


Diasporas and Canadian Foreign Policy

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FIGURE 1

WHICH STATES AND WHY?

THE INTERACTION EFFECTS OF ETHNIC COMPOSITION AND INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINT ON PREFERENCES



Implications

- Highly diverse states with high political constraints (democracies) are likely to be more cautious, and circumspect with respect to diaspora politics.
- They are more likely to support institutions that encourage reciprocity, rule of law and international institutions based on civic (as opposed to ethnic) nationalism in pursuit of “identity free” politics.
- They are more likely to engage in and support pacific forms of conflict resolution that discourages and inhibits risk taking and unilateral actions in international affairs.

Double Edge Sword

- Mutual vulnerability argument. Their configuration should inhibit risky foreign policy making and strategies
- Diversity in combination with political constraints help ensures no group can dominate political process – must satisfy multiple and diverse demands – distribution of preferences
- Institutional design including norms based on conflict resolution reinforces future behavior based on past successes
- Distribution of power (eg federalism) in some diverse political systems builds additional constraints;
- System becomes efficient as opposed to redistributive

Implications for Canadian Foreign Policy

- Domestic politics matters
- Obtaining and Maintaining Political Power matters
- Concentration of diaspora groups as constituents matters
- Leaders will play the “diaspora card” if it satisfies the above conditions

Result

- The problem of outbidding
- Loss of centre
- Diaspora group lobbying or other forms of pressure tactics and special pleading – Halodomar, Sri Lanka, Haiti, push and pull forms of engagement
- Selective foreign policy choices –ODA, peace building - based on constituent interests and alignments rather than core national interests
- Invidious comparison

Then What?

- If diaspora politics is a double edge sword how can we, on the one hand, build what is inevitably an increasingly diverse society while on the other hand, ensure that our foreign policies are coherent and strategic?
- The answer may lie in social capital - investing in trust- building processes among Canadian citizens through open communication and honesty about being Canadian
- Build consensus around that trust building and interdependency rather than creating and imposing a value set – parliament could be the vehicle for the process
- Multiculturalism hypothesis is not about celebrating differences. It is premised on trust and confidence. The more positive you feel about yourself the more positive your behaviour towards others.

Then What?

- Educate and discipline our parliamentarians about those interdependencies
- Diversify our public service to build trust
- Understand diffusion and spillback and talk about it
- Avoid tempting quick fixes or at least understand their implications
- Understand that the “values card” may have minimal future value
- Understand that Quebec’s influence on foreign policy choices will outweigh diaspora influences in the short to medium term as it has in the past because of our federated political system though that influence has de facto shifted westward.

Examples


Haiti, Jamaica and Sri Lanka

In each case we can clearly see how Canadian foreign policy is shaped by specific events abroad without fully understanding the implications of our actions


Diasporas become the conduit through which Canada leverages influence in these countries whether that comes in form of disaster politics, organized criminal activity, genocide prevention or peace building

The difficulty comes when politicians fail to understand the implications of their actions and the complexity of the problems they are confronting

Distribution of Diasporas in Canada



Diasporas in Canada by Continent (2000) (foreign citizenship)



- Africa (113,744)
- Americas (254,091)
- Asia (242,203)
- Europe (245,797)
- Middle East (281,431)
- India (323,171)
- Philippines (239,811)

Number of Diasporas per Homeland (Global 2000)

Russia	43
India	42
Pakistan	28
Egypt	27
Philippines	25
Morocco	24
Turkey	24
Bangladesh	22
Algeria	21
Nigeria	19
Serbia and Montenegro	19
Iran	18
Iraq	18
Mexico	18
Indonesia	17
Afghanistan	16
Romania	16
Bosnia and Herzegovina	15
Sri Lanka	15
Thailand	15
Uzbekistan	14
Mali	13

Colombia	12
Congo, Dem. Rep.	12
Lebanon	12
Palestinian Territories	12
Somalia	12
Azerbaijan	11
Senegal	11
Sudan	11
Syria	11
Angola	9
Croatia	9
Georgia	9
Israel	9
Peru	9
Yemen	9
Haiti	8
Macedonia	8
Mozambique	8
Tajikistan	8
Guinea	7
Myanmar	7
Niger	7
Cambodia	6
Congo	6
Moldova	6
Nepal	6
Togo	6

Chad	5
Eritrea	5
Ethiopia	5
Laos	5
Uganda	5
Venezuela	5
Cote d'Ivoire	4
Cuba	4
El Salvador	4
Guatemala	4
Burundi	3
Central African Republic	3
Guinea-Bissau	3
Paraguay	3
Rwanda	3
Sierra Leone	3
Trinidad and Tobago	3
Comoros	2
Liberia	2
Nicaragua	2
Panama	2
Papua New Guinea	2
Lesotho	1

Number of Diasporas per Host State (2000)

United States of America	55
Germany	49
Canada	37
Pakistan	32
France	29
United Kingdom	26
Jordan	24
Australia	23
Saudi Arabia	22
Italy	20
Israel	19
United Arab Emirates	14
Sweden	14
Libya	14
Spain	13
Kuwait	13
Switzerland	12
Netherlands	12
Lebanon	12
China	12
Russia	11
Ukraine	10
Kenya	10
Congo, Dem. Rep.	10
Serbia and Montenegro	9
Philippines	9
Denmark	9

Syria	8
Ghana	8
Burkina Faso	8
Belgium	8
Turkey	7
Oman	7
Norway	7
Greece	7
Austria	7
Uzbekistan	6
Tanzania	6
Portugal	6
Nigeria	6
Nepal	6
Malaysia	6
Cote d'Ivoire	6
Zimbabwe	5
Yemen	5
Thailand	5
Sudan	5
South Africa	5
Palestinian Territories	5
Kazakhstan	5
Japan	5
Indonesia	5
India	5
Guinea	5
Argentina	5
Algeria	5

Venezuela	4
Uganda	4
Kyrgyzstan	4
Gambia	4
Gabon	4
Benin	4
Armenia	4
Zambia	3
Taiwan	3
Senegal	3
New Zealand	3
Morocco	3
Iraq	3
Iran	3
Ethiopia	3
Egypt	3
Croatia	3
Congo	3
Brazil	3

Remittances

Are they the answer?

Many fragile states that depend on remittances are also heavily aid dependent
– are remittances a substitute for aid?

Haiti no real growth and large remittances. How is this possible?

Some countries that receive a large amount of remittances – eg China and India - are also wealthy and no longer need aid and they may not *need* remittances in the same way the fragile states do.

Are remittances a loss for the Canadian economy? Yes.

Are there substitutes for loss of income and out migration (Guyana)?

Brain circulation ?

Diaspora Tourism?

Remittances by Receiving Country (for countries with D@R 2006)

(US\$ Millions)

India	\$24,965	Thailand	\$1,879	Mali	\$458
Mexico	\$24,493	Iran	\$1,517	Cambodia	\$429
Philippines	\$14,951	Azerbaijan	\$1,342	Eritrea	\$411
Russian Federation	\$8,443	Croatia	\$1,328	Macedonia	\$394
Bangladesh	\$6,768	Nepal	\$1,294	Ethiopia	\$382
Pakistan	\$6,171	Palestinian Territories	\$1,225	Trinidad and Tobago	\$374
Morocco	\$5,785	Moldova, Republic of	\$1,105	Lesotho	\$358
Romania	\$5,751	Israel	\$1,063	Mozambique	\$323
Lebanon	\$5,453	Haiti	\$1,060	Myanmar	\$314
Indonesia	\$4,830	Yemen	\$1,052	Panama	\$314
Egypt	\$4,484	Tajikistan	\$1,026	Cote d'Ivoire	\$223
Nigeria	\$4,363	Georgia	\$1,005	Congo	\$217
Turkey	\$4,294	Cuba	\$983	Burundi	\$184
Colombia	\$4,223	Angola	\$969	Togo	\$167
Serbia and Montenegro	\$4,173	Sudan	\$963	Guinea	\$164
Algeria	\$3,963	Somalia	\$790	Liberia	\$163
Guatemala	\$3,592	Syria	\$747	Chad	\$137
El Salvador	\$3,329	Uganda	\$728	Niger	\$136
Iraq	\$3,238	Nicaragua	\$727	Sierra Leone	\$101
Uzbekistan	\$2,924	Senegal	\$650	Rwanda	\$85
Sri Lanka	\$2,889	Congo, Dem. Rep.	\$636	Papua New Guinea	\$78
Afghanistan	\$2,485	Laos	\$588	Central African Republic	\$73
Peru	\$2,353	Venezuela	\$558	Comoros	\$49
Bosnia and Herzegovina	\$2,119	Paraguay	\$541	Guinea-Bissau	\$28

Remittances by Receiving Country (with D@R 2006)

(% of GDP)

Eritrea	37.88%
Tajikistan	36.48%
Moldova, Republic of	33.82%
Somalia	30.38%
Afghanistan	29.59%
Liberia	25.83%
Lesotho	24.25%
Lebanon	24.00%
Burundi	22.80%
Laos	21.82%
Haiti	21.36%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	18.76%
El Salvador	18.19%
Uzbekistan	17.02%
Nepal	16.07%
Nicaragua	13.54%
Georgia	13.31%
Serbia and Montenegro	13.12%
Philippines	12.79%
Comoros	12.03%
Bangladesh	10.92%
Sri Lanka	10.71%
Guatemala	10.18%
Morocco	10.09%

Guinea-Bissau	9.21%
Uganda	7.81%
Mali	7.72%
Togo	7.57%
Congo, Dem. Rep.	7.44%
Senegal	7.27%
Sierra Leone	7.00%
Azerbaijan	6.67%
Cambodia	5.96%
Paraguay	5.94%
Yemen	5.52%
Guinea	4.94%
Central African Republic	4.91%
Pakistan	4.79%
Romania	4.73%
Mozambique	4.24%
Egypt	4.17%
Niger	3.84%
Nigeria	3.80%
Algeria	3.45%
Iraq	3.45%
Rwanda	3.41%
Croatia	3.11%
Colombia	3.11%

Congo	2.94%
Mexico	2.92%
Ethiopia	2.87%
India	2.75%
Sudan	2.56%
Peru	2.52%
Myanmar	2.29%
Angola	2.20%
Syria	2.14%
Chad	2.09%
Trinidad and Tobago	1.88%
Panama	1.84%
Cuba	1.78%
Papua New Guinea	1.38%
Indonesia	1.33%
Turkey	1.07%
Cote d'Ivoire	1.01%
Macedonia	0.95%
Thailand	0.91%
Israel	0.86%
Russian Federation	0.86%
Iran	0.68%
Venezuela	0.31%

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