



# Nepal

## A Risk Assessment Brief



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**Executive Summary**

Since 2006, Nepal's risk of conflict has marginally increased. While the 2006 risk index was 5.96, current estimates suggest an increase to 6.34. While governance and political stability, militarization, demographic stress, human development, and international linkages have improved since 2006, indicators demonstrating history of armed conflict, economic performance, and environmental stress indicate negative trends. Data was largely unavailable for 'population heterogeneity', but based on events and primary data this area has marginally improved since 2006.<sup>1</sup> Short-term instability in Nepal is anticipated, but there is a prospect of future long-term stabilization.

**Internal Stakeholders**

Government of Nepal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Main parties: UML; NC; MPRF; TMLP in a 22 member coalition</li> <li>• Led by Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal</li> <li>• Wants to remain in power</li> </ul>
CPN-M Communist Party of Nepal <sup>2</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Led by the very influential ex-Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda)</li> <li>• Largest party in the constituent assembly</li> <li>• Main opposition party since its withdrawal from the government</li> <li>• Has the ability to mobilize the masses to reignite the civil war</li> <li>• Wants control of the government and the military</li> </ul>
Military	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interested in who holds government power (as this affects the Maoist integration scheme and the composition of the military)</li> </ul>
Ethnic Minorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interested in who holds government power as it has the potential to affect their political, social, and economic rights</li> </ul>

**External Stakeholders**

India	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• India desires regional influence in South Asia. There are long historical, cultural, traditional and religious ties between Nepal and India and the Nepal-India trade treaty renewed in March 2007 promises to increase FTA effectiveness.<sup>3</sup></li> <li>• India and Nepal share a border which creates security concerns for India, particularly because it is currently facing a Maoist insurgency (known as the Naxalites) within its own borders. A sympathetic Maoist-led Nepal could provide a base of operations from which the Naxalites could operate. Consequently, India has an interest in ensuring that its border is secure and that its Maoist insurgency is not bolstered by the Maoist party within Nepal.<sup>4</sup></li> </ul>
China	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• China and India are the regional powerhouses of Asia and it is in China's interest to utilize the geostrategic position of Nepal in its rivalry with India. Consequently, China has been supportive of Nepal's Maoist party leader, Prachanda.<sup>5</sup></li> </ul>
United Nations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) began work in 2007.<sup>6</sup></li> <li>• UNMIN's primary task was to monitor the ceasefire and to provide electoral assistance. Its current goals include helping to affect an increase in political legitimacy and to positively impact stability in Nepal.<sup>7</sup></li> <li>• UNMIN is providing arms control and providing assistance to the former Maoist armed forces and the Nepalese army to remove landmines.<sup>8</sup></li> <li>• The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights is monitoring the human rights situation and is attempting to educate the Nepalese army concerning these rights.<sup>9</sup></li> <li>• The OCHCHR is also assisting in police training and transitional justice.<sup>10</sup></li> </ul>
United Kingdom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The United Kingdom has been in Nepal through DFID since April 1999 with the aim of reducing poverty. It has given large grants to former Nepalese soldiers.<sup>11</sup></li> </ul>
United States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The United States has an incentive to provide Nepal with military and economic support as part of a containment strategy to prevent China from exercising a large amount of control over South Asia.<sup>12</sup></li> </ul>

**Indicators**

CIFP 2006

CIFP 2009 est.<sup>13</sup>

CIFP 5.47

History of Armed Conflict

CIFP 6.20

Stabilizing Factors:

- A Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2006 that ended the civil war that first began between the Government of Nepal and the Maoists in 1996. A ceasefire was held under UN monitors and the Maoists were disarmed and

placed in cantonments.

- The number of battle-related deaths decreased from 457 in 2006 to zero recorded in 2008. The conflict intensity also transitioned from minor intensity to no conflict intensity at all.<sup>14</sup>

Destabilizing Factors:

- While the major conflict has officially been resolved, violent attacks led by minor militant groups, including the Young Communist League (YCL) and a number of groups from the region of Terai, continue to hinder the potential for peace. The government of Nepal is currently undertaking negotiations with some of these groups.<sup>15</sup>
- There are an estimated 50,000 to 70,000 IDPS still unable (and in some cases unwilling) to return to their homes.<sup>16</sup>
- The number of stateless people in Nepal has doubled from 400,000 in 2005<sup>17</sup> to 800,000 in 2009.<sup>18</sup>
- The number of refugees residing in Nepal (the majority of who are of Bhutanese descent) remains stagnant but continues to generate hostility among the local Nepalese population who are jealous of the perceived higher standard of living found within the UNHCR refugee camps. The younger generation of refugees is also expressing their increasing discontent with their status quo.<sup>19</sup>

**CIFP 7.79**

**Governance and Political Stability**

**CIFP 7.00**

Stabilizing Factors:

- Relatively free and fair elections (the EU acted as election monitors) were held in April 2008.<sup>20</sup>
- The monarchy was officially abolished as voted upon by the elected Constituent Assembly (a previous stalemate issue raised by the Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist (CPN-M) that had already derailed initial election dates).<sup>21</sup>
- The eight-point agreement signed in 2008 prior to elections granted increased rights, including representation in government and the Nepalese army, to the rioting minority of Madhesis.<sup>22</sup>
- The newly elected Constituent Assembly (CA) passed the Good Governance Act (2008) in an effort to dispel public perception of government corruption. The Act is designed to make the public administration more transparent and accountable to the Nepalese population.<sup>23</sup>

Destabilizing Factors:

- While fifty-six percent of the seats in the CA are proportionally elected (e.g. thirty-three percent of seats are reserved for women), many of the targeted minorities still feel underrepresented in both government and public administrative positions.<sup>24</sup>
- The democratic regime offers no security yet as a durable form of governance in Nepal, especially given the historical yo-yo governance trend.<sup>25</sup> In fact, the Maoists left government in May of 2009 after the authority of the CPN-M Prime Minister over the Nepalese army was challenged by the Nepali Congress Party (NCP) President. This has weakened the stability of the Constituent Assembly.<sup>26</sup> "Prachanda" Pushpa Kamal Dahal, the ex-Prime Minister, demanded a unified national government and complete civilian control over the military by 24 January 2010.<sup>27</sup>
- The Corruption Perception Index remains relatively unchanged since 2006, despite the transition from an autocracy to a democracy. Despite party platforms based on the eradication of corruption, those accused are often acquitted.<sup>28</sup>
- Campaign violence was rampant leading up to 2008 elections and violent attacks on journalists continue.<sup>29</sup>
- Inadequate commitment to transitional justice continues to frustrate the Nepalese population and is contributing to a decreasing trust in the rule of law.<sup>30</sup>
- A finalized Constitution has yet to be negotiated and ratified.

**CIFP 4.55**

**Militarization**

**CIFP 4.45**

Stabilizing Factors

- 4,008 individuals are to be discharged by mid-February (500 of whom are child soldiers) from the main Maoist army cantonment in Sindhuli. There are rehabilitation programs being offered to the discharged members by the various UN branches (UNICEF, UN Peace Fund for Nepal, UN Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, United Nations Children's Fund, and the UN population Fund).<sup>31</sup>
- Development of social reintegration assistance packages for disqualified Maoist army personnel by UNDP Nepal, UNICEF, UNMIN and UNFPA along with the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction to provide assistance and training.<sup>32</sup>
- Military Expenditures (both total, fraction of regional military expenditure, and as a % of GDP) have marginally decreased. Imports of major conventional weapons and the number of total armed forces have not increased.<sup>33</sup>
- In triangulation with the analysis in the *Nepal: Peace and Justice, Crisis Group Asia Report*, it is believed that the UN, the US, and India are stakeholders that would not want to see the destabilization of Nepal's legitimate government by the military.<sup>34</sup>

Destabilizing Factors

- There has been slow integration of the Maoists and excluded groups into the Nepalese Army. There has been "growing strength of hardliners" amongst the Maoists coupled with substandard conditions at their cantonment sites<sup>35</sup>. In January 2010, CPN-Maoists demanded a security policy before the army integration can materialize.<sup>36</sup>

**CIFP 3.00**

**Population Heterogeneity**

**CIFP 6.50<sup>37</sup>**

Stabilizing Factors:

- The government has made large efforts to reduce cultural exclusion after 2006 and has recently adopted a secular attitude. It has acknowledged the need to include marginalized groups in the Constituent Assembly; has provided a quota system for marginalized groups in the Nepal Police and Armed Police Force in 2007; has drafted the Amendment Bill of Interim Constitution in 2007 which states greater inclusion for marginalized ethnic and caste groups (Janajati, Madhesis, Dalits) in the state; has enacted the Civil Service Bill 3 in 2007 which grants seat reservation to excluded peoples in 2007 and the Interim Constitution which recognized the rights of historically marginalized groups and denounced discrimination and untouchability; has introduced the ratification of ILO convention in 2007 that will ensure the rights of Janajati in culture, education, land, natural resources, traditional justice, recruitment, employment conditions, social security, health, and vocational training as well as the assurance of participation in governance; has created the Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction and the Badi community in 2007 which ended the forced use of derogatory surnames and provided free schooling for children in the Badi community, and finally, the government enacted the Ordinance on Social Inclusion in 2009 which makes the public service inclusive for marginalized groups. In triangulation with the UNDP's analysis, it is believed that this legislature holds promise for future ethnic stability.<sup>38</sup>

#### Destabilizing Factors:

- Violent outbreaks amongst the Madhesi during 2008 regarding demands for regional autonomy in the Southern Terai plains (lowlands region) speaks of unrest and continued resentment.<sup>39</sup>
- Nepal remains highly ethnically diverse and there has been increasing ethnic solidarity amongst the various marginalized ethnic groups that has created friction.<sup>40</sup>

**CIFP 6.57**

**Demographic Stress**

**CIFP 6.51**

#### Stabilizing factors

- The population growth rate has continued its downward trend.<sup>41</sup>

#### Destabilizing factors

- The rapid depletion of wood stocks as a fuel resource has contributed to an increase in the rate of migration to urban centres.<sup>42</sup>

**CIFP 6.42**

**Economic Performance**

**CIFP 6.60**

#### Stabilizing

- Nepal continues to experience annual growth in GDP (est. at 4.7% for 2009) and Per Capita GDP (est. at \$1200USD).<sup>43</sup>
- Nepal's economy receives additional support in the form of remittances, which amounted to a high of \$2.8 billion in 2009.<sup>44</sup>
- It is moving to strengthen trade agreements with its economically powerful neighbours, China and India.<sup>45</sup>
- Growing energy demands created by the rapidly growing economy of India provides Nepal with the opportunity to capitalize on its hydroelectric-production potential to be exported to foreign markets.<sup>46</sup>
- Reduced violence and conflict facilitates the development of Nepal's tourism industry.<sup>47</sup>

#### Destabilizing

- Economic freedom is ranked lower than global and regional averages and Nepal's foreign direct investment is very limited.<sup>48</sup>
- Nepal is largely dependent on foreign aid which accounts for approximately 50% of its development budget.<sup>49</sup>
- The state remains one of the poorest countries in the world and is marred with inequality.<sup>50</sup>
- The economy is limited and primarily dependent upon agriculture which provides approximately 71% of Nepalese employment and accounts for approximately 31% of the country's economic output.<sup>51</sup>
- Political instability has led to continuous strikes, labour protests, and road blockades which have hindered economic progress.<sup>52</sup>
- Nepal's economic homogeneity (being based primarily upon agriculture) coupled with its proneness to natural disasters<sup>53</sup> creates precarious economic conditions.
- Existing high levels of corruption also deter economic growth.<sup>54</sup>

**CIFP 8.14**

**Human Development**

**CIFP 8.00**

#### Stabilizing

- The cessation of intense conflict reduces the damage to infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and roads. Such infrastructure is vital to making progress in human development, particularly in the rural areas.<sup>55</sup>
- Democratization has the potential to remove the barriers to equitable treatment in Nepal and contribute to universal progress across the country.<sup>56</sup>
- Indicators such as life expectancy, infant mortality rates, and maternal mortality rates have improved.<sup>57</sup>
- **The number of people living under extreme poverty has been nearly halved.**<sup>58</sup>

#### Destabilizing

- Literacy rates, education enrolment, access to sanitation facilities and improved water sources have all stagnated.<sup>59</sup>
- Natural disasters have created food shortages and infrastructural damage that has burdened human development.<sup>60</sup>
- Political instability is slowing down progress towards human development.

Stabilizing factors

- The government has officially recognized the dangers inherent to continued environmental degradation. However, the environmental agenda has been sidelined due mostly to the seeming priority of other issues.<sup>61</sup>

Destabilizing factors

- Because of a lack of alternative fuel there is a rapid rate of deforestation.<sup>62</sup>
- Nepal's rural areas are confronted with acute and serious forms of land degradation, deforestation, loss of biodiversity, and scarcity of fuel wood and drinking water.<sup>63</sup>
- Degradation of the environment continues to constitute a substantial threat to the assets of the poor.<sup>64</sup>
- Urban areas face air and water pollution and solid waste management problems.<sup>65</sup>
- Nepal has a food shortage because of increased flooding in the wet season and drought in the dry season.<sup>66</sup>

Stabilizing Factors:

- A National Action Plan on Aid Effectiveness will be implemented to improve the effectiveness of foreign assistance, decreasing the risk of foreign aid being retracted.<sup>68</sup>
- There has been an improvement in official relations with India.<sup>69</sup>
- Improved international linkages increase economic growth, business, trade, and foreign aid.<sup>70</sup>
- India and China's growing economy is steadily influencing Nepal's economy.<sup>71</sup>
- Water resources and hydropower enable long term investment.<sup>72</sup>

Destabilizing Factors:

- The global economic crisis affected India's food prices,<sup>73</sup> which exacerbated Nepal's food shortage.
- Nepal is an illicit producer of cannabis and hashish for domestic and international markets and operates as a transit point for opiates.<sup>74</sup>

**Best Case Scenario**

- The CPN-M and the Nepalese government reach an agreement that allows the government to regain internal stability.
- The constitution is peacefully negotiated and ratified by all major political parties by the May 2010 deadline.
- Perceived corruption in the government and civil society decreases and a truth and reconciliation commission is formed to investigate war crimes and provide justice to the population.
- The Maoists are integrated into the army.
- Ethnic tensions decline because of increased recognition of social, political and economic rights of minorities. Minority representation in the government and positions within the public administration also increases.
- Government stability increases FDI in hydroelectric dam projects, stimulating improved economic growth.
- Nepal continues to stabilize and is no longer considered a fragile state.

**Worst Case Scenario**

- CPN-M successfully paralyzes the government when their demands for a unified government and military control are not met.
- The Maoists hold massive labour strikes and erect numerous roadblocks, plunging Nepal into an economic standstill and a decline in human development.
- The growing population strains the limits of the finite amount of cultivable land.
- The food shortage continues unabated and is exacerbated by the deteriorating political atmosphere.
- The continued global economic decline causes a decrease in aid.
- The Maoists are not integrated into the armed forces, which leads to the remobilization of insurgency groups.
- Ethnic tensions continue to rise and the Madhesis take advantage of the political anarchy to declare complete autonomy for the region of Terai.
- The tension between the Bhutanese refugees and the Nepalese erupts into small-scale violence leading eventually to escalated inter-state violence between Bhutan and Nepal.
- Finally, Nepal deteriorates back into civil war.

**Most Likely Scenario**

- In the short term there will be severe political instability as the CA attempts to affect an acceptable balance of power.
- The Maoists will hold a series of small strikes, as threatened, and the coalition will eventually fracture under the weight of these strikes. Some Maoist demands will be met in the interest of regaining political stability. However, the Maoists will also offer some small concessions to the CA.
- The constitution deadline will be pushed back until 2011.
- Corruption will continue unabated and post-conflict justice will also be postponed due the priority of other issues.
- The integration of the Maoists into the army will eventually take place but there will be minor altercations during the process.
- Continued ethnic tension will diminish over time due to the recent legislative moves towards inclusion.
- The economic situation will remain the same given the continued political instability.

- In the short term there will be an increase in the risk for conflict. However, should the political situation stabilize as expected with the reintegration of the Maoists into government, the long term trend will lead to a decreasing risk of conflict.

<sup>1</sup> The 2006 report did not have data for either ethnic diversity or risk of ethnic rebellion, and thus it did not include these indicators in its overall score for population heterogeneity. We felt that these indicators were relevant so we increased the indicator to reflect this risk. Thus, this accounts for the huge discrepancy between 2006 and 2009.

<sup>2</sup> The Communist Party of Nepal recently changed its name to the United Communist of Nepal (UCPN-M), however because all our data refers to them as the CPN-M, we used this name in our dialogistic.

<sup>3</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, "Nepal", November 2009.

<sup>4</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, "Nepal", November 2009.

<sup>5</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, "Nepal", November 2009.

<sup>6</sup> United Nations, *United Nation's Mission in Nepal*, <http://www.unmin.org.np/> [30 January 2010].

<sup>7</sup> United Nations, *United Nation's Mission in Nepal*, <http://www.unmin.org.np/> [30 January 2010].

<sup>8</sup> United Nations, *United Nation's Mission in Nepal*, <http://www.unmin.org.np/> [30 January 2010].

<sup>9</sup> United Nations, *United Nation's Mission in Nepal*, <http://www.unmin.org.np/> [30 January 2010].

<sup>10</sup> United Nations, *United Nation's Mission in Nepal*, <http://www.unmin.org.np/> [30 January 2010].

<sup>11</sup> Akanksha Banerji, *CNN-IBN*, <http://ibnlive.in.com/news/uk-court-grants-british-gurkhas-residential-rights/74788-2.html> [30 January 2010].

<sup>12</sup> CIFP South Asia 2007, <http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1217.pdf> [24 January 2010]

<sup>13</sup> The CIFP for 2009 is estimated because it is not globally ranked like the 2006 data. We determined our estimated 2009 data by comparing primary data from 2009 and to the 2006 CIFP numbers, and noted any change and approximated new numbers for 2009.

<sup>14</sup> Uppsala Universitet, *Department of Peace and Conflict Research: Conflict Database, Asia: Nepal - General Information*, [www.pcr.uu.se/database/conflictSummary.php?bcID=203](http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/conflictSummary.php?bcID=203) [25 January 2010].

<sup>15</sup> UNDP, *Nepal Human Development Report 2009*, <http://hdr.undp.org> [24 January 2010].

<sup>16</sup> IDMC, *Nepal*, [www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/\(httpEnvelopes\)/1949E98C81942B55C12571FE004D8821?OpenDocument](http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/1949E98C81942B55C12571FE004D8821?OpenDocument) [23 January 2010].

<sup>17</sup> UNHCR, *2005 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook*, [www.unhcr.org/4641beb10.html](http://www.unhcr.org/4641beb10.html). [25 January 2010].

<sup>18</sup> UNHCR, *2010 UNHCR Country Operations Profile - Nepal*, [www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e487856](http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e487856) [22 January 2010].

<sup>19</sup> UNHCR, *2010 UNHCR Country Operations Profile - Nepal*, [www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e487856](http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e487856) [21 January 2010].

<sup>20</sup> Freedom House, *Map of Freedom in the World: Nepal (2009)*, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2009> [23 January 2010].

<sup>21</sup> Polity IV Project, *Polity IV Country Reports 2007: Nepal*, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/nep2.htm> [25 January 2010].

<sup>22</sup> Polity IV Project, *Polity IV Country Reports 2007: Nepal*, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/nep2.htm> [25 January 2010].

<sup>23</sup> Transparency International, *Transparency International Global Corruption Report 2009*, p. 276-279

[http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/gcr\\_2009#6.3](http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/gcr_2009#6.3) [24 January 2010].

<sup>24</sup> Freedom House, *Map of Freedom in the World: Nepal (2009)* <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2009> [23 January 2010].

<sup>25</sup> Polity IV Project, *Polity IV Country Reports 2007: Nepal*, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/nep2.htm> [25 January 2010].

<sup>26</sup> Crisis Group, "Nepal's Future: In Whose Hands?" *Asia Report N 173*, 13 August 2009

[www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6269&1=1](http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6269&1=1) [30 January 2010].

<sup>27</sup> Deepesh Shrestha, "Nepal Maoists demand national unity government in a month," *AFP*, 22 December 2009.

[http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jEGPuVf0ytbxttc8KJrp\\_3jCsEHA](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jEGPuVf0ytbxttc8KJrp_3jCsEHA). [30 January 2010].

<sup>28</sup> Transparency International, *Transparency International Global Corruption Report 2009*, p. 276-279

[http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/gcr\\_2009#6.3](http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/gcr_2009#6.3) [24 January 2010].

<sup>29</sup> Freedom House, *Map of Press Freedom: Nepal (2009)*, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2009>. [23 January 2010].

<sup>30</sup> Freedom House, *Map of Press Freedom: Nepal (2009)*, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2009>. 23 January 2010].

<sup>31</sup> UNDP, *Nepal 2010*, <http://www.undp.org.np/news/latestnews.php?NewsID=1230&showNews=1> [24 January 2010].

<sup>32</sup> UNDP, *Nepal Human Development Report 2009*, <http://hdr.undp.org>. [21 January 2010].

<sup>33</sup> IISS, Military information on Nepal, [www.iiss.org](http://www.iiss.org), [25 January 2010]

<sup>34</sup> Crisis Group, "Nepal: Peace and Justice," *Asia Report 184*, 14<sup>th</sup>, January 2010, p.3

[http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south\\_asia/184\\_nepal\\_\\_peace\\_and\\_justice.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/184_nepal__peace_and_justice.pdf) [22 January 2010].

<sup>35</sup> UNDP, *Nepal Human Development Report 2009*, <http://hdr.undp.org>. [21 January 2010].

- <sup>36</sup>“ Urging the Maoists to withdraw protest programme and the indefinite general strike,” *The Rising Nepal*, [http://www.gorkhapatra.org.np/rising.detail.php?articleid=29917&cat\\_id=4](http://www.gorkhapatra.org.np/rising.detail.php?articleid=29917&cat_id=4) [22 January 2010].
- <sup>37</sup> See endnote 1.
- <sup>38</sup> CIA Worldfactbook <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/np.html>; UNDP, *Nepal Human Development Report 2009*, <http://hdr.undp.org> [20 January 2010].
- <sup>39</sup> UNDP, *Nepal Human Development Report 2009*, <http://hdr.undp.org> [20 January 2010].
- <sup>40</sup> “Nepal: Ethnic Identity Crisis Gathers Momentum- Members of Tharu Community seek greater Rights, March 2009”, [www.irinnews.org](http://www.irinnews.org) [24 January 2010].
- <sup>41</sup> World Bank, *Key Development Data & Statistics*, [http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/ddpreports/ViewSharedReport?&CF=1&REPORT\\_ID=9147&REQUEST\\_TYPE=VIEWADVANCED&HF=N&WSP=N](http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/ddpreports/ViewSharedReport?&CF=1&REPORT_ID=9147&REQUEST_TYPE=VIEWADVANCED&HF=N&WSP=N) [25 January 2010].
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- <sup>43</sup> CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/np.html> [20 January 2010].
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- <sup>45</sup> Singh Man, Shanker. *The Himalayan Times*, “Nepal-India Relations: Trade and Economic Dimensions.” <http://www.thehimalayantimes.com/fullNews.php?headline=Nepal-India+relations:+Trade+and+economic+dimensions&NewsID=220289>; [http://www.gov.cn/misc/2009-04/07/content\\_1278967.htm](http://www.gov.cn/misc/2009-04/07/content_1278967.htm) [15 January 2010].
- <sup>46</sup> U.S. Department of State: Diplomacy in Action, *Background Notes: Nepal* <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5283.htm> [25 January 2010].
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- <sup>50</sup> UNDP, *Nepal Human Development Report 2009*. [http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/asiathepacific/nepal/Nepal\\_NHDR\\_2009.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/asiathepacific/nepal/Nepal_NHDR_2009.pdf) [24 January 2010].
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- <sup>52</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, “Nepal”, November 2009.
- <sup>53</sup> CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/np.html> [20 January 2010].
- <sup>54</sup> Corruption Perception Index, [http://www.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi/2009/cpi\\_2009\\_table](http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table)
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