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IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM CAMPAIGN FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION

A PREPAREDNESS RESOURCE FOR THE FIELD

Spring 2003

FEWER is a global coalition that provides early warning and promotes co-ordinated, early responses to violent conflict.

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- Peace Mission of General Lebed (Russia)
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I. INTRODUCTION

By the FEWER Board

The Implications of the Anti-Terrorism Campaign for Conflict Prevention – A Preparedness Resource for the Field is our second report on the anti-terrorism campaign. Its aim is to shed light on implications of the campaign for conflict prevention efforts at a regional and global level. The report is prepared by analysts drawn from within and outside the FEWER network and includes the following:

- ❑ An assessment of recent anti-terrorism policy developments;
- ❑ Emerging implications of anti-terrorism efforts on conflict prevention work from a regional and global perspective; and
- ❑ A framework to assist conflict prevention practitioners in determining and preparing for the impact of anti-terrorism on their work.

Below follows an assessment of our previous report considering developments over the last 18 months. Emerging issues from the analysis presented in the subsequent pages is also included. It is important to note that whilst this is a global study, it does not attempt to analyse the effects of the anti-terrorism campaign in all countries. Rather, it should be seen as an overview of anti-terrorist policies and its impact on conflict prevention efforts in certain conflict-affected regions. FEWER has chosen to focus on the regions where the network and its member organisations are most active.

LOOKING BACK – 18 MONTHS ON

In the last FEWER report on the regional and global risks associated with the anti-terrorism campaign, three key messages were highlighted:

- ❑ The failure to recognise that terrorism sometimes has a popular base in society raises the possibility that the anti-terror campaign will move ultimately against civilians who – for whatever reason – support terrorists. Neglect of the popular basis of different terrorist groups is disconcerting. Civilian casualties may be high in those places where civilian support for terrorism is high.
- ❑ Several regions will be affected by a U.S.-led campaign against terrorism. Worst case scenarios are grim with resurgence and escalation of violence, governmental instability, regional polarisation, significant migration flows exceeding four million people, and severe economic consequences.
- ❑ On a global level, the choices made for a U.S.-led campaign will change the political, social, economic and humanitarian landscape everywhere. In a best case scenario, the United Nations becomes an integral force in any campaign against terrorism. A number of strategic socio-economic measures are implemented, and the global drive to eliminate poverty, tackle debt, strengthen human rights and democracy, and protect the environment is bolstered.

One year on (see Appendix I for a full review), we see the following:

- ❑ The root causes of terrorism remain largely unaddressed and beyond the interests of governments leading the anti-terrorism campaign. The predominant emphasis on “defeating” terrorism by military and security-based means is reducing civilian control over the military in several countries, undermining human and civil rights, and leading to the appropriation of the ‘anti-terrorism’ discourse by governments (e.g. Nepal) keen to defeat internal insurgents. To a certain extent, however, fears of political instability in allied countries (e.g. Pakistan) have proven to be relatively unfounded.
- ❑ Regionally, with exceptions in the Caucasus (Chechnya) and Southeast Asia (Philippines and Indonesia), worst case scenarios have not unfolded. Nonetheless, stability in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nigeria remains fragile. Deep ethnic, political and religious divides in all countries are still of concern, making them prone to destabilisation as the anti-terrorism campaign progresses.
- ❑ At a global level, parts of our worst case and realistic scenarios have been realised. Terrorist attacks have been intensified in Russia, Indonesia, the Middle East, with warnings issued both in North America and Western Europe. A number of rebel groups now carry the label of “terrorists”, complicating (and in some cases

undermining) conflict prevention efforts. Xenophobia is rising against Muslims and Christians alike. Economic recovery is slow and oil prices are increasingly unstable. Pressure on international institutions to bolster anti-terrorism efforts is varied, although instruments such as debt relief and development aid are used extensively – and current international norms and law are challenged with the war in Iraq.

- ❑ Of the global risks cited in our previous report, only major humanitarian disasters have not materialised. New security threats are emerging; setbacks to democracy, conflict prevention and human rights, as well as the rise of xenophobia have been seen.

NEW EMERGING MESSAGES

This report highlights three key messages:

- ❑ Evidence suggests that the anti-terrorism campaign increasingly affects conflict prevention efforts in different regions. Although direct causal links are difficult to establish, it is important to further research the range of positive and negative impacts that the campaign has in relation to conflict resolution and peace-building.
- ❑ The anti-terrorism campaign (in its current form) undermines conflict prevention efforts in two fundamental ways:
 - ❑ it complicates operational efforts in the field (e.g. increased human rights violations, legitimacy accorded to state oppression, engagement with 'terrorist' branded groups becomes difficult, etc.); and
 - ❑ it challenges the legal and ethical basis of peace initiatives (e.g. reduced credibility of democratic principles, reduced space for non-violent resolution of conflict, challenges to international law, etc.).
- ❑ Policy makers and practitioners need to anticipate and prepare for the impact of anti-terrorism measures if gains made in conflict prevention are to be safeguarded. The conflict prevention field will become increasingly vulnerable to set-backs and failure as the anti-terrorism campaign progresses.

2. ANTI-TERRORISM POLICY – RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

By the Norman Paterson School of International Relations (Canada)

In the immediate post-11 September period, the anti-terrorism strategy of the United States and its Allies appeared relatively simple: hunt down Osama Bin Laden and physically destroy the al-Qaeda terrorist networks that he helped to create and finance. Freeing the Afghani people from Taliban rule was in essence a 'value-added' political and social component of the other-wise largely *military* "War on Terrorism", a war characterised by joint Special Forces and Northern Alliance 'search and destroy' missions, and a wide-scale (if often inaccurate) tactical aerial bombardment campaign headed by the Americans, and supported by British and Canadian troops.

Diplomacy, although less visible, has been key since the initial phase of the "War on Terrorism". Because the U.S. required direct support from Pakistan to launch the war in Afghanistan, and likewise because it needed permission to over-fly and occupy the strategic airspace of several other countries in the Central Asian region, the United States used its diplomatic skills, as well as financial incentives, to further the anti-terrorism campaign. A prime example of this diplomatic-economic combination was exhibited in the Uzbek-American agreement of October 2001 that allowed American troops access to military bases in Uzbekistan in order to launch counter-terrorism operations in Central Asia. Moreover, the relationship has brought an estimated \$8 billion in US assistance to Uzbekistan.

Since early 2002, however, the parameters of the anti-terrorism campaign strategy have broadened significantly, resulting in the creation of a virtual Pandora's box of political, economic, law enforcement, and social policies at both the domestic and international levels designed to compliment the tactical and operational aspects of the military "War on Terrorism". National governments from around the world have drafted and legislated domestic action plans and signed onto new conventions to counter existing terrorist threats, as well as enhance the ability of the international community to prevent, detain, and prosecute any future would-be terrorists or their supporters. See *Figure 211* for examples of political, economic, law enforcement, and social measures from around the world dealing with anti-terrorism.

While critics of the new and often ill-defined anti-terrorism campaign worry about the rule of law and the erosion of the fundamental principles of democracy and social justice, supporters of the hard-line military approach have advocated increasing co-operation between countries and organisations in order to 'defeat' terrorism in any way possible. In many ways, both offensive and defensive military action has proved the principal means by which the international community has chosen to execute its anti-terrorism plans. NATO, and in particular the US, has become increasingly interested in conducting military training exercises with Partnership for Peace countries, particularly the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, in an effort to counter terrorism threats and enhance reaction capabilities.

Several members of the United Nations have expressed concern over the increasing role of the supranational organisation in the "War on Terrorism" and the domination of the Security Council by the United States and Britain, countries that have pushed for an expansion of the "War on Terrorism" to Iraq, and possibly other countries in the near future. The suspicion of or the actual presence of weapons of mass destruction continues to be an indicator of potential terrorist threat and may become a key issue in the formulation of future anti-terrorism policy.

As anti-terrorism strategies continue to expand, now including in many countries new immigration and refugee policies, travel and trade restrictions, and a much tighter control of government protest and dissent, a very real fear exists that governments may use the "War on Terrorism" to domestically restrict groups or individuals who pose a challenge or direct threat to the government. This has particularly profound implications for conflict prevention activities.

Figure 2-1 Examples of anti-terrorism measures from individual countries, organisations, and alliances post-September 11th.

Country/Organisation	Policy Description	Comment
Mali, Niger, Chad, Mauritania, United States- Pan Sahel Initiative	Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), designed to protect borders, track movement of people, combat terrorism, and enhance regional co-operation and stability.	PSI is an American-led effort that supports U.S. national security interests in Africa, including waging the war on terrorism.
China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan-Shanghai Co-operation Organisation	Establishment of an Anti-Terrorism Centre in Bishkek, which aims to co-ordinate interaction among the six member countries in combating international terrorism, national separatism and religious extremism in Central Asia.	China appears to be a strong supporter of this regional anti-terrorism initiative, perhaps particularly because of its domestic vulnerabilities in the north-western territories of Tibet and Xinjiang. Since the late 1980s, Muslim separatists in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region have posed an increasing threat to China's territorial integrity.
Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova (GUUAM)	Uzbekistan suspends its membership from the regional organisation, and the 11 September attacks appeared to serve as the main catalyst in its decision to do so.	Tashkent's interest in the security aspect of GUUAM declined after 11 September, when the Uzbek government forged a bilateral security relationship with Washington. The relationship already has brought an estimated \$8 billion in US assistance to Uzbekistan.
Canada	The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) received significant financial investment in order to support the war on terrorism domestically (CAN\$576 million).	Enhancing analytical, intelligence sharing, and operational technology has been key, as well as supporting protective operations; enhancing security activities at airports, major centres, ports and border crossing; and targeting cross-border criminal activities linked with terrorism.
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Gulf Co-operation Council, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, U.K., U.S.A.	Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), established to detect and prevent the misuse of the world financial system by terrorists.	The FATF has established a list of non co-operative countries and territories that do not comply with its rules and practices in the financial fight against terrorist funding. The list currently includes: the Cook Islands, Egypt, Grenada, Guatemala, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nauru, Nigeria, the Philippines, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and the Ukraine.

At present, anti-terrorism operations are being conducted around the world. Although the most obvious and easily traceable aspects of these operations generally relate to military actions taken in fighting the “War on Terrorism”, significant political, economic, and law enforcement activities aimed at preventing domestic and international terrorism in the future are also undertaken. See *Figure 2-2* for examples of the principal means used in fighting terrorism.

Figure 2-2 Principal Means Used in Fighting the “War on Terrorism”

Military	Political	Economic	Law-Enforcement
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❑ ‘Search and Destroy’ missions, e.g. Tora Bora, Afghanistan ❑ Tactical air-strikes and aerial bombardment e.g. Afghanistan ❑ Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and drones, e.g. the Predator drone equipped with Hellfire missiles that killed a suspected Al-Qaeda operative in Yemen ❑ Training of foreign militaries in Counter-Terrorism (CT) doctrine and tactics, i.e. US forces training armies in Georgia and the Philippines ❑ Increasing militarisation of areas strategically important to the “War on Terror”, including the Horn of Africa, and Djibouti in particular ❑ Call for NATO to move towards an alliance capable of fielding a streamlined force for rapid dispatch anywhere in the world in the campaign against terrorism ❑ US-led “Coalition of the willing” military action against Iraq on March 20, 2003. One of the main reasons behind the offensive was alleged Iraqi links to Al-Qaeda and the search for weapons of mass destruction. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❑ Increase in quantity and quality of local, regional, and international initiatives aimed at enhancing mutual security and co-operation ❑ Diplomatic initiatives extended to former adversaries of the U.S. in attempting to form an international coalition to fight terrorism (Russia, China, Somalia, Iran) ❑ Increased pressure by the international community for the resolution of long-standing conflicts, specifically in the Muslim and/or Arab worlds, including Central Asia, the Gulf, South East Asia, North Africa, and the Balkans ❑ Repression in the name of anti-terrorism- particularly of ethnic minorities and Muslims in countries such as China, Russia (Chechnya), Turkey, and Israel although the “War on Terrorism” is said to be non-denominational, Muslims and Arabs are targeted ❑ Harsh US statements towards Iran, Syria and North Korea. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❑ Large increase in security and defence budgets in many of the Western countries, as well as increased financial contributions to aid information and intelligence sharing ❑ Significant expenditure on humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, as well as other Central Asian countries identified as ‘key’ in the “War on Terrorism” ❑ Passing of UN Security Council resolution 1373 which criminalised the funding of terrorism, and UN Security Council Resolution 1390 which ordered the freezing of Taliban assets abroad ❑ Establishment of the Financial Action Task Force on Money-Laundering ❑ American financial backing of Central Asian, South East Asian, South Asian, Persian Gulf, and African initiatives to counter domestic terrorism and the threat of spill-over ❑ Preferential trade arrangements with countries backing the “War on Terrorism” (e.g. Singapore), ❑ Cancelled military assistance to 35 countries (e.g. Brazil, Croatia, Bulgaria) not signing bilateral treaties with the US for impunity of US soldiers in the International Criminal Court. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❑ Most actions taken concern information sharing and intelligence both at the domestic and international levels ❑ Domestically, greater co-ordination has been mandated between government agencies involved in the fight against terrorism in a variety of countries ❑ Stricter rules have been implemented in many countries regarding immigration, visitor and student visa rights, and refugee policies, and greater enforcement in these areas has been mandated ❑ Internationally, new investigative tools and resources have been made available to developing nations in order to help them contribute to the “War on Terrorism” ❑ Enhanced security measures at airports, borders, and other possible entry points for terrorists, usually involving advanced technology ❑ Establishment of domestic legislation in many countries regarding what qualifies as a terrorist act, and possible punishments for terrorism, as well as the establishment of laws governing terrorist financing

3. ANTI-TERRORISM EFFORTS – IMPACT ON CONFLICT PREVENTION ACTIVITIES

The impact of the anti-terrorism campaign on conflict prevention is multifaceted. As action is taken in multiple sectors (military, political, economic and law-enforcement), globally and in different regions, anti-terrorism efforts impact in different ways on conflict prevention. Trying to analyse this impact is both difficult and contested. It is, however, important if gains made in conflict prevention are to be safeguarded throughout the campaign. In an effort to shed light on the interplay between anti-terrorism efforts and conflict prevention, this chapter reviews identified impact to date from both a regional and global perspective.

REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES

Summary of findings from the “Anti-terrorism and Peace-building Roundtable” (London, May 2002)

Author: FEWER Secretariat

Regional perspectives on the impact of anti-terrorism on conflict prevention are drawn from Nepal, the Caucasus, Philippines, and the Ferghana Valley. The examples given below are relatively generic and require further research. As such, they should be seen as pointers only for potential regional impact in other regions.

Human rights violations increase

Human rights abuses in Nepal have sharply increased as the global anti-terrorism campaign unfolds. The declaration of a State of Emergency as well as the enactment of repressive laws the country have led to arbitrary detentions, disappearances and extra-judicial killings by government authorities. Access to justice and legal remedies is denied to those who have been branded as “terrorists”. The international community remains largely silent on the human rights issue presuming that “terrorism” is being eliminated. On the other side, violent and retaliatory attacks by the Maoists have increased – resulting in further human rights violations. The level of fear among the people is high as they are trapped between the Maoists and the government security forces. Impunity appears pervasive and to date none of the security personnel responsible for human rights violations have been brought to trial.

Geo-political complications fuels local support to extremists

US presence in Georgia, and in other regions bordering with the Russian North Caucasus, is increasing in the context of the global anti-terrorist campaign. This is affecting the unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Field analysts report that radical Islamic sponsors of local extremist groups, as well as certain groups within the Cherkess and Chechen Diaspora have been prompted by the US presence in the region to increase their support to local extremist networks.

The increased importance of the military affects negotiated settlement

A key result of the anti-terrorism campaign in the Philippines has been the strengthening of the power and role of the Filipino military. This has created obstacles to returning to formal peace negotiations between the government peace panels and their counterparts in the Communist Party of the Philippines, the New People's Army (NPA), the National Democratic Front (NDF) and in the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The US action declaring the NDF as a "foreign terrorist organisation", and the subsequent cutting of basic subsidies by the Dutch Government to NDF leader Jose Maria Sison have further obstructed peace processes.

Anti-terrorism legitimises state oppression

Since the anti-terrorism campaign was launched, terrorism has been used to legitimise state oppression in Nepal. Avenues for justice, both at national and international levels, have been blocked to those who are labelled as “terrorists”. The mandate

Caveats on impact

The impact of anti-terrorism efforts on conflict prevention is difficult to delineate in general terms. A number of observations should be noted, therefore, when looking at such impact:

- ❑ The campaign carries both positive and negative implications for conflict prevention activities. In this report, the negative factors only are listed. This is due to the focus of the roundtable on challenges (as opposed to opportunities) for conflict prevention practitioners.
- ❑ The implications mentioned below are context specific and expressed largely because of the specific nature of different conflicts reviewed. Indeed, there will be “permissive” conditions present in particular conflict situations that account for the impact seen.
- ❑ It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between what is considered a direct impact of the anti-terrorism campaign and what would be a natural evolution of a conflict. As such, some of the implications mentioned are likely to be questioned.

of national institutions, including that of the judiciary has been restricted. In addition to the declaration of a state of emergency, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention and Control) Ordinance has been enacted, granting unlimited power to governmental authorities and security forces, and a special court has been established to try those accused of being Maoists and terrorists.

The political economy of conflict becomes entrenched

Although both the separatists and groups within the Russian army are profiteering from controlling the illegal oil and weapons trade in Chechnya, the importance of the illicit economy for extremists increased following the anti-terrorism clampdown on suspicious financial transactions. In addition to the illegal trade, local analysts reported increases in kidnapping, ransoming activities, and extortion as 'local fund-raising' became more important for the insurgents. After the hostage crisis in Moscow in October 2002, however, the radical section of the separatist movement is likely to strengthen its external funding base again, due to the significant decrease caused by the global anti-terrorism campaign.

Deportation of illegal migrants fuels economic tensions

Great proportions of Filipino overseas workers, whether in Israel or Italy, are undocumented and illegal. Malaysia was set to deport about 100,000 Filipinos, but stopped temporarily when the Philippine government protested the inhumane conditions of their detention and expulsion. The influx of returning refugees is likely to intensify economic tension and conflict in the already volatile areas of Western Mindanao.

Growth of criminal networks and deteriorating security

The provisional government of Afghanistan has banned the production of opium poppy and is attempting to buy out the plantations of narcotic poppy from the population. Still, in the absence of radical improvements in socio-economic conditions in Afghanistan, and with the removal of the threat of famine, a reduction in the production of narcotics cannot be expected. The result is that the territory encompassed by drug trafficking routes, including the Ferghana valley, will remain under the partial control of international drug cartels. The Ferghana valley, the Kyrgyz part in particular, is engrossed in the production of narcotics. Poverty and unemployment in Central Asian states has created a favourable environment for an expansion of the narcotics business throughout the region. The rise in heroin prices since 11 September leads to increased acreage for narcotic plants as the criminal situation in the Valley deteriorates.

Engagement with terrorist-branded insurgents becomes more difficult

Nepal provides an example of the difficulties encountered in drawing insurgent groups into track-two diplomacy following the anti-terrorism campaign. The former government of Nepal not only declared the Maoists as terrorists, but also offered financial rewards for "the heads" of Maoists leaders. When insurgent groups such as the Maoists are referred to as terrorists, it is more difficult for peacemakers to engage with them, because those who try to establish contact with such groups are also likely to be labelled as terrorists.

GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES

Author: International Alert (UK)

From a global perspective, a number of critical issues face the conflict prevention community. These are summarised below.

Tensions between freedom and security

The conflict prevention community is confronted with some very invidious choices at the moment—the most critical being that between freedom and security. While some would argue that this is a false dichotomy it is also clear that the radical assertion of state right and power is resulting in very significant challenges to civil liberties. Since 11 September 2001 most countries have given state security priority over human security. In a recent poll in the US, for example, 67% of Americans were willing to abandon First amendment rights to freedom of expression in order to guarantee security. The US quest for "Total Information Awareness" is already resulting in unprecedented levels of internal and external surveillance with very few mechanisms in place for judicial review and redress.

Reduced credibility of democratic principles

The development and application of draconian anti-terrorist legislation in many countries (in response to Resolution 1373) is undermining many of the democratic principles which terrorists are committed to subverting. The suspension of Habeas Corpus and the detention of individuals without trial at Guantanamo and in other parts of the world are challenging concepts of rights, liberty and the rule of law that are now taken for granted. The suspension of these rights makes it difficult for the West to argue the qualitative superiority of democratic governance. Many past and present autocratic rulers have also used national security as a justification for the suspension of Human Rights and have been opposed in the past for doing so. When constitutional democracies suspend these rights the moral arguments for democracy become much more difficult.

Reduced space for non-violent resolution of conflict

The space for non-violent resolution of conflict is diminishing as powerful state systems assert coercive military responses to terror. Whenever military solutions are preferred to negotiated solutions it becomes more difficult to assert the value and importance of testing and exhausting non violent approaches to conflict prevention. The US 2020 defence doctrine of “Full Spectrum Dominance on land in the sea and in the air” leaves little space for negotiated diplomatic solutions to problems and is a major challenge to non-violent long-term conflict prevention.

Challenges to international law

The US and Australian government’s assertion of their right to take “pre-emptive and pro-active” responses to emergent threat (without necessarily seeking UN or multilateral legitimisation, as witnessed in Iraq) challenges some fundamental principles of international law, especially the principle of non interference in the domestic affairs of other nations. When this assertion of pre-emptive right is coupled with assassination strategies (e.g. the US pilotless drone attack on suspected terrorists in Yemen and numerous Israeli assassinations), due process and the international rule of law are severely undermined as states subordinate the legal process to political judgement. Article 51 of the Charter is silent about whether the right to “self defence” includes the pre-emptive use of force. In terms of state practice, however, the anticipatory use of force is not generally considered lawful or acceptable without UN legitimisation.

Increased State focus

The balance between State systems and Civil Society has shifted strongly in favour of State systems over the past year. In so far as civil society capacity building is a major focus of much “track two” peace building this may generate future tensions between State and non-state actors in different parts of the world.

Selective multilateral action

There is a tension between the multilateralist impulses of Europe (i.e. a desire to work in and through regional and global institutions for peace and security) and the unilateralist impulses of the United States. This is an important issue for the future. The US practices *a la carte* multilateralism. It chooses to use the UN and other organisations when it has to but prefers to pursue its own interests unilaterally. This is a luxury not available to smaller and medium sized powers for which multilateralism is not an optional extra but essential for doing regional and global business.

Negative fall-outs of military assertion

The overwhelming military power of the United States and “the West” generates both obedience and resistance. Because there is no nation or combination of nations that can balance US military power, asymmetric resistance becomes a viable option for those sceptical of US policy. The arrogant assertion of military power will generate a range of violent responses — maybe even the very threats that the West is seeking to prevent. Over time these may become increasingly linked with devastating consequences for world order.

Disproportionate responses to 11 September 2001

Utilising the 11 September incidents as a justification for: (i) a new political division of the world (under the leadership of the US); and (ii) the articulation of a never-ending war against rogue states and terrorists seems a very disproportionate response to the World Trade Centre incident (calamitous though that was). It is vital that terrorists and terrorism are defined primarily as criminal problems rather than political problems so that

proportionate intelligence, police and special military resources can be directed to dealing with them. Similarly it is vital that the US does not define terrorism as a US problem alone. It is a problem that challenges democratic governance and the rule of law everywhere. It can only be dealt with through a radical assertion of democratic responses that are within and under the rule of national, regional and global legal jurisdictions.

4. AN EMERGING PREPAREDNESS FRAMEWORK FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION

From the above sections it is clear that the anti-terrorism campaign has an impact on conflict prevention initiatives. Currently there are no approaches available to practitioners that enable this impact to be anticipated and prepared for. Such lack of preparedness makes conflict prevention work vulnerable to setbacks and failure.

Drawing on insights gained from the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Programme of FEWER/International Alert/Saferworld, a simple preparedness framework for conflict prevention initiatives can be proposed. The preparedness framework outlined below is based on the following assumptions:

- ❑ Anti-terrorism measures both at a regional and international level have an impact on conflict situations.
- ❑ As with any new type of intervention in conflict settings the impact of interventions is determined by the context.
- ❑ Understanding the impact of an intervention on conflict dynamics makes it possible to project implications for conflict prevention initiatives.

	Anti-terrorism measures/means	Conflict context	Projected impact on conflict dynamics	Implications for conflict prevention
Regional				
International				

A brief explanation for each of the columns is given below:

- ❑ *Anti-terrorism measures/means* refers to those outlined in figures 2.1. and 2.2. of this report. Users of the framework will need an understanding of (often covert) anti-terrorism measures/means employed on the ground in a given region.
- ❑ *The conflict context* refers to relevant and existing conflict factors (or indicators) that are affected by anti-terrorism measures/means (see examples given below). Users of the framework will need access to relevant conflict analyses for the completion of this section.
- ❑ *Projected impact on conflict dynamics* refers to how anti-terrorism measures/means are likely to affect the previously identified conflict factors. This and the subsequent section should be completed ideally with a group of analysts and field personnel.
- ❑ *The implications for conflict prevention* is the summary assessment of the framework (see examples given below).

Caveats to the preparedness framework

The framework has a number of weaknesses and should be seen as a contribution towards the development of more sophisticated models.

- ❑ The first weakness is that it is not an analytical tool, but rather a framework for organising analytical input.
- ❑ Secondly, it is a one-directional linear framework that does not capture, for example, the impact of the context on anti-terrorism measures or the dynamic inter-relationship between anti-terrorism measures and impact on conflict dynamics.
- ❑ And finally, the framework does not shed light on how to adapt conflict prevention activities at an operational level.

An example of a completed framework is given below. It is based on the work by FEWER’s regional lead agencies (EAWARN and Peace Mission of General Lebed) for the North Caucasus and Chechnya in particular.

Figure 3.1. Illustrative preparedness framework

	Anti-terrorism measures/means	Conflict context	Projected impact on conflict dynamics	Implications for conflict prevention
Regional	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Search and destroy operations <input type="checkbox"/> Forceful population screening raids <input type="checkbox"/> Strict border and road controls <input type="checkbox"/> New anti-terror legislation and media campaigns 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Anti-Caucasian xenophobia <input type="checkbox"/> Use of terror tactics by Chechen insurgents <input type="checkbox"/> Criminalised political economy of war <input type="checkbox"/> Animosity in Chechnya against Federal troops and growing anti-Russian sentiments <input type="checkbox"/> High level of illicit firearms proliferation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Russian xenophobia against Caucasians and Muslims increases <input type="checkbox"/> Youths in conflict affected parts of Chechnya are drawn to join insurgents (possibility of cultural demodernisation) <input type="checkbox"/> Disappointment in political process leads to entrenched asymmetrical resistance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Russian-Chechen reconciliation efforts and intra-Chechen dialogue become more difficult <input type="checkbox"/> It becomes harder to draw Chechen ‘terrorists’ into any settlement efforts <input type="checkbox"/> Engagement with the military in the context of the peace process becomes impossible
International	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Russia-US rapprochement <input type="checkbox"/> International controls of financial transactions <input type="checkbox"/> Agreement on US-Georgian joint counter-terror measures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Counter-terrorist operations conducted in the Pankisi Gorge <input type="checkbox"/> Chechen insurgents’ external funding (from international terrorist organisations) is unstable 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Regional and international sympathisers of Chechen insurgents mobilise to counter US involvement <input type="checkbox"/> More local criminal ‘fund-raising’ leads to further entrenchment of the war economy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> The Chechen conflict becomes more complex, with new and changing alliances <input type="checkbox"/> The political economy of war becomes an even greater obstacle to settlement efforts

APPENDIX I: REALISED AND UNREALISED SCENARIOS AND RISKS

This Appendix focuses on what happened in relation to assumptions, regional and global scenarios and global risks outlined in the FEWER Policy Brief “The Fall Out of Military Strikes Against Afghanistan: Regional and Global Risks”. It provides a tabular overview of: (a) impact of action/inaction on assumptions arising from anti-terrorist policies; (b) realised/unrealised regional scenarios; (c) realised/unrealised global scenarios; and (d) realised/unrealised global risks.

Assumptions arising from anti-terrorist policies	Impact
The management of the symptoms of terrorism, rather than tackling the root causes of conflict that foster the growth of terrorism, is sufficient to defeat terrorism.	Causes of terrorism remain relatively untouched.
Political instability in allied countries (e.g. Pakistan) can be minimised or is unimportant.	Increases in repression seen in a number of countries.
A military approach to terrorism will not have serious implications for nascent democracies. It will not undermine hard-won civilian control over the military.	Role of the military increases.
The discourse among U.S and NATO leaders will not reduce the scope for constructive dissent and debate in a campaign against terrorism.	Limited scope for governments to push for non-military approaches to reduce terrorism.
An anti-terrorist alliance will survive and last throughout the war despite lacking clarity in its aims and approach.	Limited space for constructive dissent of a largely military approach to reduce terrorism.
The global economic consequences of a campaign against terrorism can be managed.	Economic recovery appears to be delayed.
The rise of further domestic social problems can be managed, particularly xenophobia and an influx of refugees.	Xenophobia remains high in a number of countries.
The implications for human rights of new legislation in the West and a security clampdown in countries close to the theatre of war will be minimal or can be ignored.	Reduced civil and human rights in the West and elsewhere.
Terrorism can be defeated militarily. The lessons from history that military responses strengthen the resolve of terrorist groups and their supporters can be ignored.	Causes of terrorism remain relatively untouched.
The war will not become unmanageable. The terms of a campaign will not give a “free licence” among allies to attack groups not directly involved in the 11 September attacks.	A number of governments adopt the “terrorism discourse” to justify internal oppression.

Regional Scenarios	Realised	Unrealised
Caucasus (Chechen epicentre and Daghestan)		
<i>Worst-case scenario</i>	<p>Terrorist acts will be carried out in Georgia and throughout the North Caucasus.</p> <p>The settlement process will become impossible; the Chechen independence movement will become radicalised.</p> <p>Radical Islamic ideologies spread throughout the region. In the run up to elections in Daghestan (2002), violence is likely.</p>	<p>Renewed Federal action in Chechnya is justified as part of the global anti-terrorist struggle. The number of displaced exceeds 100,000.</p>
<i>Realistic scenario</i>	<p>U.S.-led strikes in Afghanistan and a wider regional war may lead to reduced funding for separatist and terrorist activities in Chechnya. Chechen fighters will continue to be influenced by the radical Islamic ideology, but the number of the Arab fighters in the region will decrease.</p> <p>The Russian army will continue operations to end the resistance and eliminate Chechen leaders, especially those who are believed to receive support from Osama bin Laden. These operations may be accompanied by intense population screenings.</p>	<p>Elections to a representative power body may be organised after a settlement is reached and the situation stabilises. Reconstruction of the Chechen Republic then receives a new impetus.</p>
Central Asia (Ferghana Valley)		
<i>Worst-case scenario</i>		<p>Protracted war in Afghanistan and subsequent response measures by the Taliban lead to activation of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) fighters and large-scale incursions in the Ferghana Valley. Violent and oppressive responses by regional governments may lead the Hizb ut-Tahrir to rethink their non-violent stance and attempt a mobilisation of supporters for armed struggle.</p> <p>Ethnic minorities will move in large numbers exceeding two million people. There will be a flow of refugees from each side to their ethnic homeland, a chaotic, disorganised, and panic-stricken exodus of large numbers of people.</p> <p>Regional governments, supported by Russia, seek to neutralise the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, or the Movement loses its legitimacy through incidents of bloodshed that seriously undermine the <i>mujahidin's</i> image and cut off the bulk of their supporters and sympathisers.</p>
<i>Realistic scenario</i>	<p>Drug trafficking is likely to grow along with greater instability. Regional governments and law enforcement agencies may put a break to instability, as may the drug traffickers themselves, as the threats of instability to the shadow economy are also significant.</p> <p>The relationship between different ethnic groups will remain, despite serious challenges, largely positive.</p>	

<p>South (Pakistan and Afghanistan) Asia and Worst-case scenario</p>	<p>Afghanistan has been destroyed after over 20 years of war and three consecutive years of drought have accentuated the current humanitarian crisis. The present situation will deteriorate further.</p> <p>While many Islamic governments deplore the attacks on the U.S. and support a targeted fight against terrorism they (governments and civilian population alike) may interpret an act of aggression against the Taliban – regardless whether they agree with the Taliban regime – as an act of aggression against the Islamic world.</p> <p>In Pakistan, President Musharraf's support for Western action further accentuates the already deep divide between secular and extremist forces in the country.</p>	<p>The call for a <i>jihād</i> gathers momentum. The eight imprisoned foreigners of Shelter Now International are executed by the Taliban in Afghanistan, hardening Western determination to topple the regime.</p> <p>A major backlash by Islamic groupings sympathetic to Afghanistan is very likely, as recent assassination rumours against Musharraf have shown. This could lead to a reshuffling in the army, with Musharraf being ousted as president and/or a civil war between secular and extremist elements in the country. In the instability that follows, India takes advantage and the Kashmir peace process collapses. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is compromised by instability and/or civil war, giving rise to new security threats.</p>
<p><i>Realistic scenario</i></p>		<p>Appeasing the West and offering logistic support to the U.S. will infuriate the country's ultra-Islamic groups. The Pakistani leader may not last until the elections in 2002 and it may become apparent who really controls politics in Pakistan. The possibility of a civil war still looms.</p>

Southeast Asia (Philippines)

<p><i>Worst-case scenario</i></p>	<p>The National Democratic Front, reacting to possible use of Philippine facilities by the U.S. and/or presence of U.S. troops, or to the deployment of Philippine forces with the coalition, would also step up its armed attacks (worst case scenario).</p>	<p>The situation in the Philippines would follow from the scale and nature of the U.S. led coalition's responses. Links between bin Laden and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) could be activated and resources poured to strengthen the ASG. If anti-Muslim rhetoric and attacks are stepped up, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), now in alliance with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and currently engaged in peace negotiations with the Philippine government, could again take up its secessionist struggle through armed conflict.</p> <p>If the conflict spreads in the Middle East, a substantial segment of the 1.4 million Filipinos working in Middle East countries might have to be repatriated. The huge losses in dollar revenues as well unemployment crisis would deepen the current economic crisis and delay recovery. The poverty situation and volatile atmosphere would provide fodder to forces, linked to former president Estrada, that are still trying to destabilise and topple the Arroyo government.</p>
<p><i>Realistic scenario</i></p>	<p>Although the Philippine government has declared full support to the "war on terrorism", actual action will more likely be limited to: (a) intensified intelligence work and co-ordination; (b) a final push to get most of the leaders of the Abu Sayyaf; and (c) allowing U.S. use of Philippine facilities (for stopover, refuelling, staging area, etc.).</p> <p>The MILF with the MNLF will not take up the call for jihad, but most Muslim Filipinos will feel aggrieved by any attack on Muslim populations. On the other hand, anti-Muslim sentiments have again been stoked among Christians especially in Mindanao and this will provide a difficult atmosphere for the GRP-MILF peace talks.</p> <p>The GRP-MILF peace talks will remain stalled, not only because of opposing views on the role of the Philippines in the U.S. led response to terrorism, but also because the situation bolsters the military's dominant role in the Arroyo administration. Security measures being proposed tend to curtail human rights, including those of foreigners in the Philippines, even while the country protests the recent arrests of Filipinos in Belgium.</p> <p>With the U.S. as the major market for exports of the Philippines and other Asian countries, an economic slowdown will worsen. Budgets for the military and the police will continue to increase despite the severe budget deficit.</p>	<p>Some return of Filipinos working in the Middle East countries at risk of war is likely.</p>

Southeast Asia (Indonesia)

<p><i>Worst-case scenario</i></p>	<p>Attacks by the U.S. and allies against Afghanistan result in militant groups holding true to their promises. Attacks are launched against U.S. and other foreign nationals, as well as their interests in Indonesia.</p> <p>Indonesia's economic recovery efforts stumble, resulting in increased unemployment and heightened incentives for violence.</p> <p>The police prove largely unwilling and unable to prevent attacks. Increasingly stringent security measures are applied, and President Megawati Sukarnoputri is seen as a tool of American interests, alienating the Muslim population, and straining Megawati's relationship with the Muslim political parties that helped her come to power.</p> <p>Christian-Muslim tensions are significantly heightened, communities become polarised, and communal attacks begin to occur against places of worship across the country.</p>	<p>U.S. and other foreign companies begin to halt operations and evacuate foreign staff, and foreign investment in Indonesia begins to drop significantly. Combined with a decline in domestic consumer activity.</p> <p>Reconciliation efforts and peace processes in existing local conflict areas such as the Maluku and Aceh collapse, and levels of violence increase significantly.</p>
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West Africa (Nigeria)

<p><i>Worst-case scenario</i></p>	<p>Inter-communal violence increases.</p>	<p>President Obasanjo, perceived to be sympathetic to the West, is overthrown and a northern extremist installed, similar to the late dictator Sani Abacha. Islamic rule by Shariah expands. Southeastern, oil-rich states, responding to Islamic militancy, revive their secessionist struggle (ended in the 1970s by the Biafran War) and the Nigerian nation-state begins to unravel.</p> <p>Fleeing refugees of the most populous state in Africa overwhelm smaller neighbouring states like Benin, Togo, Niger and Cameroon. Instability widens as Christians and Muslims are pitted against one another throughout the region. The peace processes in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire collapse. West African 'Christian' leaders, winning sympathy from the West, intensify their rhetoric and link it to the counter-terrorist effort. U.S.-sponsored agents try to assassinate those who support terrorists and appear to side with Christians in West Africa. Libya's Qaddafi responds by arming Islamic groups in the region. The African Union (successor to the Organisation of African Unity and promoted by Libya) collapses.</p>
<p><i>Realistic scenario</i></p>	<p>Hard-earned achievements towards democracy, progress, and regional integration could be lost.</p>	<p>Dictators who were usurped by the growth of democracy in the sub-region could seize the opportunity of Western shift of focus to the fight against terrorism, and return to dictatorial tendencies, similar to those seen in the Cold War era.</p>

Global Scenarios	Realised	Unrealised
<p><i>Worst case scenario</i></p>	<p>Taliban forces are mobilised for action elsewhere. A counter-attack is launched by <i>Al-Qaeda</i> against Western targets in the countries where it has operatives.</p> <p>Terrorist and fundamentalist rebel groups increase attacks in the Middle East, Central, South and Southeast Asia, West and North Africa, and North Caucasus, with attacks on Western targets in other parts of the world.</p> <p>The war escalates, with U.S.-NATO attacks not only on terrorist groups, but also on different rebel movements. A series of conflict prevention efforts collapse -- in Israel-Palestine, India-Pakistan, and Chechnya.</p> <p>Xenophobia against Muslims and other minorities reaches unprecedented levels in Western Europe, Russia and North America.</p> <p>Shock to confidence leads to reduced household and business spending and provokes a more serious and</p>	<p>A military campaign is launched initially against terrorist bases in Afghanistan, then Sudan, and Syria, including targeted air strikes and "search and destroy missions" by Special Forces of the assembled alliance. Afghanistan, Syria and Sudan retaliate with attacks on the neighbouring countries (Pakistan and Israel, for instance) that support the U.S.-NATO alliance. The Taliban mount a crushing offensive against the Afghan opposition (Northern Alliance), which is defeated.</p> <p>The "Holy War" called for by the Taliban gathers momentum, anti-Western demonstrations are organised, and pressure mounts on moderate Islamic groups and governments. The Pakistani government is overthrown, and its nuclear technology is made available to a range of countries and terrorist groups.</p> <p>A counter-alliance is formed among moderate and extremist governments and groups, and Huntington's "clash of civilisations" starts to unfold. The world splits</p>

	<p>prolonged recession.</p> <p>The world becomes increasingly divided along North-South and religious lines, leading to a disruption in economic relations, financial crisis in emerging markets, and oil price increases.</p>	<p>along religious lines.</p> <p>Instability caused in different parts of the world by the fall-out of U.S.-NATO attacks leads to massive refugee and migration flows in an excess of five million people. With the onset of winter in many parts of the world, delivery of aid becomes impossible. Suffering among civilians reaches untold of proportions. Humanitarian agencies are overwhelmed and chaotic relief operations follow.</p> <p>Shifts in priorities among international organisations, pressured by an anti-terrorist alliance to support the campaign, leads to further suffering and the loss of hard-gained advances in poverty alleviation, debt relief, human rights and democratisation, and the protection of the environment.</p>
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<p><i>Realistic scenario</i></p>	<p>The U.S. and NATO countries, with selected allies (Pakistan, Russia) launch targeted military strikes (air and special ground forces) against Bin Laden and Afghanistan. The Afghan opposition (Northern Alliance) receives unprecedented support and mounts an offensive against the Taliban, and pressure mounts on the regime to hand over Bin Laden. Alliance members initiate increased intelligence gathering and sharing efforts in order to uncover terrorist networks, hideouts, and assets. A series of arrests follow in Europe and North America.</p> <p>The Middle East peace process collapses. Terrorist attacks are staged in different parts of the world against European and North American targets. Anti-Western demonstrations follow in the Muslim world. As in the worst-case scenario, xenophobia against Muslims increases in Europe, Russia and North America.</p> <p>Normal economic relations resume with new security measures imposing only moderate inconvenience. No major rifts appear in the international community, though there is some deflection of attention away from, and subordination of, international economic issues to discussions on terrorism.</p> <p>Attempts are made to reduce instability in different parts of the world that follows U.S.-NATO attacks. Significant refugee and migration flows are nonetheless seen, although below the level of four million people.</p> <p>Pressure remains limited on international organisations to modify priorities and support the campaign. Some setbacks are nonetheless seen in poverty alleviation, debt relief, human rights and democratisation, and the protection of the environment.</p>	<p>Afghanistan retaliates against Pakistan, and the Pakistani government is increasingly destabilised, plagued by domestic violence and dissent in the military. The U.S.-NATO alliance launches air strikes against terrorist targets in Syria, Iraq and Sudan, with joint military efforts in other countries. After breaks in the cease-fire, Israel launches a series of attacks in the Palestinian Territories and Lebanon. Hamas and Palestinian counter-attacks follow on Israel, backed by Syria.</p> <p>A counter-movement emerges of moderate and extremist States, and the potential for Huntington's "clash of civilisations" increases.</p> <p>There is a minor, temporary, and largely undetectable effect on eventual economic recovery.</p> <p>With the onset of winter in many parts of the world, delivery of aid becomes increasingly difficult. As in the worst case scenario, suffering among affected civilians reaches unprecedented levels.</p>
<p><i>Best case scenario</i></p>	<p>The role of the UN is increased, and the UN Security Council sanctions anti-terrorist efforts.</p> <p>Security measures are stepped up in Europe and North America to prevent further attacks.</p>	<p>U.S. and NATO political leaders, in consultation with the U.N., agree on a set of political, economic, social and military measures. These include the use of selected embargoes, identification and seizure of terrorist assets in banks, narrow military strikes against clearly defined targets where terrorist activities are evidenced, and expanded programs aimed at addressing the conditions in which terrorism thrives.</p> <p>Pakistan and Tajikistan are not drawn on for operational support and remain stable.</p> <p>Conflict prevention activities in key hot spot areas are bolstered.</p> <p>New investment in security measures coincides with expected general economic recovery. The international community unites in combating terrorism, and this spirit of co-operation prevails in international economic discussions. Security concerns are alleviated, and commercial and financial markets continue to become more integrated.</p> <p>With a bolstering of conflict prevention efforts, the instability in different parts of the world that follows U.S.-NATO attacks is reduced.</p> <p>International organisations increase efforts to eliminate poverty, reduce debt, and expand human rights and democracy, and environmental protection.</p>

Global Risks	Realised	Unrealised
<i>New security threats.</i>	Instability in South Asia (notably in Pakistan and Afghanistan) will yield new security threats.	Instability in Pakistan, for example, may result in nuclear weapons being shared with Islamic terrorist groups. Terrorist and non-state actors may use weapons of mass destruction.
<i>Multiethnic societies may witness the rise of xenophobia.</i>	As the war on terrorism progresses, multiethnic societies will experience a rise of xenophobia and attacks on Muslim communities.	
<i>Business worldwide is affected.</i>	The financial costs of coping with a less secure world may increase.	A marked trend towards isolation could hurt developing countries and emerging markets by making it harder for them to attract foreign investment or financing. Finally, businesses may be subjected to new regulations and seek to strike a new balance between operating efficiency and security.
<i>The mandate and activities of international institutions are adversely affected.</i>	International institutions must now take terrorism into account both in terms of protecting themselves and in terms of their operational goals. They will be under pressure to launch anti-terrorism programmes.	The IMF and the World Bank, for example, may be called on to assist certain countries, in certain ways, simply because they are participating in a “war” on terrorism.
<i>Business becomes a target of terrorism.</i>	As the attacks on the World Trade Centre show, business is a prime target of terrorism. Oil pipelines, air travel and tourism, and American/British brands may be next.	Further attacks will affect stock markets and economic stability worldwide.
<i>Major setbacks are experienced in conflict prevention and resolution efforts.</i>	Efforts to prevent and manage crises in the North Caucasus, Middle East, Central Asia, Horn of Africa, West Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and Latin America may be adversely affected by an all-out war on terrorism.	
<i>Major humanitarian disasters arise.</i>		Anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan will immediately affect conflicts in the North Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. Increased refugee flows and mass exodus follow operations. Humanitarian organisations will be overwhelmed.
<i>Reversals on human rights worldwide.</i>	The war on terrorism is likely to have severe human rights implications both in the West and in the regions of anti-terrorist operations. In the West, xenophobia and anti-terrorist activities will infringe on individual freedoms. Regions affected by the war may see the radicalisation of moderate regimes, giving rise to increased human rights abuses.	
<i>Setbacks for democracy.</i>	The bolstering of military forces in countries where democracy is nascent may compromise hard-won civilian control over the military. The military may take advantage of the legitimacy given by a U.S.-NATO campaign and increasingly influence democratic institutions.	

APPENDIX 2: ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

ARTICLES, PAPERS AND POLICY BRIEFS

THE BAKER INSTITUTE TASK FORCE ON THE GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM REPORT, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Available from www.csis.org.

DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM IN CENTRAL ASIA, Martha Brill Olcott. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus, 27 June 2002. Available from www.ceip.org/pubs.

DON'T RELAX, The Economist. Vol. 363, Issue 8275, 1 June, 2002.

11 SEPTEMBER TERRORIST VIOLENCE AND THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION, Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation. Working Paper, May 2002.

THE ELUSIVE ENEMY, The Economist. Vol. 364, Issue 8284, 3 August 2002.

FRIENDLY FIRE, The Economist. Vol. 363, Issue 8369, 20 April, 2002.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: DEEPENING DEMOCRACY IN A FRAGMENTED WORLD, UNDP. Available from hdr.undp.org/.

HUMANITARIAN ACTION IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM, Larry Minear. Humanitarian and War Project, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Working Paper no. 63. Available from www.unhcr.ch.

IN AMERICA WE DO NOT TRUST, The Economist. Vol. 364 Issue 8289, 14 December 2002.

MAKING OUR WAY BACK TO HUMANITY: BEYOND 11 SEPTEMBER, John Paul Lederach. Published in *Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia*, 2002. Available from www.euconflict.org.

SEPTEMBER 11, ONE YEAR LATER: A WORLD OF CHANGE, Jessica T. Mathews. Carnegie Foundation for International Peace, Policy Brief, August 2002. Available from www.ceip.org/pubs.

STUMBLING TO WAR: THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE, INTERNATIONAL ALERT AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER, Dr. Kevin Clements. International Alert, Opening Speech Donor Day, 25 September 2002. Available from www.international-alert.org.

TELL IS LIKE IT IS, The Economist. Vol. 363, Issue 8276, 8 June 2002.

TERROR WAR THREATENS REFUGEES, WARNS U.N., United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Inter Press Service, 8 January 2002, Available from www.unhcr.ch.

A WORLD OF TERROR, The Economist. Vol. 365, Issue 8295, 19 October 2002.

RELATED WEB SITES

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL features information and analyses concerning the impact of "The War on Terrorism" on global human rights in its site, *Justice not Revenge*. Visit web.amnesty.org/web/content.nsf/pages/gbrsep11crisis.

THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS maintains a general terrorism resource site entitled *Terrorism Questions and Answers*. Visit www.terrorismanswers.com.

THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL'S COMMITTEE AGAINST TERRORISM maintains a site detailing its operations and recommendations for combating terrorism. Visit www.un.org/terrorism/.

THE WINSTON FOUNDATION operates the *Conflict Prevention Resource Site* which contains a section dedicated to the "The War on Terrorism."
Visit www.wf.org.

The views expressed in the above list of sources are solely those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response.