

## Sub-national Report for Aceh: Events, Scenarios and Analysis

### **FINAL REPORT July 2006**

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## Part A: Overview

### 1. Note

#### About this Report

This sub-national report has been produced by the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) for use by non-governmental organizations, businesses, academics, Canadian policy-makers, and other parties concerned with the current and future state of sub-national regions. The Iraqi Kurdistan Events Monitoring Profile is based on a fusion of CIFP Risk Assessment and Events Monitoring methodologies.<sup>1</sup>

#### About the Author

Adam Fysh is a researcher based in Ottawa, Canada. His Masters dissertation focused on the use of environmental indicators in conflict prediction methodologies. He is a principal investigator for the Enver Group and his current research focuses on the use of neural nets and graphic data modelling for conflict analysis. Mr. Fysh has been a curriculum designer and trainer in skills for peace operations and has traveled extensively for those purposes in Africa, East Asia and the Americas.

#### About CIFP

CIFP has its origins in a prototype geopolitical database developed by the Canadian Department of National Defence in 1991. The prototype project called GEOPOL covered a wide range of political, economic, social, military, and environmental indicators through the medium of a rating system. In 1997, under the guidance of Andre Ouellete, John Patterson, Tony Kellett and Paul Sutherland, the Canadian Department of

Foreign Affairs and International Trade decided to adopt some elements of GEOPOL to meet the needs of policy makers, the academic community and the private sector. The CIFP project as it became known has since then operated under the guidance of principal investigator David Carment of Carleton University and has received funding from DFAIT, IDRC and CIDA. The project represents an on-going effort to identify and assemble statistical information conveying the key features of the political, economic, social and cultural environments of countries around the world.

The cross-national data generated through CIFP was intended to have a variety of applications in government departments, NGOs, and by users in the private sector. The data set provides at-a-glance global overviews, issue-based perspectives and country performance measures. Currently, the data set includes measures of domestic armed conflict, governance and political instability, militarization, religious and ethnic diversity, demographic stress, economic performance, human development, environmental stress, and international linkages.

The CIFP database currently includes statistical data in the above issue areas, in the form of over one hundred performance indicators for 196 countries, spanning fifteen years (1985 to 2000) for most indicators. These indicators are drawn from a variety of open sources, including the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and the Minorities at Risk and POLITY IV data sets from the University of Maryland.

<sup>1</sup> For information on the structural risk assessment, see Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (2001) *Risk Assessment Template*, Available: <http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/docs/studra1101.pdf>.

## 2. Executive Summary

*Profile*


- The Kingdom of Aceh has expressed its independence since before colonial Europeans first arrived in Indonesia. By accident of history, the English extended beyond their own authority to cede Aceh to the Dutch, who met resistance in their attempts to govern the sub region.
- A violent and destructive battle with the Dutch gave way to further conflict with the newly independent state of Indonesia after World War II. The diffused nature of the population and territory of Indonesia made it particularly difficult for Jakarta to bring Aceh into the government.
- The special status Jakarta arranged for Aceh was intended to be a pacifying manoeuvre but ended up entrenching sentiments of uniqueness and autonomy. Demographically, Aceh is significantly distinct from other regions of Indonesia.
- The independence movement has been growing steadily since the 1970s and

came to a head in the 1990s when the armed militants of Aceh were recognized by Jakarta.

- Just as negotiations for disarmament between militants and state actors were warming, Aceh became one of the regions hardest hit by the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.
- Today, Aceh is awash with aid and support but the future status of the sub region and the robustness of the ceasefire with armed militants remains to be proven.

*Baseline analysis*

- Aceh is a medium-risk region with an overall risk score of 6.40.
- The primary destabilizing clusters are Governance and Political Instability, Demographic Stress and Environmental Stress.
- These clusters are destabilizing largely due because as Indonesia and Aceh negotiate and rebuild, these cluster areas are sidelined.



**Figure 1. Chart of trend lines for all events and the count of events by week**

*Event Trends*

- 333 events were monitored between 10 October 2005 and 12 April 2006.
- The average event score is positive, suggesting that though Aceh has had a turbulent past and still faces many hurdles, the reporting period showed promising results.
- Despite the overall stabilizing mode for events, Aceh exhibits a strongly negative overall trend.
- The negative trend is due to a decline in the magnitude of stabilizing events accompanied by a decline in the number of stabilizing events. Destabilizing events remain nearly constant through the reporting period.

*Primary drivers of event trends*

- Governance and Political Instability will be a continual process of negotiation and institution rebuilding for Aceh;
- In the Militarization cluster there was a massive troop withdrawal and disarmament that led to the positive trend;
- The International Linkages cluster benefited from huge amounts of international aid and development, though the number of those events

tailed off at the end of the reporting period;

- Environmental Stress had a negative pattern due to frequent natural disasters and resource exploitation without state-level controls on those activities to balance;
- The Human Development saw negative trends due primarily to the after effects of natural disasters and practices common within Indonesia.

*Scenarios*

- Most likely case: Aceh improves slightly over the next year.
- Best case: Aceh improves dramatically.
- Worst case: Aceh degenerates slightly if peace agreements do not hold

*Conclusion*

- Despite Aceh's violent past, it is poised to improve and could do so dramatically.
- Aceh should thus be largely able to absorb minor political setbacks.
- The possibility of re-engagement by GAM and TNI forces could be catalyzed by natural disaster or any number of symbolic political acts by either side.

### 3. Event Trends Summary

#### Overall

**General Trend** 

- There was a general decrease in the number of stabilizing events but this was accompanied by an immense fall in number and magnitude of destabilizing events
- The main source of the trend lies in the Militarization, Governance and Political Stability and International Linkages, Environmental Stress and

Human Development clusters, due to the extremely high level of aid and peace building activity as well as a reduction of violent activity.

- International Linkages may become one area to track, particularly as it relates to other clusters. If the magnitude and regularity of stabilizing international events decreases too rapidly, clusters such as governance and human development may suffer.

#### Primary Drivers

*Primary drivers are those clusters that contain more than twenty-five events. These clusters are the main areas of activity in the region, with the greatest contribution to the overall trend.*

##### **Militarization**

**General Trend** 

- Voluntary disarmament of GAM
- Withdrawal of national troops and police

##### **Governance and Political Instability**

**General Trend** 

- Peace talks
- Commemoration of Tsunami and independence anniversaries
- Recapture of Political control over governance activities
- Government-initiated reconstruction projects

##### **International Linkages**

**General Trend** 

- Immense foreign aid and support for reconstruction, development, peace and structural stability

##### **Environmental Stress**

**General Trend** 

- Natural disasters such as landslides and tremors
- Appearance and repercussions of bird flu
- Logging disputes and related human development and governance stresses

##### **Human Development**

**General Trend** 

- Widespread homelessness and poverty as a result of 2004 tsunami
- Initiation of health endeavours to support Aceh's reconstruction.

## **Secondary Drivers**

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*Secondary drivers are those clusters with less than twenty-five monitored events. These clusters provide supplementary information to the overall analysis.*

### **History of Armed Conflict**

- Vestigial violence from DDR process

### **Economic Performance**

- Aid-related inflation surge due to distorted economy
- Measures to ensure long-term economic growth

### **Population Heterogeneity**

- Migration from tsunami-affected regions
- Religious tension

### **Demographic Stress**

- Identity-based political posturing
- Rise of irredentist Muslim organizers
- Exclusive religious services for tsunami memorial

*Events are accurate as of April 12, 2006*

## 4. Forecasting

### Most Likely Case

***In the most likely case Aceh will experience improvement and its risk score will fall, but it is unlikely to fall to a lower risk category.***

The tabled autonomy law under discussion in Jakarta is passed though not without controversy. Meanwhile, demobilization and return from exile for GAM fighters continues without significant incident. There continue to be concerns about the distribution and equity of aid and support supplies but reconstruction and development, paired with the cessation of hostilities leave Aceh in better condition than it was before the tsunami. The economy continues its slow upward climb; some foreign support firms and aid agencies continue to invest in the future safety and stability of Aceh while others withdraw their support in favour of other emergencies.

### Best Case

***In the best case, Aceh will experience strong improvement and will move towards a lower risk score and category.***

The autonomy law passes without controversy and demobilization and return of exiled combatants continues without incident. There an appreciable but not

damaging withdrawal of international aid but not before Indonesia and Aceh have the chance to establish the structures of governance and infrastructure to support those undertakings without as much international support. The economy of the sub region recovers to better than pre-tsunami levels due to reforms in trade, foreign and governance policies. Aceh becomes a model for non-partisan disaster recovery and a constructive partnership between Banda Aceh and Jakarta takes firm root.

### Worst Case

***In the worst case, Aceh's improvements will tail off, and it will be at risk of quickly falling into a higher risk category.***

In the wake of another humanitarian disaster, international aid and support evaporates suddenly leaving Aceh and Indonesia with incomplete infrastructure and governance projects. High expectations and diminished prospects lead many Acehnese to question once again what benefit they derive from their peaceable association with Indonesia and the GAM is re-militarized. Perceived broken promises by Jakarta and desperation lead many to pursue ever more fanatical identity-politics. Indonesia mobilizes Javanese police and the military back to Aceh which serves only to reinforce the alienation and resentment.



## Part B: Detail

### 5. Profile

Aceh is a diverse region in one of the most demographically heterogeneous countries in the world, Indonesia. Situated at the Northern tip of the island of Sumatra, Aceh is a special territory (known as a *daerah istimewa*) that is not considered a province but has its unique designation to indicate its special status. It has considerably more federal freedom to legislate or control regional aspects of its governance than most of the rest of Indonesia.

Aceh has long insisted upon its cultural and political autonomy; in the 12<sup>th</sup> century, the Kingdom of Aceh exercised significant trade and political control over ports in present-day Thailand and Malaysia. The Sultanate of Aceh ruled prosperously for centuries until the 1600s when it was involved in a series of engagements with Portuguese, British and Dutch trading companies and their protectors. By the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the Sultanate had given up much of its non-contiguous territory but still exercised significant power due to its geographical position and spice exports.

In 1824 the English ceded their territories in Sumatra to the Dutch though it was not clear at the time that the English had no legitimate authority to cede Aceh as it was never truly controlled by them<sup>2</sup>. When Dutch administrators arrived to govern the territory they were met by resistance from the Acehnese. From the 1890 into the pre-WWI period, the Dutch waged a battle for control of the tip of the island that resulted in an estimated 50-100,000 deaths.

<sup>2</sup> For more information on this convoluted transfer of territory and authority, see: James T. Siegel's *The Rope of God*. The text traces the resultant strife and development of Aceh from the time of the British transfer to the Dutch.

At the time of Indonesian independence following the Second World War, the Indonesian military met the same unexpected resistance when it was dispatched to annex Aceh. Preoccupied with unifying and governing an already diffused national population, Jakarta granted Aceh special territorial status<sup>3</sup>. The Acehnese have lived for 50 years under this special status condition throughout regular low-grade skirmishes with Indonesian national forces.

Aceh's political independence movement grew steadily throughout Suharto's reign culminating in the 1970s and 80s Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM). A response to the perceived exploitation of massive stores of oil and natural gas found in Aceh and Acehnese feelings of resentment for anti-Muslim<sup>4</sup> Javanese chauvinism; the movement declared independence from Indonesia and fought a years-long battle for the sub region. Relations between Banda Aceh and Jakarta were changeable though by the 1990s, GAM was recognized as an Operational Military by Jakarta and negotiations were formalized. The nominal leaders of the GAM had taken refuge in Sweden and there were incidents of violence, repression and mutual recrimination throughout the rule of Megawati Sukarnoputri. By the mid-2000s, Aceh had rejoined constructive political negotiations with Jakarta but the outlook was unclear.

<sup>3</sup> For a description of the details of Aceh's special status, see the US Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress' country study of Aceh: <http://countrystudies.us/indonesia/84.htm>

<sup>4</sup> Both Aceh and the rest of Indonesia are predominantly Muslim but the unique history of Aceh has inculcated a practice less affected by tribal, European and Chinese influence than that which is practiced in most of the rest of Indonesia.

In the days following the destructive tsunami of December 26, 2004, the GAM announced a formal ceasefire of all hostilities to allow aid and reconstruction efforts to reach the region most severely affected by the disaster. The government of Indonesia also eased economic and mobility restrictions on the region. These acts of good faith opened the door for another round of peace negotiations in 2005. Finland, the EU and ASEAN helped the parties negotiate the disarmament of GAM, withdrawal of non-local Indonesian troops and police, and the return of exiled former combatants.

Though not without occasional setbacks, the peace of process for Aceh has met all deadlines and conditions for stable recovery and political settlement.

The region remains, at the time of this writing, blighted by massive poverty and homelessness as a result of the 2004 tsunami. International and national aid and reconstruction are ongoing and appear to be supportive of the long-term peace and stability of the sub region, as well as the reconstruction related to the natural disaster.

The main question facing Aceh today is that of its future status; EU and ASEAN monitors are set to terminate their missions in 2006 (though they have asked for more time). It is unclear whether, once the international aid and support community departs, Aceh's negotiated agreement with Jakarta will hold.

## 6. Stakeholders

In Aceh there are ten main stakeholders that are affected by changes in the political environment. Each stakeholder is composed of a variety of actors that have their own grievances and interests. Aceh has four internal stakeholder categories and six external stakeholder groups.

The tension that has existed in Aceh's stakeholders is deferred in favour of stability and reconstruction. Some of the stakeholders have grievances and/or interests that put them directly at odds with one another. These are largely due to Aceh's (and Indonesia's) extreme heterogeneity which may lead to different priorities.

**Table 1. Internal Stakeholders**

<i>Stakeholder</i>	<i>Composition</i>	<i>Grievances/Interests</i>
1. Government of Indonesia	- President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (succeeded Megawati Sukharnoputri in October 2004)	- Seeking national peace and stability - Desires reconstruction to support government policy, not supplant - Seeks to keep Aceh a part of Indonesia
	- Dr. Ir. Mustafa Abubakar, Administrator of Special Territory of Aceh	- Jakarta's representative, seeks to keep Aceh a part of Indonesia - Exercise political tools at the disposal of the special territory (Sharia law, etc.) - Seeks rapid reconstruction and stability for one of Indonesia's most afflicted regions.
	- Tentara Nasional Indonesia – TNI (Indonesia's military)	- Seeking stability and control - Loyal to Jakarta
2. Independence Movement	- Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) Also known as Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF)	- Sought political independence from Indonesia - Represented aggrieved Muslims in Aceh who felt discriminated against by Jakarta - Outlawed and then recognized militant actors - Seeking stability and prosperity for Acehnese
	- Hasan De Tiro, leader of GAM and Abdullah Syafei'i Dimatang (Indonesian representative of GAM)	- Exiled in Sweden - Leader of GAM with historical claims to 13 <sup>th</sup> Century Sultanate
3. Ethnic Groups	- Acehnese - Alas - Gayo - Tamiang - Chinese	- Afflicted by aftermath of 2004 tsunami - Poor, unemployed, often homeless - Seeking reconstruction, development and prosperity for Aceh - To varying degrees pro-autonomy - To varying degrees feel resentment toward mainstream Indonesia

		- To varying degrees feel religiously distinct from mainstream Indonesia
	- Other Indonesian	- Diverse, not unified in ideology, ethnicity, language, concerns etc. - To varying degrees sympathetic to Aceh
4. Religious groups	-	- Diverse, not unified in history, ethnicity, language, dogma etc. - To varying degrees sympathetic to Aceh

**Table 2. External Stakeholders**

5. International Aid Community	- USAID, CIDA, Australia, Malaysia, Kuwait, Mexico, Kuwait, World Bank, Netherlands, FIFA, Oxfam, Saudi Arabia, etc.	- Reconstruction, stability and development for Aceh (and Indonesia) - Diverse, not unified in ideology, ethnicity, language, concerns etc. - To varying degrees, seeking a non-partisan <i>cause célèbre</i> for controversial aid budgets - Supportive of a peaceful resolution - Do not publicly favour one solution over another
6. European Union		- Supportive of a peaceful resolution - Strong pressure for Indonesia to respect minority rights - Part of disengagement monitoring team for TNI and disarmament
7. ASEAN	- Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam	- Supportive of a peaceful resolution - Strong pressure for Indonesia to respect minority rights - Part of disengagement monitoring team for TNI and disarmament - Eager to resume fruitful trade - Eager to make a positive impression on Indonesia (greatest power in the region)
8. Sweden	-	- Hosted GAM's exiled leadership - Supportive of a peaceful resolution
9. Finland	-	- Mediated negotiations between GAM and Jakarta - Supportive of a peaceful resolution
10. International Business Community	- Shipping, logging, minerals, commodities traders, fishing, etc.	- Eager to resume fruitful trade

## 7. Sub-National Risk Indicators

### 7.1. Summary

#### **Medium risk (6.40)**

According to CIFP risk analysis, Aceh is a medium risk region with an assessment of 6.40. This analysis is based on an assessment of nine clusters that affect risk for future conflict: History of Armed Conflict, Governance and Political Instability, Militarization, Population Heterogeneity, Economic Performance, International Linkages, Environment, Demographic Stress, and Human Development.<sup>5</sup>

The following sections look at the risk assessment for each cluster, including stabilizing factors, destabilizing factors and potential spoilers for each cluster area. The analysis finds that the main areas of concern for Aceh are History of Armed Conflict, Governance and Political Instability, Militarization, Population Heterogeneity and Economic Performance.

A key area of concern is the Governance cluster as it has demonstrated itself to be a major source of destabilizing factors over the past decade. Despite the ceasefire and easing of hostilities in 2005, tensions could reignite due to isolated spoilers as well as the broader problem of people left homeless and dispossessed by the tsunami<sup>6</sup>. Given Aceh's history and the current strained peace between groups, spoiler events in this cluster area could set off a new round of independence-related activities. Similarly, Population Heterogeneity could provide spoiler events if Aceh's residents again feel slighted or ignored by what they perceive to be a discriminatory government in Jakarta.

International Linkages could be the third catalyst of unrest for two reasons. First, as aid and interest in Aceh's reconstruction inevitably wane, competition for increasingly scarce support may reanimate rivalries. Second, aid communities, countries and NGOs often have competing and contradictory terms for the receipt of their supplies. This has the potential to ignite partisan and identity-based competition.

Finally, Environmental Stress may not be a direct cause of contention between the disputing factions but it could prove to be another cause for discontent and the kind of demographic discrimination from which the Acehnese have long claimed to suffer. Indonesia's governance sector may make deals and decisions with international resources firms that could echo the kinds of exploitation Aceh has seen in the past.

<sup>5</sup> For more information about the clusters and their application to risk analysis see Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (2001) *Risk Assessment Template*

<sup>6</sup> For more information, see: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/tsunami/story/0,1705506,00.html>

## 7.2. Risk indicators by cluster

### 7.2.1. History of Armed Conflict

**High risk (6.6)**

#### *Stabilizing Factors*

- Fall in ethnically motivated incidences of violence since mid-2005

#### *Destabilizing Factors*

- Occurrence of occasional violence with political and ethnic motivations
- Preponderance of weapons and rising religious fundamentalism
- Internally displaced persons problem not yet resolved; high homelessness rate;

#### *Potential spoilers*

- Increase in ethnically motivated violence

### 7.2.2. Governance and Political Instability

**High risk (6.59)**

#### *Stabilizing Factors*

- Improving dialogue between GAM and Jakarta
- National level acceptance of sub regional security and governance structures
- Continued reforms, attempts to meet international monitor's standards
- Leaders demonstrate tendency to issue calm public statements even during crises
- Aceh sub regional elections

#### *Destabilizing Factors*

- Corruption reforms and reconstruction of federal structures slow
- Improper spending of aid funds
- Jakarta's collaboration with resource firms

#### *Potential spoilers*

- Dissatisfaction with election results
- Acehese perceptions of injustice at government policies

### 7.2.3. Militarization

**High risk (6.6)**

#### *Stabilizing Factors*

- Widespread and successful disarmament of GAM militants
- Withdrawal of TNI and Police
- Integration of Acehese security service

#### *Destabilizing Factors*

- Suspicion that GAM is withholding names of combatants and weapons

#### *Potential spoilers*

- Appearance of arms caches in Aceh

### 7.2.4. Population Heterogeneity

**High risk (7.00)**

#### *Stabilizing Factors*

- Acehese election unambiguous about political support for Mustafa Abubakar

#### *Destabilizing Factors*

- Recent history of discrimination against Acehese and former combatants despite amnesty
- Minority groups feel they have little access to economic opportunities, social services
- Tension related to religious fundamentalism

#### *Potential spoilers*

- Rapid deterioration of inter-ethnic relations

### 7.2.5. Economic Performance

**High risk (7.33)**

#### *Stabilizing Factors*

- Influx of donor cash
- Positive trends: tax collection, local micro credit support, sub regional reforms, increased investments
- Jakarta cooperating with international institutions, making some progress, reforms

*Destabilizing Factors*

- High levels of inflation
- Homelessness and unemployment causing markets and local producers to suffer
- Cost of resources on world market extremely variable

*Potential spoilers*

- Price shocks on key exports, such as sugar, spices and timber
- Irresponsible allocation of aid

**7.2.6. International Linkages**

**Medium risk (4.82)**

*Stabilizing Factors*

- Broad international non-partisan attention to reconstruction after the tsunami
- ASEAN and EU supportive of peace process between GAM and Jakarta
- International monitors' presence in Aceh
- International praise for democratic maturation

*Destabilizing Factors*

- Identity-based charities and support may be polarizing
- Criticism of pace of reconstruction

*Potential spoilers*

- Violence directed after monitors leave
- Competition for increasingly scarce aid

**7.2.7. Environmental Stress**

**Medium risk (6.0)**

*Stabilizing Factors*

- International attention to environmental issues in Aceh

*Destabilizing Factors*

- Poor environmental protection: industrial pollutants, resource exploitation, little waste collection<sup>7</sup>
- Ownership of oil could catalyze renewed tensions

<sup>7</sup> UNDP (2004) *Progress Report on Millennium Development Goals - Indonesia*. 75.

*Potential spoilers*

- Natural disaster
- Acehnese resentment of resource deals struck by Jakarta

**7.2.8. Demographic Stress**

**Medium risk (6.20)**

*Stabilizing Factors*

- Non-partisan, non-religious commemoration of tsunami disaster

*Destabilizing Factors*

- Religious tension
- Lack of interest in return to Aceh by some disaster refugees

*Potential spoilers*

- Youth protest, violence-related to religious fundamentalism

**7.2.9. Human Development**

**Medium risk (5.63)**

*Stabilizing Factors*

- Primary education is a universal right; rise in school enrolment since 2000<sup>8</sup>
- Increased activity by women, particularly to address gender inequality and within institutions and politics<sup>9</sup>
- Low HIV/AIDS level<sup>10</sup>
- International attention to government practices

*Destabilizing Factors*

- Gender inequalities
- Poverty, child-trafficking, access to clean water, health-access, dangerous areas all still require attention post-tsunami

*Potential spoilers*

- Major problems with service provision
- Disease outbreak

<sup>8</sup> UNDP (2004) *Progress Report on Millennium Development Goals*. 38.

<sup>9</sup> UNDP (2004) *Progress Report on Millennium Development Goals*. 46-47.

<sup>10</sup> UNDP (2004) *Progress Report on Millennium Development Goals*. 61-65.




**8. Events Data: Trends and Analysis**

**8.1. Summary**

**Table 3. Overall statistics**

	Total number of events	Average event score	Average score as a percent of total possible (9)
All	333	2.63	29.2%
Stabilizing	329	5.38	59.8%
Destabilizing	245	-5.02	-55.8%

**Table 4. Overall event trends**

	<b>All events</b>	<b>Stabilizing events</b>	<b>Destabilizing events</b>
<b>Weekly aggregate</b>	Strongly negative 	Strongly positive 	Moderately positive 

Between 10 October 2005 and 12 April 2006, 333 events were recorded for the Aceh region. The overall statistics from this 28 week period show that on average, events tend to be stabilizing. The period experienced negative trends among stabilizing events and positive trends in destabilizing events, resulting in a strongly negative trend overall. The main reason for this trend is the fact that there has been a dramatic decrease in both stabilizing events and in destabilizing events. The middle of the reporting period witnessed a relatively large spike in the number and magnitude of events that tailed off in frequency and magnitude near the end of the reporting period. The second reason is that the first few weeks the sub region experienced a handful of destabilizing events that gradually improved; this was reflected by a positive trend in destabilizing events. Thus, Aceh

has experienced a fall in stabilizing events, but there has been a reduction in the number and magnitude of destabilizing events. The strongly negative trend line seems to suggest an outlook direr than events might indicate.

The main source of this trend lies in the Governance and Political Stability, International Linkages, Militarization, Environmental Stress and Human Development clusters. This is unsurprising, given the initiation and continuation of the GAM disarmament and withdrawal of TNI troops. As Aceh goes through immense reconstruction it is witness to unseen levels of international attention and support – this is catalyzing major developments and reforms all over the country but felt most strongly in the most affected region, Aceh. International Linkages is an area that should be closely monitored; it has the potential to be the cause of a number of destabilizing events despite its current high levels of stabilizing support. Despite the trend line from this reporting period, Militarization, Governance and International Linkages should be sources of stability and security in the future. More concerning, however, are the Environmental Stress and Human Development clusters. Without holistic attention these clusters have the potential to deliver spoilers to an overall promising trend in Aceh.

*Events are accurate as of April 12, 2006*



## 8.2. Primary Drivers




*Primary drivers are those clusters that contain more than twenty-five events. These clusters are the main areas of activity in the region, with the greatest contribution to the overall trend.*

### 8.2.1. Governance and Political Instability

**Table 5. Governance and Political Instability statistics**

	Total number of events	Average score	Average score % of possible 9
All	95	3.66	40.7%
Stabilizing	76	6.00	66.7%
Destabilizing	19	-5.63	-62.6%

**Table 6. Governance and Political Instability event trends**

	<b>All events</b>	<b>Stabilizing events</b>	<b>Destabilizing events</b>
<b>Weekly aggregate</b>	Moderately negative 	Moderately negative 	Moderately negative 

Despite a somewhat negative average event score, the Governance and Political Instability cluster demonstrates some measure of improvement for Aceh. The trend is moderately negative across all events. This is largely due to a decreasing number of stabilizing events over the six month period, primarily directly following the disarmament of GAM combatants in the autumn. The preponderance of strongly positive stabilizing events and small number (though of an equally strong negative type) should make clear that trends in this cluster have more to do with the frequency than the magnitude of events.

#### Overview of Stabilizing Events

- Peace building and status negotiations with combatants almost entirely constructive
- Commemoration of tsunami disaster
- Bill on Aceh regional administration

#### Overview of Destabilizing Events




- Concern surrounding the peace deal struck by the government with GAM
- Allegations of improper allocation of aid and emergency supplies

### 8.2.2. International Linkages

**Table 7. International Linkages statistics**

	Total number of events	Average score	Average score % of possible 9
All	99	3.70	41.1%
Stabilizing	92	4.30	47.8%
Destabilizing	7	-4.28	-47.6%

**Table 8. International Linkages event trends**

	<b>All events</b>	<b>Stabilizing events</b>	<b>Destabilizing events</b>
<b>Weekly aggregate</b>	Moderately negative 	Moderately negative 	Moderately negative 

International Linkages is similar to the Governance cluster in that the average score of events is positive despite event trends. Also like Governance, the number of events showing a stabilizing influence far exceeds the negative events. Negative trend lines in this case are indicative of a slowing down of the frequency of stabilizing events. Following the commemoration of the tsunami disaster midway through the reporting period, the frequency and magnitude of stabilizing events diminished markedly. As well, as disarmament of GAM finalized, the extremely high-magnitude stabilizing events tailed off. This is should not suggest that this cluster is in peril, only that it has seen two isolated peaks.

#### Overview of Stabilizing Events

- International observers of disarmament of GAM and disengagement of TNI troops
- Construction of schools, hospitals, banks, community centres, governance institutions, capacity of security personnel
- Donations of cash and supplies in aid

#### Overview of Destabilizing Events







- Reconstruction pace too slow
- Improper allocation of aid funds by international actors

**8.2.3. Militarization**

	Total number of events	Average score	Average score % of possible 9
All	52	5.46	60.7%
Stabilizing	46	6.98	77.6%
Destabilizing	6	-6.17	-68.6%

**Table 9. Militarization statistics**

**Table 10. Militarization event trends**

	All events	Stabilizing events	Destabilizing events
	Status quo 	Strongly positive 	Status quo 
<b>Weekly aggregate</b>			

On average, events relating to militarization were extremely positive (+61%), reflecting the overall positive militarization trends in Aceh. Interestingly, the trend for weekly events trends is relatively stable. This is explained by the glut of militarization news early in the reporting period – almost entirely stabilizing and related to the disarmament of GAM combatants – and the relative paucity of events in this cluster once the disarmament had been concluded. The fact that only a handful of events in this cluster are negative indicates that the trend line has much more to do with the frequency of events than a decrease in magnitude of positive events.

*Overview of Stabilizing Events*

- Nearly incident Disarmament of GAM
- Absence of animosity or recrimination related to disarmament
- Withdrawal of TNI troops
- Destruction of weapons

*Overview of Destabilizing Events*







- Suspicion of GAM withholding arms and names of combatants

**8.2.4. Environmental Stress**

**Table 11. Environmental Stress statistics**

	Total number of events	Average score	Average score % of possible 9
All	30	-3.27	-36.3%
Stabilizing	4	5.5	61.1%
Destabilizing	26	-4.61	-51.2%

**Table 12. Environmental Stress event trends**

	All events	Stabilizing events	Destabilizing events
	Moderately positive 	Moderately negative 	Moderately positive 
<b>Weekly aggregate</b>			

The Environmental Stress cluster presents a situation that is the reverse of many other clusters for this sub region. The event trend appears to be heading in a positive direction but the majority of events in this cluster are negative (and significantly so). The average score of events is significantly negative (-36%). Though stabilizing events had a stronger average score, there were more destabilizing events in total, which offset the strength of the stabilizing events. According to the conflict indicator statistic, the trend is positive, despite the negative trend among stabilizing events. This is due in large part to the reduction in number and value of destabilizing events. The majority of events in this cluster showed no seasonal or time-bound tendency because they tended to occur at either the state-level or were related to natural phenomena (earthquakes, landslides, etc.) that can not be predicted.

*Overview of Stabilizing Events*

- Tsunami early warning system

*Overview of Destabilizing Events*




- Earthquakes and landslides
- Appearance of bird flu
- Illegal logging
- Death-threats to environmentalists opposing logging

### 8.2.5. Human Development

**Table 13. Human Development statistics**

	Total number of events	Average score	Average score % of possible 9
All	43	-0.70	-7.8%
Stabilizing	18	4.72	52.4%
Destabilizing	25	-4.60	-51.1%

**Table 14. Human Development event trends**

	<b>All events</b>	<b>Stabilizing events</b>	<b>Destabilizing events</b>
<b>Weekly aggregate</b>	Moderately negative 	Moderately negative 	Moderately positive 

The Human Development cluster presents a somewhat balanced situation that appears to be heading in a negative direction. The average score of events is negative, although weak (-8%); although stabilizing events had a stronger average score, there were more destabilizing events in total, which offset the strength of the stabilizing events. According to the conflict indicator statistic, the trend is

negative, despite the positive trend among destabilizing events. This is due in large part to the reduction in number and magnitude of destabilizing events. Many Human Development-related issues have been ignored in Aceh in favour of more desperately needed governance and infrastructural reforms. Though there are incidents of the initiation of health programmes, the more reported-upon events tend to involve the gross neglect of Human Development issues.

*Overview of Stabilizing Events*

- Health clinics, schools, construction of community centres
- Regulation of labour standards for Acehnese workers
  - Support for the disabled and homeless

*Overview of Destabilizing Events*

- Corporal punishment
- Child trafficking
- Lack of regulation or enforcement of housing standards
- Depression
- Poor access to clean water

### **8.3. Secondary Drivers**

*Secondary drivers are those clusters with less than twenty-five monitored events. These clusters provide supplementary information to the overall analysis.*

#### **8.3.1. Armed Conflict**

Incidents in this cluster were comprised of isolated clashes between disarming GAM combatants and TNI forces. As the disarmament concluded these events disappeared from international press attention altogether (if they continued to occur).

#### **8.3.2. Population Heterogeneity**

Population heterogeneity portrays an unsure environment, indicative of the poor relations between Acehnese and Javans in the region. Although there was no outright ethnic conflict during this period, tensions between the groups have not been eliminated. Given Population Heterogeneity's high baseline risk level, it could experience a rapid deterioration if events take significantly negative tones.

#### **8.3.3. Economic Performance**

This cluster contained a handful of balancing events: reports of high inflation; a construction-industry boom related to rebuilding after the tsunami; the appearance of many micro-credit projects in Aceh, particularly for women; resource price volatility for primary export commodities such as spices and sugar.

#### **8.3.4. Demographic Stress**

Demographic stress continues to be a significant structural risk factor in Aceh due to the continued problems an extremely diverse ethnic and religious population. Events in this cluster were related primarily to religious discrimination.

## Part C: Annex

### 9. Summary of Data

**Table 15. Overall data**

Risk indicator		All events		Stabilizing events		Destabilizing events	
		Trend	Avg.	Trend	Avg.	Trend	Avg.
<b>Medium risk</b>	<b>(6.41)</b>	-1.03	2.63	-1.31	5.38	.39	-5.02

**Table 16. Data for primary drivers**


Cluster	Risk indicator	All events		Stabilizing events		Destabilizing events	
		Trend	Avg.	Trend	Avg.	Trend	Avg.
Governance and Political Instability	<b>High risk (6.79)</b>	-.21	3.66	-.04	6.00	-.24	-5.63
International Linkages	<b>Medium risk (5.42)</b>	-.1	3.70	-.12	4.30	-.46	-4.28
Militarization	<b>High risk (7.00)</b>	-.08	5.46	1.37	6.98	-.1	-6.17
Environmental Stress	<b>Medium risk (5.67)</b>	.25	-3.3	-.6	5.5	.37	-4.61
Human Development	<b>Medium risk (5.82)</b>	-.33	-.70	-.2	4.72	.1	-4.60

**Table 17. Data for Secondary Drivers**

Cluster	Risk indicator
Armed Conflict	<b>Medium risk (5.93)</b>
Population Heterogeneity	<b>High risk (7.00)</b>
Economic Performance	<b>High risk (7.44)</b>
Demographic Stress	<b>Medium risk (6.20)</b>

## 10. Trend Line Charts

### 10.1. All events



**Figure 2. Chart of trend lines for all events and the count of events by week**

### 10.2. Stabilizing events




Figure 3. Chart of trend lines for stabilizing events and the count of events by week

### 10.3. Destabilizing events





Figure 4. Chart of trend lines for destabilizing events and the count of events by week



## 11. Maps



**Figure 5. Map of Aceh Province from United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs**

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### 12.1. Event Sources

Events were obtained using Lexis Nexis and Google Alerts (<http://www.google.com/alerts>), the latter of which provided a daily summary of news reports for the search term 'Aceh', 'Banda Aceh' and 'GAM'. The news reports originated from a wide variety of local and international sources, including:

- ABC News
- Bahrain News Agency - Bahrain
- BBC News
- BusinessWeek
- Financial times
- Forbes
- ICRC
- Institute for War and Peace Reporting
- Institutional Investor - New York
- International Herald Tribune
- ISN - Zurich, Switzerland
- Mainichi Daily News - Japan
- Miami Herald
- New York Times
- Noticias - Spain
- AAP newsfeed
- AFP
- AFX
- Antara, Indonesia
- AP
- Asia Pulse
- Australia Chronicle
- BBC Asia
- Borneo Bulletin
- Channel News Asia
- Czech News Agency
- Deutsche Presse
- Dominion Post, NZ
- Financial Times
- Canada.com
- Cellular-News
- China Post
- Reliefweb
- Reuters
- Scotsman UK
- Seattle Post Intelligencer
- Swissinfo
- Taipai Times - Taiwan
- Telecom Paper
- Thanh Nien Daily
- UN News Centre
- United Press International
- Voice of America
- Webwire
- Xinhua
- Herald Sun
- Jakarta post
- Japan newswire
- Malaysia general news
- Medianet
- New Straits Times
- Political risk analysis
- South China Morning Post
- Thai Press
- The Age
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- UNDP
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## 13. Methodology

### 13.1. Description of Events Monitoring

Event trends are assessed using the slope of time-series trend lines that are provided by plotting event data over a given period of time. First, based on the context of the region as described by the Background, Stakeholders and Risk Indicators sections, events are identified as being generally stabilizing or destabilizing<sup>11</sup> and given a sign of either +1 (stabilizing) or -1 (destabilizing). Events are then coded on a scale of 1 to 3 for three dimensions: the degree to which they can be linked to the risk of future peace or conflict – Causality (Ca); whether the event is typical or constitutes an acceleration of events – Escalation (Es); and the degree to which the event affects relevant stakeholders– Centrality (Ce). Causality and Escalation are coded based on a qualitative analysis of the event considered within the context of the region’s risk indicators. Centrality is coded using a quantitative analysis of the proportion of stakeholders affected by the event.

A conflict indicator statistic is then calculated by summing the three dimensions of an event (Ca+Es+Ce), and multiplying it by the sign to provide a stabilizing indicator of +3 to +9 and a destabilizing indicator of -3 to -9. The analyst can use this conflict indicator to explore summary statistics as well as trend lines of the region’s events.

Summary statistics provide the analyst with an overview of the average event scores. The total number of events and the average conflict indicator statistics are calculated, including sub-calculations by sign. For the average scores, a percentage is calculated based on the highest score for that conflict indicator statistic. For instance, an average Ca+Es+Ce can score

as high (or low) as +/- 9, so a score of +/- 2 achieves a percentage of +/- 22%. Positive percentages are indicative of an environment that on average experiences stabilizing events, as there are either more stabilizing events or more strongly valued stabilizing events. Negative percentages indicate the opposite, an environment characterized by destabilizing events. The closer the percentage comes to +/- 100% the better (or worse) events tend to be.

The second avenue of analysis is via trend lines to observe whether the events demonstrate any positive or negative trend over time. The conflict indicators are plotted against time – usually six months – and trend lines are generated, based on ordinary least squares regression, and compared in two different ways. The first comparison, the individual event trend line, plots the conflict indicators of each event over time. This is useful in that it indicates whether and to what degree the individual event conflict indicators have a positive or negative trend over time. However, it does not account for an increase or decrease in the total *number* of events, so the second trend analysis is that of the weekly aggregate. To attain this trend line, the conflict indicators are first summed by week; for instance, if one week has four events with the conflict indicators of +2, +2, -2 and -2, the overall weekly aggregate would be 0, the stabilizing weekly aggregate would be +4 and the destabilizing weekly aggregate would be -4. The weekly aggregate is then plotted over time to produce a trend line that incorporates the theory that an increase or decrease in total number of events should matter in addition to their changing value. That is, one would presume that a rapid increase in the number of stabilizing events would indicate an improving trend, even if the

<sup>11</sup> Note that in some unique cases an event will be coded as both stabilizing and destabilizing.








conflict indicators for the individual events remain largely unchanged.

Taken together, these two trend analyses provide an overview of the general event developments over the previous months. In the analysis, both stabilizing and destabilizing trend lines reflect improvements through positive slopes,

indicating the reduction in conflict vulnerability. On the other hand, negative slopes denote a deteriorating situation – an increase in conflict vulnerability. The degree of improvement or deterioration is identified as status quo, moderate, or strong, based on the slope and according to the following chart:

**Table 18. Matrix of Trend Magnitudes and associated symbols**

<b>Trend Magnitude</b>	Strongly Negative	Moderately Negative	Status quo	Moderately Positive	Strongly Positive
<b>Slope size</b>	Below -1	Between -1 and -.1	Between -.1 and .1	Between +.1 and +1	Over +1
<b>Symbol</b>					

Finally, scenarios are created for best case, worst case and status quo situations, based on an analysis of overall and cluster summary statistics and trends. The best and worst cases consider the trends among stabilizing and destabilizing events. The best case assumes that the strongest of the positive trends will hold for the future time period, and the worst case assumes that the strongest of the negative trends will occur. This holds regardless of whether the positive (or negative) trend occurs among destabilizing (or stabilizing) events. For instance, if there is strongly positive trend among destabilizing events, this trend would be used to extrapolate events for the best case scenario. If there is a strongly negative trend among stabilizing events, this trend would be used for the worst case. The status quo, on the other hand, will extrapolate future tendencies based on the overall trend. For instance, if there is moderate overall improvement, then the status quo assumes that this is

the trend for the future. Events are then surmised based on these trends in order to provide a conjectured future case.

Each case concludes by estimating the region’s future capacity to absorb damaging events and take advantage of peace-building opportunities by forecasting the best, worst or status quo trends. The conclusion will also state the likelihood that the region will approach a higher or lower risk level; this analysis is based on whether the current risk level is already near a lower or higher category and the magnitude of the trend under consideration. For example, a medium-risk region of 3.6 with a strongly positive trend line is likely to move into the low risk level. Alternatively, a medium-risk region of 6.4 with a weak trend line is unlikely to move into the low risk level, but it could move into a high risk level with a moderately deteriorating trend.

### 13.2. Description of Events Data Collection

Events were collected in one of two methods for this study.

In most cases, the news-parsing technology of Google-Alerts ([www.google.com/alerts](http://www.google.com/alerts)) was employed to scan and collect daily reports of events data reported by the international press about the particular sub-national region of interest. Search terms were identified by the sub-national region itself and as a result of the stakeholder analysis (if one actor or group tended to garner a significant amount of press but not necessarily reported in the same news stories as the name of the sub-national region); in some cases, alternate spellings and transliterations were used as search terms to ensure a more robust set of data. News reports were then delivered to

analysts as daily emails (if news events were found for that day) which were then coded into a Microsoft Access Database using the methodology described above.

The other method by which data was gathered for this study was to collect the data post-facto. Some sub-national regions' data was collected only partially using Google-Alerts so a more robust reassessment of the monitoring time period was required. To do this, analysts employed a LexisNexis search for the monitoring period and using the same search parameters as had been used with Google-Alerts. The events collected using this methodology are identical in type to the daily digest-type – the only difference is the timing in which the analysts coded the events was not continuous.