



Fragile States Country Report No. 11

Zimbabwe

October 2007

Events data coverage: September 2006 to February 2007

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
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FRAGILITY IN BRIEF Zimbabwe is extremely fragile; CIFP ranks it 34th out of 193 countries. The state is weak in **Authority**, **Legitimacy** and **Capacity** and the situation — characterized by rampant poverty, economic failure, and political strife and repression — is unlikely to improve under the leadership of President Robert Mugabe. His attempts to retain power since assuming office in 1980 have resulted in widespread abuse of human rights and civil liberties, and has proved disastrous for the country's economy. Despite the precipitous economic decline of recent years, Mugabe has nonetheless been determined to withstand Western political and economic reform pressure. This has led to stop-gap economic measures that do not address the sustainable economic developments needed to decrease state fragility. On the contrary, in many cases reforms actually worsened the situation. Numerically, Zimbabwe is considered at medium risk in terms of **Capacity**, placing it 63rd out of 193 countries. For both **Authority** and **Legitimacy**, Zimbabwe fares worse, ranking 35th for **Authority** and 20th for **Legitimacy**.


Events analysis reinforces these findings, and highlight the fact that the situation is continuing to worsen. Destabilizing events, often related to governance and economics, far outweighed stabilizing developments. Some stabilizing events were nevertheless notable, such as increased investment in the mining sector and cooperation with neighboring states on environmental protection and treatment of nationals. However, on the whole, events reflected the challenge of poor governance in Zimbabwe. This included widespread strikes by soldiers, public servants and impoverished workers, the most extensive since Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. Political power will shift eventually, if only because of Mugabe's advanced age. Yet, this transition is unlikely to be peaceful, considering Mugabe's history of endorsing violence and repression to remain in power.




Zimbabwe Authority (A), Legitimacy (L), and Capacity (C) Triangle

MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (MDGs): LIKELIHOOD OF ATTAINMENT						
Extreme Poverty and Hunger	Education	Gender Equality	Child Mortality	Maternal Mortality	HIV/AIDS & Malaria	Environmental Sustainability
Low	Low	Medium	Low	Low	Medium	Low

STRUCTURAL BASELINE & EVENTS SUMMARY



SUMMARY



“Zimbabwe’s key areas of fragility include governance, human development and the economy.”

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

Based on structural data, Zimbabwe’s key areas of fragility include governance, human development and the economy. These three areas of high risk are related, as the government’s capacity to foster economic growth is tied to the quality of life of its citizens. Zimbabwe has areas of somewhat lower fragility (demography, environment and security and crime). Yet, these areas have less impact on the overall fragility of Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe also scores poorly in overall measure **Authority, Legitimacy, and Capacity**, with the former scoring slightly better than the latter two. This can be attributed to the strong authority exercised by the Mugabe government, but few see this as legitimate or providing for the basic needs of Zimbabweans. Put differently, continuing state **Authority** has been won at the expense of reduced government **Legitimacy** and **Capacity**; as the latter two continue to decline, it seems likely that state **Authority** will begin to do so as well.

EVENTS

The events analysis underscores governance, human development and the economy as being the three high risk areas. Levels of democracy and restrictions on political rights are key issues of concern for governance. Events related to human development were related to the country’s lack of gender-related development and poor Human Development Index scores, and thus contributed to the country’s decline. Zimbabwe’s prospects of meeting the Millennium Development Goals are bleak; more immediate concerns include chronic food shortages. Economic indicators include a low GDP per capita and evidence of an extensive informal economy, the latter appearing in response to the failure of formal market institutions. Inflation has been and continues to be a key challenge, a consequence of poor economic management. This period witnessed drastic price hikes for most goods, from food to public transit. In short, during the period of observation Zimbabwe was unable to maintain the authority necessary to provide basic security, the capacity to provide basic social needs, and the political legitimacy to effectively represent its citizens at home and abroad.

KEY ISSUES AND FACTS

Security and Crime:

- Harsh police repression of opposition rallies and striking workers
- Rampant smuggling of diamonds, gold, and other precious minerals from mines
- Curfews often imposed in urban areas

Economics:

- World’s highest inflation rate, over 1000% leading to widespread poverty
- High rates of unemployment, estimated at between 70-80%
- Restricted Official Development Assistance because of mistrust of Mugabe’s regime in the international community
- Shortages of fuel, electricity, agricultural inputs
- Frequent strikes, particularly by teachers and healthcare workers

Human Development:

- Lowest life expectancy rates in the world
- Increasing HIV/AIDS rates
- Food shortages

Governance:

- Presidential elections are set for 2008
- but Mugabe is attempting to prolong his term until 2010, a move resulting in widespread opposition, even within his own party. Such protests are a positive political sign
- Increased ties with China, Iran, and Russia while relations with Western countries continue to be strained
- The factions of the main opposition party, Movement for the Democratic Change, are trying to re-unite
- High levels of corruption

Environment:

- Diminished agricultural production due to poor land management, including official seizure of lands from white farmers, and drought

Demography:

- High rates of emigration, often illegal movement into neighbouring states

PRIMARY DRIVERS

ECONOMICS

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS Economic weakness is a major driver of state fragility. With a negative GDP growth at an estimated -4.4% in 2006, Zimbabwe's economy continues to contract. From 2000 to 2007, the economy declined by 40%, going from one of sub-Saharan Africa's strongest economies to one of its weakest. The inflation rate has soared, exceeding 1000%; some suggest that official sources are underreporting these already astronomical rates. The 1990's recession in the formal economy caused the informal economy to flourish, but even this sector has weakened. The withdrawal of western aid in 2002 also had a negative impact on the economy. Remittances from the diaspora are often intercepted by the central bank, placing much of the burden on the country's poor.

EVENTS Zimbabwe did experience some stabilizing events, including expanded economic cooperation with China and Iran and a lucrative beef trade deal with Hong Kong. Iran supported the re-opening of Zimbabwe's only oil refinery and helped build a new power plant to reduce current electricity shortages. However, these events were overshadowed by rising inflation, and overall, the economy appears on the verge of collapse. The population is increasingly unable to afford — and in some cases even locate — the most basic goods such as bread and milk. Current unemployment rates hover at around 80%. Many of those who are employed in key sectors, such as education and healthcare, went on strike en masse to protest their working conditions and lack of resources. The economy was further stunted by the Land Reform Program, which has detrimentally affected agricultural output in Zimbabwe. Almost all white-owned commercial farms have been expropriated without feasible plans for ensuring ongoing productivity of these farms.

KEY EVENTS

- **"Confidential' Report Warns Country 'In State of Economic Crisis'**
ZimOnline, 9 October 2006
The government acknowledges the opposition's accusation that the economic crisis due to poor governance
- **'Look East' Policy Said 'Unproductive'**
AFP, 16 October 2006
Economic turnaround will not occur simply through new deals with non-western countries

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS Human development levels are very low and continue to fall. According to the UNDP Human Development Index, Zimbabwe's score has decreased in recent years, and the country currently rests at 151 of 177 states. The UN Human Poverty Index ranks Zimbabwe 88th out of 102 countries in 2004. In that year, over 80% of the population was living on under \$2 a day. Though there has been a drop in the level of HIV/AIDS infection, the rate is still extremely high. HIV/AIDS continues to be a major source of the increasing mortality rate and the fact that Zimbabwe has the highest number of orphans in the world. On a positive note, literacy rates and primary school enrolment levels have remained relatively high. Still, the numbers have dropped as teachers strike or leave the country, resources dwindle, and school fees rise.


EVENTS Events confirm that poverty is one of the primary challenges facing Zimbabwe and a major contributor to state fragility. Poor land management combined with drought and flooding have led to a food shortage that has lasted for the past six years and is worsening. Still, the government has demonstrated considerable commitment to combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic as well as other diseases, and the World Health Organisation has helped strengthen ongoing programmes to combat malaria. The government also gave the World Food Programme permission to resume food aid to thousands of Zimbabweans, a positive move in light of food shortages. However, fuel shortages and persistent rains delayed assistance. Furthermore, child and maternal mortality rates have increased due to rising healthcare costs, among other factors.

KEY EVENTS

- **Zimbabwe's Prospects To Meet UN Millennium Development Goals 'Bleak'**
Financial Gazette, 9 November 2006
Human development levels continue to drop as a result of poor governance and the economic crisis
- **Poverty in Zimbabwe Increasing**
Daily Mirror, 1 December 2006
Number of people living below the food poverty line has increased by 29% since 2003

Medium-risk


Average Events Score and Tendency



Avg Score: -0.25
Trend Score: -0.72

Medium-risk

Average Events Score and Tendency



Avg Score: -0.23
Trend Score: 0.03

PRIMARY DRIVERS



GOVERNANCE

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS Governance problems are responsible for much of the recent turmoil and resulting fragility in Zimbabwe. The government, led by President Mugabe's ZANU-PF party, is challenged in almost all areas, with high levels of corruption, weakened democratic institutions and restrictions on political freedoms. The latter result from the suppression and violence employed by Mugabe's government to remain in power. The government's resistance to Western reform pressure has resulted in short-term policies that do not fully address the dire economic situation. The result has been an overall system of governance that is highly dependent on corruption to ensure loyalty.

EVENTS Events on average were decidedly negative; the moderately stabilizing trend observed during the period of observation was not due to any change in government policies, but is instead a reflection of the growing opposition to Mugabe. This has spread beyond the opposition to include civil society organizations and members of Mugabe's own party. This Internal discord emerged as a backlash to Mugabe's campaign to extend his term until 2010. Since his announcement to extend his term in December 2006, condemnation of the decision has been widespread. Mugabe has continued his 'Look East' policy, expanding ties with China and Iran in the agriculture, energy, tourism, and industrial sectors. Land reform has also continued, as the government seized farms from the few remaining white farmers. One stabilizing development was that the government has begun to more closely monitor the trafficking of goods and people at the borders. The government also began to build houses in rural provinces in an attempt to address homelessness, though the problem was largely created by Mugabe's own decision to destroy illegal housing in 2005. The November 2006 decision to amend the constitution and create a Human Rights Commission appeared to be a positive development, though the legitimacy of the initiative fell when civil society organizations pulled out of the discussions due to disagreements with the government regarding the definition of civil society.

KEY EVENTS

- **Officials ready to expose biggest post-1980 state corruption case**
The Independent, 28 October 2006
The scandal indicates pervasiveness of corruption in Zimbabwe
- **Land reform programme goes under international scrutiny**
The Independent, 8 December 2006
Evicted Dutch farmers take case to International Court, raising international profile of Mugabe's policies
- **ZANU-PF MPs launch "Stop Mugabe Campaign"**
The Independent, 22 December 2007
Unprecedented display of opposition to Mugabe's plan to extend his term from his own party members
- **President Robert Mugabe's plan to extend his term of office in tatters**
The Independent, 9 February 2007
Resistance to Mugabe's plan to extend his term until 2010 helps pave the way for a negotiated transition



SECONDARY DRIVERS


SECURITY AND CRIME

SUMMARY Security of individuals and respect for human rights is another area of weakness in Zimbabwe. The ongoing clashes between opposition groups and the police result in political instability, and the high number of refugees contributes to regional volatility. Over 500,000 people have been internally displaced as a result of land reform programs, political violence, human rights violations and economic collapse. Illegal trafficking of people and goods continues to present a major problem at border posts, as does smuggling of precious stones and minerals from mines. The population has little respect for the police as a security enforcer given its reputation for brutally cracking down on government dissidents. Government oppression of opposition parties and organizations through the military and the police is widespread and often violent. The underfunded prison system is unable to meet basic needs of prisoners, and desertions within the defence forces have been increasing as the government can no longer afford to provide incentives to guarantee loyalty.

SECONDARY DRIVERS


ENVIRONMENT

SUMMARY Agriculture was previously a key source of revenue for Zimbabwe, a country rich in natural resources. Poor land management, exacerbated by natural disasters, has since resulted in the depletion of natural resources and reduced agricultural output. The most serious environmental problem for Zimbabwe is thus the erosion of agricultural lands and deforestation. The mining sector has also damaged the environment, and the country is estimated to have the world's highest DDT concentrations in its agricultural produce, caused by the fight against malaria. Persistent rains and drought alternatively have reduced crop yield, contributing to the ongoing food shortage. Consumption of energy and solid fuels is very high and the current fuel shortage has had a negative impact on the economy. Positively, Zimbabwe has set up protected wildlife parks and forest reserves, likely tied to tourism. During the past six months, there have been some movement towards regional cooperation to manage shared resources. This includes a meeting of water experts to discuss the Zambezi River and the creation of a cross-border conversation park with Zambia, Angola, Namibia, and Botswana.



DEMOGRAPHY

SUMMARY Zimbabwe is experiencing a major youth bulge; approximately 37% of the population is under 15 years of age. This is particularly worrisome in the context of economic decline and political crises, creating a recipe for increasing civil unrest. Economic and political turmoil has both increased education and healthcare costs and reduced prospects for employment. Infant mortality rates have increased since 2000 and fertility rates have declined by over 50% in the past twenty years, which the government attributes to its family planning programs. High rates of migration are indicative of the government's lack of provision for the basic needs of its citizens. Demography risk factors are closely linked to both human development and the environment. Rapid urbanization contributes to the depletion of natural resources, the spread of disease and an increase in the number of people living in squalid, cramped conditions.



CANADA AND ZIMBABWE

CANADIAN CONTRIBUTIONS

- **Support to Legal Resources Foundation**
Project duration: 2005-2008
CIDA contribution: \$2 million
Legal and human rights education for the poor
- **The Ruvheneko Centre Program**
Project duration: 2004-2007
CIDA contribution: \$1.6 million
Building capacity of churches and communities for HIV/AIDS prevention, care, mitigation
- **Right, Democracy and Governance Fund – Phase III**
Project Duration: 2003-2010
CIDA contribution: \$4.5 million
Funding civil society project on human rights, democracy and good governance
- **Zvitambo Project**
Project Duration: 2003-2007
CIDA contribution: \$4.6 million
Improve HIV care and prevention in rural mission hospitals
- **Program Support Unit – Phase III**
Project Duration: 2005-2009
CIDA contribution: \$2,105,000
Supports sector experts in gender and governance to advise CIDA on its programs and objectives

LINKS

- **Canadian exports to Zimbabwe (2006):** CAD \$6,406,730 – primarily chemical, mechanical, electrical products and machinery as well as vehicles and equipment (Statistics Canada)
- **Canadian imports from Zimbabwe (2006):** CAD \$2,234,712 – primarily food products, minerals, base metals, glass and stone (Statistics Canada)
- **Zimbabwean Diaspora in Canada (2001):** In the 1996-2001 period Statistics Canada reported 675 immigrants and 675 non-permanent residents making a current total of 4,090
- **Development engagement:** In 2002, Canada withdrew all official direct assistance along with the US and the EU in protest of Mugabe's government. Aid is now channelled through NGOs. In 2003-04, CIDA contributed \$16.42 million to strengthen civil society organizations and provide humanitarian assistance.

(Data from CIDA, 2007, and DFAIT, 2006)

6—12 MONTH SCENARIOS

BASELINE LIKELY CASE *BASED ON MOST LIKELY*

ASSUMPTIONS FOR EACH CLUSTER

Mugabe maintains his position. The opposition continues to be divided and cannot present a clear alternative to Mugabe's party. Opposition to Mugabe's plan to extend his term is not strong enough to remove him from power, though does expose limits on his power. Nonetheless, Mugabe pushes forward with plans to stay in office until 2010, while maintaining his anti-West position. The economic situation continues to worsen with rising inflation. Bilateral economic deals with China, Iran, and other countries do not reverse economic decline. As a result of the ongoing economic problems, poverty rates increase and health needs go unmet. Refugee flows to neighbouring states and the degradation of natural resources continue. Illegal mining diminishes potential income for government. Members of the armed forces continue to desert, as reduced paycheques prove unable to ensure loyalty to Mugabe's regime.

ALTERNATIVE LIKELY CASE *BASED ON VARIATION IN WEAK-*

EST ASSUMPTION — REACTION TO MUGABE'S TERM EXTENSION PLANS

Factions within the official opposition party (MDC) unite and begin to present a clear, cohesive alternative to Mugabe. They negotiate a power sharing arrangement with disgruntled members of Mugabe's party (ZANU-PF) who also want to see Mugabe removed from power. Regional organizations, such as the South African Development Community (SADC), have a key role in these discussions. Mugabe continues to order the violent oppression of his opposition. Mugabe's political rallies have a reduced effect, as the population starts to expect a 2008 takeover by a new government formed by MDC and ZANU-PF. Expectations grow that a new government will be able to turn the economic situation around and address the widespread poverty plaguing the country.

BEST CASE *BASED ON ASSUMPTION THAT MUGABE DECIDES NOT TO*

RUN FOR THE 2008 ELECTIONS

After a series of peaceful protests by the MDC and facing pressure from within ZANU-PF, Mugabe agrees to hold presidential elections in 2008 and not to run again. The reversal of his decision to extend his term is heralded by western states and international organizations as a positive step towards good governance. Levels of official development assistance accordingly increase. The economic forecast improves slightly due to renewed aid as well as the benefits from deals with China and Iran. Emigration rates decrease slightly as people are more willing to stay and licit foreign investment increases as a result of the change in Mugabe's plans. Food aid from NGOs reduces mortality rates.

WORST CASE *BASED ON ASSUMPTION THAT MUGABE IS FORCIBLY*

REMOVED FROM POWER

Mugabe is forcibly removed from power by disgruntled members of his own party and the armed forces. However, infighting in both MDC and ZANU-PF mean that there is no viable government alternative. Political chaos ensues, and both violence and looting are prevalent. The overthrow of Mugabe's regime increases economic instability, and partners such as China and Iran are no longer able or willing to implement deals. Poverty rates increase, and healthcare, sanitation and education needs are not met due to political turmoil. Mortality rates from droughts and flooding greatly increase without any coordinated government relief efforts. Refugee flows rise, causing regional instability. Environmental degradation increases as the population ignores the effect of improper land use in an attempt to sustain themselves.

POSSIBLE POLICY ENTRY POINTS

Security & Crime:

- Support cooperation with neighbouring states to develop strong border security measures
- Strongly condemn incidences of police brutality and urge condemnations from like-minded states

Economics:

- Focus on economic development at the community level, working with local NGOs to improve agricultural training and provide farming equipment to promote sustainable livelihoods

Governance:

- Apply diplomatic pressure condemning Mugabe's plan to extend his term
- Develop the capacities of NGOs to educate people about good governance
- Provide support for the reunification of the official opposition party in order to ensure a strong alternative to ZANU-PF
- Discuss with China and Iran the need for political reform in Zimbabwe


Human Development:

- Support NGOs working to reduce poverty through education and job skills training
- Support Zimbabwe's MDG education targets for 2015

Environment:


- Support education at the local level about proper land management
- Encourage discussions between neighbouring states about management of shared natural resources

MAPS



EVENTS MONITORING CHARTS

TABLE 1: OVERALL EVENTS CHART




READING THE EVENTS CHART

Red line (solid): Trend line for events; downward slope left to right is negative

Blue line (solid): Trend line for number of events

Purple line (dotted): This indicates the sum total scores of events (positive or negative), as coded in the event monitoring process; the red trend line is derived from these values.

TABLE 2: GOVERNANCE EVENTS CHART




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TABLE 3: HUMAN DEVELOPMENT EVENTS CHART




READING THE EVENTS CHART

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Blue line (solid): Trend line for number of events

Purple line (dotted): This indicates the sum total scores of events (positive or negative), as coded in the event monitoring process; the red trend line is derived from these values.

TABLE 4: ECONOMICS EVENTS CHART



READING THE EVENTS CHART

Red line (solid): Trend line for events; downward slope left to right is negative

Blue line (solid): Trend line for number of events

Purple line (dotted): This indicates the sum total scores of events (positive or negative), as coded in the event monitoring process; the red trend line is derived from these values.

INDEX METHODOLOGY

Like its predecessor the CIFP conflict risk index, the fragility index employs a methodology of relative structural assessment. The analysis begins with a structural profile of the country, a composite index that measures overall country fragility along six dimensions or clusters: governance, economics, security, human development, demography and environment. Each of these clusters is based on a number of indicators; for example, indicators under the 'economics cluster' include economic growth, gross domestic product, inflation and unemployment, etc. The data is further analyzed to provide insight into relative state strength and weakness along three dimensions of 'stateness', namely authority, legitimacy, and capacity. This multidimensional assessment methodology is a direct response to the multi-causal nature of fragility and failure; states can weaken in any number of ways, such that any attempt to attribute fragility to a single deterministic set of causal variables inevitably remains underdetermined, capturing only a limited subset of all fragile states. Instead, CIFP adopts a more inductive approach, identifying areas of relative strength and weakness across all measures of state performance.

In ranking state performance on a given indicator, global scores are distributed across a nine-point index. The best performing state receives a score of one, the worst a score of nine, and the rest continuously distributed between these two extremes based on relative performance. As country performance for some types of data can vary significantly from year to year – as in the case of economic shocks, natural disasters, and other externalities – averages are taken for global rank scores over a five-year time frame. Once all indicators have been indexed using this method, the results for a given country are then averaged in each fragility cluster to produce the final scores for the country.

In general, a high score – 6.5 or higher – indicates that a country is performing poorly relative to other states. Such a score may be indicative of an arbitrary and autocratic government, a history of non-transparent government, the presence of significant barriers to political participation, the absence of a consistently enforced legal framework, or a poor human rights record.

A low score – in the range of 1 to 3.5 – indicates that a country is performing well relative to others, or that a country's structural conditions present little cause for concern. Values in the moderate 3.5 to 6.5 range indicate performance approaching the global mean.

Score	Description
1-3.5	Country performing well relative to others
3.5-6.5	Country performing at or around the median
6.5+	Country performing poorly relative to others

EVENTS MONITORING METHODOLOGY

SUMMARY

The purpose of CIFP event monitoring is to observe and report on events within a country to better understand the dynamic trends affecting democratic processes and governance in the country. This data, when combined with structural data, provides a more comprehensive analysis of both the underlying conditions and recent developments, thereby informing a more nuanced and ultimately policy-relevant analysis.

In CIFP event monitoring methodology, events are all coded using a number of criteria. First, each event is assigned to the specific cluster area to which it is *most directly* related, either governance, economics, security and crime, human development, demography, or environment. Second, the event is coded as being either stabilizing or destabilizing to the state. The event score is then determined by answering the following three questions:

1. How direct is the impact of the event on state stability?
2. How broad is the impact of the event?
3. How intense is the event, in comparison with past events in the country?

Each question is answered quantitatively using a three-point scale.

EVENTS MONITORING METHODOLOGY

COMPONENTS OF THE COMPOSITE EVENT SCORE

- CAUSAL RELEVANCE**
1. Event is relevant, but with no clearly delineable direct causal linkage to state stability or fragility (e.g. an announcement of funding, or an international soccer friendly).
 2. Event is relevant, with a delineable, though indirect causal linkage to state stability or fragility (e.g. New legislation enhancing minority rights is passed, or a bomb detonates within an ethnically divided region).
 3. Event is relevant with a delineable and direct causal linkage to state fragility (e.g. Declaration of a ceasefire or the assassination of a government minister.)

CENTRALITY

1. Event affects less than 25% of political stakeholders.
2. Event affects 25% - 75% of political stakeholders.
3. Event affects more than 75% of political stakeholders.

INTENSITY/ESCALATION

1. Event is comparable to others experienced in the state in the previous six months.
2. Event is more intense than others experienced in the state in the previous six months.
3. Event is more intense than others experienced in the state in the previous five years.


STAKEHOLDERS

As part of the initial country profile, the analyst compiles a list of stakeholders. Stakeholders are those individuals or groups that possess an identifiable, broadly similar political agenda and either have an effect on or are affected by state stability or fragility. They often have an organizational structure in addition to sufficient resources to pursue explicitly or implicitly articulated goals.

EVENT ANALYSIS

The analysis occurs in both aggregate (all events) and disaggregate (events analysed by cluster) by using quantitative data in two ways. First, **summary statistics** provide the analyst with an overview of the average event scores. Positive average event scores are indicative of an environment that experiences more or more significant positive events than negative events. Negative average scores indicate the opposite.

Example Summary Graph



Tendency Key	Negative Slope	Status quo Slope	Positive Slope
OLS Slope value	Below -0.1	Between -.1 and .1	Above +0.1
Symbol			

The second avenue of analysis is via **regression lines** to observe whether the events demonstrate any positive or negative tendency over time (left).

These two types of information — average event score and event tendency — are combined into a single graph (see right). The graph may be thought of as analogous to a thermometer and

barometer. The risk score given at the top of the graph — color-coded as green, yellow, or red — is based upon the structural analysis for a given cluster. The colour indicates the relative level of risk in the cluster, and may be thought of as the “thermometer,” providing an indication of the overall risk in the country. The arrow and bar below may be thought of as the “barometer”, providing both the average event score and the event tendency, which are akin to the level and direction of barometric pressure, respectively.

SCENARIO GENERATION

The report includes scenarios for the country’s fragility over the short term, normally 6-18 months. Normally, the analysis includes four scenarios: a baseline case, an alternative case, a best-case, and a worst-case. Each is based on an analysis of overall and cluster summary statistics and trends, as well as stakeholder interests. The best-case identifies the most positive outcome possible (most conducive to stable democratic governance and poverty reduction) in the near future. Conversely, the worst-case scenario identifies the opposite. These two scenarios are intended to highlight different facets of the situation for the reader, by considering the strongest trends among stabilizing and destabilizing events, drawing attention both to dominant threats and potential points of entry. Finally, the baseline and alternative scenarios extrapolate future tendencies based on analysts best assumptions for the state, again combined with likely stakeholder interaction. Dominant trends—those most likely to continue in each of the 6 dimensions of fragility over the next six to eighteen months—become underlying assumptions. These are then combined to form an overall portrait of the country for the near term, providing a baseline “likely” scenario. The alternative case simply considers what would happen if the weakest of these assumptions did not hold, thereby giving some indication of the scenarios’ robustness. Taken together, the scenarios define both the probable and potential developments in the country over the near term. Such insights may inform contingency policy planning processes, and provide some basis for benchmarks with which to evaluate the success of initiatives intended to improve state fragility.

STRUCTURAL DATA (SOURCE AND SCALE OF RAW DATA IN PARENTHESES)	Cluster avg.	Fragility index score	Fragility index rank	Raw Data -- Five year avg	Last Year of Data	Trend Score
1. Governance	7.05					
Freedom of the Press (FH, index, 0-100)		8.7	6	87.8	2006	s.q.
Gov't Effectiveness (WB Governance Matters, index, Deviation from mean)		8.1	21	-1.1	2005	*
Level of Corruption (TI, index, 0-10)		7.4	41	2.5	2006	s.q.
Level of Democracy (Polity IV, index, (-10 - 10))		8.2	23	-6.4	2004	neg
Level of participation in international political organizations (CIFP)		4.5	97	6.0	2005	*
Percentage of Female Parliamentarians, index, (WB WDI)		5.5	89	11.1	2005	s.q.
Permanence of Regime Type (Polity IV, years since regime change)		4.2	96	15.0	2004	s.q.
Refugees hosted (UNHCR, total)		5.7	62	10318.6	2005	neg
Restrictions on Civil Liberties (FH, index, 1-7)		7.9	11	6.0	2005	s.q.
Restrictions on Political Rights (FH, index, 1-7)		7.4	18	6.4	2005	neg
Rule of Law (WB GM, Deviation from mean)		8.6	8	-1.5	2005	*
Voice and Accountability in Decision-making (WB GM, Dev. from mean)		8.5	15	-1.6	2005	*
2. Economics	5.79					
Economic growth — Percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		8.8	1	-5.8	2005	neg
Economic Size — Relative (WB WDI, GDP per capita, constant 2000 US\$)		7.1	43	492.7	2005	neg
Economic Size — Total (WB WD, GDP, constant 2000 US\$)		5.6	78	6.33E+09	2005	neg
External Debt — percentage of GNI (WB WDI)		3.0	100	33.4	2004	*
FDI — percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		2.1	149	0.4	2004	s.q.
Foreign Aid — percent of Central Government Expenditures (WB WDI)	
Foreign Aid — Total per capita (WB WDI)		3.6	116	14.3	2004	s.q.
Inequality — GINI Coefficient (WB WDI)		7.5	23	50.1	2003	*
Inflation (WB WDI)		8.8	2	72.6	2002	neg
Informal Economy — Black Market (Heritage Fund, Index, 1-5)		5.2	44	4.0	2006	s.q.
Informal Economy — Ratio of PPP to GDP (WB WDI)		7.4	31	4.2	2005	neg
Infrastructure — Reliability of Electricity Supply (WB, % output lost)		7.3	26	20.2	2003	s.q.
Infrastructure — Telephone mainlines per 1000 inhabitants (WB)		7.1	46	22.1	2004	s.q.
Infrastructure — Internet Usage per 1000 inhabitants (WB)	
Investment Climate — Contract Regulation (Heritage Foundation, Index, 1-5)		4.9	20	4.0	2006	s.q.
Level of participation in international economic organizations (CIFP)		2.7	149	7.0	2005	*
Paying Taxes (WB Doing Business, global rank)		5.2	81	94.0	2006	*
Regulatory Quality (WB GM, deviation from mean)		8.9	3	-2.1	2005	*
Remittances Received — percentage of GDP (WB)	
Reserve Holdings — Total (WB)		6.8	49	2.73E+08	2002	neg
Trade Balance — percentage of GDP (WB)	
Trade Openness — percentage of GDP (WB)		6.2	54	111.4	2005	pos
Unemployment — Total (WB)		3.8	62	7.1	2002	*
Percentage of Women in the Labour Force (WB)		3.9	114	44.2	2005	neg
3. Security & Crime	5.25					
Conflict intensity (Uppasala PRIO, number of conflict-related deaths)		1.0	35	0.0	2005	*
Dependence on External Military Support (FFP, Index, 1-10)		6.6	34	7.4	2006	*
Human Rights — Empowerment (CIRI, Index, 0-10)		7.9	30	2.2	2004	neg
Human Rights — Physical Integrity (CIRI, Index, 0-8)		7.7	34	3.0	2004	s.q.
Military Expenditure — percentage of GDP (WDI)		5.5	45	2.8	2004	pos
Political Stability (WB GM, deviation from mean)		8.4	13	-1.7	2005	*
Refugees Produced (WB, total)		4.9	89	4225.1	2004	neg
Risk of ethnic Rebellion (CIFP, based on MaR dataset)		4.3	67	3.0	2005	*
Terrorism -- Number of fatalities (US NCTC, number of fatalities)		3.7	68	0.5	2005	*
Terrorism -- Number of Incidents (US NCTC, number of incidents)		2.6	96	0.5	2005	*

STRUCTURAL DATA (CONT'D)

4. Human Development	6.53					
Access to Improved Water (WB, percent of the population)	6.1	63	81.0	2004	*	
Access to Sanitation (WB, percent of the population)	6.2	58	53.0	2004	*	
Education — Primary Completion — female (WB, percent)	6.3	48	82.4	2003	*	
Education — Primary Completion — total (WB, percent)	6.1	51	84.5	2003	*	
Education — Primary Enrolment — total (WB, percent)	6.1	51	84.5	2003	*	
Education — Primary Enrolment — Ratio Female to Male (WB)	5.3	76	97.4	2003	s.q.	
Food Security — Aid as percentage of total consumption (FAO STAT)	8.2	15	7.1	2001	*	
Gender Empowerment Measure (UNDP, index, 0-1)	
Gender-related Development Index (UNDP, index, 0-1)	7.3	37	0.5	2004	neg	
Health Infrastructure — Expenditures as a percentage of GDP (WB)	2.4	155	8.3	2003	s.q.	
HIV/AIDS — New AIDS Cases Reported (UN, total)	
HIV/AIDS — Percent of Adult Females Infected (WB)	7.3	24	58.7	2005	*	
HIV/AIDS — Percent of Adult population infected (WB)	8.8	4	21.1	2005	*	
Human Development Index (UNDP, index 0-1)	7.5	32	0.5	2004	neg	
Infant Mortality (WB, per 1000 live births)	7.2	44	76.2	2004	*	
Literacy (WB, percent of population age 15 and above)	
Literacy — female (WB, percent of female population age 15 and above)	
5. Demography	5.25					
Life Expectancy — Female (WB)	9.0	1	37.6	2004	*	
Life Expectancy — Total (WB)	8.9	1	37.9	2004	*	
Migration — Estimated Net Rate (UN)	5.8	73	-0.8	2005	*	
Population Density (WB, population per square km)	3.3	133	33.2	2005	s.q.	
Population Diversity — Ethnic (CIFP)	1.7	135	0.0	2005	*	
Population Diversity — Religious (CIFP)	7.6	28	0.6	2005	*	
Population Growth (WB, annual percent)	3.2	142	0.6	2005	s.q.	
Slum Population — proportion of population (WDI, UN)	1.1	99	0.0	2001	*	
Urban Growth Rate — Annual percent (WB)	4.7	102	1.9	2005	s.q.	
Youth Bulge — Percent aged 0-14 of total population (WB)	7.0	44	41.0	2005	s.q.	
6. Environment	5.36					
Arable/fertile land availability (WB, hectares per person)	3.7	132	0.3	2002	s.q.	
Consumption — Commercial energy consumption per capita (UN, kg of oil equivalent)	3.8	120	378.5	2003	pos	
Consumption — Use of solid fuels (UN, percent of population using)	6.9	47	73.0	2003	*	
Disaster Risk Index, (UNDP, average number of deaths per million)	4.2	105	0.5	2001	*	
Ecological Footprint — Global hectares per capita (WWF, Global Footprint Network)	2.7	118	0.9	2003	*	
Water — Annual withdrawal (FAO STAT, percent of total renewable)	6.5	49	21.0	2002	*	
Water — Available renewable per capita (FAO STAT, m ³ /inhabitants/year)	7.3	39	1550.5	2006	*	
Forest — Annual percent change in area (FAO)	8.1	17	-1.7	2005	*	
Pollution — CO ₂ emissions per capita (WB, metric tons per capita)	4.1	107	1.1	2002	pos	
Pollution — CO ₂ emissions per dollar PPP (WB, kg per 2000 US\$ PPP)	6.2	54	0.5	2002	s.q.	
TOTAL	5.92					

For trend scores, (s.q.) indicates continuation of status quo, (pos) indicates a positive trend toward stability, and (neg) indicates a negative trend toward fragility. (*) indicates insufficient data for calculation of trend and volatility scores.

STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

GOVERNMENT (ZANU-PF PARTY)

- ZANU-PF leader Robert Mugabe was elected Prime Minister in 1980 and changed the Constitution in 1987 to make himself President. ZANU-PF has won every election since 1980 but allegations of corruption and vote rigging are widespread.
- Mugabe played a key role in ending white rule in Zimbabwe, formerly Rhodesia

Interests

- Remaining in power
- Land reform to take land from white farmers and transfer it to black Zimbabweans
- Relying on non-Western countries for trade and development where political reforms are not a pre-requisite

Recent Actions and Attitude

- Mugabe's government has taken an aggressive approach to dissenters, including banning rallies, widespread arrests and police brutality
- "Look East" policy: develop closer ties with China and Iran
- Mugabe wants to extend his term until 2010, and he plans to run again in 2010. This plan has sparked some opposition within ZANU-PF
- Corruption scandals involving senior politicians looting from state-owned steel manufacturer Zisco and the importation of sub-standard fertilizer from South Africa

POPULATION

Interests

- Economic stability and prosperity
- Reduced poverty
- Freedom of speech
- Full democratic participation

Recent Actions and Attitude

- There have been more strikes in the last six months of events analysis than since Zimbabwe's independence in 1980
- More than 65% of Zimbabweans are living below the poverty line and unemployment is hovering around 80%

OPPOSITION – MOVEMENT FOR A DEMOCRATIC CHANGE (MDC)

- Official opposition divided into two factions, one led by Morgan Tsvangirai and the other by Arthur Mutambara
- Roots of party are in the labour movement
- In the 2005 parliamentary elections the MDC won 39.5% of the vote and denounced the elections as fraudulent

Interests

- Forming the next government of Zimbabwe with the aim of better managing the country's resources and reversing the economic crisis
- Promoting opposition to Mugabe's government, often staging protest rallies

Recent Actions and Attitude

- MDC has organized and supported a number of political rallies and strikes in the past months
- MDC is strongly opposed to Mugabe's plan to move the presidential elections until 2010
- The two factions have been making attempts to re-unite

ZIMBABWE DEFENCE FORCES

Interests

- Maintain order within the current political regime that provides incentives for military loyalty to Mugabe; top officials are Mugabe supporters

Recent Actions and Attitude

- Senior military officials have become increasingly involved in government, particularly the issue of Mugabe's successor
- Desertions from the army have been increasing as economic crisis makes 'loyalty payments' difficult
- Police banning protest rallies and arresting and raiding the homes of suspected dissidents
- Police campaigns to ensure loyalty to Commissioner and Mugabe

STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

OPPOSITION CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS AND LABOUR UNIONS

Interests

- Bring about democratic change
- Coordinate activities and increase capacity to deal with socio-economic and political crises
- Ensure the economic, social, and constitutional freedom of workers through promoting good governance

Recent Actions and Attitude

- A group of civil society organizations from Zimbabwe attended the African Commission on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR) in Gambia and rejected assertions by a government delegation that President Robert Mugabe was addressing human rights concerns
- Multiple political arrests; Members of these opposition groups frequently harassed and assaulted by police
- Staged a number of strikes and rallies
- Church leaders presented a national vision document to Mugabe

NEIGHBOURING STATES

- Botswana
- South Africa
- Zambia
- Mozambique
- Namibia
- Democratic Republic of the Congo

Interests

- Maintaining secure borders to prevent the illegal flow of people, goods and narcotics
- Protecting shared natural resources and increasing regional prosperity through trade

Recent action and attitudes

- South Africa continued engagement with Mugabe, but tensions rose when Zimbabwe refused air clearance for South Africa's SOS international air medical team for undisclosed reasons
- Zimbabwe has launched an intensive operation to reduce human trafficking and illegal trade at the borders
- Zimbabwe seized 24 coaches from the DRC Railway Authority to recover a US \$3 million debt
- Water experts from Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe met to discuss how to increase and maximise benefits from the robust water-course without over-exploiting the resource

WESTERN STATES AND INTERNATIONAL/ REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Interests

- Respect for democratic freedom and civil rights
- Economic stability and prosperity in Zimbabwe to contribute to wider development of the region
- Reintegration of Zimbabwe to global economy

Recent action and attitudes

- Zimbabwe has given permission to the World Food Programme to resume providing food aid to thousands of Zimbabweans
- Britain encouraged EU to maintain sanctions against Zimbabwe when current sanctions expired in February
- Sweden contributed \$6 million for Zimbabwe's orphans
- IMF renewed sanctions against Zimbabwe
- SADC refused to bow to EU pressure to have regional bloc apply pressure on Mugabe's government
- Sweden commended greater female representation in Zimbabwe's Senate
- UN Country team expresses dismay over Mugabe's endorsement of police attacks on labour leaders
- US continues to support HIV/AIDS programs in Zimbabwe despite differences between governments

CHINA AND IRAN

Interests

- Supporting Zimbabwe's anti-Western stance
- Developing trade and diplomatic ties with Zimbabwe
- Accessing Zimbabwe's extensive natural resources

Recent Actions and Attitude

- China is expanding partnerships with Zimbabwe on infrastructure, minerals, agriculture, telecom, tourism
- Iran is seeking to increase investment in the energy, automobile, industrial, and agricultural sectors
- Iran will construct a power plant for Zimbabwe, which is experiencing major electricity shortages, and also re-launch the country's only oil refinery

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Bulawayo Chronicle (Bulawayo)	The Standard (China)
Agence France Presse	The Star (South Africa)
Business Day (South Africa)	The Zimbabwean (United Kingdom)
Daily Mirror (Zimbabwe)	VOA News (USA)
Fars News Agency (Iran)	Zim Online (South Africa)
Financial Gazette (Zimbabwe)	Xinhua (China)
Mehr News Agency (Iran)	Zimbabwe Independent (Zimbabwe)
Newzimbabwe.com (Zimbabwe)	Zimbabwe Times (United Kingdom)
	Zim Daily (UK, USA, Australia)

ABOUT THE STATE FRAGILITY PROJECT

This project is intended to contribute to a better understanding of fragility in Zimbabwe, thereby providing support to decision-making for Canadian foreign policy and development actors in the country. The project aims to support informed, evidence-based decision making for Canadian foreign policy and development assistance related to fragile states. The report is intended to communicate the preliminary findings of the project; its findings should not be considered definitive or final.

The report is based on three elements. First, structural indicators are grouped into six clusters capturing different facets of state fragility: Security and Crime, Governance, Economics, Human Development, Environment and Demography. The structural data includes more than 80 separate structural indicators providing a detailed quantitative baseline portrait of the country.

Second, the analysis draws on event monitoring data compiled by CIFP researchers over a six month period extending from September 2006 to February 2007. Collected from a variety of web-based news aggregators, which include both international and domestic news sources, the events are evaluated and assigned quantitative scores to identify fragility trends. Third, the report includes a series of analytical exercises, including stakeholder analysis and scenario generation. This multi-source data structure enables more robust analysis than any single method of data collection and assessment.

ABOUT COUNTRY INDICATORS FOR FOREIGN POLICY

CIFP is a project located at Carleton University. Its core mandate is to develop analytical methodologies that will generate information on the key features of the political, economic, social and cultural environments of countries around the world, providing at-a-glance global overviews, issue-based perspectives and country performance measures. While the initial dataset focuses on measures of domestic armed conflict, as part of this project that database has been substantially revised to capture state fragility.

The CIFP database includes statistical data in the form of over one hundred performance indicators for 197 countries. With its focus on policy relevance, the CIFP provides a rich information resource to policy officers across all government departments. By offering a detailed assessment methodology for evaluating individual country performance, the CIFP provides guidance to program officers working in complex and fragile environments, enabling them to focus their efforts and resources on the root structural causes rather than the outward symptoms of a problem.

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ABOUT FRAGILITY

CIFP employs fragility as the most effective lens through which to view state risk, broadly understood. Though the use of the concept of the concept remains controversial, when properly understood as a technical term of country analysis, it enables analysts to conduct a more thorough assessment of country risk than more specific concepts such as conflict or human development, both of which are effectively components of overall state fragility. Further, the concept allows the incorporation of environmental, demographic, political, and economic considerations, providing a more complete portrait of a state's overall risk than narrow examination of any one of those factors. In effect, the concept incorporates all such areas of study into a complete analysis of the risks present in a given state or region.

When understood in this sense, all states exhibit some elements of fragility, whether in the form of demographic stress, politicized ethnic divisions, high levels of pollution, the presence of internal conflict, or low levels of human development. Through the use of transparent and quantifiable data, CIFP strives to bring together all such phenomena into a coherent country narrative, thereby rendering the concept of fragility an objective aid to country analysis, rather than a divisive element of subjective political discourse.

www.carleton.ca/cifp

