; education.</li> <li>Economic disparities in access to education &amp; health services.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Low human development, including health &amp; education.</li> <li>Economic disparities in access to education &amp; health services</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High regional disparities in human development.</li> <li>Inadequate &amp; inequitable service provision.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Moderate human development including low health &amp; education.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High regional disparities in human development, including discrepancies along group lines.</li> <li>Inadequate &amp; inequitable services.</li> </ul>

Environmental Stress	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High Population density affecting access to arable land.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Refugee movements increasing population density and access to arable land.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Environmental stress due to mining and protracted conflict.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Moderate performance.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Population movements and fluctuating regional densities having a negative effect on environment.</li> </ul>
International Linkages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• History of some isolation resulting in poorly developed international linkages.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• History of some isolation resulting in poorly developed international linkages.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• History of some isolation resulting in poorly developed international linkages.</li> <li>• Incursions from neighbouring states.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Moderate international linkages.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Weak international linkages.</li> </ul>

**BACKGROUND INFORMATION<sup>2</sup>**

One of the key principles adhered to by FEWER members is a commitment to local ownership in establishing and sustaining the network. This is achieved by building conflict analysis, prevention, and peace-building capacity upon existing networks, and utilizing existing capacity, methodology and structures.

Within the West African sub-region of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, one such formal structure at the governmental level is the Mano River Union (MRU). There is a low level of public knowledge about this institution and its activities, yet the mandate of the organization offers a valuable vehicle for conflict prevention and resolution efforts that should not be over-looked. The MRU Secretariat is located in Freetown, Sierra Leone, with regional offices in Conakry, Guinea, and Monrovia, Liberia.

Currently the MRU is experiencing a period of institutional and financial crisis due to the deterioration in relations between the countries resulting from continuing cross-border incursions. However, the MRU has a unique security mandate, owing to the 1986 Non-Aggression Treaty and the 15<sup>th</sup> protocol, signed in April 2000, establishing structures on the basis of a consultative process — a Joint Security Committee, Technical Committee, and a Border Security and Confidence Building Unit -- with the objective of restoring trust between the countries. These plans are

experiencing delay in a phase of partial implementation because of the continuing instability and violent conflict within the sub-region.

The objectives of the MRU are summarized as follows:

**Short-term**

→ rapid restoration of a durable peace in the region; reinforcement of the activities of the MRU Secretariat; and participation in the return and re-integration of refugees

**Medium-term**

→ encourage the use of the river as a commercial and political channel between the three countries; and create a favourable environment for stability

**Long-term**

→ create an economic framework for the development of the region; harmonisation in the use of resources within the region; and promote social and political unity

**Senegambia**

By virtue of geography and political history, The Gambia and The Republic of Senegal have a unique relationship. Situated in the middle of Senegal, The Gambia in effect cuts off direct access to Casamance—Senegal’s most fertile province, and the scene of a bloody separatist revolt in the late 1990s.

Following Senegalese intervention during an attempted coup in the Gambia in 1981, the

<sup>2</sup> Source: *Mano River Union Regional Report* prepared by FEWER and WANEP for the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, November 2000.

two countries entered into a confederation known as Senegambia, with the objectives of integrating security forces, communication networks, coordinating foreign policy, and forming a monetary union. Reluctant to accelerate trade and customs unions, The Gambia withdrew from the agreement in 1989.

Historically the greater Senegambian region is of broader dimensions, including all of both the Senegal and the Gambia river basins. This extends to Guinea-Bissau, and large areas of Guinea, Mali, and Mauritania. Throughout this greater Senegambia region, traditional social and political structures are similar.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Jean-Marc Fleury, "Senegambia. Building on the Past."

## I. HISTORY OF ARMED CONFLICT

Lead Indicators	Country	Global Rank (Avg. 1995-1999)	Trend Score	Volatility Score	Risk Score
<b>Armed Conflicts</b>					
(Total Conflict Intensity Level) Source: SIPRI	Gambia	1.0	0	0	1.0
	Guinea	1.0	0	0	1.0
	Liberia	2.2	-1	1	2.20
	Senegal	3.2	2	1	6.20
	Sierra Leone	6.4	1	1	8.40
<b># of Refugees Produced</b>					
(Number of) Source: UNHCHR	Gambia	1.0	0	0	1.0
	Guinea	1.0	0	0	1.0
	Liberia	8.6	-1	2	9.60
	Senegal	3.0	-1	1	3.00
	Sierra Leone	8.4	1	1	10.40
<b># of Refugees Hosted, IDPs, Others of Concern</b>					
(Number of) Source: UNHCHR	Gambia	4.6	1	2	7.6
	Guinea	9.0	-1	1	9.0
	Liberia	8.6	-1	2	9.60
	Senegal	6.0	-1	2	7.00
	Sierra Leone	9.0	-1	1	9.00
<b>Composite History of Armed Conflict Score</b>					
	<b>Gambia</b>				<b>3.20</b>
	<b>Guinea</b>				<b>3.67</b>
	<b>Liberia</b>				<b>7.13</b>
	<b>Senegal</b>				<b>5.40</b>
	<b>Sierra Leone</b>				<b>9.27</b>

While “violent conflict” is the dependent variable of conflict analysis, a country’s history of armed conflict also operates as a causal factor underlying the potential for continued or future violence. An enduring history of violent conflict can itself serve as an incentive for parties to continue to resort to violence as a means of airing and attempting to resolve grievances. Such a history can also indicate a greater inclination for armed forces to use repressive means to address disputes or civil unrest, and an inability or unwillingness of the state to resolve disputes through institutional channels. Flows of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) produced by past or ongoing violent conflict can also have destabilizing effects within affected regions and countries, potentially spiralling into larger problems. Furthermore, the impact of conflict on material living standards, levels of human development, the environment and other issue

areas, can create further incentives for violence.

While it is the task of this report to elaborate upon the myriad factors underlying conflict potential in Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Senegal, and Sierra Leone, this section briefly outlines the experiences of these five countries with violent conflict over the past decade. All five countries have seen flare-ups in violent conflict of varying intensities and types, many of which have long histories. Revolutionary conflicts over the control of government structures, and fuelled by deep political and ideological differences, date back decades in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and continued well into the 1990s. Struggles initiated soon after independence by groups in Liberia have seen increased intensity.

Gambia: In July 1994 a bloodless coup was led by Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh, who seized power amid allegations of corruption directed at President Jawara. Several people were killed during a November 1994 counter-coup from within the army, which Jammeh survived.

Senegal: A bloody separatist revolt in the southern province of Casamance started in 1982. In almost 20 years of fighting 231 villages have been abandoned, and 60,000 people displaced. The Senegalese government and the separatist Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance signed a cease-fire and a peace agreement on March 16, 2001. The agreement will allow the free circulation of people and goods; an end to all arbitrary arrests, kidnapping, torture, killings, and manhunts; and the resettling of refugees and building of roads to connect Casamance with the rest of the country.

Guinea: Following unrest within the army and civil service in 1992, President Lansana Conte (who seized power in a 1984 coup) sanctioned creation of political parties. During the 1993 election campaign, during which many people were killed, opposition groups alleged massive fraud. During the subsequent 1998 Presidential elections, opposition leader Alpha Conde was arrested and later tried and sentenced to five years of hard labour for 'threatening the security of the state' amid wide criticism at home and abroad. In 2000, raids occurred along the borders with Liberia and Sierra Leone—hundreds of people, including many civilians, were killed.

Accusations of interference erupted from both Guinea (accusing Taylor of backing rebels from Liberia and Sierra Leone in their attacks on Guinean border villages) and Liberia (accusing Guinea of supporting dissidents fighting government troops in northern Liberia).

Liberia: In 1989 ex-civil servant Charles Taylor launches an invasion beginning a civil war that later develops several splinter factions. On July 19, 1996, legislative and presidential elections bring Taylor to power. Fighting occurs along the border with Guinea in 1999 and 2000. Throughout the 1990s and into 2000 and 2001, Liberian supported smuggling

and export of Sierra Leonean diamonds fuel the civil war there.

Sierra Leone: Since independence in 1961 a series of coups thwarted repeated democratic initiatives. A rebel war began in 1991 as parliament was approving a draft multi-party constitution. In spite of efforts to negotiate and sign peace agreements, the civil war intensified in 1995 and again in 1997, necessitating the installation of a Nigerian led ECOMOG force to enforce an embargo. Rebels continued a reign of terror that included a brutal spree of crude civilian amputation, looting, rape, and massive exploitation of children. In 1999 the Indian and Kenyan led UNAMSIL force was installed and twice required re-enforcements, lastly by the U.K. in 2000. The civil war was officially declared over in January 2002, and a Special Court for Sierra Leone was set up by the government and the UN.

It is important to note that the violent conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone embodied a myriad of linkages, most notably through "a highly criminalized war economy"<sup>4</sup> that sustained the trade in diamonds, arms, and drugs. Analysts have noted that this was "years of brutality by forces devoid of ideology, political support, and ethnic identity. Only the *economic* opportunity presented by a breakdown in law and order could sustain [such] violence."<sup>5</sup>

### Refugees and Internal Displacement

Of the CIFP lead indicators, the number of internally displaced persons and the numbers of refugees produced and hosted within the sub-region, are factors prominently identified as high risk and contributing to regional conflict potential.

Flows of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) produced by past or ongoing violent conflict have destabilizing effects within affected regions and countries, potentially spiralling into larger problems. Furthermore, the impact of conflict on material living standards, levels of human development, the environment and other issue areas, can create

<sup>4</sup> Smillie, Gberie, Hazleton, "The Heart of the Matter. Sierra Leone, Diamonds & Human Security (Complete Report)" Partnership Africa Canada, January 2000.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.


further incentives for violence. In the past decade, the sub-region has experienced highly destabilizing population movements. During the intense periods of fighting in Liberia and Sierra Leone, a substantial number of refugees escaped to neighbouring countries, in particular Guinea. However, the number of refugees produced is small when compared to the millions who were displaced internally.

The FEWER lead agency in West Africa, the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) reports that Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees experience periods of prolonged fear, intimidation, sexual abuse including rape<sup>6</sup>, murder of family members and imprisonment as they traveled through territories controlled by various rebel factions.


The traditional support usually provided by the immediate and extended families is weak or absent in the refugee camps where residents are often living apart from their families as they were either killed or separated during flight. This renders the refugees highly vulnerable to further exploitation.

Another equally important factor is the burden that refugees impose on the host community. The over-population of several areas within the Forest and Maritime regions of Guinea has resulted in large-scale devastation of virgin forests, over exploitation of arable land and in several areas-fallow periods have declined from 10 and 7 years to barely 5 and 3 years. Secondly, the presence of refugees in several towns has led to substantial increases in food prices and to enormous competition for the few available medical and social services.<sup>7</sup>

**Number of Refugees Produced and Residing Outside the Country** Source: UNHCR



**Refugees Hosted, IDPs and Others of Concern** Source: UNHCR



<sup>6</sup> Following a joint assessment mission, reports emerged in February and March 2002 from UNHCR and Save the Children UK, that confirm the allegations of widespread sexual abuse, particularly of children under 18, in refugee camps in the sub-region.

<sup>7</sup> As reported in 2001 WANEP occasional paper by Dr. Ba-Foday Suma. "The Refugee Saga in the Mano River Basin: Statistics Don't Bleed, People Do" <http://www.wanep.org/drsuma.htm>

## II. POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE


Lead Indicators	Country	Global Rank (Avg. 1995-1999)	Trend Score	Volatility Score	Risk Score
<b>Level of Democracy</b>					
Source: Polity IV Data Set	Gambia	8.0	-1	1	8.0
	Guinea	6.0	0	0	6.0
	Liberia	6.0	-1	2	7.00
	Senegal	6.0	0	0	6.00
	Sierra Leone	6.5	1	2	9.50
<b>Regime Durability</b>					
(Years since Regime Change)	Gambia	7.6	-1	0	6.6
Source: Polity IV Data Set	Guinea	8.0	-1	0	7.0
	Liberia	8.8	-1	0	7.80
	Senegal	4.0	-1	0	3.00
	Sierra Leone	7.8	1	2	10.80
<b>Restrictions on Civil and Political Rights</b>					
Source: Freedom House	Gambia	8.4	-1	0	7.4
	Guinea	8.0	0	0	8.0
	Liberia	7.0	-1	1	7.00
	Senegal	5.8	-1	0	4.80
	Sierra Leone	6.6	-1	2	7.60
<b>Restrictions on Press Freedom</b>					
Source: Freedom House	Gambia	7.4	1	0	8.4
	Guinea	7.4	1	1	9.4
	Liberia	7.8	-1	0	6.80
	Senegal	4.0	1	1	6.00
	Sierra Leone	8.4	1	0	9.40
<b>Level of Corruption</b>					
Source: World Governance Research Indicators Dataset	Gambia	4.0	single measure		4.0
	Guinea	8.0	single measure		8.0
	Liberia	9.0	single measure		9.00
	Senegal	5.0	single measure		5.00
	Sierra Leone	4.0	single measure		4.00
<b>Composite Governance and Political Instability Score</b>					
	<b>Gambia</b>				<b>6.88</b>
	<b>Guinea</b>				<b>7.68</b>
	<b>Liberia</b>				<b>7.52</b>
	<b>Senegal</b>				<b>4.96</b>
	<b>Sierra Leone</b>				<b>8.26</b>

Regime characteristics are associated with conflict potential in myriad ways. Democratic institutions, for example, encourage a relationship between state and society that fosters pluralism, inclusion, and ultimately peaceful conflict resolution. Alternately, the lack of accountable and transparent

institutions through which to channel grievances can aggravate the risk of outbursts of violent conflict. So too can the denial of civil and political liberties, such as the rights of expression, assembly and association, or the censorship of media, increase the likelihood dissenting views will be expressed through

violence. Endemic corruption of political elites can also result in the loss of popular confidence in state institutions and undermine their legitimacy, providing incentives for expressing grievances through extra-institutional means.

**Regime Durability**  
Source: Polity IV Data Set



Regime characteristics are associated with conflict potential in myriad ways. Democratic institutions, for example, encourage a relationship between state and society that fosters pluralism, inclusion, and ultimately peaceful conflict resolution. Alternately, the lack of accountable and transparent institutions through which to channel grievances contributes to the risk of outbursts of violent conflict.

**Regime Type**

The Mano River Union sub-region is characterized by long-standing regimes with authoritarian characteristics, and by the prevalence of the complete collapse of central political authority. Since the mid-1980s, the political situation in this region of West Africa has been tumultuous. All three countries have experienced the devastating effects of civil war.

**Regime Durability**

A change in the governance regime is associated with a substantial change in the mode of governance or the ideology guiding the government. Changes in regime often

result in politically volatile situations associated with high risk of conflict potential. The regime durability index provides a measure of the stability of the regime in power.

The sharp fluctuations in the graph indicate that all three countries of the Mano River Union sub-region have experienced a regime change in the last decade. Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone have all held elections, however democracy is a recent phenomenon across the sub-region, and the new regimes in Guinea and Liberia remain unstable, and their durability untested. Qualitative observations detect that there have been no significant gains made across the region in establishing democratic norms and institutions.

The tendency towards extra-institutional consolidation of power, and the prominence of armed forces in political processes, increases the risk factors for conflict potential in the sub-region. In a classic example of African political reality, after ousting the civilian government in 1984, former soldier Lansana Conté attempted to legitimize his presidency after organizing a political party and elections in 1993. During this process the main opposition candidate, Alpha Condé, was arrested, imprisoned, and charged with attempting to invade and destabilize the country

Since the military take-over in 1980, Liberia has held elections twice: in 1985, and more recently the 1997 Special Legislative and Presidential Elections. The latter were proclaimed free and fair by international observers although this was protested by the thirteen opposition parties and resulted in a voluntary exile of opposition and opinion leaders to neighbouring Guinea and Cote D’Ivoire. Subsequent allegations that these exiles have been involved in armed incursions in Lofa county have further destabilized the situation.

Sierra Leone is currently in a state of failure, and engaging the RUF in a process of disarmament, demobilization, and transition with the assistance of the UNAMSIL forces, and sanctions imposed by UN resolution 1306. With limited resources available following the 1996 ‘Elections for Peace’, the civilian



government was unable to establish authority over its territory and the RUF secured their control over critical diamond mining regions and continued their war effort with this source of income at their disposal. The complex resulting from smuggling both arms and diamonds through Liberia and Guinea contributes to further instability within the sub-region, although the creation of a new diamond certification scheme and plans to channel a portion of the export taxes back into community development projects mitigates this risk somewhat.

Despite the recent prospects for ending the hostilities resulting from UNAMSIL's presence, across the Mano River Union sub-region the potential for further political transformation, and violent conflict, remains high.

**Respect for Political and Civil Liberties**

As the trends in the figures illustrate, the regime transitions discussed above have resulted in very modest improvements in political and civil liberties such as freedoms of expression, assembly, association, and religion across the sub-region.


The high risk scores in political and civil liberties and freedom of the press observed for all three countries of the Mano River Union are evidence of weak, even non-existent, patterns of governance within the sub-region.<sup>8</sup>

Principles of good governance, and indicators of a strong democratic government include: transparency, accountability, independence or autonomy, electoral ownership, representation, efficient management and administration, and legitimacy. In contrast, in the case of Sierra Leone, the following evidence of weak governance is observed: poor definition of the roles and mandates of governance stakeholders, collapse of law and order, institutionalised bribery and corruption, pseudo-dictatorship, limited efforts to develop beyond the capital, inefficient management and administration, discriminatory distribution

of resources and privileges, and a general collapse of civil society owing to the extremely difficult circumstances of daily survival.<sup>9</sup>

In sum, in the sphere of governance and political instability, a considerable risk of conflict potential is evident, primarily with respect to the instability brought about by the newness of the governing regimes within the sub-region. Entrenched patterns of authority have yet to be replaced with sound institutions capable of reliably channeling discontent and managing the potential for conflict. In fact, there is strong evidence to suggest that countries undergoing such democratic transitions are more conflict-prone than either enduring democracies or autocracies.

**Democratic Transitions**



So too has the rule of law remained weak. The legacies of a corrupt legal system have created widespread cynicism about the efficacy of following legal processes. Serious human rights violations have gone unpunished, and progress on holding those accountable for violence has been slow. Victims of past abuse have obtained little satisfaction from the legal system, and many have as a result turned instead to extra-legal action.


<sup>8</sup> Whereby governance refers to the management, administration, and development of the political, economic, and social spheres within a country.

<sup>9</sup> WANEP/FEWER Thematic Reports, November 2000.

The development of institutions of democratic governance has been stymied by decades of civil war. The rule of law, the judiciary, electoral processes, the national legislature, are all in need of institutional strengthening. However, democracy remains a recent phenomenon across the region, and the new regimes remain unstable and unconsolidated. Their durability remains to be tested. Regimes nonetheless remain largely authoritarian in character.

**Weaknesses in the Institutions and Processes of Democracy**

**Restrictions on Civil and Political Rights**  
Source: Freedom House



Freedom House has defined declining trends in political rights and civil liberties indicators due to worsening levels of civil conflict and credible allegations of high-level official corruption.

Critical institutions and processes of democracy remain weak

In particular Sierra Leone and Liberia suffer from pervasive corruption, a weak and inefficient legal system, and a political system that remains elite-based and exclusive.

**Political Instability, Governance and Conflict Potential**

Despite the gains in democracy across the region, considerable risks remain, primarily with respect to the instability brought about by the political liberalization process itself. Entrenched patterns of authority have yet to be replaced with sound institutions capable of reliably channelling discontent and managing the potential for conflict. In fact, there is strong evidence to suggest that countries undergoing democratic transitions are more conflict-prone than either stable democracies or autocracies. This risk, combined with the prospect of reversals in the democratization process, remains quite present across the region, though particularly in the cases of ...

Elite-dominated or exclusive political systems, will continue to contribute to the potential for violence by denying citizens opportunities to participate equitably in political processes. So too will weak or biased law enforcement and judicial institutions likely continue to compound feelings of the futility of expressing and seeking to resolve grievances through institutional channels, compelling other kinds of actions instead.

### III. MILITARIZATION

Lead Indicators	Country	Global Rank	Trend Score	Volatility Score	Risk Score
<b>Military Expenditure</b>		<b>(Avg. 1995-1999)</b>			
(% of GDP, Constant 1995 US\$)	Gambia	1.8	1	1	3.8
Source: SIPRI	Guinea	3.0	-1	0	2.0
	Liberia	..	..	..	..
	Senegal	4.0	-1	1	4.00
	Sierra Leone	4.3	-1	2	5.25
<b>Fraction of Regional Military Expenditure</b>		<b>(1990-1999)</b>			
(Percent of known total spending for decade)	Gambia	3.0	single measure		3.0
Source: Calculated from SIPRI data	Guinea	5.0	single measure		5.0
	Liberia	4.0	single measure		4.00
	Senegal	8.0	single measure		8.00
	Sierra Leone	4.0	single measure		4.00
<b>Total Armed Forces</b>		<b>(Avg. 1995-1999)</b>			
(per 10,000)	Gambia	1.0	-1	0	0.0
Source: IISS Military Balance	Guinea	1.7	-1	0	0.7
	Liberia	4.0	1	0	5.00
	Senegal	1.0	-1	1	1.00
	Sierra Leone	1.0	-1	2	2.00
<b>Composite Militarization Score</b>					
	Gambia				2.27
	Guinea				2.56
	Liberia				4.50
	Senegal				4.33
	Sierra Leone				3.75

The size, quality and readiness of a country's military forces affect a country's ability, not only to defend itself from external threats, but to manage internal violent conflicts, and to prevent them through having a deterrence effect. A country's degree of militarization can impact its capacity, but also potentially its inclination, to address and resolve potential conflicts through use of armed force. However, high levels of military expenditure can also indicate a privileging of the security forces in the domestic political arena, and indicate increased potential for military involvement in political affairs. Of course, considering limited spending capabilities, investments in the military can result in decreased investments in social capital and productive sectors. But so too can high levels of military spending relative to social spending, combined with high numbers of military personnel, indicate that state priorities are focused upon military rather than developmental solutions to potential crises.

The CIPF scoring represents official data, and therefore must be interpreted with caution on the issue of militarization. On the surface, it seems suspect that a region embroiled in civil war and violent conflict for the past decade has militarization scores generally categorized as low and medium risk. This is a reflection of the relative nature of the scoring methodology. In this context, noteworthy observations include the relatively poorer composite performance of Liberia and Sierra Leone. Additionally, that Senegal's relatively high proportion of military spending within the region can be attributed to the ongoing military suppression of the separatist movement in Casamance as well as significant military contributions to regional ECOMOG operations.

However, official data do not represent a clear picture of the level of militarization in the sub-region—for example guerrilla forces are not included, and the overall impact of militarization for conflict potential.

**Child Soldiers and Small Arms**

In Sierra Leone and Liberia, during the civil wars both governments and armed groups employed child combatants.<sup>10</sup> The issue of militarization and the presence of child soldiers are linked to the phenomenon of a “youth bulge”<sup>11</sup> prevalent throughout the sub-region. For example, in Sierra Leone, 44.73% of the population falls into the 0-14 year old demographic. At present, the exact number of child soldiers, and the presence and number of small arms can only be estimated, as neither is included in official tallies. However, estimated figures given are conservative.

Source: Child Soldiers Global Report, The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2001.

	<b>Child Soldiers Present</b>
<b>Gambia</b>	None indicated
<b>Guinea</b>	Unknown
<b>Liberia</b>	Government Forces: Yes Opposition Forces: Yes
<b>Senegal</b>	None indicated
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	Government Forces: Yes Opposition Forces: Yes

The presence of child soldiers has far-reaching developmental implications for the prospects for peace, security, and development in the sub-region. For example, according to UNICEF, in Liberia “15,000 children – some as young as age six – were trained as soldiers.”<sup>12</sup>

**Demobilization**

The prevalence of small arms, munitions, and explosives, financed by illicit diamond and drug smuggling, served to prolong the period of intense violent conflict in both Liberia and Sierra Leone.<sup>13</sup> The enduring presence of these weapons—despite the 1998 regional moratorium on their production, procurement,

and sale, and despite recent disarmament efforts by ECOMOG and UNAMSIL—increases the risk of conflict renewal within the sub-region.

The unfortunate convergence of systemic poverty and alienation, a large youth cohort, and the widespread availability of light weapons, enabled children as combatants. Often provided with drugs and alcohol, and under threat of brutal punishment for errors or desertion, children were conditioned into obedience to undertake fearless killings. Many were forced to commit atrocities against their own families and communities, and others forced to act as sexual slaves—young girls were raped and became pregnant by their captors. Childhood was literally stolen from many youngsters in the sub-region during the past decade, and the yet unknown psychological effects of their experience will likely have an enduring impact.

**Post-Civil War Demobilization**

The question of demobilization of large numbers of fighters in Sierra Leone will remain a significant issue for some time to come. This issue is particularly important from the point of view of creating a durable solution that provides social and economic opportunities for ex-soldiers, in order to ward off the potential risks of a large, marginalized population of military veterans. There are also concerns that if the demobilization programme is not implemented effectively, it will create the conditions for ongoing or future violent conflict.

For example, there have been concerns that weapons are not being properly confiscated, and that inadequate severance packages will cause ex-soldiers to turn increasingly to crime. Despite the completion of formal disarmament and demobilization, many Sierra Leoneans suspect weapons caches. There is a large discrepancy between those who have disarmed/discharged (62,952), and those who are receiving reintegration benefits (15,365). This discrepancy is due to the fact that the NCDDR reintegration phase has only recently begun. Evidently, there is much reintegration work to do. The integration of ex-Revolutionary United Front (RUF)/Civilian Defence Forces (CDF) into the Sierra Leone Army also accounts for a significant portion of this discrepancy. Moreover, many ex-combatants are participating in NGO reintegration programs.

<sup>10</sup> Child Soldiers Global Report. It is unclear whether children are used by the military in Guinea.

<sup>11</sup> The issue of the “youth bulge” is discussed more fully in section V—Demographic Stress.

<sup>12</sup> UNICEF, State of the World’s Children Report, 2002.

<sup>13</sup> The connections between diamonds, small arms and drugs are discussed in section VI—Economic Performance, and section IX—International Linkages.

**IV. POPULATION HETEROGENEITY**

Lead Indicators	Country	Global Rank	Trend Score	Volatility Score	Risk Score
<b>Ethnic Diversity</b>		<b>(1990s)</b>			
(Calculated index)	Gambia	8.0	single measure		8.0
Source: CIA World Factbook 2000	Guinea	8.0	single measure		8.0
	Liberia	9.0	single measure		9.00
	Senegal	8.0	single measure		8.00
	Sierra Leone	8.0	single measure		8.00
<b>Religious Diversity</b>		<b>(1990s)</b>			
(Calculated index)	Gambia	3.0	single measure		3.0
Source: CIA World Factbook 2000	Guinea	4.0	single measure		4.0
	Liberia	8.0	single measure		8.00
	Senegal	3.0	single measure		3.00
	Sierra Leone	7.0	single measure		7.00
<b>Risk of Ethnic Rebellion (Single Measure)</b>		<b>(c.1998)</b>			
(Calculated Index)	Gambia	1.0	single measure		1.0
Source: Minorities at Risk Data Set	Guinea	4.0	single measure		4.0
Gurr (2000)	Liberia	1.0	single measure		1.00
	Senegal	2.0	single measure		2.00
	Sierra Leone	5.0	single measure		5.00
<b>Composite Population Heterogeneity Score</b>					
	Gambia				4.00
	Guinea				5.33
	Liberia				6.00
	Senegal				4.33
	Sierra Leone				6.67

The degree of ethnic and religious diversity in a country can significantly influence its potential for conflict. In some heterogeneous societies, the competing demands of different ethnic and religious groups result in failures to achieve political consensus, contributing to tensions and in some cases the outbreak of violent conflict. This is especially the case in situations where there are high incentives for group action, such as a historical loss of group autonomy, long-standing or widening political and economic disparities between communal groups, or restrictions on cultural practices. In addition, the capacity for collective action also depends in large part upon the strength of a group’s identity, and its level of political mobilization.

**Ethnic and Religious Diversity**

As indicated in the table above, there is a high degree of ethnic diversity across the sub-region. Significant levels of religious diversity

are present within Liberia and Sierra Leone, while the populations of Gambia, Guinea, and Senegal are more homogeneous with respect to religion. In a number of instances, the conflicts within the sub-region have displayed elements of ethnic and religious tension. For example, in September 2000 ethnically motivated skirmishes in border regions of Guinea attempted to expunge foreign nationals from Sierra Leone and Liberia from the area. The large refugee communities along border areas have also contributed to increasing ethnic tensions.

In the Gambia, the largest ethnic group is the Mandinka (42%), followed by Fula (18%), Wolof (16%), Jola (10%), Serahuli (9%), other African (4%), and non-Africa (1%). In terms of religious diversity, ninety percent of the people in the Gambia are Muslims, followed by Christians (9%) and those with indigenous beliefs (1%).

In Guinea, the largest ethnic group is the Peuhl, representing 40% of the population, followed by the Malinke (30%), the Soussou (20%) and other smaller ethnic groups (10%). Similarly to the Gambia, within Guinea the population is eight-five percent Muslim, followed by Christians (8%) and those with indigenous beliefs (7%).

Liberia has a high degree of population heterogeneity. Members of indigenous African tribes represent 95% of the population, including Kpelle (20%), Bassa, Gio, Kru, Grebo, Mano, Krahn, Gola, Gbandi, Loma, Kissi, Vai, and Bella; Americo-Liberians (2.5%) (descendants of former slaves from U.S.A.), and Congo People (2.5%)—descendants of former slaves from the Caribbean. With respect to religious diversity, forty percent of the population hold varied indigenous beliefs, and another forty percent are Christians, followed by Muslims (20%).

In Senegal, the ethnic composition is: Wolof (43.3%), Pular (23.8%), Serer (14.7%), Jola (3.7%), Mandinka (3%), Soninke (1.1%), European and Lebanese (1%), and various other ethnic groups, including the Diolas (9.4%). With respect to religious diversity, ninety-two percent of the population are Muslims, followed by those with various indigenous beliefs (6%), and Christians (2%).

Similar to Liberia, Sierra Leone also has a high degree of population heterogeneity. Ethnic groups include: Temne (30%), Mende (30%), Creoles—descendants of freed Jamaican slaves who were settled in the Freetown area in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century (10%), eighteen other African tribes (30%), as well as small numbers of Europeans, Lebanese, Pakistanis, and Indians. With respect to religious diversity, sixty percent of the population are Muslims, followed by those holding various indigenous beliefs (30%), and Christians (10%).

#### Minorities at Risk

The Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project at the University of Maryland has assembled a wide range of data on ethnic groups world-wide that have been subjected to various kinds of cultural, political, and/or economic discrimination. Minority Groups are identified by the MAR Project as being “at risk” if the country in which they reside has a population

greater than 500,000, the group itself has a population larger than 100,000 (or 1 percent of the country population), and it meets at least one of four criteria. These four criteria are: that the group is subject to political, economic or cultural discrimination; that the group is disadvantaged from past political, economic or cultural discrimination; that the group is politically, economically or culturally advantaged, and that advantage is being challenged; that the group supports political organizations advocating greater group rights. On the basis of these criteria, the MAR project has identified as Minorities at Risk<sup>3</sup>:

#### Assessing Risk of Ethnic Rebellion

In his analysis of the characteristics of Minority groups at Risk as coded in the MAR data set, Gurr (2000) identified six risk factors that according to tests correctly identified 88% of existing ethnic rebellions.<sup>4</sup> These factors are: the persistence of protest in recent past; the persistence of protest in the recent past; government repression; territorial concentration; group organization; regime instability; and transnational support from foreign states. Based on data from the 1998 for each of these key variables, and using logistic regression analysis, Gurr calculated scores for the risk of future rebellion for each minority at risk group. The key variables and resulting risk scores for Minority at Risk groups in are indicated in the accompanying table.<sup>5</sup> The table indicates that risk scores are low to medium for the region. However in combination with ethnic and religious diversity, the composite population scores show a slightly different picture. Sierra Leone receives a high risk score of 6.7, while all the others are considered medium risk.

#### Minorities at Risk

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of the country population), and it meets at least one of four criteria. These four criteria are: that the group is subject to political, economic or cultural discrimination; that the group is disadvantaged from past political, economic or cultural discrimination; that the group is politically, economically or culturally advantaged, and that advantage is being challenged; that the group supports political organizations advocating greater group rights. Based on these criteria, the MAR project has identified the following groups as Minorities at Risk<sup>14</sup>:

	<b>Minorities at Risk</b>
<b>Guinea:</b>	Fulani, Malinka, and Susu
<b>Sierra Leone:</b>	Creoles, Limba, Mende, Temne
<b>Senegal:</b>	Diolas (in Casamance region)

While Liberia does not register any minority groups "at risk", according to the M@R criteria, the population there is highly heterogeneous anecdotal reports indicate that religious and ethnic differences have strongly contributed to ongoing hostilities there. Following indiscriminate government blame towards members of the Krahn and Mandingo communities regarding border skirmishes, the conflict assumed an ethnic dimension. Additionally, what began as an ethnic fracas between the Lormas and the Mandingos (two of the 16 ethnic groups) over occupation of land in northern Lofa county, transformed into a religious conflict and witnessed the burning of Mosques, Churches, and other traditional shrines of worship.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>5</sup> CIFP has converted Gurr's risk scores to a "high-medium-low" scale on the basis of a ranking of the Minorities at Risk cases. The country scores for "Risk of Ethnic Rebellion" included in the overall CIFP risk index are based on a global ranking of scores for all countries with identified Minorities at Risk (a rank score of "1" being reserved for countries with no identified Minorities at Risk), totaling for each country the individual risk scores for Minorities at Risk groups within each country.

<sup>3</sup> For information and sources on all Minority at Risk groups, see the MAR Project web-site at <<http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/list.html>>.

<sup>4</sup> Ted Robert Gurr, "Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century," United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000.

<sup>14</sup> For information and sources on all Minority at Risk groups, see the MAR Project web site at <<http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/list.html>>.

<sup>15</sup> See: WANEP/FEWER "Liberia County Report" November 2000, and Human Rights Watch World Report 2001, "Liberia: Human Rights Developments"



## V. DEMOGRAPHIC STRESS

Lead Indicators	Country	Global Rank	Trend Score	Volatility Score	Risk Score
<b>Total Population</b>		<b>(Avg. 1995-1999)</b>			
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Gambia	2.4	exception		2.4
	Guinea	5.0	exception		5.0
	Liberia	3.0	exception		3.00
	Senegal	6.0	exception		6.00
	Sierra Leone	4.0	exception		4.00
<b>Population Growth Rate (Annual %)</b>		<b>(Avg. 1995-1999)</b>			
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Gambia	9.0	-1	0	8.0
	Guinea	6.8	-1	0	5.8
	Liberia	7.8	1	0	8.80
	Senegal	8.0	1	0	9.00
	Sierra Leone	6.8	-1	1	6.80
<b>Population Density (people per sq km)</b>		<b>(Avg. 1995-1999)</b>			
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Gambia	7.0	exception		7.0
	Guinea	3.0	exception		3.0
	Liberia	3.0	exception		3.00
	Senegal	4.0	exception		4.00
	Sierra Leone	5.0	exception		5.00
<b>Urban Population (% of Total)</b>		<b>(Avg. 1995-1999)</b>			
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Gambia	2.0	exception		2.0
	Guinea	2.0	exception		2.0
	Liberia	4.0	exception		4.00
	Senegal	4.0	exception		4.00
	Sierra Leone	3.0	exception		3.00
<b>Urban Population Growth Rate (Annual %)</b>		<b>(Avg. 1994-1998)</b>			
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Gambia	9.0	-1	0	8.0
	Guinea	8.0	-1	0	7.0
	Liberia	6.6	1	1	8.60
	Senegal	7.8	-1	0	6.80
	Sierra Leone	7.6	-1	0	6.60
<b>Youth Bulge (Pop. Aged 0-14 as a % of Total)</b>		<b>(Avg. 1995-1999)</b>			
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Gambia	6.8	1	0	7.8
	Guinea	8.8	-1	0	7.8
	Liberia	8.2	-1	0	7.20
	Senegal	8.0	-1	0	7.00
	Sierra Leone	9.0	-1	0	8.00
<b>Composite Demographic Stress Score</b>					
	<b>Gambia</b>				<b>5.87</b>
	<b>Guinea</b>				<b>5.10</b>
	<b>Liberia</b>				<b>5.77</b>
	<b>Senegal</b>				<b>6.13</b>
	<b>Sierra Leone</b>				<b>5.57</b>

The size, density, distribution and composition of a country's population can contribute greatly to the potential for violent conflict. Changes in these factors, such as rapid rates


of growth and urbanization, can also accelerate the conflict development process through heightening competition for access to physical and social resources, due to



increasing scarcity, growing inequality, and environmental degradation.

**Annual % Population Growth Rate**

Source: World Bank Development Indicators




**Population Age Structure**

The age composition of a population is a powerful element in its tendencies to violence. Evidence suggests that the younger the population and the higher the level of unemployment, for example, the greater the potential for violence. Young, unemployed populations can also be political volatile constituents, placing far less trust in political institutions and patterns of authority.


**Population Age Structure**

Source: World Population Prospects, The 2000 Revision



**Population Projections**

Source: World Population Prospects, The 2000 Revision  
Population (000)




Most of these countries have populations that are very young. Bearing in mind current high population growth rates, some estimates project that by 2020 the number of children aged under 15 will surge even more. These demographic shifts will dramatically raise demands on the education system, as well as doubling the demand for employment in one of the poorest countries in the region.

**Internal Migration and Urbanization**

Trends in internal migration continue to make population mobility a critical demographic issue for all five countries, especially considering the degree to which internal migration may increase the potential for cultural and religious conflicts in cases where there are economic and social discrepancies between migrants and locals

**Annual % Urban Growth Rates**  
 Source: World Bank Development Indicators



Related to internal migration are rates of urbanization. Across all five countries, urban areas persist in attracting people from rural areas, contributing to the pace of social transformation and to the already large burdens on urban infrastructure, including sanitation and waste management. In general the growth rates of urban populations have been dropping across the region for the last fifteen years, Yet urban growth rates in the region remain markedly higher than national averages.

## VI. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

Lead Indicators	Country	Global Rank	Trend Score	Volatility Score	Risk Score
<b>GDP Growth Rate</b>		<b>(Avg. 1995-1999)</b>			
(Annual %)	Gambia	4.8	-1	2	5.8
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Guinea	4.2	1	1	6.2
	Liberia	..	..	..	..
	Senegal	3.2	-1	0	2.2
	Sierra Leone	7.8	1	2	10.8
<b>GDP Per Capita</b>		<b>(Avg. 1995-1999)</b>			
(PPP, Current International \$)	Gambia	8.0	-1	0	7.0
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Guinea	7.0	-1	0	6.0
	Liberia	..	..	..	..
	Senegal	8.0	-1	0	7.0
	Sierra Leone	9.0	1	1	11.0
<b>Inflation</b>		<b>(Avg. 1995-1999)</b>			
(Consumer prices (annual %))	Gambia	3.2	-1	2	4.2
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Guinea	..	..	..	..
	Liberia	..	..	..	..
	Senegal	2.8	-1	2	3.8
	Sierra Leone	8.2	1	2	11.2
<b>Official Exchange Rate</b>		<b>(Avg. 1995-1999)</b>			
(LCU per US\$, period average)	Gambia	5.0	-1	1	5.0
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Guinea	8.2	-1	1	8.2
	Liberia	2.0	-1	2	..
	Senegal	8.0	-1	1	8.0
	Sierra Leone	8.4	-1	2	9.4
<b>Foreign Direct Investment</b>		<b>(Avg. 1995-1999)</b>			
(Net inflows (% of GDP))	Gambia	3.8	-1	1	3.8
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Guinea	7.4	-1	2	8.4
	Liberia	..	..	..	..
	Senegal	6	-1	2	7.0
	Sierra Leone	8	-1	2	9.0
<b>Total Debt Service</b>		<b>(Avg. 1995-1999)</b>			
(% of GNP)	Gambia	6.8	-1	1	6.8
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Guinea	5.0	-1	1	5.0
	Liberia	..	..	..	..
	Senegal	6.4	-1	1	6.4
	Sierra Leone	5.0	-1	2	6.0
<b>Trade Openness</b>		<b>(Avg. 1995-1999)</b>			
(Trade as a % of GDP)	Gambia	2.6	-1	0	1.6
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Guinea	8.0	-1	1	8.0
	Liberia	..	..	..	..
	Senegal	5.0	1	0	6.0
	Sierra Leone	8.0	1	1	10.0
<b>Inequality Score</b>					
(GINI Coefficient)	Gambia ('92, Exp.)	7.0	single measure		7.0
Source: World Income Inequality Database V1.0	Guinea ('94, Exp.)	6.0	single measure		6.0
	Liberia	..	..	..	..
	(1995, Exp.) Senegal	6.0	single measure		6.0
	(1989, Exp.) Sierra Leone	9.0	single measure		9.0

Composite Economic Performance Score			
Gambia			5.2
Guinea			6.8
Liberia			..
Senegal			5.8
Sierra Leone			9.6

The linkages between economic performance and potential for violent conflict are strong. Low or declining incomes, high inflation, exchange rate fluctuation or collapse, and volatile levels of foreign investment significantly impact material living standards, and can create or aggravate dissatisfaction with government performance, undermining government credibility. High levels of economic inequality contribute to social fragmentation, declining state legitimacy, and can cause scapegoating of economically privileged minorities. Low involvement in international trade is also associated with higher risk of state failure, given that the conditions that inhibit high levels of international trade and foreign investment (such as rampant corruption and poor infrastructure) also contribute to the risk of political crises.<sup>6</sup>

**A War Economy: Diamonds and Economic Performance**

Published statistics based on official data tell only part of the story. The complete absence of data for Liberia is a reflection of a state failure. In January of 2000, Partnership Africa Canada published a paper examining the economics of the conflict in the Mano River Union countries. The authors demonstrate that “[o]nly the economic opportunity presented by a breakdown in law and order could sustain violence at the levels that plagued Sierra Leone after 1991. ...Marketing channels...are increasingly influenced by *organized* crime and by the transcontinental smuggling not just of diamonds, but of guns and drugs, and by vast sums of money in search of a laundry. Violence in such cases is central to the advancement of those with vested interests.”<sup>16</sup>


The economics of licit and illicit diamond production and exports in the sub-region had

a significant impact on the levels of violence throughout the decade. For example, the high levels of diamond exports from Liberia bear no relationship to its limited resource base in diamonds.


**Diamond Production**

Source: Minerals Yearbook 2000, United States Geological Survey.

*Gems (Thousand Carats)*



*Industrial Diamond (thousand Carats)*



In the above tables, note that as official production in Sierra Leone declined in the late 1990s, there were corresponding increases in Liberia. It is also important to bear in mind

<sup>16</sup> Smillie, Gberie, Hazleton. "The Heart of the Matter..." p. 10, 14.

that these statistics represent as little as 15 % of Sierra Leone’s actual production. USGS estimates annual Liberian production at 150,000 carats, generous amount according to their technical reports), while the Belgian Diamond High Council reports 1998 imports from Liberia at 2.6 million carats.<sup>17</sup>

**Economic Performance and Conflict Potential**


The tables below indicate that most of these countries experience at best fluctuations in their economic development, a function of dependence on the export of natural resources, weak investment in infrastructure and sporadic violent conflict.

The myriad problems in the sub-region are diverse and interrelated. High inflation, negative rates of economic growth, and low GDP per capita—particularly in Liberia and Sierra Leone, are indicative of the unstable situation with respect to security and violent conflict. This has also had a significant impact on development activities by donors. In addition, high levels of government debt crowds out investment and limits government’s capacity to undertake social investments to facilitate growth, such as implementing universal access health and education programs.


The consequence of poor economic management, weak governance, and high levels of corruption, since independence, together with a decade of protracted civil wars resulting in millions of displaced people, the destruction of infrastructure, and reduced levels of foreign investment, is a very fragile economy and many challenges as reconstruction—physically, socially, and economically—begins. Although as the accompanying tables illustrate, relatively speaking, Gambia, Guinea, and Senegal are better positioned for continued economic growth and development. Disparate distribution of wealth also exacerbates tensions. Sierra Leone and Gambia, scoring nine and seven respectively on the CIFP GINI index, have relatively unequal distributions of income. This is also reflected geographically. For example, in the northern province of

Sierra Leone, 37.2% of the population has monthly per capita expenditures below the poverty line (US\$1/day), while in the western province the proportion is much lower at 15.7%.<sup>18</sup>


**GDP Growth Rate**  
(Annual %) Source: World Bank



**GDP Per Capita**  
(PPP, Current International \$) Source: World Bank



**Inflation**  
(Consumer prices (annual %)) Source: World Bank



<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> World Bank, "Republic of Sierra Leone: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper" June 2001. p. 15.

## VII. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Lead Indicators	Country	Global Rank	Trend Score	Volatility Score	Risk Score
<b>Access to Improved Water Source</b>		<b>2000</b>			
(% of Total Pop.)	Gambia	7.0	single measure		7.0
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Guinea	8.0	-1	..	7.0
	Liberia	..	..	..	..
	Senegal	5.0	-1	..	4.0
	Sierra Leone	9.0	..	..	9.0
<b>Access to Sanitation</b>		<b>2000</b>			
(% of Total Pop.)	Gambia	8.0	single measure		8.0
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Guinea	7.0	-1	..	6.0
	Liberia	..	..	..	..
	Senegal	6.0	-1	..	5.0
	Sierra Leone	9.0	..	..	9.0
<b>Life Expectancy</b>		<b>(1997-1999)</b>			
(Years)	Gambia	8.0	0	0	8.0
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Guinea	9.0	0	0	9.0
	Liberia	9.0	0	0	9.0
	Senegal	8.0	0	0	8.0
	Sierra Leone	9.0	0	0	9.0
<b>Infant Mortality Rate</b>		<b>(1997-1998)</b>			
(per 1000 live births)	Gambia	8.0	-1	0	7.0
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Guinea	9.0	-1	0	8.0
	Liberia	9.0	-1	0	8.0
	Senegal	7.0	-1	0	6.0
	Sierra Leone	9.0	-1	0	8.0
<b>Maternal Mortality Rate</b>		<b>1995</b>			
(per 100,000 live births)	Gambia	9.0	single measure		9.0
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Guinea	9.0	single measure		9.0
	Liberia	..	single measure		..
	Senegal	9.0	single measure		9.0
	Sierra Leone	9.0	single measure		9.0
<b>HIV/AIDS</b>		<b>(1997-1998)</b>			
(% of Adult Population)	Gambia	7.5	-1	0	6.5
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Guinea	7.0	-1	0	6.0
	Liberia	8.0	-1	0	7.0
	Senegal	7.0	-1	0	6.0
	Sierra Leone	8.0	-1	0	7.0
<b>Primary School Enrollment</b>		<b>(1993-1997)</b>			
(% of Relevant Age Group)	Gambia	8.0	-1	0	7.0
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Guinea	9.0	-1	1	9.0
	Liberia	..	..	..	..
	Senegal	8.0	-1	1	8.0
	Sierra Leone	..	..	..	..
<b>Secondary School Enrollment</b>		<b>(1993-1997)</b>			
(% of Relevant Age Group)	Gambia	8.0	-1	0	7.0
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Guinea	9.0	-1	0	8.0
	Liberia	..	..	..	..
	Senegal	9.0	1	0	10.0
	Sierra Leone	..	..	..	..
<b>Child Labour</b>		<b>(1995-1999)</b>			
(% of Children aged 10-14)	Gambia	8.0	-1	0	7.0
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Guinea	8.0	-1	0	7.0

Indicators	Liberia	6.0	-1	0	5.0
	Senegal	7.3	-1	0	6.3
	Sierra Leone	5.0	-1	0	4.0
<b>Composite Human Development Score</b>					
	Gambia				7.4
	Guinea				7.7
	Liberia				7.3
	Senegal				6.9
	Sierra Leone				7.9


As with overall levels of economic development, poor levels of human development correlate strongly with higher risk of violent conflict and state failure. The lack of, or decline in, public services such as health care, education, safe water and sanitation indicate weak state capacity to provide and allocate vital services. This can decrease popular confidence in the state, leading to political instability and social unrest. So too can unmet expectations regarding educational opportunities or other opportunities for social advancement increase discontent and the likelihood and severity of civil strife. Low levels of investment in human capital can also hinder the development of a skilled labour force, necessary for creating livelihoods and increasing incomes, and so on in a downward spiral.

**Poverty and Human Development**

All of the countries in this study suffer from inadequate tax collection and domestic revenue mobilization that make possible adequate health care and public access to education. The countries of the Mano River Union in particular as shown in the table to the left lack access to health and educational facilities, safe water and sanitation. Rates of AIDS/HIV infection may be higher than reported. Nevertheless cases of HIV/aids are highest for the two war-torn countries, Sierra Leone and Liberia. The bar chart in the figure above indicates that Senegal has reasonable access to improved water sources (such as house connections, public standpipes, boreholes with handpumps, protected dug wells, or protected springs).

**Access to Improved Water and Sanitation**  
Source: World Bank, WDI

*% Total Population*



Access to sanitation facilities (such as a connection to a sewer or septic tank system, pour-flush latrine, simple pit or ventilated improved pit latrine) shows only slight gains for the countries listed. Among the many factors contributing to high infant and maternal mortality rates are the lack of prenatal care, low attendance by trained personnel during delivery, lack of qualified service providers, and high levels of adolescent pregnancy.

## II. ENVIRONMENTAL STRESS

Lead Indicators	Country	Global Rank	Trend Score	Volatility Score	Risk Score
<b>Deforestation</b>		<b>(1990-1995)</b>			
(% Annual)	Gambia	6.0	single measure		6.0
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Guinea	6.0	single measure		6.0
	Liberia	..	..	..	..
	Senegal	5.0	single measure		5.0
	Sierra Leone	9.0	single measure		9.0
<b>Arable Land</b>		<b>1997</b>			
(People per Sq. Km.)	Gambia	7	single measure		7.0
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Guinea	8.0	single measure		8.0
	Liberia	..	..	..	..
	Senegal	5.0	single measure		5.0
	Sierra Leone	8.0	single measure		8.0
<b>Freshwater Resources</b>		<b>1998</b>			
(Cubic Meters Per Capita)	Gambia	5	single measure		5.0
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators	Guinea	2.0	single measure		2.0
	Liberia	..	..	..	..
	Senegal	5.0	single measure		5.0
	Sierra Leone	2.0	single measure		2.0
<b>Composite Environmental Stress Score</b>					
	<b>Gambia</b>				<b>6.0</b>
	<b>Guinea</b>				<b>5.3</b>
	<b>Liberia</b>				<b>..</b>
	<b>Senegal</b>				<b>5.0</b>
	<b>Sierra Leone</b>				<b>6.3</b>

Across the Mano River Union and Senegambia regions, the range of current environmental issues is broad. Development challenges, expansion of industry and commerce, and ongoing conflicts in each of the three focus countries have resulted in policies and practices that have given short shrift to environmental sustainability, and have led to a number of common environmental problems. These have included deforestation, soil erosion and land degradation, loss of biodiversity, air and water pollution particularly in and around urban areas, and the degradation of marine and coastal resources.

Of particular concern here, however, are those environmental factors that have contributed either indirectly or directly, or risk doing so, to the potential for violent conflict. The degradation and depletion of natural resources – particularly renewable resources, such as freshwater, arable land and forests -- can generate a variety of effects that underlie

social or political instability, and increase the potential for conflict. Reduced stocks of natural resources increase scarcity, heighten competition, and can result in increasingly unequal distribution of resources between communal groups or regions. The unequal allocation of resources in a climate of scarcity, or the capture of resources by dominant groups, can create or exacerbate cleavages within a society, creating incentives for violent conflict. Environmental degradation or depletion can also result in constrained economic productivity and growth, causing increased poverty and loss of livelihoods, leading to forced displacement or migration into ecologically-marginalized areas. Environmental factors interact powerfully with various other factors, including population pressures in the form of population growth and shifts in population density.



**IX. INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES**

Lead Indicators	Country	Global Rank	Trend Score	Volatility Score	Risk Score
<b>Economic Organizations Index</b>		<b>2000</b>			
(Number of)	Gambia	7.0	single measure		7.0
Source: CIA World Factbook 2000	Guinea	7.0	single measure		7.0
	Liberia	8.0	single measure		8.0
	Senegal	3.0	single measure		3.0
	Sierra Leone	7.0	single measure		7.0
<b>Military/Security Alliances Index</b>		<b>2000</b>			
(Number of)	Gambia	9.0	single measure		9.0
Source: CIA World Factbook 2000	Guinea	9.0	single measure		9.0
	Liberia	9.0	single measure		9.0
	Senegal	9.0	single measure		9.0
	Sierra Leone	9.0	single measure		9.0
<b>UN Organizations Index</b>		<b>2000</b>			
(Number of)	Gambia	6.0	single measure		6.0
Source: CIA World Factbook 2000	Guinea	6.0	single measure		6.0
	Liberia	6.0	single measure		6.0
	Senegal	4.0	single measure		4.0
	Sierra Leone	4.0	single measure		4.0
<b>Multipurpose and Miscellaneous Orgs. Index</b>		<b>2000</b>			
(Number of)	Gambia	6.0	single measure		6.0
Source: CIA World Factbook 2000	Guinea	5.0	single measure		5.0
	Liberia	7.0	single measure		7.0
	Senegal	3.0	single measure		3.0
	Sierra Leone	6.0	single measure		6.0
<b>International Disputes</b>		<b>2000</b>			
(Number of)	Gambia	4.0	0	0	4.0
Source: CIA World Factbook 2000	Guinea	1.0	0	0	1.0
	Liberia	1.0	0	0	1.0
	Senegal	5.0	-1	0	4.0
	Sierra Leone	1.0	0	0	1.0
<b>Composite International Linkages Score</b>					
	<b>Gambia</b>				<b>6.4</b>
	<b>Guinea</b>				<b>5.6</b>
	<b>Liberia</b>				<b>6.2</b>
	<b>Senegal</b>				<b>4.6</b>
	<b>Sierra Leone</b>				<b>5.4</b>

The form of a country’s engagement with outside actors – bilaterally with other countries or multilaterally through international or regional forums – can serve to reduce or, in some cases, contribute to the potential for violent conflict. On the one hand, international linkages can contribute positively to the mitigation of both intrastate and interstate conflicts, if external actors perform in a facilitating or supportive fashion, and have the operational capacity to contribute meaningfully in terms of mediation and

support for reconciliation efforts. Constructive engagement – whether through diplomatic, political, commercial, trade or cultural relations – can contribute to interdependency and shared vested interests, and creates opportunity for a wide range of support mechanisms. Participation in international regimes and organizations can also help decrease security risks by codifying broad rules and processes by which to resolve disputes peacefully.

On the other hand, weak linkages or harmful engagement with partisan actors can contribute profoundly to the potential for the outbreak or escalation of conflict. Countries with fewer diplomatic, political, commercial, trade or cultural linkages with neighbouring states, as well as international and regional organizations, and are less likely to profit from constructive engagement with outside actors, in areas such as developmental assistance, mediation, or support in peace processes. In addition, neighbouring countries might also contribute directly or indirectly to armed conflict by harbouring or supporting armed protagonists of a civil conflict. Furthermore, the interventions of neighbouring or regional actors can contribute to the potential of a civil conflict becoming inter-state or regional in scale.

**Bilateral Relations and Disputes**

Border disputes within the region are well documented. The primary focal point has been

**International Disputes**

(Source: CIA World Factbook, 2001)

<b>GAMBIA</b>
None
<b>GUINEA</b>
Border incursions by Revolutionary United Front combatants from Sierra Leone.
<b>LIBERIA</b>
Large refugee population from civil war in Sierra Leone; civil war in that country has engendered a massive flow of refugees to southern Guinea and Liberia.
<b>SENEGAL</b>
None
<b>SIERRA LEONE</b>
Civil war has engendered massive refugee movements into neighboring Guinea and Liberia.

the massive movements of peoples into Guinea from both Liberia and Sierra Leone. At this time relations between the Guinea and Liberia are tense and are likely to remain protracted. The possibility of renewed open warfare between Liberia and Guinea over issues related to refugee instability cannot be discounted. As noted in the CIA world factbook, where the definition of international disputes includes a wide variety of situations that range from traditional bilateral boundary disputes to unilateral claims of one sort or

another, resource disputes, geopolitical questions, or irredentist issues.

**Multilateral Relations and Linkages**

The table below clearly indicates that Senegal is the most engaged country in the international community (with active involvement in a range of different and important international linkages). In contrast Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia are clearly not nearly as directly involved in the activities of both regional and global organisations (with little or no involvement in the activities of many international organisations). This is worrisome to the extent that countries with fewer diplomatic, political, commercial, trade or cultural linkages with neighbouring states, as well as international and regional organizations, and are less likely to profit from constructive engagement with outside actors, in areas such as developmental assistance, mediation, or support in peace processes

Memberships in Int'l Organizations (2000)	Gambia	Guinea	Liberia	Senegal	Sierra Leone
Source: CIA World Factbook					
<b>Economic Organizations</b>					
African, Carib., and Pacific Group of States	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
African Development Bank	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ECOWAS	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Group of 15	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Group of 77	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
International Chamber of Commerce		✓		✓	✓
Islamic Development Bank	✓	✓		✓	✓
West African Development Bank		✓		✓	✓
West African Economic and Monetary Union		✓		✓	✓
<b>United Nations Organizations</b>					
Economic Commission for Africa	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Food and Agriculture Organization			✓	✓	✓
International Atomic Energy Agency	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
International Civil Aviation Organization	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
International Development Association	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
International Fund for Agricultural Dev.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
International Finance Corporation	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
International Labor Organization	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
International Monetary Fund	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
International Maritime Organization	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
International Telecommunication Union	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
UN General Assembly	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
UNCTAD	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
UNESCO	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
UNIDO	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Universal Postal Union	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
World Bank	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

World Health Organization	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
WIPO	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
World Meteorological Organization	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
World Trade Organization	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<b>Security / Military Organizations</b>					
None					
<b>Miscel. &amp; Multipurpose Organizations</b>					
Agency for Cultural and Technical Coop.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Commonwealth	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Customs Cooperation Council	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Int. Confederation of Free Trade Unions	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Int. Mobile Satellite Organization	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Int. Telecommunications Satellite Org.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Int. Criminal Police Organization	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Int. Olympic Committee	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Int. Organization for Migration	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Nonaligned Movement	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Int. Fed. of Red Cross and Red Crescent Soc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Int. Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Organization of African Unity	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Org. for the Prohib. of Chemical Weapons	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Organization of the Islamic Conference	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Permanent Court of Arbitration	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
World Confederation of Labor	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
World Federation of Trade Unions	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
World Tourism Organization	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

increasingly prominent, and the sub-region is embroiled in a complex of illicit linkages between diamonds, arms, and drug smuggling:

“...a major centre for massive diamond-related criminal activity, with connections to smuggling and theft throughout Africa and considerably further afield.”<sup>19</sup>

International Terrorism has come quickly to the forefront of international concern, and has become a primary topic of discussions at various forums for bilateral and multilateral co-operation and policy co-ordination.

Though CIFP analysis provides no hard evidence of this linkage, FEWER network member WANEP located in Accra, engaged in an initial assessment of the impact of terrorism on the West African Region.<sup>20</sup>

Though the focus of the analysis is on Nigeria, it is worthwhile highlighting some of WANEP’s important findings which are as follows. The 11 September terrorist attacks in the United States occurred the day after the Federal Army in Nigeria suppressed a weekend-long bloody clash between Christians and Muslims in Jos Plateau State. Immediately following the U.S. attacks, it was reported that Islamic extremists stepped up violence on Tuesday evening chanting *Allah-u-akballu* (God is great), with more killings, as well as the burning houses and churches. By the end of Tuesday, over 500 persons (both Muslims and Christians) were reported dead in the three-day attacks in Jos Plateau State. Jos is believed to be predominantly Christian.

The war in Afghanistan has received sharp reactions throughout Nigeria, especially in Northern Nigeria (Kano, Jos Plateau, Zamfara, etc). An interview with the BBC Network Africa Program (September 21, 2001) by an Islamic scholar in the Northern Nigerian city of Kano shows the general perception held by a majority of the Muslim community in Nigeria

## Transnational Crime and International Terrorism

### Illicit Drug Production and Trafficking (Source: CIA World Factbook, 2001)

<b>GAMBIA</b>
None recorded
<b>GUINEA</b>
None recorded
<b>LIBERIA</b>
Trans-shipment point for Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin and South American cocaine for the European and US markets.
<b>SENEGAL</b>
Trans-shipment point for Southwest and Southeast Asian heroin moving to Europe and North America; illicit cultivator of cannabis.
<b>SIERRA LEONE</b>
None recorded

International Terrorism has come quickly to the forefront of international concern, and has become a primary topic of discussion at various forums for bilateral and multilateral co-operation and policy co-ordination. A number of transnational threats have become

<sup>19</sup> Smillie, Gberie, and Hazleton. “The Heart of the Matter. Sierra Leone, Diamonds & Human Security” Partnership Africa Canada, January 2000. p. 49.

<sup>20</sup> See Fewer Analytical Report September 23 2001 (www.fewer.org).

and other parts of West Africa. The scholar declared:

The Islamic Community will declare a Jihad if Afghanistan is attacked and Osama bin Laden is unlawfully arrested and prosecuted by the West. Don't be deceived by so-called Islamic moderates like the presidents of Egypt, Saudi, and Kuwait. They do not represent the Islamic community. Afghanistan is now regarded as the icon for the struggle against those who impose their civilisation on us and Osama bin Laden is the embodiment of that struggle. We will fight. After all there is a better world awaiting us in paradise where beautiful women with pointed breasts await our arrival.

In Nigeria, a nation of immense oil wealth and widespread poverty, promises of a happy death – meeting pointed-breasted women in paradise in the after-life – is deadly serious because ordinary people respond profoundly to myths and beliefs. This tendency may only be intensified by a U.S.-led military strike against Muslims, even though the attacks come outside of Africa. Many Muslims in Nigeria already feel threatened by the rule of a Southern Christian believed to be the president closest to Western powers in Nigerian history<sup>21</sup>. Christian fundamentalists in Nigeria are occasionally victimised by violence, imposition of Shari'ah law, and other threats. Christians liken their situation to 'Armageddon' and call for a crusade. Inter-communal violence increases<sup>22</sup>.

In a worst case scenario, Nigeria's President Obasanjo, perceived to be sympathetic to the West, is overthrown and a northern extremist installed, similar to the late dictator Sani Abacha. Islamic rule by Shari'ah expands. Southeastern, oil-rich states, responding to Islamic militancy, revive their secessionist struggle (ended in the 1970s by the Biafran War) and the Nigerian nation-state begins to unravel.

Fleeing refugees of the most populous state in Africa could overwhelm smaller neighbouring

states like Benin, Togo, Niger and Cameroon. Instability widens as Christians and Muslims are pitting against one another throughout the region. The peace processes in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Cote d'Ivoire collapse. West African 'Christian' leaders, winning sympathy from the West, intensify their rhetoric and link it to the counter-terrorist effort. U.S.-sponsored agents try to assassinate those who support terrorists and appears to side with Christians in West Africa. Libya's Qaddafi responds by arming Islamic groups in the region. The African Union (successor to the Organization of African Unity and promoted by Libya) collapses.

The U.S. global campaign against terrorism remains extremely difficult to define. As a result, the proliferation of conflicting goals could provoke more conflict. The Islamic and Christian population in West Africa could end up choosing sides and as a result the 2003 general elections in Nigeria and elsewhere in West Africa could be disrupted. Shari'ah conflicts could be intensified by U.S.-led attacks on terrorist cells. West Africa, highly dependent on aid, could get less aid, thus increasing poverty and regional instability.

All but three countries in West Africa will hold general elections in 2002 and 2003. Dictators who were usurped by the growth of democracy in the sub-region could seize the opportunity of Western shift of focus to the fight against terrorism, and return to dictatorial tendencies, similar to those seen in the Cold War era. Hard-earned but modest achievements towards democracy, progress, and regional integration could be lost.

### Sierra Leone: A Diagnostic

Sierra Leone in particular could be most affected by recent changes in the region.<sup>23</sup> In a worst case scenario, Sierra Leone could witness resumed hostilities. Forthcoming elections could prove to be fixed or do not occur and corruption in government could return and grow. In a worst case scenario, the

<sup>21</sup> It is public knowledge that Nigeria's President, Olusegun Obasanjo, is a personal friend of British Prime Minister Tony Blair and other Western leaders.

<sup>22</sup> Religious fanaticism and solidarity is so demonstrated in Nigeria such that any issue with a religious connotation quickly generates violent hostility among Muslims and Christians.

<sup>23</sup> With input from Koren Marriott, Loranne Kettlewell, Marguerite Luong, Chie Yoshitomi (see Sierra Leone: A Risk Assessment Brief at [www.carleton.ca/cifp](http://www.carleton.ca/cifp)).

new government could disintegrate and the RUF rebels will fail to convert to a legitimate political party. The ruling Sierra Leone's Party (SLPP), the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) or the Kamajors could all rearm and spoil the peace process. In a worst case scenario, the newly elected government could prove unable to improve the infrastructure for human development and social services. As a result social and economic mis-management and decline continues. Arms-for diamonds trade resumes and power struggles arise over newly found oil resources. More worrisome is the possibility that UN programs are discontinued or prove to be unsuccessful: child soldiers and ex-soldiers fail to disarm and reintegrate civil society; As a result refugees and IDPs would be unable to resettle. The net result is that neighboring conflicts in Liberia and Guinea could expand and spill over into Sierra Leone.

In a more likely scenario, the government will stay focused on making the elections happen

as scheduled. As a result elections will occur but the level of participation will be lower than the government had anticipated (voter registration is very slow as a result of slow repatriation). There will be a difficult (but continued) dialogue among the parties. Violent confrontations are less likely to break out mainly because the warring factions are tired of fighting. The Special War Court will proceed but not all perpetrators will be brought to justice. There will be a continued international presence (primarily the UN and UK) but their programs have proven to be lengthier and more costly than expected. As a result the resettlement and reintegration of refugees and IDPs will become more costly and time consuming. Britain will likely continue to retrain and restructure Sierra Leone's military. However, social and economic restructuring will be slower and concrete results will not likely be achieved promptly. Illegal trafficking and mining of diamonds will likely continue on a diminished scale.

## DEFINITIONS OF INDICATORS

### Issue Area 1. History of Armed Conflict

**Armed Conflicts (Conflict Intensity Level) (Time Series: 1990-1999) (Source: Conflict Data Project and SIPRI Yearbook)** The "Conflict Intensity Level" describes the intensity of armed conflicts occurring within a country in a given year, based on data from the Conflict Data Project (CDP) at Uppsala University. The CDP defines an armed conflict as a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state. In order to be counted as an armed conflict, the CDP requires that there be a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths per year and per incompatibility. The scale for the Conflict Intensity Level is as follows: **1. Minor armed conflict:** At least 25 battle-related deaths per year and fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict; **2. Intermediate armed conflict:** At least 25 battle-related deaths per year and an accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths, but fewer than 1,000 per year. **3. War:** At least 1 000 battle-related deaths per year. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the "Armed Conflicts" variable, 1 is "no armed conflict" and 9 is "high degree of armed conflict."

**Refugees Produced and Residing Outside Country (Refugees by Country of Origin) (Time Series: 1990-1999) (Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), State of the World's Refugees)** The number of refugees originating in the country in question, but currently taking asylum outside the country. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the "Refugees Produced" variable, 1 is "Low number of refugees" and 9 is "High number of refugees."

**Refugees Hosted, IDP and Others of Concern (Time Series: 1995-2000) (Source: UNHCR, Annual Statistical Overview Reports)** The total number of displaced populations within a country, including Refugees (by Country of Asylum), Asylum Seekers, Returned Refugees, IDPs, Returned IDPs, and Other Populations of Concern. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the "Refugees Hosted, IDP and Others of Concern" variable, 1 is "Low number of displaced persons" and 9 is "High number of displaced persons." Note that whereas the "Refugees Produced Index" ranks the number of displaced persons produced by a country (and have sought or received asylum/residence elsewhere), the "Refugees Hosted, IDP and Others of Concern Index" ranks the number of displaced persons of various types within a country.

### Issue Area 2. Governance and Political Instability

**Level of Democracy (Overall Polity Score) (Time Series: 1990-1999) (Source: Polity IV)** The Overall Polity Score is on a 21 point scale ranging from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). In the definition of Polity IV, democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. Autocracy is defined operationally in terms of the presence of a distinctive set of political characteristics. In mature form, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. Their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite, and once in office they exercise power with few institutional constraints. For the global rank based index (nine-point scale) of the Overall Polity Score, 1 is "strongly democratic" and 9 is "strongly autocratic."

**Regime Durability (Time Series: 1985-1999) (Source: Polity IV)** The number of years since the most recent regime change (defined by a three-point change in the Overall Polity score over a period of three years or less). In calculating the Regime Durability Score, the first year during which a new (post-change) polity is established is coded as the baseline year "zero" (value = 0) and each subsequent year adds one to the value of the Durability variable. For the Global rank based index (nine-point scale) of the Regime Durability Score, 1 is "high durability" and 9 is "low durability."

**Restrictions on Civil and Political Rights (Time Series: 1985-1999) (Source: Freedom House, Annual Survey of Freedom)** Restrictions on Civil and Political Rights are scored on a 2 to 14 scale, where 2 is the highest degree of freedom and 14 is the lowest. The score is the sum of Freedom House scores for Political Rights (on a 1-7 scale) and Civil Liberties (on a 1-7 scale). In Freedom House's definition, Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, which is the system by which the polity chooses authoritative policy makers and attempts to make binding decisions affecting the national, regional, or local community. In Freedom House's definition, Civil Liberties include the freedoms to develop views, institutions, and personal autonomy apart from the state. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the combined score for Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1 is "free" and 9 is "not free."

**Restrictions on Press Freedom (Time Series: 1994-2000) (Source: Freedom House, Annual Press Freedom Survey)** Freedom House's Annual Press Freedom Survey assesses the degree to which each country permits the free flow of information on 1-100 point scale, where countries scoring 0 to 30 are regarded as having a free press, 31 to 60 as having a partly-free press, and 61 to 100 as having a not-free press. The Survey assesses a number areas of concern, including: the structure of the news-delivery system (the laws and administrative decisions and their influence on the content of the news media); the degree of political influence or control over the content of the news systems; the economic influences on news content exerted either by the government or private entrepreneurs; and actual violations against the media, including murder, physical attack, harassment, and censorship. For the global rank based index (nine-point scale) of the Press Freedom Score, 1 is "free" and 9 is "not free."

**Level of Corruption (Time Series: 1995-2000) (Source: Transparency International)** Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) provides a score of the perceptions of corruption within countries, ranging from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). The CPI has adopted the approach of a composite index, that averages the scores of multiple surveys concerning the perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general public. Transparency International focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. The surveys used in compiling the CPI tend to ask questions in line with the misuse of public power for private benefits, with a focus, for example, on the bribing of public officials or giving and taking of kickbacks in public procurement. As the same component surveys are not necessarily employed every year of the CPI, the comparison of CPI scores between different years is problematic. Global rank based index (nine-point scale) of the Corruption Score, where 1 is "highly clean" and 9 is "highly corrupt."

### Issue Area 3. Militarization

**Military Expenditure (% of GDP, Constant 1995 US\$) (Time Series: 1990-1998) (Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database)** SIPRI military expenditure figures as a percentage of GDP, expressed in US\$ Millions, at constant 1995 prices and exchange rates. Where possible, SIPRI military expenditure include all current and capital expenditure on: the armed forces, including peace keeping forces; defence ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence projects; paramilitary forces when judged to be trained, equipped and available for military operations; military space activities. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Total Military Expenditure (% of GDP, Constant 1995 US\$) variable, 1 is "low expenditure" and 9 is "high expenditure."

**Fraction of Regional Military Expenditure (% of known total spending for 1990s) (Single Measure: 1990s) (Source: Calculated from SIPRI Military Expenditure Database)** The Fraction of Regional Military Expenditure was calculated through totaling known military expenditures for the West African Region, using SIPRI Military Expenditure data, then dividing the sum into the total expenditure for each country. The Southeast Asian Region is taken to include the following countries, which were figured into the regional total: Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei Darussalem, and the Philippines. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Fraction of Regional Military Expenditure variable, 1 is "Low fraction of Regional Military Expenditure" and 9 is "High fraction of Regional Military Expenditure."

**Total Armed Forces (Per 1000 People) (Time Series: 1998-2000) (Source: CIFP score based on IISS Military Balance and World Development Indicators)** In order to assess and compare the portion of a country's population involved in the operation of the military, the size of a country's Total Armed Forces was calculated per 1000 people, based on Armed Forces data from the IISS Military Balance and Population data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. Total armed forces includes both Active Forces and Reserves. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Total Armed Forces (Per 1000 People) variable, 1 is "Low number of armed forces" and 9 is "High number of armed forces."

### Issue Area 4. Population Heterogeneity

**Ethnic Diversity Score (Single Measure: 1990s) (Source: CIFP score based on CIA World Factbook, Levinson's Ethnic Groups Worldwide: A Ready Reference Handbook)** The Ethnic Diversity Score is calculated on the basis of Shih's  $D_1$  index of ethnic diversity. This measure is based on the number of ethnic groups in a country weighted by the fraction of the population each group represents. A primary strength of Shih's measure is that both the number and the sizes of ethnic groups jointly determine the degree of ethnic diversity. The primary source of data is the CIA World Factbook, but where this source did not provide adequate percentage breakdowns of ethnic groups, CIA data was supplemented with information from Levinson's Ethnic Groups Worldwide: A Ready Reference Handbook. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Ethnic Diversity Score variable, 1 is "low diversity" and 9 is "high diversity."

**Religious Diversity Score (Single Measure: 1990s) (Source: CIFP score based on CIA World Factbook, Levinson's Ethnic Groups Worldwide: A Ready Reference Handbook)** The Religious Diversity Score is calculated on the basis of Shih's  $D_2$  index of religious diversity. This measure is based on the number of religious groups in a country weighted by the fraction of the population each group represents.<sup>24</sup> A primary strength of Shih's measure is that both the number and the sizes of religious groups jointly determine the degree of religious diversity. The primary source of data is the CIA World Factbook, but where this source did not provide adequate percentage breakdowns of religious groups, CIA data was supplemented with information from Levinson's Ethnic Groups Worldwide: A Ready Reference Handbook. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Religious Diversity Score variable, 1 is "low diversity" and 9 is "high diversity."

**Risk of Ethnic Rebellion (Single Measure: 1990s) (Source: CIFP Score based on Minorities at Risk Data Set)** Minority Groups are identified by the Minorities at Risk Project as being "at risk" if the country in which they reside has a population greater than 500,000, the group itself has a population larger than 100,000 (or 1 percent of the country population), and it meets at least one of the four criteria for inclusion as a "minority at risk." These four criteria are: that the group is subject to political, economic or cultural discrimination; that the group is disadvantaged from past political, economic or cultural discrimination; that the group is an politically, economically or culturally advantaged, and that advantage is being challenged; that the group supports political organizations advocating greater group rights. In his analysis of the characteristics of Minority groups at Risk as coded in the MAR data set, Gurr (2000) identified six risk factors that according to tests correctly identified 88% of existing ethnic rebellions. These factors are: the persistence of protest in recent past; the

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

persistence of protest in the recent past; government repression; territorial concentration; group organization; regime instability; and transnational support from foreign states. Based on data from the 1998 for each of these key variables, and using logistic regression analysis, Gurr calculated scores for the risk of future rebellion for each minority at risk group. The CIFP rankings for "Risk of Ethnic Rebellion" are based on a global ranking of scores for all countries with identified Minorities at Risk (a rank score of "1" being reserved for countries with no identified Minorities at Risk), totaling for each country the individual risk scores for Minorities at Risk groups within each country. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Risk of Ethnic Rebellion Score variable, 1 is "low risk of ethnic rebellion" and 9 is "high risk of ethnic rebellion."

#### Issue Area 5. Demographic Stress

**Total Population (Time Series: 1985-1998) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship. Refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum are generally considered to be part of the population of their country of origin. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Total Population variable, 1 is "low population" and 9 is "high population."

**Population Growth Rate (Annual %) (Time Series: 1985-1998) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Annual growth rate of population from previous year. Population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of the country of origin. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Population Growth Rate variable, 1 is "low growth rate" and 9 is "high growth rate."

**Population Density (People Per Sq. km) (Time Series: 1985-1998) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Population density is midyear population divided by land area in square kilometres. Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship. Refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum are generally considered to be part of the population of their country of origin. Land area is a country's total area, excluding area under inland water bodies, national claims to continental shelf, and exclusive economic zones. In most cases the definition of inland water bodies includes major rivers and lakes. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Population Density variable, 1 is "low density" and 9 is "high density."

**Urban Population (% of Total) (Time Series: 1985-1998) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Urban population is the midyear population of areas defined as urban in each country and reported to the United Nations. It is measured here as a percentage of the total population. Data is sourced from the United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects: The 1998 Revision. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Urban Population variable, 1 is "low population" and 9 is "high population."

**Urban Population Growth Rate (Annual %) (Time Series: 1985-1998) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Annual growth rate of urban population from previous year. Urban population is the midyear population of areas defined as urban in each country and reported to the United Nations. Data is sourced from the United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects: The 1998 Revision. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Urban Population Growth Rate variable, 1 is "low growth rate" and 9 is "high growth rate."

**Youth Bulge (Pop. Aged 0-14 as a % of Total) (Time Series: 1985-1998) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Total population between the ages 0 to 14. Population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of the country of origin. Data based on World Bank staff estimates. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Youth Bulge variable, 1 is "low growth rate" and 9 is "high growth rate."

#### Issue Area 6. Economic Performance

**GDP Growth Rate (Annual %) (Time Series: 1985-1998) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 1995 U.S. dollars. GDP measures the total output of goods and services for final use occurring within the domestic territory of a given country, regardless of the allocation to domestic and foreign claims. Gross domestic product at purchaser prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. The residency of an institution is determined on the basis of economic interest in the territory for more than a year. Data derived from World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the GDP Growth Rate (Annual %) variable, where 1 is "high Growth Rate" and 9 is "low Growth Rate."

**GDP Per Capita (PPP, Current International \$) (Time Series: 1985-1998) (Source: World Development Indicators)** GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). GDP PPP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar in the United States. GDP measures the total output of goods and services for final use occurring within the domestic territory of a given country, regardless of the allocation to domestic and foreign claims. Gross domestic product at purchaser prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated



assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. The residency of an institution is determined on the basis of economic interest in the territory for more than a year. Data are in current international dollars. Data derived from World Bank, International Comparison Programme database. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the GDP Per Capita (PPP, Current International \$) variable, where 1 is "low GDP Per Capita" and 9 is "high GDP Per Capita."

**Inflation (Consumer Prices, annual %) (Time Series: 1985-1998) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a fixed basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. Data derived from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and data files. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Inflation (Consumer Prices, annual %) variable, 1 is "low inflation" and 9 is "high inflation."

**Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (% of GNP) (Time Series: 1985-1998) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Foreign direct investment is net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. Data are figured as a percentage of GNP. Data are derived from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and Balance of Payments databases, and World Bank, Global Development Finance 2000. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (% of GNP) variable, 1 is "high investment" and 9 is "low investment."

**Total Debt Service (% of GNI) (Time Series: 1985-1998) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Total debt service, figured as a percentage of Gross National Income, is the sum of principal repayments and interest actually paid in foreign currency, goods, or services on long-term debt, interest paid on short-term debt, and repayments (repurchases and charges) to the IMF. Data derived from World Bank, Global Development Finance 2000. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Total Debt Service (% of GNI) variable, 1 is "low debt service" and 9 is "high debt service."

**Trade Openness (Trade as a % of GDP) (Time Series: 1985-1998) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product. Exports and Imports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services provided to or received from the rest of the world. Included is the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. Labour and property income (formerly called factor services) is excluded. Data are in constant 1995 U.S. dollars. Data derived from World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Trade Openness (Trade as a % of GDP) variable, 1 is "high openness" and 9 is "low openness."

**Inequality Score (GINI Coefficient) (Single Measure) (Source: World Income Inequality Database)** The Gini index provides a convenient summary measure of the degree of inequality, ranging, in ideal terms, from 0 (absolute equality) to 100 (absolute inequality). Inequality in the distribution of income is reflected in the percentage shares of either income or consumption accruing to segments of the population ranked by either income or consumption (expenditure) levels. Data on personal or household income or consumption come from nationally representative house-hold surveys. The data included in the CIFP refer to different years between 1985 and 1999, and the rankings are based on either per capita income or consumption (expenditure). Because the underlying household surveys differ in method and in the type of data collected, the distribution indicators are not reliably comparable across countries. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Inequality Score (GINI Coefficient) variable, 1 is "low inequality" and 9 is "high inequality."

#### Issue Area 7. Human Development

**Access to Improved Water Source (% of Total Population) (Time Series: 1990, 2000) (Source: UNICEF/WHO - Global Water and Sanitation Assessment Report)** Data were collected from two main sources: assessment questionnaires and household surveys conducted by UNICEF and WHO. The assessment questionnaires defined access to water supply in terms of the types of technology and levels of service afforded. This included house connections, public standpipes, boreholes with handpumps, protected dug wells, protected springs and rainwater collection; allowance was also made for other locally-defined technologies. "Reasonable access" was broadly defined as the availability of at least 20 litres per person per day from a source within one kilometer of the user's dwelling. Types of source that did not give reasonable and ready access to water for domestic hygiene purposes, such as tanker trucks and bottled water, were not included. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Access to Improved Water Source (% of Total Population) variable, 1 is "high % with access" and 9 is "low % with access."

**Access to Sanitation (% of Total Population) (Time Series: 1990, 2000) (Source: UNICEF/WHO - Global Water and Sanitation Assessment Report)** Data were collected from two main sources: assessment questionnaires and household surveys conducted by UNICEF and WHO. The assessment questionnaires defined access to sanitation in terms of the types of technology and levels of service afforded. This included connection to a sewer or septic tank system, pour-flush latrine, simple pit or ventilated improved pit latrine, again with allowance for acceptable local technologies. The excreta disposal system was considered adequate if it was private or shared (but not public) and if it hygienically separated human excreta from human contact. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Access to Sanitation (% of Total Population) variable, 1 is "high % with access" and 9 is "low % with access."

**Life Expectancy (Years) (Time Series: 1987-1998 (87, 90, 92, 97, 98)) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a new-born infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the

time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. Based on World Bank staff estimates. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Life Expectancy (Years) variable, 1 is "high life expectancy" and 9 is "low life expectancy."

**Infant Mortality Rate (Per 1,000 Live Births) (Time Series: 1987-1998 (87, 90, 92, 97, 98)) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Infant mortality rate is the number of infants who die before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year. Based on World Bank staff estimates. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Infant Mortality Rate (Per 1,000 Live Births) variable, 1 is "low mortality rate" and 9 is "high mortality rate."

**Maternal Mortality Rate (Per 100,000 Live Births) (Single Measure: 1995) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Maternal Mortality Rate is the number of maternal deaths per 100,000 live births. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Maternal Mortality Rate (Per 100,000 Live Births) variable, 1 is "low mortality" and 9 is "high mortality."

**HIV/AIDS (% of Adult Population) (Time Series: 1997, 1999) (Source: UNAIDS Epidemic Reports)** To calculate the adult HIV prevalence rate, the estimated number of adults living with HIV/AIDS at the end of each year was divided by that year's adult population. UNAIDS estimates include all people with HIV infection, whether or not they have developed symptoms of AIDS, alive at the end of the year. Adult population is defined as men and women aged 15-49. This age range captures those in their most sexually active years. While the risk of HIV infection obviously continues beyond 50, the vast majority of those with substantial risk behaviour are likely to have become infected by this age. Since population structures differ greatly from one country to another, especially for children and the upper adult ages, the restriction of "adults" to 15-49-year-olds has the advantage of making different populations more comparable. This age range was used as the denominator in calculating the adult HIV prevalence rate. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the HIV/AIDS (% of Adult Population) variable, 1 is "low prevalence of HIV/AIDS" and 9 is "high prevalence of HIV/AIDS."

**Primary School Enrollment (% of Relevant Age Group) (Time Series: 1985-1997) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Net enrollment ratio is the ratio of the number of children of official school age (as defined by the national education system) who are enrolled in school to the population of the corresponding official school age. Primary education provides children with basic reading, writing, and mathematics skills along with an elementary understanding of such subjects as history, geography, natural science, social science, art, and music. Based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). Data derived from United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization Statistics. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Primary School Enrollment (% of Relevant Age Group) variable, 1 is "high enrollment" and 9 is "low enrollment."

**Secondary School Enrollment (% of Relevant Age Group) (Time Series: 1985-1997) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Net enrollment ratio is the ratio of the number of children of official school age (as defined by the national education system) who are enrolled in school to the population of the corresponding official school age. Secondary education completes the provision of basic education that began at the primary level, and aims at laying the foundations for lifelong learning and human development, by offering more subject- or skill-oriented instruction using more specialized teachers. Based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). Data derived from United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization Statistics. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Secondary School Enrollment (% of Relevant Age Group) variable, 1 is "high enrollment" and 9 is "low enrollment."

**Children in Labour Force (% of 10-14 Age Group) (Time Series: 1990-1998 (90, 95, 98)) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Children 10-14 in the labour force is the share of that age group that is active in the labour force. Labour force comprises all people who meet the International Labour Organization's definition of the economically active population. Data is derived from International Labour Organization statistics. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Children in Labour Force (% of 10-14 Age Group) variable, 1 is "low % of children in labour force" and 9 is "high % of children in labour force."

**Issue Area 8. Environmental Stress**

**Rate of Deforestation (% Change) (Single Measure: 1990-1995) (Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank Atlas)** Definitions of forest area vary among countries. Land area is the country's total area, excluding the area under inland bodies of water. Annual Average Deforestation is calculated on the basis of the average annual percentage reduction in Total Forest Coverage. Data on land area and forests are from the Food and Agriculture Organization. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Rate of Deforestation variable, 1 is "low deforestation" and 9 is "high deforestation."

**People per Square km of Arable Land (1994-1998) (Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank Atlas)** People per Square km of Arable Land. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Rate of Deforestation variable, 1 is "high amount of arable land" and 9 is "low amount of arable land."

**Freshwater Resources (Cubic Meters per Capita) (Single Measure: 1998) (Source: World Development Indicators)** Cubic meters of freshwater resources per capita. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Freshwater Resources variable, 1 is "high amount of freshwater resources" and 9 is "low amount of freshwater resources."

**Issue Area 9. International Linkages**

**Economic Organizations (Single Measure: 2000) (Source: CIA World Factbook)** The number of organizations, based on CIA World Factbook data on memberships, coded by the CIPF as having a mandate focusing primarily on economic matters. To construct an index of membership in economic organizations, the total GDP represented by each organization (based on the total GDPs of all member states [using 1998 GDP figures at Market Prices in 1995 US\$ millions]) was calculated. These organizational totals were summed for each country to provide an indication of the strength of the Economic Organizations to which the country belonged. Countries were sorted from highest to lowest, divided into nine equal categories, and then assigned numbers ranging from 1 to 9 based on the category to which they belonged (where 1 = High Membership and 9 = Low Membership).

**Military/Security Alliances (Single Measure: 2000) (Source: CIA World Factbook)** The number of organizations, based on CIA World Factbook data on memberships, coded by the CIPF as having a mandate focusing primarily on military and security matters. To construct an index of membership in Military/Security Organizations, the total armed forces represented by each organization (based on the total armed forces of all member states [using 2000 Armed Forces numbers from IISS's Military Balance]) was calculated. Then, these organizational totals were summed for each country to provide an indication of the strength of the Military/Security Organizations to which the country belonged. Countries were sorted from highest to lowest, divided into nine equal categories, and then assigned numbers ranging from 1 to 9 based on the category to which they belonged (where 1 = High Membership and 9 = Low Membership).

**UN Organizations (Single Measure: 2000) (Source: CIA World Factbook)** The number of organizations of which a country is a member, based on CIA World Factbook data on memberships, which are formally part of the United Nations System. To assess each country's stature within the United Nations (UN), the number of UN organizations to which a country belonged was used as the indicator of a country's relative dominance. Countries were sorted from highest to lowest, divided into nine equal categories, and then assigned numbers ranging from 1 to 9 based on the category to which they belonged (where 1 = High Membership and 9 = Low Membership).

**Multipurpose and Miscellaneous Organizations (Single Measure: 2000) (Source: CIA World Factbook)** Multipurpose organizations include those organizations, based on CIA World Factbook data on memberships, coded by the CIPF as having a mandate that crossed various sectors of activity. Miscellaneous organizations include those organizations coded by the CIPF as having a mandate focusing primarily on areas not included above, or otherwise not fitting into any of the above categories. A procedure similar to that of UN organizations was used to assess the strength of each country's memberships in multipurpose organizations or miscellaneous organizations (i.e. organizations that could not be classified as economic, military/security, UN, or multi-purpose.) The number of such organizations to which a country belonged was used as the indicator of a country's relative dominance. Countries were sorted from highest to lowest, divided into nine equal categories, and then assigned numbers ranging from 1 to 9 based on the category to which they belonged (where 1 = High Membership and 9 = Low Membership).

**Total International Disputes (Time Series: 1999-2000) (Source: CIA World Factbook)** To assess a country's relationship with its neighbours, CIPF examined the number of international disputes in which the country was involved. International disputes are defined by the CIA World Factbook to include a wide range of situations that range from traditional bilateral boundary disputes to unilateral claims of one sort or another. The Total International Disputes variable counts the total annual number of international disputes that appear annually in the CIA World Factbook. In cases where a country claims a territory that is also claimed by a number of other countries, disputes are counted for each of the other countries individually. If a country has multiple disputes with another country, again these are counted separately. For the global rank based index (nine point scale) of the Total International Disputes variable, where 1 is "no disputes" and 9 is "many disputes."

## DATA SOURCES

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- Annual Review of Freedom  
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm>
- Annual Press Freedom Survey  
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/pressurvey.htm>

### International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

- Military Balance Annual  
<http://www.iiss.org/pub/milbal1.asp>

### Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)

- Epidemic Updates and Reports  
[http://www.unaids.org/epidemic\\_update/](http://www.unaids.org/epidemic_update/)

### Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

- Military Expenditure Database  
[http://projects.sipri.se/milex/mex\\_database1.html](http://projects.sipri.se/milex/mex_database1.html)
- SIPRI Yearbooks  
<http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/yearb.html>

### Transparency International

- Corruption Perceptions Index  
<http://www.transparency.org/documents/cpi/2001/cpi2001.html>  
Archive (1995 to 2000): <http://www.gwdg.de/~uwvw/>

### United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) / World Health Organization (WHO)

- Global Water and Sanitation Assessment Reports  
[http://www.who.int/water\\_sanitation\\_health/Globassessment/GlobalTOC.htm](http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/Globassessment/GlobalTOC.htm)

### United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

- Human Development Reports  
<http://www.undp.org/hdro/>

### United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

- Statistical Overviews  
<http://www.unhcr.ch/statist/main.htm>
- State of the World's Refugees Reports  
<http://www.unhcr.ch/sowr2000/toc2.htm>

### United Nations Statistical Division

- United Nations Statistical Yearbook  
<http://esa.un.org/unsd/pubs/>

### United Nations University (UNU) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

- World Income Inequality Database  
<http://www.undp.org/poverty/initiatives/wider/wiid.htm>

### United States Central Intelligence Agency

- World Factbook Annuals  
<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/>  
Archive (1992 to 1999): <http://www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/>

**University of Maryland, Centre for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM)**

- Polity IV Project Dataset  
<http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/polity/>
- Minorities at Risk Project Dataset  
<http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/>

**Uppsala University**

- Conflict Data Project  
<http://www.pcr.uu.se/data.htm>

**World Bank**

- World Development Indicators  
<http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi/home.html>

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