

Sub-national Report for Kosovo: Events, Forecasting and Analysis

FINAL REPORT

Report Prepared by: Liz St. Jean

With support from:

David Carment

Adam Fysh

Stewart Prest

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<http://www.carleton.ca/cifp>

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Part A: Overview

1. Note

About this Report

This sub-national report has been produced by the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) for use by non-governmental organizations, businesses, academics, Canadian policy-makers, and other parties concerned with the current and future state of sub-national regions. This Events Monitoring Profile is based on a fusion of CIFP Risk Assessment and Events Monitoring methodologies.¹

About the Author

Liz St. Jean is a research analyst for CIFP. Her area of study is international conflict management, with a focus on humanitarian intervention. Her current research examines the factors involved in decisions regarding the use of force in peace operations. She has studied economics as well as international relations at the University of British Columbia. She spent a year working on an independent research project that involved three months in Northern Uganda, and a month in Rwanda.

About CIFP

CIFP has its origins in a prototype geopolitical database developed by the Canadian Department of National Defence in 1991. The prototype project called GEOPOL covered a wide range of political, economic, social, military, and environmental indicators through the medium of a rating system. In 1997, under the guidance of Andre Ouellete, John Patterson, Tony Kellett and Paul Sutherland, the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

decided to adopt some elements of GEOPOL to meet the needs of policy makers, the academic community and the private sector. The CIFP project as it became known has since then operated under the guidance of principal investigator David Carment of Carleton University and has received funding from DFAIT, IDRC and CIDA. The project represents an on-going effort to identify and assemble statistical information conveying the key features of the political, economic, social and cultural environments of countries around the world.

The cross-national data generated through CIFP was intended to have a variety of applications in government departments, NGOs, and by users in the private sector. The data set provides at-a-glance global overviews, issue-based perspectives and country performance measures. Currently, the data set includes measures of domestic armed conflict, governance and political instability, militarisation, religious and ethnic diversity, demographic stress, economic performance, human development, environmental stress, and international linkages.

The CIFP database currently includes statistical data in the above issue areas, in the form of over one hundred performance indicators for 196 countries, spanning fifteen years (1985 to 2000) for most indicators. These indicators are drawn from a variety of open sources, including the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and the Minorities at Risk and POLITY IV data sets from the University of Maryland.

¹ For information on the structural risk assessment, see Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (2001) *Risk Assessment Template*, Available: <http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/docs/studra1101.pdf>.

2. Executive Summary

Profile

- Kosovo is a region in the Balkans with a large Albanian majority, who possess a demonstrated desire for independence.
- During the 1990s, the region experienced several conflicts, which were characterized by ethnic fears and hostility. This included attacks, displacement and discrimination against Albanians in Kosovo.
- Agitation for Kosovo’s independence likewise led to violent conflict between Albanians and Serbs in the mid 1990s, culminating in a military intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
- The result is that today Kosovo is largely administered by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) with a NATO protection force (KFOR), although some services are run by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG).
- Economic conditions were relatively poor during the 1990s and then plummeted following the conflict with Serbia.
- The main issue facing Kosovo today is that of its future status; it has remained a UN protected territory since 1999, and there has been little room for agreement

between Serbia and Kosovo authorities to come to a negotiated agreement.

Baseline analysis

- Kosovo is a medium-risk region with a score of 6.25.
- The overall situation in Kosovo is destabilizing due to years of conflict, structural governance problems, poor economic development, and high ethnic tensions. This is a consequence of the ethnic violence, civil conflict and international intervention that Kosovo experienced in the late 1990s.

Event Trends

- Events were monitored between 19 October 2005 and 2 May 2006.
- Events support the baseline conclusion that Kosovo is a risky region. However, the trend analysis concluded that despite the overall destabilizing nature of the events, Kosovo exhibits a strongly positive trend.
- The improving trend is due to a rise in the number of stabilizing events accompanied by a fall in the number and magnitude of destabilizing events.




Figure 1. Chart of trend lines for all events and the count of events by week

Primary drivers of event trends

- Armed Conflict experienced a reduction in violent incidents;
- In Governance and Political Stability there was a lessening of inflammatory political statements and an increase in conciliatory gestures;
- Economic Performance has a negative trend due to some capital flight and persistent unemployment;
- International Linkages had a positive trend but is still an area of concern, as the international community has begun to link Kosovo's status with Serbia's poor ICTY cooperation. Moreover, the trend in Serbia and Montenegro is negative², which will likely have a spill over effect on Kosovo.

Scenarios

- Most likely case: relations between Kosovo and Serbia improve; status talks continue but without any foreseeable resolution.
- Best case: Kosovo and Serbia agree over Kosovo's future status, and the situation improves dramatically.
- Worst case: Kosovo future status talks enter a deadlock with all actors at odds with one another. There is widespread discontent and low-level violence.

Conclusion

- Despite Kosovo's grave history, it is poised to improve and could do so dramatically.
- Kosovo should thus be largely able to absorb future damaging events.
- However, the possibility of a worsening situation in Serbia and Montenegro needs to be closely monitored.

² See Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (2006) Sub-national Report for The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro: Events Scenarios and Analysis, forthcoming.

3. Event Trends Summary

Overall

General Trend



- There was a general increase in the number of stabilizing events accompanied by a fall in number and magnitude of destabilizing events
- The main source of the trend lies in the Armed Conflict, Governance and Political Stability and International Linkages clusters, due to the onset of the Kosovo Future Status Talks and a reduction of violent activity.
- International Linkages and Economic Performance are two main areas of concern. The latter currently exhibits a negative trend, and the former began to demonstrate an increase in destabilizing events towards the end of the reporting period. These two clusters could thus become a source of future negative trend.

Primary Drivers

Primary drivers are those clusters that contain more than twenty-five events. These clusters are the main areas of activity in the region, with the greatest contribution to the overall trend.

Armed Conflict

General Trend



- Sporadic violence directed towards Kosovo Serbs
- New shadow paramilitary groups surfaced, but their threats of widespread violence did not manifest

Governance and Political Instability

General Trend



- Improving relations between Kosovo and Serbia over Kosovo's future status talks
- Volatility of Kosovo's political leadership: interim presidency in place since President Rugova passed away; former guerrilla (Agim Ceku) elected as Prime Minister following the resignation of PM Kosumi

Economic Performance

General Trend



- Continued and relatively successful privatisation, international assistance
- Some capital flight and low expectations for future growth among the population
- Serb complaints of lack of participation in privatisation efforts

International Linkages

General Trend



- International initiation of and significant attention to Kosovo future status talks
- Serb frustration with international community regarding future status talks, but the relationship improved
- International criticism directed towards Serbia, and signs that Serbia's lack of cooperation with ICTY may adversely affect future status talks

Secondary Drivers

Secondary drivers are those clusters with less than twenty-five monitored events. These clusters provide supplementary information to the overall analysis.

Militarization

- Enhanced security measures

Population Heterogeneity

- Albanian graffiti on Serbian houses
- Poor relations between Orthodox Church leaders, Albanians

Environmental Stress

- Fear of avian flu spread and was then stemmed by the Kosovo government

Demographic Stress

- Continuation of high youth bulge and youth unemployment

Human Development

- Concern over living standards and health conditions for Roma population living in internally displaced persons camps

Events are accurate as of May 2, 2006

4. Forecasting

Most Likely Case

In the most likely case Kosovo will experience improvement and its risk score will fall, but it is unlikely to fall to a lower risk category.

Future status talks continue without any foreseeable resolution, but they do not fail. Although Serbia and Kosovo are able to agree on some minor issues, they cannot find a compromise on the question of autonomy or independence. Talks thus exist in a state of limbo, and relations between Kosovo and Serbia continue to be uneasy. Western powers and Russia maintain their divergent opinions, but do not intensify pressure to achieve their different objectives. Ethnic groups, lobby organizations and government officials continue to make destabilizing statements, which are then downplayed or offset by stabilizing statements by other local actors. Sporadic civilian attacks continue, although they lack the consistency of a disciplined armed movement and are more criminal in nature. The economy continues its hesitant upward climb; some foreign companies pursue investment while others withdraw their offers to finance privatisation.

Best Case

In the best case, Kosovo's will experience strong improvement and will move towards a lower risk score and category.

Kosovar and Serbian negotiating teams resolve their differences over the future status of Kosovo, and ethnic groups largely accept the resolution. External stakeholders accept and applaud the final status as a fair and legitimate outcome. Refugees and IDPs begin to return with the assistance of UNMIK, the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG)

and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Serbs begin to participate in Kosovo institutions, and there is a relatively cooperative spirit between Serbs and Albanians. The Kosovo government tackles corruption and is reasonably successful. All remaining paramilitary groups slowly disappear without the emergence of new or splinter groups. Armed attacks and property destruction against ethnic Serbs continue to reduce, and there is an increase in constructive inter-ethnic and inter-religious dialogue. The economy flourishes due to an influx of foreign investment into formerly state-owned enterprises and infrastructure.

Worst Case

In the worst case, Kosovo's improvement will be small, and it will remain in the medium-risk category.

Serbia and Kosovo continue to battle over their differing views of Kosovo's future, and both sides experience infighting over how to achieve their aims. As a result, Kosovo and Serbian negotiating teams are unable to come to any resolution, and one or both sides quit the negotiations. The international community attempts to pressure both sides to recommence talks, but the discord between Western powers and Russia instead causes a greater divide between Kosovo and Serbia, as each side feels it has international support. Widespread discontent within Kosovo erupts into mass demonstrations that devolve into a short-lived riot. Armed militias grow in size and activity, increasing the number and intensity of armed attacks on ethnic Serbs and their property. The Roma ethnic group takes a more conflictive approach to establishing their identity within Kosovo. The economy is stagnant, contributing to (and possibly caused by) a lack of foreign investment in formerly state-owned enterprises and infrastructure.

Part B: Detail

5. Profile

Kosovo is a region in the Balkans whose population consists of Serbian and Roma minority groups living among a large majority of ethnic Albanians. Kosovo Albanians have a demonstrated desire to be independent; they agitated for independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) during the Cold War and from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in the post Cold War era. During the mid 1990s, this agitation grew increasingly hostile, leading to violent conflict between Albanians and Serbian security forces, and in 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization responded to the conflict with an air power intervention.

SFRY originally consisted of a union between six republics and two autonomous provinces,³ each of which contained a diverse mix of ethnic groups.⁴ Yugoslavia held together during Josip Tito's reign⁵, but after his death, it began to destabilize in the 1980s. Conflict existed among the republics due to their dispute over Yugoslavia's future governance and territory.⁶ This devolved to war in the 1990s, largely under the direction of Slobodan Milosevic, President of Serbia (1989-1997) and Yugoslavia (1997-2000). The warring was characterized by ethnic fears and hostility; for instance, Milosevic effectively

provoked Serbian resentment over losing control of the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo.⁷ In the early 1990s, Serbian forces engaged in short wars with Croatia and Slovenia, and a longer, vicious war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The result was the independence of four republics and the creation of the FRY, which consisted of Serbia, Montenegro and the disputed provinces. In 1998, tensions intensified in Kosovo over the Albanian Kosovars' desire for independence, and Serbian forces clashed with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).⁸ During this period, many Kosovo Albanians were attacked, forcibly displaced and faced constant discrimination.

The international community imposed sanctions in response to both the BiH and Kosovo conflicts. Militarily, the United Nations became involved in a peacekeeping mission to Bosnia, and NATO engaged in a bombing campaign in response to Serbia's actions in Kosovo and their refusal to sign a peace agreement. Serbia eventually capitulated, leading to the United Nations designating Kosovo an international protectorate under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. Kosovo is largely administered by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) with a NATO protection force (KFOR), although some services are run by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG). Many Serbs and

³ The republics included Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Slovenia; the provinces were Kosovo and Vojvodina.

⁴ Main ethnic groups included Serbs, Bosniaks (also identified as Muslims) Albanians, Hungarians, Montenegrins, Roma, Croats, Slovenes, and Macedonians.

⁵ Josip Tito led the Yugoslav federation from 1945 until his death; during this period he maintained the union by balancing power between the republics and provinces. He attempted to create a union free from ethnic nationalism, yet nationalism persisted. Economist Intelligence Unit. (2006) *Country Report Serbia*.

⁶ Republics such as Croatia and Slovenia desired independence, while Serbia wished to maintain a stronger federal system.

⁷ There is an ongoing academic argument as to whether these ethnic tensions were the result of elite manipulation or whether they rose naturally among the population. Regardless, the result was still fighting between ethnic groups.

⁸ This was a Serbian initiative led by Milosevic, as Montenegro adopted a neutral stance on the Kosovo issue. International Crisis Group. (2006) *Kosovo: The Challenge of Transition*. Available: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3226&l=1> (Accessed 8 May 2006): 5. Hereafter ICG (2006).

Roma fled out of fear of Albanian reprisals and now live as internally displaced persons within Serbia and Montenegro. For more information on Serbia and Montenegro stability, see CIFP (2006) [Events Monitoring Profile: The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro](#).

Kosovo is considered the historic birthplace of Serbia, even though today it contains a strong Albanian majority (90%) who view it as their homeland.⁹ Thus, for nationalistic reasons, Serbs are reluctant to allow independence and Albanians demand it, putting the two groups directly at odds. Serbia also fears that it will serve a precedent for minority groups within Serbia to agitate for independence. Albanian Kosovars, however, feel no connection to Serbia and with the fresh memory of Serbia's violent actions in 1998, strongly believe they deserve independence. Kosovo has a history of challenging Serbia through both non-violent and violent means; indeed, it was the latter that led to the 1998/99 Kosovo conflict. Despite international presence, tensions between Albanians and Serbs persist, between both officials and the general population. Following the end of the Kosovo conflict, the Albanian memory of Serb repression led to retaliation through discrimination and periodic attacks against Kosovar Serbs. As a result, much of the Serb refugee population in neighbouring areas are reluctant to return. Tensions also emerged within the Albanian community, allegedly including an assassination of a key Albanian leader.¹⁰ These tensions reflect divisions among Albanians as to whether Kosovo should be independent, autonomous within Serbia and Montenegro or merge with Albania.

Economic conditions were relatively poor during the 1990s and then plummeted following the conflict with Serbia.

International assistance fell in 2003 due to the lack of progress on Kosovo's political future. The worsening economic situation combined with the tense political environment to bring about a violent explosion in 2004; Albanians rioted, targeting both Serbs and UNMIK. Since then, there have only been sporadic incidences of violence, but the situation remains poised to erupt should the situation deteriorate further amidst highly destabilizing events.

The main issue facing Kosovo today is that of its future status; it has remained a UN protected territory since 1999, and there has been little room for agreement between Serbia and Kosovo authorities to come to a negotiated agreement. Serbian leadership wishes to see Kosovo remain within Serbia and Montenegro, even if it necessitates some measure of autonomy. Many Albanian Kosovars, however, continue to push for complete independence. The push for an independent Kosovo thus provides not only the backdrop to but also the current focus of political tension.

⁹ Minorities at Risk (2003) Kosovars minorities at risk within Yugoslavia. Available: <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=34501> (Accessed 11 May 2006) 2.

¹⁰ Minorities at Risk (2003) 2.

6. Stakeholders

In Kosovo there are twelve main stakeholders that are affected by changes in the political environment. Each stakeholder is composed of a variety of actors that have their own grievances and interests. Kosovo has seven internal stakeholder categories and five external stakeholder groups.

Currently, there is much tension, and potential for increased tension, among Kosovo stakeholders. Many have grievances and/or interests that put them

directly at odds with one another. These are largely due to opposing views of Kosovo's future status, but there are also antagonisms within stakeholder groups as to the best method to achieve their goal. For instance, some Kosovo Albanian stakeholders support non-violent methods to achieve independence, while other groups advocate any method, including violence, for the same aim. This has led to a volatile situation within and between Kosovo stakeholders.

Table 1. Internal Stakeholders

<i>Stakeholder</i>	<i>Composition</i>	<i>Grievances/Interests</i>
1. Kosovo sub-national leadership: PISG (Provisional Institutions of Self-Government)	- President is in transition, Rugova passed away 21 January 2006; Fatmir Sejdiu currently holds the presidency	- Working for Kosovo independence
	- Prime Minister Kosumi resigned 01/03/06; Agim Çeku became Prime Minister 01/03/06.	- In favour of independence - Çeku is a former KLA commander who Belgrade accused of war crimes - Head of Kosovo Protection Force (see below)
	- Kosovo's major ruling party: the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) – Led by Dr Ibrahim Rugova	- Seeking independence - History of non-violent protest to gain independence
	- Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) – Led by Ramush Haradinaj	- Seeking independence - Linked to Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)
	- Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) – Hashim Taci	- Seeking independence - Linked to KLA
	- Kosovo Protection Force	- Successor to KLA following KLA demobilization - Seeking independence - Linked to violent incidences
2. Serbia and Montenegro national leadership	- President Svetozar Marovic	- Quiet role within negotiations
3. Serbian sub-national leadership	- President Boris Tadic - Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica	- Working against Kosovo independence - Favour Kosovo autonomy within Serbia and Montenegro - Claims Serbia must protect Serbs within Kosovo, but ruled out military option

4. Montenegrin sub-national leadership	- President Filip Vujanovic - Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic	- Currently considering their own separation from Serbia and Montenegro - Not engaging in the Kosovo discussions
5. Negotiating teams	- Albanian	- Working for independence
	- Serbian	- Working against independence
6. Paramilitary Groups	- Kosovo Independence Army(KIA)	- Located in Western Kosovo - Established in Autumn 2005 - Fighting for Kosovo's independence
	- Albanian National Army (AKSh)	- Based in Macedonia - Fighting for unification of ethnic Albanian areas
	- Black Shadow	- Splinter group of AKSh - Located in Presevo Valley - Newly established to ensure Kosovo's independence - Calling for the annexation of portions of Serbia
7. Ethnic groups	- All	- Impatient for the resolution of Kosovo's future status
	- Albanian	- Largest ethnic group - more than 90% of population - Represent ethnic Albanian interests in status talks - Generally pro-independence
	- Serbian	- Second largest ethnic group, reside - Anti-independence, pro-autonomy - Concerned over their rights and ethnically motivated violence
	- Roma	- Third largest ethnic group - Want to be considered as having a legitimate role in negotiations

Table 2. External Stakeholders

8. International missions in Kosovo	- UNMIK: UN Interim Administration in Kosovo – led by Soren Jessen Petersen (SRSG) - OMiK: OSCE Mission in Kosovo - EUMM: EU Monitoring Mission	- Working to strengthen Kosovo institutions, security - Supportive of a peaceful resolution - Do not publicly favour one solution over another
	- KFOR: NATO Kosovo Force	- Expressed desire to reduce troop levels - Provides security for Kosovo
9. United Nations (Political)	- Martti Ahtisaari (Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Kosovo) - Albert Rohan - Deputy UN	- Mediator for talks on Kosovo's future status - Supportive of a peaceful resolution - Do not publicly favour one solution

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	envoy	over another
10. European Union (Political)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stefan Lehne – EU representative to the discussions - Javier Solana - High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy; Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Supportive of a peaceful resolution - Strong pressure for Kosovo to respect minority rights
11. Kosovo Contact Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the United States 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Majority of Contact Group arguing for mutually acceptable solution - Has begun to publicly indicate that independence is likely for Kosovo
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Russia 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Anti-independence for Kosovo - Claims independence will be a precedent that will create a single model solution for all Caucus territories
12. Regional states	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Albania 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Supportive of independent Kosovo
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Macedonia, Greece, others 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Advocating a mutually acceptable solution

7. Sub-National Risk Indicators

7.1. Summary

Medium risk (6.25)

According to CIFP risk analysis, Kosovo is a medium risk region with an assessment of 6.25.¹¹ This analysis is based on an assessment of nine clusters that affect a country's risk for future conflict: History of Armed Conflict, Governance and Political Instability, Militarization, Population Heterogeneity, Economic Performance, International Linkages, Environment, Demographic Stress, and Human Development.¹²

The following sections look at the risk assessment for each cluster, including stabilizing factors, destabilizing factors and potential spoilers for each cluster area. The analysis finds that the main areas of concern for Kosovo are History of Armed Conflict, Governance and Political Instability, Militarization, Population Heterogeneity and Economic Performance.

A key area of concern is History of Armed Conflict as it has demonstrated itself to be a major source of destabilizing factors over the previous decade. Despite the recent slow-down in ethnically motivated violence since 2004, tensions remain high due to isolated incidents as well as the broader problem of internally displaced persons and refugee returnees. Given Kosovo's history and the current strain between ethnic groups, spoiler events in this cluster area could set off waves of violence between Albanians and Serbs, particularly if the situation deteriorates. Similarly, Population Heterogeneity could

also provide spoiler events. This is due to the large degree of ongoing non-violent friction between ethnic groups, which has the possibility of escalating and spilling over to violent friction.

Governance and Political Instability is the third source of unrest for two reasons. First, corruption, cronyism and other governance problems are prevalent within Kosovo, in addition to the lack of multi-ethnic participation in the PISG. Second, Kosovo and Serbian political parties directly oppose one another regarding their vision of a future Kosovo. Moreover, political parties within both Kosovo and Serbia have evidenced disagreement over the best approach to negotiations. The result is that Governance and Political Instability exhibits a large degree of risk for Kosovo.

Fourth, Militarization provides a major destabilizing factor there as there has been a consistent problem of "phantom guerrilla forces" that local and international security forces are unable to eliminate. Finally, Economic Performance contributes to Kosovo's heightened risk assessment, due in large part to poor economic conditions, such as high unemployment, and ongoing difficulties with the privatisation process.

¹¹ This is based on a thirteen point scale and by comparing available data to the risk assessment of Serbia and Montenegro, which is 6.15. For Serbia and Montenegro's risk assessment, see Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (2006) *Conflict risk assessment report*, forthcoming.

¹² For more information about the clusters and their application to risk analysis see Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (2001) *Risk Assessment Template*

7.2. Risk indicators by cluster

7.2.1. History of Armed Conflict

High risk (7.13)

Stabilizing Factors

- Fall in ethnically motivated incidences of violence since 2004¹³

Destabilizing Factors

- Occurrence of sporadic violence with political and ethnic motivations, the latter aimed at Serbs and the Orthodox Church; major rioting in 2004¹⁴
- Approximately 120, 860 refugees, IDPs and minorities at risk¹⁵
- Internally displaced persons problem not yet resolved; low return levels; tensions over the return of Serb refugees¹⁶

Potential spoilers

- Increase in ethnically motivated violence

7.2.2. Governance and Political Instability

High risk (8.79)

Stabilizing Factors

- Improving dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia: Serbian acceptance (although

reluctant) to actually discuss possible independence¹⁷

- Kosovo Assembly elections (2004), Serb Presidential visit (2005) occurred without major incident¹⁸
- Continued reforms, attempts to meet UN standards¹⁹
- Leaders demonstrate tendency to issue calm public statements even during crises²⁰

Destabilizing Factors

- Opposing views about the fundamental nature of Kosovo's future at both the official and popular level²¹
 - Serb fear that independence will cause extremism in other parts of Serbia
- Tensions between government, opposition
 - Allegations of criminal activity in government²²
- Uncertainty over Kosovo's legal status if independent
- Poor law-enforcement capacity: inability to stem riots, violence in 2004²³
- Problems with decentralizations; Kosovo Serbs boycott PISG institutions²⁴ and the 2004 election²⁵
- Cronyism and corruption with PISG²⁶

Potential spoilers

- Serbia expresses willingness to fight for Kosovo
- Worsening relations between Kosovo and Serbia; status talks fall apart

¹³ United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR). (2005) Position on the Continued International Protection Needs of Individuals from Kosovo. Available: <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/publ/opendoc.pdf?tbl=RSDLEGAL&id=42550aa94&page=publ> (Accessed 13 May 2006): 1. Hereafter UNHCR (2005).

¹⁴ United Nations Development Program (UNDP). (2005) *Kosovo Early warning report July – Sept 2005* Available: http://www.kosovo.undp.org/publications/ews11/ew_r11_engl.pdf (Accessed 13 May 2006). 1. Hereafter UNDP (2005) *Early warning report*.

¹⁵ United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR). (2006) Global Appeal 2006. See: <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/publ/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PUBL&id=4371d1ac0> (accessed 13 May 2006): 314. Hereafter UNHCR (2006).

¹⁶ UNDP (2005) *Early warning report*. 2.

¹⁷ United Nations Secretary General (UNSG). (2006) *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo*. Available: <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep06.htm> (Accessed 13 May 2006): 3. Hereafter UNSG (2006).

¹⁸ UNHCR (2005) 1.

¹⁹ UNSG (2006): 1.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ UNDP (2005) *Early warning report*. 1.

²² UNSG (2006): 2

²³ UNHCR (2005) 2.

²⁴ UNDP (2005) *Early warning report*. 1 and UNSG (2006): 2-5.

²⁵ Freedom House (2005) *Freedom in the World: Kosovo*. Available:

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=2&year=2005&country=6892> (Accessed 12 May 2006): 2.

²⁶ ICG, 5.

7.2.3. Militarization

High risk (8.53)

Stabilizing Factors

- International responsibility to provide protection
- Growth of Kosovo Police Service (KPS)²⁷
- KLA demobilization²⁸

Destabilizing Factors

- "Phantom guerrilla forces"²⁹ appearing, making destabilizing statements, some sporadic attacks, then disappearing; includes radicals from KLA³⁰
- Negative impact on KPS from previous KLA structures; lack of disarmament program³¹
- KFOR history of being unable to manage borders, poor institutional memory due to rapid turnover³²

Potential spoilers

- Surge in activity among existing, new guerrilla forces

7.2.4. Population Heterogeneity

High risk (7.33)

Stabilizing Factors

- Education taught in five languages
- Improvement in minority freedom of movement³³
- Kosovo leaders reaching out to minority community³⁴
- Draft law on languages underway³⁵

²⁷ ICG (2006) 6.

²⁸ Bonn International Centre for Conversion (2001) *Wag the Dog: The Mobilization and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation Army* Available: <http://bicc.de/publications/briefs/brief20/content.php> (Accessed 12 May 2006): 39. Hereafter Bonn (2001).

²⁹ International Crisis Group. (2004) *Kosovo Conflict History* Available: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c=country=58 (Accessed 8 May 2006).

³⁰ Bonn (2001): 40.

³¹ Bonn (2001): 40.

³² Bonn (2001): 40-41.

³³ UNSG (2006): 3

³⁴ UNSG (2006): 4.

- Multi-ethnic police force³⁶

Destabilizing Factors

- Recent history of high levels of discrimination; Serbian fears of reprisals
- Tensions between Albanians and Serbs, Roma; ethnically motivated "incidents"; discrimination and low freedom of movement for ethnic minorities³⁷
- Minority groups have little access to economic opportunities, social services³⁸
- Both Albanian and Serbian populations are prepared to protest if their demands are unmet³⁹
- No links between Albanians and Serbs in schools⁴⁰

Potential spoilers

- Rapid deterioration in inter-ethnic tensions

7.2.5. Economic Performance

Medium risk (5.57)

Stabilizing Factors

- Renewed privatization efforts⁴¹
- Positive trends: tax collection, fall in deflation, regional agreements, local reforms, increased investments⁴²
- Cooperating with international institutions, making some progress, reforms⁴³

Destabilizing Factors

- Problems with privatization⁴⁴
 - Serbia opposed to privatising, claiming Serbs are not receiving their due share
- Poor economic conditions: low and falling export levels, rising import levels, rising

³⁵ UNSG (2006): 8.

³⁶ Minorities at Risk (2003) 1

³⁷ UNHCR (2005) 2.

³⁸ UNHCR (2005) 3.

³⁹ UNDP (2005) *Early warning report*. 2.

⁴⁰ ICG (2006) 5.

⁴¹ UNDP (2005) *Early warning report*. 24 and UNSG (2006): 4.

⁴² UNDP (2005) *Early warning report*. 1, 17.

⁴³ European Union (2005) Progress Report. Available: http://www.delscg.cec.eu.int/en/eu_and_fry/key_documents/documents/2005%20sec_1423_final_en_progress_report_kosovo.pdf (Accessed 11 May 2006).

⁴⁴ UNDP (2005) *Early warning report*. 17.

trade deficit, deflation, high and rising unemployment (49%), poor municipal tax collection⁴⁵

- High spending on public service; monopolies burdening the economy⁴⁶

Potential spoilers

- Price shocks on key imports, such as oil
- Rapid increase in unemployment

7.2.6. International Linkages

Medium risk (5.76)

Stabilizing Factors

- Growing feeling that the Kosovo issue needs to be resolved⁴⁷
- International community clearly opposed to the partition of Kosovo
- KFOR continuing to provide security and assistance
- High amounts of international aid⁴⁸
- International praise for democratic maturation⁴⁹
- Demonstrated cooperation with ICTY; 2005 Peaceful surrender of Prime Minister Haradinaj to the ICTY⁵⁰

Destabilizing Factors

- Border demarcation with Macedonia still not resolved
- Criticism of KFOR, UNMIK
- International reluctance to start Kosovo status negotiations
- Disagreement among Contact Group as to Kosovo's future
- Variety of states, individuals pushing for Kosovo independence
- Uncertainty of Serbia's EU membership

⁴⁵ UNDP (2005) *Early warning report*. 1, 17 – 24.

⁴⁶ ICG (2006) 5.

⁴⁷ The previous view was known as "standards before status" whereby Kosovo and its institutions needed to reach certain standards before discussions would be launched regarding its future status. Freedom House (2005) 2.

⁴⁸ United Nations Development Program (UNDP). (2004) Millennium Development Goals Baseline Report for Kosovo. Available: <http://www.kosovo.undp.org/MDG/MDG-English-Version.pdf> (Accessed 13 May 2006): 23. Hereafter UNDP (2004) *Millennium Development Goals*.

⁴⁹ See for instance UNSG (2006): 7.

⁵⁰ European Union (2005).

- Poor relationships between Serbia and neighbours⁵¹

Potential spoilers

- Violence directed towards KFOR
- Worsening relationship between Serbia and international community
- Russia intensifies its support of Serbia's retention of Kosovo
- Albania, other nations make inflammatory statements regarding Kosovo's future status

7.2.7. Environmental Stress

Low risk (2.33)

Stabilizing Factors

- PISG adoption of Law on Environmental Protection

Destabilizing Factors

- Poor environmental condition: industrial pollutants, lack of protection, remnants of 1999 conflict, little waste collection⁵²

Potential spoilers

- Natural disaster

7.2.8. Demographic Stress

Medium risk (4.59)

Stabilizing Factors

Destabilizing Factors

- Predicted increase in population⁵³
- Youth bulge (60% of population under 25)⁵⁴ and high youth unemployment (71.6%)⁵⁵

Potential spoilers

- Youth protest, rioting over unemployment

7.2.9. Human Development

⁵¹ ICG (2006) p6.

⁵² UNDP (2004) *Millennium Development Goals*. 21.

⁵³ UNDP (2004) *Millennium Development Goals*. 8.

⁵⁴ Minorities at Risk (2003) *Millennium Development Goals*. 3.

⁵⁵ UNDP (2004) *Millennium Development Goals*. 23.

Medium risk (6.35)

Stabilizing Factors

- Primary education is a universal right; rise in school enrolment since 2000⁵⁶
- Increased activity by women, particularly to address gender inequality and within institutions and politics⁵⁷
- Low HIV/AIDS level⁵⁸

Destabilizing Factors

- High illiteracy, low quality education⁵⁹
- Gender inequalities: low institutional female representation, women are economically disadvantaged⁶⁰
- Tuberculosis problem⁶¹

Potential spoilers

- Major problems with service provision

⁵⁶ UNDP (2004) *Millennium Development Goals*. 9.

⁵⁷ UNDP (2004) *Millennium Development Goals*. 11-12

⁵⁸ UNDP (2004) *Millennium Development Goals*. 19.

⁵⁹ UNDP (2004) *Millennium Development Goals*. 9.

⁶⁰ UNDP (2004) *Millennium Development Goals*. 11-12.

⁶¹ UNDP (2004) *Millennium Development Goals*. 20.




8. Events Data: Trends and Analysis

8.1. Summary

Table 3. Overall statistics

	Total number of events	Average event score	Average score as a percent of total possible (9)
All	637	-.25	-3%
Stabilizing	329	3.5	39%
Destabilizing	308	-3.9	-43%

Table 4. Overall event trends

	All events	Stabilizing events	Destabilizing events
Weekly aggregate	Strongly positive 	Moderately positive 	Moderately positive 

Between 24 October 2005 and 2 May 2006, 637 events were recorded for the Kosovo region. The overall statistics from this 28 week period show that on average, events tend to be destabilizing, but at a low level. The period experienced positive trends among both stabilizing and destabilizing events, resulting in a strongly positive trend overall. The first reason for this trend is the fact that there has simply been an increase in stabilizing events as well as a decrease in destabilizing events. The second reason is that the first few weeks of the period experienced a large number of highly destabilizing events. Thus, not only has Kosovo experienced a rise in stabilizing events, but there has been a reduction in the number and magnitude of destabilizing events.

The main source of this trend lies in the Armed Conflict, Governance and Political Stability and International Linkages clusters. This is unsurprising, given the onset and continuation of the Kosovo Future Status Talks as well as the lack of violent events in the second half of the period. Economic Performance, however, presents cause for concern, given that it demonstrated a generally negative trend, despite its overall positive scores. This occurred largely due to an increase in destabilizing events – such as capital withdrawal – and a fall in the magnitude of stabilizing events. International Linkages is also an area that needs to be closely monitored; it does demonstrate a slightly positive overall situation and status quo-to-moderately positive trend, but this is due to improvements among destabilizing events. Stabilizing events exhibit slightly negative trends, and so an increase in number or magnitude of destabilizing events would prove damaging. Overall, Kosovo would greatly benefit from an increase in stabilizing events, particularly of greater magnitude (such as better cooperation between the negotiating parties). This would undoubtedly reduce the conflict potential in Kosovo, but for now the political situation is generally improving.

Events are accurate as of May 2, 2006

8.2. Primary Drivers




Primary drivers are those clusters that contain more than twenty-five events. These clusters are the main areas of activity in the region, with the greatest contribution to the overall trend.

8.2.1. Armed Conflict

Table 5. Armed Conflict statistics

	Total number of events	Average score	Average score % of possible 9
All	34	-4	-44%
Stabilizing	4	5	56%
Destabilizing	30	-6	-67%

Table 6. Armed Conflict event trends

	All events	Stabilizing events	Destabilizing events
Weekly aggregate	Moderately positive 	Moderately positive 	Moderately positive 

Despite a somewhat highly negative average event score, the Armed Conflict cluster demonstrates some measure of improvement for Kosovo. The trend is moderately positive across all events. This is largely due to a number of highly destabilizing events earlier in the six month period, including the emergence and threats from a number of paramilitary groups. The threats did not materialize, and so the Armed Conflict situation demonstrated an improvement.

Overview of Stabilizing Events

- Detention of suspects as response to at least one incident
- Some Serbs returning

Overview of Destabilizing Events




- Violence towards ethnic Serbs and their property, including Orthodox Church
- Emergence of a new radical groups Black Shadow, Kosovo Independence Army; threaten violence, demand portions of Serbia
- Conflict between anti-UN protestors, police

8.2.2. Governance and Political Instability

Table 7. Governance and Political Instability statistics

	Total number of events	Average score	Average score % of possible 9
All	204	-1	-11%
Stabilizing	76	3.8	42%
Destabilizing	128	-4	-44%

Table 8. Governance and Political Instability event trends

	All events	Stabilizing events	Destabilizing events
Weekly aggregate	Moderately positive 	Moderately positive 	Status quo 

Governance and Political Instability is similar to Armed Conflict in that the average score of events is negative, although not highly, and it demonstrates positive trends. The trend line presents a moderately positive trend. This has occurred because when the Kosovo Status Talks began six months ago, both Kosovo and Serbia continually disagreed. Since then both have tended towards making more conciliatory statements, and the inflammatory rhetoric has somewhat subsided.

Overview of Stabilizing Events

- Future status negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia begin and continue
- Ethnic Serbs express willingness to work with Agim Ceku
- Kosovo government changed without major problems
- New Kosovo government reaffirms its commitment to current borders
- Some Serbian officials hint at flexibility on independence issue
 - Public statements claiming desire to reach compromise
- Kosovar officials work towards minority rights package for ethnic Serbs
- Kosovar police force strengthened, playing larger role

- Talks initiated for January 2006
- Increased collaboration within Kosovo government, between parties
- Some evidence of positive developments in legal system
- Downplay of extremist comments indicating independence would be considered occupation

Overview of Destabilizing Events




- Negotiations falter; Serbia and Kosovo cannot agree over major issues
- Volatile political situation in Kosovo
 - Kosovo President Rugova ill; passes away; Serbian President Tadic banned from funeral
 - PM Kosumi quits; new PM is a former guerrilla (Ceku) facing Serbian war crimes charges; Serbia upset by Ceku's nomination
- Tensions continue between Serbia and Kosovo
 - Serbia continues to adamantly vocalize that it will not tolerate Kosovo independence, while Kosovo maintains its stance that only independence is sufficient
 - Cannot agree over future status of Kosovo Serbs, their governance
 - Extremist rhetoric in Serbia, claiming independent Kosovo will be considered occupied
 - No expectation of any progress from talks
- Consternation in both Kosovo and Serbian negotiating teams; disagreement, expulsion of some members
- Kosovar Serbs still unwilling to participate in Kosovo governance
- Accusations of corruption in government and local firms from Kosovo officials, UN, local media
- Roma agitate for recognition, autonomous community

8.2.3. Economic Performance

Table 9. Economic Performance statistics

	Total number of events	Average score	Average score % of possible 9
All	52	.7	8%
Stabilizing	31	3.4	38%
Destabilizing	21	-3	-33%

Table 10. Economic Performance event trends

	All events	Stabilizing events	Destabilizing events
Weekly aggregate	Moderately negative 	Status quo 	Moderately positive 

On average, events relating to economic performance were only slightly positive (+8%), reflecting the uncertain economic situation facing Kosovo. Moreover, the trend is moderately negative. This has occurred because although there have been some positive tendencies in the economy, such as continued privatisation, they have been offset by economic difficulties, such as some capital flight and general low expectation among the population. Plus, the majority of stabilizing events occurred during the first few months, whereas most of the destabilizing events took place towards the last few months.

Overview of Stabilizing Events

- Positive developments: increase in trade, agreements, privatisation
- Variety of efforts initiated to instigate economic development
- Continuation and augmentation of international assistance

Overview of Destabilizing Events




- Serb complaint that they are not participating in privatisation
- Some investors withdrawing citing fear from threats
- Problems with organized crime
- Problems with electricity, bills unpaid
- Poor economic outlook

8.2.4. International Linkages

Table 11. International Linkages statistics

	Total number of events	Average score	Average score % of possible 9
All	328	.8	9%
Stabilizing	211	3.4	39%
Destabilizing	117	-4	-44%

Table 12. International Linkages event trends

	All events	Stabilizing events	Destabilizing events
Weekly aggregate	Moderately positive 	Moderately positive 	Moderately positive 

The international linkages cluster presents somewhat of a balanced situation that appears to be heading in a positive direction. The average score of events is positive, if not highly so (9%). Although destabilizing events had a stronger average score, there were more stabilizing events in total, which offset the strength of the destabilizing events. The trend is positive due in large part to the reduction in number and value of destabilizing events at the international level. Following the initiation of the Kosovo status talks, there was discord between the international community and Serbia over Kosovo’s status. Such discord, although still present, receded somewhat from public discussion during the subsequent months. There was a flare in tensions near the end of January and early February due to international statements supporting Kosovo’s independence. However, this did not have a lasting impact and was sufficiently offset by stabilizing events, as demonstrated by the overall improving trend.

There is still some need for caution when considering Kosovo’s international linkages, for three reasons. First, is the volatility of this cluster, particularly among destabilizing events; within the overall improving trend, there are many peaks and valleys, which seem to occur roughly every two weeks. The overall

improvement is constantly punctured by destabilizing periods. Second, the majority of the improvement occurred in the initial portion of the six months; the data for last few months demonstrates a substantially weaker improvement. This may indicate a future reduction in the degree of improvement. Finally, some of the recent destabilizing events in this area are caused by Serbia’s lack of cooperation with ICTY to capture and surrender Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, two war crimes suspects. This lack of cooperation has a more profound impact on Serbia and Montenegro’s political environment, but it has since spilled over into Serbia-Kosovo relations. Although it has not been a major factor yet, an analysis of the trend in Serbia and Montenegro suggests a likely worsening situation.⁶² Should the international community continue to link inadequate Serbian ICTY cooperation with Kosovo’s future status, we can expect to see a worsening trend within the international linkages cluster for Kosovo.

Aside from these caveats, should this cluster area continue along its current path, one would expect to see a better overall environment of international linkages.

Overview of Stabilizing Events

- International community decides to begin talks on Kosovo’s future status
- Status talks garner significant positive international attention
 - Support for the new Kosovo government
 - Neighbours reaffirm commitment to current borders
 - NATO strengthens, maintains security presence
 - EU preparations to increase its presence
 - Russia and China agree to not block a ‘new’ Kosovo
 - Pressure on Serbia and Kosovo to work together for a solution
 - Regional actors remain supportive and are not pushing their own interests

⁶² See CIFP (2006) *Sub-national Report for The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro: Events, Forecasting and Analysis*.

Sub-national Report for Kosovo: Events, Forecasting and Analysis

- Downplay of international comments indicating independence as predetermined
- International assistance on reforms, such as curbing criminal activity
- International pressure on Kosovo to support minority rights
- Praise for PISG attempts to integrate Kosovo Serbs

Overview of Destabilizing Events

- Disharmony in international community over future status
 - Some statements by individual officials in region, Contact Group indicating inevitable independence, violability of borders

- Russia refuses independence
- Serb frustration with international community
 - Accuses UN of supporting separatists
 - Upset over comments by regional, international actors that indicate support for Kosovo independence
 - Upset by Interpol revoking Ceku warrant
- International criticism of Serbia
 - UN accuses Serbia of blocking refugee return
 - Lack of Mladic capture triggers suggestion that Kosovo independence will be imposed
- Some states fear escalating tensions in Kosovo, request stronger NATO presence
- Children harmed with tear gas during NATO exercise

8.3. Secondary Drivers

Secondary drivers are those clusters with less than twenty-five monitored events. These clusters provide supplementary information to the overall analysis.

8.3.1. Militarization

Militarization events were stabilizing for the most part. These events come in the form of enhanced security and military reforms, where there is significant room for improvement. Should this cluster become a primary driver through an increase other security reforms, it could offer Kosovo further stabilization.

8.3.2. Population Heterogeneity

Population heterogeneity portrays an unstable environment, indicative of the poor relations between Albanians and Serbs in the region. Despite some positive events, there were several graffiti incidents, and the Orthodox Church continued to issue inflammatory statements. This suggests that although during this period there was no outright ethnic conflict, tensions are festering. This is largely because many of the tensions have transferred into the Governance and Political Instability cluster. However, these tensions could transfer back into Population Heterogeneity, resulting in an increase in destabilizing ethnic events. And given Population Heterogeneity's high risk level, it could experience a rapid deterioration if the overall situation worsens or a significant trigger event occurs.

8.3.3. Environmental Stress

Environmental stress events during this period were in the latter half, relating to the avian flu and were generally balanced. There was some initial fear among the population, which was then downplayed by Prime Minister Ceku.

8.3.4. Demographic Stress

Demographic stress continues to be a significant structural risk factor in Kosovo. Due to the continued problems of a high youth bulge and youth unemployment, this cluster could provide trigger events in the future.

8.3.5. Human Development

Human development events were generally negative during this period. The main area of concern was related to the health conditions facing the Roma population, their initial refusal to relocate for health reasons, and the poor availability of heating and electricity in general.

Part C: Annex

9. Summary of Data

Table 13. Overall data

Risk indicator	All events		Stabilizing events		Destabilizing events	
	Trend	Avg.	Trend	Avg.	Trend	Avg.
Medium risk (6.25)	1.12	-.25	.73	3.5	.39	-3.9

Table 14. Data for primary drivers

Cluster	Risk indicator	All events		Stabilizing events		Destabilizing events	
		Trend	Avg.	Trend	Avg.	Trend	Avg.
Armed Conflict	High risk (7.13)	.40	-4	.2	5	.19	-6
Governance and Political Instability	High risk (8.79)	.61	-1	.38	3.8	.03	-4
Economic Performance	Medium risk (5.57)	-.18	.7	-.09	3.4	-.14	-3
International Linkages	Medium risk (5.76)	.29	.8	.20	3.4	.15	-4

Table 15. Data for Secondary Drivers

Cluster	Risk indicator	
Militarization	High risk	(8.53)
Population Heterogeneity	High risk	(7.33)
Environmental Stress	Low risk	(2.33)
Demographic Stress	Medium risk	(4.59)
Human Development	Medium risk	(6.35)

10. Trend Line Charts

10.1. All events




Figure 2. Chart of trend lines for all events and the count of events by week

10.2. Stabilizing events




Figure 3. Chart of trend lines for stabilizing events and the count of events by week

10.3. Destabilizing events




Figure 4. Chart of trend lines for destabilizing events and the count of events by week

11. Maps



Figure 5. Map of Kosovo from the International Crisis Group

12. Bibliography

12.1. Event Sources

Events were obtained using Google Alerts (<http://www.google.com/alerts>), which provided a daily summary of news reports for the search term 'Kosovo'. The news reports originated from a wide variety of local and international sources, including:

- ABC News
- Agency of Information - Macedonia
- Agenzia Giornalistica Italia
- airforcetimes.com
- AKI - Rome
- Albania.com
- ArmyTimes.com
- Athens News Agency
- B92 (Serbian radio)
- Bahrain News Agency - Bahrain
- Balkan Update
- BBC News
- Black Enterprises
- Bucharest Daily News
- Bulgarian News Network
- BusinessWeek
- FENA - Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Financial times
- Focus News (Sofia, Google Alert)
- Forbes
- Fort Worth Star Telegram-Fort Worth, TX
- Georgetown University The Hoya - Washington
- Hindu - India
- Houston Chronicle
- ICRC
- Institute for War and Peace Reporting
- Institutional Investor - New York
- Interfax Russia, Moscow
- International Herald Tribune
- Islamic Republic News Agency - Tehran
- ISN - Zurich, Switzerland
- ITAR-TASS-Moscow
- Journal of Turkish Weekly
- Kathimerini - Athens, Greece. Kim Info Service - Serbia and Montenegro
- Monsters and critics - Glasgow
- NBC
- KosovaLive
- Kosovareport
- Macedonian Press Agency - Greece
- Mainichi Daily News - Japan
- Makfax - Skopije, Macedonia
- Canada.com
- Cellular-News
- China Post
- Civil Georgia
- Cleveland Plain Dealer - Cleveland, OH, USA
- CRI - Beijing, China
- Czech news agency
- Daily Journal Caracas
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- Prensa Latina - Havana, Cuba
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- Regnum news agency - Russia
- Reliefweb
- Reporter - Athens, Greece
- Reuters
- RIA Novosti - Moscow
- Scotsman UK
- Seattle Post Intelligencer
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- Slovenia Business Week - Slovenia
- Southeast European Times - MD,USA
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- Stratfor USA
- Stuff.co.nz - New Zealand
- Swissinfo
- Taipai Times - Taiwan
- Telecom Paper
- Thanh Nien Daily
- Town Hall-Washington
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- Turkish Press
- UN News Centre
- United Press International
- UNPO (The Hague)

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13. Methodology

13.1. Description of Events Monitoring

Event trends are assessed using the slope of time-series trend lines that are provided by plotting event data over a given period of time. First, based on the context of the region as described by the Background, Stakeholders and Risk Indicators sections, events are identified as being generally stabilizing or destabilizing⁶³ and given a sign of either +1 (stabilizing) or -1 (destabilizing). Events are then coded on a scale of 1 to 3 for three dimensions: the degree to which they can be linked to the risk of future peace or conflict – Causality (Ca); whether the event is typical or constitutes an acceleration of events – Escalation (Es); and the degree to which the event affects relevant stakeholders– Centrality (Ce). Causality and Escalation are coded based on a qualitative analysis of the event considered within the context of the region's risk indicators. Centrality is coded using a quantitative analysis of the proportion of stakeholders affected by the event.

A conflict indicator statistic is then calculated by summing the three dimensions of an event (Ca+Es+Ce), and multiplying it by the sign to provide a stabilizing indicator of +3 to +9 and a destabilizing indicator of -3 to -9. The analyst can use this conflict indicator to explore summary statistics as well as trend lines of the region's events.

Summary statistics provide the analyst with an overview of the average event scores. The total number of events and the average conflict indicator statistics are calculated, including sub-calculations by sign. For the average scores, a percentage is calculated based on the highest score for that conflict indicator statistic. For

instance, an average Ca+Es+Ce can score as high (or low) as +/- 9, so a score of +/- 2 achieves a percentage of +/- 22%. Positive percentages are indicative of an environment that on average experiences stabilizing events, as there are either more stabilizing events or more strongly valued stabilizing events. Negative percentages indicate the opposite, an environment characterized by destabilizing events. The closer the percentage comes to +/- 100% the better (or worse) events tend to be.

The second avenue of analysis is via trend lines to observe whether the events demonstrate any positive or negative trend over time. The conflict indicators are plotted against time – usually six months – and trend lines are generated, based on ordinary least squares regression, and compared in two different ways. The first comparison, the individual event trend line, plots the conflict indicators of each event over time. This is useful in that it indicates whether and to what degree the individual event conflict indicators have a positive or negative trend over time. However, it does not account for an increase or decrease in the total *number* of events, so the second trend analysis is that of the weekly aggregate. To attain this trend line, the conflict indicators are first summed by week; for instance, if one week has four events with the conflict indicators of +2, +2, -2 and -2, the overall weekly aggregate would be 0, the stabilizing weekly aggregate would be +4 and the destabilizing weekly aggregate would be -4. The weekly aggregate is then plotted over time to produce a trend line that incorporates the theory that an increase or decrease in total number of events should matter in addition to their changing value. That is, one would presume that a rapid increase in the number of stabilizing events would






⁶³ Note that in some unique cases an event will be coded as both stabilizing and destabilizing.

indicate an improving trend, even if the conflict indicators for the individual events remain largely unchanged.

Taken together, these two trend analyses provide an overview of the general event developments over the previous months. In the analysis, both stabilizing and destabilizing trend lines reflect

improvements through positive slopes, indicating the reduction in conflict vulnerability. On the other hand, negative slopes denote a deteriorating situation – an increase in conflict vulnerability. The degree of improvement or deterioration is identified as status quo, moderate, or strong, based on the slope and according to the following chart:

Table 16. Matrix of Trend Magnitudes and associated symbols

Trend Magnitude	Strongly Negative	Moderately Negative	Status quo	Moderately Positive	Strongly Positive
Slope size	Below -1	Between -1 and -.1	Between -.1 and .1	Between +.1 and +1	Over +1
Symbol					

Finally, scenarios are created for best case, worst case and status quo situations, based on an analysis of overall and cluster summary statistics and trends. The best and worst cases consider the trends among stabilizing and destabilizing events. The best case assumes that the strongest of the positive trends will hold for the future time period, and the worst case assumes that the strongest of the negative trends will occur. This holds regardless of whether the positive (or negative) trend occurs among destabilizing (or stabilizing) events. For instance, if there is strongly positive trend among destabilizing events, this trend would be used to extrapolate events for the best case scenario. If there is a strongly negative trend among stabilizing events, this trend would be used for the worst case. The status quo, on the other hand, will extrapolate future tendencies based on the overall trend. For instance, if there is moderate overall improvement, then the status quo assumes that this is

the trend for the future. Events are then surmised based on these trends in order to provide a conjectured future case.

Each case concludes by estimating the region’s future capacity to absorb damaging events and take advantage of peace-building opportunities by forecasting the best, worst or status quo trends. The conclusion will also state the likelihood that the region will approach a higher or lower risk level; this analysis is based on whether the current risk level is already near a lower or higher category and the magnitude of the trend under consideration. For example, a medium-risk region of 3.6 with a strongly positive trend line is likely to move into the low risk level. Alternatively, a medium-risk region of 6.4 with a weak trend line is unlikely to move into the low risk level, but it could move into a high risk level with a moderately deteriorating trend.

13.2. Description of Events Data Collection

Events were collected in one of two methods for this study.

In most cases, the news-parsing technology of Google-Alerts (www.google.com/alerts) was employed to scan and collect daily reports of events data reported by the international press about the particular sub-national region of interest. Search terms were identified by the sub-national region itself and as a result of the stakeholder analysis (if one actor or group tended to garner a significant amount of press but not necessarily reported in the same news stories as the name of the sub-national region); in some cases, alternate spellings and transliterations were used as search terms to ensure a more robust set of data. News reports were then delivered to

analysts as daily emails (if news events were found for that day) which were then coded into a Microsoft Access Database using the methodology described above.

The other method by which data was gathered for this study was to collect the data post-facto. Some sub-national regions' data was collected only partially using Google-Alerts so a more robust reassessment of the monitoring time period was required. To do this, analysts employed a LexisNexis search for the monitoring period and using the same search parameters as had been used with Google-Alerts. The events collected using this methodology are identical in type to the daily digest-type – the only difference is the timing in which the analysts coded the events was not continuous.