

## CIFP Country Risk Assessment: Medium Term "Watch List"

REPORT for Spring/Summer 2004

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A Full Description of our Methodology is available upon request.

## **CIFP Watch List**

### **A. Project Goals**

The goal of the project was to identify 3 countries at risk of violent armed conflict in the next 3 years in order for an appropriate intervention to be developed. The methodology for the watch list draws on open source information and the methodologies developed by CIFP researchers as noted in appendix a and b. In general terms our methodology entailed:

1. A preliminary selection which identified 30 and then 10 countries that are not yet at a level of significant violent conflict but which exhibit many of the indicators of potential serious violent conflict both in the immediate and medium term;
2. A second-stage selection that identified 3 countries in which it was determined that a third party conflict prevention response is appropriate.

### **B. Process**

#### *1. Initial Identification Process:*

CIFP identified 30 possible countries which have appeared on multiple assessment lists. They are (in alphabetical order as opposed to any kind of ranking system):

- Angola
- Bolivia
- Colombia
- Equatorial Guinea
- Georgia
- Guinea-Bissau
- Guatemala
- Guyana
- Indonesia
- Iran
- Kazakhstan
- Kyrgyzstan
- Macedonia
- Myanmar
- Nepal
- Pakistan
- Papua New Guinea
- Philippines
- Saudi Arabia
- Somalia
- Solomon Islands
- Sri Lanka
- Sudan
- Swaziland
- Taiwan
- Tibet
- Turkmenistan
- Turkey
- Uganda
- Uzbekistan

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- Venezuela
- Yemen
- Zimbabwe

### *2. From 30 to 10:*

A selection of 10 cases required that the CIFP team integrate findings from methodologically dissimilar risk assessment procedures, projects, frameworks and models. The assumption is that there are two kinds of reporting mechanisms currently available: risk assessment reports which precede and serve as a foundation for subsequent early-warning reports and early-warning reports which integrate the various data sources and analytical methods drawing on dynamic patterns of behaviour and local events. The former are risk assessment reports in the most general sense in that they do not provide a level of specificity required for precise policy response and early action. They cover for example:

- The Potential for State Failure;<sup>1</sup>
- Increasing Gross Human Rights Violations;
- Increasing Militarization;
- Regional Conflict Developments;
- Refugee Flows and Instability;
- History of Armed Conflict;
- Increased Economic or Environmental Stress;
- Health Epidemics;
- Globalization.

From this list of 30, the CIFP team then selected 10 countries on the basis of consensus using the criteria proposed by the project itself: which countries were not already receiving substantial outside help or would likely receive significant attention if the situation unravelled for geo-political or economic reasons. For example, Pakistan was not short-listed because of American interests within the country and the region. Turkey was removed because of both NATO and EU engagement. Georgia recently held democratic elections and a reform minded President was elected. Those countries which were already in the midst of violence were also removed from the list (i.e. Sudan, Uganda) those countries where the potential for conflict was strong remained on the list. Based on this criteria, the 10 countries identified are (in alphabetical order):

- Bolivia
- Equatorial Guinea
- Guinea-Bissau
- Guyana
- Papua New Guinea
- Uzbekistan
- Venezuela
- Turkmenistan
- Yemen
- Zimbabwe

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<sup>1</sup> For a more comprehensive comparative analysis see Carment, D. "Assessing State Failure: Implications for Theory and Policy" in *Third World Quarterly* (June 2003).

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### *3. From 10 to 3:*

At this point the group then moved to Stage Two of the methodology in order to identify countries in which a third party conflict prevention response would be appropriate. The purpose was to generate greater specificity about when and how the country in question is likely to evolve into violence within the next 1-3 years. The group looked for key patterns of increasing organized violence, as well upcoming events that could serve as proximate causes of violence – i.e. elections, as well as the absence or presence of third party efforts to ameliorate/reduce tensions (such as fundamental aid to preventive diplomacy). The amount of research conducted and additional information collected were substantial. For example, upon further investigation it was determined that the likelihood of Bolivia erupting into violence over the next 1-3 years was less than Zimbabwe because of recent elections and because there were a lack of triggering factors that would see the violence move from the capital into the countryside. However, Zimbabwe was also removed from the list because of South African engagement in the country as the regional power.

Factors relating to the viability of conflict prevention such as the presence of locally engaged civil society as well as the presence of outside efforts such as UNDP or World Bank poverty reduction programmes became critical in determining the final 3 countries. In the end, it came down to a matter of expert opinion as interpretation of the information and research presented was required. The final 3 countries chosen are (in alphabetical order):

- 1. Guinea Bissau**
- 2. Guyana**
- 3. Papa New Guinea**

The reasons for choosing these countries will be detailed in the findings section of the report.

As well, the countries listed below were slightly below the threshold for inclusion in our estimation but are included in order to provide an alternative to the top-tier countries (if for example there are problems in implementing conflict prevention responses in any of the 3 countries). These second-tier countries are (in alphabetical order):

- 1. Equatorial Guinea**
- 2. Uzbekistan**
- 3. Yemen**

Information on these 3 countries is also included in the findings section of the report.



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<p><u>PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde):</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ <u>Leader Carlos Gomes Junior</u></li> </ul> <p><u>Social Renovation Party (PRS):</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ <u>Party of former and deposed president Kumba Yala</u></li> </ul> <p><u>United Social Democratic Party (PUSD):</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ <u>Leader Francisco Fadul</u></li> </ul> <p><u>Guinea's Armed Forces:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ <u>General Verissimo Seabra Correia</u></li> </ul> <p><u>(spoilers)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ <u>PRS and Kumba Yala</u></li> </ul> <p><u>Possibly the Armed Forces</u></p>	<p>the majority of children to attend school during the past year, and reports of increased avoidable mortalities because of the Government's failure to pay for basic medicines continue to feed social tensions. It's estimated that unless there's an improved national response there will be a fivefold increase in the HIV infection rate in the next 5 years. According to UNDP Human Development Report, Guinea-Bissau ranks 169th with a human development index far below the regional average in terms per capita GDP, life expectancy, access to safe water, literacy rate, primary school enrolment rate, etc.</p> <p>- <u>Current Elections:</u> The results of the March 28<sup>th</sup> election for a new 12-seat parliament were initially delayed because many polling stations in the capital Bissau failed to receive ballot boxes and voting slips. Following complaints of voting irregularities by the PRS and Kumba Yala, General Verissimo Seabra Correia, the head of the armed forces who led last year's coup, asked the National Electoral Commission to delay the publication of results until their complaint had been settled. The delay in announcing results has led to rising tension leading to an exodus of residents fearing an onslaught of violence. Francisco Fadul, leader of the PUSD, another major contender in the election, has publicly conceded defeat to the PAIGC, which now appears set to form the next government. Carlos Gomes Junior claimed victory for his party at a press conference on Thursday and promised that he would form a broad-based government of national unity. However, while the military has promised to not interfere in the election process, its actions in September of 2003 set a dangerous precedent by ousting a democratically elected president. If the current government is not able to ameliorate socio-economic situation, and/or begins to show signs of corruption, it is likely that the military will involve itself. Moreover, the ousted Kumba Yala, is not content with the election results and may use popular discontent and unrest over economic stagnation to fuel protest against newly elected government.</p> <p>- <u>Military Fracturing and Reintegration:</u> There are reported tensions among the army rank and file over the longstanding backlog of salary arrears and poor conditions in the barracks. Moreover, representatives of the former combatants in the losing side of the civil war are demanding, inter alia, a full amnesty, their reinstatement into the army, and a formal agreement witnessed by the United Nations and the international community.</p> <p>- <u>Regional Instability:</u> Situation along the border with Senegal remains calm although there are occasional reports of incidents, a recent one resulting in the death of 2 Guinean soldiers. The activities of the Casamance militants in Guinea-Bissau, a minority rebel group from Senegal, continue to strain relations between both countries and threaten regional stability. Moreover, neighboring countries have experienced repeated coup attempts and conflict with rebel groups, reducing political, social, and economic stability in the region which threatens the fragile political process now underway in Guinea-Bissau, and is likely to present serious challenges to stimulating development for years to come.</p>
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<p><u>Additional Sources:</u> Reuters Alert Net, IRIN, ICG April 2004, MAR, CPLP, UNOGBIS Security Council Report 2003, HIIK, National Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper GB, Radio Television Portugal, LUSA information agency, UNDP.</p>	<p><b><u>ABSENCE / PRESENCE OF THIRD PARTIES:</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <u>Regional:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ ECOWAS: Akuffo Ado, Ghanaian foreign minister, quoted as saying that "ECOWAS will not allow another political and military crisis to erupt in Guinea-Bissau that could threaten stability in the sub-region." ECOWAS intervened in 1999 to end the civil war.</li> <li>➤ African Development Bank</li> </ul> </li> <li>- <u>International:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP), led by a team from Portugal monitoring and aiding in carrying out free and fair elections</li> <li>➤ United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) in the country since 1999 offering the UN's good offices and assistance</li> <li>➤ IMF, World Bank</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><b><u>RECOMMENDATION:</u></b> Despite ongoing international and regional engagement, the socio/economic and political situation in Guinea Bissau has remained precarious. Conflict prevention in Guinea-Bissau does not simply mean holding free and fair elections; it means creating the socio/economic conditions that guarantee a level of political stability. There is a role for a conflict prevention initiative to work with the UN mission, local government and donor community to address grievances with regards to social, public and health services so as to reduce the most direct causes of social discontent and unrest. Moreover, working with the CPLP, the presidential elections scheduled for 2005 could be organized so as to eliminate the irregularities that were, and may continue to be, a source of protest. Initiatives could work with Guinean government to reduce corruption and increase transparency. Well run elections, along with helping authorities address socio/economic grievances, and curbing corrupt practices while increasing transparency will give people a greater sense of confidence in their government, and enhance its legitimacy.</p>
<p><b><u>GUYANA</u></b></p> <p><b><u>STAKEHOLDERS:</u></b></p> <p><u>Indo-Guyanese:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ People's Progressive Party (PPP Civic)</li> <li>➤ Pres. Bharrat Jagdeo</li> </ul> <p><u>Afro-Guyanese:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ People's National</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>EVENTS &amp; INDICATORS:</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <u>Ethnic Divisions:</u> Imposed majority of Indo over Afro since 1834 by British. 51% East Indian over 30% black African descent. Racial Hostility Bill (2002) increased penalties for race-based crimes but long-standing animosity remains a concern.</li> <li>- <u>History of Disputed Elections:</u> rigged elections kept PNC in power from 1964-1992; 1997 and 2001 elections were monitored by third parties yet still deemed fraudulent</li> <li>- <u>Regional and foreign mediators/monitors:</u> Both parties are resistant to powersharing and prefer a "winner-takes-all" system, requiring mediation.</li> <li>- <u>Civil Unrest:</u> Very common, especially in protest of election results. Private sector launched total shut-down October 9-10 2002.</li> <li>- <u>Environmental Degradation:</u> frequent victim of natural</li> </ul>

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<p>Congress (PNC Reform)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Desmond Hoyter, former president</li> </ul> <p>(Spoilers)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Each other</li> </ul> <p><u>Additional Sources:</u> ReliefWeb, Economist, Reuters, AlertNet, UNICEF, Freedom House</p>	<p>disasters (i.e. floods).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <u>Borders</u>: borders are porous and unpatrolled. Increasingly attractive route for South American cocaine.</li> <li>- <u>Economic Stagnation</u>: One of the poorest countries in Western Hemisphere.</li> </ul> <p><b><u>ABSENCE/PRESENCE OF THIRD PARTIES:</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <u>Regional</u>: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Caricom negotiated political agreements in 1998.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- <u>International</u>: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Carter Centre helped broker the return to democracy in 1992 (victory of PPP)</li> <li>➤ Sir Paul Reeves, special envoy of SG of Commonwealth attempted to resume talks in 2002</li> <li>➤ UNDP (country office) and USAID providing support for Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA)</li> <li>➤</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><b><u>RECOMMENDATIONS:</u></b></p> <p>Long standing animosity remains a concern between the Afro and Indo-Guyanese as the PNC and PPP continue to polarize. PNC opposition against President Jagdeo and the PPP is reportedly mounting and rumours of another labour strike, similar to that in October 2002, may again flare ethnic tensions and riots. Accusations of death squads, continue to fuel the fire. Apprehension also surrounds the next election, possibly as soon as 2006. While Guyana is an excellent candidate for conflict prevention initiatives given the above scenario, an investment in Guyana poses somewhat of a risk: Triggers are difficult to predict. As one of the poorest countries in the Western hemisphere Guyana is also in need of long-term development, a factor which may hinder preventive action. All the same, the PPP and PNC have shown that they are open to outside assistance and a powersharing approach would be suitable in this case, with or without an outbreak of severe violence.</p> <p>Also, jointly organised initiatives with such institutions as OAS, World Bank and other donors would be accepted by both government and citizens.</p>
<p><b><u>PAPA NEW GUINEA</u></b></p> <p><b><u>STAKEHOLDERS:</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ <u>National Alliance Party</u> Prime Minister, Sir Michael Somare.</li> <li>➤ <u>Political Parties</u>; 43 as of 2002.</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>EVENTS &amp; INDICATORS:</u></b></p> <p><u>Linguistic Divisions</u>: 840 languages, many living in small tribes – therefore a high degree of autonomy from Government.</p> <p><u>Secessionist Movement</u>: 1988-1997 Indonesian secessionist revolt on Bougainville Island, – 20,000 lives lost. A fragile peace has held since.</p> <p><u>Electoral Difficulties</u>: June 17, 2002, even the Prime Minister was unable to vote due to 'missing' ballot box. No violence erupted, however latent dissatisfaction with system evident. Next election to be held no later than 2007.</p> <p><u>Internal Military Unrest</u>: March 24, 2002 – mutiny occurred over low pay; no violence, thirteen charged.</p> <p><u>Economic Stagnation</u>: Agriculture provides subsistence livelihood for 85% of population. Crime is rampant in more urban areas.</p> <p><u>Environmental Issues</u>: Tsunamis and volcanic eruptions are an</p>



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<p>➤ <u>Government of Australia</u>; ECP</p> <p>➤ <u>Spoilers</u>: Indonesian enclaves within Bougainville Island.</p> <p><u>Sources</u>: CNN, UNICEF, World Bank, IRIN, CIDCM, U.S. State/ CIA –Factbook.</p>	<p>ever-present danger.</p> <p><b><u>ABSENCE/PRESENCE OF THIRD PARTIES:</u></b></p> <p><u>Regional:</u></p> <p>-December 2003, <u>Enhanced Co-Operation Program (ECP)</u> created between Australia and PNG; 230 Australian police, 64 government staff awaiting deployment.</p> <p>-UN agencies.</p> <p>-Spartan attention overall.</p> <p><b><u>ENTRY POINTS:</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>➤ Policing, elections monitoring, governmental capacity building, infrastructure enhancement, etc.</li><li>➤ Government appears to welcome assistance, expertise, etc.</li><li>➤ More robust engagement built upon ECP would appear appropriate.</li></ul> <p><b><u>RECOMMENDATIONS:</u></b></p> <p>-Given that the situation is in flux (namely the recent presence of the ECP), the next few months will be a crucial period for observation. As a result, this analysis comes at the start of a peace-bolstering initiative, as opposed to during one. It would be good to re-evaluate the situation on the ground once the ECP has had time to take effect.</p> <p>-Possible partners include ECP, national government, donor agencies.</p>
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### *Second-Tier Countries:*

#### **EQUATORIAL GUINEA**

This country has had a dictatorship since 1979. Although there was a sign of democratization in the 1990s, this has not been taken seriously since there is complete government control of the press as well as flagrant human rights abuses, mistreatment in prisons, policy brutality, etc. However, the greatest threat comes from the President's own family as there is a history of relatives violently usurping one another (a brother was recently implicated in a plot to topple the president). The economy is stagnant and offshore oil and natural gas deposits may be the only hope of economic recovery. Although 2004 economic growth is forecast at 23%, few have benefited from the new oil wealth, poverty is rampant and former dependent industries have deteriorated. Skilled and educated peoples have fled and the opposition boycotts electoral races.

Precipitators to violence include: Recently the President Nguema demanded from Spain that the exiled opposition leader be extradited to E-G. There was the arrest of 70 mercenaries in Zimbabwe and 15 in E-G, all accused of conspiracy to assassinate and overthrow Nguema (March 7<sup>th</sup> 2004). There has been mass fleeing of immigrants and Cameroonians and Ghanaian officials have authorized the evacuation of their respective nationals. There have been police killings, rapes and beatings from the recent crackdown.

Outside involvement includes: A South African ambassador has visited the country along with intelligence agents to 'quiz' South African mercenaries in Zimbabwe and E-G. Nigeria is considering providing military help to President Nguema. A UN Special Envoy is to investigate the situation on the ground.

#### **UZBEKISTAN**

Although independent groups increased their political activity in 2003, the government's attitude to political liberalisation has not changed. Opposition parties have been denied registration, their members face harassment and arrest, and there is increasing pressure on NGOs and civil society generally. It seems unlikely that independent candidates will be permitted to contest parliamentary elections in December 2004. Freedom of expression remains extremely limited: newspapers and broadcasting remain almost exclusively under state control, and journalists work under constant pressure from the authorities.

Reports suggest that torture is still widespread in places of detention. Human rights defenders and ordinary people who speak out against local or central authorities face harassment or arrest from law enforcement agencies.

Economic failure has provoked social discontent. Despite the state repression, factory workers staged rare strikes in 2003 over unpaid wages, and pensioners went out on the streets demanding their payments. The most active and well-educated citizens are moving to Russia or the West.

This deteriorating socio-economic environment is provoking a rising tide of popular frustration, which fosters support for radical Islamist groups. Expectations that increased Western engagement after 11 September 2001 would lead to regime liberalisation have not been met. Instead, there is growing disenchantment with the

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U.S. military presence and increasing identification of Western institutions and governments with the repressive regime.

Experts compare the situation in Uzbekistan with that in Georgia before the fall of president Shevardnadze. The main interest of Western governments is to keep the status quo and to have a reliable security partner in Central Asia.

Most important has been the recent spate of terrorist bombings and other violence as an indication of the serious deterioration in the country: 2 suicide bombings at Tashkent market 29 March, and gun battle between police and militants in Tashkent 30 March. Another explosion in the capital reported 31 March. Government quick to blame Islamist extremists for attacks, which reportedly killed 42 over 3 days and targeted mainly Uzbek police.

## **YEMEN**

The country has a history of Islamic militant groups and it is the ancestral home of Bin Laden. Numerous Islamic militant attacks over the years include 'targets' ranging from NGO's to the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000, leaving 17 dead. In 2002 the intensity of the conflict between the Yemeni government and the Islamist Jihad increased. On December 28, 2002 a member of the Islamist Jihad murdered the deputy chairman of the Socialist Party of Yemen (YSP), Jarallah Omar. He had supported an alliance between the YSP and the Reform Party in what would have entailed an attenuation of the Reform Party's radical-Islamist wing. In June and July 2002 the government intensified its actions against the Islamists, who predominantly bide themselves in the mountainous South of the country. Most recently (March 21, 2004) two Islamic militants were arrested in connection with the Cole bombing and on March 4, 2004, 12 militants who had previously escaped in April 2003 were re-captured.

U.S. Special Forces arrived shortly after Cheney's visit to help train Yemen military in the catching of Islamic Militants. AU.S. Combined Joint Task Force exists in the region with a mission to battle terrorism.

There is reason to conclude (unless a new U.S. Administration takes office in November) that Yemen would likely have the intervention of American forces if violence were to increase.

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### **E. Report Recommendations and Next Steps**

The value of a watchlist is that documenting such information and putting a country on a public list can itself bring about positive changes in behaviour both by external and internal actors. The style for such an analysis is in the form of country diagnostics and risk assessment methodologies created by CIFP. These reports and templates provide an in-depth overview of a country's current situation as well as the entry points for conflict prevention programming (see Appendix B). Look for more watch lists as we continue to develop this project.

## **Appendix A**

### **1. Early Warning / Risk Assessment Definitions Developed and Used by CIFP**

#### Risk Assessment

- Identify situations in which the conditions for a particular kind of conflict are present.

#### Early Warning

- The systematic collection and analysis of information for the purposes of anticipating the escalation of violent conflict, developing strategic responses to these crises, and presenting options to critical actors for the purposes of decision-making and response.

### **2. Required Information**

**Macro or long-term processes** associated with system-structure transformations and the associated problems of the emergence of weak states;

**Intermediate mechanisms** associated with institutional viability and state weakness; and

**Micro or short term selection processes** and mechanisms that account for preferences of violence over pacific forms of strategic interactions and the subsequent escalation and/or duration of ethnic hatreds, violence, repression, and war at specific points in time

- Structural risk assessment reports are intended to precede and serve as a foundation for subsequent early-warning reports.
- Early-warning reports integrate the various data sources and analytical methods.
- Consequently, “risk assessment” and “early warning” are complementary but distinct modes of analysis that can be distinguished in several important respects.

### **3. Analytical Needs For Early Warning**

a) an understanding of three elements:

(i) stakeholder agendas, (ii) grievances and (iii) behaviour;

b) a range of data sources and analytical methods, such as:

- (i) micro-level assessments;
- (ii) intermediate and micro-level events; and
- (iii) macro-level trends using structural data and leading indicators

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### **Appendix B**

#### **CIFP Outputs**

##### **Regional Conflict Risk Assessment Reports**

- [Conflict Risk Assessment Report: Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines \(01/01/2002\)](#)
- 
- [Conflict Risk Assessment Report: West Africa: Mano River Union and Senegambia \(01/04/2002\)](#)
- 
- [Conflict Risk Assessment Report Sub-Sahara Africa \(4/11/2002\)](#)
- 
- [Conflict Risk Assessment Report African Great Lakes \(6/9/2003\)](#)
- 
- [Conflict Risk Assessment Report: Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine \(8/11/2002\)](#)

##### **Methodology**

- [Early Warning Methodology Report \(01/07/2000\)](#)
- [CIFP Needs Assessment Report \(01/07/2000\)](#)
- [Early Warning Methods: Background Report and Methodological Notes \(Summer 2000\)](#)
- [Early Warning Methodology Report \(01/07/2000\)](#)
- [Preliminary Selection of Indicators: Discussion Paper \(10/12/2002\)](#)
- [Assessing Country Risk: Creating an Index of Severity \(01/05/2001\)](#)
- [Risk Assessment Template \(01/08/2001\)](#)
- [Conflict Prevention, Gender and Early Warning: A Work in Progress \(11/02/2002\)](#)
- [CIFP Methodology, Data Descriptions, Data Sources](#)
- [CIFP Risk Assessment Indicator Definitions](#)