

Failed and Fragile States 2006

A Briefing Note for the Canadian Government

November 2006

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About CIFP

Since 1997, CIFP has been working with the Canadian government and its international partners to develop effective policies for responding to intrastate conflict. In the last five years, CIFP has broadened the scope of its activities beyond its initial focus on country level, structural indicator-based conflict risk assessment. The project has developed a private sector component, which includes a methodology for evaluating the role that companies play in and around conflict. Training is another capability CIFP has sought to develop. The project has been engaged in a number of training exercises aimed at teaching analysts, typically in developing countries but also within Canada, how to employ an integrated risk assessment and early warning methodology.

In 2005, the project embarked on an initiative in response to the significant challenge posed by fragile and failing states, particularly in the face of continuing emphasis on streamlining aid effectiveness. In addition to assisting the development community identify, assess, and monitor fragile states, CIFP is addressing the government's need for guidance and best practices on focusing their efforts, identifying lead departments, relevancy of instruments and competence, as well as impact assessment and evaluation. The peer review process inherent to the academic discipline of a University like Carleton and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA) can expose practices and methods in government to the leading edge of applied research in political science.

CIFP Work to Date

- ◆ **Phase 1:** During the initial stage of the project, the first set of conflict risk assessment indicators was identified, a web presence was established, and partnership and outreach activities were initiated (1997-1999).
- ◆ **Phase 2:** The initial conflict risk assessment template was developed; networking and other activities were also solidified. CIFP's relationship with the FEWER network led to a pilot project implemented in two regions to test the CIFP methodology and the development and operationalization of CIFP's training techniques (1999-2000).
- ◆ **Phase 3:** The third phase of the project should be understood as a strengthening and consolidation phase. The project's web presence was revised to make it more user friendly, several risk assessment reports were generated, CIFP expanded its outreach and training activities and number of training sessions were conducted (2001-2003).
- ◆ **Phase 4:** Phase four can be considered a phase of consolidation and development. CIFP team members are actively engaged in networking and outreach activities to strengthen existing partnerships and explore new opportunities. CIFP has introduced a new division into its structure designed to expand its activities and clientele in the private sector. Increased awareness has enhanced CIFP's reputation as a valuable source of information and research and an increase in the demand for training workshops (2003-present). CIFP's unique methodology for the identification and analysis of conflict potential makes it a leader in the field of risk assessment. Our goal is to facilitate informed and timely decision-making in foreign policy and business and serve as an educational tool for those working in the field of conflict prevention. To fulfill these objectives, CIFP engages in a continuously expanding range of activities: collecting and analysing data; conducting research; producing risk assessment reports, watchlists, and country briefs; and engaging in regional, national, and sub-national monitoring. Over the last four years, over three thousand individuals, organizations, think tanks and Universities have registered on the project's website.

Executive Summary

The Fragile States Monitoring and Assessment Project is a research endeavour of Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP), undertaken with support from the Canadian international Development Agency (CIDA). It is intended to provide evidence-based decision support to government programming in fragile states. It is also a response to the growing international consensus that without an understanding of both the fundamental source(s) of fragility in a state and a carefully considered strategy to address those underlying concerns, international engagement is likely to be at best ineffective and at worst counter-productive. As part of that effort, this document fulfills four objectives:

- First, it presents the initial results of the project, identifying the states most likely to require broad international engagement.
- Second, it presents a detailed assessment tool to aid government programming in specific fragile states. These country fragility profiles provide information regarding the particular sources of instability, enabling more effective development and whole of government strategies.
- Third, the document identifies countries that require further in-depth monitoring, a task to be accomplished using the CIFP event-monitoring capability.
- Finally, the document presents initial statistical research results regarding the nature of the relationship between state fragility and selected key variables. These include level of income, human development, gender empowerment, quantity of international assistance, regime type, income inequality, and human rights.

These statistical results demonstrate direct statistical links between stability and development, income, and gender empowerment. They also provide some insight into the more complex relationships between human rights, democracy, and stability. These latter relationships do not appear to be simply linear, but rather curvilinear, in nature. It is possible that there is an inverted 'U' relationship between stability and both regime type and level of human rights.


With its use of authority, legitimacy, and capacity (ALC) as the fundamental components of CIFP's structural assessment methodology, this briefing note seeks to demonstrate the utility of these concepts in the context of a comprehensive explanatory framework, particularly their considerable potential to effectively approach questions of state fragility. The results contained in this note constitute strong validation of the ALC framework, demonstrating its value as part of an evidence-based assessment tool.

Directions for future work include research into the exact causal relationship between various key indicators, including the complex interrelationships between security, development, trade, and stability. Such research touches on elements of importance to all aspects of Canada's whole-of-government approach to state fragility. Within the scope of the immediate project, next steps include the further development and operationalization of its event monitoring and program assessment capabilities. Once complete, the project will have produced a suite of tools capable of providing support and guidance through all stages of government policy formation in areas of fragile states – from initial assessment, to monitoring, to policy formulation and evaluation.

The 5 top fragile states											
Country	Fragility Index	ALC Scores			Cross-cutting Theme	Indicator Clusters					
		A	L	C		Gender	Governance	Economics	Security and Crime	Human Development	Demography
Burundi	8.25	8.04	7.58	8.65	7.42	7.18	8.08	9.17	8.89	7.25	8.00
Congo (Kinshasa)	8.11	7.93	7.58	8.49	7.72	7.67	6.93	9.15	9.70	7.35	5.47
Afghanistan	7.89	9.06	8.42	6.68	..	9.56	6.00	9.53	7.78	7.57	4.33
Somalia	7.86	7.53	8.41	7.82	..	8.90	8.42	7.18	8.51	7.34	7.13
Liberia	7.84	6.18	8.82	8.64	8.52	9.22	7.58	7.20	8.91	6.78	5.40

Section I: Introduction

This fragile state briefing note, the first of its kind, fulfills four related objectives. First, it presents the initial results of the Fragile States Monitoring and Assessment Project undertaken by Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP). CIFP has been tasked by the Canadian international Development Agency (CIDA) to assist in the development of a number of wide-ranging tools that encompass, among other things, the monitoring, forecasting and evaluation of failed and fragile states, as well as the assessment of supporting policies intended to address the challenges they represent. The following diagram outlines the full extent of the CIFP analytical framework – known as the CIFP Net Assessment (CNA) – identifying the various modules involved in the analysis.



This report focuses on aspects of the CNA related to the structural assessment of fragile states. A concept paper produced by CIFP in January 2006 provides a more detailed outline of other project elements; further details regarding the nature and scope of the project may be found there.

The results in this note include a detailed and multi-dimensional ranking of the most fragile states in the world today. These lists provide a sound basis for policy decisions regarding resource allocation, providing quantitative information to CIDA and to other relevant elements of the Canadian Government such as the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) as they struggle to allot finite resources among the many countries in need of assistance.

More generally, the document identifies the states most likely to require broad

international engagement in coming years, information of crucial importance to the Department of National Defence (DND) and other government agencies as they outline long range procurement and recruitment strategies.

Second, it presents a detailed assessment methodology for evaluating individual country performance. This drill-down capability provides guidance to programming officers at CIDA and other government departments working in complex and fragile environments, enabling them to focus their efforts and resources on the root structural causes of fragility rather than the outward symptoms of the problem. At the same time, it allows them to avoid decisions likely to further destabilize the country through otherwise unforeseen consequences of programming activities.

Third, the document identifies countries that require further in-depth monitoring, a task to be accomplished using the event-monitoring capability that CIFP developed as a separate component of the CNA framework. Finally, the document presents initial statistical research results regarding the nature of the relationship between state fragility and selected key variables. These include level of income, human development, gender empowerment, quantity of international assistance, regime type, income inequality, and human rights. The findings included here are a first cut; they are intended to be provocative and indicative rather than definitive, pointing out potential relationships between fragility and various potential causes and identifying directions for future research.

CIFP analysis of state fragility begins with the understanding that, to function effectively, any state must exhibit three fundamental properties: authority, legitimacy, and capacity. Weakness along any of these dimensions can be sufficient to destabilize a country, requiring specific types of intervention by international donors. With its use of this 'ALC' framework in its structural assessment, this report introduces these concepts to the lexicon of fragile state analysis. It seeks to demonstrate their utility in the context of a comprehensive explanatory framework, particularly their considerable

potential to effectively approach questions of state fragility.

In evaluating these three dimensions of 'stateness', the CIFP fragility index provides a robust assessment tool that is policy relevant. The results contained in this note constitute strong initial validation of the ALC framework, demonstrating its value as part of an evidence-based assessment methodology. Placed within the broader context of CIFP's Net Assessment methodology, it provides a sturdy structural foundation for subsequent modules of the methodology, including continuous event monitoring, and evaluation of policy impact and relevance.

A further outcome of the project is the additional definition it brings to discussions regarding the global distribution of highly fragile states. A cursory examination of the list of fragile states (see table 2) suggests that, as one might expect, many of the most fragile are found in Africa. However, that distribution becomes less definitive as one examines specific results along the dimensions of authority, legitimacy, and capacity (see table 3).

African states predominate among states facing the greatest challenges in state capacity; Haiti is the only non-African state among the top twenty. The states with significant gaps in authority and legitimacy are a more diverse group, however. Afghanistan, Belarus, Haiti, Nepal, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Yemen all appear among the twenty states with the greatest problems of legitimacy. Importantly, this is NOT equivalent to saying that such states are illegitimate. Rather, it is a finding that reflects the problems created in these states by unstable governance, a lack of human security, poor human rights records, opaque government, and/or high levels of gender inequality.

In terms of authority, Afghanistan, Iraq, Colombia, and others join African states such as Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Sudan on the list of states facing the gravest challenges to state authority. With governments in these states unable to exercise full control over their own territory, they continue to experience high levels of violence within

their borders; many continue to face active and violent insurgencies.

Other key findings within the document include the initial statistical analyses summarized in section V. These results demonstrate direct statistical links between stability and development, income, and gender empowerment. They also provide some insight into the more complex relationships between stability and human rights and democracy. Though the latter both appear related to country stability in some way, the relationships do not appear to be simply linear, but rather curvilinear, in nature. It is possible that, as in the literature on conflict, there is an inverted 'U' relationship between stability and both regime type and level of human rights.

More intriguing still is the seemingly untidy relationship between international aid flows and state fragility. With virtually no correlation between levels of fragility and aid per capita, the result presents important questions regarding the extent to which the members of the OECD-DAC and the broader international community have followed through on commitments to fragile states.

Clearly, this document is one small part of a much larger undertaking. Many of the findings it presents – both the intuitive and the surprising – require extensive further research. That said, the CIFP project is a step forward in understanding state fragility and failure, and the policy approaches most likely to be effective in mitigating their effects in the short and long term.

Section II: The Index

Presented here are the initial results of CIFP's state fragility index. The current analysis uses data from more than 70 indicators that have been selected from an initial list of more than 100, with indicators selected on the basis of their relation to state fragility and their level of country coverage.

State fragility is defined as the extent to which a state can or cannot provide the basic functions of governance to its population. Broadly understood, good governance also refers to the activities of

non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society groups that play important roles within a state; accordingly, measures for these elements also appear within the index. Ultimately however, it is the presence or absence of functional government that distinguishes functional from fragile or failed states. Given this fact, state performance forms the heart of CIFP’s fragility index. Within the index, fragility is assessed along three primary dimensions – authority, legitimacy, and capacity – each of which captures a core component of a functional state. Extreme deficiency along any one of these dimensions may be enough to significantly destabilize a state, even to the point of failure. State weakness in any one of these areas is thus a cause for concern, with implications for both the stability of the country and the approach development partners must take when working to strengthen the state and its institutions.

In addition to the assessment of a state’s relative levels of authority, legitimacy, and capacity, each country profile includes a cluster-based summary of state performance. Cluster areas include governance, economics, security and crime, human development, demography, and environment.

Methodology

Like its predecessor the CIFP conflict risk index, the fragility index employs a methodology of relative assessment. In ranking state performance on a given indicator, global scores are divided into nine equal groups, and converted to a 9-point index. The best performing ninth of states receive a score of 1, the second ninth a score of 2, and so on. For example, the countries with the highest GDP per capita score a 1, while those with the lowest income score a 9.

Since relative country performance can vary significantly from year to year – as in the case of economic shocks, natural disasters, and other externalities – averages are taken for global rank scores over a five-year time frame. The most recent five years contained in the CIFP data set are used for this index. In addition, scores are modified to reflect positive or negative trend lines, as well as excessive volatility. Given the importance

of emerging trends – both positive and negative – in understanding state performance, such modifications serve to provide users with valuable additional information.¹ Once all indicators have been indexed using this method, the results for a given country are then averaged to produce its final score. In calculating particular dimensions of fragility – such as the authority component or human development cluster – only those indicators considered relevant to the particular dimension are included in the average.²

In general, a high score – 6.5 or higher – indicates that a country is performing poorly relative to other states. Such a score may be indicative of an arbitrary and autocratic government, poor economic performance, low levels of human development, or the presence of a destabilizing structural condition such as a significant youth bulge or a critical lack of arable land.

A low score – in the range of 1 to 3.5 – indicates that a country is performing well relative to others, or that a country’s structural conditions present little cause for concern. Values in the moderate 3.5 to 6.5 range indicate performance approaching the global mean.

Score	Description
1-3.5	Country performing well relative to others
3.5-6.5	Country performing at or around the median
6.5+	Country performing poorly relative to others
Highest 5%	Country among worst global performers


¹ In extreme cases, these can actually raise a given score above the nominal index maximum of 9; for instance, the West Bank and Gaza have a legitimacy score of 10.33, reflecting the difficulties successive regimes have had in the Palestinian territories both gaining and maintaining acceptance domestically and internationally.

² The selection of variables to be included in each indicator cluster or ALC dimension was made in consultation with the project’s Scientific Committee, a group of subject and policy experts formed to advise the project in matters of content and methodology.

Evaluating 'stateness' – ALC³

As stated previously, CIFP analysis of state fragility begins with the understanding that, to function effectively, any state must exhibit three fundamental properties: authority, legitimacy, and capacity. These terms are explained in detail below, along with their implications for the analysis of state fragility and failure. Obviously, they are constructs, reflecting the functions of a state and its component parts.

The three dimensions are inextricably interlinked; shortfalls in any one dimension will have implications for a given state's functionality along the other two. ALC scores provide insight into the relative fragility of a state. The results of the ALC assessment not only indicate the presence of weakness, but indicate the type and extent of that weakness, thus assisting policy makers both in the initial decision to engage and in subsequent discussions regarding the form any engagement should take.



Authority


Any functional state must possess the ability to enact binding legislation over a population. Further, that state must be able to exercise the coercive force over its national territory necessary to provide a stable and secure environment to its citizens and communities. This security is a necessary prerequisite to the realisation of public, private, and civil society interests.

States lacking in authority may be unable to exercise control over the full extent of their legal territory; such states will likely have difficulty responding effectively to

³ Discussion of ALC methodology adapted from David Carment et al., "Failed and Fragile States: A Concept Paper for the Canadian Government," CIFP, January 2006.

**Essential Properties of a State:
Authority**

The power to enact binding legislation over a population, possession of a monopoly over the legitimate use of force on national territory, and the capability to provide a stable, secure environment in which public, private and civil society interests can be realized.




threats, whether internal or external. In some areas, non-state actors such as rebel militias or criminal organizations may possess de facto authority; in others, the rule of law may be completely absent. Border control may be intermittent or non-existent, enabling illicit flows of people and goods. State response to foreign incursions may be weak and ineffective.

Other potential problems include the inability to enforce government policy, combat corruption and criminality, effectively mobilize the resources of the state towards the ends requested and required by government, regulate private markets, or guarantee contracts.

Legitimacy


Legitimacy refers to the ability of a state to command public loyalty to the governing regime, and to generate domestic support for that government's legislation and policy. Such support must be created through a voluntary and reciprocal arrangement of effective governance and citizenship founded upon principles of government selection and succession that are recognized both locally and internationally. States in which the ruling regime lacks either broad and voluntary domestic support or general international recognition suffer a lack of legitimacy. Such states face significant difficulties in

**Essential Properties of a State:
Legitimacy**



The ability of a state to generate public loyalty, support, and acceptance of citizens through a voluntary, reciprocal arrangement of effective governance and citizenship, and the international recognition thereof.

maintaining peaceful relations between and among various communities within the state; any security that exists is likely the result of coercion rather than popular consent. As a result, such states are inherently vulnerable to internal upheaval and are likely to remain fragile so long as legitimacy remains wanting.



Capacity

Capacity refers to the power of a state to mobilize public resources towards productive ends. States with a satisfactory level of capacity display a basic competence in political and economic management and administration, with governments capable of regulating domestic affairs and conducting international transactions. They also possess the basic infrastructure required of a modern state, including functional transportation and communication networks. States lacking in capacity may prove unable to respond effectively to sudden shocks such as natural disasters, epidemics, food shortages, or refugee flows. They may therefore be heavily reliant upon civil society and the international community in times of crisis.

Initial Findings

Table 2 presents a list of the 40 top fragile states as calculated by the CIFP Fragility Index. For each state, the table includes the net fragility score, ALC scores, cluster scores, and the score for the cross-cutting theme of gender.⁴ Table 3 provides a list of

⁴ Rather than isolating gender measures from other indicators in a separate cluster, CIFP includes gender indicators in calculations of all clusters whenever such information is available. Thus, measures of female employment factor into the economic score, while female political representation factors into the governance score. These varied gender scores are also averaged to produce an aggregate gender score

the 20 most fragile states within the categories of authority, legitimacy, and capacity. The results in Table 3 provide clear evidence of the multifaceted nature of state fragility. While some states display weakness along virtually all dimensions, the situation for most is more complex, with states exhibiting elements of both stability and fragility. In this context, stability refers to a state's ability to function effectively, providing essential public goods to its population.

On the basis of the fragility index, one may not only identify broad areas of relative strength or weakness, but drill down in detailed country profiles to identify the precise source of the phenomenon. This drill-down capability in turn assists in programming decisions and identifies areas or trends of concern that require further monitoring. In addition, the information provides a framework with which to evaluate policy effectiveness; this aspect of the methodology is discussed in further detail below. Ultimately, the results in tables 2 and 3 provide an important validation of the ALC framework, demonstrating its ability to capture a breadth and depth of state performance beyond that of any single indicator matrix.

The approach represents an advance in the field of structural fragility assessment. Earlier frameworks put forward by United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the UK Department for International Development (DfID) were instrumental in bringing discussions of state fragility to the forefront of international discourse; the ALC approach builds on their work, combining their insights with CIFP's refined methodology and analytical rigour.

Tables 3 and 4 clarify the diverse challenges faced by various fragile states. A number of sub-Saharan African nations face serious problems arising from limited capacity. Some countries – including Mozambique, Mali, and several others that perform relatively well in areas of authority and legitimacy – face enormous challenges in terms of state capacity. Others, such as

that 'cuts across' all clusters. Such an approach provides a high visibility to issues of gender, while avoiding the trap of 'ghettoizing' gender variables in a separate cluster.

Table 2: The 40 top fragile states											
Country	Fragility Index	ALC Scores			Cross-cutting Theme	Indicator Clusters					
		A	L	C		Gender	Governance	Economics	Security and Crime	Human Development	Demography
Burundi	8.25	8.04	7.58	8.65	7.42	7.18	8.08	9.17	8.89	7.25	8.00
Congo (Kinshasa)	8.11	7.93	7.58	8.49	7.72	7.67	6.93	9.15	9.70	7.35	5.47
Afghanistan	7.89	9.06	8.42	6.68	..	9.56	6.00	9.53	7.78	7.57	4.33
Somalia	7.86	7.53	8.41	7.82	..	8.90	8.42	7.18	8.51	7.34	7.13
Liberia	7.84	6.18	8.82	8.64	8.52	9.22	7.58	7.20	8.91	6.78	5.40
Chad	7.81	6.79	8.13	8.43	9.33	7.96	7.04	6.89	9.83	7.57	4.87
Ethiopia	7.81	7.58	7.14	8.31	7.47	6.59	7.44	8.07	8.83	8.35	6.40
Cote d'Ivoire	7.79	7.74	7.89	7.79	8.51	7.83	7.09	7.46	8.64	8.15	6.40
Eritrea	7.73	7.04	7.91	8.14	7.00	6.93	7.45	7.68	9.02	7.49	6.07
Angola	7.73	7.98	7.66	7.55	6.62	7.62	7.21	7.88	9.28	7.58	4.00
Haiti	7.72	6.81	8.53	7.94	7.27	8.32	7.24	8.05	7.95	6.90	7.67
Kenya	7.60	7.46	7.68	7.66	8.60	7.32	7.25	6.98	8.40	8.30	6.67
Rwanda	7.55	6.27	7.47	8.51	6.42	6.93	6.74	6.47	8.69	8.43	8.20
Zimbabwe	7.54	6.77	8.33	7.76	7.62	7.49	8.21	6.79	8.40	6.05	6.27
Guinea-Bissau	7.52	6.66	7.42	8.25	8.38	6.93	8.11	5.43	8.60	8.40	4.67
Sierra Leone	7.50	6.55	7.22	8.46	7.60	7.38	8.18	5.70	8.46	7.33	6.00
Congo (Brazzaville)	7.49	6.70	7.57	8.02	7.06	7.68	7.47	6.69	8.17	8.23	4.20
Sudan	7.48	7.83	7.58	7.21	7.82	7.13	6.38	9.22	8.22	6.95	6.00
West Bank and Gaza	7.41	6.69	10.33	7.50	8.30	6.85	9.08	8.16	4.78	7.00	9.00
Nepal	7.37	6.58	7.76	7.71	7.42	7.63	6.69	8.28	7.73	7.34	6.00
Nigeria	7.33	7.19	7.46	7.37	7.64	7.19	6.65	7.02	8.08	8.30	6.67
Niger	7.28	5.61	7.09	8.63	9.07	6.92	7.58	3.22	9.16	7.70	6.67
Yemen	7.27	6.59	8.32	7.31	8.93	8.00	6.56	7.44	7.20	7.63	8.33
Uganda	7.24	7.38	6.50	7.51	5.33	6.51	6.11	7.38	8.27	8.95	6.67
Central African Republic	7.17	5.47	8.19	7.97	8.33	7.91	7.49	4.96	8.58	7.23	2.67
Mauritania	7.16	5.99	7.81	7.69	9.34	7.64	6.89	5.67	8.23	6.68	6.93
Guinea	7.15	5.97	7.56	7.92	7.40	7.40	7.36	4.87	8.94	6.90	4.93
Burkina Faso	7.00	5.50	6.39	8.28	7.90	5.61	7.16	3.25	8.94	8.40	5.00
Iraq	6.94	7.52	7.50	6.15	6.42	7.60	7.80	9.38	5.53	6.30	4.33
Tanzania	6.90	6.48	6.14	7.61	6.74	5.99	6.23	5.85	9.16	7.28	5.33
Malawi	6.89	5.87	6.29	7.90	7.42	5.78	7.84	3.52	8.45	8.43	7.00
Togo	6.83	5.50	7.54	7.48	8.17	7.56	6.56	4.26	8.21	6.98	6.33
Pakistan	6.82	7.08	6.43	6.83	6.11	6.47	6.01	8.58	6.44	7.34	6.73
Madagascar	6.81	5.06	7.24	7.83	7.94	6.68	6.88	4.89	8.15	7.74	5.00
Mozambique	6.79	5.53	6.12	8.05	6.80	5.05	7.23	5.05	9.20	7.15	3.67
Myanmar (Burma)	6.79	6.96	7.15	6.47	6.25	6.75	6.96	8.81	6.75	5.20	4.73
Bangladesh	6.77	6.25	7.68	6.72	7.76	8.25	5.77	7.68	6.48	7.03	4.33
Cameroon	6.77	6.02	7.06	7.23	6.60	7.28	6.52	5.56	7.81	7.48	4.33
Mali	6.76	5.40	6.34	8.01	9.02	5.73	7.13	4.14	9.34	7.20	4.33
Laos	6.67	5.83	7.05	7.15	6.16	5.93	7.11	6.41	7.14	7.00	3.67

Colombia and Sri Lanka, score poorly in the area of authority as a result of the security challenges they face, but perform relatively well in measures of capacity and legitimacy. Still others, such as Belarus, demonstrate problems with government legitimacy even as they continue to

maintain some degree of state authority and capacity.

Similarly, certain countries face particular challenges in specific cluster areas. For instance, despite the presence of reliable governing institutions and robust economic

Table 3: Twenty most fragile states, by ALC Component

Authority		Legitimacy		Capacity	
Afghanistan	9.06	West Bank and Gaza	10.33	Burundi	8.65
Burundi	8.04	Liberia	8.82	Liberia	8.64
Angola	7.98	Haiti	8.53	Niger	8.63
Congo (Kinshasa)	7.93	Afghanistan	8.42	Rwanda	8.51
Sudan	7.83	Somalia	8.41	Congo (Kinshasa)	8.49
Cote d'Ivoire	7.74	Zimbabwe	8.33	Sierra Leone	8.46
Ethiopia	7.58	Yemen	8.32	Chad	8.43
Somalia	7.53	Swaziland	8.23	Ethiopia	8.31
Iraq	7.52	Central African Republic	8.19	Burkina Faso	8.28
Kenya	7.46	Chad	8.13	Guinea-Bissau	8.25
Uganda	7.38	Eritrea	7.91	Eritrea	8.14
Colombia	7.26	Cote d'Ivoire	7.89	Mozambique	8.05
Nigeria	7.19	Equatorial Guinea	7.82	Congo (Brazzaville)	8.02
Indonesia	7.19	Belarus	7.82	Mali	8.01
Pakistan	7.08	Mauritania	7.81	Central African Republic	7.97
Eritrea	7.04	Nepal	7.76	Haiti	7.94
Iran	7.00	Kenya	7.68	Guinea	7.92
Myanmar (Burma)	6.96	Bangladesh	7.68	Malawi	7.90
Sri Lanka	6.95	Angola	7.66	Comoros	7.86
Haiti	6.81	Congo (Kinshasa)	7.58	Madagascar	7.83

development, many small states, particularly island nations such as St. Lucia, exhibit high levels of environmental stress. While all these countries may benefit from assistance provided by members of the international community, the nature of that assistance and its method of delivery clearly will vary widely in each case.

Table 3 presents the twenty most fragile states in terms of authority, legitimacy, and capacity. While a number of states appear on more than one list, only three – the DRC, Eritrea, and Haiti – appear on all three. This intriguing fact both underscores the variety of ways in which states exhibit fragility, and demonstrates utility of the ALC methodology in isolating and clarifying those varied experiences. These three states face challenges unlike those of other developing states, with each requiring a unique approach to development, one capable of addressing the variety of challenges facing the state.

States that appear on one or two of the lists also face particular challenges that require carefully tailored policy approaches. International engagement in Iraq, Colombia, or Sri Lanka obviously must take careful note of the volatile security situations in each country. Conversely, international development programs in states such as Mali,

Mozambique, and Chad must make government capacity and human development a priority, aside from any considerations of security. Though all are in some ways fragile, all require unique policy approaches.

Table 4 provides more detailed analysis of state performance. Again the diversity between and within lists is notable, reinforcing the point that no single index can capture the full measurement of state performance. No country appears on all six lists, or even on five. While a number of countries appear on two or three lists, only a few – including Ethiopia, Somalia, and Burundi – appear on four.

The information provided by the CIFP assessment methodology identifies the particular challenges faced by each country listed in tables 3 and 4, providing invaluable information to policy makers attempting to engage these states effectively. To cite just one example, Yemen is among the top 20 states in terms of its legitimacy gap. It is also among the top 20 states in terms of governance, demography, and environment. Clearly, any development program that does not take into account all these areas of state weakness faces diminished prospects for success, as does a program that correctly identify these underlying sources of fragility, but lacks the resources to

Table 4: Twenty most fragile states, by indicator cluster					
Governance		Economics		Security and Crime	
Afghanistan	9.56	West Bank and Gaza	9.08	Afghanistan	9.53
Liberia	9.22	Somalia	8.42	Iraq	9.38
Somalia	8.90	Zimbabwe	8.21	Sudan	9.22
Haiti	8.32	Sierra Leone	8.18	Burundi	9.17
Bangladesh	8.25	Guinea-Bissau	8.11	Congo (Kinshasa)	9.15
Tonga	8.08	Burundi	8.08	Myanmar (Burma)	8.81
Saudi Arabia	8.03	Solomon Islands	7.98	Russia	8.65
Yemen	8.00	Malawi	7.84	Sri Lanka	8.62
Chad	7.96	Iraq	7.80	Pakistan	8.58
Central African Republic	7.91	Zambia	7.63	Iran	8.51
Brunei Darussalam	7.83	Comoros	7.61	Colombia	8.35
Cote d'Ivoire	7.83	Liberia	7.58	Philippines	8.31
Azerbaijan	7.82	Niger	7.58	Nepal	8.28
Lebanon	7.78	Central African Republic	7.49	West Bank and Gaza	8.16
Tajikistan	7.70	Congo (Brazzaville)	7.47	Indonesia	8.11
Congo (Brazzaville)	7.68	Eritrea	7.45	Ethiopia	8.07
Congo (Kinshasa)	7.67	Ethiopia	7.44	Haiti	8.05
Mauritania	7.64	East Timor	7.44	Angola	7.88
Kazakhstan	7.64	Guinea	7.36	Azerbaijan	7.81
Iran	7.63	Kenya	7.25	Turkey	7.77
Human Development		Demography		Environment	
Chad	9.83	Uganda	8.95	Saint Lucia	9.20
Congo (Kinshasa)	9.70	Malawi	8.43	West Bank and Gaza	9.00
Mali	9.34	Rwanda	8.43	Andorra	9.00
Angola	9.28	Burkina Faso	8.40	Bahrain	9.00
Mozambique	9.20	Guinea-Bissau	8.40	Qatar	9.00
Niger	9.16	Ethiopia	8.35	Malta	9.00
Tanzania	9.16	Kenya	8.30	Yemen	8.33
Eritrea	9.02	Nigeria	8.30	Rwanda	8.20
Guinea	8.94	Congo (Brazzaville)	8.23	Burundi	8.00
Burkina Faso	8.94	Cote d'Ivoire	8.15	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	7.70
Liberia	8.91	Ghana	7.90	Comoros	7.67
Burundi	8.89	Equatorial Guinea	7.90	Haiti	7.67
Ethiopia	8.83	Madagascar	7.74	Dominica	7.50
Rwanda	8.69	Niger	7.70	Somalia	7.13
Cote d'Ivoire	8.64	Yemen	7.63	Lebanon	7.07
Guinea-Bissau	8.60	Angola	7.58	Malawi	7.00
Central African Republic	8.58	Chad	7.57	El Salvador	7.00
Gambia	8.52	Afghanistan	7.57	Sri Lanka	7.00
Somalia	8.51	Cape Verde	7.51	Bahamas	7.00
Sierra Leone	8.46	Eritrea	7.49	Ghana	6.93

adequately address them. Simply put, policy makers must consider both the sources of fragility and the true costs associated with an effective strategy when crafting an engagement program; to do otherwise is to invite ineffective, possibly destabilizing policy.


Section III: Relevance to Policy

The following diagrams outline the potential role for CIFP fragile state analysis in government policymaking cycles. As the

previous discussion makes clear, the ALC approach allows CIFP to identify and clarify key strengths and weakness of states that Canada chooses to engage in, thereby informing government decisions regarding fragile state policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation.

The structural ALC analysis forms only one element of a much larger assessment framework. As the following diagrams indicate, the full CNA includes event monitoring, Delphic consultation of expert

opinion, as well as an assessment of potential policy relevance and effectiveness. When integrated into government decision-making processes, these elements combine to provide a rich informational resource to policy officers across all government departments.



Perhaps even more significant than the support that the CNA can provide to any individual department is the potential role it can play in facilitating whole-of-government policymaking. Current international best practice in fragile states places particular emphasis on the need for fully integrated analysis and engagement in fragile states. To be effective, government policy must be coordinated across all relevant departments; moreover, that policy must be informed by timely and comprehensive risk assessment. With a shared understanding of both the nature of the problems facing a given state and the likely solution to those problems, Canadian engagement is likely to be more effective.




Table 5 provides results for CIDA's 25 development partners, as well as the five fragile states that CIDA has committed to support. Table 6 provides a similar assessment for priority countries identified as potential stabilization targets.

Collectively, the countries represent an extremely diverse group both geographically and in terms of country performance; it is not mere rhetoric to say that the challenges facing Bolivia (a CIDA development partner) are worlds apart from those confronting the DRC or Sri Lanka. The framework thus enables all elements of the Canadian government to target the root causes of fragility in each case, rather than focusing on particular symptoms of the problem.

Further, regional analyses, such as those included in Table 7, highlight potential complications arising from regional instability. Such analyses are crucial if Canada is to realize the greatest possible impact in its areas of engagement. One need only think of Western Africa or the Great Lakes region to see how the most determined efforts by the international community in a given country may be overwhelmed by instability in its neighbours. Many sources of instability – including refugee flows, environmental threats, epidemics, drought, famine, and transnational crime – tend to have regional or even global dimensions. To ensure a lasting positive impact on its developing partners, CIDA must anticipate such regional complications and adapt its programming accordingly.

Related to the issue of regional dimensions of fragility is the question of assessing the impact of current and potential international actors on fragile state development. Any attempt to analyze CIDA's potential contribution to development in a given fragile state must consider the role played any state government or powerful non-state group operating inside the borders, whether that role is benign or malign to the goals of state stability and poverty alleviation. Though measures of international involvement in fragile states do appear in the index, such complex issues require greater analytical depth than can be provided by structural analysis. As a result, CIFP net assessment includes a qualitative analysis of the role played by key stakeholders, both domestic and external, critically appraising the extent to which their involvement may compliment or potentially undermine CIDA-sponsored

Table 5: CIDA Development Priorities											
Country	Fragility Index	ALC Scores			Cross-cutting Theme	Indicator Clusters					
		A	L	C		Gender	Govern-ance	Econ-omics	Security and Crime	Human Develop-ment	Demo-graphy
CIDA Development Partners											
The Americas											
Honduras	6.25	6.00	6.60	6.26	5.89	6.69	6.11	6.38	6.46	5.48	5.53
Nicaragua	5.94	5.07	6.12	6.47	5.53	5.94	6.48	4.62	6.31	6.33	5.00
Bolivia	5.86	5.68	5.91	5.98	4.77	6.32	6.46	5.87	5.34	6.00	3.07
Guyana	5.00	5.39	5.08	4.69	5.44	4.73	5.99	4.01	5.14	4.90	2.33
Asia											
Pakistan	6.82	7.08	6.43	6.83	6.11	6.47	6.01	8.58	6.44	7.34	6.73
Bangladesh	6.77	6.25	7.68	6.72	7.76	8.25	5.77	7.68	6.48	7.03	4.33
Indonesia	6.36	7.19	6.05	5.89	5.18	6.54	6.45	8.11	5.11	6.08	5.67
Cambodia	6.35	5.59	6.37	6.85	5.46	6.96	5.52	6.27	7.40	6.35	4.00
Sri Lanka	6.06	6.95	5.83	5.48	6.00	6.05	6.03	8.62	4.25	5.20	7.00
Viet Nam	5.60	5.75	5.45	5.57	3.45	5.41	5.28	6.07	5.78	5.97	4.40
Eastern Europe											
Ukraine	5.60	6.07	7.17	4.53	6.54	7.53	6.00	7.05	4.19	3.40	3.00
Sub Saharan Africa											
Ethiopia	7.81	7.58	7.14	8.31	7.47	6.59	7.44	8.07	8.83	8.35	6.40
Kenya	7.60	7.46	7.68	7.66	8.60	7.32	7.25	6.98	8.40	8.30	6.67
Rwanda	7.55	6.27	7.47	8.51	6.42	6.93	6.74	6.47	8.69	8.43	8.20
Niger	7.28	5.61	7.09	8.63	9.07	6.92	7.58	3.22	9.16	7.70	6.67
Burkina Faso	7.00	5.50	6.39	8.28	7.90	5.61	7.16	3.25	8.94	8.40	5.00
Tanzania	6.90	6.48	6.14	7.61	6.74	5.99	6.23	5.85	9.16	7.28	5.33
Malawi	6.89	5.87	6.29	7.90	7.42	5.78	7.84	3.52	8.45	8.43	7.00
Mozambique	6.79	5.53	6.12	8.05	6.80	5.05	7.23	5.05	9.20	7.15	3.67
Cameroon	6.77	6.02	7.06	7.23	6.60	7.28	6.52	5.56	7.81	7.48	4.33
Mali	6.76	5.40	6.34	8.01	9.02	5.73	7.13	4.14	9.34	7.20	4.33
Zambia	6.65	5.31	6.54	7.79	7.82	6.57	7.63	3.56	8.44	6.70	5.00
Benin	6.53	5.00	6.38	7.63	8.25	5.52	6.63	3.36	8.36	6.93	5.60
Senegal	6.49	5.74	6.13	7.23	7.57	5.70	6.29	5.41	8.19	6.75	4.60
Ghana	6.47	5.65	5.61	7.50	8.20	5.32	6.67	3.75	8.26	7.90	6.93
CIDA-funded Fragile States											
Afghanistan	7.89	9.06	8.42	6.68	..	9.56	6.00	9.53	7.78	7.57	4.33
Haiti	7.72	6.81	8.53	7.94	7.27	8.32	7.24	8.05	7.95	6.90	7.67
Sudan	7.48	7.83	7.58	7.21	7.82	7.13	6.38	9.22	8.22	6.95	6.00
West Bank and Gaza	7.41	6.69	10.33	7.50	8.30	6.85	9.08	8.16	4.78	7.00	9.00
Iraq	6.94	7.52	7.50	6.15	6.42	7.60	7.80	9.38	5.53	6.30	4.33

efforts in the country.⁵

Further Policy Applications

CIDA's current development strategy focuses the majority of its resources in a limited number of development partners; one immediate consequence of this shift in policy is an increased need for a robust evaluation capability. With greater resources allocated in each country that

CIDA operates, there come increased expectations of visible and concrete returns on Canadian investment.

Beyond contributions to broad strategic policy formulation and associated resource allocation choices, the fragility index may also hold promise as an effective tool for such policy and programme evaluation.

CIDA is currently implementing lessons identified in its Policy Statement on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness (2002), and the comprehensive model for development which "addresses the

⁵ Space limitations prevent a full discussion of the impact assessment methodology. For further information, please see "Failed and Fragile States: A Concept Paper."

Table 6: Potential Stabilization Priority Countries											
Country	Fragility Index	ALC Scores			Cross-cutting Theme	Indicator Clusters					
		A	L	C		Gender	Governance	Economics	Security and Crime	Human Development	Demography
First Tier											
Congo (Kinshasa)	8.11	7.93	7.58	8.49	7.72	7.67	6.93	9.15	9.70	7.35	5.47
Uganda	7.24	7.38	6.50	7.51	5.33	6.51	6.11	7.38	8.27	8.95	6.67
Pakistan	6.82	7.08	6.43	6.83	6.11	6.47	6.01	8.58	6.44	7.34	6.73
Indonesia	6.36	7.19	6.05	5.89	5.18	6.54	6.45	8.11	5.11	6.08	5.67
Colombia	6.21	7.26	6.24	5.45	5.32	6.35	6.18	8.35	5.42	4.93	5.00
Second Tier											
Yemen	7.27	6.59	8.32	7.31	8.93	8.00	6.56	7.44	7.20	7.63	8.33
Guatemala	6.45	5.78	6.87	6.70	6.70	7.22	5.68	5.90	6.95	6.86	6.47
Sri Lanka	6.06	6.95	5.83	5.48	6.00	6.05	6.03	8.62	4.25	5.20	7.00
Kyrgyzstan	5.75	5.44	6.98	5.48	7.48	7.57	6.98	4.81	4.40	5.43	3.33
Western Balkans											
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5.40	5.90	6.80	4.44	6.95	7.53	5.21	6.54	3.48	5.58	3.93
Croatia	4.63	5.31	5.22	3.87	5.23	5.64	5.03	5.94	3.42	3.50	2.33
Slovenia	3.50	3.59	3.80	3.30	4.24	4.35	3.90	3.87	2.40	3.05	3.67

Table 7: Regional Profiles											
Country	Fragility Index	ALC Scores			Cross-cutting Theme	Indicator Clusters					
		A	L	C		Gender	Governance	Economics	Security and Crime	Human Development	Demography
Central Asia											
Afghanistan	7.89	9.06	8.42	6.68	..	9.56	6.00	9.53	7.78	7.57	4.33
Kyrgyzstan	5.75	5.44	6.98	5.48	7.48	7.57	6.98	4.81	4.40	5.43	3.33
Pakistan	6.82	7.08	6.43	6.83	6.11	6.47	6.01	8.58	6.44	7.34	6.73
Tajikistan	5.85	5.14	7.50	5.77	6.06	7.70	6.83	5.22	4.75	5.45	4.33
Turkmenistan	5.42	4.86	6.93	5.10	4.40	6.54	6.05	5.84	4.33	4.38	3.67
Uzbekistan	6.00	5.61	7.45	5.69	6.44	7.47	6.72	6.51	4.72	5.45	4.67
Great Lakes Region											
Burundi	8.25	8.04	7.58	8.65	7.42	7.18	8.08	9.17	8.89	7.25	8.00
Congo (Kinshasa)	8.11	7.93	7.58	8.49	7.72	7.67	6.93	9.15	9.70	7.35	5.47
Rwanda	7.55	6.27	7.47	8.51	6.42	6.93	6.74	6.47	8.69	8.43	8.20
Sudan	7.48	7.83	7.58	7.21	7.82	7.13	6.38	9.22	8.22	6.95	6.00
Uganda	7.24	7.38	6.50	7.51	5.33	6.51	6.11	7.38	8.27	8.95	6.67
South East Africa											
Zimbabwe	7.54	6.77	8.33	7.76	7.62	7.49	8.21	6.79	8.40	6.05	6.27
Mozambique	6.79	5.53	6.12	8.05	6.80	5.05	7.23	5.05	9.20	7.15	3.67
Zambia	6.65	5.31	6.54	7.79	7.82	6.57	7.63	3.56	8.44	6.70	5.00
South Africa	5.66	5.92	5.16	5.72	6.16	4.32	5.91	5.57	6.42	5.93	5.07
The Balkans											
Serbia and Montenegro	6.00	6.67	6.16	5.28	6.95	6.75	6.25	7.75	5.39	3.79	2.33
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5.40	5.90	6.80	4.44	6.95	7.53	5.21	6.54	3.48	5.58	3.93
Croatia	4.63	5.31	5.22	3.87	5.23	5.64	5.03	5.94	3.42	3.50	2.33
Slovenia	3.50	3.59	3.80	3.30	4.24	4.35	3.90	3.87	2.40	3.05	3.67
Macedonia	5.51	5.65	6.74	4.80	6.52	6.87	6.13	6.55	3.55	4.35	4.33

political, economic, social and institutional dimensions of development. It stresses the importance of getting governance right, the proper sequencing of reforms, the need for building capacity to ensure sustainability, and engaging civil society.”⁶

In addition to being more comprehensive, CIDA has also undertaken efforts recently to focus its bilateral assistance in fewer countries, and in those countries to be a significant donor in at least one, but no more than three sectors identified as priorities in a national poverty reduction strategy. If a development partner, chosen today on the basis of its ability to use development assistance effectively for poverty reduction, suffers setbacks in its authority, legitimacy and capacity, there are risks to the investments CIDA is making. If ALC indices are improving, the chances of sustainable broad based growth are likely to be increasing. By monitoring ALC performance on an ongoing basis in addition to monitoring gains in education, health, and so on at the sector level, CIDA can assess the effects programming has not only on the sector in question, but on overall ALC-measured state functionality as well. This in turn can help to demonstrate how development investments contribute to decreases in fragility and long term benefits for sustainable poverty reduction.

Finally, the fragility index provides some indication of the location and types of engagement that the Canadian Government is likely to face in the medium to long term. CIFP’s net assessment approach provides a framework through which other government departments can explore and identify opportunities for early investment in cooperation with CIDA to bolster waning ALC performance in order to prevent fragility, as well as to address situations of current fragility or imminent failure.

Despite the best efforts of local and international leaders, some of today’s fragile states will become tomorrow’s failed states, requiring robust international engagement, including military


intervention. Even as the index provides guidance to CIDA, START, and other government agencies as they work to strengthen weak and vulnerable states, it has the potential to provide DND and other government agencies involved in long-term planning with information regarding how and where Canadian Forces (CF) and other government resources may be deployed in the future.

Section IV: Country Profiles

In addition to the broad comparative indices, CIFP also produces detailed assessments for each country in the fragility index. These country profiles enable users to drill down to the level of individual indicator, assisting efforts to assess performance in specific subject areas. The detailed reports provide insight into the nature of the particular risks facing a given country; it also highlights areas of relative strength – those areas ripe for increased investment. For instance, tables 8 and 9 provide detailed fragility profiles for Sri Lanka and Ghana. Sri Lanka exhibits weak authority, largely as a result of the interminable conflict between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan government. Indicators related to political violence, organized crime, number of refugees produced, and other measures of security tend to reflect various destabilizing aspects of the conflict. Nonetheless, the government maintains a relatively high level of legitimacy, with a strong democratic history and functioning governing institutions. Human development indicators also suggest that the country is performing relatively well when compared to regional averages, with moderate levels of literacy, infant mortality, and HIV/AIDS infection given the state’s overall level of economic development.

Ghana faces rather different challenges. Unlike Sri Lanka, Ghana has enjoyed an extended period of relative peace and stability. Despite its location in war-torn West Africa, Ghana thus far seems to be staying clear of the destructive conflicts entangling its regional neighbours. This fact is clearly reflected in its relatively low scores for virtually all measures of security and crime. In addition, its democratic institutions are relatively robust, with little

⁶ CIDA, “Policy Statement on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness,” September 2002. Available online: <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/STE-32015515-SG4>.

Table 8: Detailed country fragility profile for Sri Lanka					
 <p>Sri Lanka</p> <p>Legend: Asian Regional Average Sri Lanka</p>	CIPF Fragility Profile				
	Fragility Index	A	L	C	Gender
	6.06	6.95	5.83	5.48	6.00
	Governance	Economics	Security and Crime		
6.05	6.03	8.62			
Human Development	Demographics	Environment		Number of Indicators	
4.25	5.20	7.00		71	
	Global Rank Score	Trend Score	Volatility Score	Indicator	Cluster Average
1. Governance					6.05
Permanence of Regime Type	2.0	0.0	1.0	3.0	
Level of Democracy	4.0	0.0	0.0	4.0	
Party financing	7.0	-1.0	1.0	7.0	
Number of Women Parliamentarians	6.0	0.0	1.0	7.0	
Percentage of Women Parliamentarians	8.4	-1.0	1.0	8.4	
Transparency of Government policymaking	4.5	1.0	2.0	7.5	
Independence of the judiciary	5.0	1.0	2.0	8.0	
Free press	6.4	-1.0	2.0	7.4	
Level of Corruption	5.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	
Restrictions on Civil and Political Rights	5.0	-1.0	1.0	5.0	
Level of participation in international political organizations	1.3	*	*	1.3	
Refugees hosted, IDPs, other populations of concern	8.0	-1.0	2.0	9.0	
2. Economics					6.03
Economic size	4.0	0.0	1.0	5.0	
Relative economic size (GDP per capita)	6.0	0.0	1.0	7.0	
Economic growth (GDP growth)	4.4	0.0	2.0	6.4	
Inflation	7.0	0.0	2.0	9.0	
Inequality Score (GINI Coefficient)	3.0	*	*	3.0	
Unemployment by sex (Female)	6.4	1.0	2.0	9.4	
Service reliability (Communications)	6.2	0.0	1.0	7.2	
Internet	7.0	0.0	0.0	7.0	
Informal Economy (Black market)	6.0	*	*	6.0	
Investment climate (Contract regulation)	5.0	*	*	5.0	
Standards of living (GNI per capita)	6.0	0.0	1.0	7.0	
Remittances (Relative)	2.2	0.0	1.0	3.2	
Reserve Holdings	4.6	0.0	1.0	5.6	
External Debt (Relative)	5.2	0.0	1.0	6.2	
Trade Openness (%GDP)	4.8	0.0	1.0	5.8	
Overall Unemployment	4.8	0.0	1.0	5.8	
Participation in international economic organisations	3.0	*	*	3.0	
FDI [Net inflows (% of GDP)]	6.6	0.0	1.0	7.6	
Foreign Aid (%GNI)	4.4	0.0	1.0	5.4	

Sri Lanka (continued)					
3. Security & Crime					8.62
Politically motivated violence against civilians (incidents)	9.0	0.0	2.0	11.0	
Armed Conflict (intensity)	6.2	-1.0	1.0	6.2	
Political Stability	8.6	-1.0	1.0	8.6	
Number of Refugees Produced	7.0	0.0	2.0	9.0	
Risk of ethno-political rebellion	7.0	*	*	7.0	
Terrorism (Perception)	9.0	*	*	9.0	
Military Expenditure (% of GDP)	7.8	0.0	2.0	9.8	
Politically motivated violence against civilians (fatalities)	8.5	0.0	2.0	10.5	
Organised crime	5.0	1.0	2.0	8.0	
Human Rights – Empowerment	5.2	1.0	2.0	8.2	
Police force / law enforcement	5.0	1.0	2.0	8.0	
Legal system	5.0	1.0	2.0	8.0	
Human Rights -- Physical Integrity	7.8	-1.0	2.0	8.8	
4. Human Development					4.25
Child malnourishment	6.0	*	0.0	6.0	
Bottom Quintile share of income	2.0	*	0.0	2.0	
Absolute poverty	5.0	*	0.0	5.0	
Literacy	4.0	0.0	0.0	4.0	
Literacy (Gender)	6.0	*	0.0	6.0	
Primary School Enrolment (Total)	
Primary School Enrolment (Girls)	
Access to Sanitation	5.0	*	*	5.0	
Health expenditure per capita	7.0	0.0	0.0	7.0	
Health infrastructure	
Health professionals	6.0	*	*	6.0	
Children in the Labour Force (% of total age 10-14)	2.2	-1.0	1.0	2.2	
Access to improved water	5.0	*	*	5.0	
Human Development Index	5.2	0.0	0.0	5.2	
Gender Development Index	5.2	-1.0	0.0	4.2	
AIDS New cases reported (total number)	3.2	0.0	0.0	3.2	
HIV/AIDS (Relative)	2.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	
HIV/AIDS (Gender)	1.0	*	*	1.0	
Infant mortality rates	3.2	0.0	1.0	4.2	
5. Demography					5.20
Population growth rates	4.2	-1.0	1.0	4.2	
Population density	8.4	exempt**	exempt**	8.4	
Population diversity (Ethnic)	5.0	*	*	5.0	
Population diversity (Religious)	6.0	*	*	6.0	
Youth Bulge (Pop. Aged 0-14 as a % of Total)	3.0	-1.0	1.0	3.0	
Life expectancy (Total)	3.4	-1.0	2.0	4.4	
Slum Population	5.0	*	0.0	5.0	
Urban Growth Rate (Annual percentage)	5.6	0.0	0.0	5.6	
6. Environment					7.00
Deforestation	7.0	*	*	7.0	
Fresh water	6.0	*	*	6.0	
Arable/fertile land availability	8.0	0.0	0.0	8.0	
* Signifies that there is only a single observation available for the indicator, thus preventing trend and volatility analysis.					
**Population density is exempt from trend analysis in this calculation because it increases almost without exception.					

Table 9: Detailed country fragility profile for Ghana						
<p>Ghana</p> <p> <input type="checkbox"/> Asian Regional Average <input type="checkbox"/> Sri Lanka </p>		CIFP Fragility Profile				
		Fragility Index	A	L	C	Gender
		6.47	5.65	5.61	7.50	8.20
		Governance	Economics	Security and Crime		
		5.32	6.67	3.75		
		Human Development	Demographics	Environment		Number of Indicators
		8.26	7.90	6.93		69
	Global Rank Score	Trend Score	Volatility Score	Indicator	Cluster Average	
1. Governance						5.32
Permanence of Regime Type	7.5	0.0	2.0	9.5		
Level of Democracy	4.4	-1.0	0.0	3.4		
Party financing	6.0	*	*	6.0		
Number of Women Parliamentarians	4.5	-1.0	2.0	5.5		
Percentage of Women Parliamentarians	6.8	-1.0	2.0	7.8		
Transparency of Government policymaking	3.0	*	*	3.0		
Independence of the judiciary	5.0	*	*	5.0		
Free press	4.4	-1.0	2.0	5.4		
Level of Corruption	5.2	0.0	1.0	6.2		
Restrictions on Civil and Political Rights	3.6	-1.0	1.0	3.6		
Level of participation in international political organisations	1.0	*	*	1.0		
Refugees hosted, IDPs, other populations of concern	5.4	0.0	2.0	7.4		
2. Economics						6.67
Economic size	5.8	0.0	1.0	6.8		
Relative economic size (GDP per capita)	7.0	0.0	0.0	7.0		
Economic growth (GDP growth)	3.6	0.0	0.0	3.6		
Inflation	8.8	1.0	2.0	11.8		
Inequality Score (GINI Coefficient)	2.0	*	*	2.0		
Unemployment by sex (Female)		
Service reliability (Communications)	8.0	0.0	0.0	8.0		
Internet	8.3	0.0	0.0	8.3		
Informal Economy (Black market)	6.0	*	*	6.0		
Investment climate (Contract regulation)	5.0	*	*	5.0		
Standards of living (GNI per capita)	7.0	0.0	1.0	8.0		
Remittances (Relative)	6.8	0.0	0.0	6.8		
Reserve Holdings	6.2	0.0	1.0	7.2		
External Debt (Relative)	6.4	-1.0	1.0	6.4		
Trade Openness (%GDP)	2.8	0.0	2.0	4.8		
Overall Unemployment		
Participation in international economic organisations	6.0	*	*	6.0		
FDI [Net inflows (% of GDP)]	5.8	0.0	1.0	6.8		
Foreign Aid (%GNI)	7.0	0.0	2.0	9.0		

Ghana (continued)					
	Global Rank Score	Trend Score	Volatility Score	Indicator	Cluster Average
3. Security & Crime					3.75
Politically motivated violence against civilians (incidents)	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	
Armed Conflict (intensity)	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	
Political Stability	5.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	
Number of Refugees Produced	4.4	0.0	1.0	5.4	
Risk of ethno-political rebellion	5.0	*	*	5.0	
Terrorism (Perception)	5.0	*	*	5.0	
Military Expenditure (% of GDP)	1.2	0.0	1.0	2.2	
Politically motivated violence against civilians (fatalities)	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	
Organised crime	
Human Rights – Empowerment	5.2	-1.0	2.0	6.2	
Police force / law enforcement	5.0	*	*	5.0	
Legal system	4.0	*	*	4.0	
Human Rights -- Physical Integrity	5.2	-1.0	0.0	4.2	
4. Human Development					8.26
Child malnourishment	5.0	*	0.0	5.0	
Bottom Quintile share of income	7.0	*	0.0	7.0	
Absolute poverty	9.0	*	0.0	9.0	
Literacy	6.8	-1.0	2.0	7.8	
Literacy (Gender)	..	*	0.0	..	
Primary School Enrolment (Total)	8.2	0.0	2.0	10.2	
Primary School Enrolment (Girls)	8.2	0.0	2.0	10.2	
Access to Sanitation	7.0	*	*	7.0	
Health expenditure per capita	8.0	0.0	0.0	8.0	
Health infrastructure	
Health professionals	9.0	*	*	9.0	
Children in the Labour Force (% of total age 10-14)	4.8	-1.0	1.0	4.8	
Access to improved water	7.0	*	*	7.0	
Human Development Index	7.2	1.0	2.0	10.2	
Gender Development Index	7.0	0.0	2.0	9.0	
AIDS - New cases reported (total number)	9.0	0.0	2.0	11.0	
HIV/AIDS (Relative)	7.8	0.0	2.0	9.8	
HIV/AIDS (Gender)	6.5	1.0	1.0	8.5	
Infant mortality rates	7.0	-1.0	1.0	7.0	
5. Demography					7.90
Population growth rates	6.4	-1.0	2.0	7.4	
Population density	6.0	exempt*	exempt	6.0	
Population diversity (Ethnic)	9.0	*	*	9.0	
Population diversity (Religious)	6.0	*	*	6.0	
Youth Bulge (Pop. Aged 0-14 as a % of Total)	7.8	-1.0	2.0	8.8	
Life expectancy (Total)	7.0	1.0	2.0	10.0	
Slum Population	8.0	*	0.0	8.0	
Urban Growth Rate (Annual percentage)	6.0	0.0	2.0	8.0	
6. Environment					6.93
Deforestation	8.0	*	*	8.0	
Fresh water	6.0	*	*	6.0	
Arable/fertile land availability	4.8	0.0	2.0	6.8	

* Signifies that there is only a single observation available for the indicator, thus preventing trend and volatility analysis.
**Population density is exempt from trend analysis in this calculation because it increases almost without exception.

history of political or human rights violations; all this contributes to legitimacy and authority scores far stronger than the regional average.

Unfortunately, Ghana faces a range of other challenges related to capacity. Human development indicators for the country are extremely low, with trend-lines suggesting that they have in some cases declined in relative terms over the last five years. Literacy, school enrolment, infant mortality, and measures of poverty all suggest the severity of the developmental challenges facing the country. CIDA efforts to enhance Ghanaian development must therefore work to address these issues; fortunately, Ghana's high levels of authority and legitimacy suggest the country will continue to be an effective partner in development efforts, with the means and the willingness to maintain vital local ownership of international development programs.

Obviously, such brief discussions serve only to identify some of the broad ways in which the fragility index might enable more nuanced and effective Canadian government policy. As with the comparative index, the detailed country profiles provide a tool both to guide and evaluate government policy.

Section V: Statistical Analysis

Beyond its immediate policy relevance as a tool to guide allocation and programming decisions, the fragility index also possesses substantial value of a more academic nature as well. Despite the prominent place afforded discussions of the subject of state fragility in current international political discourse, relatively little is known about the precise nature of state fragility, particularly its causes and effects. Notwithstanding certain previous efforts such as those of the Political Instability Task Force, surprisingly few have attempted to create a complete and quantitatively testable theory of state fragility. As a result, proper policy responses to fragile states remain similarly elusive.

To be sure, any effort to quantify and test hypotheses regarding state fragility and

state failure faces formidable conceptual obstacles. First and foremost is perhaps the lack of widely accepted definitions of fragility and failure. Unlike studies of conflict, there is no single identifiable dependent variable to observe and quantify. Though violent conflict is often present in very fragile societies, the two terms are not synonymous. In many cases, conflict is a symptom of the broader phenomenon of state fragility, one that appears too late to provide useful early warning to policy makers.

Given the myriad ways a state may weaken or fail, scholarship has tended to proceed through research into particular facets of the problem. Studies of civil conflict, ethnic conflict, poverty, political and civil rights, democracy, democratization, economic development, individual inequality, class-based inequality, intercommunal inequality, conflict diffusion and contagion effects, gender issues, intra- and interstate security dilemmas, human security, commodity dependence, transnational crime, radical fundamentalism, small arms and light weapons proliferation, human trafficking, environmental degradation and other subjects have all contributed to our understanding of state stability and fragility.

However, few have attempted to create and test more general theories exploring the interrelationships between multiple elements of the preceding list. For instance, the complex relationship between poverty, conflict, and development remains problematic and incompletely understood. While some inroads have been made by authors such as Fitzgerald and Stewart, and Collier et al., too many policy makers continue to operate using simplistic formulations such as 'poverty causes conflict,' which clearly do not capture the

Number of countries covered	190
Number of indicators	74
Average country coverage per indicator	150.4
Average number of indicators per country profile	60.6

Index component	Number of indicators	Fragility Index	Authority	Legitimacy	Capacity
Authority	24	0.83			
Legitimacy	16	0.84	0.58		
Capacity	34	0.94	0.62	0.75	
Gender	8	0.74	0.40	0.75	0.77
Governance	12	0.77	0.57	0.93	0.64
Economics	19	0.79	0.49	0.75	0.85
Security and Crime	13	0.68	0.91	0.56	0.41
Human Development	19	0.91	0.69	0.63	0.94
Demographics	8	0.83	0.60	0.61	0.87
Environment	3	0.29	0.11	0.31	0.33

full extent of the relationship.

Obviously, the fragility index cannot provide complete answers to all the issues outlined above. However, it does open a new avenue of inquiry, presenting researchers with the opportunity to quantitatively explore the phenomenon of

state fragility. The underlying database – comprising more than 96,000 points of data covering 191 countries – provides a resource to test many fundamental assumptions regarding the causes and effects related to state fragility and failure. The following section begins that effort, presenting some initial statistical results.

Country	Fragility Index	Authority	Legitimacy	Capacity
Absolute poverty (% of population living on less than \$1 a day, World Bank, data taken from most recent year)	0.66	0.36	0.33	0.78
CIRI empowerment human rights index (2004)	-0.54	-0.48	-0.69	-0.38
CIRI physical integrity human rights index (2004)	-0.60	-0.73	-0.54	-0.41
Freedom House Press Freedom Index (2004)	0.65	0.55	0.81	0.50
Freedom House civil and political rights index (2003)	0.64	0.52	0.78	0.51
Fund for Peace failed state index (2006)	0.89	0.79	0.89	0.78
Gender development index (UNDP, 2003)	-0.91	-0.68	-0.75	-0.96
GDP per capita (WDI, 2003)	-0.85	-0.60	-0.86	-0.82
Gender empowerment measure (UNDP, 2003)	-0.82	-0.67	-0.86	-0.75
GINI (WDI, most recent year)	0.45	0.31	0.35	0.49
Human development index (UNDP, 2003)	-0.90	-0.63	-0.70	-0.95
Infant mortality (2003)	0.81	0.58	0.62	0.85
Military spending (% GDP, 2002)	0.24	0.24	0.30	0.17
Foreign aid per capita (OECD, 2004)	-0.08	-0.25	-0.09	0.07
Foreign aid as % GNI (OECD, 2004)	0.48	0.17	0.29	0.60
Political stability (WB Governance database, 2004)	-0.81	-0.83	-0.75	-0.64
Polity IV Democracy-Autocracy index (2003)	-0.47	-0.27	-0.67	-0.40
Square of Polity Democracy-Autocracy index (2003)	-0.72	-0.53	-0.70	-0.70
SIPRI armed conflict database	0.21	0.38	0.08	0.12
Slum Population (% total urban)	0.78	0.61	0.56	0.80
Trade openness (2002)	-0.29	-0.34	-0.16	-0.27
Youth Unemployment (2001)	0.30	0.28	0.41	0.19

Given limitations of time and space, the results presented here are intended to be indicative and provocative rather than definitive, pointing the way toward future avenues of research. Any relationships suggested here must be treated with caution, given that they have yet to be verified using regression analysis. Instead they are presented to give some idea of the patterns emerging from the data; subsequent analysis will be necessary to confirm the validity of the relationships, *ceteris paribus*. In coming months, CIFP will publish more thorough treatments as it continues its research programme, with future papers focusing on particular hypotheses related to the causes of and potential policy prescriptions for state fragility.

Tables 11 and 12 present correlation calculations between the various elements of the fragility index. Several points are immediately apparent. First, state fragility would appear to be more fundamentally correlated with a lack of capacity than low levels of authority or legitimacy, with the full fragility index correlating with capacity at 0.94, as opposed to 0.83 and 0.84 for authority and legitimacy, respectively. Intuitively, such a result makes sense – questions of political will are moot in the face of insurmountable structural weakness. Admittedly, this result is partly a result of the index structure; the 34 measures of capacity outnumber the 16 indicators of legitimacy and the 24 indicators of authority. Further research is therefore required to confirm the hypothesis.


Second, authority and legitimacy are relatively weakly related to one another, correlating at 0.58. Both correlate more closely with the full index than each other. Authority in particular seems the most independent dimension of the three, correlating with capacity at just 0.62. Such findings suggest that certain states may be able to maintain relatively high levels of authority even in the absence of strong legitimacy or capacity. This interpretation would appear to be supported by the ability of certain regimes – such as North Korea and Zimbabwe – to maintain a measure of state control despite extremely limited resources and in the face of widespread international pressure. Such states present a particularly difficult

challenge to international development agencies given their governing regimes' apparent resistance to diplomatic and economic pressure.

Conversely, states with relatively strong legitimacy and capacity such as Colombia and Sri Lanka nonetheless remain unable to exercise effective control over the full extent of their territory. The lack of authority in such states may undermine attempts to provide development assistance; even if the government is willing and able to support, cooperate with, or take ownership of international development programs, such efforts may appear partisan and do nothing more than fuel the conflict. Aid programs in these countries must therefore take the lack of authority into account in their design and execution, or they may inadvertently deepen the conflict and further destabilize the region.


Human Development and Income

Human development appears closely related to states' overall fragility. At 0.91, the human development cluster correlates more closely to the index than other cluster areas. This result is further supported by the results included in table 12 and the scatter plot below; the UNDP's human development index also correlates with the CIFP fragility index at -0.90, suggesting a close linear relationship between human development and state stability. As is the case with capacity, this result may be partially a result of endogeneity in the composition of the



index, a possibility that must be explored through further research. Should subsequent testing support the close relationship between development and fragility however, the result would have substantial implications for development and security policies of both donor and partner nations. It would suggest that state-building programs that focus excessively on security at the expense of development may in fact prove counterproductive, focusing on symptom rather than cause.


As is the case with GDI, GEM, GDP per capita, CIRI's human rights indices, Polity IV's Democracy-Autocracy index, and several other measures, the negative correlation between HDI and the fragility index is expected. All such indicators score poor performance at the low end of their respective scales, whereas the fragility index scores fragility at the high end. Consequently, all such indicators should – and do – correlate negatively with the CIFP fragility index.



infant mortality and high GDP per capita have been previously identified with both stability and peace.

Interestingly, the scatter plot graphs above suggest that both exhibit a non-linear relationship to fragility. In the case of GDP per capita, the greatest returns to increasing mean income levels occur at lower income levels, with the returns to stability appearing to diminish as per capita GDP increases further. Conversely, state fragility appears to decline precipitously as infant mortality approaches zero; at higher levels, marginal reductions in infant mortality appear to have a less decisive effect. Naturally such observations may be mitigated following more rigorous statistical analysis; nonetheless, they point to important avenues of further inquiry.


Relation of GDP Per Capita to Fragility



Gender Empowerment

Other correlations prove intriguing as well. In particular, the fact that strong performance on gender measurements correlates closely with stability may come


Relation of Gender Empowerment to Fragility



As tables 11 and 12 indicate, there are a number of other strong correlations of note. Infant mortality, GDP per capita, gender empowerment, the GDI, the World Bank's political stability index, and the Fund for Peace failed states index all correlate at greater than 0.8 (or -0.8 in certain cases, as discussed above). Some of these strong correlations are unsurprising. Indices such as the World Bank's political stability index and the Fund for Peace both represent attempts to identify conditions of relative stability or fragility; one would therefore expect a high level of convergence with the CIFP fragility index. Further, indicators such as low

as a surprise to some, even as it serves as vindication for others. To a certain extent, the correlation between gender development and stability mirrors the relationship between development and stability; indeed, the 2003 GDI correlates with HDI at over 0.99, suggesting the two indices actually capture virtually identical performance measures. The same cannot be said of the GEM however, as its method of calculation draws on different measurements than either the HDI or GDI. Nonetheless, the scatter plot graph above suggests a strong correlation to stability that goes beyond raw measures of development. The possibility that gender parity may indeed play a strong and measurable role in the stability of the state beyond that of general development is a potentially powerful result, one that at a minimum warrants further quantitative investigation.


Relation of Inequality to Fragility



Other Observations

Beyond the seemingly strong linkages identified above, there are a number of other correlations of note. Though the level of correlation between fragility and inequality is not as strong as some of the relationships listed above, the results are nonetheless suggestive. An examination of scatter plot above suggests that though relative equality is not sufficient to ensure stability, it is perhaps a necessary prerequisite. While some states with comparatively low GINI scores appear relatively fragile, states with GINI scores above 50 are almost universally so, with all but one state in that category scoring higher than 5 on the fragility index.


Relation of Democracy to Fragility



The correlation between fragility and regime type proves somewhat more complex. Though they clearly exhibit a relationship of some type, it is not a linear one; indeed, the two correlate at -0.48, far below the level observed for development indicators. Instead, as the graph above suggests, the relationship seems to resemble the inverted 'U' relationship that various writers have observed between conflict – both civil and international – and regime type.

The graph above plots the average fragility index scores for countries at each of the 21 points that make up Polity IV's Democracy-Autocracy index. The trend line provides a 2 degree polynomial bivariate regression of the relationship. According to Polity, a score of -10 indicates a total autocracy, while a score of 10 indicates a fully functional democracy. Clearly, the full democracies are the most stable – states with a score of 10 in the most recent year of the Polity index averaged 3.7 on the fragility index. At the other end of the scale, full autocracies averaged 5.1. States between these two extremes tended to be

Relation of Human Rights to Fragility – CIRI Empowerment Index




more fragile; indeed, states scoring between -5 and 5 on the Polity index averaged a fragility score of 6.5, far above the average for both total autocracies and full democracies. The implication would seem to be that, while established democracies and entrenched autocracies tend to be relatively stable, states caught between those two extremes, termed anocracies by some writers, tend to be more fragile.

Intriguingly, a similar relationship appears to exist between human rights indicators and fragility. All three rights measures included in this study – CIRI’s measures of physical integrity and empowerment, as well as the civil and political rights index maintained by Freedom House – display a curvilinear relationship to fragility, with CIRI’s empowerment index providing the most vivid evidence of the phenomenon. The graph above, constructed in the same manner as the preceding Polity graph, suggests that though states with the best human rights records tend to be the most stable, states with extremely poor rights records tend to be somewhat less fragile than those that score nearer the mean. Such insights are in some ways surprising and even troubling, with potential implications for the way in which states engage chronic human rights offenders. As states work to encourage better respect for human rights, they must be careful to minimize the risk of a potentially catastrophic destabilization of the state.

Again, as with the preceding graph, the trend line included is produced using a simple bivariate regression; it remains possible that the apparent relationship will disappear in analyses that control for other potentially relevant factors.

Trade Openness


The following graph plots trade openness against state fragility. From the scatter plot, it would appear that the relationship between trade and stability is a relatively unpredictable one. Though a trend is visible in the data, clarified by the second degree polynomial trend line, it is a weak one, with a number of outliers. It is possible that the relationship is clearer when controlling for other factors, particularly state income. It is also possible that the relationship is a lagged one,




requiring time series data to fully capture. That is, states may become more stable over time following liberalization of trade policies. At the same time, it is also possible that the graph is capturing the reality that there tend to be winners and losers in trade, with certain types of states proving unable to effectively capitalize on the potential for increased income that can come from liberal trade policies. Clearly, given the importance many writers place on liberal trade as a driver of positive change in developing societies, the effect demands further study.

Development Assistance

One final area of interest and potentially of some concern to CIDA and the broader development community involves the relationship between aid and fragility. Though there is some correlation between fragility aid flows as a percentage of GNI, there is virtually no relationship between fragility and aid per capita. The former correlates with the fragility index at 0.48, while the latter correlates at -0.08. The





fact that fragile states receive less aid per capita than more stable developing countries must be noteworthy to members of the OECD DAC that are actively working to addressing the challenges represented by fragile states and aid orphans. Clearly, it is a complex issue, and the snapshot contained in the graphs above do not take into consideration factors such as time lag and the endogeneity that accompany any discussion of aid allocations. It is possible that as some have argued, global aid flows are primarily determined by factors other than economic performance. The findings may also be an indication that development agencies recognise the importance of other instruments beyond ODA in fragile states, or the result of aid agencies' reluctance to invest in countries perceived to be "poor performers." Above all, the results underscore the need for more information about the flows and effects of all forms of assistance to fragile states – from ODA, to preferential trade agreements, to diplomatic investment, to military engagement.

Section VI: Conclusion

This briefing note serves several important purposes. First and foremost, it clearly establishes the validity of the ALC approach to fragile state assessment. Its dynamic and multifaceted methodology provides a level of information and insight that goes far beyond that provided by existing approaches. Second, the note presents important initial findings regarding fragile state performance globally, both in comparison to other countries, and in more in-depth country fragility profiles.

Third, the briefing provides initial results arising from research into the fundamental causes of state fragility. Some of the

results, such as the close relationship between state stability and human development, gender empowerment, and per capita income, provide evidence to support a number of CIDA's core programming initiatives. Other results represent potential challenges to Canada's foreign and development policy. For instance, should results regarding complex relationships between fragility and democracy, human rights, and levels of aid survive subsequent testing, they may force many to re-examine their fundamental assumptions regarding development and foreign policy in fragile states.

Above all, the briefing note highlights a number of important directions for future work. Research must continue into the exact causal relationship between various key indicators, including the complex interrelationships between security, development, trade, and stability. Such research will doubtless find a governmental audience beyond CIDA, as it touches on elements of importance to all aspects of Canada's whole-of-government approach to state fragility. Relevant departments include not only the traditional players of defence, development, diplomacy, and trade, but also the RCMP, members of the nascent Democracy Council, and all other government agencies who find themselves engaged in fragile states.

With respect to CIFP's fragile states project, next steps include the further development and operationalization of its event monitoring and program assessment capabilities. Once under way, the event monitoring capability will provide policy makers with vital information on the emerging trends in countries and regions of concern to the Canadian government, enabling more dynamic and responsive policy decisions. The program assessment methodology will assist policy officers in their efforts to maximize the impact of Canadian programming in fragile state environments, providing guidance in both the initial program formation and subsequent evaluative phases. Once complete, the project will have produced a suite of tools capable of providing support and guidance through all stages of government policy formation in areas of fragile states – from initial assessment, to monitoring, to policy formulation and evaluation.


Appendix A: Country Fragility Rankings by Region

Country	Fragility Index	A	L	C	Country	Fragility Index	A	L	C
The Americas					Asia (continued)				
Haiti	7.72	6.81	8.53	7.94	Uzbekistan	6.00	5.61	7.45	5.69
Guatemala	6.45	5.78	6.87	6.70	India	5.95	6.71	4.99	5.87
Honduras	6.25	6.00	6.60	6.26	Philippines	5.94	6.60	5.55	5.65
Venezuela	6.23	6.47	6.71	5.85	East Timor	5.94	4.74	5.24	7.51
Colombia	6.21	7.26	6.24	5.45	Tajikistan	5.85	5.14	7.50	5.77
Ecuador	6.02	6.17	6.58	5.65	Kyrgyzstan	5.75	5.44	6.98	5.48
Nicaragua	5.94	5.07	6.12	6.47	China	5.72	6.15	6.06	5.28
Paraguay	5.93	5.40	6.68	5.96	Kiribati	5.64	4.03	5.43	7.30
Peru	5.93	6.00	6.50	5.61	Viet Nam	5.60	5.75	5.45	5.57
Bolivia	5.86	5.68	5.91	5.98	Turkmenistan	5.42	4.86	6.93	5.10
Belize	5.63	5.18	5.65	5.95	Mongolia	5.35	4.54	5.54	5.83
Dominican Republic	5.54	4.84	6.28	5.67	Micronesia	5.28	3.02	6.20	6.99
Jamaica	5.40	5.49	5.79	5.16	Vanuatu	5.26	4.12	5.57	5.84
El Salvador	5.39	4.70	5.07	6.03	Kazakhstan	5.22	5.53	6.38	4.54
Panama	5.36	5.14	6.22	5.12	Maldives	5.21	3.15	6.06	5.81
Brazil	5.31	5.60	5.68	4.93	Thailand	5.09	5.37	5.03	4.92
Mexico	5.24	5.97	5.24	4.72	Fiji	5.09	4.41	6.38	4.88
Trinidad and Tobago	5.09	5.52	4.94	4.89	Tonga	5.02	3.28	6.84	5.30
Argentina	5.08	5.43	5.18	4.79	Korea, North	4.94	3.87	6.85	4.55
Grenada	5.01	4.00	4.66	5.96	Malaysia	4.93	5.26	5.29	4.53
Guyana	5.00	5.39	5.08	4.69	New Caledonia	4.73	2.08	8.17	5.86
Suriname	4.89	4.77	4.94	4.95	Brunei Darussalam	4.58	3.20	6.56	4.44
Dominica	4.85	3.53	4.65	5.79	Western Samoa	4.43	2.84	5.00	5.30
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	4.85	3.59	5.45	5.45	Palau	4.41	3.42	4.81	4.99
Saint Lucia	4.68	3.36	5.57	5.25	Korea, South	3.87	4.22	3.91	3.58
Antigua and Barbuda	4.58	3.48	6.38	4.51	Singapore	3.74	3.55	4.45	3.47
Cuba	4.49	4.41	6.02	3.79	Japan	3.52	3.73	3.29	3.46
Saint Kitts (Christopher) and Nevis	4.48	3.67	5.75	4.49	Australia	2.94	3.63	2.50	2.63
Uruguay	4.36	4.45	4.41	4.27	New Zealand	2.82	3.01	2.31	2.95
Chile	4.34	4.22	4.77	4.23	Eastern Europe				
Costa Rica	4.34	4.17	4.19	4.53	Serbia and Montenegro	6.00	6.67	6.16	5.28
Bahamas	4.24	3.51	5.12	4.35	Georgia	5.91	6.30	6.51	5.37
Barbados	4.01	3.54	5.07	3.75	Azerbaijan	5.81	5.81	7.03	5.37
United States	3.85	5.43	2.71	3.21	Turkey	5.76	6.67	6.02	5.01
Canada	3.23	4.13	2.71	2.80	Ukraine	5.60	6.07	7.17	4.53
Asia					Macedonia	5.51	5.65	6.74	4.80
Afghanistan	7.89	9.06	8.42	6.68	Russia	5.49	6.47	6.79	4.10
Nepal	7.37	6.58	7.76	7.71	Bosnia and Herzegovina	5.40	5.90	6.80	4.44
Pakistan	6.82	7.08	6.43	6.83	Armenia	5.39	4.48	7.08	5.35
Myanmar (Burma)	6.79	6.96	7.15	6.47	Moldova	5.09	4.76	6.26	4.87
Bangladesh	6.77	6.25	7.68	6.72	Albania	5.05	4.44	6.35	4.98
Laos	6.67	5.83	7.05	7.15	Romania	5.02	5.00	6.03	4.58
Indonesia	6.36	7.19	6.05	5.89	Bulgaria	4.66	4.76	5.56	4.18
Cambodia	6.35	5.59	6.37	6.85	Croatia	4.63	5.31	5.22	3.87
Solomon Islands	6.23	4.49	6.29	7.49	Belarus	4.52	3.97	7.82	3.71
Bhutan	6.18	4.32	6.85	7.33	Slovakia	4.19	4.60	4.88	3.56
Papua New Guinea	6.15	5.64	5.09	7.05	Poland	4.18	4.43	4.62	3.78
Sri Lanka	6.06	6.95	5.83	5.48	Estonia	4.14	4.17	4.44	3.97


Country	Fragility Index	A	L	C	Country	Fragility Index	A	L	C
Eastern Europe (continued)					Sub-Saharan Africa				
Latvia	4.12	3.68	4.78	4.11	Burundi	8.25	8.04	7.58	8.65
Lithuania	3.99	3.80	4.64	3.81	Congo (Kinshasa)	8.11	7.93	7.58	8.49
Czech Republic	3.92	4.29	4.44	3.29	Somalia	7.86	7.53	8.41	7.82
Hungary	3.72	4.09	4.16	3.25	Liberia	7.84	6.18	8.82	8.64
Slovenia	3.50	3.59	3.80	3.30	Chad	7.81	6.79	8.13	8.43
Europe					Ethiopia	7.81	7.58	7.14	8.31
Greece	4.20	4.38	4.46	3.91	Cote d'Ivoire	7.79	7.74	7.89	7.79
Italy	4.17	5.09	4.01	3.57	Eritrea	7.73	7.04	7.91	8.14
Cyprus	3.89	4.25	4.10	3.56	Angola	7.73	7.98	7.66	7.55
Andorra	3.87	2.38	5.49	3.95	Kenya	7.60	7.46	7.68	7.66
Spain	3.83	4.48	3.44	3.58	Rwanda	7.55	6.27	7.47	8.51
France	3.74	4.81	3.27	3.14	Zimbabwe	7.54	6.77	8.33	7.76
Portugal	3.68	4.07	2.81	3.90	Guinea-Bissau	7.52	6.66	7.42	8.25
Germany	3.58	4.07	3.29	3.32	Sierra Leone	7.50	6.55	7.22	8.46
United Kingdom	3.43	4.87	2.43	2.88	Congo (Brazzaville)	7.49	6.70	7.57	8.02
Liechtenstein	3.42	2.20	4.86	3.85	Sudan	7.48	7.83	7.58	7.21
Belgium	3.34	4.10	2.99	2.94	Nigeria	7.33	7.19	7.46	7.37
Malta	3.33	2.96	3.58	3.49	Niger	7.28	5.61	7.09	8.63
Ireland	3.27	3.25	3.48	3.16	Uganda	7.24	7.38	6.50	7.51
Netherlands	3.10	4.36	1.84	2.85	Central African Republic	7.17	5.47	8.19	7.97
Austria	3.06	3.12	3.06	3.03	Guinea	7.15	5.97	7.56	7.92
Monaco	2.91	2.20	4.31	2.46	Burkina Faso	7.00	5.50	6.39	8.28
Switzerland	2.74	3.37	1.92	2.70	Tanzania	6.90	6.48	6.14	7.61
Norway	2.68	3.08	2.74	2.34	Malawi	6.89	5.87	6.29	7.90
Luxembourg	2.60	2.27	1.97	3.28	Togo	6.83	5.50	7.54	7.48
Sweden	2.53	2.98	2.05	2.47	Madagascar	6.81	5.06	7.24	7.83
Iceland	2.42	2.26	1.53	3.14	Mozambique	6.79	5.53	6.12	8.05
Finland	2.40	2.49	1.80	2.63	Cameroon	6.77	6.02	7.06	7.23
Denmark	2.37	2.76	1.58	2.54	Mali	6.76	5.40	6.34	8.01
Middle East and North Africa					Zambia	6.65	5.31	6.54	7.79
West Bank and Gaza	7.41	6.69	10.33	7.50	Benin	6.53	5.00	6.38	7.63
Yemen	7.27	6.59	8.32	7.31	Senegal	6.49	5.74	6.13	7.23
Mauritania	7.16	5.99	7.81	7.69	Comoros	6.49	3.91	6.89	7.86
Iraq	6.94	7.52	7.50	6.15	Swaziland	6.48	5.22	8.23	6.65
Iran	6.25	7.00	6.96	5.38	Ghana	6.47	5.65	5.61	7.50
Syria	5.90	5.21	6.97	5.95	Gambia	6.40	5.38	6.57	7.15
Algeria	5.88	6.25	6.90	5.05	Equatorial Guinea	6.39	4.58	7.82	6.98
Egypt	5.78	5.34	7.32	5.34	Lesotho	6.37	5.53	6.61	6.87
Lebanon	5.74	6.35	7.29	4.62	Djibouti	6.19	4.80	6.98	7.06
Morocco	5.72	4.94	7.17	5.64	Gabon	6.09	5.00	7.27	6.40
Saudi Arabia	5.59	5.79	7.47	4.67	Namibia	6.05	5.68	5.74	6.51
Kuwait	5.31	5.23	6.86	4.76	South Africa	5.66	5.92	5.16	5.72
Oman	5.31	4.47	6.48	5.41	Botswana	5.58	4.48	5.53	6.45
Libya	5.30	4.80	7.15	4.86	Sao Tome and Principe	5.57	4.18	5.50	6.77
Jordan	5.21	4.70	6.79	4.89	Cape Verde	5.34	4.40	4.99	6.14
Bahrain	4.96	4.13	7.33	4.48	Seychelles	4.77	4.05	5.62	4.80
Israel	4.71	6.39	4.52	3.49	Mauritius	4.61	3.65	5.60	4.82
Tunisia	4.61	3.72	6.11	4.60					
United Arab Emirates	4.61	3.81	6.63	4.17					
Qatar	4.55	3.92	6.14	4.26					

Appendix B: Graphical representation of selected relationships

Relation of Human Rights to Fragility -- Freedom House




Relation of Human Rights to Fragility -- CIRI Physical Integrity Index



The above graphs provide the average fragility scores for countries at each point on two human rights indices. The graph on the left plots average scores in relation to the Freedom House political and civil

liberties index, while the one on the right presents results for CIRI's Physical integrity index. Though the relationships are much less clear cut than for the CIRI empowerment index, nonetheless it is clear from both graphs that states with strong respect for human rights tend to be quite stable, as do the most brutal states. Those in between the two extremes tend to experience elevated levels of fragility, which gradually declines as states engage in better human rights practices.

Relation of Fund for Peace Failed State Index to CIFP Fragility Index



The graph at left plots CIFP's fragility index against the failed states index produced by the Fund for Peace project (FFP). Clearly, the two indices capture similar phenomena; however, CIFP features considerably greater country coverage, with data on 190 countries as opposed to 146 for FFP.