



Fall 2007

Based on structural and event data available as of August 2007

This follow-up report is produced as part of the CIFP governance and democratic processes project. It is intended as an assessment of the structural and dynamic facets of democratic governance in Haiti, and includes a second period of events monitoring (January to August 2007), adapted scenarios, and a complete structural profile. New sections for the analysis of key issues and regional comparisons have been added. The overall project aims to support informed, evidence-based decision making for Canadian foreign policy and development assistance related to democratization and good governance.

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**PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR**

David Carment

**SENIOR RESEARCH ANALYST**

Stewart Prest

**LEAD RESEARCHER**

Sonia Bouffard

Norman Paterson School of International Affairs  
1412 Dunton Tower  
1125 Colonel By Drive  
Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6  
[www.carleton.ca/cifp](http://www.carleton.ca/cifp)

# Haiti

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Haiti has improved its security and rule of law situation thanks to the efforts of UN peacekeepers in collaboration with Haitian police in key neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince. The disarmament and arrest of numerous gang members and leaders are significant achievements and could lead to progress in other areas, such as government and market efficiency.

However, the Haitian government is still unable to provide security and basic public goods to its population. These government services, along with increased economic and employment opportunities are all prerequisites of long-term political stability. A reduction in corruption and an increase in the efficiency of the judicial system are also necessary.

One challenge emanates from the parliament's relative fragmentation and inefficiency. In Spring 2007 Parliament was inactive for three months due to the absence of the majority of its deputies. After their return, Parliament experienced legislative gridlock. Without substantive progress towards legislative reform, Haiti will have difficulty improving the delivery of services and programs that could better the life of average Haitians, democratic achievements of the past year. Democratic achievements of the past year would be threatened as a result

Finally, one should recall that the long-term presence of the United

**TABLE 1: KEY FINDINGS**

- The security situation is improving, although MINUSTAH is mostly responsible for progress in this area
- Parliamentary paralysis is worrisome. Guidelines and training for parliamentarians are essential if Haiti is to move toward a stable, efficient democratic system that can generate better economic and social opportunities
- Massive poverty and unemployment continue to be significant challenges
- Although the international community remains highly supportive and involved, announcements of ODA grants have decreased in the period monitored and have largely not yet resulted in effective programs

Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is not guaranteed. Although the UN Secretary General has said that MINUSTAH could be in Haiti for another four years, the government must prepare to assume security responsibilities in the event of an early withdrawal by the UN.

Currently, the PNH is incapable of acting as the country's sole security provider. Judicial and penitentiary systems also require rapid reform in order to consolidate progress in political stability and rule of law.

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TABLE 2: UNDERLYING CONDITIONS

Political Stability & Violence	Government & Market Efficiency	Rule of Law
6.85	6.67	7.66
Human Rights	Government Transparency & Accountability	Democratic Participation
6.95	8.12	6.96

TABLE 3: EVENT MONITORING RESULTS JANUARY-SEPTEMBER 2007





TABLE 4: AGGREGATE OF EVENTS RECORDED



UNDERLYING CONDITIONS

Structural data reveals that Haiti is still a country that is at risk, facing many challenges related to governance and democratization (See Table 2). All six governance clusters are of concern with very high scores. Rule of law and the accountability and transparency are the areas of chief concern; taken collectively, they serve to underline the multitude of challenges facing Haiti, and remind observers that much effort is still necessary in order to maintain and build on the hopeful developments of recent months.

DYNAMIC EVENTS ANALYSIS

Between the 18th of December, 2006 and the 31st of August, 2007, CIFP recorded 359 events that either affected or reflected the level of good governance and democratic processes in Haiti. A **statistical analysis** of the recorded events from this 38-week period shows that, on average, events tend to be moderately stabilizing. (See Table 3).

The **main source** of this trend lies in the political stability and violence, rule of law, as well as government and market efficiency clusters, which had the most events recorded over the monitoring period. A number of stabilizing events in the

government and market efficiency cluster reflect the announcement and allocation of international aid grants to the Haitian government in order to improve the delivery of social services and stimulate the economy. Other positive events included reports regarding the disarmament or arrest of numerous gang leaders and members, recorded in the political stability and rule of law clusters. Taken together, these positive developments resulted in a significant boost in the trend and average score, compared with the prior period monitored (June to December 2006). The number of raids and arrests performed by UN peacekeepers in collaboration with PNH officers contributed to the positive scores and translated into a more stable and secure situation on the ground. (See Table 4).

KEY EVENTS

**Interventions in key neighbourhoods by UN peacekeepers and PNH officers**

MINUSTAH led several interventions in key neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince, resulting in the arrest and disarmament of numerous gang leaders and members. The interventions took place between February 20<sup>th</sup> and August 10<sup>th</sup>, 2007 and contributed to an increase in security and the prevalence of rule of law in areas formerly controlled by criminal groups, such as Cité-Soleil and Martissant.

**Fight against Narco-trafficking**

President Préval finally recognized that narco-trafficking activities could pose a significant challenge

READING THE EVENTS CHART

- Red line (solid):** Trend line for events; downward slope left to right is negative
- Blue line (solid):** Trend line for number of events
- Purple line (dotted):** This indicates the sum total scores of events (positive or negative), as coded in the event monitoring process; the red trend line is derived from these values.
- Blue line (dotted):** The total number of events; the blue trend line is derived from these values

to Haiti's tentative newfound political stability. On May 14<sup>th</sup>, 2007 the Presidents of Haiti and the Dominican Republic promised to cooperate in the areas of security, drug-trafficking and economic development. On June 5<sup>th</sup>, 2007, Préval affirmed that Haiti would reinforce its capability to fight drug trafficking; finally, on July 23<sup>rd</sup>, he confirmed that DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) operations would continue.

### Parliamentary paralysis

On April 12<sup>th</sup>, deputies came back to the Legislative Assembly after three months of absence. Absenteeism by a majority of deputies led to a suspension of legislative activities and was a further blow to the Parliament's effectiveness. On April 11<sup>th</sup>, 2007, a group of deputies suggested that Préval disband the inactive Parliament, which would have carried important consequences for the stability of the political system. In June, parliamentarians opposed the cabinet shuffle proposed by the Prime Minister; in August, the relationship between the Executive and Legislative branches was further tested when deputies voted against the budget after attempting to reallocate more than 575 million gourdes.

### SCENARIO FORECASTING

Scenario analysis is one of the primary analytical tools used by CIFP to set the stage for policy evaluation. Scenarios evaluate interactions between stakeholder agendas and grievances, baseline structural features, and dynamic events. Each scenario is an assessment based on hypothetical

projections (positive or negative) of stakeholder behaviour and events.

The best-case assumes that the strongest positive trends will dominate over any negative trends in the near future. Conversely, the worst-case scenario assumes the opposite. Finally, the most likely case scenario extrapolates future tendencies based on the overall trend within the state.

*"Haiti remains a state of concern, where security and government and market efficiency improve slightly but slowly. Security and the prevalence of rule of law will remain precarious, requiring MINUSTAH to remain active in its role of security provider."*

### Most Likely Scenario

Haiti remains a state of concern, where security and government and market efficiency improve slightly but slowly. Security and the prevalence of rule of law will remain precarious and MINUSTAH will continue to be active in its role of security provider. Police reform will begin but will not be matched by a complete revamping of the judicial and penitentiary systems. Parliamentary fragmentation and conflicts between the different branches of Parliament will continue to reduce its effectiveness in terms of legislative reform and the management of public affairs. However, the international community will put pressure on the government to compromise and find common ground, thus avoiding the complete disbanding of Parliament.

### Best-Case Scenario

Haiti will consolidate the progress made by the United Nations Stabilization Mission against gangs in key neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince and further reduce violence

and political instability. The government will invest time and resources to quickly begin a complete overhaul of the Haitian National Police and, aided by international donors, will design and begin the implementation of a reform of the judicial and penitentiary systems. Progress in the realm of security will help attract investment, although in small quantities, until further stability is achieved. Parliament

will understand that collaboration with the executive is essential to good and efficient management of public affairs and will compromise and negotiate on a more regular basis.

### Worst-Case Scenario

Further skirmishes between the executive and the legislative branches of government will create more deadlocks and prevent the government from efficiently managing resources including programs design and essential service delivery. If conflicts persist, Parliament runs the risk of being disbanded by Préval, who will resort to rule by decree, or hold potentially destabilizing elections. In either case, security sector reforms will be delayed, reducing or even reversing previous progress achieved in violence reduction. Gangs will reorganize and crime will rise again, thus impeding an increase in investment and economic opportunities.

## 2. Analysis: Key Issues

### POLITICAL STABILITY & VIOLENCE

#### United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was created on April 30, 2004 by resolution 1542. After ensuring that the 2006 electoral processes would be successful, MINUSTAH is now working at ensuring political stability for the new government, increasing security on the island, implementing judicial and correctional reforms, and striving to promote economic recovery in Haiti.

The UN is currently providing advice on service delivery, financial activities, decentralization, border management and customs. The mission is also encouraging the current government to build some anti-corruption measures into the government system and to encourage the emergence of local and national leadership.

However, the priority for MINUSTAH continues to be security and political stability, including the dismantling of urban gangs, disarmament, and the training of the Haitian National Police. Considerable progress has been achieved in 2007 with the arrest of more than 700 gang members, a development reflected in the increased security found in neighbourhoods such as Cité Soleil and Martissant. MINUSTAH is now focussing on consolidating progress and expanding control to regions outside the capital, especially to the coasts where

drug trade is flourishing due to porous maritime borders. On 8 August 2006, Prime Minister Jacques-Edouard Alexis signed the Haitian National Police reform plan. This plan laid out a clear and comprehensive outline for the development of a basic policing capacity within Haiti and constituted a practical road map for collaboration between the Haitian government and international partners. The adoption of the reform plan was perceived by the UN Secretary General as a good starting point and was mentioned in his report on the Stabilization of Haiti in December 2006.

Progress in judicial and correction system reform is proving slower and more challenging. The judicial and penitentiary systems both need comprehensive improvement in terms of infrastructure, and personnel training with respect to respect for human rights, independence and quality control. Although the Préval's government has attempted to identify problems and potential solutions, reforms are progressing at a very slow pace and could hamper progress in state security and stability if not carried out shortly.

Finally, MINUSTAH is in a position to help create conditions for economic recovery with the collaboration between the international community and the private sector, including the extensive Haitian diaspora. Although security is still the priority and an essential requirement to national and foreign investment, the UN has

#### MINUSTAH FACTS & FIGURES

*Personnel:* 8,810 uniformed personnel, including 7,050 troops and 1,760 police officers, supported by 457 international civilian personnel, 806 local civilian staff and 184 United Nations Volunteers

*Approved budget:* 1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007: \$489.21 million

*Contributors of military personnel:* Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Jordan, Nepal, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, United States and Uruguay

*Contributors of police personnel:* Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Guinea, Jordan, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Senegal, Spain, Togo, Turkey, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu and Yemen

realized the importance of economic recovery to Haiti's long term political stability and peace. It is now reaching out to the diaspora as a result.

Canada is contributing valuable resources to the mission including a contingent of 100 police officers and significant amounts of development assistance. Haiti has been identified as a priority by the Conservative government and Canada intends to collaborate with the UN and the OAS as well as other bilateral partners. In July 2006, the Canadian government announced that it would invest \$520 million for the reconstruction and development of Haiti between July 2006 and September 2011.





Source:  
Edmond Mullet. CIA Conference titled "Journey Since the Deployment of MINUSTAH." Ottawa, June 1<sup>st</sup>, 2007.

United Nations. *MINUSTAH Official Web Site*. Available at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minustah/index.html>

### Civil-Military Relations

The army has played a significant role in Haiti's political history. Between 1843 and 1915, black generals captured the Presidency on a regular basis, alternating with black civilians and the French elite, although the latter only gained power on 6 occasions out of 22. With the American invasion in 1915, the traditional army was disbanded and replaced by the *Garde*, which removed the stepping-stone for black generals to access the highest echelon of the political structure. Until the 1950's, most presidents were light-skinned members of the civilian elite, although the military continued to take its share of power or act behind the scenes in order to ensure that their candidate would be in power.

In 1946, the military took power directly when a junta overthrew the government of Elie Lescot. His successor, Dumarsais Estimé, had his term interrupted by the *Garde* who replaced him in 1950 with Colonel Paul Magloire. Although the colonel's tenure was short, he had time to consolidate his power, ban political parties, and close newspapers and schools.

In order to avoid military coups against the regime, the Duvalier dictatorships collaborated with the military as well as with paramilitary groups, known as the *Tontons Macoutes*, in extracting economic resources from the traditional elite and keeping the regime securely in power in exchange for important financial rewards. Following the exile of Jean-Claude Duvalier, the military assumed power directly but was unable to achieve a consensus either within or outside its ranks, which led to a succession of coups in the next four years.

President Aristide's victory in the 1990 election opened the door for clashes between the new government and the traditional elites, who objected to Aristide's program for economic revitalization and his war on corruption. The military and paramilitary groups, which had benefited directly from preceding governments and were seeing their influence and potential gains reduced, rejected the new balance of power and reacted by carrying out a military coup against the new government in September 1991.

The military was ousted from power during the American invasion in 1994 and subsequently abolished by the returning President Aristide. Army officers were either integrated into the new Haitian police or else dismissed. Many were part of the insurgency that was organized against President Aristide in 2004 and wiped away the nascent Haitian National Police. These events were partly a consequence of Aristide ignoring former military officers and their supporters, and partly a result of his failure to organize a national dialogue on governance that would have involved all segments of the population including traditional elite groups.

The military has not yet been restored in Haiti but a commission has been launched by the Préal government on the topic in order to determine whether the re-creation of the army is necessary or if a supporting unit for the currently outgunned police would be sufficient. Parliamentarians

and senators have divergent views about the need to restore the national army. On June 18<sup>th</sup>, 2007, the Senate affirmed that it would support President Préval's plans to set up a "gendarme" unit instead of restoring the armed forces. Others would prefer to see the national army reconstituted. Regardless of the form it takes, this potential unit or force could come to replace MINUSTAH once the mission is set to leave the island and will be indispensable to the stability and security on the island. Balancing its role as security guarantor against its potential to upset recent hard-won political compromises will be a key challenge facing the government in coming years.

Source:  
Lundahl, Mats. Politics or Markets? Essays on Haitian Underdevelopment.

Schnabel, Albrecht and Hans-Georg Ehrhart. Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding.

#### RULE OF LAW

##### Deportation of criminals

The number of illegal aliens expelled from the US rose steadily after 1993, and reached a total of 49,000 in 2004. This increase reflected a new "catch and remove" policy by the federal government, as well as a series of bills passed by Congress aimed at facilitating the deportation of criminal immigrants (see table U.S. Laws affecting the deportation of immigrants). Criminal aliens have been identified and deported on three grounds: 1) accused of past crimes while residing crime-free, 2) criminals deported upon

release from incarceration for past crimes, and 3) illegal immigrants guilty of the felony crime of repeated border crossing.

The consequences in Central America and the Caribbean, where most criminal aliens were deported, were significant. In Latin American and Caribbean countries where the political and economic resources to absorb a high number of criminal deportees are lacking, the deportations contributed to the erosion of law enforcement. When deportees — often raised in the US from an early age — did not speak the language, know the culture, and had no immediate family or roots in the country they were deported to, they experienced difficulty integrating into the country. In many cases, the new arrivals joined criminal gangs or illegally

attempted to return to the United States. Health and criminal history was often not communicated to the authorities of the country where deportees were sent, which has led to inappropriate follow-up and monitoring.

While most criminals were deported at the end of their prison sentences and were not supposed to be sent to prison upon arriving in their countries of origin, countries such as Haiti have been known to send deportees to jail for an indefinite period of time upon their arrival, which is a clear violation of their political rights. While some countries, such as Belize, have instituted a policy of monitoring deportees, the program has proven difficult to sustain because of limited resources.

#### US LAWS AFFECTING THE DEPORTATION OF IMMIGRANTS

The *Immigration Act* of 1990 classified immigrants convicted of any crime of violence with a sentence of five or more years.

The *Omnibus Crime Control Act* of 1994 called for the prompt deportation of any alien without a green card who has been convicted of an aggravated felony and who is deportable.

The *Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Reconciliation Act* of 1996 transformed a series of minor offences, such as shoplifting, into offences resulting in deportation

The *Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act* of 1996 further expanded the list of aggravated felonies

The *Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act* lowered the sentences and monetary amount qualifying threshold for many crimes previously defined as aggravated felonies.

The *Anti-Drug Abuse Act* of 1998 created the aggravated felons legal classification, which made immigrants convicted of murder, drug or firearms trafficking subject to deportation after serving their time.

At the Caribbean Summit in May 1997 the Caribbean community (CARICOM) exposed some of the problems linked to criminal deportation to the US. The meeting resulted in an agreement between CARICOM and the US that recognized that each government had the right to define its own position about deportation, but agreed that 1) authorities would advise the

prevent them from joining existing criminal networks.

Although studies and statistical analyses have concluded that no direct relationship exists between criminal deportees and crime in the receiving countries, criminal deportees are an additional burden on governments lacking financial resources and adequate infrastructure to ensure their

countries of origin; they are necessary supplements to government efforts to provide for the integration of criminal deportees in their home societies.

*Chans Alternativ* is an organization created in 1996 by Michelle Karshan, an American activist living in Haiti, along with four Haitian deportees. The organization runs an integration program for criminal aliens deported to Haiti from the US and Canada. It provides support and community services to new-comers by palliating immediate needs such as housing, food, medical care, drug counselling, language courses and professional training, and by acting as a community for deportees with no family in Haiti.

*"In countries where money and facilities to absorb a high number of criminal deportees are lacking, the deportations contributed to the erosion of law enforcement."*

receiving country before any deportation of criminals; 2) information about the person to be deported was to be provided; 3) countries would ensure that the deportee was a national of the receiving country prior to deportation; and 4) conditions would be improved to facilitate the deportees' integration and

welfare. More emphasis needs to be put on understanding the origin of displacement, poverty and institutional justice in order for the amount of both crime and deportation to be reduced.

In Haiti, organizations such as *Chans Alternativ* help deportees to integrate themselves into their

Source:

Allegro, Linda. "Deportation of Illegal Aliens under a Neoliberal Security Agenda: Implication for Central America." *AmeriQuests* 3 (1), April 2006. (Online)

BBC. "The burden of being sent 'home'". 22 January 2004.

Griffin, Clifford E. "Criminal Deportation: The Unintended Impact of U.S Anti-Crime and Anti-Terrorism Policy along its Third Border." *Caribbean Studies* 30 (2), 2002.

Precil, Privat. "Criminal Deportees and Returned Teens; A Migration Phenomenon, A Social Problem." *The Panos Institute of the Caribbean*. May 1999.

Warner, Judith Ann. "The Social Construction of the Criminal Alien in Immigration Law, Enforcement Practice and Statistical Enumeration: Consequences for Immigration Stereotyping." *Journal of Social and Ecological Boundaries* 2005-2006.

TABLE 5: CRIMINAL ALIENS DEPORTED BY THE US





TABLE 6: NATIONALITY OF US PRISONERS (2004)



**STATISTICS:**

- The Dominican Republic, Haiti and Jamaica are the biggest recipients of criminal deportees in the Caribbean
- An average of 4,196 people were deported to the Caribbean each year between 1993-1999 (3,159 were criminal deportees)
- 7,3% of the total 4,8 million deportations since 9/11/2001 have been deportations of criminals
- 32% of those in federal prisons in 2002 were Hispanic
- Hispanics in the US are 40% more likely to be federally imprisoned (2002)

**Security Sector Reforms**

When MINUSTAH was created on April 30<sup>th</sup>, 2004, its mandate reflected a clear emphasis on the

need to establish security. Although the National Haitian Police (PNH) continues to exist, UNPOL now provides for security in much of the country. Reforms of the police have been announced and confirmed by the elected Préval's government and are currently underway; however, the UN force remains essential to the political stability and the security of Haiti and its people. Real progress has been slow and hampered by different factors.

First, key stakeholders such as government officials, gang leaders and PNH officers have been reluctant to collaborate, or seem to have shown little enthusiasm to do so. The slow pace of change at the Parliamentary level has obviously slowed down the reforms and limited the funds available for the restructuring and training of the police. Within the PNH, some police officers have also been unenthusiastic about the reform of the forces and have tended to free-ride and leave the work for UNPOL officers to complete. Not surprisingly, gang leaders have also been reluctant to collaborate and lay down their arms. While a few of them have been arrested by MINUSTAH or have voluntarily participated in the Demobilization and Disarmament program, instances of crimes committed by urban gangs are still high. Without the collaboration of key stakeholders, security sector reforms will inevitably take more time and be more difficult to achieve in a comprehensive and sustainable manner. It is also important to consider the moral hazard that could result from the

#### ABOUT MINUSTAH

Established by Resolution 1542 of the Security Council in April 2004. Its mandate includes:

- ensuring a secure and stable environment within which the constitutional and political process in Haiti can take place;
- assisting the Transitional Government in monitoring, restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police,
- assisting the Transitional Government, particularly the Haitian National Police, with comprehensive and sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs for all armed groups,
- assisting with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order in Haiti
- protecting United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement for its personnel

*“Drug trafficking networks are well established, involving many in practices counter to the rule of law, but providing important economic resources in a largely poor country.”*

presence of UNPOL officers in the country for many years. The presence of a force able to assume the security of the country could dramatically reduce the commitment of all parties to the establishment of a viable and effective domestic police force. It could be counter-productive in the sense that it could slow down the pace of the reforms and reduce the motivation of the government and the new recruits to succeed.


Secondly, judicial and penitentiary reforms, which are instrumental to the success of police reforms and the consolidation of progress in terms of security, have been almost non-existent. On August 21, 2006, the MINUSTAH declared that it was working with the government to formulate priorities in terms of judicial reforms, but no tangible programs or initiatives have been announced subsequently (Radio Métropole, August 21<sup>st</sup>, 2006). A few declarations have been made about the importance of

reforming the justice system to ensure its objectivity, capacity and impartiality, but no concrete steps have been taken towards this goal. Systematic reforms will most likely not take place for another few years, which could be detrimental to the overall success of security sector reform.

Thirdly, the culture of corruption and self-help is very strong in Haiti. The security of the Haitian population has never been provided through an effective civil police force and, in the last few years, Haitians have become used to taking security matters into their own hands. In one of the most recent extreme cases, residents of a Port-au-Prince's slums killed two gang members who were attempting to kidnap a seven-year-old child by stoning them to death (Radio Métropole, September 14<sup>th</sup>, 2006). Most Haitians believe the PNH to be highly corrupted, which has decreased the overall trust that citizens have in the official security



TABLE 7: LINKS BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT COMPONENTS OF RULE OF LAW



on December 29, 1994 and in accordance with its obligations under the Convention, filed a report describing the progress made in implementing the Convention. Unfortunately, progress is almost non-existent and children in Haiti continue to live in appalling conditions with cases of abuse and exploitation recorded on a regular basis.

The government has recognized its legal obligations under the Convention, but claims that a lack of resources have hindered government efforts to protect children from abuse and to provide them with the care and support mandated by the Constitution and the CRC. Non-governmental organizations have stepped up and taken part of the responsibility concerning child protection. Unfortunately, in the absence of national programs, many children outside the capital remain subject to abuse.

Particularly disturbing is the large number of child domestic labour cases, sometimes approaching child slavery. In Haiti, domestic children are called *restavèk*. They become house slaves when they are turned over by their parents to a family, which agrees to care for the child, provide schooling, food, shelter, and clothing in exchange for domestic labour. In reality, the *restavèk* spend their formative years isolated, deprived of schooling and subjected to long days of work with no pay and living conditions inferior to those of the overseer's family. Physical and verbal abuse are frequent. Child abuse is aggravated by poverty

providers. Attitudes and institutional norms will be difficult to overcome and, coupled with the high number of arms in circulation among civilians, the problem could be prove as difficult to solve as in a number of Central American countries, such as El Salvador.

The international community has pledged to give Haiti considerable sums of money to return to the path of democracy and the rule of law. Among these contributions, the United States have given US\$7 million to reform the police and improve conditions in the detention centres (Alter Presse, September 21<sup>st</sup>, 2006), while the Canadian government has promised funds to build a new police academy (Radio Métropole, October 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2006). International pledges to date suggest that the funds necessary to perform police reforms should not be lacking. Materials and infrastructure are also likely to be available, especially now that the US has partially lifted its arms embargo to allow the Haitian government

to rearm the police forces (International Herald Tribune, October 6<sup>th</sup>, 2006). The infrastructure and material that has been used by UNPOL officers might also be available to the revitalized PNH once it is reformed.

Involving all key stakeholders in the reform process will be essential for the success of the operations. Addressing each component of security sector reform, including the police, penal code, judiciary and penitentiary systems will be crucial since they are closely interlinked (*see table below*). Piecewise problem-solving will likely not be successful. Finally, engaging in extensive information campaigns about the rule of law will also be vital to the success of the reforms and the restoration of a functioning legal system in Haiti.

**HUMAN RIGHTS**

**Children's Rights in Haiti**

Haiti ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)

TABLE 8: PRIMARY ENROLMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN




TABLE 10: POPULATION USING IMPROVED DRINKING WATER





TABLE 9: INFANTS WITH LOW BIRTH WEIGHT IN THE CARIBBEAN



STATISTICS:

- 21% of infants have low birth weight, 1998-2005
- 54% of population use improved drinking water sources
- 30% of population use adequate sanitation facilities
- 52% of boys attend primary school (1996-2005), net ratio male
- 57% of girls attend primary school (1996-2005), net ratio female
- 17% of boys attend secondary school (1996-2005), net ratio male
- 20% of girls attend secondary school (1996-2005), net ratio female

and rudimentary living conditions. *Restavek* often live in poor families, who do not benefit from proper sanitation and access to improved drinking water.

The low percentages of school attendance in primary and secondary schools in general are also disturbing. Only 52% of boys attend primary school compared to 57% for girls. Secondary school attendance is reduced to 17% and 20% for boys and girls respectively.

Today there are an estimated 300,000 child domestic workers in Haiti, which represents an estimated one out of every ten children. There are an estimated

2,000 street children in the country.

Source:

Child Right Information network. Available at: <http://www.crin.org/resources/infoDetail.asp?ID=13145&flag=news>

National Coalition for Haitian Rights. Available at: [http://www.nchr.org/hrp/restavek/report\\_es.htm](http://www.nchr.org/hrp/restavek/report_es.htm)

UNICEF Statistics. Available at: [http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/haiti\\_statistics.html](http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/haiti_statistics.html)

Migrants' Rights

Migrants from Haiti have been working in the Dominican sugar industry since the beginning of the twentieth century. Because of how long it took for the sugar industry to flourish in the Dominican Republic, plantation

owners never used slaves as labourers. Instead, they first hired Dominican workers and later attracted foreigners to fill the demand for workers that Dominicans would not. Foreign workers tolerated lower wages, accepted harsher discipline and were less inclined to strike. They were largely of Afro-Caribbean descent; the first workers came from islands such as St-Kitts, Anguilla, Antigua and Nevis, and then began arriving from Haiti in the 1920s. By 1926, 100,000 Haitian workers were employed on Dominican sugar plantations.

The large number of Haitians living within Dominican territory soon seemed threatening to Dominican authorities, starting with the Trujillo dictatorship, which attempted to reduce the number of Haitian immigrants by beginning an inflammatory and discriminatory campaign against Haitian workers. While Haitians were first recruited directly by sugar industries through officials posted in Haiti, sour relations between the government of Haiti and the Dominican Republic were responsible for the interruption of formal migration channels and the increase in illegal and undocumented migration after 1942. Although official recruitment of temporary workers was restored during the Duvalier era, illegal migrants continued to cross the border in vast numbers.

As of 2002, 1 million Haitians were living in the Dominican Republic, working in the agriculture and construction sectors. Fleeing poverty, they undertook poorly paid and arduous jobs and faced racial discrimination as well as the constant threat of deportation.

Instances of human trafficking between the two countries have been reported.

Today, deep-rooted racial discrimination against Haitian migrants living in the Dominican Republic is causing arbitrary mass deportations and the denial of birth certificates to thousands of children, according to a new study published by Amnesty International. Despite the constitution's conferral of citizenship to persons born on Dominican soil, Dominico-Haitians are systematically refused Dominican citizenship. Between 20,000 and 30,000 Haitians are expelled from the Dominican Republic every year and, in most cases, this occurs without any judicial oversight. Those living in the country without a birth certificate are unable to register their children to secondary schools, obtain an identity card that could allow them access to the formal job market, and vote. Their lack of legal status has a clear negative impact on their access to economic opportunities, as well as on other central aspects of their lives.

A protocol of understanding signed by Haiti and the Dominican Republic in December 1999 regulated the treatment of deportees. In that document, the Dominican Republic agreed to improve its deportation procedures in several ways. Specifically, the Dominican government promised:

- a) not to deport Haitians at night or during the afternoon on Sundays or holidays;
- b) to avoid separating nuclear families (parents and young children);
- c) to deport Haitians only through

- the Jimaní, Dajabón, Elías Piña, and Pedernales border crossings, rather than the country's less accessible crossings;
- d) to allow deportees to collect their personal belongings and retain their identity documents;
- e) to provide each deportee with a copy of his or her order of deportation and;
- f) to give the Haitian authorities notice of repatriations.

In July 2001, the Dominican secretary of education announced that schools would no longer require children to show birth certificates in order to enrol. Then President Mejía stated that this was a likely first step towards granting such children full citizenship. More recently, a welcome change was announced in March 2002, after negotiations with the petitioners in a case involving Haitians and Dominico-Haitians currently pending in the Inter-American human rights system, when the Dominican government agreed to establish a joint committee to monitor its compliance with the rulings of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

In 2004, Haiti and the Dominican Republic signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime as well as the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons. In the last year, the governments of Haiti and the Dominican Republic also met to discuss the problems of violence at the border and the cases of Human Rights abuses affecting Haitian migrants.

Despite all of these agreements, cases of human rights abuses against Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic persist. Deportations still occur and the border between the two countries remains extremely unstable and subject to violent clashes.

Source:

Human Rights Watch. Available at: [http://hrw.org/reports/2002/domrep/domrep0402-01.htm#P139\\_17439](http://hrw.org/reports/2002/domrep/domrep0402-01.htm#P139_17439)

Samuel Martinez, "From Hidden Hand to Heavy Hand: Sugar, the State, and Migrant Labor in Haiti and the Dominican Republic" *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 34, No. 1. (1999), pp. 57-84.



## GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY & ACCOUNTABILITY

### Transparency and Accountability in the Haitian Bureaucracy

Haiti has very weak bureaucratic capabilities and a dysfunctional parliamentary system. Not surprisingly, this influences its transparency and accountability record and increases its tendency toward corruption. Haiti ranked last in the 2006 Transparency International Corruption Index. In a survey administered by the World Bank to measure corruption in Haiti, 93% of households said that corruption was a major problem and 68% said that corruption had worsened in the last 3 years (Report published in May 2007).

#### *Main problems*

The government's lack of funds prevents it from paying civil servants competitive salaries and at regular intervals. This affects the bureaucracy, along with police officers and judges, and forces public servants to seek bribes in order to make a living. Many protests by public servants in different sectors have recently showed the extent of the problem. Some health workers, for example, had not been paid in months and were claiming their salaries.

Poorly defined hiring procedures favour patronage and constant shifts in personnel. The lack of job security then creates an incentive for short-term enrichment through illegal means instead of through effective and high quality services that would be rewarded by long-term tenure in a well-established bureaucracy.

The lack of a specific hiring mechanism for the bureaucracy, as well as the reliance on political patronage to fill bureaucratic positions within the civil service, lowers the quality of candidates and the level of concern for the public good. The absence of both training for public servants as well as strong professional and ideological standards also reduces the likeliness of non-corrupt and transparent behaviour.

Payment of bribes is a common practice in Haitian society. Households, private companies, as well as international and domestic public servants all pay bribes at different times and to different groups in order to access public services and obtain licenses or governmental contracts. This morally accepted practice takes on more serious proportions when

*“Households, private companies, and international and domestic public servants all pay bribes in order to access public services.”*

completed by government officials with the government budget. It also lowers the expectations of Haitians for their elected government in terms of both accountability and performance. It also reduces incentives for competitiveness and innovation.

Haiti has no clear mechanism with which to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption. Such a lack often prevents formal measures from being taken even in well-known cases of corruption. It also reduces the confidence and pride that Haitians have in their government.

There are a few positive developments in terms of accountability and transparency.

In 2004, the government created the “Unite de Lutte Contre la Corruption” (Anti-corruption Fighting Unit), a semi-autonomous body charged with taking the lead in establishing a broad-based national strategy to promote good governance and combat corruption. Unfortunately, since incorporation the group has produced few concrete results.

#### **The Party System in Haiti**

A political party in the modern sense can be defined as a social formation which seeks offices or power in government, exhibits a structure or organization which links leaders at the centre of the government to a significant segment of the population, and generates in-group perspectives or at least symbols of identification or loyalty (William Nisbet Chambers).

Parties have several roles to carry out in the proper functioning of a democracy. They organize candidates into a cohesive unit, provide logistical support as well as financing, and increase the possibility to influence policy by rallying a significant number of candidates. They facilitate the choice of electors by offering a defined platform as well as continuous ideology and symbolism. This allows voters to more easily make an informed choice; it also makes it easier for voters to hold leaders to account in subsequent elections. Because they reduce the number of viewpoints, promises and opinions, they also facilitate compromise and increase the chances of executive-legislative collaboration.



Further, party infrastructures provide continuity while the party is not in government. Finally, parties encourages elected officials to act in an accountable and transparent manner in order to avoid the risk of being abandoned by the party and to lower their chance of winning a seat in the next election. If there are stable rules of inter-party competition, if parties have stable social roots, and finally if party organizations are independent of individuals' ambitions and all actors accord legitimately to a party system, then they contribute significantly to the consolidation of democracy.

In Haiti, several factors explain why the party system has never been consolidated. First of all, Haitian elites have historically favoured dictatorship and refused to surrender power or collaborate with the opposition. Secondly, social organizations such as labour unions, which are normally middle class organizations and which could have progressively evolved into political parties, have been few and not particularly powerful within social and political structures. Finally, the lack of party development during the earliest stages of state building has led to the empowerment of the bureaucracy and a tradition of voting for personality instead of political qualifications.

The consequences of this lack of party institutionalization have been manifold and significant. First, the countless number of candidates being represented in each election makes it difficult for the public to make an informed

choice, or even be familiar with the platform of each candidate; this often leads voters to choose on the basis of the candidate's personality or notoriety, rather than ideas and competency. The presence of multiple parties and independent candidates in Parliament also complicates effort to achieve compromise over legislation and develop good working relationships between deputies as well as between the executive and the legislative. Finally, the fragmented party system and lack of party allegiance render it difficult to hold government officials accountable for their actions. Once a deputy has been elected, the lack of institutional constraints on his actions and the lack of peer pressure encourages deputies to act only to increase his personal

fortune or prestige, rather than to improve the lot of his constituents.

#### GOVERNMENT & MARKET EFFICIENCY Diaspora & Remittances

A significant percentage of Haiti's population resides outside the country, having fled during the Duvalier dictatorship or the subsequent years of instability, including Aristide's time in office. As of 2002, 1 million Haitians were living in the Dominican Republic, 497,000 in the United States, 82,405 in Canada, and there was also a large population of Haitians in the Bahamas and other islands of the Caribbean.

**In 2005, the Haitian diaspora sent US\$ 985,000,000 home in the form of remittances, contributing the equivalent of**

#### BACKGROUND: POLITICAL PARTIES IN HAITI

- 1880:** Liberal party and National party emerged in Haiti (elitist parties)
- 1911-34:** US Occupation
- 1934-45:** Worker-Peasant movement, Communist, Socialist parties and the Progressive are created.
- 1954-86:** Destruction of political parties
- 1975-80:** Emergence of a dozen political parties (Parti Unité Nationale, Parti National Progressiste-Duvalieriste, etc).
- 1986-90:** Prominent leaders such as Aristide limit action of the parties (Creation of the parti Congrès national pour la démocratie haitienne and Front National pour le changement et la démocratie, Alliance nationale).
- 1990:** Aristide creates the Lavalas movement but runs under the banner of the Front national pour le changement et la démocratie.
- 1995:** Split of the Lavalas movement into several small parties such as the Lavalas Political Platform. Over 30 parties fill candidates for the legislative elections. Lavalas Platform wins 17 of 27 seats in the Senate and 67 of 83 seats in the House of Deputies. Préval wins with 87.9% of the vote.
- 1996:** Creation of Family Lavalas Party by Aristide.
- 1999:** Préval shuts down the parliament to end struggles between parties.
- 2000:** Lavalas wins a majority of seats in the legislative elections and mayoral races. 29,000 compete for 1,500 positions. Opposition parties unite into Groupe de Convergence in order to stand up to Lavalas in Parliament.

**one quarter of Haiti's GDP.**

The diaspora helps alleviate poverty by sending money to friends and family, but also by providing them with goods for private consumption or retail. Although the Haitian population uses an important part of remittances sent to buy consumer goods, a percentage of the money is saved, invested, or spent on services with positive externalities such as education and basic health care. The diaspora is also a source of new technology, market intelligence, business contacts, tourism revenue and a market for imports of nostalgic food.

Haitian Hometown Associations present in Canadian and American cities are particularly active and have contributed large sums of money to development projects aimed at rebuilding schools, clinics and local infrastructure. They could act as important points of contact or development partners for governmental agencies wanting to increase the efficiency of development dollars. Associations in Canada include the Regroupement des organismes canado-haitiens pour le développement, Point de ralliement des femmes d'origine haitienne, Conseil national des citoyens et citoyennes d'origine haitienne, Alliance Gonaïvienne de Montréal, Fédération des associations régionales haitiennes à l'étranger, Agence haitienne pour le développement local.

In order to maximize the contribution of Haiti's diaspora to the island's development, incentives must be provided by

**MAY 2006 CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES ELECTIONS (NUMBER OF SEATS):**

L'Espwa:	23
Family Lavalas:	1
Rassemblement des Démocrates Nationaux Progressistes:	1
Fusion des Sociaux-Démocrates Haitienne:	17
Oganizasyon Pèp Kap Lité:	10
Union Nationale Chrétienne pour la Reconstruction d'Haiti:	12
L'Artibonite en Action:	5
Alliance Démocratique:	10
Mouvement Indépendant pour la Réconciliation Nationale:	1
Mobilisation pour le Progrès Haitien:	3
Mouvement Chrétien pour une Nouvelle Haïti:	3
Front pour la Reconstruction Nationale:	1
Mouvement pour la Réconciliation Nationale:	1
Coumbite pour Reconstruire Haïti :	1

**MAY 2006 SENATE ELECTIONS (NUMBER OF SEATS):**

L'Espwa:	13
Family Lavalas:	2
Rassemblement des Démocrates Nationaux Progressistes:	1
Fusion des Sociaux-Démocrates Haitienne:	4
Oganizasyon Pèp Kap Lité:	3
Union Nationale Chrétienne pour la Reconstruction d'Haiti:	2
L'Artibonite en Action:	2
Alliance Démocratique:	1
Mouvement Indépendant pour la Réconciliation Nationale:	1
Pont:	1

either the national government or international donors to encourage senders and recipients of remittances to save and invest in the local economy. Functioning banking institutions and lower transaction costs for the transfer of remittances would also increase the benefits linked to emigration.

Finally, Haiti should begin to draw up a strategy to attract returnees and transform its brain drain into a brain gain. Significant accomplishments in terms of political stability and economic performance will need to be achieved prior to the return of Haitian migrants to the island. However, once these prerequisites are attained, Haiti could speed up its development considerably if it could design a policy aimed at attracting returnees and capitalize

on the skills that they have acquired abroad.

**Private Sector Developments**

After the US, Haiti was the second country in the Americas to achieve independence. It did so through a revolution that pitched its black and mulatto population against French colonizers. While the plantation and forced labour system was maintained for a few years after Independence (1804) and justified by the need to maximize export revenues in order to maintain a strong army, the entire economic system was soon dismantled. Blacks who had fought for independence refused to work on plantations and claimed a parcel of land, thereby forcing the mulatto elite to move to the cities because of the lack of labour supplies. The elite soon discovered that the easiest way to enrich


**STATISTICS:**

- 20% of Latin Americans live out of their country of origin
- 10% of the US population is composed of migrants
- 51% of the foreign-born population in the United States is from Latin America
- 5% of Latin American households benefit from remittances
- 15% of the migrants' income is remitted to their family, on average
- 10% of remittances can be saved up by recipients of remittances
- US\$ 10 billion is sent each year to Central America and the Caribbean in the form of remittances


**ISSUES:**

- Tighter regulations in the US after September 11, 2001 are affecting traditional migration patterns
- Difficulties for sending and receiving countries to find a balance between economic efficiency, unequal wages and human rights
- Migration and remittances can create a feeling of relative deprivation among communities and encourage further migration
- Transfer costs and transaction fees are currently high and can amount to 5% of the money transferred in the form of remittances
- Motivation for migration includes: disparities in income and employment opportunities, low education and life opportunities, environmental degradation, political instability and armed conflict, poverty and human rights abuses poverty and human rights abuses

**TABLE 11: REMITTANCES TO CENTRAL AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN (2002)**



**TABLE 12: FDI, ODA & REMITTANCES (2005)**



themselves would be to extract taxes from the peasants and, in order to do so, joined the newly formed Independent government.

A fierce competition developed among the elite to reach the highest governmental positions, leading to political instability and incentives for quick enrichment through misappropriation of public funds. Corruption was institutionalized at the highest echelons of government as well as in the lower bureaucracy and was soon coupled with a common practice of favouritism and personal reward, which contributed to an increase in the debt and a lowering of the productivity of the country. Corruption became the basis for the formation of a predatory state, which was continued and, in some ways, reinforced by the

Duvalier dictatorships. The International Commission of Jurists estimated that, between 1957 and 1986, Haiti lost \$10 million per year to the Duvalier clique. \$7 million of that was annually transferred abroad for personal purposes.

An assessment of Haiti's political economy contributes to a better understanding of its abysmal economic performance and lack of a dynamic and productive private sector. Because of institutionalized corruption and a system based on personal reward, import monopolies were a common practice throughout Haiti's history. These import monopolies were granted by the government to friends and allies and were most often inefficient. High tariffs accompanied the monopolies and prevented the

development of a dynamic manufacture sector. It was not until the end of the 1980s that competitive market reforms were instituted and that the government stopped distorting the market through biased interventions.

In the countryside, things were no better. Plots were divided with each generation, reducing their owners to subsistence. Erosion caused by deforestation and a switch from cattle herding and coffee production to subsistence agriculture is now threatening the economic activity of the majority of the population. Peasants, although conscious of the soil growing infertile, are unable to redress the situation because of the lack of innovation and modern agricultural techniques, widespread poverty, aversion to risk and low

**HAITI'S ECONOMY: FAST FACTS**

GDP Growth:	2%
GDP:	\$4.3 billion
Inflation:	15.5%
Official Development Aid:	\$515 million
Agriculture (of GDP):	28.4%
Industry (of GDP):	16.6%
Services (of GDP):	55%
Exports (of GDP):	12.3%
Imports (of GDP):	32.5%
Population (millions):	8.5

All figures from the World Bank, 2005 in US dollars,

education level.

The current economic situation is grim. The light assembly industries that emerged in the 1970s were never allowed to grow and are now competing with the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Costa Rica, where political stability is much better and a more educated labour supply is available. Tourism also had its peak in 1979 with 339,000 visitors and then declined to marginal numbers due to political unrest, a lack of infrastructure, and the AIDS crisis. **Currently, Haiti has an economy of services based on products sold to international NGOs and UN workers.** World Bank indicators show that it is difficult to open a business, register property, trade across borders and close a business, which partly explains the difficulty for the government to attract foreign investors. Attracting the diaspora could be one way for the government to boost investment and economic development, although major reforms of the security and

economic sectors will need to occur beforehand.

Source:

Lundahl, Mats. *Politics or markets? Essays on Haitian Underdevelopment*. London: Routledge, 1992.

**DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION**

**Gender**

Haiti has the worst development indicators in the Americas. Its gender indicators are also amongst the worst in the region.

*Politics:* Only 2 women were elected to the lower house in the last elections out of a total of 82 deputies. They thus represent a meagre 2.4% of elected representatives. Combined with political appointments, this figure rose only as high as 4 out of 27 or 14.8%. One of the reasons for

this relatively poor performance is the lack of quotas for women in the main parties. Only the Socialist Party (Mouvement National des Mouvements Démocratiques) has a 25% quota for women, but it won no seats in the 2006 election.

*Economy:* The gendered dimensions of poverty have to do with women's unequal access to resources in the economy and the household. In general, poverty refers to the inability to attain an adequate standard of living as a result of a lack of resources and can be measured on the basis of income or consumption, or include other considerations such as life expectancy, and access to potable water and health services. The UNDP Human Development Report, which includes these broader indicators, ranks Barbados

TABLE 13: HAITI'S DEBT (% OF GNI)





TABLE 14: SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY (% OF GDP)



**FACTORS PREVENTING INNOVATION IN AGRICULTURE:**

- Lack of education
- Low calorie intake
- Aversion to risk
- Fear of increasing land value
- Mountainous terrain
- Lack of credit
- Importance of current low income versus potential future income

**EASE OF DOING BUSINESS IN HAITI (OUT OF 175)**

Overall:	139
Starting a business:	167
Dealing with Licenses:	60
Employing Workers:	37
Registering property:	135
Getting Credit:	117
Protecting Investor:	142
Paying Taxes:	87
Trading across Borders:	138
Closing a Business:	146



as having the lowest levels of poverty in the Caribbean, and Haiti the highest. According to the United Nations Human Development Report (2003), which now has a Gender-related Development Index (based on life expectancy, adult literacy, gross educational enrolment ratio and estimated earned income), Haiti scores the lowest in the region for its integration of women in the economic and social dimensions of life. That said, it should be noted that the GDI correlates very closely with the UN's Human Development Index; consequently, Haiti's poor performance on the GDI is partially related to its poor overall level of development.

*Health:* The figures for health indicators are not much more encouraging. Only 24% of women giving birth in Haiti do so



with a skilled birth attendant. The country has the region's lowest average life expectancy at 50 years (compared to 77.3 years in Barbados, the highest in the Caribbean). Women's life expectancy is only 50.5 years, little better than men's. Haiti also has the highest rate of HIV/AIDS infection in the Caribbean at 5.17% of the adult population (Ages 15-49). 50% of those cases are women, a relatively high proportion when compared with other jurisdictions.

As is the case in other Caribbean countries such as Guyana, Jamaica and Belize, levels of maternal mortality are high. In Haiti, the mortality rate is 523 mothers for every 100,000 live births. Haiti is followed by Guyana (179/100,000) and Jamaica (118/100,000). In comparison, the maternal mortality ratio in the United States is 10/100,000; such numbers clarify the severity of the problem. One of the main causes is the lack of access to, and the poor quality of, medical services in general.

#### 2006-07 Parliamentary Paralysis in Haiti

In his previous term in office as president of Haiti, Préval ruled mostly by decree due to a lack of

collaboration between the legislative and the executive branches as well as struggles among parliamentarians. Préval was elected to pursue progressive economic and social policies—building schools, roads and hospitals, reforming and supporting Haiti's agricultural base, developing a judiciary responsive to the majority of Haitians who are poor. The OPL party, then the largest party in the legislature, changed course after the election and opted for the policies championed by the international financial institutions and the U.S. The policy dispute led to parliamentary paralysis and spilled beyond Parliament into the streets, where protests forced the resignation of the Prime Minister in June, 1997. The dispute turned into an impasse, and for the next three years endless negotiations diverted the Administration's energy and paralyzed government operations.

Although ruling by decree has not yet occurred in his second term as president, René Préval has underlined Parliament's inefficiency on many occasions since the 2006 election. Préval has complained about the incapacity of the Parliament to pass legislation or

Gender-Related Development Index	
Female adult literacy rate	48.90%
Male adult literacy rate	52.90%
Female combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio	51%
Male combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (%)	53%
Female estimated earned income in 2001 (PPP US\$)	\$1,339
Male estimated earned income in 2001 (PPP US\$)	\$2,396

**CAUSES OF PARLIAMENTARY GRIDLOCK:**

- Inexperience and lack of training for elected deputies and senators
- Tendency to run for office as rent or prestige-seeking behaviour, rather than to accomplish results
- Lack of party allegiance leading to difficulties with compromise
- Corruption and attraction to personnel gains
- No tradition of functioning democracy

table realistic projects and programs, and also about the budget deadlock leading to the government's inability to spend money currently available to the state. In addition to this, he has castigated the opposition and exposed the animosity existing between the Prime Minister and his deputies. There have been repeated calls for Alexis' resignation. The infighting between elected representatives recently led to the firing of Deputy Elie on alleged corruption charges.

In the spring of 2007, there was also a long recess in parliamentary activity after most deputies left parliament, only to come back on April 11 after three months of absenteeism.

Source:

*Brian Concannon Jr, "Naje Pou Soti": Legal Obstacles Facing Haiti's Preval" Jurist, March 2006. Available at: <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/03/naje-pou-soti-legal-obstacles-facing.php>*

**GENDER:** CIFP indicators for gender provide an overview of a range of gender-based indicators for selected countries in the Caribbean. The results provide measures of performance in the areas of human rights, delivery of education and health services to women (both in terms of actual level of attainment, and in comparison to what males in the same country receive on average), and participation in the political and economic life of the country. The results highlight the challenges that lay ahead for Haiti in term of Percentage of female parliamentarians, women social rights, gender-related development index indicators (UNDP), and life expectancy. Only one indicator represent a low risk (women political rights) while three showcase a medium risk: Women's economic rights, Women in the Labour force and Percentage of female infected by HIV/AIDS

Compared with other Caribbean countries, Haiti's scores are the highest and most challenging. The limited participation of women in the Haitian labour force is reflective of a larger regional pattern; one reflective of the more traditional social structure and the high overall unemployment rate in all countries. More positively, women's political rights and their literacy ratio represent the least risk for the gender component of governance and democratic processes.

	Cuba	Dominican Republic	Guyana	Haiti	Jamaica
% of Female Parliamentarians (WDI)	1.4	3.6	2.6	8.1	4.6
Female Parliamentary Quota (Global database of quotas for women)	9.0	2.0	..	..	9.0
Women's Political Rights (CIRI)	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0
Women's Social Rights (CIRI)	3.0	5.0	3.0	7.0	5.0
Women's Economic Rights (CIRI)	3.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
Women in the labour force (WDI)	6.9	7.3	7.1	5.0	3.9
Education - Primary Completion -- female (WDI)	3.8	4.6	4.1	..	6.0
Education -- Primary Completion -- Ratio (WDI)	5.1	1.3	6.2	..	1.8
Education -- Primary Enrolment -- Ratio of Female to Male (WDI)	6.8	3.4	5.8	..	2.6
Gender Empowerment Measure (UNDP)	..	..	..	..	..
Gender-related Devlpt Index (UNDP)	..	5.3	5.5	7.7	4.9
HIV/AIDS -- % of Adult Females (WDI)	5.6	5.2	8.0	5.4	3.5
Literacy -- female (WDI)	1.0	4.7	..	..	5.1
Literacy -- Ratio (WDI)	2.1	1.6	..	..	1.1
Life Expectancy -- Female (WDI)	2.7	5.8	6.4	7.7	5.2
Life Expectancy -- Ratio (WDI)	2.5	5.9	6.6	7.7	4.7

### 3. Summary of Structure & Trends in Good Governance, 2007


Between the 18<sup>th</sup> of December, 2006 and the 31st of August, 2007 CIFP recorded 359 events that either affected or reflected the level of good governance and democratic processes in Haiti. A **statistical analysis** of the recorded events from this 38-week period shows that, on average, events tend to be moderately stabilizing. Events recorded during this period had a positive average score (1.72), which can be explained by the fact that a greater number of positive events were recorded over the 8-month period (243 positive events compared to 116 negative ones). The number of positive and negative events for the period tend to be constant over time, which means that the overall trend results from a general pattern rather than a sudden surge at the beginning or end of observation (*See Table 15 and 16*).

TABLE 15: STRUCTURAL SCORES

PSV	GME	RL
6.85	6.67	7.66
HR	GTA	DP
6.95	8.12	6.96

CIFP's structural data is divided into 6 clusters, each of which is addressed in detail following this summary. The six clusters are Government and Market Efficiency (**GME**), Political Stability and Violence (**PSV**), Human Rights (**HR**), Rule of Law (**RL**), Government Transparency and Accountability (**GTA**), and Democratic Participation (**DP**).


TABLE 16: EVENT MONITORING RESULTS  
JANUARY-SEPTEMBER 2007



The **main source** of this trend lies in the political stability and violence, rule of law, and government and market efficiency clusters; the majority of events recorded over the monitoring period related to these three areas. The large number of stabilizing events in the government and market efficiency cluster relate to the allocation of international aid grants to the Haitian government in order to improve the delivery of social services in an attempt to stimulate the economy. Combined with strongly positive events in the political stability and rule of law cluster, such positive developments boost the trend and average score significantly when compared with the previous period monitored (June to December 2006). The number of raids and arrests performed by UN peacekeepers in collaboration with PNH officers also contributed to the positive average score; more importantly, they have translated into a more stable and secure situation on the ground.

The **results of the analysis** of good governance and democratic processes are encouraging although they should be viewed in context. Many challenges remain over the next few years in terms of security, the rule of law, economic opportunity, employment and service delivery. However, small achievements such as those recorded in the rule of law and political stability clusters over the last six months are important. In a country such as Haiti, small successes can contribute to the morale of both international actors and the local population, and may serve to galvanize enthusiasm, consolidate gains, and encourage further progress.

TABLE 17: AGGREGATE EVENT TREND—JANUARY 2007 TO AUGUST 2007



**READING THE EVENTS CHART**

- Red line (solid):** Trend line for events; downward slope left to right is negative
- Blue line (solid):** Trend line for number of events
- Purple line (dotted):** This indicates the sum total scores of events (positive or negative), as coded in the event monitoring process; the red trend line is derived from these values.
- Blue line (dotted):** The total number of events; the blue trend line is derived from these values




## 4. Primary Drivers

Primary drivers are clusters that contain more than 25 events. These clusters are the main areas of activity in the country and make the greatest contribution to the overall event trend.

**TABLE 18: POLITICAL STABILITY & VIOLENCE**

	<b>6.85</b>
Permanence of Regime Type	8.4
Informal Economy — Black Market	7.2
Conflict Intensity	2.8
Dependence on External Military Support	8.4
Military Expenditure — % of GDP	..
Political Stability	8.2
Refugees Produced	6.1
Terrorism -- Number of fatalities	6.9
Terrorism -- Number of Incidents	6.8

**TABLE 19: EVENT MONITORING RESULTS  
JANUARY-SEPTEMBER 2007**



### POLITICAL STABILITY & VIOLENCE

#### Underlying Conditions

Structural data indicates that Haiti is at high risk in terms of political stability and violence. Its score of 6.85 is largely a consequence of continuing political volatility and violence. Weak scores for the permanence of regime type and political stability reflect the relative fragility of the newly reinstated democratic political system. The number of refugees produced is a further indicator of concern; refugees have fled Haiti as a result of security and economic concerns, with many families seeking sanctuary in the United States, Canada and numerous Caribbean islands. Those fleeing tend to be relatively well educated and financially independent, which has led to a brain drain that now impairs economic recovery and political stability. Finally, informal market activity reflects the difficulty the government experiences in both regulating economic activity and collecting taxes; it also underscores the corruption and lack of control found at the country's borders.

#### Event Analysis

The political stability and violence cluster has a positive average score (0.64) and a trend of 0.24, which is moderately positive. (See *Table 20*). The increased number of positive events over the period both improved the average score and lifted the trend upward.

Significant events include the

successful missions carried out by MINUSTAH to dismantle urban gangs and arrest gang leaders, as well as the improved security climate that resulted as a consequence. While the number of violent incidents between the gangs, UN peacekeepers and police forces increased following the 2006 elections, the UN's efforts in March of 2007 to impose the rule of law in the most violent slums has borne fruit and contributed to the reduction of insecurity and violence. The integration of gang members into the Disarmament and Demobilization Program created in 2006 has also contributed to the positive average score.

An improvement in Haiti's relations with the Dominican Republic, including a promise of collaboration in terms of security, drug-trafficking and economic development also contributed to the positive observations. Nonetheless, significant challenges remain in terms of the government's stability and performance.

#### Significant stabilizing events:

- UN Secretary General recommends extending the mission for a further 12 months (January 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2007)
- DDR program director indicates that 100 gang members have participated in the program (January 26<sup>th</sup>, 2007)
- 700 UN troops move into Haiti's largest slum (February

- 10<sup>th</sup>, 2007)
- UN dismantles gangs, seizes weapons and captures gang leaders (March 17<sup>th</sup>, March 24<sup>th</sup> 2007)
- Promises of cooperation are made between Haiti and the Dominican Republic in terms of security, drug-trafficking and economic development (May 14<sup>th</sup>, 2007)
- Préval announces commission to study the creation of gendarme instead of restoring the army (June 18<sup>th</sup>, 2007)

**Significant destabilizing events:**

- At least five people are killed in clashes between UN troops and armed gang members in a Haitian shantytown near the capital (December 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2006, January 24<sup>th</sup>, 2007)
- China blocks an extension of the UN peacekeeping force in Haiti due to the country's diplomatic ties with Taiwan (January 29<sup>th</sup>, 2007)

- Several thousand Lavalas partisans protest for the return of Aristide (February 7<sup>th</sup>, 2007 and June 16<sup>th</sup>, 2007)
- Gangs of Haitians fleeing persecution take refuge in the border zone and cross into Dominican territory (February 13<sup>th</sup>, 2007)
- Drug traffickers use Dominican territory to introduce guns and ammunition in Haiti (February 15<sup>th</sup>, 2007)
- Members of Parliament suggest that Préval should disband the inactive Parliament (April 11<sup>th</sup>, 2007)
- Senators take steps to fire the Prime Minister and Cabinet (August 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2007)

TABLE 20: PSV EVENT TREND—JANUARY 2007 TO SEPTEMBER 2007




TABLE 21: RULE OF LAW

	<b>7.66</b>
Police, Law & Criminality	8.9
Prison Population Rate	2.0
Prison Occupancy Level	8.1
Number of Political Prisoners	7.4
Judicial Independence	9.0
Impartial Courts	8.5
Integrity of the Legal System	8.3
Military Interference in Rule of Law	7.9
Property Rights	9.0

**RULE OF LAW**

**Underlying Conditions**

**This cluster represents a very high source of instability for Haiti.** Its average score of 7.66 captures the findings from extremely destabilizing indicators for the integrity of the legal system, law and criminality, as well as judicial independence.

These indicators reflect the situation on the ground, where the police forces must battle corruption within their own ranks and, as a result, are unable to keep gangs and other criminal groups under control. The judicial system lacks proper infrastructure and trained judges with the capacity to deliver unbiased judgement; it also lacks independence from both the government and criminal groups.

**Events Analysis**

The average score of the rule of law cluster is positive at 1.15, while the trend is moderately positive (0.35). The stabilizing trend demonstrates that the situation in the streets of Haiti has improved during the 6-month period over which events were recorded (*See Table 24*).

While a series of kidnappings targeting school children and foreigners drove the trend down at the beginning of the period, the significant number of arrests by UN peacekeepers and PNH officers aimed at dismantling gangs and criminal groups contributed to drive the trend upward.

The new recognition by the government that drug trafficking

is an issue that needs to be addressed as well as the few operations intended at dismantling drug networks are also notable signs of progress. On the other hand, a good number of the destabilizing events recorded are the consequences of the arrests made by the UN and the PNH. These include civilians killed or injured in the clashes, overcrowding prison facilities and criminal gangs fleeing the cities toward the countryside.


**Significant stabilizing events:**

- Police step up arrests forcing prisoners to take turns sleeping in crowded prisons (January 5<sup>th</sup>, 2007)
- Canada contributes \$10 million to boost Haiti's security. (February 6<sup>th</sup>, 2007)
- UN arrests gang leaders and members. (February 20<sup>th</sup>, 21<sup>st</sup>, 23<sup>rd</sup>, March 9<sup>th</sup>, April 23<sup>rd</sup>, May 7<sup>th</sup>, 14<sup>th</sup>, 28<sup>th</sup>, 29<sup>th</sup>, June 6<sup>th</sup>, August 10<sup>th</sup>, 2007)
- Haiti reinforces its capability to fight drug trafficking (June 5<sup>th</sup>, 2007)
- DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) operations continue. (July 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2007)

**Significant destabilizing events:**

- Kidnapping of school children forces the government to end the school year prematurely (December 16<sup>th</sup> and December 19<sup>th</sup>, 2006)
- Police officer involved in kidnapping is apprehended (December 20<sup>th</sup>, 2006)
- Seven people die during an invasion at the Jeremie's prison facility. (January 4<sup>th</sup>,

TABLE 22: EVENT MONITORING RESULTS  
JANUARY-SEPTEMBER 2007



- 2007)
  - Civilian killed during altercation between rival gangs. (January 20<sup>th</sup>, 2007)
  - Growing concern over the guns-for-drugs trade. February 16<sup>th</sup>, 2007)
  - Heavily armed gangs fleeing Haiti's dangerous slums in the face of UN peacekeeper raids establish new bases in provincial areas. (February 28<sup>th</sup>, 2007)
  - Haiti's prison system is on the brink of collapse. (May 6<sup>th</sup>, 2007)
  - Top UN officials denounce a sharp increase in lynching and other mob attacks. (July 27<sup>th</sup>, 2007)

TABLE 23: RL EVENT TREND—JANUARY 2007 TO SEPTEMBER 2007







TABLE 24: GOVERNMENT & MARKET EFFICIENCY

		<b>6.67</b>	
Economic Growth—% of GDP	8.2	Contract Regulation	8.3
Economic Size—Relative—GDP/capita	7.3	Enforcing Contracts	5.8
Economic Size—Total—GDP	6.4	Dealing with Licences	3.6
External Debt—% of GNI	2.4	Registering Property	7.0
Ease of Doing Business	7.2	Health Expenditures	3.4
Starting a Business	8.7	Access to Improved Water	8.1
Protecting Investors	7.6	Government Effectiveness	8.8
Trading Across Borders	7.1	FDI—% of GDP	1.8
Closing a Business	7.8	Foreign Aid—% of Expenditures	..
Economic Freedom	8.0	Inequality—GINI Coefficient	8.8
National Savings Level	7.1	Trade Balance—% of GDP	4.5
Foreign Investment Freedom	8.7	Unemployment — Total	..
Intellectual Property	9.0	Paying taxes	4.7

TABLE 25: EVENT MONITORING RESULTS  
JANUARY-SEPTEMBER 2007



**GOVERNMENT & MARKET EFFICIENCY  
Underlying Conditions**

Haiti's Government and Market Efficiency score represents high risk on average. High scores for indicators included in the World Bank *Ease of Doing Business* data, such as Foreign Investment Freedom, Intellectual Property, Starting a Business and Protecting Investors, helps explain why foreign investment has remained low in the past decade (US\$ 9.5 million in 2005). Poor scores for government effectiveness highlight problems linked with the lack of government investment in social programs and speaks to the precarious living conditions in which the majority of the population lives. More positively, the moderate and even positive scores for economic size and relative external debt are signs that could signal an eventual economic recovery. Haiti has benefited from debt cancellation under the *Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative* and several countries and organizations have subsequently granted Haiti a debt

cancellation or reduction. If the financial resources gained are invested wisely and security is increased significantly in the capital, the economic situation could improve in the long-term.

**Event Analysis**

The average event score in the Government and Market Efficiency cluster is strongly positive (3.22), while the trend is moderately negative (-0.15); in other words, most events related to government efficiency and economic performance were strongly positive on average, but negative events registered higher scores towards the end of the period monitored (*see Table 28*).

The majority of positive events recorded in this cluster have been announcements of international aid grants by several industrialized countries including Canada, the United States, Venezuela, the European Union, as well as international organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank. Negative events included reports of the difficulties encountered by the government when delivering basic services, such as health, education, infrastructure, transportation, etc. Several instances of strikes by government workers were also recorded and disrupted basic services. The events recorded reflect the situation on the ground: although important sums of money are continually injected into Haiti's economy in the form of loans and official development assistance grants, services offered to the population remain limited.

**Significant stabilizing events:**


- Announcements of international aid grants by Canada, the United States, the European Union, Venezuela, Japan, the Interamerican Development Bank and the World Bank. (Throughout the period)
- Project Konbi Ak Tet Ansanm is financed by USAID and should generate 40,000 jobs during the first year. (January 26<sup>th</sup>, 2007)
- The OAS pledges to help Haiti update its tourism master plan in order to spur economic development and opportunity. (February 10, 2007)
- MINUSTAH helps rehabilitate a high school for some 5,000 students. (March 13<sup>th</sup>, 2007)
- Haiti earns duty-free entry into the US for apparel sewn on the island nation. (March 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2007)
- A UN backed project is helping local communities in north-eastern Haiti to increase and diversify their agricultural production. (April 4<sup>th</sup>, 2007)
- Government invests in infrastructure and road building. (May 26<sup>th</sup>, 2007)
- The government decides it will take a census of all building over the next 6 month. (July 21<sup>st</sup>, 2007)

**Significant destabilizing events:**

- City morgue is under-refrigerated, jammed to capacity and short of funds. (April 7<sup>th</sup>, 2007)
- More than 400 Pétion-Ville city employees are fired (April 25<sup>th</sup>, 2007)

- Ferry packed with more than 300 people hits a sandbar and pitches passengers overboard, killing at least nine. (April 26<sup>th</sup>, 2007)
- A two-day transport strike grips Haiti's major cities and underscores a mounting crisis over fuel prices, which rose nearly 20% in two weeks. (June 13<sup>th</sup>, 2007)
- A two-week strike by janitors and support staff forces Haiti's largest hospital to turn away patients. (June 28<sup>th</sup>, 2007)
- The United States halts mango imports from Haiti and returns 50 shipping containers of tropical fruit after discovering fruit flies in crates. (July 5<sup>th</sup>, 2007)
- School fees increase by as much as 80%, especially in private schools, some of them even requiring payment in American dollars. (July 10<sup>th</sup>, 2007)

TABLE 26: GME EVENT TREND—JANUARY 2007 TO SEPTEMBER 2007



## 5. Secondary Drivers

TABLE 27: HUMAN RIGHTS

	<b>6.95</b>
Civil Liberties	7.9
Political Rights	7.4
Human Rights—Empowerment	5.1
Human Rights—Physical Integrity	7.4

### HUMAN RIGHTS

#### Underlying Conditions

Haiti's Human Rights score represents an area of concern for democratic processes and good governance with an average score of 6.95. The different indicators reflect the number of human rights abuses committed by the police forces and other armed groups. These include arbitrary detention and unlawful killings; lack of political representation for minorities, including indigenous peoples, women and youth; and the recent killing of journalists and human rights activists. Although the score for empowerment is only moderately destabilizing, improvement in this sphere is still necessary.

TABLE 28: HR EVENT STATISTICS

	All Events	Stabilizing Events	Destabilizing Events
# of Events	17	9	8
Avg. Event Score	0.35	5.00	-4.86
Avg, as % of Total	4%	56%	-54%

TABLE 29: GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY & ACCOUNTABILITY

	<b>8.12</b>
Corruption—World Bank	8.9
Voice & Accountability	8.0
Press Freedom	7.4

#### Event Analysis

Very few events were recorded in the cluster of human rights. One was the request of Senator Joseph Lambert to reinstate the death penalty in order to address the lawlessness in the country (December 18<sup>th</sup>, 2006). Various events denounced the degrading conditions in penitentiaries across the country. A few reports of human rights violations against Haitian workers living in the Dominican Republic also emerged; in response the government is attempting to collaborate with Dominican authorities to improve working conditions and reduce abuses and violations. Finally, the discovery of a human trafficking network selling children for adoption has also been reported in the news sources. A few positive declarations and events were also mentioned in the news.

MINUSTAH announced on January 16, 2007 that it would make the promotion of Human Rights a priority. The Canadian government also announced that it would give \$8 million to promote women's rights.

### GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY & ACCOUNTABILITY

#### Underlying Conditions

Indicators of Accountability and Transparency reveal that this cluster still represents a significant challenge for Haitian efforts at reform. High corruption and limited press freedom combine with a poor score for voice and accountability to give a good picture of the situation on the ground, particularly the lack of constraints on actors within the political system.

The limited capacity of Haiti's democratic system partly explains the lack of accountability and transparency mechanisms. While corruption is a common problem in Latin American and countries of the Caribbean, it is nonetheless important to consider as it limits the likelihood of improvements in other clusters, such as government efficiency and rule of law. Media freedom is also crucial; without objective observers holding the government accountable, it seems unrealistic to expect the government to be able to police itself effectively.

#### Events Analysis

Government transparency and accountability continue to be

TABLE 31: DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION

	<b>6.96</b>
Checks and Balances	5.6
Degree of Party Dominance	6.8
% of Female Parliamentarians	8.1
Polity Score	6.8
Executive Constraints	7.4

significant challenges for Haiti. During the period of observation, politicians and senior bureaucrats refused to explain their actions as requested by Parliament (January 16<sup>th</sup>, 2007), and a few senators were accused of having received bribes in exchange for voting in favour of the Socabank legislation. A number of journalists and reporters were murdered (January 22<sup>nd</sup>, April 14, 2007 and May 17<sup>th</sup>, 2007). On the positive side, the Senate launched a few corruption inquiries, the Parliament ratified the UN Convention on Corruption, and the President and Prime Minister both reaffirmed their intention to fight corruption.

party dominance is in the lower echelon of the high-risk category with a score of 6.8.

**Event Analysis**

Events recorded within the democratic participation cluster have been stabilizing overall. Events came in the form of peaceful protests, holding of a local and legislative elections (February 12, 2007) and municipal elections (April 29<sup>th</sup>, 2007). A series of negative events were also recorded and revolved around a cessation of parliamentary activity for a period of three months due to the absence of the majority of deputies, which ended on April 12<sup>th</sup>, 2007. A second deadlock caused by a conflict between deputies and the Prime Minister Alexis added to political instability and prevented Parliament from functioning normally. Finally, the refusal of the deputies to approve the budget also caused legislative delays and friction between the deputies and the President (August 7<sup>th</sup>, 2007).

TABLE 32: DP EVENT STATISTICS

	All Events	Stabilizing Events	Destabilizing Events
# of Events	29	22	7
Avg. Event Score	2.66	5.27	-5.57
Avg, as % of Total	30%	59%	-62%

**DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION**

**Underlying Conditions**

**Indicators of democratic participation have an average score of 6.96, which indicates a relatively high risk.** The low ratio of female parliamentarians is particularly worrisome, as only 4 women were elected to the Lower House (out of 99 and equalling 4%) and four to the Higher House (out of 30 and equalling 13.3%).

The lack of adequate executive constraints is another problematic indicator that clearly highlights some of the limitations facing Haiti's political system. The tendency for Presidents to rule by decree when collaboration with deputies cannot be achieved, combined with the emphasis put on the presidential candidates within the party structure tends to make for centralized, relatively autocratic governance. The polity score, or the degree of democratization of the Haitian society, is also at high risk with a score of 6.8, while the degree of





## 6. Summary of Trends in Good Governance, 2006-2007

### SUMMARY OF 2006-2007 EVENTS

Events recorded in 2007 were more positive than those recorded between June and December of 2006. While the average score of events recorded in 2006 was 0.39, it reached 1.15 during between January and September 2007. The trend over 2006-07 is also positive (0.10), which demonstrates an improvement in the security situation in Haiti over the year. Instances of gang violence and kidnapping have decreased significantly and rule of law has been improved by the significant number of arrests made by UN peacekeepers in collaboration with PNH officers.

### SUMMARY OF PSV 2006-2007 EVENTS

Overall, events in 2006-2007 show a slightly positive trend of 0.09. From a negative average score of -0.15 in 2006, the situation has improved slightly in 2007 to exhibit a positive average score of 0.64. The trend is also encouraging as it went from a continuation of the *status quo* to a moderately positive trend in the last period monitored. The UN decision to impose rule of law, arrest gang members and leaders, and confiscate weapons in the most volatile slums of Port-au-Prince represented a significant gain for political stability.

### SUMMARY OF GME 2006-2007 EVENTS

Events recorded over the last year suggest a continuing *status quo* (0.049), with a positive average score overall. The strongly positive average score and trend in 2006 are balanced by the low average score and negative trend recorded in 2007. Announcements of international aid grants recorded in the months following the 2006 elections have since diminished pushing the trend downward. The quality and quantity of service delivery have been constant.

TABLE 33: AGGREGATE EVENT TREND—JUNE 2006 TO AUGUST 2007




TABLE 34: PSV EVENT TREND—JUNE 2006 TO SEPTEMBER 2007





TABLE 35: GME EVENT TREND—JUNE 2006 TO SEPTEMBER 2007



## 7. Regional Perspective: Governance and Democratization

Not surprisingly, Haiti has the most destabilizing indicators in the region when compared to the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Jamaica and Guyana. **Within the region, the Rule of Law and Government and Market Efficiency tend to be the most threatening to good governance and democratic processes, while Political Stability and Violence seems to present areas of relative stability.** While Cuba's indicators reflect the nature and limitations of the political system on the island and make comparisons more challenging, comparing structural data between Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Jamaica, for example, offers interesting insight into what Haiti could work towards and achieve in the medium and long-term future.

In terms of political stability and violence, we can see that the absence of conflict as well as good scores for the permanence of regime type, military expenditures, number of refugee produced and the number of terrorism incidents can help create better conditions and reduce violence and political instability. However, extensive black markets and dependence on external support tend to remain high across the region, which explains why only the Dominican Republic and Jamaica achieve a low-risk average score for this cluster.

Rule of Law is the most challenging cluster across the region. Judicial independence and the integrity of the legal system as well as the prison population rate remain indicators of concern in all five countries. They combine with medium risk indicators to represent the reality on the ground, where police officers and judges are often subject to corruption, prison conditions are appalling, and property rights are hardly enforceable. While Haiti's score represents the highest source of concern, it is clearly not the only country in the region dealing with such issues.

Human rights are a source of concern in Haiti and Cuba but represent medium risk scores in the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Guyana. Reasons for concern differ from country to country, with no continuity across the region. Although Jamaica receives the best score for political rights, Guyana performs relatively well in the area of civil liberties. Conversely, the Dominican Republic has a high risk score for physical integrity.

Government Accountability and Transparency is Haiti's most destabilizing cluster and also the cluster where the gap between Haiti and its neighbours is the widest. While Cuba also has a high-risk score,

TABLE 36: UNDERLYING CONDITIONS: REGIONAL COMPARISON

PSV	RL	HR	GTA	GME	DP
HAITI					
6.85	7.66	6.95	8.12	6.67	6.96
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC					
2.96	6.82	4.43	4.02	5.54	4.00
CUBA					
3.80	8.55	8.15	7.50	5.48	7.37
GUYANA					
3.97	5.62	3.91	4.02	6.35	4.61
JAMAICA					
3.25	5.51	4.12	3.89	4.76	4.52

the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Guyana all have an average score that represents a medium risk. Scores for press freedom vary between 2.1 (Jamaica) and 8.9 (Cuba), with Guyana at the lower end of the spectrum (2.9) and Haiti in the second worst position with a score of 8.12. Other indicators present less variance.

The Government and Market Efficiency cluster is composed of 27 different indicators. Most countries in the region exhibit a mix of low, medium and high-risk indicators that reflect the priorities and the efficiency of the governments in power. All countries except for Haiti have average scores that represent a medium risk for governance and democratic processes, although Haiti with its score of 6.67 is not far from Guyana (6.35). If the Préval government uses the numerous grants and loans that it received from the international community in an effective manner and improves basic social

services and programs, the score for this cluster could improve significantly short- to medium term.

Finally, democratic participation once again separates countries into two distinctive groups, with Haiti and Cuba performing poorly and the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Guyana exhibiting medium risk scores. The nature of the political system in place is reflected in the score that each country is attributed for executive constraints, polity type and checks and balances. Haiti needs to improve its percentage of female parliamentarians and develop

greater executive constraints into its political system in order to move from a high-risk to a medium-risk average score in the future.

Governance index scoring scale	
Score	Description
1-3.5	Country performing well relative to others
3.5-6.5	Country performing at or around the median
6.5+	Country performing poorly relative to others

## Haiti

	Cluster Average	Raw Score	CIFP Index Score	Last Year of Data Available	Data Trend
<b>1. Democratic Participation</b>	<b>6.96</b>				
Checks and Balances (World Bank Database of Political Indicators, Index, 1-5)		3.0	5.6	2004	neg
Degree of Party Dominance (WB DPI, ratio of opp. to gov't members in legislature)		0.1	6.8	2004	neg
Percentage of Female Parliamentarians (WB WDI)		3.9	8.1	2005	pos
Level of Democracy (Polity IV, Index, -10-10)		-2.0	6.8	2003	s.q.
Executive Constraints (Polity IV, Index, 1-7)		3.0	7.4	2003	s.q.
<b>2. Government and Economic Efficiency</b>	<b>6.67</b>				
Economic growth -- Percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		-0.4	8.2	2005	s.q.
Economic Size -- Relative -- GDP per capita (WB WDI)		440.5	7.3	2005	neg
Economic Size -- Total -- GDP (WB WDI)		3649435400	6.4	2005	neg
External Debt -- percentage of GNI (WB WDI)		28.5	2.4	2004	*
Ease of Doing Business (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		137.5	7.2	2006	*
Starting a Business (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		167.0	8.7	2006	*
Protecting Investors (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		141.5	7.6	2006	*
Trading Across Borders (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		136.0	7.1	2006	*
Closing a Business (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		145.5	7.8	2006	*
Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation, Index, 0-100)		48.5	8.0	2007	s.q.
Savings Level (WB WDI, Gross Domestic as a % of GDP)		7.6	7.1	2003	neg
Foreign Investment Freedom (Heritage Foundation, Index, 0-100)		30.0	8.7	2007	s.q.
Intellectual Property (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10)		1.1	9.0	2004	*
Investment Climate -- Contract Regulation (Heritage Foundation, Index, 1-5)		5.0	8.3	2006	s.q.
Enforcing Contracts (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		105.5	5.8	2006	*
Dealing with Licences (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		57.0	3.6	2006	*
Registering Property (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		133.0	7.0	2006	*
Enrolment Rates (UNESCO, Gross enrolment ratio)		..	..	..	..
Health Infrastructure -- Expenditures as a percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		7.1	3.4	2003	pos
Access to Improved Water (WB WDI, percentage of pop.)		54.0	8.1	2004	*
Gov't Effectiveness (WB Governance Matters, Deviation from mean)		-1.6	8.8	2005	*
FDI -- percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		0.2	1.8	2004	s.q.

	Cluster Average	Raw Score	CIFP Index Score	Last Year of Data Available	Data Trend
<b>2. Government and Economic Efficiency, cont'd</b>					
Foreign Aid -- percent of Central Government Expenditures (WB WDI)		..	..	..	..
Inequality -- GINI Coefficient (WB WDI)		59.2	8.8	2003	*
Trade Balance -- percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		-1.6	4.5	2003	s.q.
Unemployment (WB, percentage)		..	..	..	..
Paying Taxes (WB Doing Business, global rank)		83.5	4.7	2006	*
<b>3. Accountability</b>	<b>8.12</b>				
Corruption (WB GM, Dev. from mean)		-1.6	8.9	2005	*
Voice and Accountability in Decision-making (WB GM, Dev. from mean)		-1.3	8.0	2005	*
Freedom of the Press (FH, Index, 0-100)		72.8	7.4	2006	pos
<b>4. Human Rights</b>	<b>6.95</b>				
Restrictions on Civil Liberties (FH, Index, 1-7)		6.0	7.9	2005	s.q.
Restrictions on Political Rights (FH, 1-7)		6.4	7.4	2005	neg
Human Rights -- Empowerment (CIRI, Index, 0-10)		7.2	5.1	2004	neg
Human Rights -- Physical Integrity (CIRI, Index, 0-10)		3.2	7.4	2004	neg
<b>5. Political Stability and Violence</b>	<b>6.85</b>				
Permanence of Regime Type (Polity IV, years since regime change)		1.2	8.4	2004	neg
Informal Economy -- Black Market (Heritage Foundation, 1-5)		4.6	7.2	2006	pos
Conflict intensity (Uppsala PRIO, number of conflict-related deaths)		75.0	2.8	2005	*
Dependence on External Military Support (Fund for Peace, 1-10)		10.0	8.4	2006	*
Military Expenditure -- percentage of GDP (WDI)		..	..	..	..
Political Stability (WB GM, deviation from mean) Political Stability (WB GM, deviation from mean)		-1.5	8.2	2005	*
Refugees Produced (WB WDI)		7856.5	6.1	2004	s.q.
Terrorism -- Number of fatalities (US NCTC, number of fatalities)		1.5	6.9	2005	*
Terrorism -- Number of Incidents (US NCTC, number of incidents)		5.0	6.8	2005	*
<b>6. Rule of Law</b>	<b>7.66</b>				
Police, Law, and Criminality (WB GM, Dev from global mean)		-1.7	8.9	2005	*
Prison Population Rate (International Centre for Prison Studies, per 100,000 pop.)		49.2	2.0	2006	s.q.
Prison Occupancy Level (ICPS, percentage of official capacity)		184.7	8.1	2006	*
Number of Political Prisoners (CIRI, Index, 0-2)		0.8	7.4	2004	neg
Judicial Independence (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10)		0.2	9.0	2004	*
Impartial Courts (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10)		2.1	8.5	2004	pos
Integrity of the Legal System (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10)		3.4	8.3	2004	pos
Military Interference in the Rule of Law (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10)		3.3	7.9	2004	neg
Property Rights, (Heritage Foundation, Index, 0-100)		10.0	9.0	2007	s.q.

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# Dominican Republic

	Cluster Average	Raw Score	CIFP Index Score	Last Year of Data Available	Data Trend
<b>1. Democratic Participation</b>	<b>4.00</b>				
Checks and Balances (World Bank Database of Political Indicators, Index, 1-5)		3.8	3.8	2004	pos
Degree of Party Dominance (WB DPI, ratio of opp. to gov't members in legislature)		0.9	3.6	2004	neg
Percentage of Female Parliamentarians (WB WDI)		16.7	3.6	2005	s.q.
Level of Democracy (Polity IV, Index, -10-10)		8.0	4.2	2004	s.q.
Executive Constraints (Polity IV, Index, 1-7)		6.0	4.8	2004	s.q.
<b>2. Government and Economic Efficiency</b>	<b>5.54</b>				
Economic growth -- Percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		2.5	6.0	2005	s.q.
Economic Size -- Relative -- GDP per capita (WB WDI)		2467.2	4.3	2005	s.q.
Economic Size -- Total -- GDP (WB WDI)		21321708000	3.9	2005	s.q.
External Debt -- percentage of GNI (WB WDI)		38.5	4.1	2004	*
Ease of Doing Business (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		115.5	6.3	2006	*
Starting a Business (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		114.5	6.2	2006	*
Protecting Investors (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		134.0	7.2	2006	*
Trading Across Borders (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		53.5	3.3	2006	*
Closing a Business (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		142.0	7.6	2006	*
Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation, Index, 0-100)		55.1	6.2	2007	s.q.
Savings Level (WB WDI, Gross Domestic as a % of GDP)		18.6	4.8	2005	s.q.
Foreign Investment Freedom (Heritage Foundation, Index, 0-100)		50.0	6.7	2007	s.q.
Intellectual Property (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10)		3.6	6.5	2004	s.q.
Investment Climate -- Contract Regulation (Heritage Foundation, Index, 1-5)		4.0	4.9	2006	s.q.
Enforcing Contracts (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		113.0	6.1	2006	*
Dealing with Licences (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		67.5	4.1	2006	*
Registering Property (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		124.5	6.7	2006	*
Enrolment Rates (UNESCO, Gross enrolment ratio)		74.3	4.5	2004	s.q.
Health Infrastructure -- Expenditures as a percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		6.8	3.7	2003	pos
Access to Improved Water (WB WDI, percentage of pop.)		95.0	3.9	2004	*
Gov't Effectiveness (WB Governance Matters, Deviation from mean)		-0.5	5.9	2005	*
FDI -- percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		4.3	6.5	2004	s.q.
Foreign Aid -- percent of Central Government Expenditures (WB WDI)		4.4	5.0	2003	pos
Inequality -- GINI Coefficient (WB WDI)		51.7	7.9	2003	*
Trade Balance -- percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		0.3	4.3	2004	pos
Unemployment (WB, percentage)		..	..	..	..
Paying Taxes (WB Doing Business, global rank)		141.5	7.4	2006	*
<b>3. Accountability</b>	<b>4.80</b>				
Corruption (WB GM, Dev. from mean)		-0.5	5.7	2005	*
Voice and Accountability in Decision-making (WB GM, Dev. from mean)		0.2	4.5	2005	*
Freedom of the Press (FH, Index, 0-100)		35.4	4.2	2006	neg

	Cluster Average	Raw Score	CIFP Index Score	Last Year of Data Available	Data Trend
<b>4. Human Rights</b>	<b>4.43</b>				
Restrictions on Civil Liberties (FH, Index, 1-7)		2.0	2.6	2005	s.q.
Restrictions on Political Rights (FH, 1-7)		2.2	3.6	2005	s.q.
Human Rights -- Empowerment (CIRI, Index, 0-10)		7.8	4.5	2004	neg
Human Rights -- Physical Integrity (CIRI, Index, 0-10)		4.2	6.9	2004	s.q.
<b>5. Political Stability and Violence</b>	<b>2.96</b>				
Permanence of Regime Type (Polity IV, years since regime change)		6.0	6.9	2004	s.q.
Informal Economy -- Black Market (Heritage Foundation, 1-5)		3.6	4.3	2006	neg
Conflict intensity (Uppsala PRIO, number of conflict-related deaths)		0.0	1.0	2005	*
Dependence on External Military Support (Fund for Peace, 1-10)		4.8	2.8	2006	*
Military Expenditure -- percentage of GDP (WDI)		1.0	1.5	2005	s.q.
Political Stability (WB GM, deviation from mean) Political Stability (WB GM, deviation from mean)		0.1	4.8	2005	*
Refugees Produced (WB WDI)		64.0	3.3	2003	s.q.
Terrorism -- Number of fatalities (US NCTC, number of fatalities)		0.0	1.0	2005	*
Terrorism -- Number of Incidents (US NCTC, number of incidents)		0.0	1.0	2005	*
<b>6. Rule of Law</b>	<b>6.82</b>				
Police, Law, and Criminality (WB GM, Dev from global mean)		-0.5	5.8	2005	*
Prison Population Rate (International Centre for Prison Studies, per 100,000 pop.)		170.2	6.4	2006	pos
Prison Occupancy Level (ICPS, percentage of official capacity)		175.3	7.9	2006	*
Number of Political Prisoners (CIRI, Index, 0-2)		2.0	5.4	2004	s.q.
Judicial Independence (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10)		3.6	6.5	2004	*
Impartial Courts (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10)		3.7	6.9	2004	neg
Integrity of the Legal System (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10)		3.7	7.3	2004	neg
Military Interference in the Rule of Law (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10)		5.0	7.0	2004	s.q.
Property Rights, (Heritage Foundation, Index, 0-100)		30.0	8.3	2007	s.q.

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Governance index scoring scale	
Score	Description
1-3.5	Country performing well relative to others
3.5-6.5	Country performing at or around the median
6.5+	Country performing poorly relative to others

# Cuba

	Cluster Average	Raw Score	CIFP Index Score	Last Year of Data Available	Data Trend
<b>1. Democratic Participation</b>	<b>7.37</b>				
Checks and Balances (World Bank Database of Political Indicators, Index, 1-5)		1.0	9.0	2004	s.q.
Degree of Party Dominance (WB DPI, ratio of opp. to gov't members in legislature)		0.0	9.0	2004	s.q.
Percentage of Female Parliamentarians (WB WDI)		32.8	1.4	2005	pos
Level of Democracy (Polity IV, Index, -10-10)		-7.0	8.5	2004	s.q.
Executive Constraints (Polity IV, Index, 1-7)		1.0	9.0	2004	s.q.
<b>2. Government and Economic Efficiency</b>	<b>5.48</b>				
Economic growth -- Percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		3.9	4.8	2004	s.q.
Economic Size -- Relative -- GDP per capita (WB WDI)		..	..	..	..
Economic Size -- Total -- GDP (WB WDI)		..	..	..	..
External Debt -- percentage of GNI (WB WDI)		..	..	..	..
Ease of Doing Business (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		..	..	..	..
Starting a Business (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		..	..	..	..
Protecting Investors (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		..	..	..	..
Trading Across Borders (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		..	..	..	..
Closing a Business (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		..	..	..	..
Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation, Index, 0-100)		32.1	8.9	2007	neg
Savings Level (WB WDI, Gross Domestic as a % of GDP)		..	..	..	..
Foreign Investment Freedom (Heritage Foundation, Index, 0-100)		26.0	8.8	2007	s.q.
Intellectual Property (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10)		..	..	..	..
Investment Climate -- Contract Regulation (Heritage Foundation, Index, 1-5)		4.4	6.2	2006	s.q.
Enforcing Contracts (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		..	..	..	..
Dealing with Licences (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		..	..	..	..
Registering Property (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		..	..	..	..
Enrolment Rates (UNESCO, Gross enrolment ratio)		79.0	3.6	2004	pos
Health Infrastructure -- Expenditures as a percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		7.1	3.4	2003	s.q.
Access to Improved Water (WB WDI, percentage of pop.)		91.0	4.7	2004	*
Gov't Effectiveness (WB Governance Matters, Deviation from mean)		-0.6	6.2	2005	*
FDI -- percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		..	..	..	..
Foreign Aid -- percent of Central Government Expenditures (WB WDI)		..	..	..	..
Inequality -- GINI Coefficient (WB WDI)		..	..	..	..
Trade Balance -- percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		..	..	..	..
Unemployment (WB, percentage)		5.0	2.8	2002	..
Paying Taxes (WB Doing Business, global rank)		..	..	..	..
<b>3. Accountability</b>	<b>7.50</b>				
Corruption (WB GM, Dev. from mean)		-0.3	4.8	2005	*
Voice and Accountability in Decision-making (WB GM, Dev. from mean)		-1.9	8.8	2005	*
Freedom of the Press (FH, Index, 0-100)		95.6	8.9	2006	s.q.

	Cluster Average	Raw Score	CIFP Index Score	Last Year of Data Available	Data Trend
<b>4. Human Rights</b>	<b>8.15</b>				
Restrictions on Civil Liberties (FH, Index, 1-7)		7.0	8.6	2005	s.q.
Restrictions on Political Rights (FH, 1-7)		7.0	8.3	2005	s.q.
Human Rights -- Empowerment (CIRI, Index, 0-10)		0.0	9.0	2004	s.q.
Human Rights -- Physical Integrity (CIRI, Index, 0-10)		4.4	6.7	2004	s.q.
<b>5. Political Stability and Violence</b>	<b>3.80</b>				
Permanence of Regime Type (Polity IV, years since regime change)		41.0	2.6	2004	s.q.
Informal Economy -- Black Market (Heritage Foundation, 1-5)		4.7	6.9	2006	pos
Conflict intensity (Uppsala PRIO, number of conflict-related deaths)		0.0	1.0	2005	*
Dependence on External Military Support (Fund for Peace, 1-10)		7.0	6.5	2006	*
Military Expenditure -- percentage of GDP (WDI)		..	..	..	..
Political Stability (WB GM, deviation from mean) Political Stability (WB GM, deviation from mean)		0.1	4.7	2005	*
Refugees Produced (WB WDI)		17767.2	6.8	2004	pos
Terrorism -- Number of fatalities (US NCTC, number of fatalities)		0.0	1.0	2005	*
Terrorism -- Number of Incidents (US NCTC, number of incidents)		0.0	1.0	2005	*
<b>6. Rule of Law</b>	<b>8.55</b>				
Police, Law, and Criminality (WB GM, Dev from global mean)		-1.1	8.0	2005	*
Prison Population Rate (International Centre for Prison Studies, per 100,000 pop.)		372.6	8.2	2006	neg
Prison Occupancy Level (ICPS, percentage of official capacity)		..	..	..	..
Number of Political Prisoners (CIRI, Index, 0-2)		0.0	9.0	2004	s.q.
Judicial Independence (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10)		..	..	..	..
Impartial Courts (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10)		..	..	..	..
Integrity of the Legal System (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10)		..	..	..	..
Military Interference in the Rule of Law (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10)		..	..	..	..
Property Rights, (Heritage Foundation, Index, 0-100)		10.0	9.0	2007	s.q.

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Governance index scoring scale	
Score	Description
1-3.5	Country performing well relative to others
3.5-6.5	Country performing at or around the median
6.5+	Country performing poorly relative to others



# Guyana

	Cluster Average	Raw Score	CIFP Index Score	Last Year of Data Available	Data Trend
<b>1. Democratic Participation</b>	<b>4.61</b>				
Checks and Balances (World Bank Database of Political Indicators, Index, 1-5)		2.6	6.1	2004	pos
Degree of Party Dominance (WB DPI, ratio of opp. to gov't members in legislature)		0.8	3.2	2004	pos
Percentage of Female Parliamentarians (WB WDI)		22.0	2.6	2005	pos
Level of Democracy (Polity IV, Index, -10-10)		6.0	5.4	2004	s.q.
Executive Constraints (Polity IV, Index, 1-7)		5.0	5.9	2004	s.q.
<b>2. Government and Economic Efficiency</b>	<b>6.35</b>				
Economic growth -- Percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		0.3	7.7	2005	neg
Economic Size -- Relative -- GDP per capita (WB WDI)		977.6	6.1	2005	neg
Economic Size -- Total -- GDP (WB WDI)		731960320	7.9	2005	neg
External Debt -- percentage of GNI (WB WDI)		72.2	6.7	2004	*
Ease of Doing Business (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		134.5	7.1	2006	*
Starting a Business (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		74.5	4.4	2006	*
Protecting Investors (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		151.0	8.0	2006	*
Trading Across Borders (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		154.0	8.0	2006	*
Closing a Business (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		127.0	6.9	2006	*
Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation, Index, 0-100)		54.9	6.1	2007	pos
Savings Level (WB WDI, Gross Domestic as a % of GDP)		9.5	6.9	2004	s.q.
Foreign Investment Freedom (Heritage Foundation, Index, 0-100)		50.0	6.7	2007	s.q.
Intellectual Property (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10)		1.1	9.0	2004	*
Investment Climate -- Contract Regulation (Heritage Foundation, Index, 1-5)		4.0	4.9	2006	s.q.
Enforcing Contracts (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		120.0	6.4	2006	*
Dealing with Licences (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		73.5	4.4	2006	*
Registering Property (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		49.5	3.2	2006	*
Enrolment Rates (UNESCO, Gross enrolment ratio)		77.4	3.9	2004	s.q.
Health Infrastructure -- Expenditures as a percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		5.0	6.2	2003	s.q.
Access to Improved Water (WB WDI, percentage of pop.)		83.0	5.9	2004	*
Gov't Effectiveness (WB Governance Matters, Deviation from mean)		-0.3	5.1	2005	*
FDI -- percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		6.2	7.3	2004	pos
Foreign Aid -- percent of Central Government Expenditures (WB WDI)		..	..	..	..
Inequality -- GINI Coefficient (WB WDI)		43.2	6.4	2003	*
Trade Balance -- percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		-8.9	7.5	2004	pos
Unemployment (WB, percentage)		..	..	..	..
Paying Taxes (WB Doing Business, global rank)		117.5	6.3	2006	*
<b>3. Accountability</b>	<b>4.02</b>				
Corruption (WB GM, Dev. from mean)		-0.5	5.6	2005	*
Voice and Accountability in Decision-making (WB GM, Dev. from mean)		0.6	3.6	2005	*
Freedom of the Press (FH, Index, 0-100)		22.8	2.9	2006	s.q.

	Cluster Average	Raw Score	CIFP Index Score	Last Year of Data Available	Data Trend
<b>4. Human Rights</b>	<b>3.91</b>				
Restrictions on Civil Liberties (FH, Index, 1-7)		2.2	2.9	2005	neg
Restrictions on Political Rights (FH, 1-7)		2.2	3.6	2005	neg
Human Rights -- Empowerment (CIRI, Index, 0-10)		9.0	3.5	2004	s.q.
Human Rights -- Physical Integrity (CIRI, Index, 0-10)		5.4	5.6	2004	s.q.
<b>5. Political Stability and Violence</b>	<b>3.97</b>				
Permanence of Regime Type (Polity IV, years since regime change)		10.0	6.0	2004	s.q.
Informal Economy -- Black Market (Heritage Foundation, 1-5)		4.0	5.2	2006	s.q.
Conflict intensity (Uppsala PRIO, number of conflict-related deaths)		0.0	1.0	2005	*
Dependence on External Military Support (Fund for Peace, 1-10)		..	..	..	..
Military Expenditure -- percentage of GDP (WDI)		..	..	..	..
Political Stability (WB GM, deviation from mean) Political Stability (WB GM, deviation from mean)		-0.4	6.1	2005	*
Refugees Produced (WB WDI)		52.0	3.1	2003	s.q.
Terrorism -- Number of fatalities (US NCTC, number of fatalities)		1.0	3.9	2005	*
Terrorism -- Number of Incidents (US NCTC, number of incidents)		0.5	2.6	2005	*
<b>6. Rule of Law</b>	<b>5.62</b>				
Police, Law, and Criminality (WB GM, Dev from global mean)		-0.6	6.1	2005	*
Prison Population Rate (International Centre for Prison Studies, per 100,000 pop.)		178.6	6.5	2006	s.q.
Prison Occupancy Level (ICPS, percentage of official capacity)		106.6	4.2	2006	*
Number of Political Prisoners (CIRI, Index, 0-2)		2.0	5.4	2004	s.q.
Judicial Independence (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10)		2.3	7.5	2004	*
Impartial Courts (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10)		4.8	5.2	2004	neg
Integrity of the Legal System (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10)		4.8	7.2	2004	neg
Military Interference in the Rule of Law (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10)		9.6	3.4	2004	neg
Property Rights, (Heritage Foundation, Index, 0-100)		48.0	5.2	2007	neg

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Governance index scoring scale	
Score	Description
1-3.5	Country performing well relative to others
3.5-6.5	Country performing at or around the median
6.5+	Country performing poorly relative to others

# Jamaica

	Cluster Average	Raw Score	CIFP Index Score	Last Year of Data Available	Data Trend
<b>1. Democratic Participation</b>	<b>4.52</b>				
Checks and Balances (World Bank Database of Political Indicators, Index, 1-5)		3.0	5.6	2004	s.q.
Degree of Party Dominance (WB DPI, ratio of opp. to gov't members in legislature)		0.4	5.2	2004	pos
Percentage of Female Parliamentarians (WB WDI)		12.3	4.6	2005	neg
Level of Democracy (Polity IV, Index, -10-10)		9.0	3.4	2004	s.q.
Executive Constraints (Polity IV, Index, 1-7)		7.0	3.7	2004	s.q.
<b>2. Government and Economic Efficiency</b>	<b>4.76</b>				
Economic growth -- Percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		1.5	7.4	2005	s.q.
Economic Size -- Relative -- GDP per capita (WB WDI)		3190.5	4.1	2005	s.q.
Economic Size -- Total -- GDP (WB WDI)		8394668200	5.3	2005	s.q.
External Debt -- percentage of GNI (WB WDI)		89.0	7.7	2004	*
Ease of Doing Business (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		49.0	3.3	2006	*
Starting a Business (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		10.0	1.4	2006	*
Protecting Investors (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		59.0	3.6	2006	*
Trading Across Borders (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		75.5	4.4	2006	*
Closing a Business (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		22.5	2.1	2006	*
Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation, Index, 0-100)		66.5	3.0	2007	s.q.
Savings Level (WB WDI, Gross Domestic as a % of GDP)		13.1	6.2	2004	s.q.
Foreign Investment Freedom (Heritage Foundation, Index, 0-100)		88.0	1.6	2007	s.q.
Intellectual Property (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10)		4.0	5.8	2004	s.q.
Investment Climate -- Contract Regulation (Heritage Foundation, Index, 1-5)		3.0	2.1	2006	s.q.
Enforcing Contracts (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		45.5	3.1	2006	*
Dealing with Licences (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		94.0	5.3	2006	*
Registering Property (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank)		105.0	5.8	2006	*
Enrolment Rates (UNESCO, Gross enrolment ratio)		75.1	4.4	2004	s.q.
Health Infrastructure -- Expenditures as a percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		5.4	5.6	2003	neg
Access to Improved Water (WB WDI, percentage of pop.)		93.0	4.2	2004	*
Gov't Effectiveness (WB Governance Matters, Deviation from mean)		0.0	4.3	2005	*
FDI -- percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		6.9	7.4	2004	s.q.
Foreign Aid -- percent of Central Government Expenditures (WB WDI)		0.5	2.3	2003	neg
Inequality -- GINI Coefficient (WB WDI)		38.8	4.7	2003	*
Trade Balance -- percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		-8.3	7.4	2004	s.q.
Unemployment (WB, percentage)		13.4	7.7	2004	pos
Paying Taxes (WB Doing Business, global rank)		162.0	8.4	2006	*
<b>3. Accountability</b>	<b>3.89</b>				
Corruption (WB GM, Dev. from mean)		-0.5	5.9	2005	*
Voice and Accountability in Decision-making (WB GM, Dev. from mean)		0.5	3.7	2005	*
Freedom of the Press (FH, Index, 0-100)		17.2	2.1	2006	s.q.

	Cluster Average	Raw Score	CIFP Index Score	Last Year of Data Available	Data Trend
<b>4. Human Rights</b>	<b>4.12</b>				
Restrictions on Civil Liberties (FH, Index, 1-7)		3.0	4.1	2005	s.q.
Restrictions on Political Rights (FH, 1-7)		2.0	3.4	2005	s.q.
Human Rights -- Empowerment (CIRI, Index, 0-10)		8.8	3.6	2004	neg
Human Rights -- Physical Integrity (CIRI, Index, 0-10)		5.6	5.4	2004	neg
<b>5. Political Stability and Violence</b>	<b>3.25</b>				
Permanence of Regime Type (Polity IV, years since regime change)		43.0	2.5	2004	s.q.
Informal Economy -- Black Market (Heritage Foundation, 1-5)		3.3	3.6	2006	neg
Conflict intensity (Uppsala PRIO, number of conflict-related deaths)		0.0	1.0	2005	*
Dependence on External Military Support (Fund for Peace, 1-10)		6.1	5.4	2006	*
Military Expenditure -- percentage of GDP (WDI)		1.0	1.5	2005	s.q.
Political Stability (WB GM, deviation from mean) Political Stability (WB GM, deviation from mean)		-0.3	5.9	2005	*
Refugees Produced (WB WDI)		104.0	3.2	2003	s.q.
Terrorism -- Number of fatalities (US NCTC, number of fatalities)		0.5	3.7	2005	*
Terrorism -- Number of Incidents (US NCTC, number of incidents)		0.5	2.6	2005	*
<b>6. Rule of Law</b>	<b>5.51</b>				
Police, Law, and Criminality (WB GM, Dev from global mean)		-0.5	5.9	2005	*
Prison Population Rate (International Centre for Prison Studies, per 100,000 pop.)		174.8	6.5	2006	s.q.
Prison Occupancy Level (ICPS, percentage of official capacity)		115.0	5.1	2006	*
Number of Political Prisoners (CIRI, Index, 0-2)		2.0	5.4	2004	s.q.
Judicial Independence (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10)		5.3	4.8	2004	*
Impartial Courts (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10)		4.8	5.1	2004	s.q.
Integrity of the Legal System (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10)		2.5	8.8	2004	neg
Military Interference in the Rule of Law (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10)		10.0	3.0	2004	s.q.
Property Rights, (Heritage Foundation, Index, 0-100)		50.0	5.1	2007	s.q.

**For trend scores, (s.q.) indicates continuation of status quo; (pos) indicates a positive trend toward stability, and (neg) indicates a negative trend toward instability. (\*)Indicates insufficient data for calculation of trend scores.**

*Note: CIFP index methodology has recently been amended. Scores are no longer modified for trend and volatility; thus index scores solely reflect relative country performance over the previous five years of available data. Further information regarding the index methodology is available in an attached appendix, as well as in a forthcoming companion document.*

Governance index scoring scale	
Score	Description
1-3.5	Country performing well relative to others
3.5-6.5	Country performing at or around the median
6.5+	Country performing poorly relative to others





## *Appendix 2: About the Methodology*

The report is based on three elements, adapted from CIFP's fragile states methodology. First, structural indicators are grouped into six clusters capturing different facets of democratic processes and governance: rule of law, human rights, government transparency and accountability, government and market efficiency, political stability and violence, and democratic participation. The structural data in this preliminary report constitute a limited set of leading indicators of democracy and governance; later versions of the document will include up to 75 separate structural indicators providing a detailed quantitative baseline portrait of the country.

Second, the analysis draws on event monitoring data compiled by CIFP researchers over a six month period extending from November 2006 to May 2007. Collected from a variety of web-based sources, including both international and domestic news sources in English and Spanish, the events are quantitatively evaluated and systematically assessed to identify general trends of relevance to democratic processes and governance. Highly significant events are also qualitatively analyzed to highlight their specific causes and consequences.

Third, the report includes a series of analytical exercises, including stakeholder analysis and scenario generation. Future iterations of the report may include detailed consultations with country and subject experts located in-country as well as in Canada and abroad. This multi-source data structure enables more robust analysis than any single method of data collection and assessment.

### INDEX METHODOLOGY

Like the CIFP fragility index, the governance index employs a methodology of relative structural assessment. The analysis begins with a structural profile of the country, a composite index that measures overall country performance along six dimensions listed above. Each of these clusters is based on a number of indicators. This multidimensional assessment methodology is a direct response to the multi-dimensional nature of governance and democratic processes. CIFP thus adopts what might be termed an inductive approach, identifying areas of relative strength and weakness across a broad range of measures related to governance and democratic processes.

In ranking state performance on a given indicator, global scores are distributed across a nine-point index. The best performing state receives a score of one, the worst a score of nine, and the rest are continuously distributed between these two extremes based on relative performance. As country performance for some types of data can vary significantly from year to year – as in the case of economic shocks, natural disasters, and other externalities – averages are taken for global rank scores over a five-year time frame. Once all indicators have been indexed using this method, the results for a given country are then averaged in each subject cluster to produce the final scores for the country.

In general, a high score – 6.5 or higher – indicates that a country is performing poorly relative to other states. Such a score may be indicative of an arbitrary and autocratic government, a history of non-transparent government, the presence of significant barriers to political participation, the absence of a consistently enforced legal framework, or a poor human rights record.

A low score – in the range of 1 to 3.5 – indicates that a country is performing well relative to others, or that a country's structural conditions present little cause for concern. Values in the moderate 3.5 to 6.5 range indicate performance approaching the global mean.

### EVENTS MONITORING METHODOLOGY

The purpose of CIFP event monitoring is to observe and report on events within a country to better understand the dynamic trends affecting democratic processes and governance in the

country. This data, when combined with structural data, provides a more comprehensive analysis of both the underlying conditions and recent developments, thereby informing a more nuanced and ultimately policy-relevant analysis. The six-month monitoring period demonstrated in these reports is an integral part of the proof of concept. Subsequent reports will include systematic and long term monitoring for more complete and accurate forecasting and policy-relevant diagnosis. Ongoing monitoring that allows the production of easy-to-interpret context-specific briefings would integrate shifting stakeholder interests, changes in baseline structure and of course event dynamics.

In the CIFP event monitoring methodology, events are all coded using a number of criteria. First, each event is assigned to the specific cluster area to which it is *most directly* related. This assigned cluster acts as the dependent variable; the event will be coded with respect to its effect on that particular aspect of governance. Second, the event is coded as being either positively or negatively related to the assigned cluster. The event score is then determined by answering the following three questions:

1. How direct is the impact of the event on the cluster stability?
2. How broad is the impact of the event?
3. How intense is the event, in comparison with past events in the country?

Each question is answered quantitatively using a three-point scale; thus the highest score for a single event is 9. The answers to these questions are added together to generate a composite indicator for each event, thereby determining its net impact on governance. The composite indicator is used to create time-series regression lines, as event data is plotted over a defined time period. These trends are analysed both in aggregate and disaggregated by cluster, in an effort to understand the current trajectory of the country. This trajectory is referred as the event 'tendency' during the period observed, to emphasize its role as an indicative piece of information rather than a deterministic extrapolated trend line. This analysis in turn provides some indication of the potential developments in governance and democratic processes over the short- to medium-term.

#### COMPONENTS OF COMPOSITE EVENT SCORE

##### Causal Relevance

1. Event is relevant, but with no clearly delineable causal linkage to governance or democratic processes (e.g. a funding announcement or an international soccer friendly).
2. Event is relevant, with a delineable, though indirect causal linkage to governance or democratic processes (e.g. New legislation enhancing minority rights is passed, or a bomb detonates within an ethnically divided region).
3. Event is relevant with delineable and direct causal linkage to governance or

democratic processes. (e.g. Declaration of a ceasefire or assassination of a government minister.)

##### Centrality

1. Event affects less than 25% of political stakeholders.
2. Event affects 25% - 75% of political stakeholders.
3. Event affects more than 75% of political stakeholders.

##### Intensity/Escalation

1. Event is comparable to others experienced in the state in the previous six months.
2. Event is more intense than others experienced in the state in the previous six months.
3. Event is more intense than others experienced in the state in the previous five years.

#### EVENT ANALYSIS

The analysis occurs in both aggregate (all events) and disaggregate (events analysed by cluster) by using quantitative data in two ways. First, **summary statistics** provide the analyst with an overview of the average event scores. Positive average event scores are indicative of an environment that experiences more or more significant positive events than negative events. Negative average scores indicate the opposite.

Tendency Key	Negative Slope	Status quo Slope	Positive Slope
OLS Slope value	Below -0.1	Between -.1 and .1	Above +0.1
Symbol			

The second avenue of analysis is via **regression lines** to observe whether the events demonstrate any positive or negative tendency over time. The composite indicators are plotted over a defined period of time – usually six months – and trend lines are generated using ordinary least squares regression. The trend line uses a weekly aggregate in order to capture the changing magnitude of events as well as any increase or decrease in the total *number* of events; both phenomena are deemed important to the analysis. When numbers associated with the trend line are included in the report, they refer to the slope of the trend line. In general, the greater the magnitude of the slope, the more significant the trend. In general, slopes greater than (+/-0.1) are considered to be significant; those falling between this range are considered indicative of continuing *status quo*.

Thus, a rapid increase in the number of positive events may result in a positive trend line, as might an increase in the average score per event. This trend analysis provides an overview of general event-driven developments over the months under consideration. On the other hand, a negative slope denotes a deteriorating situation one in which there is an increase in the number or significance of negative events relative to positive ones during the time period under observation.

#### SCENARIO GENERATION

The report includes scenarios for the country over the short term,

normally up to 18 months. The analysis includes three scenarios: a best-case, worst-case and most likely case, with each based on an analysis of basic structural data, recent trends in governance-related events, as well as a consideration of the role likely to be played by significant stakeholders within the country. The best-case assumes that the strongest positive trends will dominate over any negative trends in the near future. Conversely, the worst-case scenario assumes the opposite. These two scenarios are intended to highlight different facets of the situation for the reader. The best and worst cases consider the strongest trends among stabilizing and destabilizing events, drawing attention both to dominant threats and potential points of entry.

Finally, the most likely case scenario extrapolates future

tendencies based on the strongest overall trends present within the state. To begin with, it identifies dominant trends – those most likely to continue in each of the six subject clusters over the short term. These trends are then combined to form an overall portrait of the country over the near term, providing a baseline “likely” scenario. Taken together, these three scenarios define the universe of developments that may occur in the country in the near term, and give some sense of what may reasonably be expected in the same period. Such insights may inform contingency planning processes in both the domestic government and international partners, and provide some assistance when setting benchmarks with which to evaluate the success of initiatives intended to improve governance and democratic processes.

#### STAKEHOLDERS

As part of the initial country profile, the analyst compiles a list of stakeholders. Stakeholders are those individuals or groups that possess an identifiable, broadly similar political agenda and either have an effect on or are affected by governance. They often have an organizational structure in addition to sufficient resources to pursue explicitly or implicitly articulated goals.

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Alter Presse (Haiti)	Miami Herald (Miami, USA)
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Bay area Indymedia (San Francisco, USA)	New Zealand Stuff
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Boston Globe	News Balita (Philippines)
Carribbean News Net (Cayman Islands)	News Channel 13
Cayman Compass	News Haiti Action
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The CIFP database includes statistical data in the form of over one hundred (100) performance indicators for 197 countries. With its focus on policy relevance, the CIFP provides a rich information resource to policy officers across all government departments. By offering a detailed assessment methodology for evaluating individual country performance, the CIFP provides guidance to program officers working in complex and fragile environments, enabling them to focus their efforts and resources on the root structural causes rather than the outward symptoms of a problem.