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This report is produced as part of the CIFP governance and democratic processes project. It is intended as a baseline analysis, assessing structural and dynamic facets of democratic governance in Ghana and includes adapted scenarios, and a complete structural profile. The overall project aims to support informed, evidence-based decision making for Canadian foreign policy and development assistance related to democratization and good governance.

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Ghana Public support for democracy in Ghana remains high at the national level 15 years after the end of military rule. Ghana continues to move forward toward better governance outcomes in the context of this stable and peaceful political environment, but progress is not even across all sectors and challenges persist. We make this conclusion on the basis of several sources of information, including baseline indicator assessment, dynamic events monitoring, field interviews, and assessments of public perception. Ghana's performance in long-term measures of good governance outcomes ranks 2nd of 16 countries in West Africa, trailing Cape Verde by a thin margin.

MAIN ISSUES & CHALLENGES

Reliance on foreign aid: Foreign aid (US\$1.4 billion) is more than 10 percent of Ghana's GDP. This is problematic in itself, but could become more so if donors become dissatisfied with Ghana's performance and reduce aid flows.

Corruption: Although it is difficult to accurately measure corruption, Ghana does have a serious problem. Corruption exists on a grand scale at high levels, and in petty forms such as bribes extorted by police officers. Problems with transparency and accountability restrict economic growth and limit poverty reduction for women, children and the very poor.

Land tenure and access to capital: Land tenure in Ghana is bifurcated between traditional forms that restrict formalized individual ownership and a law based system of private property. Many traditional forms exclude women from property. Uncertain tenure makes investment excessively risky. The high cost of borrowing also reduces investment.

Expectations of governance: Politicians in Ghana do not perform to expectations. CSOs and NGOs have an important role to play in mobilizing popular demand for better governance outcomes.

North-South divide: Northern Ghana remains considerably less developed than the south. This inequality produces immediate negative outcomes for people living in less-developed areas, and could stir popular and geographic tensions in the future if not addressed.

OTHER KEY FINDINGS

- Steady GDP growth over 5% and declining inflation are economic success stories
- Poverty reduction remains a challenge; per capita GDP is only US\$ 320 according to the World Bank
- Free primary education is a plus, but access to secondary and tertiary schooling is limited
- Gender equality is improving but major gaps persist; Ghana's human rights regime has flaws but stands out in West Africa for its relative strength
- Religious peace and interaction provides important social cohesion
- Civil society organization and capacity remains underdeveloped but is improving

1. Executive Summary

Ghana's governance performance must be evaluated in the context of its location. Many other West African countries are experiencing or have recently come out of serious civil disturbances or outright conflict. Ghana is at peace and experiencing positive economic growth. Governance in Ghana is challenged by gaps between desired outcomes and capacity. Resource, structural, and leadership constraints challenge Ghana's governance capacity in infrastructure and security provision, rights promotion, economic management, and income generation. Limited capacity negatively impacts the government's ability to deliver positive change to some of the country's most challenged groups, including women, children, and the very poor.




TABLE 2: STRUCTURAL & EVENTS DATA SUMMARY

	STRUCTURAL SCORE	AVERAGE EVENT SCORE
Aggregate Score	4.5	1.3
Political Stability and Violence	3.3	*
Government and Market Efficiency	5.4	2.5
Rule of Law	5.5	*
Human Rights	4.2	*
Government Transparency and Accountability	4.3	-1.5
Democratic Participation	5.1	-1.5

* Insufficient events recorded during observation period, 29 May-30 November 2006, to provide a reliable average score.

INTERPRETING EVENT CHARTS

Red line (solid): Event trend line; downward slope left to right is negative
Blue line (solid): Trend line for number of events
Purple line (dotted): This indicates the sum total scores of event scores (positive or negative) in a given week, as coded in the event monitoring process; the red trend line is derived from these values.
Blue line (dotted): The total number of events; the blue trend line is derived from these values

Institutional performance ratings conducted by in-country experts indicate problems with Ghana's various branches of government being able to carry out their proscribed tasks – the judiciary, civil service, and Parliament stand out as institutions hampered by capacity problems.

UNDERLYING CONDITIONS

Political stability and peace are areas of great success for Ghana,, but government and economic efficiency, democratic participation, and the rule of law show signs of malaise. These results are somewhat surprising given that the international community provides US\$ 1.4 billion to Ghana annually based on assumptions of effective democratic governance and economic efficiency. Still, Ghana's performance in all these areas is in the mid-range relative to all countries and, although there is room for improvement, the country stands out in West Africa for its successes.

Drilling downward reveals that key strengths can be found in specific indicators of performance including the viability of political parties, contract regulation, and press freedoms. On the other hand, deficiencies are evident in the areas of GDP per capita, dependence on foreign aid, and the integrity of the legal system. See p. 32 for a full list of indicators.

INTERPRETING STRUCTURAL AND AVERAGE EVENT SCORES

- Structural scores can range from 1-9, with 1 being the best possible and 9 the worst
- Scores are derived by comparing the country in question to an average of 166 other countries; there is no benchmark of perfection.
- Scores below 3.5 are rated as low risk, between 3.5-6.5 are medium risk, and over 6.5 are high risk.
- Event scores are out of a potential 9, positive or negative

EVENTS ANALYSIS

Events analysis paints a similarly varied picture, and highlights strengths and weaknesses evident over a shorter period of time. Events on the ground can act as accelerants of change, driven and influenced by more fundamental positive and negative features of a country's socio-political make-up. CIFP monitored 625 events from **29 May to 30 November 2006**, evaluating each on its centrality, causality, and escalation relative to other events. The average event score for the period is positive, supporting the popular perception that Ghana is a relatively stable country.

As with its structural data, CIFP organizes events analysis within clusters. In Ghana, the bulk of events related to governance outcomes and covered by local and international media occurred in Government and Market Efficiency (GME), Government Transparency and Accountability (GTA), and Democratic Participation (DP) clusters. On average, events in the GME cluster were indicative of or could lead to positive

outcomes. This is welcome news, given that Table 2 shows that the GME cluster is Ghana's second weakest. Less positively, the average of events related to the GTA cluster was destabilizing. Improvements need to be made in this area, but recent events have shown troubling flaws, most importantly in the form of corruption. Events related to democratic participation tended to be destabilizing, suggesting the relative weakness shown in the structural score in Table 2 for the DP cluster is manifested in negative public perceptions of the democratic system.

Expert field consultations carried out by CIFP in Ghana provide support for these findings. For example, the executive wields the bulk of power in Ghana, at the expense of Parliament in particular. Civilian control over the military is strong, but the army's history of coups is a factor which must be considered. Other potential areas of concern to state authority in the future include economically driven inter-

communal tensions and the development of unsupervised fundamentalist *madrassas* in the north of the country.

Not all people enjoy equal access to decision-making; women and the rural poor are at a particular disadvantage, while wealth increases influence. Foreign donors are popularly perceived to have a dominant position in steering the country.

Civil rights are relatively strong, although again in some areas the treatment of women and children lags behind. Corruption remains an ongoing challenge; the police in particular do not enjoy public acclaim. The democratic participation of easily marginalized groups, including women, rural farmers, and the urban poor are weak. Current citizen expectations of the government are low, and the risk of being punished by voters for inaction is minimal. CSOs are working to mobilize the public but progress is slow, in part because of insufficient organization.

KEY EVENTS: JUNE-NOVEMBER 2006

Cocaine scandal involving the police

On 26 April 2006 more than two tons of cocaine vanished from a ship in police custody. The director general of police operations, Kofi Boakye, and several top members of the Interior Ministry's narcotics control board were suspended following a special committee's report. Five police officers admitted to selling a drug trafficker his freedom and pleaded guilty to charges of extortion. The 'cocaine saga' brought the Ghanaian police service into further disrepute and enhanced public dissatisfaction with law enforcement agencies.

Millennium Challenge Compact signed by Ghana and the USA

On 1 August 2006 Ghana and the USA signed the US\$547 Compact of the Millennium Challenge Account, offered because Ghana met a set of benchmarks for good governance and meant to alleviate poverty. The Compact shows donors see utility in continued financial assistance to Ghana and constitutes one-quarter of the entire MCA that the USA is giving to nine countries.

Power shortages caused by low water levels in the Akosombo Dam

In August 2006, Ghana's Volta River Authority (VRA) told the Ghanaian metals industry to halve its power consumption due to water shortages impacting power generating facilities. In October the VRA announced that electricity would be curtailed indefinitely and shortages persist at the time of publication. The power shortages affect local industry and the population and illustrate the government's struggle to resolve infrastructure problems.

SCENARIO FORECASTING

Scenario analysis is one of the primary analytical tools used by CIFP to set the stage for policy evaluation. Scenarios evaluate interactions between stakeholder agendas and grievances, baseline structural features, and dynamic events. Each scenario is an assessment based on hypothetical projections (positive or negative) of stakeholder behaviour and events.

The best-case assumes that the strongest positive trends will dominate over any negative trends in the near future. Conversely, the worst-case scenario assumes the opposite. Finally, the most likely case scenario extrapolates future tendencies based on the overall trend within the state. These scenarios are developed in further detail on page 28.

Most Likely Scenario

Our assessment of these three information sources suggests that in the most-likely scenario, the Kufuor government continues with market-oriented reforms, but the weak bureaucracy remains a hindrance to implementation. Donors continue their support for Ghana, but long-established patterns and systems stand in the way of major changes. Economic growth continues, but the very poor do not enjoy an equal share of its benefits due to the difficulty of alleviating rural poverty. NGOs and CSOs improve their organization but continue to find accessing and influencing the government a difficult task. Overall, Ghana continues on a stable course, which involves some improvement at a measured pace.



Best-Case Scenario

In the best case scenario civil society activism succeeds in making corruption an election issue in the run-up to 2008. Both major parties make policies to reform the civil service and enhance government transparency key election planks. Land reform efforts also gather steam because of the election. Foreign donors see hope in these events and continue to back Ghana in the form of aid. Steps are taken to address power shortages by increasing capacity. In sum, the upcoming 2008 elections bring out the best in both political parties, and competition acts as a catalyst for policy improvements.

Worst-Case Scenario

In the worst case scenario one or more serious corruption scandals causes donor fatigue. Further aid is restricted and current programs reviewed. Power shortages continue because of a lack of progress in developing alternate sources, and this has serious consequences for economic stability. Partisan political squabbles, corruption, and slow economic progress for the poor produce low voter turnouts in the 2008 elections. In this scenario, the worst case Ghana's democracy and economy are both weakened.

2. Country Profile

Since the market-friendly National Patriotic Party (NPP) won the 2000 election, Ghana has enjoyed relative political stability and strong economic growth; the country recently regained the level of per capita GDP that it enjoyed at independence. Though the period since Ghana's return to democratic government has been relatively peaceful, there have been several interruptions. Notable examples include the Nanumba-Konkomba land skirmishes in 1994, as well as deaths as a result of election-related violence in 1992 and 1996. Encouragingly, the most serious of these incidents occurred over a decade ago and seem unlikely to recur at present; however, electoral violence remains a possibility and therefore bears watching.

Ghana's ethnic identities are complex. Debate is ongoing about the exact number of distinct ethnic groups in the country, but most estimates are over 100. The Akan, Ewe, Mole-Dagbane, Guan, and Ga-Adangbe are major ethnic groups in Ghana. Each of these is subdivided into smaller units that share a common cultural heritage, history, and language. Because of this situation the level of ethnic fragmentation is mixed. Identities are often highly localized, but ties to larger groups also persist. Even in regions where one group is dominant mixing occurs, and cities in particular are "melting pots".


Christians make up 60% of the population, Muslims 20%, and 20% retains indigenous belief systems. Geographic and social intermixing between groups are common. Religious affiliations cut across ethnic and class lines, although Islam is dominant in the north and Christianity in the south. This, combined with Ghana's fractured ethnic composition may at least in part explain



GHANA'S ECONOMY: FAST FACTS	
GDP Growth (% , 2005)	5.8
GDP (standard exchange)	\$10 bn
GDP/Capita (standard exchange)	\$450
Official Development Aid (2004)	\$1.4 bn
Informal Economy (% of GDP)	38
Agriculture (% of GDP)	39
Industry (% of GDP)	25
Services (% of GDP)	37
Exports (% of GDP)	30
Imports (% of GDP)	50
Population (millions)	22.1
Population Growth (%/year)	2.0

All figures from the World Bank, 2005 in US dollars, unless otherwise noted

the country's internal calm. Religious and ethnic identities form a complex web that prevents excessive polarization. Religion is extremely important for many Ghanaians in their daily life. Religious attitudes and interpretations are primarily rooted in acceptance and moderation; these ideas dominate inter-religious relations as well. The development of foreign funded, unsupervised Islamic fundamentalist *madrassas* (religious schools) in the predominately Muslim north is a possible area of concern. Inter-religious tolerance is currently high but external infusions of extremism could alter the status quo.



Ghana's political and economic north-south divide is clear in this map showing the concentration of mining industry and agricultural activity in the southern part of the country and the isolation of the north. (Source: IZF.Net)

3. Stakeholders & Key Characteristics

This report defines stakeholders as those whose goals, interests and agendas both influence and are affected by the political environment. Nine main stakeholders in Ghana are outlined in Table 3. Stakeholders are used to analyze the importance and impact of events, as well as explain dynamics in Ghana's system of governance. These categories are broad, and are not monolithic. Each stakeholder is heterogeneous to varying degrees, but their memberships' primary interests and alignments are the similar.

TABLE 3: KEY STAKEHOLDERS (IN NO PARTICULAR ORDER)

STAKEHOLDERS	COMPOSITION	SIGNIFICANCE, INTERESTS, AND ACTIONS
1 Government of Ghana	<p>Ruling party (NPP): President John Agyekum Kufuor, and Vice-President Alhaji Aliu Mahama</p> <p>Ghana Police Service (GPS): Inspector General of Police Patrick K. Acheampong</p> <p>Armed Forces of Ghana (AFG): Chief of Defence Staff Maj. Gen. Joseph Boateng Danquah</p>	<p>Significant Facts</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> NPP holds the Presidency and 128/230 seats in the Parliament of Ghana. NPP support base is in centre-south Ghana <p>Recent Actions and Attitudes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> NPP favors free markets and foreign investment. It has cooperated with international donors to reduce Ghana's debt load and gain major foreign funding GPS is plagued by corruption scandals AFG has reformed since era of military rule that officially ended in 1992 and refrains from political activity Military spending as percentage of GDP has doubled since 1990, but is low at 0.8%
2 Political Opposition	<p>National Democratic Congress (NDC) led by John Atta Mills</p> <p>Great Consolidated Peoples Party (GCPP)</p> <p>Convention Peoples Party (CPP)</p> <p>Peoples National Convention (PNC)</p> <p>United Ghana Movement (UGM)</p> <p>National Reform Party (NRP)</p> <p>Former President Flight-Lt Jerry Rawlings</p>	<p>Significant Facts</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> NDC holds 94/230 seats in Parliament (other parties combined hold 7), with support based in the north and Volta regions, as well as parts of Accra Rawlings remains active in Ghanaian politics and retains popularity in poorer areas Mills lost 2004 presidential race but will run again in 2008 CPP is the traditional 'Nkrumist' (socialist) party but has lost strength in recent years <p>Recent Actions and Attitudes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Relative to NPP, NDC is left wing/populist. Other parties fall across the political spectrum In October 2006 Kufuor accused Rawlings of plotting another coup (the charges were not substantiated) The NDC has used recent corruption scandals to denounce the government

TABLE 3, CONT'D: KEY STAKEHOLDERS

STAKEHOLDERS	COMPOSITION	SIGNIFICANCE, INTERESTS, AND ACTIONS
<p>3 Ghana's Population</p>	<p>Composition</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 31.4% below poverty line • 20% unemployment rate • 60% agrarian employment <p>Religious groups</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 63% Christian • 16% Muslim • 21% indigenous faiths <p>Ethnic groups</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 44% Akan • 16% Moshi-Dagomba • 13% Ewe • 8% Ga • 3% Gurma • 1% Yoruba <p>Refugees</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 15,000 from Togo (2005) • 40,000 from Liberia (2004) 	<p>Significant Facts</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Religious affiliation cuts across ethnic boundaries; acceptance and mixing are high • Religious leadership is actively moderate and promotes peaceful coexistence • Many people identify with sub-groups based on language, dialects, chieftaincies, and territory rather than major ethnic categories • Akan groups are dominant and live in centre/south of country <p>Recent Actions and Attitudes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic development is an important demand • Many refugees wish to stay in Ghana • Minor tensions exist between ethnic groups over land, but peace is the dominant trend • Mild tension exists between Ghanaian and refugee populations
<p>4 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)</p>	<p>Domestic and international good governance, human rights, and service organizations</p>	<p>Significant Facts</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity problems driven by human and physical resources plague NGOs, though NGO organization is improving <p>Recent Actions and Attitudes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Good governance NGOs monitor and lobby for improved democratic processes and government accountability • Human rights NGOs monitor and lobby for the disadvantaged, including the poor, children, and women; led by the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI), they also condemn the recently increasing vigilantism (11 September 2006) • Service NGOs provide health care and education, and other services • NGOs fear being perceived as partisan and losing legitimacy
<p>5 Tribal Chiefs</p>	<p>The most powerful chief is the Asantehene—King of the Asante—Otumfuo Osei Tutu. It is important to note that he is <i>not</i> the King of Ghana</p> <p>Non-Asante Chiefs are not subservient to the Asantehene; There are over 30 000 chiefs of varying rank in Ghana</p>	<p>Significant Facts</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The House of Chiefs was recognized in the 1992 Constitution to administer matters of chieftaincy • Chiefs are forbidden active participation in politics, but family members often play important roles. They have a significant degree of political influence at the local level <p>Recent Actions and Attitudes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Succession and land disputes are common; many are settled in the Houses of Chiefs, but violence occurs • Chiefs see capitalist land reform as a threat to their power • Other chiefs have accused the Asantehene of overstepping his bounds

TABLE 3, CONT'D: KEY STAKEHOLDERS

STAKEHOLDERS	COMPOSITION	SIGNIFICANCE, INTERESTS, AND ACTIONS
6 Labour Unions	<p>Trades Union Congress (TUC)</p> <p>Ghana Federation of Labour (GFL) - Umbrella organization for labour unions in Ghana</p>	<p>Significant Facts</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unions in Ghana have roughly 500 000 members <p>Recent Actions and Attitudes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unions seek to improve the wages and conditions of the workers • National Association of Graduate Teachers (NAGRAT) engaged in an unpopular strike from September to November 2006 over wages
7 Mining Industry	<p>Anglogold Ashanti at Obuasi</p> <p>Newmont Mining Corporation in Brong-Ahafo</p> <p>Gold Fields in Tarkwa</p>	<p>Significant Facts</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mining makes up 5% of Ghana's GDP and 37% of total exports • Gold mining makes up 90% of Ghana's mineral exports <p>Recent Actions and Attitudes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mining companies favour free markets • Clashes between mining companies and locals over environmental damage and compensation • Power shortages hinder production
8 Agricultural Sector	<p>Leading sectors are cocoa, timber, and pineapple</p>	<p>Significant Facts</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agriculture accounts for over 40% of GDP and employs 60% of the workforce • Cocoa alone makes up 5% of Ghana's GDP • International cocoa prices are volatile; in the past two decades prices have reached 60% and 170% of the average • Private cocoa-exporting companies in operation since 2000
9 International Donors & Lenders	<p>Multilateral Institutions: World Bank Institute (current portfolio totals US\$1.3 bn—50% disbursed); International Monetary Fund (2006 US\$80 mn disbursed); African Development Bank (2004 US\$42 mn); European Union</p> <p>Bilateral Donors</p>	<p>Significant Facts</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Foreign aid makes up over 10% of Ghana's GDP • Financial and expertise advantages give donors influence over Ghanaian policy <p>Recent Actions and Attitudes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Donors promote decentralization and market liberalization • Donors tend to view Ghana's governance and economic reforms favorably • In 2005 Ghana was granted US\$ 3.5 billion in debt relief as part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program • In August 2006 the USA signed a US\$ 547 million Millennium Challenge Account Compact with Ghana

Stakeholder Analysis:

Each stakeholder has the ability to promote or detract from good governance in Ghana. Stakeholders with conflicting interests experience tension, but the relationships can be complex. For example, the current government promotes free market reforms in cooperation with foreign donors, but tribal chiefs constrain President Kufuor's land reform efforts.

Ninety per cent of land in Ghana is under customary land tenure linked to traditional authority. Land can be leased from chiefs under a variety of conditions, but land disputes among chiefs and between chiefs and lease holders are common. This can discourage foreign investors who are reluctant to invest capital when title is insecure. Chiefs are determined to retain the power they enjoy under this arrangement, and as a result they oppose capitalist land reform. The chiefs' interests thus pose a challenge to the Ghanaian government's efforts to implement capitalist reforms that may



contribute to economic growth. At the same time, the chiefs make an important contribution to the overall stability of the country by making significant contributions to local-level dispute resolution. This is especially true in rural areas where other elements of state capacity are weak. Tribal chiefs are both an impediment to some government policies and an important part of the state itself. Meanwhile, capitalist land reform may stimulate economic growth, but it can also result in poor farmers being deprived of family land as wealthy individuals are able to amass vast tracts.

Tensions also exist between other stakeholders. Trade unions and industry have differing views of what direction economic policies should take, with unions pushing for greater shares of profits and firms trying to maintain profit margins. Although foreign donors support the current government's

market orientation at times they are frustrated with the slow pace of change. NGOs and the government often fail to see eye to eye because NGOs push for change faster than the government wants to move. NGOs also push against other stakeholders, including the mining industry. The opposition and the government are natural antagonists.


Just as tension exists when interests are in conflict, stakeholder cooperation occurs when interests are aligned. The current government and the mining industry agree on the broad strokes of economic liberalization. Donors like the direction the government is headed, even if they are not always satisfied with the pace. NGOs work hard to support the general population, and the population finds common ground with both the government and the opposition on different issues.



4. Summary of Structure and Trends in Good Governance

Ghana's total structural score is 4.5, which translates into a medium risk, although at the low end of the category. This suggests that governance in Ghana is producing reasonable outcomes but that there is room for improvement. Ghana's performance in the Government and Market Efficiency cluster is worrying because of its importance to economic development. On the other hand, Political Stability and Violence shows a low-risk score of 3.3. Given the experience of Ghana's regional neighbours, the peace and positive economic growth that Ghana enjoys must be weighted appropriately in an analysis of the country's governance and democratic processes. Peace and growth both bring benefits to the population, and good governance is a crucial prerequisite of such positive outcomes.

TABLE 4: AGGREGATE EVENT TREND—03-06/2006



CIFP's structural data on Ghana is divided into 6 clusters, each of which is addressed in detail following this summary. The six clusters are Government and Market Efficiency (GME), Political Stability and Violence (PSV), Human Rights (HR), Rule of Law (RL), Government Transparency and Accountability (GTA), and Democratic Participation (DP).

TABLE 5: AGGREGATE EVENT STATISTICS

	All Events	Stabilizing Events	Destabilizing Events
# of Events	625	423	202
Avg. Event Score	1.3	4.0	-4.4
Trend	-0.7	0.1	-0.7

From **29 May to 30 November 2006**, CIFP monitored 625 events in Ghana. Each event was assessed as either stabilizing (positive) or destabilizing (negative) in its effects on governance outcomes, and rated on three different scales: the directness of the event's impact on good governance, its centrality (proportion of stakeholders directly impacted), and its escalation (level of severity) relative to other events of the same type during the monitoring period. Events were assigned to one of CIFP's six structural data clusters.

TABLE 6: STRUCTURAL SCORES

PSV	GME	RL
3.3	5.4	5.5
HR	GTA	DP
4.2	4.3	5.1

The overall trend for all events in Ghana over the monitoring period was weakly negative (-0.7), but on average events were moderately stabilizing (1.3). This means that events in Ghana over the past six months have been generally positive, but less so near the end of the monitoring period than in the beginning. Two main factors contribute to this result:

TABLE 7: PRIMARY DRIVERS OF AGGREGATE VALUES

Cluster	Avg. Event Score	Trend Score
GME	2.5	-0.5
GTA	-1.5	0.0
DP	1.5	-0.2

- 1) There was a slight increase in the number of destabilizing events towards the end of the monitoring period, and a relatively large proportion of these rated as highly destabilizing on the three-dimensional CIFP evaluative framework. This produced the negative trend in the destabilizing category (-0.7).
- 2) More stabilizing than destabilizing events were recorded. The amount and intensity of stabilizing events remained relatively steady to produce a weak positive trend (0.1).

The positive trend in stabilizing events is very weak. The larger number of stabilizing events relative to destabilizing (*row 1 in Table 5*), and the strength equality of the two event scores (*row 2 in Table 5*), means that the average events score is positive.

PRIMARY DRIVERS

The GME, GTA, and DP clusters had the most events recorded. Of these, the GME cluster was the most active, and the fact that events in this area were generally stabilizing is a positive sign (*2.5 in the left column of Table 5*). However, a downward six-month trend and poor structural performance in the GME cluster suggests performance in this sector cannot be taken for granted. The values in the GME cluster were largely a result of Ghana's large aid inflows and high number of development and poverty alleviation initiatives, offset against systematic power shortages. The GME cluster is at risk of stagnation because of power shortages, uncertain land tenure, and problems with access to credit. If these factors are not addressed, economic growth could be impeded, and the effects of this will ripple through the system.

Negative average event scores in the GTA and DP clusters are troubling, but they are not serious enough to prevent Ghana's overall score from being positive for the monitoring period.

In the GTA cluster a number of corruption scandals kept overall values negative, but these were

steady throughout the monitoring period, and hence the consistency.

Events related to persistent strikes that impede the provision of basic services and low voter turnouts for district and municipal elections contributed to the negative event scores in the DP cluster; these were concentrated in the latter half of the monitoring period and helped drive the negative trend.

Short term trends must be considered in context, as they may fluctuate over longer periods of time. In this light, negative or neutral trends in the primary drivers of this monitoring period are more troublesome when they are matched with negative event scores and poor structural values.

This is the case with the DP and GTA clusters, and this implies that performance is neither strong nor improving. The combined results for the GME cluster are more complex. The negative short term trend is less important than the

overall positive nature of events; the fact that events were less positive in November than in March is not alarming. However, Ghana's relatively poor structural showing in this area means that much work remains to be done. If, in the future, the downward trend were to continue to the point that the average score becomes negative for GME events, it would be an indicator of a serious and growing problem, particularly given the relatively low point from which Ghana is starting.

The same logic holds true for Ghana as a whole. The negative short term trend is outweighed by the generally positive tone of events during the period. However, Ghana's overall structural starting point is of only moderate strength, and a continuation of the six-month trend could be expected to involve events that would negatively impact governance outcomes.



5. Primary Drivers

Primary drivers are clusters that contain more than 25 events. These clusters are the main areas of activity in the country and make the greatest contribution to the overall trend.

5.1 GOVERNMENT & MARKET EFFICIENCY

Government and Market Efficiency has a structural cluster score of 5.4 (row 1 of Table 8); this is in the medium risk category and is higher than any other cluster except for Rule of Law. Eight of 26 indicators are in the high risk range, compared to four that are low risk.

Inflation: The current government under John Kufuor reduced inflation to 14.9% in 2005 from 41.9% in 2001; while this is a significant improvement, even greater currency stability will be necessary.

Services: Poor access to improved water, low levels of health expenditure, and relatively low levels of primary school enrollment contribute to the overall high risk score. Primary school enrollment is an area of hope; enrollment rates have risen

over 10% since 2000 to 88.4%, and the government has legislated free primary education to make the service available to Ghana's poorer citizens. Though non-financial barriers to access remain for certain sectors of the population, such developments nonetheless are significant and positive.

Economy: Ghana's GDP grew an average of 4.5% per year from 1995-2004. More recently, it grew 5.3% in 2005 and 5.7% in 2006. However, GDP per capita remains low at roughly US\$320 according to the World Bank. Unemployment is at 20%, and 31.4% of the country's population lives below the poverty line. More positively, low levels of inequality are a strong point, and give Ghana a basis from which to improve governance outcomes.

Industry: Ghana's economy is founded on the lucrative cocoa

and gold sectors. Cocoa makes up 5% of GDP, while gold supplies 90% of Ghana's mineral exports, which in turn make up nearly 40% of total exports. The 2004 merger of Ashanti Goldfields with AngloGold Ltd made AngloGold Ashanti the world's largest gold-mining company, based in South Africa. Ghana's economy also relies on foreign assistance, which according to the World Bank equals over 10% of GDP, 54% of gross capital formation and 19% of imported goods and services.

Aid: The international community has steadily supported Ghana since its first Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) was launched in 1983. In 1995 the IMF approved a three-year US\$258 million Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), extended in 1999 with a further \$110 million loan. Between 1999

TABLE 8: GOVERNMENT AND MARKET EFFICIENCY

OVERALL SCORE: **5.4**

Economic growth -- Percentage of GDP	3.7	Contract Regulation	2.7
Economic Size -- Relative -- GDP per capita	8.1	Enforcing Contracts	3.3
Economic Size -- Total -- GDP	5.7	Dealing with Licenses	4.8
External Debt -- percentage of GNI	2.8	Registering Property	6.4
Ease of Doing Business	5.5	Enrolment Rates	8.0
Starting a Business	7.6	Health Expenditure	6.2
Protecting Investors	2.4	Access to Services -- Improved Water	6.8
Trading Across Borders	4.8	Government Effectiveness	4.8
Closing a Business	5.2	FDI -- percentage of GDP	4.2
Economic Freedom	5.7	Foreign Aid -- percentage of Central Government Expenditures	8.3
National Savings Level	6.8	Inequality -- GINI Coefficient	5.1
Foreign Investment Freedom	6.9	Trade Balance -- percentage of GDP	5.3
Intellectual Property	5.0	Paying Taxes	4.6

Structural scores can range from 1-9, with 1 being the best possible and 9 the worst. Scores are derived by comparing the country in question to an average of 166 other countries; there is no benchmark of perfection. Scores below 3.9 are rated as low risk, 5.9 as medium risk, and over 6.0 as high risk.

TABLE 9: GME TREND—03-06/2006




TABLE 10: GME EVENT STATISTICS

	All Events	Stabilizing Events	Destabilizing Events
# of Events	287	233	54
Average Event Score	2.5	4.1	-4.5
Trend	-0.5	-0.4	0.0

See Page 2 for a brief guide to interpreting trends and scores.

“Relative to other countries in West Africa, government and market efficiency in Ghana is strong and has been able to produce positive outcomes in terms of absolute economic growth and the consolidation of democratic processes.”

and 2001 the IMF continued to release additional amounts under the ESAF, later renamed the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). In 2002, Ghana received US\$3.7 billion in debt-service relief under the terms of the HIPC initiative. The country's status as the 'star pupil' of the IMF was reconfirmed in May 2003, when the Fund approved another three-year, US\$258 million HICP grant and extended the arrangement to October 2006. In mid-2004 the European Union announced a grant of €62 million in support of the 2004-06 budgets, and in mid-2005 the World Bank made available \$125 million as part of a poverty reduction programme. In June 2005, Ghana's multilateral debts to the World Bank, the IMF and the African Development Bank were forgiven. As a result of governance reforms, in August 2006 the Kufuor government signed a US\$ 547 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact with the U.S. aimed at poverty alleviation.

Trend Analysis: In Table 10, the GME cluster as a whole shows a positive average score of 2.5 due to the overwhelming predominance of stabilizing (233) over destabilizing events (54). The negative trend (-0.5) was driven primarily by decreasing frequency and intensity of stabilizing events in the later stages of the monitoring period, even though these were still far more numerous than the destabilizing events.

On balance, the overwhelming majority of events that contribute to or indicate good

governance outcomes outweigh the minor reversals driving the negative short-term trend. Put differently, the trend is indicative of a diminishment of positive events, rather than an increase in negative events. This finding supports the idea that Ghana is moving in the right direction economically, and is a welcome finding given the poor structural scores in this sector. The negative trend will become problematic if it persists over a long period of time and overall events begin to exhibit a negative pattern; for the time being it means that events have become less positive rather than actually negative in nature.

Stabilizing events in this monitoring period were associated with aid contributions from foreign bilateral and multilateral donors, releases of positive economic figures, and government reforms to the bureaucracy. Destabilizing events consisted of unresolved land disputes impeding progress in land reform, increasing instances of water and food shortages, deforestation, and power shortages caused by low water levels in the Akosombo Dam.

Conclusion: Relative to other countries in West Africa, government and market efficiency in Ghana are strong and have been able to produce positive outcomes in terms of absolute economic growth and the consolidation of democratic processes. On the other hand, Ghana is challenged by gaps between the current level of state capacity, and the

outcomes that both the international community and its allies in the country desire.

Resource and structural constraints, including international trade regimes, limit infrastructure provision and economic management. Limited capacity negatively impacts the government's ability to deliver positive change to some of the country's most challenged groups, including women, children, and the very poor.

Institutional performance evaluations by in-country experts indicate problems with Ghana's various branches of government being able to carry out their proscribed

tasks – the judiciary, the civil service, and Parliament stand out as institutions hampered by capacity problems. Foreign donor capacity in information and resources often outstrips Ghana's own, creating concerns over national policy sovereignty. Cooperants in CIFP's field consultations identified complacent leadership as an obstacle to serious change.

The efficiency of the Ghanaian government can be evaluated on two levels: its effectiveness in producing positive policy outcomes, and the perception of this effectiveness in the eyes of the international community. Ghana is

often cited as an example of good governance and economic development, and it enjoys a high level of investment and foreign aid from international financial institutions and individual donor governments. However, Ghana's heavy reliance on aid could become problematic in the future. If the country's relatively slow progress in decentralization, combating corruption, and government efficiency reforms continues, donors may reevaluate Ghana's performance and reduce the inflows of development assistance. Given the centrality of development aid to Ghana's financial health such an outcome would have grave implications.


SIGNIFICANT STABILIZING EVENTS

- World Bank invests \$103 million in water and sanitation projects (13 June 2006): The WB's contributions show confidence in Ghana and will have a direct impact on the lives of citizens
- \$140 million for Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy from World Bank (15 June 2006): Ghana's policies continue to enjoy the confidence of the international economic community
- Cocoa production up 39.7% from the previous year (21 June 2006): Cocoa is the foundation of cash-crop agriculture in Ghana
- Ghana, USA sign US\$547 million Millennium Challenge Compact (1 August, 2006): Strict performance measures must be met for MCA agreements
- IMF approves PRGF disbursement worth \$39 million (4 September 2006): IMF funds continue to support development in Ghana
- Government earmarks US\$4.5 million to feed pupils (26 September 2006): Direct support of education could produce long-term benefits
- EU pledges financial assistance in support for decentralization (8 November 2006): International community advocates decentralization of political control to improve development
- Government unveils improved compensation package for civil servants (7 November 2006): Lack of adequate pay to civil servants may encourage corruption.

SIGNIFICANT DESTABILIZING EVENTS

- National power shortages force industry to reduce power consumption (31 August 2006): Excessive reliance on the Akosombo Dam carries risks
- Ghana's donor partners express dissatisfaction with slow pace of decentralization (7 July 2006): Decentralization is a central component of many donors' goals
- Government reduces support for rural potable water (23 June 2006): According to the UNDP one in four Ghanaians lacks access to improved water
- Report: Ghana threatened by desertification (8 June 2006): Loss of agricultural land in the already poor north will exacerbate economic difficulties
- Report: 20 to 30% of electricity production goes to waste (31 October 2006): Reducing waste could help alleviate power shortages

TABLE 11: GTA TREND—03-06/2006



5.2 GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY & ACCOUNTABILITY

The Government Transparency and Accountability (GTA) cluster ranks as medium risk with an overall score of 4.3.

Press Freedom: Press freedom has improved steadily over the past decade. Consultations with media representatives in Ghana suggested that the Kufuor government’s repeal of Ghana’s criminal libel laws in July 2001 represents the most important step in promoting a strong and free press since the end of the Rawlings era, and that the NCC remains committed to these principles.

Corruption: Corruption and accountability in political party financing remain serious obstacles to good governance outcomes in Ghana. Ghana scored only 3.3 out of 10 in Transparency International’s November 2006 report and ranked 70th out of 163 countries. Although these studies are not directly comparable year to year, Ghana’s performance does not appear to have improved significantly, if at all. Stories of petty corruption by the police are common. These often involve ‘extra payments’ for services, and this becomes especially problematic when the payments result in miscarriages of justice.

This conclusion is consistent with CIFP’s field research findings that suggest corruption detracts from economic performance and state legitimacy. Corruption in government often starts at the party level. In Ghana party transparency is low. Experts

consulted in Ghana who work with the political system, argued that individuals within party hierarchies are often trapped in corrupt practices by political necessity. Individuals may want to do good deeds but in order to accomplish anything substantive, the realities of corruption must be dealt with.

Trend Analysis: Table 12 indicates that the GTA cluster recorded almost twice as many destabilizing events (59) as stabilizing ones (32). The similar intensity of both types of events and their frequency produced a negative average event score (-1.5). The combined trend was neutral because decreasing intensity and frequency in stabilizing events was countered by an opposite trend in the destabilizing category. The negative average event score is unfortunate because transparency and accountability are crucial to implementing better governance, and Ghana does not exhibit a high structural baseline. The period of monitoring does not show any improvement, with the GTA cluster dominated by destabilizing events.

Many destabilizing events were associated with two scandals. One involved missing cocaine shipments and bribery implicating the director general of police operations, ACP Kofi Boakye, and several top members of the interior ministry’s narcotics control board. The other ended in the resignation of the former Minister of Roads and Transport, Dr. Richard Anane after he was accused of giving

TABLE 12: GME EVENT STATISTICS

	All Events	Stabilizing Events	Destabilizing Events
# of Events	91	32	59
Average Event Score	-1.5	4.2	-4.5
Trend	0.0	-0.3	0.5

TABLE 13: TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

	4.3
Corruption - World Bank	5.0
Voice and Accountability	4.3
Press Freedom	3.5

Structural scores can range from 1-9, with 1 being the best possible and 9 the worst. Scores are derived by comparing the country in question to an average of 166 other countries; there is no benchmark of perfection. Scores below 3.9 are rated as low risk, 5.9 as medium risk, and over 6.0 as high risk. See Page 2 for a brief guide to interpreting trends and scores.

public funds to his mistress. The fact that instances of corruption are revealed and investigated does indicate a level of transparency that holds corrupt officials accountable for their actions to some extent. Silence would be even more disturbing than public scandal.

Positive events included international pressure on the Ghanaian government over the 'conflict diamond' trade. The diamond trade issue indicates that international pressure can be brought to bear to force the government to take responsibility for problems that negatively impact people in Ghana and internationally.

“Corruption is such a common occurrence that Ghanaians are habituated to the current state of affairs, perceive it as being normal, and see little hope for change.”

In November 2006 at the Kimberley Process plenary meeting in Botswana Ghana agreed to accept assistance from the international community to end the illegal trade in conflict diamonds.

The pressure that civil society organizations put on the government to lay a Freedom of Information (FOI) Bill before Parliament is even more encouraging. Such a bill, if effective, would be a powerful tool for promoting accountability and accountability in Ghana. Unfortunately the government has not responded to this pressure, and the FOI Bill remains a task for the future.

Conclusion: CIFP’s field monitoring indicates that corruption is such a common occurrence that Ghanaians are habituated to the current state of affairs, perceive it as being normal, and see little hope for change. NGOs must become more effective than they have been in the Freedom of Information campaign, and this will require improvements in resources and organization. Until there is serious and consistent public demand for change the government is unlikely to support serious reform.


SIGNIFICANT STABILIZING EVENTS

- Committee to investigate theft of cocaine in police custody (4 July 2006): The establishment of a committee suggests that the government is taking this scandal seriously
- Government refines procurement monitoring system (17 July 2006): Procurement is a major source of corruption when oversight is poor
- UNDP donates IT equipment to CHRAJ worth \$2,500 (8 November 2006): Resources are intended to enhance the Commission’s capacity
- Government to improve living conditions of teachers: Teachers, like most government employees, have low wages

SIGNIFICANT DESTABILIZING EVENTS

- Unfair promotions cause uneasiness at Immigration Service (19 June 2006): Corruption can sap the morale of the civil service and discourage honest people from joining
- Senior police officer suspended in the cocaine saga (28 July 2006): As more testimony emerges higher level officials are implicated; the fallout goes on for months
- Minister of Transportation Dr. Richard Anane resigns (3 October 2006): Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) condemns Anane for giving public funds to his mistress
- Defense Ministry denies role in cocaine scandal (5 October 2006): Accusations of corruption in this scandal that spread beyond the police are indicative of potentially greater problems and deep networks
- Global Perception Index gives Ghana poor corruption marks (7 November 2006): Kuofuor and his government are accused of failing to fight

TABLE 14: DP TREND—03-06/2006



5.3 DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION

The Democratic Participation (DP) cluster baseline assessment indicates medium risk.

Political Choice: An important factor contributing to democratic process in Ghana is that there are two parties that could easily form a government. This gives voters more choice than is available in many countries, and prevents one party from becoming permanently entrenched in power.

2006. The destabilizing events were highly significant, however, and there was an increase in their number towards the end of the period under review. Low voter turnouts for the 26 September 2006 district and municipal level elections were key negative incidents. This low turnout supports a key field research finding that citizens lack confidence in their ability to effect meaningful change at the local level.

TABLE 15: DP EVENT STATISTICS

	All Events	Stabilizing Events	Destabilizing Events
# of Events	92	69	23
Average Event Score	1.5	3.4	-4.2
Trend	-0.2	0.2	-0.4

Women in Politics: The overall level of democracy in Ghana is strong but the fact that only one in ten parliamentarians are women drives the risk score upward and is indicative of gender inequality in the country. The general level of women's participation in Ghanaian politics remains low, and field research indicates little government interest in women's issues. Many women see little incentive in engaging in a political system which has traditionally been the sole province of males. Ghana elected ten women to parliament in the 1960s in an experiment with a quota system that is no longer in use. As with human rights, activists on the ground may raise awareness among women and reverse this trend as they gain in organization.

The positive trend in stabilizing events was driven by increasing levels of levels of activity by community leaders, chiefs, local NGOs, and the public's response to these actions. An increasing number of strike related events, which when peaceful were treated as a form of democratic expression, were a contributing factor. When combined, the sheer volume of stabilizing events was sufficient to neutralize the significance of destabilizing events, producing the positive average score. However, the strength of the negative trend in destabilizing events (-0.4, relative to 0.2 for stabilizing events) pushed the overall trend into negative territory (-0.2).

TABLE 16: DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION

	5.1
Checks and Balances	5.6
Degree of Party Dominance	3.3
Percentage of Female Parliamentarians	6.3
Polity Score	5.3

Structural scores can range from 1-9, with 1 being the best possible and 9 the worst. Scores are derived by comparing the country in question to an average of 166 other countries; there is no benchmark of perfection. Scores below 3.9 are rated as low risk, 5.9 as medium risk, and over 6.0 as high risk. See Page 2 for a brief guide to interpreting trends and scores.

Trend Analysis: As shown in Table 15, events in the DP cluster score a low positive average (1.5). This is a positive sign in a sector that is important to good governance. There were three times as many stabilizing (69) as destabilizing events (23) between March and November

Events showing democratic participation and a positive overall score reflect a relatively healthy political culture. Ghanaian newspapers called the low turnout at the September 2006 District Assembly elections a sign of 'electoral apathy' in Ghana. The failure of citizens to participate in the basic democratic action of voting may result from

dissatisfaction with the political affairs and feelings of powerlessness and disenchantment. An alternate explanation is that the centralized nature of power in Ghana makes local elections seem unimportant; turnout in the 2004 Presidential Election was 85%. CIFP's Ghanaian consultations indicate that public support for democracy as a principle is high, though the extent of public participation in the governance of the state is often limited to voting. A 5 July 2006 survey conducted by a local NGO, the Gospel Evangelical Crusades and Providence Foundation, found low levels of public understanding about citizens' roles in the country's democratic processes. Ghana is a young democracy, and extensive NGO activity within the country might contribute to a more robust civil society in the future.

Civil society organizations are increasingly promoting gender awareness. Women in rural areas – which are predominately poor – are doubly challenged by having

overlapping memberships in multiple marginalized groups. Beyond this, traditional cultural values inhibit the belief that women are ignored. In interviews, Ghanaian gender specialists uniformly agreed that gaps exist between the attention that women should receive and what many parts of the population think women deserve from government. Traditional cultures in Ghana have clearly defined roles for men and women, and these ideas are particularly persistent in rural areas. The relative exclusion of half of Ghana's population from access to political decisions is a challenge to the overall legitimacy of the country's governance system. Gains are being made, but much remains to be done.

Conclusion: Findings from CIFP's consultative process indicate that groups at risk of marginalization – the urban and rural poor, ethnic minorities, and women – exhibit low levels of political participation in Ghana. This finding is supported by research from the UNDP. Voting activity at the

national level is relatively high (85% in the 2004 Presidential elections, 62% in the 2000 Parliamentary elections), but this is where participation ends. Disengagement by the poor is disturbing because the bulk of Ghana's population is low income.

Ethnic minorities fear repercussions from being seen as destabilizing influences in larger communities if they push demands too aggressively; religious minorities often possess cross-cutting memberships in various ethnic groups that work to diffuse the potential for backlash. The Asante ethnic group is pluralistically dominant and no other single group equals its influence. Political affiliation is not clearly defined by ethnicity but correlations exist. Regions with Asante majorities (in particular in the centre of the country) tend to vote NPP, while those without typically favor the NDC or others. Ethnic identities themselves are not deterministic but they are influential.

SIGNIFICANT STABILIZING EVENTS

- Students' representative appeals to the government for benefits of loan trusts (19 July 2006): This is indicative of youth engaging the government to address their interests
- Coalition calls for openness on proposed Tema Oil Refinery privatization process (4 August 2006): Energy experts, economists, political activists and civil society groups working together indicates cross-cutting cooperation and ties
- Muslim youth donate blood in response to an appeal made by the national blood bank (18 September 2006): Inter-religious relations are good, and minorities are engaged in national life
- CSOs launch campaign for transparency in mining and agricultural revenue disbursement (13 October 2006): Civil society organisations have an important role to play in defending the interests of the general public
- Centre for Budget Advocacy commends child-friendly policies in 2007 budget (27 November 2006): Good government/NGO relations are a positive sign, as is attention to child welfare

SIGNIFICANT DESTABILIZING EVENTS

- Survey finds Ghanaians poorly informed about functions of District Chief Executives and Members of Parliament (5 July 2006): A lack of understanding of democratic systems reduces electoral engagement:
- Ghana municipal polls suffer low voter turnout (26 September 2006): Low citizen participation at the local level indicates lack of confidence in most immediate political processes
- Students' Council expresses disappointment with ongoing teachers' strike (16 October 2006): Breakdowns in efficiency occasionally result in dissatisfaction with relatively young democracy
- Reports indicate electoral apathy in Ghana at district level (6 November 2006): Low district turnouts mirror local level problems and Ghanaians' feelings of disillusionment with democracy

6. Secondary Drivers

6.1 POLITICAL STABILITY & VIOLENCE

The Political Stability and Violence cluster highlights some of Ghana's important strengths in good governance outcomes. The total cluster structural score is 3.3 and is rated as a low risk. Peace is fundamental to human security and the foundation upon which all other achievements are built.

Scores for politically motivated violence against civilians and the intensity of armed conflict are very low. Ghana has not experienced problems with terrorism to date, a testament to the level of communal tolerance and moderation in the country. Despite a post-colonial history of military coups, human rights violations and repression of political dissidence, Ghana has enjoyed relative stability since it adopted a new democratic constitution in 1992. The score for regime type permanence is quite high, representing Ghana's recent return to open electoral politics, but field consultations suggest that current commitment to democracy is firm. The refugee score of 6.7 is

influenced by the displacement of 150,000 Ghanaians during ethnic violence in the 1990s, many of whom fled to Togo.

“The Political Stability and Violence cluster highlights some of Ghana’s important strengths in good governance outcomes.”

Ethnic clashes and electoral violence flared in the early and mid-1990s, but these incidents took place over a decade ago and do not appear likely to reoccur in a serious way in the near future. Sporadic violence surrounding elections is worth watching for but it is unlikely to be systematic or severe. More recently, chieftaincy successions have been a source of conflict within ethnic groups; these are often related to land control. Factional fighting in the Dagomba dispute of 2002 killed dozens, including the paramount chief who was dismembered. This dispute remains unresolved, and could reignite as the process to select a new chief proceeds.

Conclusion: CIFP's event monitoring found the Political Stability and Violence (PSV) cluster to be less active than any other. In this area no news may well equate to good news, but more destabilizing than stabilizing events occurred. Some isolated instances of instability – 3 casualties in Ghana's soccer victory celebrations, occasions of vigilante justice in Accra and Kumasi due to popular distrust of the police (on 8 August 2006, for instance, three dead bodies were found at Abeka Lapaz and Akweteman; on 28 August, two robbers were beaten to death at

Adabraka), and land disputes (on 20 August, three people were attacked near Teima over a land dispute) were of sufficient

significance to balance positive events and produce a neutral overall trend; the average score for this cluster is weakly negative. These short term findings are not significant enough to outweigh the overwhelmingly positive situation reflected in the structural data, and the likelihood of serious strife in the near future is small.

Since Ghana's return to electoral democracy the Armed Forces of Ghana (AFG) have stepped back from a politicized role and transformed itself into an institution focused on defending the country against security threats. Consultations with experts in Ghana suggest the AFG's transformation is a response to popular sentiment that Ghana's economic and political progress is proceeding well under civilian supervision in spite of continuing challenges. Should public confidence in elected leaders decline the army could feel justified in assuming a more politically active role, and this would have grave consequences for democracy in Ghana.

Ghana's record of peace is particularly impressive considering the fate of many other West African countries in the past decades. CIFP's in-country consultations highlighted that

	3.3
Permanence of Regime Type	8.2
Black Market	4.0
Battle-related Deaths	1.0
Dependence on external support	3.4
Military Expenditure as a percentage of GDP	1.5
Political Stability	5.0
Refugees Produced	6.7
Terrorism Fatalities	1.0
Terrorism Incidents	1.0
Polity Fragmentation	1.0

Ghanaians are acutely aware of and take pride in their country's exceptionalism in this regard. This in itself may be a powerful force working to solidify peaceful political practices in the country. Immediate threats to peace appear minor and localized; chieftaincy disputes in the north may be the most pressing problems.

“Rumors of corruption pursue the judiciary, but hard proof is uncommon. This is illustrative of problems with transparency that permeate politics in Ghana.”

In the longer term, underlying conditions of poverty and geographic inequality remain essentially unchanged from a decade ago and improvements are slow at best. Significant economic and institutional disparity exists between impoverished regions of the north and east, and more prosperous and developed southern Ghana. The differences are not only economic in nature – the north and east tend to vote for the NDC, while the NPP is strong in the centre, creating regionally divided blocs of power. Increasing gaps in economic opportunity and equality could be problematic, in particular if individual actors see possibilities for personal advancement by advancing ethnic agendas.

6.2 RULE OF LAW

Rule of Law (RL) ranks as medium risk cluster with a structural score of 4.7. Evenly distributed mid-range indicator scores suggest that most institutions important for the effective rule of law are not performing perfectly but have sufficient strength to provide foundations for future improvements.

Conclusion: The average score for events in the RL cluster was

weakly positive; stabilizing outnumbered destabilizing events, although the cluster did not show a great deal of activity in total. The most important destabilizing events in this cluster involved police corruption scandals that showed systemic failures. On the other hand, the more numerous stabilizing events included numerous

education workshops, the government's introduction of new integrated approach to check drug trafficking (20 July 2006), and effective prosecutions of corrupt officials (on 25 September 2006 five policemen appeared in court in connection to the disappearance of the cocaine shipment and director general of police operations ACP Kofi Boakye was suspended).

Ghana's national police service suffers a low level of popular support and trust. Corruption scandals contribute to public distrust of the police. The practice of demanding bribes for service can lead to uneven policing for the rich and the poor. Vigilante justice occurs on occasion (in August, instances of vigilantism occurred at Pedu, Adabraka, Abeka Lapaz and Akweteman, among others; a 2005 U.S. State Department report noted a sharp increase in incidents of vigilantism and a coalition of human rights NGOs, led by the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative publicly condemned the resurgence in 'instant justice' on 11 September 2006) because people are loath

TABLE 18: RULE OF LAW

	5.5
Police, Law, and Criminality	4.8
Prison Population Rate	2.2
Prison Occupancy Level	7.3
Number of Political Prisoners	5.7
Judicial Independence	4.1
Impartial Courts	4.1
Integrity of the Legal System	8.4
Military Interference in the Rule of Law	7.2
Property Rights	5.4

to involve the police in their disputes, or because there are simply no police to be found.

Access to justice services is an area of concern. Constraints arise from a number of different factors, including the costs of dealing with the legal system, a lack of knowledge regarding the purpose and uses of the system – a problem compounded by illiteracy – and perceptions that the system is biased against the interests of the poor, all work to prevent universal access to justice services. Rumors of corruption pursue the judiciary, but hard proof is uncommon. This is illustrative of problems with transparency that permeate politics in Ghana. Particularly in rural areas people turn to traditional authorities as a dispute resolution mechanism in place of the state justice system. This is partly due to the lack of capacity in the state system, and partly due to Ghana's hybrid political structure that deliberately incorporates traditional authorities and encourages the persistence of alternative justice measures.

Weak state capacity to offer adequate correctional facilities is

a source of concern – reports indicate that prisons are overcrowded (7 November 2006) and youths are detained in adult jails (17 November 2006).

Rights and legal frameworks surrounding issues of land title, education, and health care also show signs of weakness. Land title remains mired in uncertainty caused by the overlap of state and traditional treatments of the issue. Efforts to codify land title may benefit the rich at the expense of the poor; clear title enables transfers, and wealthy individuals are able to take advantage of their leverage to amass large tracts, leaving the poor – who have often been subsistence farmers – without access to livelihood.

6.3 HUMAN RIGHTS

Ghana has a history of military regimes, coups and repressive state policies. Its human rights regime is a relatively young one and it will take time for awareness and protection of human rights to fully develop. With that in mind political, religious, and press freedoms are a bright spot for Ghana, particularly in comparison to neighboring West African countries. Political freedoms have steadily improved since Ghana's return to electoral politics from military rule. The creation of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) in 2001 to address human

rights violations committed under various military regimes since independence in 1957 was a major step forward. The governing NPP has promoted press freedoms, most importantly by repealing Ghana's criminal libel laws which were formerly used to muzzle media of all forms. Recent foot-dragging over a proposed Freedom of Information Bill suggests limits to the extent to which the government wishes to cooperate with the media, however.

Conclusion: From March to December 2006, Ghana's human rights environment was characterized by a greater number and intensity of stabilizing than destabilizing events, and a moderately positive trend. In October of 2006 the Kufuor government began to pay reparations to about 2,000 Ghanaians who suffered abuses by the government, as per the Commission's recommendations.

The passing of a second reading of the Domestic Violence Bill in late November 2006 was also a positive sign, but gender issues remain an area of some concern. The government's lack of speed in moving forward the Domestic Violence Bill and the extent to which it was watered down in order to pass on 21 February 2007 are indicative of low public sector commitment to gender issues. Connections can be drawn to the recurring theme in this report that civil society remains only weakly organized. Women's groups and advocates of children's rights remain

relatively fractured and limited in their formation, providing little incentive for policy makers to advance their causes. Cultural barriers to change in the status of women and children remain entrenched in some quarters. Also, on 1 September 2006 the government stepped in and banned an international gay and lesbian conference after public protests. The positive public reaction to this move – newspapers ran approving editorials and community groups applauded the government's action – show that the slow adoption of effective Western style human rights regimes is not simply a matter of government "foot dragging".

The right to education has been bolstered by the government's recent measures to introduce free primary education. According to the World Bank primary school enrollment is up 10% from 2000, and now stands at 88.4%. Unfortunately, schooling at the secondary level remains inaccessible to many; enrollment is at 44%, and only 3% of Ghanaians go on to benefit from tertiary education. The National Health Insurance scheme is evidence of state interest in the health sector, but resources and poor bureaucratic management combine to make implementation and access weak points. According to the WHO Ghana has 15 physicians per 100,000 citizens and ranks 136th out of 177 countries. Women face particular challenges in health care; Ghana also ranks 136th out of 177 for the percentage of births with a physician in attendance.

TABLE 19: HUMAN RIGHTS	4.2
Civil Liberties	3.3
Political Rights	2.9
Human Rights - Empowerment	5.1
Human Rights - Physical Integrity	5.3

7. Ghana's Political System

The following section of this report is primarily based on interviews with governance experts in Ghana conducted as part of CIFP's in-country consultative process. A brief summary of methodology and survey findings are appended to this report. The purpose of the consultative process and this explanation of its findings about Ghana's political system is to provide information about how Ghana's political system operates in practice rather than how it is structured on paper.

7.1 OVERVIEW

Ghana is a republic, led by a universally elected President and a 230-member unicameral parliament. The president appoints a Vice-President and nominates the Council of Ministers, subject to Parliamentary approval. Ghana's political system is a hybrid of central democratic and localized traditional authorities. This places some limitations on state authority, especially at the local level where traditional authorities are strong. Significant power resides in the hands of the executive while the Parliament is relatively weak. The military was once active politically and ruled the country for several decades but it is now more restrained. Ghana's civil service and judiciary are both under-resourced; the bureaucracy in particular is plagued by organizational dysfunction.

Ghana's traditional chiefs are constitutionally barred from active participation in state politics but remain important in the country's political landscape. The 1992 Constitution officially recognized the National House of Chiefs, the highest level of the Houses of Chiefs system, and thus incorporated traditional authorities into the state's political fabric. The current government created a Ministry of Chieftaincy and Culture, and President Kufuor and several members of the party leadership are members of influential chiefly families. Traditional authorities' influence is largely limited to the local level. The chieftaincy system does not directly affect national authority, but chiefs do control some local instruments of policy, and can therefore affect the state's ability to effect change on the ground. Political legitimacy remains divided between chiefs and the nation-state.

TABLE 20: GHANA'S POLITICAL SYSTEM

Government type:	Republic
Governance system:	Multi-party parliamentary system since 28 April 1992
Executive:	President is Head of State & Commander-in-Chief. Direct universal suffrage for a maximum of two four-year terms; appoints Vice-President; Nominates Council of Ministers, subject to approval by Parliament
Legislative:	230-member unicameral Parliament. Direct universal suffrage with four-year terms; approves Council of Ministers nominated by the President
National House of Chiefs:	Oversees regional Houses of Chiefs; Recognized in the constitution as caretaker of chieftaincy matters
Judiciary:	Constitutionally independent judiciary; jurisdiction over enforcement and interpretation of constitutional law

Field research indicates that the executive branch ranks higher than Parliament in terms of popular opinion regarding professionalism and popular trust. This may be associated with cultural ideas of power – as one study participant put it, “no one asks questions of the giver” – and perceptions that the legislature acts on the will of the executive rather than the people. The executive is also shielded to some extent; it is difficult to know how exactly it goes about its business, and the public face of the institution is carefully managed. The media plays a role in this, as the media depends on the government to voluntarily release information, and many outlets are reluctant to publish anything unfavorable out of fear of being cut off. At the same time, many media outlets are highly partisan and public perceptions of reports can be colored by this knowledge. Criticism may be discounted as being excessively partisan, and consequently ignored.

Government response to constituencies is uneven. Civil society organization is still in a formative stage, and the government lacks the capacity to gather constituent appeals effectively and in a way that is easy to understand.

“Ghana’s executive branch wields real and effective power beyond what is assigned by the constitution.”

CIFP’s consultative process identified a positive relationship between wealth and influence over government policy. Given Ghana’s status as a low-income country this pattern offers a challenge to government legitimacy in the eyes of a large segment of the population, as poor people may feel excluded from decision making. The level of influence of foreign donors over policy is also of concern in this regard. The influence of money is an obvious factor in this assessment, but expertise may also play a role. Donors have advantages in information and resources that can make them necessary partners in policy formulations. Excessive foreign influence could negatively impact perceptions of legitimacy, again because of popular perceptions of a lack of domestic control over decision-making.

The legitimacy of the current governance regime in Ghana is not seriously threatened by a lack of responsiveness in the short term. Ghana’s various constituencies appear to have low expectations of government, a fact that indirectly contributes to stability. Awareness and political literacy are likely to rise with in step with increased NGO capacity and improved organization, and

Ghanaian society may speak with a louder voice as a result. Study participants almost uniformly agreed that there is a high level of complacency in Ghana’s electorate born of disillusionment and a lack of education about what government should do. Low

expectations translate into an unresponsive government.

Ghana’s government does suffer legitimacy problems in one important area: collection of taxes. Public attitudes toward the right of the government to assign and collect taxes are generally negative. The government has not done enough to educate citizens about the purpose of taxes. In turn, people are reluctant to pay for abstract public goods. There are gaps between what taxpayers put in and what they feel they get out of the system. These gaps are connected to problems of government capacity and responsiveness. Dysfunctional bureaucratic structures also detract from the legitimacy of the government’s financial demands on the public. Consistently excessive tax assessments, real or perceived, reduce public trust in and erode the legitimacy of the system.

7.2 INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND PROCESSES

The Executive: Ghana’s executive branch wields real and effective power beyond what is assigned by the constitution. The executive is able to select the Speaker of the House who sets Parliament’s agenda, which in



turn provides the executive with considerable influence over the legislature’s behavior. For its part, the legislative branch enjoys relatively little influence, with power effectively centralized in the cabinet. Interview respondents argued that donors wield influence that is equal to or greater than the Parliament itself because policy tends to originate with the executive, and donors have more influence over the executive than does the legislature. Donors provide a substantial portion of Ghana’s annual budget, thereby providing them with a major source of leverage with the Ghanaian government. At present, the political power of the military has diminished considerably since the adoption of electoral democracy in 1992. The judiciary remains under-resourced.

The executive has assumed an increasing share of effective power in recent years as other institutions have failed to protect their own mandates. There are two broad causes for this. First, there is no institution willing and able to exercise effective oversight over

the executive. The legislature often fails to act as a check on executive behavior, the media rarely opposes government actions, and civil society remains weak and loosely organized. Second, political traditions in Ghana have typically been based on strong authority at high levels, allowing

“The current fusion of the roles of the Minister of Parliamentary Affairs and the House Majority Leader is a prime constraint on Parliament’s effectiveness.”

the central executive to act without criticism. According to an Afrobarometer survey of popular opinion, one in five people in Ghana think that the President should be able to override Parliament on legislative matters.

If enhanced, oversight could improve the executive’s performance. In previous decades, the military provided an admittedly undemocratic check on executive behavior, but has largely abandoned such political activities in recent years. Clearly, the de-politicization of the military is positive; however, it does leave a gap in the mechanisms of oversight in the country. Other actors such as Parliament and the media have not stepped in with sufficient vigor to fill the gap. Improper supervision of the executive branch is a serious concern. Without proper oversight, insular decision-making is a problem; this in turn can alienate the electorate and reduce public faith in democracy.

The Parliament of Ghana: Ghana’s Parliament effectively represents Ghana’s population, taking office as a result of open and fair elections. Unfortunately, as previously discussed, there are limits to its effectiveness. Reasons

for these limits can be attributed to four causes: Parliament’s relationship to the executive, resource constraints, an excessively partisan environment, and a poor understanding on the part of many MPs as to the true role of Parliament—and Parliamentarians. Each is considered below.

The current fusion of the roles of the Minister of Parliamentary Affairs and the House Majority Leader is a prime structural factor constraining Parliamentary effectiveness. The house leader is in fact a member of the executive, effectively making the house leadership an agent of the executive, whose main task is to ensure that Parliament carries out the executive’s business. Such an arrangement has obvious negative implications for the legislature’s independent oversight activities. In practice, the executive selects the house leadership, rather than this being done within the legislative body. Beyond this, the ability of the

executive to promote MPs to cabinet provides further leverage to encourage legislative cooperation.

Resource constraints impair parliamentary activities in two ways. First, support services are insufficient to meet the demands of Parliament in terms of research, information support, and coordination. Second, human resources available to Parliament are lacking in quantity and quality. Severe underpayment of the civil service limits Parliament’s ability to hire and retain capable individuals. Insufficient compensation also creates an incentive structure for corruption, with serious negative implications for good governance in the country.

Ghana’s Parliament is often deeply partisan, limiting its ability to effectively supervise governance in the country. All commentary and discourse are construed as partisan, and true dialogue aimed at finding solutions is rare. Parties dominate the discussion to the extent that individual MPs rarely express their own views; party



lines are enforced, and MPs' representative function is curtailed. A lack of unwritten conventions that could act to facilitate compromise and effective function is a further problem. Decisions are taken on an *ad hoc* basis and bitterly contested along partisan lines. This may be a product of Ghana's relatively recent return to democratic politics; the system is still new, and time may be required to develop consensus around parliamentary conventions. In recent elections, Parliament's composition has mirrored voting for the Presidency. Dynamics could change dramatically if voters were to start to split their ballots, voting one party into the executive and another into a majority position in Parliament.

MPs' own understanding of their role, and that of their institution, is problematic as well. CIFP's consultative process indicates that many MPs see political activity as a path to money, rather than a course of public service. Such attitudes are understandable when

one compares average income levels to the salaries earned by MPs; nonetheless such an incentive structure works against good governance.

Further, there is a connection between the partisan battles of Parliament and its membership's attitude toward their jobs. Because almost all legislation originates with the executive, MPs from the party of the presidency tend to see their role as being champions of suggested legislation rather than as members of an institution charged with acting as a balance on the other branches of government. Many MPs see

"There are problems in Ghana's Parliament associated with MPs being excessively concerned with personal interest, and insufficiently attentive to the public good."

furthering their own party's interests as their primary objective. This is reinforced by the ability of parties to reward the faithful and punish those who step out of line. MPs that cooperate with party elites can be rewarded with political

positions, including committee memberships and cabinet posts, while those who strike an independent course are isolated. Taken together, such an analysis suggests that there are problems in Ghana's Parliament associated with MPs being excessively concerned with personal interest, and insufficiently attentive to the good of the public they are elected to serve.

The opposition is impeded from holding the government to account for many of the same reasons that limit the ability of Parliament as a whole to oversee the executive. Beyond this, the partisan nature of Parliament

means that the opposition is often unable or unwilling to make constructive criticisms. Respondents also cited the opposition's lack of understanding of its own role as something other than an alternative ruling party as a problem.

On the other side, since the return to democracy, the opposition in Ghana has played a valuable role because it has been a viable alternative to the government. This contributed to a smooth transition of power from the NDC to the NPP, and helped avoid problems experienced by other young democracies during times of change. Given that the same conditions still hold true, the same result can be expected should the political fortunes of the two dominant parties be reversed.

The Judiciary: Interview participants familiar with Ghana's justice



system put forth judicial corruption as a suspected problem, but hard proof is lacking. This situation is indicative of transparency and accountability problems. More clearly, there are problems related to resources, process, and access. Human resources are limited, and this contributes to chronic delays and inefficiencies, which in turn discourages use of the system. In other words, resource limitations contribute to concerns regarding access. Survey respondents also suggested that there are problems with due process in the criminal system. Guilt is often presupposed, if not officially, at least in practice.

The Civil Service: Most observers agree that Ghana's civil service is underpaid. This leads to problems attracting and retaining strong candidates. The government recognizes this problem and has expressed interest in fixing it, but it appears that an effective solution has not yet been found. The problem of insufficient

funding is the prime causal factor in the gap between human resource needs and realities. Interviewees in Ghana also identified leadership as an area that is lacking, though this too can be traced in no small part to funding problems. Without adequate pay it is difficult to attract top talent.

Structurally, Ghana's civil service lacks clear and effective chains of command and responsibility. Officials carve out personal fiefdoms, and information flows are deliberately restricted. Upper level executives are parachuted in, and these political appointments clash with established fiefdoms. Often, the former find themselves frozen out of real control. Patron/client relationships driven by funding and party loyalty are pervasive, and this (along with the politicized nature of high level positions) prevents any sustainable meritocracy from developing. Oversight of bureaucratic operations is further hampered by the behavior of ministers in the

executive, who were described by some respondents as acting as champions for their departments rather than even-handed adjudicators of government policy.

These problems have the effect of causing Ghana's bureaucracy to either not do its job at all, or to be crushingly slow, burying people in paperwork and focusing on process rather than substance. Corruption is seen as a problem as well. CIFP's consultative process in Ghana indicates that the civil service is in a state of inertia. Because leadership is lacking and structurally constrained when it does exist positive change is difficult to effect. Entrenched interests resist change in spite of the efforts of some individuals. These problems may be magnified at lower levels of political organization, such as the districts and below, where resources and oversight are even more limited than at the national level.



8. Scenario Forecasting

In terms of possible turning points and external factors that could affect Ghana in the future, those listed below are issues which could have an impact on the course of Ghanaian politics in the coming months and years. The list is meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive.

- The next federal elections are coming in December 2008; given Ghana's experience during the previous elections since 1992, there is a strong possibility for clashes between partisans of the two main parties
- The upcoming national elections could change the government – a mixed legislature/executive could enhance bipartisan cooperation or create deadlock
- Climactic factors such as drought, water scarcity and deforestation could impact the agricultural sector and power generation
- Donor attitudes in the face of the slow pace of decentralization and low performance could fluctuate, with serious consequences

8.1 MOST LIKELY CASE SCENARIO

In the most likely scenario, the key drivers of governance outcomes in Ghana will continue on similar trajectories to the ones they have maintained for the previous six months, and stakeholder behaviour will remain constant. This suggests a slight decline in Ghana's performance in the approaching period can be anticipated.

Most Likely Case Scenario - 6 Months: Free market reforms push forward, propelled by the strong executive, but government activity continues to be inefficient and halting due to the highly partisan atmosphere and weak bureaucracy. Donors continue to support market reforms and push for improvements in other areas of governance, but rapid improvements are unlikely. Industry and labour present periodic but minor disturbances. Power shortages continue, and this hampers economic production in some sectors.

Both the government and opposition are vocal about change, but long-standing patterns and deeply rooted interests block meaningful change. The opposition makes small gains at best in holding the executive to account because of the low likelihood of serious political reforms. Donors continue to be dissatisfied with the level of corruption in Ghana, but take little action in the short term. NGOs focused on transparency slowly become



more organized and effective, but their efforts are largely stymied by government inaction. The press continues to engage in partisan attacks based on each outlet's political affiliation that highlight instances of corruption, but overall investigative capacity is not likely to improve a great deal.

Although democratic participation currently exhibits a downward trend, it is likely that this will reverse in the coming months, and be the one area of change. Both the government and opposition appear firmly committed to democracy, and the public is likely to become more engaged as the 2008 elections draw closer. The NGO community and press contribute to mobilizing the public insofar as they are able, and the upcoming elections give them incentive to redouble their efforts. The population continues to be committed to the relatively recently implemented democratic system.

Most Likely Case Scenario - 2 Years: Market reforms continue. Donors become frustrated with Ghana's lack of progress in improving government efficiency, but their heavy investments prevent them from taking rapid steps to cut aid. Industry and labour actions are largely a product of international conditions and government behaviour. Improvements in Ghana's terms of international trade would enhance industry's position, and presumably that of labour, while an international slowdown would have the opposite effect. Labour would most likely benefit from an NDC victory in 2008.

Corruption continues to plague governance in Ghana; neither major party is immune. Civil society slowly gains the ability to press for change, and the press likewise slowly improves as it matures in its relatively recent condition of freedom. Corruption becomes more of a public issue, but as a deeply rooted problem it is slow to change. Donor dissatisfaction grows. The justice system does not improve markedly, although slow change is a possibility.

Democratic participation peaks and declines after the election; this is to be expected, particularly as current Ghanaian participation in politics is often limited to voting. Civil society and the press gain in strength during the election and slightly improve their ability to engage the public after the event. The press also builds its capacity to promote participation.

Pressure from civil society and donors, and good intentions on the part of politicians, result in improvements in rights of women, children, and the poor. Minor violent incidents surround the 2008 elections, but remain minimal. Stability returns post election. Ethnic and chieftaincy disputes simmer but do not boil over.

8.2 BEST CASE SCENARIO

In a best case scenario, downward trends in Ghana's governance are reversed and positive trends enhanced. The government responds to the demands of an engaged civil society and realizes significant improvements to good governance by curbing corruption, addressing issues of poverty and inequality, and engaging ethnic/factional tensions in a positive way.

Best Case Scenario – 6 Months: Bipartisan cooperation in the government improves as a result of donor and NGO efforts making both parties realize that change is necessary for continued aid and popular support; bureaucratic reform is initiated. Donors respond by increasing aid, and letting Ghana assume greater control over its disbursement. Labour unrest does not occur, and both the mining and agricultural sectors enjoy success. The current negative trend in government and economic efficiency reverses and becomes mildly positive, although power shortages continue to be a problem because the government lacks the capacity to make improvements in the short term.

The executive decides that fighting corruption, including civil service reform, is crucial to its re-election in 2008 and takes steps accordingly. The opposition seeks to avoid being marginalised and pushes reform along, trying to outbid the government. Donor pressure linking aid to change proves to be constructive because of the change in attitude of both major parties, and assists the movement. Civil society and the press contribute insofar as they can, and corruption becomes an important election issue.

Popular enthusiasm for democracy remains high in Ghana. Both major political parties continue to see public support as their key to power, and act accordingly. Civil society and the press see slight improvements, as this is a slow process. A strong democracy is in keeping with donor aspirations,



promoting continuing support, and at the same time encourages a healthy climate for foreign investment.

Best Case Scenario – 2 Years: Power shortages are resolved by a combination of improved natural conditions (i.e. more water) and the construction of new sources with outside support. The 2008 elections produce a stable government that allows the legislature to act as a balance to executive power, and cooperation results as both parties seek to maximize their interests. International trade regimes become more favourable to Ghana.

Both political parties embrace anti-corruption efforts, in no small part because a better organized civil society and press mobilize popular demands for change to the extent that they can no longer be ignored. Meaningful anti-corruption laws are put in place and enforced, and bureaucratic reform starts to show results. Corruption remains a problem, but one that is diminished from its current state.

Donors respond to positive change by granting Ghana more control over aid funding.

All stakeholders contribute to the enhancement of democratic processes because of gains available. The legislature is able to enhance its oversight capacity relative to the executive, increasing incentives for popular support. The public is pleased with its payoff from the democratic bargain, and continues its support for the system. The rule of law is improved because of a combination of public and civil society demand, coupled with willingness on the part of the government to push reform and implement serious changes. Major groundbreaking rights legislation is passed as a result of popular demand, including strong laws against violence against women. The 2008 election is violence-free. The government actively engages chieftaincy problems in the north of Ghana, and successfully approaches them in a non-

partisan way, resulting in successful resolution of some cases.

8.3 WORST CASE SCENARIO

In a worst case scenario, downward trends worsen while positive trends reverse. Ghana's stability deteriorates, corruption discourages the population and donors, and foreign assistance gradually decreases.

Worst Case Scenario – 6 Months:

Tensions between the government and opposition driven by partisan disputes worsen and further reduce government efficiency. Donors begin to lose faith in Ghana's ability to right itself and become more concerned about their involvement. Power shortages worsen as demand outstrips supply. Labour unrest increases in frustration with government ineptitude, while industry and agriculture continue to lag, in part because of global regimes and conditions.

One or more major corruption scandals emerge, and instead of leading to more openness they cause both the governing and opposition parties to become defensive rather than opt for reform. Donor dissatisfaction grows in response, and important programs such as the Millennium Challenge Account that are tied to corruption standards come under review. The press and civil society prove unable to generate sufficient pressure on the political process to effect change.

The government and opposition engage in partisan battles that discourage voters from engaging in the democratic process. The public stays home and does not





vote in large numbers in the 2008 election. Civil society and the press fail to make strides in their efforts to become more effective, further reducing the prospects of popular mobilization.

Worst Case Scenario – 2 Years:

The government is paralyzed by ongoing partisan battles. Donors reduce their aid contributions because of frustration with poor government performance and corruption, causing budgetary stress. Coupled with weak economic performance in the private sector, social upheaval and a downward trend in the popularity of democracy result. Discord between industry and labour grows as unions fight to enhance work conditions in a poor economic environment. Ethnic cleavages between Ghanaian majority and minority groups heavily involved in business—such as the Lebanese, Indian, and Chinese communities—are stretched by growing gaps in inequality and elite scape-goating.

The 2008 elections are marred by allegations of dishonesty, eroding the legitimacy of the democratic process in Ghana. Neither the government nor the opposition makes meaningful attempts to promote reform. Civil society and the press make no forward progress, or in an extreme worst case are themselves tainted by connections to scandals. Low voter turnout for the elections in 2008 encourages politicians in both major parties to focus less on pleasing the public and more on satisfying personal and partisan interests. The public responds with more cynicism, creating a vicious cycle. Civil society fails to make advances, while the press contributes to the bitterly divided atmosphere. Ghana's democratic system begins to atrophy.

More scandals highlight the diminished relevance of the rule of law. Government inactivity coupled with processes of entropy further degrades the effectiveness of law in Ghana, leading to widespread dissatisfaction with the political status quo.

Resistance to rights based legislation from conservative elements of society succeeds in derailing advancements in legal protections for the disadvantaged. Disorganized CSOs and NGOs are unable to provide an effective counterweight. Violence associated with the 2008 election is worse than in the past two contests, and taints the process to some degree. Partisan involvement in chieftaincy disputes causes these to flare up, and because of links to national parties and figures tensions spread beyond the immediate geographic locale.



9. Underlying Conditions

Governance index scoring scale	
Score	Description
1-3.5	Country performing well relative to others
3.5-6.5	Country performing at or around the median
6.5+	Country performing poorly relative to others
Highest 5%	Country among worst global performers

	Raw Score	Global Rank Score	Sum	Sample Size	Last Date Available
1. Democratic Participation			5.12		
Checks and Balances	3.0	5.6	5.6	164	2004
Degree of Party Dominance	0.8	3.3	3.3	172	2004
Percentage of Female Parliamentarians	9.5	6.3	6.3	185	2005
Polity Score	5.6	5.3	5.3	153	2004
Executive Constraints	5.6	5.1	5.1	154	2004
2. Government & Market Efficiency			5.40		
Economic growth - % of GDP	5.1	3.7	3.7	183	2005
Economic Size - Relative - GDP/capita	270.5	8.1	8.1	179	2005
Economic Size - GDP	5745164400	5.7	5.7	180	2005
External Debt - % of GNI	32.3	2.8	2.8	132	2004
Ease of Doing Business	98.0	5.5	5.5	174	2006
Starting a Business	143.5	7.6	7.6	174	2006
Protecting Investors	33.0	2.4	2.4	173	2006
Trading Across Borders	85.0	4.8	4.8	174	2006
Closing a Business	91.5	5.2	5.2	174	2006
Economic Freedom	56.5	5.7	5.7	159	2007
National Savings Level	8.9	6.8	6.8	163	2005
Foreign Investment Freedom	50.0	6.9	6.9	159	2007
Intellectual Property	4.5	5.0	5.0	110	2004
Contract Regulation	3.2	2.7	2.7	159	2006
Enforcing Contracts	50.5	3.3	3.3	173	2006
Dealing with Licences	83.5	4.8	4.8	174	2006
Registering Property	120.0	6.4	6.4	175	2006
Enrolment Rates	45.7	8.0	8.0	173	2004
Health Expenditure	5.0	6.2	6.2	186	2003
Access to Services - Improved Water	75.0	6.8	6.8	174	2004
Government Effectiveness	-0.2	4.8	4.8	194	2005
FDI -- percentage of GDP	1.9	4.2	4.2	165	2004
Foreign Aid - % of Central Government Expenditures	64.5	8.3	8.3	74	2004
Inequality -- GINI Coefficient	39.6	5.1	5.1	121	2003
Trade Balance -- percentage of GDP	-2.7	5.3	5.3	149	2004
Paying Taxes	80.0	4.6	4.6	173	2006

Political Stability & Violence	Government & Market Efficiency	Rule of Law
3.3	5.4	5.5
Human Rights	Government Transparency & Accountability	Democratic Participation
4.2	4.3	5.1

	Raw Score	Global Rank Score	Sum	Sample Size	Last Date Available
3. Accountability			4.28		
Corruption -- World Bank	-0.3	5.0	5.0	192	2005
Voice and Accountability	0.3	4.3	4.3	194	2005
Press Freedom	27.8	3.5	3.5	191	2006
4. Human Rights			4.16		
Civil Liberties	2.4	3.3	3.3	188	2005
Political Rights	1.8	2.9	2.9	188	2005
Human Rights -- Empowerment	7.0	5.1	5.1	189	2004
Human Rights -- Physical Integrity	5.6	5.3	5.3	187	2004
5. Political Stability and Violence			3.27		
Permanence of Regime Type	2.0	8.2	8.2	159	2004
Black Market	3.5	4.0	4.0	159	2006
Battle-related Deaths	0.0	1.0	1.0	196	2005
Dependence on external support	4.5	3.4	3.4	147	2006
Military Expenditure as % of GDP	1.0	1.5	1.5	145	2005
Political Stability	0.0	5.0	5.0	196	2005
Refugees Produced	15132.5	6.7	6.7	183	2004
Terrorism Fatalities	0.0	1.0	1.0	189	2005
Terrorism Incidents	0.0	1.0	1.0	189	2005
Polity Fragmentation	0.0	1.0	1.0	161	2004
6. Rule of Law			5.46		
Police, Law, and Criminality	-0.2	4.8	4.8	194	2005
Prison Population Rate	55.2	2.2	2.2	184	2006
Prison Occupancy Level	159.1	7.3	7.3	154	2006
Number of Political Prisoners	1.8	5.7	5.7	188	2004
Judicial Independence	6.0	4.1	4.1	111	2004
Impartial Courts	5.6	4.1	4.1	131	2004
Integrity of the Legal System	3.3	8.4	8.4	123	2004
Military Interference in the Rule of Law	4.7	7.2	7.2	130	2004
Property Rights	50.0	5.4	5.4	159	2006

Appendix 1: Historical Background

Prior to European involvement in the 15th century a number of small independent kingdoms and chieftaincies existed in the area that is now Ghana. In the 17th century the Asante kingdom of central Ghana began a major expansion that culminated in a highly organized state in the mid 1800s. Early European contact with Ghana was based on trade involving gold, ivory, pepper, and slaves. European engagement was initially confined to the coast, and African trading networks brought all forms of trade goods from the interior to the ocean. The Portuguese built the first permanent European settlement on the Gold Coast in 1482 and enjoyed a period of dominance for about a century, but rivalry with other powers was fierce. By the end of the 18th century the British were in sole control of the region, having emerged ahead of the Portuguese, the Dutch, Danes, and Swedes. The British fought two major wars against the Asante state, the second of which culminated in the burning of the Asante capital of Kumasi in 1874 and the destabilization of the indigenous political order of interior Ghana. The British worked to prevent the re-establishment of centralized Asante authority and supported rival ethnic groups. Actual British presence in Ghana's interior remained light throughout the colonial period.

Immediately following WWII, an organized nationalist movement emerged in Ghana with the founding of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) in 1947. The UGCC advocated self-government "in the shortest possible time", but favored cooperative over revolutionary independence. Kwame Nkrumah, who broke with the UGCC and founded the Convention People's Party (CPP) in 1949, was more radical in his approach and adopted the slogan "self-government now". Nkrumah's power base was with the common people rather than the intelligentsia. Disturbances in 1951 resulted in a constitution that delegated some responsibility to local rule, and Nkrumah assumed a role akin to that of a prime minister, but full independence did not come until 1957. Ghana was the first colonized country in Sub-Saharan Africa to gain independence.

Nkrumah was an advocate of Pan-African unity and socialism, but his dream of a unified continent crumbled in face of opposition from his peers. He tried to industrialize Ghana by means of centralized spending but his policies saw only limited success coupled with unsustainable economic patterns. Nkrumah became increasingly isolated from his power base, initiated one party rule with himself as president for life in 1964, and was deposed in a coup in 1966 but remains a popular and iconic figure today.



Following Nkrumah's removal, Ghana went through a decade and a half of predominately military rule interspersed with brief fits of democracy; the entire period was marked by poor fiscal management and corruption that drove Ghana further into poverty. In 1981 a young Flight-Lieutenant, Jerry Rawlings, deposed the inept elected government of Hilla Limann and established a semblance of order. Under his rule Ghana restructured its economy and began to recover, albeit slowly. Human rights abuses did occur, but to a far lesser extent than in many other dictatorships of the period. Popular pressure led to elections in 1992, which Rawlings won on the NDC ticket, a feat he repeated in 1996. Rawlings did not run in the 2000 elections that John Kufuor of the NPP won; he was in turn re-elected in 2004.

Appendix 2: Ghana Field Research Methodology

This research study is based on a series of questionnaire-based consultative interviews carried out in November and December 2006 with individuals who work directly with governance building, advocacy, and analysis in Ghana. Academics, foreign and domestic government personnel, consultants, and NGO staff participated in this information gathering process. All interviews were conducted in person by a CIFP researcher in Ghana.

The survey questionnaire upon which the interviews were based consisted of structured questions based on scale-rating, ranking, and level of agreement, as well as a limited number of open-ended questions that allowed for respondents to offer more detailed answers. In total there were 19 multi-faceted questions that collected some 140 pieces of information from each respondent. Interviews took between one and two hours to complete, and detailed notes were taken during interviews to augment questionnaire derived information. A list of questions, along with coded responses, is provided on the following pages. It should be noted that the coded responses do not represent generalizable statistical findings due to the limited sample size and selection bias. The purpose of this study was to gain nuanced insights into issue areas by tapping into the expertise with high levels of knowledge and experience. This nuance was reflected in the interview process; the questionnaire results are a general framework that represents broad strokes rather than detail.

A list of potential study participants was drawn up by the researcher in cooperation

with the Canadian Parliamentary Centre (CPC) office in Accra, Ghana. Potential participants were selected on the basis of their experience with governance issues in Ghana. 78 individuals were contacted and invited to participate in the study; affirmative responses totaled 26. Study participants averaged nearly ten years apiece working with governance in Ghana. Gender balance was a consideration in forming the

participant list. All participants were guaranteed written credit as contributors, but total anonymity with regard to their individual responses. This was done in order to protect individuals who work in sensitive positions, and whose responses could have been wrongly construed as official rather than personal viewpoints. No financial compensation was provided to any participant.

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GHANA EXPERT OPINION SURVEY RESPONSES

The table below shows numerically coded averaged responses to expert opinion survey instruments completed by study participants.

Authority	Averaged Responses
How is real and effective power divided among Ghana's institutions? (add institutional shares to a total of 10)	
<i>Executive</i>	4.4
<i>Legislature</i>	2.6
<i>Military</i>	1.1
<i>Non-state groups</i>	1.8
To what extent does civil society perform state functions relative to the government? (4=more, 3=high, 2=medium, 1=low, 0=none)	
<i>Policing & judicial services</i>	1.3
<i>Infrastructure provision</i>	1.8
<i>Education (unregulated)</i>	2.1
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (0=strongly agree, 1= somewhat agree, 2=somewhat disagree, 3=strongly disagree)	
<i>Ghana manages its relations with its donors well</i>	1.0
<i>Civilians have control over Ghana's military</i>	0.9
<i>Serious political violence is unlikely in Ghana in the next 2 years</i>	0.9
<i>Ghana is safer from internal violence now than 2 years ago</i>	1.1
Legitimacy	
To what extent would you describe the following institutions as operating with professionalism and integrity? (3=high, 2=medium, 1=low, 0=none)	
<i>Executive</i>	2.0
<i>Legislature</i>	1.8
<i>Judiciary</i>	1.7
<i>Police</i>	1.2
<i>Military</i>	2.4
In your opinion, to what extent does the general public have trust in the following institutions? (3=high, 2=medium, 1=low, 0=none)	
<i>Executive</i>	1.8
<i>Legislature</i>	1.6
<i>Judiciary</i>	1.6
<i>Police</i>	1.0
<i>Military</i>	2.3
To what extent does government respond to the demands of the following constituencies? (1-10, 1 is low)	
<i>Poor citizens</i>	3.2
<i>Middle class citizens</i>	4.8
<i>Wealthy citizens</i>	6.5
<i>Urban citizens</i>	5.4
<i>Rural citizens</i>	3.1
<i>Women</i>	3.2
<i>Ethnic/religious minorities</i>	3.5

Legitimacy, cont'd
Averaged Responses
To what extent does government respond to the demands of the following constituencies?

(1-10, 1 is low)

<i>Ethnic/religious majorities</i>	4.9
<i>Foreign donors</i>	7.8
<i>Domestic business</i>	4.9
<i>Foreign business</i>	6.8

To what extent does the government meet the needs of the following constituencies?

(1-10, 1 is low)

<i>Poor citizens</i>	2.9
<i>Middle class citizens</i>	4.8
<i>Wealthy citizens</i>	5.9
<i>Urban citizens</i>	5.4
<i>Rural citizens</i>	3.2
<i>Women</i>	3.2
<i>Ethnic/religious minorities</i>	3.5
<i>Ethnic/religious majorities</i>	4.8
<i>Foreign donors</i>	6.8
<i>Domestic business</i>	3.0
<i>Foreign business</i>	6.2

In your opinion, to what extent does popular opinion hold the following statements to be true? (present)

(3=high, 2=medium, 1=low, 0=none)

<i>The state has the sole right to maintain armed forces</i>	2.8
<i>The government took power in line with legal and cultural standards</i>	2.8
<i>The government has the right to punish those who do not pay their taxes</i>	1.7

2 years ago, how did popular opinion compare to the present?

(3=better, 2=same, 1=worse; all relative to present)

<i>The state has the sole right to maintain armed forces</i>	2.1
<i>The government took power in line with legal and cultural standards</i>	1.9
<i>The government has the right to punish those who do not pay their taxes</i>	1.9

What is the current status of the following rights & freedoms in Ghana?

(3=high, 2=medium, 1=low)

<i>Women's rights</i>	1.8
<i>Children's rights</i>	1.5
<i>Ethnic/religious minority's rights</i>	1.9
<i>Religious freedom</i>	2.9
<i>Political freedom</i>	2.7
<i>Press freedom</i>	2.7
<i>Right to education</i>	2.2
<i>Property rights/land title</i>	1.8
<i>Right to health care</i>	1.8

What progress has been made on the following rights and freedoms over the past two years?

(4=high, 3=medium, 2=low, 1=none, 0=regression)

<i>Women's rights</i>	2.6
<i>Children's rights</i>	2.3
<i>Ethnic/religious minority's rights</i>	2.3
<i>Religious freedom</i>	3.2
<i>Political freedom</i>	3.0

Legitimacy, cont'd	Averaged Responses
What progress has been made on the following rights and freedoms over the past two years? (4=high, 3=medium, 2=low, 1=none, 0=regression)	
<i>Press freedom</i>	3.2
<i>Right to education</i>	2.4
<i>Property rights/land title</i>	2.3
<i>Right to health care</i>	2.3
What has been the level of the government's commitment to the following rights & freedoms over the past 2 years? (3=high, 2=medium, 1=low, 0=none)	
<i>Women's rights</i>	2.0
<i>Children's rights</i>	1.9
<i>Ethnic/religious minority's rights</i>	2.1
<i>Religious freedom</i>	2.7
<i>Political freedom</i>	2.6
<i>Press freedom</i>	2.6
<i>Right to education</i>	2.2
<i>Property rights/land title</i>	2.1
<i>Right to health care</i>	2.2
To what extent do members of the following groups participate in democratic politics? (3=high, 2=medium, 1=low, 0=none)	
<i>Ethnic minorities</i>	1.5
<i>Religious minorities</i>	1.3
<i>Women</i>	1.4
<i>Urban poor</i>	1.1
<i>Rural poor</i>	0.9
To what extent is corruption pervasive in the following groups? (3=high, 2=medium, 1=low, 0=none)	
<i>Senior politicians</i>	2.4
<i>Junior politicians</i>	2.3
<i>Low-level officials</i>	2.4
<i>Private sector</i>	2.1
To what extent do the following groups enjoy impunity from punishment for corruption? (3=high, 2=medium, 1=low, 0=none)	
<i>Senior politicians</i>	2.6
<i>Junior politicians</i>	2.2
<i>Low-level officials</i>	1.9
<i>Private sector</i>	2.1
Capacity	
To what extent does the government have the capacity to carry out the following tasks? (3=high, 2=medium, 1=low, 0=none)	
<i>Ensure an adequate national electricity supply within three years</i>	1.5
<i>Prevent an outbreak of serious political violence</i>	2.1
<i>Implement a program that reduces violence against women</i>	1.7
How does the government's capacity to carry out the following task 2 years ago compare to the same capacity today? (3=better, 2=same, 1=worse; all relative to present)	
<i>Ensure an adequate national electricity supply within three years</i>	2.4

Capacity, cont'd	Averaged Responses
How does the government's capacity to carry out the following task 2 years ago compare to the same capacity today? (3=better, 2=same, 1=worse; all relative to present)	
<i>Prevent an outbreak of serious political violence</i>	2.1
<i>Implement a program that reduces violence against women</i>	1.6
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (0=strongly agree, 1= somewhat agree, 2=somewhat disagree, 3=strongly disagree)	
<i>Governance in Ghana inspires confidence in foreign investors</i>	1.0
<i>Corruption is less of a problem for economic development now than 2 years ago</i>	1.8
<i>The government uses foreign aid money well</i>	1.3
<i>The government has control over the direction of the economy</i>	1.0
How would you rate the performance of the following institutions in Ghana? (1-10, 1 is low)	
<i>Executive</i>	5.7
<i>Legislature</i>	4.4
<i>Military</i>	6.6
<i>Judiciary</i>	5.1
<i>Bureaucracy</i>	4.0
<i>Opposition</i>	2.3

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Accra Mail (Ghana)	Global Insight Daily Analysis
African News Dimension	Gye Nyame Concord
Agence France Presse	Hindustan Times
All Africa	Houston Chronicle
Associated Press Newswires	Inter Press Service
Australian Company News Bites	ISI Emerging Markets Africawire
Automotive World	Just-Food
BBC Monitoring Africa	Kent & Sussex Courier
BBC Monitoring Media	Korea News
Bernamea Daily Malaysian News	Pharma Marketletter
Business Recorder	PR Newswire
Chicago Tribune	Public Agenda (Ghana)
Daily Graphic	Reuters News
Documents & the Middle East	Rotor & Wing
Dow Jones Commodities Service	SinoCast China Business Daily News
Dow Jones International News	States News Service
Economist Intelligence Unit	The Canadian Press
Emerging Markets Daily News	The Press Trust of India Limited
Ghanaian Chronicle	US Fed News
	Xinhua News Agency

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FIELD RESEARCH INFORMATION

As a part of the CIFP project, in cooperation with the Canadian Parliamentary Centre (CPC), field research in Ghana was funded by the Office of Democratic Governance of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). CIFP's field researcher (Kevin Wyjad) compiled a series of reports based on surveys and interviews conducted with local experts on issues relevant to good governance and democratic processes in Ghana. Field research provided a local view of events as they unfolded, and by accessing local expert opinion added nuance to issues difficult to access from afar. Having a local presence in Ghana complemented CIFP's Canada based research and analysis by acting as a check on findings and filling gaps in available knowledge.

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Ghana Field Research Funding: Office for Democratic Governance, Canadian International Development Agency

Overview: Methodology

The report is based on three elements, adapted from CIFP's fragile states methodology. First, structural indicators are grouped into six clusters capturing different facets of democratic processes and governance: rule of law, human rights, government transparency and accountability, government and market efficiency, political stability and violence, and democratic participation. The structural data in this preliminary report constitute a limited set of leading indicators of democracy and governance; later versions of the document will include up to 75 separate structural indicators providing a detailed quantitative baseline portrait of the country.

Second, the analysis draws on event monitoring data compiled by CIFP researchers over a six month period extending from June to December 2006. Collected from a variety of web-based sources, including both international and domestic news sources, the events are quantitatively evaluated and systematically assessed to identify general trends of relevance to democratic processes and governance. Highly significant events are also qualitatively analyzed to highlight their specific causes and consequences.

Third, the report includes a series of analytical exercises, including stakeholder analysis and scenario generation. Future iterations of the report may include detailed consultations with country and subject experts located in-country as well as in Canada and abroad. These consultations would draw together this experience and knowledge to expand upon and, wherever necessary, challenge the assessment arising from the quantitative structural and event-based analysis.

This multi-source data structure enables more robust analysis than any single method of data collection and assessment.



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Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) is a project located at Carleton University. Its core mandate is to develop analytical methodologies that will generate information on the key features of the political, economic, social and cultural environments of countries around the world, providing at-a-glance global overviews, issue-based perspectives and country performance measures. While the initial dataset focuses on measures of domestic armed conflict, as part of this project that database has been substantially revised to capture core measures of democratic processes and governance.

The CIFP database includes statistical data in the form of over one hundred performance indicators for 197 countries. With its focus on policy relevance, the CIFP provides a rich information resource to policy officers across all government departments. By offering a detailed assessment methodology for evaluating individual country performance, the CIFP provides guidance to program officers working in complex and fragile environments, enabling them to focus their efforts and resources on the root structural causes rather than the outward symptoms of a problem.

The contents of this report are not to be cited, duplicated or circulated without permission of the authors and CIFP. More detailed description of methodology available upon request. Feedback is welcome.

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