Country Indicators for Foreign Policy

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Sub-national Report for Dagestan: Events, Scenarios and Analysis

FINAL REPORT
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Part A: Overview

1. Note

About this Report

This sub-national report has been produced by the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) for use by non-governmental organizations, businesses, academics, Canadian policy-makers, and other parties concerned with the current and future state of sub-national regions. The Iraqi Kurdistan Events Monitoring Profile is based on a fusion of CIFP Risk Assessment and Events Monitoring methodologies.[1]

About the Author

Adam Fysh is a researcher based in Ottawa, Canada. His Masters dissertation focused on the use of environmental indicators in conflict prediction methodologies. He is a principal investigator for the Enver Group and his current research focuses on the use of neural nets and graphic data modelling for conflict analysis. Mr. Fysh has been a curriculum designer and trainer in skills for peace operations and has traveled extensively for those purposes in Africa, East Asia and the Americas.

About CIFP

CIFP has its origins in a prototype geopolitical database developed by the Canadian Department of National Defence in 1991. The prototype project called GEOPOL covered a wide range of political, economic, social, military, and environmental indicators through the medium of a rating system. In 1997, under the guidance of Andre Ouellete, John Patterson, Tony Kellett and Paul Sutherland, the Canadian Department of

Foreign Affairs and International Trade decided to adopt some elements of GEOPOL to meet the needs of policy makers, the academic community and the private sector. The CIFP project as it became known has since then operated under the guidance of principal investigator David Carment of Carleton University and has received funding from DFAIT, IDRC and CIDA. The project represents an on-going effort to identify and assemble statistical information conveying the key features of the political, economic, social and cultural environments of countries around the world.

The cross-national data generated through CIFP was intended to have a variety of applications in government departments, NGOs, and by users in the private sector. The data set provides at-a-glance global overviews, issue-based perspectives and country performance measures. Currently, the data set includes measures of domestic armed conflict, governance and political instability, militarization, religious and ethnic diversity, demographic stress, economic performance, human development, environmental stress, and international linkages.

The CIFP database currently includes statistical data in the above issue areas, in the form of over one hundred performance indicators for 196 countries, spanning fifteen years (1985 to 2000) for most indicators. These indicators are drawn from a variety of open sources, including the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and the Minorities at Risk and POLITY IV data sets from the University of Maryland.

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[1] For information on the structural risk assessment, see Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (2001) *Risk Assessment Template,* Available: http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/docs/studra1101.pdf.

2. Executive Summary

Profile
- Dagestan has historically been known as the more stable and successful cohort of Chechnya, though in recent years their fates seem tightly woven together
- Dagestan's location and resources suggest that it should be among the more prosperous regions of Russia but inequality and crime have monopolized those riches to the benefit of a few.
- Among the poorest and most lawless regions, Dagestan suffered from the combined effects of poor governance and the unhealthy influence of some agents from Chechnya and today finds itself the site of regular armed attacks.
- Long a bastion of tolerance and constitutional consensus, Dagestan today is rife with identity politics and criminality – it is often suspected of hosting fugitives and militants from Chechnya and around the Caspian Sea.
- The political status of Dagestan is not in question; Dagestan faces a future of insecurity and violence from poor governance and neighbours' strife.

Baseline analysis
- Dagestan is a medium-risk region
- The primary destabilizing clusters are History of Armed Conflict, Governance and Political Instability, International Linkages and Demographic Stress.
- These clusters are destabilizing because they create cross-cutting pressures on a variety of other cluster areas. The destabilizing effects of armed conflict, for example, have a clear impact on the economic growth, or employment rates.

Event Trends
- 91 events were monitored between 25 October 2005 and 2 May 2006.
- The trend analysis concluded that Dagestan is on a generally negative trajectory with limited sources of peace building stability
- The degrading trend is due to a rise in the number of destabilizing events accompanied by a fall in the number and magnitude of stabilizing events.


Figure 1. Chart of trend lines for all events and the count of events by week

Primary drivers of event trends
- The Governance and Political Instability cluster moderated the negative trend, due to a generally more promising outlook than in the Armed Conflict or Militarization clusters.
- In Dagestan, the History of Armed Conflict is such a pervasive part of life that at the time of this writing an entire generation of Dagestanis will know only conflict. The inclusion of that indicator cluster as a primary driver is supported by a negative trend in the events monitored over the past 6 months.
- International Linkages is an area of concern for Russia because the potential for this conflict to escalate further lies almost entirely in the support of international actors and diasporas' support of the fighters. The spill over potential of this conflict is increasingly dangerous each year. International media attention may be the only stabilizing force in this cluster.

Scenarios
- Most likely case: following Chechnya, Dagestan enters a renewed stage of violence over the spring and summer only to cool again in the fall.
- Best case: Improvement escalates and civil, political, and military leaders are able to negotiate peacefully with Russian interlocutors.
- Worst case: All sides escalate the scale and symbolic value of their assaults. The conflict does not de-escalate in the winter all aspects of the security situation deteriorate.

Conclusion
- The outlook is not hopeful in the absence of some political stakeholders willing to negotiate with one another.
- Dagestan will likely see a destabilizing season in mid-2006.

3. Event Trends Summary

Overall

General Trend

- There was a general increase in the number of destabilizing events accompanied by a fall in number and magnitude of stabilizing events
- The main source of the trend lies in the Armed Conflict and Governance and Political Instability clusters, due to pervasive and near-constant activities of

seizure, attack, cross-border trafficking, and kidnapping.
- Governance and Political Instability, though apparently stable, remains an area of concern, particularly for Dagestan, itself. This cluster could become a source of future negative trend if events continue to be security-related as they were for the reporting period.

Primary Drivers

Primary drivers are those clusters that contain more than twenty-five events. These clusters are the main areas of activity in the region, with the greatest contribution to the overall trend.

Armed Conflict

General Trend

- Ongoing civil/autonomy dispute with no peace building initiative taking root.
- Culture and pattern of violence by armed forces against civilians and by irregular militia against armed forces, civilians and property.
- Spill over refugees, arms and ideology from Chechnya.

Governance and Political Instability

General Trend

- Seizure and arrest of militants is positive
- Leadership culture in Russia is that political reforms are slow and face many hurdles.
- Well-meaning and legitimate governance in Dagestan difficult in an environment of ideological identity-based violence

Secondary Drivers

Secondary drivers are those clusters with less than twenty-five monitored events. These clusters provide supplementary information to the overall analysis.

Militarization

- Common trafficking, alleged trafficking and seizure of arms, or shipments of supplies.

Economic Performance

- Livelihood struggle for violence-affected population

Population Heterogeneity

- Ethnic dimension to political, events.
- Affinity-group fighters further imbalance the controversies of demographics.
- Extreme heterogeneity of Dagestan population.

Environmental Stress

- Potential of bird flu to cause further stress

Demographic Stress

- Structural data indicates demographic stress in religious diversity and risk of ethnic rebellion

Human Development

- Access to schools, hospitals, medical services, limited in Dagestan.

International Linkages

- External support for violence
- Internationalized conflict
- Foreign fighters

4. Forecasting

Most Likely Case

In the most likely case, Dagestan experiences moderate-to-strong decline in the short term and its ability to absorb damaging events will also be somewhat degraded.

Keeping step with its Chechen neighbours, Dagestan's concerns will fail to attract the attention of mainstream Russian policy-makers. The spring thaw will enable much of the trafficking and covert activity – historically calmer in Caucasian winters – to resume in earnest. The difference will be that the political and governance destabilization that has taken place in Chechnya over the past 6 months will result in escalated levels of militancy and spill-over to Dagestan. To remove violence from the equation, Dagestan requires some measure of isolation from the disruptive politics of the Chechen independence movement and there is presently no sign that is forthcoming. The sub region will probably fall into a category of higher risk as many of the stabilizing events of the past 6 months will likely be undone by summer violence.

Best Case

In the best case, Dagestan will experience modest improvement thanks to a commitment by all stakeholders to a political resolution.

The focus of international and Western support has a broad-based effect in Russia proper prompting politicians to concede that a military solution to the Chechen – and by consequence – Dagestani, question is not viable. The likelihood of a commitment to avoiding violence in favour of dialogue is somewhat remote in the foreseeable future but represents the only hope Dagestan has of benefiting from any meaningful peace building initiatives. Dagestan benefits from the attention of diplomatic and humanitarian support but without political dialogue, much of the impact of that support is squandered. Dagestan has the infrastructure and stable history to facilitate reconstruction but a cessation of violence and criminality must first be established.

Worst Case

Overall, in the worst case, Dagestan will continue to be blighted by the effects of the intractable, identity-based conflict of Chechnya.

Western donors and supporters withdraw their funding from key humanitarian activities and any hope of catching Moscow's diplomatic attention fades away. Dagestani radicals take this as a signal that the only way to make their voices heard is through more violent activity and cleaving closer to Chechen militants. Moscow reinforces its crackdown on domestic terrorists. A generation of Dagestanis is marginalized and radicalized and the cycle repeats with increasing severity each year. The international attention and bilateral support from which Dagestan has benefited will evaporate leaving it weakened and vulnerable to further militarization, marginalization and violence. Dagestan, and even Russia, could find itself in a category of very high risk in the worst-case scenario.

Part B: Detail

5. Profile

The fate of Dagestan, in recent history has been intimately tied to that of Chechnya. Dagestan has long benefited from many advantages and comforts not enjoyed in Chechnya and its prosperity and position long isolated it from that instability. Identity politics, crime and the fall of the Soviet Union have had a deleterious effect on Dagestan to the extent that it is today one of the most lawless, violent, corrupt and dangerous regions of Russia.[2]

The geographic location of Dagestan has created a unique and diverse backdrop for its history. Occupying nearly a third of the breadth of the Caucasian bridge, Dagestan occupies a significant portion of Russia's Western shore of the Caspian Sea. It both benefits and suffers as a result of the oil and caviar wealth associated with that provident position. Criminal gangs and corrupt bureaucrats control almost all of the wealth generated by those two resource boons making Dagestan among the poorer per-capita republics within Russia.[3] Neighbours with Azerbaijan and Georgia, Dagestan sees a significant amount of trade as well as cross-border illegal trafficking.[4]

Historically, Dagestan has been the home of many associated (though by no means consolidated) clans, tribes and ethnic groups. The country's constitution mandates that the interests of all it's people must be upheld, a stipulation that has led, itself, to a number of disputes. The republic began as a unified tribal opposition to imposed Russian rule on the Turkic, Avar, Dargin, Kumyk, Persian, etc. people of Dagestan. Famous historical warrior Imam Shamil is claimed by all tribes and is a symbol of unity. Whereas Chechens were deported and punished for their hostility to Russia, Dagestan saw no similar fates and most state agents from the Republic were thought to be trustworthy and loyal to the Soviet Union.

In the mid-1990s, facing pressure in Chechnya, Chechen warlords Shamil Basayev and Salman Raduyev crossed into a sympathetic Dagestan. Near the towns of Budennovsk and Kizlyar they roused support for an armed uprising in Dagestan similar to the one in Chechnya.[5] Most Dagestanis practice a modified and commingled variation of Islam that wanted nothing to do with the violence in Chechnya. Still, some elements sided with Basayev and Raduyev and sought to introduce Sharia law.

In 1999, the level of violence increased as an autonomous Islamic body declared the independence of part of Dagestan and called for the arrest of the republic's leader, Magomedali Magomedov.[6] Fighters flowed in from Chechnya to mount a resistance to the hastily dispatched Russian forces and hundreds of fighters and civilians were killed in the process. Later that year, Russia sent troops to occupy Chechnya which served to both quell violence in Dagestan and to refocus Chechen efforts in that territory.

Since 1999 the combination of corruption, Russian attention distracted by Chechnya, geography, growth rate and emergent religious/ethnic identification have seen Dagestan degenerate into a semi-lawless

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[2] BBC "Dagestan: *Mountain of Nationalities*. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1977662.stm
[3] IRC "*The Crisis in Chechnya and the Northern Caucasus at a Glance*" http://www.theirc.org/news/the_crisis_in_chechnya_and_the_northern_caucasus_at_a_glance.html
[4] IWPR "*Drugs Traders Exploit Dagestan*" http://www.iwpr.net/?p=crs&s=f&o=159970&apc_state=henicrs2003

[5] BBC "*The first bloody battle*" http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/482323.stm
[6] *Ibid*.

staging ground for criminality and terrorism. The discovery of arms caches, kidnappings and assassinations, and attacks on government targets are daily occurrences, though at the time of this writing not to the calibre seen in Chechnya. Many commentators blame Dagestani extremism on Chechen influence.[7]

The political status of Dagestan is not in question; the main issues facing Dagestan today are persistent insecurity and violence related to internal governance and neighbouring countries' strife.

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[7] ISN "*Dagestani Wahhabis surrender to Russia*"
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=935
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6. Stakeholders

In Dagestan there are seven main stakeholder categories that are affected by changes in the political environment. Each stakeholder is composed of a variety of actors that have their own grievances and interests.

Dagestan has three internal stakeholder groups related to the conflict, including national leadership, sub regional leadership and ethnic groups/civilian populations. There are also four external stakeholder groups including the neighbouring countries and the International Community.

Many internal stakeholders have grievances or interests that put them directly at odds with one another. External stakeholders are no more unified and face the possibility of inheriting the spill-over effects such as refugees and criminal smuggling.

Table 1. Internal Stakeholders

Stakeholder	Composition	Grievances/Interests
1. Russian leadership	- President Vladimir Putin	- Balancing internal and external political pressures - International public opinion - Domestic reputation as tough on terrorism
	- Armed forces	- Security and safety of Russia as a whole
2. Dagestani sub-national leadership	- Mukhu Aliyev, *pro-Moscow leader of Dagestan Republic*	-
	- Magomedali Magomedov, retired leader of Dagestan Republic (replaced by Aliyev)	- Stability in Moscow's favour - To quell self-determination activities - Peaceful and legitimate leadership
	- Militant Islamic Leadership - Shamil Basayev	- Seeking increased autonomy for Chechnya and Dagestan and the withdrawal of all Russian troops
3. Ethnic groups	- Avars, Dargins, Kumyks, Lezgens, Chechens, Laks, etc.	- Largest ethnic groups in sub region - Generally seeking peace and prosperity but for a radicalized few - Poor, predominantly Muslim
	- European-Russian	- Minority ethnic group - Historically and ethnically allied with Moscow - Often target of militant activities

Table 2. External Stakeholders

4. International Community	- OSCE: Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, USA, etc.	- Keen to resolve the violence in Chechnya and Dagestan as it is a barrier to political and economic reforms

		- Aid donors
	- European Parliament, EC, EU, UN	- Interest in security and livelihood of ethnic minorities - The promotion of Human Rights, access to health, education, clean water, etc.
5. Regional Community	- Georgia, Azerbaijan,	- Supportive of Dagestani stability but not overtly of its independence
6. Chechen sub regional leadership	- Aslan Maskhadov, Chechen rebel president (Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev – his replacement following assassination)	- Seeking increased autonomy and independence for Chechnya - Support for similar Dagestani objectives
7. International Criminal/Terrorist Networks		- To use Dagestan as a training and supply ground for international terrorist activities - To foment identity-based religious conflict - To capitalize on the weakened security situation in Dagestan for trafficking and smuggling activities

7. Sub-National Risk Indicators

7.1. Summary

Medium risk **(6.19)**

According to CIFP risk analysis, Dagestan is a medium risk region with an assessment of 6.19.[8] This analysis is based on an assessment of nine clusters that affect a country's risk for future conflict: History of Armed Conflict, Governance & Political Instability, Militarization, Population Heterogeneity, Economic Performance, International Linkages, Environment, Demographic Stress, and Human Development.[9]

Risk assessment analysis finds the main areas of concern for Dagestan are Armed Conflict, Militarization, Governance & Political Instability, and Population Heterogeneity; all are high risk on the CIFP database. Demographic Stress, Economic Performance, Human Development & International Linkages are medium risk.

The Armed Conflict cluster is high risk for this sub region due to ongoing violent activity, leading to high risk ratings in indicator areas of refugees and acts of political violence.[10] This is unsurprising as Dagestan represents a large proportion of the risk for armed conflict in Russia,[11] though not to the extent of Chechnya.

The Armed Conflict cluster is high risk for this sub region due to particularly high risk ratings for indicators of refugees and elements related to the history of armed conflict in Dagestan.[12]

In Governance and Political Instability, Dagestan is listed as extremely high risk in regime durability and corruption. Dagestan adds to this high risk with some of the most oppressive restrictions on press activities using regular intimidation, sabotage and kidnapping of journalists.

Russia produces many of its own arms[13] so Dagestan's import rate of weapons is officially low; still, it scores very highly in militarization due to a large armed forces presence and significant illegal arms stores and shipments, particularly in border areas with Chechnya.

In Population Heterogeneity, Dagestan is at high risk, in particular due to a high rating for risk of ethnic rebellion and for the significant stress population stress of Dagestan having a population that is largely from a different ethnic group than that of the dominant population.

In other clusters Dagestan is rated as medium or low risk despite occasional high or very high risk for indicators like inflation, life expectancy and international disputes.

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[8] This is based on a thirteen point scale and by comparing available data to the risk assessment of Russia, which is 5.78. For Russia's risk assessment, see Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (2006) *Conflict risk assessment report*, forthcoming.

[9] For more information about the clusters and their application to risk analysis see CIFP *Conflict Risk Assessment Report 2006*. http://www.carleton.ca/cifp

[10] UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2003 – Russian Federation: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/statistics/opendoc.pdf?tbl=STATISTICS&id=41d2c198c&page=statistics

[11] EIU Country Profile: Russia – Security Risks http://www.eiu.com/index.asp?layout=displayIssueArticle&issue_id=80319593&article_id=350319620

[12] UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2003 – Russian Federation: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/statistics/opendoc.pdf?tbl=STATISTICS&id=41d2c198c&page=statistics

[13] Rusarm Rosoboronexport: http://www.rusarm.ru/p_frame/main.htm

7.2. Risk indicators by cluster

7.2.1. History of Armed Conflict

High risk   (8.27)

Stabilizing Factors
- Military and police presence in Chechnya may stabilize and act as a deterrent.

Destabilizing Factors
- Incidents of violence related to self-determination in Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia ongoing.
- Ethnic dimension to self-rule issues and perceived injustice of occupation
- Deep-seated cultural animosity rooted in decades of instability, state neglect and violence
- Corruption and porous borders make Dagestan susceptible to smuggling and migration of foreign militants[14]

Potential spoilers
- Situation is already deeply dangerous though further extension of the theatre of operations into Russia proper by militants would escalate matters further

7.2.2. Governance and Political Instability

High risk   (8.53)

Stabilizing Factors
- Continued and sustained attention from the EU, OSCE, NATO and Western observers
- Increasing political stability a public expectation of good governance
- Non-violent political resolution or options for Chechnya
- National attention to minority issues in Caucasus

Destabilizing Factors
- A glut of security and international issues forcing attention away from governance and settlement of this long-running dispute
- High corruption and lack of police control over many regions[15]
- Lack of durability/stability of any republic or sub regional leadership

Potential spoilers
- Assassination or kidnapping of influential political figures in Russia, Chechnya or Dagestan
- Political autonomy initiatives by Chechen republic or Dagestani operators
- Change in government for Russia
- International media fatigue for covering this conflict

7.2.3. Militarization

High risk   (7.73)

Stabilizing Factors
- Faltering Russian economy could result in diminished availability of new weapons[16]

Destabilizing Factors
- Stated Russian military priority to address the problem of Chechnya[17] (and therefore, Dagestan)
- The large number of firearms in or transiting Dagestan
- Arms production and availability remains consistently high in Russia and Dagestan
- Access militants have to not only small arms but anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons

Potential spoilers

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[14] ISN "*Dagestani Wahhabis surrender to Russia*" http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=9352

[15] Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies "*Russia's Soft Underbelly: The Stability of Instability in Dagestan*." http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~bsp/publications/2000_03-walk.pdf
[16] EIU *Russia Country Report*
[17] BBC "*Putin vows to destroy Chechen rebels*" http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3050806.stm

- Revelation of the use of child-soldiers, suicide bombers or mass graves

7.2.4. Population Heterogeneity

High risk   (8.00)

Stabilizing Factors
- International military and security presence in neighbouring countries could reduce migration of foreign fighters
- Longstanding republic priority to balancing the interests of all ethnic groups.

Destabilizing Factors
- Dagestan is at very high risk for ethnic diversity, religious diversity and risk of ethnic rebellion
- Allegiance-groups and trans-border support communities play a large role in feeding weapons, & supplies to militants
- Civil culture in mainstream Russia is often perceived to be intolerant of Muslims and Caucasians[18]

Potential spoilers
- Involvement of foreign political or military actors in support of either side

7.2.5. Economic Performance

Medium risk (5.49)

Stabilizing Factors
- Regional economic trade cooperation

Destabilizing Factors
- Problems with governance (border-controls) causing problems in the economic sector
- Privatization of major industries to magnates and oligarchs who are above regulation and legal standards
- High degree of spending on military and security products and services.

Potential spoilers
- Failure to find or convince investors and customers for large industrial and agricultural resource sector
- Russian currency collapse

7.2.6. International Linkages

Medium risk   5.38)

Stabilizing Factors
- Expanding European interest in buffering from conflicts has the effect of support for stability measures
- Increased media attention

Destabilizing Factors
- International community disinclined to interfere with Russian domestic politics
- Tacit and subversive international and Diaspora support for militant activities in Chechnya and Dagestan

Potential spoilers
- Evidence of foreign political/military support for militants by Russia
- Withdrawal of international public attention from situation in Dagestan

7.2.7. Environmental Stress

Low risk   1.67)

Stabilizing Factors
- Increasing interest in adhering to global standards and protocols
- Massive land area able to 'absorb' even large environmental difficulties

Destabilizing Factors
- Domestic priorities focused on human needs and stability

Potential spoilers
- Natural disaster

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[18] IWPR "*Hard Times for Caucasians in Moscow*" http://www.iwpr.net/?p=crs&s=f&o=321783&apc_state=henh

7.2.8. Demographic Stress

Medium risk   (3.87)

Stabilizing Factors
- Population density and growth rates are not threatening

Destabilizing Factors
- Large urban concentration
- Density and poverty of population in Dagestan
- Population growth rate for Dagestan is alarming (due primarily to migration from Chechnya)

Potential spoilers
- Racist action against Caucasians or European-Russians by either side

7.2.9. Human Development

Medium risk   (4.32)

Stabilizing Factors
- History of cooperation and mutual support by various ethnic groups may support local emphasis on human needs

Destabilizing Factors
- Health and emotional stress factors resulting from ongoing conflict (suicide, hospitalization, health concerns related to inaccessibility of health institutions)
- Infant Mortality Rate nearly double that of Russia[19]

Potential spoilers
- Health epidemic
- Declaration of humanitarian emergency

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[19] WHO Chechnya and Neighbouring Republics http://www.who.int/hac/about/donorinfo/chechnya.pdf

8. Events Data: Trends and Analysis

8.1. Summary

Table 3. Overall statistics

	Total number of events	Average event score	Average score as a percent of total possible (9)
All	91	-1.33	-14.8%
Stabilizing	54	4.19	47%
Destabilizing	37	-5.11	-56.8%

Table 4. Overall event trends

	All events	Stabilizing events	Destabilizing events
Weekly aggregate	Moderately Negative	Status quo	Moderately negative

Between 25 October 2005 and 2 May 2006, 91 events were recorded for the Dagestan region. Of these events, 54 (59%) were stabilizing, and 37 (41%) were destabilizing. The overall statistics from this 28 week period indicate that Dagestan is not tending in a promising direction but that there remain a few sources of hope.

The overall trends exhibit negative slopes, with an overall moderately negative slope. This signifies that individual event scores are actually increasing in magnitude of negative events and stable for positive events. When factoring the change in number of events through the weekly aggregate, Dagestan presents a bleak outlook. The first reason for this is that there has simply been an increase in destabilizing events and a decrease in the magnitude of stabilizing events. The second reason is that for stabilizing events in the Governance and Political Instability cluster, for example, the projection is actually balanced. The discovery of arms caches or the arrest of militants is positive news but also bears a negative dimension and was (in the reporting period) almost always followed by retributive actions by militants.

As is the established pattern in Dagestan and Chechnya, the intensity of the conflict tends to ease in the winter when there are no leaves for cover and isolated mountain passes, upon which rebels rely for supplies, are often impassable.[20] As the Caucasus enter the spring, the number of stabilizing governance events may decrease (with the foliage cover) and destabilizing attacks remain the same or intensify.

At the moment, improvements lie in the potential of the Governance and Political Stability and International Linkages clusters. For the rest of 2006, trends indicate that the level and frequency of violence will increase and the effectiveness or existence of peace building measures will decrease. With the exception of sustained and responsible international attention and the reform of some archaic governance practices, the hopes for the sub region of Dagestan are dire.

Overall, Dagestan would greatly benefit from an increase in stabilizing events, particularly of greater magnitude. This would undoubtedly reduce the conflict potential in Dagestan, but for now the political situation is intractably stuck and tied to that of Chechnya. Individual events or gestures are insufficient, what are required are long-term, committed efforts by all parties.

Events are accurate as of May 2, 2006

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[20] BBC "*What now for Chechnya*?"
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/692813.stm

8.2. Primary Drivers

Primary drivers are those clusters that contain more than twenty-five events. These clusters are the main areas of activity in the region, with the greatest contribution to the overall trend.

8.2.1. Armed Conflict

Table 5. Armed Conflict statistics

	Total number of events	Average score	Average score % of possible 9
All	36	-4.83	-53.7%
Stabilizing	3	5	55.5%
Destabilizing	33	-5.73	-63.7%

Table 6. Armed Conflict event trends

	All events	Stabilizing events	Destabilizing events
Weekly aggregate	Moderately negative	Status quo	Moderately negative

Dagestan's Armed Conflict cluster bears a distinctly negative slope due to a regular and well-reported pattern of violence. Targets were both federal police by militants and militants by armed forces and police; a significant number of civilians were killed or injured by both sides. The few positive events in this cluster were the arrest of key leaders of the militant groups or the prevention of anticipated acts of violence. The high proportion destabilizing events vastly outstrips the handful of positive outcomes in the form of seizures and arrests.

Overview of Stabilizing Events
- Capture of militants or supplies

Overview of Destabilizing Events
- Extrajudicial killings of militants
- Attacks on civilians by both sides
- Collateral killing of civilians by both sides
- Attacks on police and armed forces

8.2.2. Governance and Political Instability

Table 7. Governance and Political Instability statistics

	Total number of events	Average score	Average score % of possible 9
All	40	1.9	21%
Stabilizing	29	4.2	46.7%
Destabilizing	11	-4.1	-45.6%

Table 8. Governance and Political Instability event trends

	All events	Stabilizing events	Destabilizing events
Weekly aggregate	Moderately negative	Moderately positive	Status quo

On average, events relating to Governance and Political Instability were negative but roughly balanced in magnitude. Despite higher numbers and magnitude of stabilizing events, the trend in this cluster levelled off near the end of the reporting period and the magnitude of destabilizing events increased markedly. This cluster is generally unaffected by seasonal or news-event impacts and takes a more holistic and state-level type of event. Near the end of the reporting period, a significant number of governance-related arrests were made (which coincided with an increase in militant activity) and this shift in event-type will have affected trend lines, as well.

Overview of Stabilizing Events
- *Pre-emptive arrest of militants*
- *History of legitimate, representative government*

Overview of Destabilizing Events
- Corruption endemic
- Allegations of elections fraud

8.3. Secondary Drivers

Secondary drivers are those clusters with less than twenty-five monitored events. These clusters provide supplementary information to the overall analysis.

8.3.1. Militarization

Armed conflict and militarization are tied intimately together in Dagestan. Frequently when there is an event relating to militarization, such as the seizure of an arms shipment or discovery of a weapons cache, there was a resulting firefight and events in this cluster often escalate into armed conflict. Events in this cluster are overwhelmingly destabilizing though with the regularity of their occurrence, not dramatically so.

8.3.2. Economic Performance

Events in the economic performance cluster for Dagestan were rare. The majority of news-reported events related directly to conflict events. Economic events tended to revolve around the apportioning of aid to Dagestani civilians.

8.3.3. Population Heterogeneity

Population heterogeneity events relate primarily to the transitioning of refugees and internally displaced persons around camps throughout the sub region. Stabilizing and Destabilizing events were roughly balanced and of minor magnitude.

8.3.4. Demographic Stress

Because Demographic Stress indicators tend to be state-level structural data it is unsurprising that there were very few news-events related to those issues. The releases of annual reports or statistics are not bound by typical news cycles.

8.3.5. Environmental Stress

A trend for Environmental Stress cannot be adequately analysed due to insufficient data points. Events of significance included an outbreak and inoculation against bird flu. These may be more significant events than reporting would indicate but the paucity of numbers can suggest no remarkable trends...

8.3.6. International Linkages

In the International linkages cluster there are very few initiatives or endeavours aimed specifically at either support or the destabilization of Dagestan. Chechnya tends to draw more of the attention, though Dagestan may be equally affected. Most events reported in this cluster revolved around the capture of militants from the sub region and their extradition to Russia.

8.3.7. Human Development

In the six-month tracking period, this cluster registered very few significant events. The news focus on violent activities and the sub regional focus on Chechnya as the polarizing conflict resulted in very little attention paid anything but the cross-border dimension of conflict. Human development issues are almost certainly less stable in Dagestan than in Russia but events to that effect were rare.

Part C: Annex

9. Summary of Data

Table 9. Overall data

Risk indicator			All events		Stabilizing events		Destabilizing events	
			Trend	Avg.	Trend	Avg.	Trend	Avg.
Medium risk	**(6.19)**		-0.45	-1.33	.08	4.19	-.26	-5.11

Table 10. Data for primary drivers

Cluster	Risk indicator		All events		Stabilizing events		Destabilizing events	
			Trend	Avg.	Trend	Avg.	Trend	Avg.
Armed Conflict	*High risk*	**(8.27)**	-.73	-4.83	0	5	-.31	-5.73
Governance and Political Instability	*High risk*	**(8.53)**	-.15	1.9	.14	4.2	.08	-4.1

Table 11. Data for Secondary Drivers

Cluster	Risk indicator	
Militarization	*High risk*	**(7.73)**
Economic Performance	*Medium risk*	**(5.49)**
Population Heterogeneity	*High risk*	**(8.00)**
International Linkages	*Medium risk*	**(5.38)**
Environmental Stress	*Low risk*	**(1.67)**
Demographic Stress	*Medium risk*	**(3.87)**
Human Development	*Medium risk*	**(4.32)**

10. Trend Line Charts

10.1. All events

Figure 2. Chart of trend lines for all events and the count of events by week

## 10.2.   Stabilizing events

Figure 3. Chart of trend lines for stabilizing events and the count of events by week

10.3.   Destabilizing events

Figure 4. Chart of trend lines for destabilizing events and the count of events by week

11. Maps

BBC News

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/e/e4/Dagestan.jpg

Figure 5. Maps of Dagestan

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The 91 events were obtained using Google Alerts (http://www.google.com/alerts), which provided a daily summary of news reports for the search term 'Dagestan' and 'Daghestan'. The news reports originated from a wide variety of local and international sources, including:

- ABC News
- Agenzia Giornalistica Italia
- Antara News
- Bahrain News Agency - Bahrain
- BBC News
- Bucharest Daily News
- Bulgarian News Network
- BusinessWeek
- Financial times
- Focus News
- Forbes
- Hindu - India
- Houston Chronicle
- ICRC
- Institute for War and Peace Reporting
- Institutional Investor - New York
- Interfax Russia, Moscow
- International Herald Tribune
- Islamic Republic News Agency - Tehran
- ISN - Zurich, Switzerland
- ITAR-TASS-Moscow
- Monsters and critics - Glasgow
- NBC
- Mainichi Daily News - Japan
- New York Times
- Noticias - Spain
- NRCU - Ukrainian Radio - Kiyv, Ukraine
- OneWorld.net
- Prague Watchdog
- 5TV
- RuBiCon
- UPI
- Xinhua
- Zee news - India
- Canada.com
- China Post
- Civil Georgia
- CRI - Beijing, China
- Czech news agency
- DefenseNews.com
- dtt.net - Brussels
- eurobserver
- EUPolitix.com - Brussels
- Euronews.net
- People's Daily Online
- Prague daily monitor
- Pravda
- Prensa Latina - Havana, Cuba
- Radio Free Europe
- Regnum news agency - Russia
- Reliefweb
- Reuters
- RIA Novosti - Moscow
- Scotsman UK
- Seattle Post Intelligencer
- Special Broadcasting Service - Australia
- Stratfor USA
- Swissinfo
- Taipai Times - Taiwan
- Turkish Press
- UN News Centre
- United Press International
- Voice of America
- Washington File
- Washington Post
- Washington Times
- Webwire
- World Peace Herald - Washington

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ml

13.   Methodology

13.1. Description of Events Monitoring

Event trends are assessed using the slope of time-series trend lines that are provided by plotting event data over a given period of time. First, based on the context of the region as described by the Background, Stakeholders and Risk Indicators sections, events are identified as being generally stabilizing or destabilizing[21] and given a sign of either +1 (stabilizing) or -1 (destabilizing). Events are then coded on a scale of 1 to 3 for three dimensions: the degree to which they can be linked to the risk of future peace or conflict – Causality (Ca); whether the event is typical or constitutes an acceleration of events – Escalation (Es); and the degree to which the event affects relevant stakeholders– Centrality (Ce). Causality and Escalation are coded based on a qualitative analysis of the event considered within the context of the region's risk indicators. Centrality is coded using a quantitative analysis of the proportion of stakeholders affected by the event.

A conflict indicator statistic is then calculated by summing the three dimensions of an event (Ca+Es+Ce), and multiplying it by the sign to provide a stabilizing indicator of +3 to +9 and a destabilizing indicator of -3 to -9. The analyst can use this conflict indicator to explore summary statistics as well as trend lines of the region's events.

Summary statistics provide the analyst with an overview of the average event scores. The total number of events and the average conflict indicator statistics are calculated, including sub-calculations by sign. For the average scores, a percentage is calculated based on the highest score for that conflict indicator statistic. For instance, an average Ca+Es+Ce can score

as high (or low) as +/- 9, so a score of +/- 2 achieves a percentage of +/- 22%. Positive percentages are indicative of an environment that on average experiences stabilizing events, as there are either more stabilizing events or more strongly valued stabilizing events. Negative percentages indicate the opposite, an environment characterized by destabilizing events. The closer the percentage comes to +/- 100% the better (or worse) events tend to be.

The second avenue of analysis is via trend lines to observe whether the events demonstrate any positive or negative trend over time. The conflict indicators are plotted against time – usually six months – and trend lines are generated, based on ordinary least squares regression, and compared in two different ways. The first comparison, the individual event trend line, plots the conflict indicators of each event over time. This is useful in that it indicates whether and to what degree the individual event conflict indicators have a positive or negative trend over time. However, it does not account for an increase or decrease in the total *number* of events, so the second trend analysis is that of the weekly aggregate. To attain this trend line, the conflict indicators are first summed by week; for instance, if one week has four events with the conflict indicators of +2, +2, -2 and -2, the overall weekly aggregate would be 0, the stabilizing weekly aggregate would be +4 and the destabilizing weekly aggregate would be -4. The weekly aggregate is then plotted over time to produce a trend line that incorporates the theory that an increase or decrease in total number of events should matter in addition to their changing value. That is, one would presume that a rapid increase in the number of stabilizing events would indicate an improving trend, even if the

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[21] Note that in some unique cases an event will be coded as both stabilizing and destabilizing.

conflict indicators for the individual events remain largely unchanged.

Taken together, these two trend analyses provide an overview of the general event developments over the previous months. In the analysis, both stabilizing and destabilizing trend lines reflect improvements through positive slopes, indicating the reduction in conflict vulnerability. On the other hand, negative slopes denote a deteriorating situation – an increase in conflict vulnerability. The degree of improvement or deterioration is identified as status quo, moderate, or strong, based on the slope and according to the following chart:

Table 12. Matrix of Trend Magnitudes and associated symbols

Trend Magnitude	Strongly Negative	Moderately Negative	Status quo	Moderately Positive	Strongly Positive
Slope size	Below -1	Between -1 and -.1	Between -.1 and .1	Between +.1 and +1	Over +1
Symbol	⬇ (red down arrow)	↘ (yellow/red down-right arrow)	➡ (yellow right arrow)	↗ (yellow/green up-right arrow)	⬆ (green up arrow)

Finally, <u>scenarios</u> are created for best case, worst case and status quo situations, based on an analysis of overall and cluster summary statistics and trends. The best and worst cases consider the trends among stabilizing and destabilizing events. The best case assumes that the strongest of the positive trends will hold for the future time period, and the worst case assumes that the strongest of the negative trends will occur. This holds regardless of whether the positive (or negative) trend occurs among destabilizing (or stabilizing) events. For instance, if there is strongly positive trend among destabilizing events, this trend would be used to extrapolate events for the best case scenario. If there is a strongly negative trend among stabilizing events, this trend would be used for the worst case. The status quo, on the other hand, will extrapolate future tendencies based on the overall trend. For instance, if there is moderate overall improvement, then the status quo assumes that this is the trend for the future. Events are then surmised based on these trends in order to provide a conjectured future case.

Each case concludes by estimating the region's future capacity to absorb damaging events and take advantage of peace-building opportunities by forecasting the best, worst or status quo trends. The conclusion will also state the likelihood that the region will approach a higher or lower risk level; this analysis is based on whether the current risk level is already near a lower or higher category and the magnitude of the trend under consideration. For example, a medium-risk region of 3.6 with a strongly positive trend line is likely to move into the low risk level. Alternatively, a medium-risk region of 6.4 with a weak trend line is unlikely to move into the low risk level, but it could move into a high risk level with a moderately deteriorating trend.

13.2. Description of Events Data Collection

Events were collected in one of two methods for this study.

In most cases, the news-parsing technology of Google-Alerts (www.google.com/alerts) was employed to scan and collect daily reports of events data reported by the international press about the particular sub-national region of interest. Search terms were identified by the sub-national region itself and as a result of the stakeholder analysis (if one actor or group tended to garner a significant amount of press but not necessarily reported in the same news stories as the name of the sub-national region); in some cases, alternate spellings and transliterations were used as search terms to ensure a more robust set of data. News reports were then delivered to analysts as daily emails (if news events were found for that day) which were then coded into a Microsoft Access Database using the methodology described above.

The other method by which data was gathered for this study was to collect the data post-facto. Some sub-national regions' data was collected only partially using Google-Alerts so a more robust reassessment of the monitoring time period was required. To do this, analysts employed a LexisNexis search for the monitoring period and using the same search parameters as had been used with Google-Alerts. The events collected using this methodology are identical in type to the daily digest-type – the only difference is the timing in which the analysts coded the events was not continuous.