

Fragile States Country Report No. 7

September 2007



September 2006
to February 2007

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Haiti

FRAGILITY IN BRIEF


Haiti is strengthening, but still fragile

Haiti is the most fragile state in the western hemisphere. Though there are some promising signs after a very difficult period of transition, Haiti nonetheless has not yet achieved a sustainable degree of stability and capacity, and continues to display weakness across all clusters. Challenges are political, environmental, social, and economic in nature, but security remains the overarching concern. Overall, Haiti ranked 13th out of 193 countries on the 2007 CIFP Fragility Index. Successful democratic elections in 2006, combined with subsequent attempts to reassert government authority in areas dominated by urban gangs and militias, provide hope for that Haiti is moving towards enhanced political stability and a secure environment; however, the rule of law is not yet enshrined and political institutions remain weak. Corruption plagues the government; Haiti was declared the most corrupt country of 163 countries in the 2006 Corruption Perceptions Index.

Haiti is weak in **Authority**, ranking 14th out of 193 countries. Violent gangs carry out kidnappings and terrorize civilians, particularly in urban areas, and the Haitian National Police do not yet possess adequate training and resources to respond in a comprehensive manner. The presence of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), operating since 2004, serves as an essential support to government, though some Haitians have turned to violence in an expression of their resentment of what they consider an occupying force. Allegations of human rights abuses that have been levied against UN troops and personnel further complicate MINUSTAH's relations with most Haitians.

Haiti is also weak in **Capacity**, ranking 28th out of 193 countries, as the state lacks the necessary resources and institutional capacity to meet the needs of the people. The majority of the population in Haiti lives in poverty, poor human development, high unemployment rates and the highest HIV/AIDS rates outside Africa.


Though still fragile, Haiti is stronger in terms of **Legitimacy** than in **Authority** and **Capacity**. The current government is generally accepted both domestically and internationally, and organizations that refused to recognize the interim government in 2004, have welcomed the elected government of René Préval.



Haiti Authority (A), Legitimacy (L), and Capacity (C) Triangle

MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (MDGs): LIKELIHOOD OF ATTAINMENT (UNICEF, 2007)						
Extreme Poverty and Hunger	Education	Gender Equality	Child Mortality	Maternal Mortality	HIV/AIDS & Malaria	Environmental Sustainability
Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Medium	Medium

STRUCTURAL BASELINE & EVENTS SUMMARY



SUMMARY

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

Haiti's structural baseline performance indicates that it is bordering between moderate and high risk. Particular areas of concern lie in Haiti's governance, economy and human development. The presence of the UN Stabilizing Mission in Haiti, established in 2004, has helped to mitigate the intensity of the ongoing conflict which is primarily gang-related. However the ongoing security challenges hinder advancements in other sectors, and Haiti's reliance on external military support is problematic. Governance is a high-risk area, with high levels of corruption, poor rule of law, and low government effectiveness. In terms of human development, Haiti exhibits poor access to improved water and sanitation conditions, high rates of infant mortality, and both limited and unregulated education. The Haitian economy has actually contracted over the last decade, and the country is highly dependent on remittances from the Haitian diaspora; encouragingly however, the economy has recently begun to expand once again. Economic inequality is also significant in Haiti; while overall inequality has remained high, the distribution of poverty has changed slightly with inequality in rural areas decreasing and urban inequality increasing.

EVENTS Encouragingly, events in Haiti exhibited a positive tendency during the period of observation, largely due to developments related to security and crime. Though incidences of violent gang activity persisted, they were more than offset by reports of successful missions by MINUSTAH troops, along with accounts of reorganization and slowly growing capacity within the Haitian National Police. The growing success of the DDR campaign to reduce the availability of small arms among non-state actors also played a role. Security concerns are central to the overall fragility of Haiti, as reflected in the frequency of violent attacks. Haiti's governance situation presented a positive outlook as well, as Préval's government sought to strengthen political institutions and the rule of law. Still, the government is facing criticism for failing to put a stop to the gang activity in urban areas. Economic events, though positive on average, became less so over the course of observation. This seemed to be a reflection of Haitians' increasing expectations of success on the part of the government, as events included several protests by workers demanding payment. Events related to human development reflected not only the deep problems related to health and education in Haitian society, but also the opportunities and growing expectations occurring in the wake of Haiti's return to electoral democracy.

KEY ISSUES AND FACTS

Security and Crime:

- Armed gangs in urban areas carrying out kidnappings and other violent crimes
- Inadequately trained and equipped police force
- Clashes between the MINUSTAH and those who oppose the UN's presence in Haiti

Economics:

- Least developed economy in the Western Hemisphere
- GDP is one tenth of the regional average
- Highly dependent on foreign aid and remittances from the Haitian diaspora

Governance:

- Impunity and weak judicial system
- High levels of corruption
- Fledging process of consolidating democratization and good governance

Human Development:


- Widespread poverty
- Highest incidences of HIV/AIDS outside Africa
- Inadequate healthcare
- Poor water access and sanitation levels
- High incidence of violent crime in urban areas prevents many children from going to school

Environment:

- Deforestation - between 1987 and 2000, forest areas diminished by half (ReliefWeb)
- Poor land management
- Natural disasters becoming more frequent
- Erosion threatens approximately 25% of Haiti's territory (ReliefWeb)

Demography:

- High rates of legal and illegal emigration to neighbouring countries



“Ongoing security challenges hinder advancements in other sectors, and Haiti’s reliance of external military support is problematic.”

PRIMARY DRIVERS

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS The overall human development situation in Haiti is worrisome. The weakest measures include access to sanitation and improved water, the proportion of the population infected with HIV/AIDS, and Haiti's Human Development Index score. Haiti is the Caribbean country most affected by HIV/AIDS, with 3.8% of adults between the ages of 15-49 estimated to be living with HIV/AIDS at the end of 2005. Rates have declined slowly, particularly in urban areas, but HIV/AIDS remains a challenge. Widespread poverty is an additional problem facing Haitians. Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere and more than 80% of the population live in poverty. Only 25% of children who attend school complete 6th grade, and 40% of Haiti's schools lack physical buildings. Further, limited regulation of education providers has led to wide variances in quality for those receiving tuition. Less than half of Haiti's population has access to potable water services, and only 4% of the rural population has electricity.

EVENTS Though both domestic and internationally sponsored efforts are underway to slowly improve Haiti's level of human development, Haitians continue to agitate for rapid advances. There were multiple protests against the government for lack of investment in the education system and child welfare. Gang violence is also negatively impacting the education system, as parents refuse to send their children to school for fear they will be kidnapped. Foreign aid continues to be crucial to meeting some of the most pressing human development needs.

KEY EVENTS

- **Efforts under way to prepare a rehabilitation center for street children in Port-au-Prince.**
9 November 2006, Radio Metropole
The welfare of child, particularly street children, has been gaining increased attention
- **EU to release 160,000 euros to help the victims of the September flooding in the Artibonite**
20 November 2006, Radio Metropole
Foreign aid key to responding to human development needs

GOVERNANCE

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS Despite strong participation in and commensurate engagement by international organizations, Haitian governance remains an area of serious concern. High levels of corruption and weakness in the rule of law underscore the weakness of Haitian institutions as the country continues to restructure itself around democratization and good governance. Government effectiveness and the rule of law are severely hindered by corruption, making it the single greatest source of governance-related fragility. Encouragingly, Haiti shows improvement in its level of democracy, as the 2006 presidential and legislative elections were generally heralded as free and fair.


EVENTS Events related to governance in Haiti exhibited a slightly stabilizing trend over the six-month period of analysis, reflecting the generally successful local elections that took place during the observation period. Results were tempered by the fact that expectations continue to be very high for Preval's government, and the lack of dramatic changes have thus far disappointed segments of the population. On a positive note, members of the National Commission for Disarmament, Dismantlement, and Reinsertion (CNDDR) were installed with the aim of reducing gang violence. The practice of impunity in Haiti has been denounced by both the international community and Haitians. In preparation for the December 2006 local and municipal elections and with support from MINUSTAH and other international organizations, the government launched a series of awareness campaigns and voter turnout was higher than expected.

KEY EVENTS

- **National Disarmament Commission created**
8 September 2006, Radio Metropole
Reinforce public security through the disarmament/dismantlement/reintegration of armed groups
- **Government officially launched an awareness campaign for the coming elections**
13 October 2006, Radio Metropole
Government tries to raise awareness about local and municipal elections

High-risk


Average Events Score and Tendency



Avg Score: 1.10
Trend Score: —

High-risk

Average Events Score and Tendency




Avg Score: 0.05
Trend Score: 0.13

PRIMARY DRIVERS

SECURITY AND CRIME


STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS Issues of security and crime have driven state fragility in Haiti. Violent conflict is concentrated in urban areas but regular incidents of kidnappings and gang violence are impeding the consolidation of peace and democracy. Haiti's dependence on external military support and historical lack of political stability are areas of great concern. They are compounded by additional problems, including the poor respect for human rights related to personal physical integrity and the high number of fatalities and incidents of terrorism.

EVENTS Though events related to security and crime tended to be slightly negative on average, they nonetheless demonstrated a strong positive trend in Haiti during the period monitored. Positive events such as the crackdowns on gang activity in suburbs of Port-au-Prince were dampened by accusations that MINUSTAH used excessive force during these operations. Despite the efforts of MINUSTAH and the Haitian National Police, kidnappings and gang violence remain common. Demonstrations against the UN presence were held on multiple occasions, and members of the government criticized MINUSTAH operations. Public frustration with the ongoing violence has led to incidences of vigilante justice. Hundreds of arrests are often made each month, but the prison system in Haiti is overcrowded and poorly run. A number of prisoners escaped from jail in November 2006, and prison guards were implicated. A positive development included the Haitian National Police (Police Nationale d'Haïti, PNH) increasing their strength, with the graduation of a class of over 500 officers, including 25 women. The PNH will soon be able to buy American weapons, as the U.S. arms embargo has been revised. MINUSTAH's mandate was set to expire in February 2007, but the UN Security Council voted to extend it until 15 October 2007. This was a key development in Haiti's security and crime climate, as MINUSTAH is providing much needed support and reinforcement to the PNH. Though the ongoing need for the UN presence was clear, China was threatening to veto the extension because of Haiti's ties to Taiwan.



KEY EVENTS

- **Notorious Solino gang leader Bibi and two of his men participated in a disarmament ceremony**
11 September 2006, Radio Metropole
The DDR program is having some success but it is unclear if gang members are truly committed to it as new small arms could easily be obtained
- **Kidnappers seem to have resumed activities in the capital**
9 February 2007, Radio Metropole
At least four people were kidnapped in the metropolitan area this week despite recent police and MINUSTAH operations. Violence around the capital region is common and has not demonstrably decreased
- **UN Security Council Extends Haiti Peacekeeping Mission for 8 Months**
15 February 2007, Xinhua
Despite some opposition to the UN presence in Haiti, the extension of the mandate is key to making some gains in security and crime in the coming months
- **Lavalas Senator Calls MINUSTAH Operation in Cite Soleil 'Massacre'**
16 February 2007, Radio Metropole
Opposition to the UN presence is expressed within government and the general public



SECONDARY DRIVERS

ECONOMICS

SUMMARY Haiti remains highly dependent on remittances from the Haitian diaspora and multilateral assistance. Structural weakness continues to hinder economic growth, and electricity has been in short supply, leading to frequent power outages in the capital. Encouragingly, GDP per capita is growing once again; the growth rate has increased from -0.5% in 2003 to 2.3% in 2006 (EIU). Total external debt has remained steady since 2002 at a relatively low amount of US \$1.3 billion. Inflation presents a serious problem, though encouragingly, rates have fallen from 22.8% in 2004 to 13% in 2006 (EIU). Years of political instability have proved detrimental to economic growth, but under Preval — who is working closely with international partners to increase trade and foreign investment — there is reason to forecast continued improvement in economic conditions.

SECONDARY DRIVERS

ENVIRONMENT

SUMMARY Haiti has limited natural resources as a result of small land area and environmental degradation, but the country is still highly dependent on agricultural output. Deforestation is a major problem in Haiti, and the current forest coverage represents just 1% of the original forest (FAO). Deforestation has led to soil erosion, which in turn has reduced crop yields and increased the country's vulnerability to deadly landslides and other natural disasters. With so little tree cover, a given tropical storm will have a greater impact on Haiti than elsewhere, a fact vividly illustrated by tropical storm Jeanne in 2004. Further, Haiti's high consumption of solid fuels illustrates the mutually reinforcing nature of the country's economic and environmental problems: even as environmental degradation adversely affects agricultural output, many Haitians must continue to harvest wood from the few remaining forests for fuel, for lack of viable alternative. The 15-year Environment Action Plan, authorized in 1999, proposed to stop deforestation by developing alternative fuel sources. However, political instability and lack of funding have limited the impact of this reform effort. The growing slum areas, especially in the capital, are also proving detrimental to environmental preservation. Haiti's environmental problems are offset by low rates of per capita carbon emissions; yet these rates will likely increase with economic development and thus are not truly structurally stabilizing areas. With pressing social, security, and political concerns, the environment has not received much attention and any economic development – critical for Haiti's stability – will likely worsen the environmental situation.

DEMOGRAPHY

SUMMARY Haiti has a population of over 8 million, which grew at a rate of 2.3% in 2006 (CIA Factbook). Over 40% of the population is 14 years of age and under, resulting in a significant youth bulge. Life expectancy remains low (53 years), particularly in comparison with the rest of the Western Hemisphere (CIA Factbook). About 1.5 million citizens live in the capital and its surrounding districts, but most of the population lives in small cities. In addition to the professionals and skilled workers who leave Haiti each year to work abroad, many of the rural poor also attempt to flee to neighbouring states. Thousands of Haitians in recent years have attempted to reach the shores of other Caribbean countries and the United States, often risking their lives in the process. The Dominican Republic tries to maintain strict control of its border with Haiti, as illegal entry by Haitians is common. About one in every eight Haitians lives outside the country's borders (US Library of Congress). Contributing to the problem of poverty and inequality, a small French-speaking minority controls most of the country's wealth.

CANADA AND HAITI

CANADIAN CONTRIBUTIONS

CIDA is supporting over 30 projects in Haiti, with the majority focused on strengthening political institutions and processes, and healthcare. Projects include:

- **Support to the Haitian Legislature**
Project Duration: 2006-2011
CIDA Contribution: \$5 million
Build the capacities of the Parliament and parliamentary commissions for the more effective preparation and passage of legislature.
- **Health Management Capacity Building Support**
Project Duration: 2006-2011
CIDA Contribution: \$ 17.5 million
Improve governance of Haiti's health system
- **Support to Haitian Savings and Credit Cooperatives Phase III**
Project Duration: 2005-2015
CIDA Contribution: \$15 million
Continue previous work done to support, develop and strengthen the co-operative movement.

DFAIT

July 2006: Canada announced \$520 million for Haiti between 2006-2011 at the international donor conference


LINKS

- **Canadian exports to Haiti (2006):** CAD 31 million, mainly aircraft and parts, fats and oils, seafood, meat
- **Canadian imports from Haiti (2006):** CAD 20 million, mainly clothing and accessories, textile products, seafood, twine and cording
- **Bilateral trade as percentage of total Canadian trade (2006):** 0.01% (Statistics Canada)
- **Total Remittances from Canada (2006):** CAD \$320 million (Inter-American Development Bank)
- **Haitian Diaspora in Canada (2001):** 82,405 of ethnic origin out of 29,639,035 in 2001 (Statistics Canada).
- **Development engagement:** Canada has provided over \$700 million in development assistance to Haiti since 1968. Haiti is the leading beneficiary of Canada's development assistance in the Americas (CIDA).
- **Canadians deployed to MINUSTAH (as of 10/01/07):** MINUSTAH military – 4 of 2884, MINUSTAH police 79 of 117 plus an additional 25 experts on police services

(Data from CIDA, 2007, and DFAIT, 2006)

Medium-risk


Average Events Score and Tendency



Avg Score: -4.0
Trend Score: —

Medium-risk

Average Events Score and Tendency



Avg Score: —
Trend Score: —

6—12 MONTH SCENARIOS

BASELINE LIKELY CASE *BASED ON MOST LIKELY*

ASSUMPTIONS FOR EACH CLUSTER

MINUSTAH and the PNH will make some gains in combating gang violence, thus providing some space for necessary governmental reforms. The DDR program continues to be implemented and accepted by more gang members. The capabilities of the PNH will continue to grow as new officers are trained by MINUSTAH. The Preval government's focus on economic growth, with support from bilateral and multilateral partners, will slowly show results, but with few visible improvements, the general public will remain sceptical about the abilities of the 'new' government. Poverty will remain widespread and HIV/AIDS prevalence rates will not show any significant decline. The violence in the capital consumes much of the government's attention, causing the needs of rural areas to be neglected.

ALTERNATIVE LIKELY CASE *BASED ON VARIATION IN WEAK-*

EST ASSUMPTION — MINUSTAH AND PNH EFFECTIVENESS

The most uncertain factor in Haiti's near future is the ability of MINUSTAH and the PNH to effectively combat gang violence without increasing the population's animosity. The renewed mandate of MINUSTAH may fuel anti-UN sentiments and lead more young people to join gangs. If the violence increases, the people's dissatisfaction with the government will increase, making it more difficult to consolidate democracy and strengthen political institutions. With levels of violence remaining steady, economic activity will be negatively affected, as will the education system around the capital, with parents keeping their children at home. Accusations of excessive violence and human rights abuses against the UN forces are likely to increase as operations to combat gang activities increase.

BEST CASE *BASED ON ASSUMPTION OF A BROAD BASED REDUCTION IN*

VIOLENCE AS A RESULT OF GOVERNMENT EFFORTS

In Haiti's best case scenario, MINUSTAH and the PNH are able to significantly reduce gang activity, thereby vastly improving the security climate around the capital. This improved security climate paves the way for economic investment and allows the government to turn more attention and resources to human development issues. NGO's will be able to operate more easily, and this will help address social needs. Moreover, international donors provide crucial support to Haiti's legal and correctional systems, areas largely unaddressed by donors during the last major phase of international engagement following Aristide's reinstatement in 1994. The improved security conditions will facilitate support for the government and democratization, and the Haitian state will strengthened with regards to **Authority**, **Capacity** and **Legitimacy**. MINUSTAH can begin to gradually reduce its role and entrust more security functions to the PNH, which reduces opposition to the UN presence.

WORST CASE *BASED ON ASSUMPTION THAT VIOLENCE ESCALATES*

In the worst case scenario, MINUSTAH and the PNH are unable to reduce gang violence and kidnappings and violent attacks increase. Efforts to put an end to gang activity become more intense, leading to an increase in accusations of human rights abuses against the UN forces and the PNH. This will decrease faith in Haiti's only domestic security force, the PNH, which is still trying to get past its history of corruption and mismanagement. With increased gang violence, the population will lose faith in the government's ability to ensure their welfare and there will be widespread protests. Emigration increases in response to the violence and high rates of illegal border crossing into the Dominican Republic lead to tensions between the two governments. Given the highly unable political situation, MINUSTAH will once again have its mandate renewed, but this will only serve to increase violence as people blame the UN for the insecurity and express their discontent through violence.

POSSIBLE POLICY ENTRY POINTS

Security & Crime:

- Focus on reducing corruption and impunity for criminal actors,
- Combat drug-trafficking
- Train police to respond more effectively to gang violence and protect civilians without infringing on human rights
- Focus MINUSTAH on providing training and support, while encouraging the PNH to be most visible and active security force

Economics:

- Strengthen infrastructure, particularly the antiquated electrical grid responsible for frequent electricity outages
- Provide funding and training for small business development, particularly in rural areas
- Support alternative livelihoods (to gang and militia activity) in rural areas
- Ensure that women are fully engaged in training programs

Governance:

- Support measures aimed at reducing corruption and improving accountability and transparency
- Encourage information sharing between different levels of government
- Fund reform and refurbishment of Haiti's legal and correctional services
- Support education initiatives for officials and the public on principles of democracy and good governance

Human Development:

- Improve access to potable water
- Support development of long-term education strategy to improve primary school enrollment and completion rates
- Support HIV/AIDS education programs in both rural and urban areas
- Fund renewal of health infrastructure


Environment:

- Fund training for those working in agricultural sector regarding land management and the dangers of deforestation
- Support agricultural technology projects to intensify production and increase output, while lessening environment impact
- Support the development of alternative fuel sources for Haitians currently dependent on wood-derived charcoal for cooking fuel, leading to further deforestation

Demography:

- Encourage cooperation between Haiti and both the Dominican Republic and the US to address issues of illegal immigration; at the same time stress the that root causes of this mass immigration — poverty and insecurity — must ultimately be addressed as part of any lasting solution

MAPS



STRUCTURAL DATA (SOURCE AND SCALE OF RAW DATA IN PARENTHESES)	Cluster avg.	Fragility index score	Fragility index rank	Raw Data -- Five year avg	Last Year of Data	Trend Score
1. Governance	7.12					
Freedom of the Press (FH, index, 0-100)		7.4	33	72.8	2006	pos
Gov't Effectiveness (WB Governance Matters, index, Deviation from mean)		8.8	6	-1.6	2005	*
Level of Corruption (TI, index, 0-10)		8.8	5	1.8	2006	s.q.
Level of Democracy (Polity IV, index, (-10 - 10))		6.7	48	-1.2	2003	neg
Level of participation in international political organizations (CIFP)		4.1	107	5.7	2005	*
Percentage of Female Parliamentarians, index, (WB WDI)		8.1	19	3.9	2005	*
Permanence of Regime Type (Polity IV, years since regime change)		8.4	15	1.2	2004	neg
Refugees hosted (UNHCR, total)		1.0	153	0.0	2005	*
Restrictions on Civil Liberties (FH, index, 1-7)		7.9	11	6.0	2005	s.q.
Restrictions on Political Rights (FH, index, 1-7)		7.4	18	6.4	2005	neg
Rule of Law (WB GM, Deviation from mean)		8.9	4	-1.7	2005	*
Voice and Accountability in Decision-making (WB GM, Dev. from mean)		8.0	23	-1.3	2005	*
2. Economics	6.55					
Economic growth — Percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		8.2	4	-0.4	2005	s.q.
Economic Size — Relative (WB WDI, GDP per capita, constant 2000 US\$)		7.3	40	440.5	2005	neg
Economic Size — Total (WB WD, GDP, constant 2000 US\$)		6.4	58	3.65E+09	2005	neg
External Debt — percentage of GNI (WB WDI)		2.4	109	28.5	2004	*
FDI — percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		1.8	156	0.2	2004	s.q.
Foreign Aid — percent of Central Government Expenditures (WB WDI)	
Foreign Aid — Total per capita (WB WDI)		4.6	94	23.9	2004	s.q.
Inequality — GINI Coefficient (WB WDI)		8.8	4	59.2	2003	*
Inflation (WB WDI)		8.5	7	20.4	2005	neg
Informal Economy — Black Market (Heritage Fund, Index, 1-5)		7.2	20	4.6	2006	pos
Informal Economy — Ratio of PPP to GDP (WB WDI)		6.7	47	3.8	2005	s.q.
Infrastructure — Reliability of Electricity Supply (WB, % output lost)		8.9	1	50.0	2003	neg
Infrastructure — Telephone mainlines per 1000 inhabitants (WB)		7.4	38	13.7	2004	s.q.
Infrastructure — Internet Usage per 1000 inhabitants (WB)		6.7	51	18.7	2004	s.q.
Investment Climate — Contract Regulation (Heritage Foundation, Index, 1-5)		8.3	2	5.0	2006	s.q.
Level of participation in international economic organizations (CIFP)		4.8	100	5.0	2005	*
Paying Taxes (WB Doing Business, global rank)		4.7	91	83.5	2006	*
Regulatory Quality (WB GM, deviation from mean)		7.9	29	-1.1	2005	*
Remittances Received — percentage of GDP (WB)		8.6	8	0.2	2004	neg
Reserve Holdings — Total (WB)		8.1	22	1.07E+08	2005	neg
Trade Balance — percentage of GDP (WB)		4.5	90	-1.6	2003	s.q.
Trade Openness — percentage of GDP (WB)		7.5	29	47.6	2003	s.q.
Unemployment — Total (WB)	
Percentage of Women in the Labour Force (WB)		5.0	92	41.6	2005	s.q.
3. Security & Crime	6.46					
Conflict intensity (Uppasala PRIO, number of conflict-related deaths)		2.8	24	75.0	2005	*
Dependence on External Military Support (FFP, Index, 1-10)		8.4	2	10.0	2006	*
Human Rights — Empowerment (CIRI, Index, 0-10)		5.1	92	7.2	2004	neg
Human Rights — Physical Integrity (CIRI, Index, 0-8)		7.4	46	3.2	2004	neg
Military Expenditure — percentage of GDP (WDI)	
Political Stability (WB GM, deviation from mean)		8.2	18	-1.5	2005	*
Refugees Produced (WB, total)		6.1	52	7856.5	2004	s.q.
Risk of ethnic Rebellion (CIFP, based on MaR dataset)	
Terrorism -- Number of fatalities (US NCTC, number of fatalities)		6.9	35	1.5	2005	*
Terrorism -- Number of Incidents (US NCTC, number of incidents)		6.8	45	5.0	2005	*

STRUCTURAL DATA (CONT'D)

4. Human Development	7.17				
Access to Improved Water (WB, percent of the population)	8.1	20	54.0	2004	*
Access to Sanitation (WB, percent of the population)	8.3	16	30.0	2004	*
Education — Primary Completion — female (WB, percent)
Education — Primary Completion — total (WB, percent)
Education — Primary Enrolment — total (WB, percent)
Education — Primary Enrolment — Ratio Female to Male (WB)
Food Security — Aid as percentage of total consumption (FAO STAT)	8.5	10	7.6	2001	*
Gender Empowerment Measure (UNDP, index, 0-1)
Gender-related Development Index (UNDP, index, 0-1)	7.7	26	0.5	2002	s.q.
Health Infrastructure — Expenditures as a percentage of GDP (WB)	3.4	136	7.1	2003	pos
HIV/AIDS — New AIDS Cases Reported (UN, total)
HIV/AIDS — Percent of Adult Females Infected (WB)	5.4	49	53.1	2005	*
HIV/AIDS — Percent of Adult population infected (WB)	8.0	18	3.8	2005	*
Human Development Index (UNDP, index 0-1)	7.9	25	0.5	2004	s.q.
Infant Mortality (WB, per 1000 live births)	7.3	39	77.5	2004	*
Literacy (WB, percent of population age 15 and above)
Literacy — female (WB, percent of female population age 15 and above)
5. Demography	6.31				
Life Expectancy — Female (WB)	7.7	31	52.4	2004	*
Life Expectancy — Total (WB)	7.7	31	51.5	2004	*
Migration — Estimated Net Rate (UN)	7.4	37	-2.5	2005	*
Population Density (WB, population per square km)	8.1	22	300.8	2005	neg
Population Diversity — Ethnic (CIFP)	2.1	128	0.1	2005	*
Population Diversity — Religious (CIFP)	4.6	87	0.3	2005	*
Population Growth (WB, annual percent)	5.2	91	1.4	2005	s.q.
Slum Population — proportion of population (WDI, UN)	7.5	20	0.3	2001	*
Urban Growth Rate — Annual percent (WB)	6.6	57	3.2	2005	s.q.
Youth Bulge — Percent aged 0-14 of total population (WB)	6.2	63	38.6	2005	pos
6. Environment	4.91				
Arable/fertile land availability (WB, hectares per person)	6.8	51	0.1	2002	s.q.
Consumption — Commercial energy consumption per capita (UN, kg of oil equivalent)	2.0	160	62.5	2003	s.q.
Consumption — Use of solid fuels (UN, percent of population using)	7.9	1	95.0	2003	*
Disaster Risk Index, (UNDP, average number of deaths per million)	7.9	24	13.7	2001	*
Ecological Footprint — Global hectares per capita (WWF, Global Footprint Network)	1.2	146	0.6	2003	*
Water — Annual withdrawal (FAO STAT, percent of total renewable)	5.5	68	7.1	2002	*
Water — Available renewable per capita (FAO STAT, m ³ /inhabitants/year)	7.1	42	1673.6	2006	*
Forest — Annual percent change in area (FAO)	6.7	42	-0.7	2005	*
Pollution — CO ₂ emissions per capita (WB, metric tons per capita)	2.1	155	0.2	2002	s.q.
Pollution — CO ₂ emissions per dollar PPP (WB, kg per 2000 US\$ PPP)	1.8	147	0.1	2002	neg
TOTAL	6.45				

For trend scores, (s.q.) indicates continuation of status quo, (pos) indicates a positive trend toward stability, and (neg) indicates a negative trend toward fragility. (*) indicates insufficient data for calculation of trend and volatility scores.

EVENTS MONITORING CHARTS


TABLE 1: OVERALL EVENTS CHART



READING THE EVENTS CHART

- Red line (solid):** Trend line for events; downward slope left to right is negative
 - Blue line (solid):** Trend line for number of events
 - Purple line (dotted):** This indicates the sum total scores of events (positive or negative), as coded in the event monitoring process; the red trend line is derived from these values.
 - Blue line (dotted):** The total number of events; the blue trend line is derived from these values
- A more detailed description of the methodology is provided as an annex to this report*


TABLE 2: SECURITY AND CRIME EVENTS CHART



READING THE EVENTS CHART

- Red line (solid):** Trend line for events; downward slope left to right is negative
 - Blue line (solid):** Trend line for number of events
 - Purple line (dotted):** This indicates the sum total scores of events (positive or negative), as coded in the event monitoring process; the red trend line is derived from these values.
 - Blue line (dotted):** The total number of events; the blue trend line is derived from these values
- A more detailed description of the methodology is provided as an annex to this report*

TABLE 3: GOVERNANCE EVENTS CHART



READING THE EVENTS CHART

- Red line (solid):** Trend line for events; downward slope left to right is negative
 - Blue line (solid):** Trend line for number of events
 - Purple line (dotted):** This indicates the sum total scores of events (positive or negative), as coded in the event monitoring process; the red trend line is derived from these values.
 - Blue line (dotted):** The total number of events; the blue trend line is derived from these values
- A more detailed description of the methodology is provided as an annex to this report*

INDEX METHODOLOGY

Like its predecessor the CIFP conflict risk index, the fragility index employs a methodology of relative structural assessment. The analysis begins with a structural profile of the country, a composite index that measures overall country fragility along six dimensions or clusters: governance, economics, security, human development, demography and environment. Each of these clusters is based on a number of indicators; for example, indicators under the 'economics cluster' include economic growth, gross domestic product, inflation and unemployment, etc. The data is further analyzed to provide insight into relative state strength and weakness along three dimensions of 'stateness', namely authority, legitimacy, and capacity. This multidimensional assessment methodology is a direct response to the multi-causal nature of fragility and failure; states can weaken in any number of ways, such that any attempt to attribute fragility to a single deterministic set of causal variables inevitably remains underdetermined, capturing only a limited subset of all fragile states. Instead, CIFP adopts a more inductive approach, identifying areas of relative strength and weakness across all measures of state performance.

In ranking state performance on a given indicator, global scores are distributed across a nine-point index. The best performing state receives a score of one, the worst a score of nine, and the rest continuously distributed between these two extremes based on relative performance. As country performance for some types of data can vary significantly from year to year – as in the case of economic shocks, natural disasters, and other externalities – averages are taken for global rank scores over a five-year time frame. Once all indicators have been indexed using this method, the results for a given country are then averaged in each fragility cluster to produce the final scores for the country.

In general, a high score – 6.5 or higher – indicates that a country is performing poorly relative to other states. Such a score may be indicative of an arbitrary and autocratic government, a history of non-transparent government, the presence of significant barriers to political participation, the absence of a consistently enforced legal framework, or a poor human rights record.

A low score – in the range of 1 to 3.5 – indicates that a country is performing well relative to others, or that a country's structural conditions present little cause for concern. Values in the moderate 3.5 to 6.5 range indicate performance approaching the global mean.

Score	Description
1-3.5	Country performing well relative to others
3.5-6.5	Country performing at or around the median
6.5+	Country performing poorly relative to others

EVENTS MONITORING METHODOLOGY

SUMMARY

The purpose of CIFP event monitoring is to observe and report on events within a country to better understand the dynamic trends affecting democratic processes and governance in the country. This data, when combined with structural data, provides a more comprehensive analysis of both the underlying conditions and recent developments, thereby informing a more nuanced and ultimately policy-relevant analysis.

In CIFP event monitoring methodology, events are all coded using a number of criteria. First, each event is assigned to the specific cluster area to which it is *most directly* related, either governance, economics, security and crime, human development, demography, or environment. Second, the event is coded as being either stabilizing or destabilizing to the state. The event score is then determined by answering the following three questions:

1. How direct is the impact of the event on state stability?
2. How broad is the impact of the event?
3. How intense is the event, in comparison with past events in the country?

Each question is answered quantitatively using a three-point scale.

EVENTS MONITORING METHODOLOGY

COMPONENTS OF THE COMPOSITE EVENT SCORE

- CAUSAL RELEVANCE**
1. Event is relevant, but with no clearly delineable direct causal linkage to state stability or fragility (e.g. an announcement of funding, or an international soccer friendly).
 2. Event is relevant, with a delineable, though indirect causal linkage to state stability or fragility (e.g. New legislation enhancing minority rights is passed, or a bomb detonates within an ethnically divided region).
 3. Event is relevant with a delineable and direct causal linkage to state fragility (e.g. Declaration of a ceasefire or the assassination of a government minister.)

CENTRALITY

1. Event affects less than 25% of political stakeholders.
2. Event affects 25% - 75% of political stakeholders.
3. Event affects more than 75% of political stakeholders.

INTENSITY/ESCALATION

1. Event is comparable to others experienced in the state in the previous six months.
2. Event is more intense than others experienced in the state in the previous six months.
3. Event is more intense than others experienced in the state in the previous five years.


STAKEHOLDERS

As part of the initial country profile, the analyst compiles a list of stakeholders. Stakeholders are those individuals or groups that possess an identifiable, broadly similar political agenda and either have an effect on or are affected by state stability or fragility. They often have an organizational structure in addition to sufficient resources to pursue explicitly or implicitly articulated goals.

EVENT ANALYSIS

The analysis occurs in both aggregate (all events) and disaggregate (events analysed by cluster) by using quantitative data in two ways. First, **summary statistics** provide the analyst with an overview of the average event scores. Positive average event scores are indicative of an environment that experiences more or more significant positive events than negative events. Negative average scores indicate the opposite.

Example Summary Graph



Tendency Key	Negative Slope	Status quo Slope	Positive Slope
OLS Slope value	Below -0.1	Between -.1 and .1	Above +0.1
Symbol			

The second avenue of analysis is via **regression lines** to observe whether the events demonstrate any positive or negative tendency over time (left).

These two types of information — average event score and event tendency — are combined into a single graph (see right). The graph may be thought of as analogous to a thermometer and

barometer. The risk score given at the top of the graph — color-coded as green, yellow, or red — is based upon the structural analysis for a given cluster. The colour indicates the relative level of risk in the cluster, and may be thought of as the “thermometer,” providing an indication of the overall risk in the country. The arrow and bar below may be thought of as the “barometer”, providing both the average event score and the event tendency, which are akin to the level and direction of barometric pressure, respectively. Taken together, they provide the reader with a snapshot indicating both the background and recent developments in a given sector of the country.

SCENARIO GENERATION

The report includes scenarios for the country’s fragility over the short term, normally 6-18 months. Normally, the analysis includes four scenarios: a baseline case, an alternative case, a best-case, and a worst-case. Each is based on an analysis of overall and cluster summary statistics and trends, as well as stakeholder interests. The best-case identifies the most positive outcome for the country (most conducive to stable democratic governance and poverty reduction) in the near future, given current conditions. Conversely, the worst-case scenario identifies the opposite. These two scenarios are intended to highlight different facets of the situation for the reader, by considering the strongest trends in the country, drawing attention both to dominant opportunities and dangers — both of which represent potential points of entry for international engagement. The baseline and alternative scenarios extrapolate future tendencies based on analysts best assumptions for the state, again combined with likely stakeholder interaction. Dominant trends—those most likely to continue in each of the 6 dimensions of fragility over the next six to eighteen months—become underlying assumptions. These are then combined to form an overall portrait of the country for the near term, providing a baseline “likely” scenario. The alternative case simply considers what would happen if the weakest of these assumptions did not hold, thereby giving some indication of the scenarios’ robustness. Taken together, these latter two scenarios begin to define the range of probable developments in the country over the near term. Such insights may inform contingency policy planning processes, and provide some basis for benchmarks with which to evaluate the success of initiatives intended to improve state fragility.

STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

PRÉVAL GOVERNMENT

- President René Préval (Fwon Lespwa party), elected in February 2006 with 51% of the vote.
- Prime Minister Jacques-Édouard Alexis Nominated May 2006
- Cabinet includes representatives from Aristide's leftist party, social democratic party Fusion, and the more controversial OPL party

Interests

- Maintain sufficient majority in legislature to pass components of Préval's reform agenda
- Strengthen political institutions and the rule of law
- Reform the justice system
- Improve the security climate
- Fight corruption in the government and police
- Improve human development levels
- Increase foreign investment to promote economic growth

Recent Actions and Attitude

- Created National Disarmament Commission to help address the prevalence of small arms and gang activity
- Local and municipal elections on 3 December 2006 were promoted and support by the central government and voter turnout was higher than expected
- Controversy over providing cars to government officials
- Chamber of Deputies President Eric Jean-Jacques deplored the presence of foreign soldiers on national territory

ARISTIDE'S FANMI LAVALAS PARTY

- Former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide served two incomplete terms; now lives in exile in South Africa

Interests

- Party currently forms part of Lespwa's governing coalition
- Aristide has stated his desire to return to power, claiming he was forced to leave by the United States and France
- Lavalas party supports the return of Aristide

Recent Actions and Attitude

- Lavalas militants are asking for the release of their leader Rene Civil, who was arrested; Lavalas supporters peacefully demonstrate for release of Lavalas prisoners and return of Aristide
- Lavalas Partisans threaten to resume Operation Baghdad movement – a violent movement carried out while the interim government was in power – if their members are not reinstated in the public administration
- Lavalas Senator Calls MINUSTAH Operation in Cite Soleil 'Massacre'

UN MISSION IN HAITI (MINUSTAH)

- Created in 2004
- Current strength is 8,836 total uniformed personnel, including 7,023 troops and 1,813 police, supported by 444 international civilian personnel, 727 local civilian staff and 165 United Nations Volunteers.

Interests

- Assist in monitoring, restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police
- Assist with comprehensive and sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes for all armed groups
- Assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order
- Protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment
- Protect civilians under threat of immediate physical violence

Recent Actions and Attitude

- Concentrated efforts to combat gang activity in the capital region
- Renewal of mandate until October 15, 2007
- Arrest of a dangerous gang leader in a joint operation carried out by MINUSTAH soldiers and Haitian police on 26 September, 2006.
- The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) advocates a dialogue between different sectors on the issue on the formation of a new public security force in the country.
- MINUSTAH chief Mulet says he has noticed improvement in the security climate in the country, particularly in Port-au-Prince.
- UN soldiers in Haiti have often been accused of encouraging insecurity in order to justify their presence.

ARMED GANGS

- Gangs are mainly in urban areas, particularly Port-au-Prince, and carry out kidnappings and violent crimes.

Interests

- Weaken the current government and the small elite that control the country's wealth
- Oppose the UN presence in Haiti; gang leaders view it as an occupation

Recent Actions and Attitude

- Frequent kidnappings, violent attacks against police and civilians; destruction of buildings and infrastructure
- Gang members in Cite Soleil say they are ready to cooperate with the police, warn them against all armed operations in the area
- Some gang members voluntarily surrendering arms as part of the DDR program

STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

INTERNATIONAL DONORS

Interests

- Political stability in Haiti
- Economic growth and prosperity in Haiti
- Adequate security capabilities to disarm gangs and improve security climate
- Increased human development levels in Haiti

Recent Actions and Attitude

- On 25 July 2006 during the International Donors' Conference for the Economic and Social Development of Haiti, Canada announced that it will allocate \$520 million in assistance for Haiti over the five-year period from July 2006 to September 2011 (CIDA)
- The US has amended its arms embargo against Haiti and the PNH will soon be able to buy arms from the US
- According to representatives of the World Bank in Haiti, donors are not going to wait for the situation to get worse before they intervene because it might cost 10 times more.
- Negotiations over deportees being held with the US
- IMF to include Haiti in a program created for poor countries with external debts.
- France has promised to help with reconstruction of Haiti
- The environment minister presented a communal plan for the Artibonite Department with financial support of a \$15 million soft loan from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).
- European Union delegation head Francesco Gossetti said that the EU is executing about 150 infrastructure projects costing over 200 million euros.
- Taiwanese Ambassador to Haiti Yang Chen Ta on Saturday (20 January) announced that the Taiwanese company OECC will rebuild the Grand'Goave Bridge. This bridge provides access to several departments including those in the south, in the Grand'Anse.

HAITIAN DIASPORA

- Significant Haitian Diaspora in Canada, the U.S. and other Caribbean countries
- Over one millions Haitians live abroad and remittances in 2004 totalled more than \$1 billion US, which was 28% of Haiti's GDP.

Interests

- Send remittances, goods back to Haiti
- Lobby home and adoptive governments to restore stability and security in Haiti

HAITIAN POPULATION

- Haiti has a population of over 8 million
- Wealthy French-speaking elite (about 1% of the population) controls much of country's resources.
- Poor Creole-speaking majority; Many continue to live in rural areas, though urban migration — and resulting growth of slum areas around Port-au-Prince and other cities — continues

Interests

- The elite want to maintain the status quo as it protects their share of the wealth
- The poor want to see major changes in the social and political structures to improve job opportunities, healthcare and education; though such reforms are necessary for Haiti's economic and human development, they are likely to be result in prolonged conflict between rich and poor in the country

Recent actions and attitudes

- Residents in Port-au-Prince have negative view of the work done by representatives elected last May.
- Widespread calls for an end to gang violence
- High turnout for local and municipal elections
- Strikes by workers in different sectors protesting working conditions and pay
- Hundreds of members of people's organizations were also in the streets on Saturday to commemorate the Battle of Vertieres and demand the departure of MINUSTAH

NEIGHBOURING STATES

- Dominican Republic
- CARICOM members
- Cuba

Interests

- Political stability in Haiti to reduce incidences of drug trafficking, refugees and violence that have affected neighbouring states
- Enhance regional economic prosperity
- Sustainable management of shared natural resources and coordination on shared environmental and demographic problems

Recent Actions and Attitude

- Dominican Republic often arrests illegal border jumpers from Haiti
- The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is seeking to relaunch cooperation with Haiti three months into the Preval/Alexis administration.

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EVENT MONITORING SOURCES

ACAN (Agencia Centroamericana de Noticias)	Metropole Haiti
Agence France Presse	Nassau Guardian (Bahamas)
Agencia Brasil	O Estado de Sao Paulo (Brazil)
Agence Haitienne de Presse	Radio Metropole (Haiti)
EFE (Spain)	Signal Radio (Haiti)
Le Matin (Haiti)	Xinhua (China)

ABOUT THE STATE FRAGILITY PROJECT

This project is intended to contribute to a better understanding of fragility in Haiti, thereby providing support to decision-making for Canadian foreign policy and development actors in the country. The project aims to support informed, evidence-based decision making for Canadian foreign policy and development assistance related to fragile states. The report is intended to communicate the preliminary findings of the project; its findings should not be considered definitive or final.

The report is based on three elements. First, structural indicators are grouped into six clusters capturing different facets of state fragility: Security and Crime, Governance, Economics, Human Development, Environment and Demography. The structural data includes more than 80 separate structural indicators providing a detailed quantitative baseline portrait of the country.

Second, the analysis draws on event monitoring data compiled by CIFP researchers over a six month period extending from September 2006 to February 2007. Collected from a variety of web-based news aggregators, which include both international and domestic news sources, the events are evaluated and assigned quantitative scores to identify fragility trends. Third, the report includes a series of analytical exercises, including stakeholder analysis and scenario generation. This multi-source data structure enables more robust analysis than any single method of data collection and assessment.

ABOUT COUNTRY INDICATORS FOR FOREIGN POLICY

CIFP is a project located at Carleton University. Its core mandate is to develop analytical methodologies that will generate information on the key features of the political, economic, social and cultural environments of countries around the world, providing at-a-glance global overviews, issue-based perspectives and country performance measures. While the initial dataset focuses on measures of domestic armed conflict, as part of this project that database has been substantially revised to capture state fragility.

The CIFP database includes statistical data in the form of over one hundred performance indicators for 197 countries. With its focus on policy relevance, the CIFP provides a rich information resource to policy officers across all government departments. By offering a detailed assessment methodology for evaluating individual country performance, the CIFP provides guidance to program officers working in complex and fragile environments, enabling them to focus their efforts and resources on the root structural causes rather than the outward symptoms of a problem.

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ABOUT FRAGILITY

CIFP employs fragility as the most effective lens through which to view state risk, broadly understood. Though the use of the concept of the concept remains controversial, when properly understood as a technical term of country analysis, it enables analysts to conduct a more thorough assessment of country risk than more specific concepts such as conflict or human development, both of which are effectively components of overall state fragility. Further, the concept allows the incorporation of environmental, demographic, political, and economic considerations, providing a more complete portrait of a state's overall risk than narrow examination of any one of those factors. In effect, the concept incorporates all such areas of study into a complete analysis of the risks present in a given state or region.

When understood in this sense, all states exhibit some elements of fragility, whether in the form of demographic stress, politicized ethnic divisions, high levels of pollution, the presence of internal conflict, or low levels of human development. Through the use of transparent and quantifiable data, CIFP strives to bring together all such phenomena into a coherent country narrative, thereby rendering the concept of fragility an objective aid to country analysis, rather than a divisive element of subjective political discourse.

www.carleton.ca/cifp

