



Events data coverage: September 2006 to February 2007

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Analyst: Nicholas Stewart

Principal Investigator: David Carment


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**FRAGILITY IN BRIEF** Pakistan is weak and unstable; it ranks as the 3<sup>rd</sup> most fragile state in Asia. The country is particularly weak in **Authority** — ranked 4th in Asia — because of security challenges presented by various armed militant groups. **State Legitimacy** is also problematic, as the government of President Musharraf is seen by much of the population as illegitimate and his attempts to retain control of the government and army are drawing protests from numerous quarters. **Capacity** is also a high risk area; the state effectively conducts international affairs and economic management, but other capabilities are limited. The Pakistani state is unable to extend control throughout the country, and faces secessionist movements from tribal and militant groups. Strong economic growth of over 6% per year is not addressing sources of poverty in the country. Pakistan is ranked 134th out of 177 countries on the 2006 UNDP Human Development Index; inequality is also significant in the country. Pakistan faces a range of development challenges in the areas of primary school enrolment, health expenditure, and respect for human rights. High numbers of refugees hosted further exacerbate tensions in certain areas of the country. Pakistan is unlikely to meet its MDGs in primary education and gender equality, as well as child and maternal mortality.


Events reflect Pakistan's structural fragility problems. Developments related to security and human development were of particular concern, while events related to governance and economic situations showed some improvement during the period monitored. Without improvement in the security environment, it will be difficult to make sustainable gains in stability. Despite continued military operations by the Pakistani Army, which has received considerable economic and material support from the United States, the influence of militant groups is rising. Events related to human development were destabilizing on average, as promised reforms to women's rights and democracy have proved to have little effect thus far.




Pakistan Authority (A), Legitimacy (L), and Capacity (C) Triangle

MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (MDGs): LIKELIHOOD OF ATTAINMENT (UNICEF, 2007)						
Extreme Poverty and Hunger	Education	Gender Equality	Child Mortality	Maternal Mortality	HIV/AIDS & Malaria	Environmental Sustainability
Medium	Low	Low	Low	Low	N/A	High

STRUCTURAL BASELINE & EVENTS SUMMARY



## SUMMARY



**STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS** Political stability, ethnic rebellion and terrorism are all high risk indicators in Pakistan, and security is low in many parts of the country. The government has been unable to establish either **Authority** or **Legitimacy** in several provinces along the Afghanistan border. In several of these regions, militant groups and the government have conducted violent attacks to achieve control. High corruption and lack of democratic governance are high risk areas. Further, many commentators believe that only President Musharraf is keeping the government intact. The economy is less problematic, as Musharraf's government initiated substantial trade liberalization. Since 2001, Pakistan has attracted considerable foreign financing, which has led to high economic growth, but corruption and underemployment remain high. Human development is a medium risk area, particularly the low civil rights of women, and religious intolerance and sectarian violence has been high throughout the country. Pakistan's environment suffers from high rates of commercial energy consumption, but the state maintains a moderately low carbon dioxide output. However, the disaster risk for Pakistan is high, with earthquakes and landslides regularly occurring.

**EVENTS** Events in Pakistan indicate an increased risk of fragility when all factors are considered. Destabilizing developments in the security sector are the primary driver of increasing fragility, and government **Authority** and **Capacity** in several regions of the country are also quite weak. Positive developments in the economic sector have been unable to offset ongoing instability in the security sector. Governance events fared better; despite ceding authority and capacity in tribal regions, President Musharraf continues to project command of state affairs for Pakistan generally, and the permanence of his regime remains intact for now. Relations with India – a long-standing rival - continue to improve. Religious communities opposed reforms to increase women's rights, causing a deterioration in human development (driven by effective negative responses from the religious communities to proposed reforms aimed to increase women's rights). While some external events in India and Afghanistan effect the governance and security sectors, the most important drivers of events have been internal processes. Events reported by international and local media related to security, governance, and human development outnumbered those associated with economics, demographics, and the environment.

*"The government has been unable to establish either Authority or Legitimacy in several provinces along the Afghanistan border."*

### KEY ISSUES AND FACTS

#### Security and Crime:

- Government has little or no authority in tribal regions
- Frequent clashes between the military and militant groups
- Frequent attacks among Sunni and Shia militant groups
- Low intensity insurgency in Baluchistan

#### Economics:

- Aid from the US remains strong
- Economic growth of 6.5% in 2006 is promising
- Corruption limits the spread of benefits from economic growth

#### Governance:

- Tensions over ability of opposition politicians to participate in elections
- Relations with India continue to improve
- Controversy over Musharraf's relationship with the army

#### Human Development:

- Economic growth localized, with little impact on most rural and many urban areas
- Promised reforms to women's rights have not materialized
- Literacy rate is 49.9% and only 36% among females

#### Environment:

- Earthquakes and landslides are common and often cause substantial damage in populated areas

#### Demography:

- Estimated 2.6 million Afghans living in Pakistan
- 36.9 % of the population is under 15 years of age

# PRIMARY DRIVERS

## GOVERNANCE

**STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS** Pakistan's governance indicators exhibit fragility in the areas of corruption, the rule of law, regime permanence, and the level of democracy. These areas are troubling, particularly because of the linkage between poor rule of law and high security risks in the country. The weaknesses are only slightly moderated by government policy and freedom of the press. The Pakistani government continues to have difficulties establishing authority and control in the North West Frontier Province, Baluchistan, North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Bajaur, and Peshwar. Government authority and legitimacy in these regions is limited.


**EVENTS** Poor government authority has constantly plagued President Musharraf. In September, the government signed an agreement with militant groups in North Waziristan aimed at ending several years of conflict between the government and pro-Taliban militant groups. The government's presence in the region decreased dramatically as per the agreement, and the authority vacuum has been filled by the militant groups. Regarding Pakistan's level of democracy, President Musharraf continued to deny exiled leaders from returning and competing in the promised 2007 free elections. Government ministers, members of the judiciary and other authorities were frequently attacked by militant groups. On one positive note, despite historical disputes, relations with India continue to improve, and the two governments are slowly moving closer to establishing formal negotiations of a peace treaty.

### KEY EVENTS

- **Pakistan 'Taliban' in Peace Deal**  
5 September 2006, *BBC News*  
Government cedes local governing autonomy to pro-Taliban militants in the North Waziristan peace accord
- **Musharraf, Manmohan Agree to Resume Peace Talks**  
16 September 2006, *The Daily Times*  
The governments of India and Pakistan agreed to establish a joint mechanism to identify terrorist threats

### Medium-risk

Average Events Score and Tendency



● Avg Score: 0.38  
➔ Trend Score: 0.04

## SECURITY AND CRIME

**STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS** Pakistan faces multiple security threats. This includes a high risk of ethnic rebellion, a large number of terrorist incidents and fatalities, and low political stability. These problems are somewhat moderated by the low conflict intensity as measured by the number of battle-related deaths, yet violence is still common between the military and militant groups in the provinces located near the Afghanistan border. Relations among militant groups and various elements of the country's security apparatus remain complex; reports persist that factions of the country's formidable intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) remain sympathetic to groups allied with the Taliban.


**EVENTS** Tribal and militant Islamist groups continuously conduct violent attacks against one another and against troops and other governmental authorities, with the latter responding in kind. Members of the judiciary have also recently become targets. Civilians come under attack as well, as suicide bombers targeted busy public areas such as markets, shopping malls and civilian mass transportation. Military and intelligence service operations to weaken the capabilities of militant groups have proved ineffective. Indeed, these operations have arguably motivated militant groups to conduct further attacks, especially if civilians in tribal areas were harmed during the military operations. Thus, large military operations were often immediately followed by a rise in militant group attacks against the military or government authorities.

### KEY EVENTS

- **Pakistan Madrassa Raid 'Kills 80'**  
30 October 2006, *BBC News*  
Widespread anger follows a report children are among the dead in a military raid
- **17 Die in Quetta Suicide Attack**  
18 February 2007, *The Daily Times (Karachi)*  
District court attacked by a suicide bomber, the deadliest of a series of attacks on judicial institutions
- **Thousands without Power, Gas after Pakistan Blasts**  
1 January 2007, *BBC News*  
Rebels in Balochistan damage electricity infrastructure and a gas pipeline, leaving large regions without electricity and gas for days

### High-risk


Average Events Score and Tendency



● Avg Score: -1.21  
➔ Trend Score: -0.13

## PRIMARY DRIVERS

### HUMAN DEVELOPMENT




**STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS** Human development is a persistent and fundamental source of fragility in Pakistan. Gender-related development and empowerment measures are extremely weak, and there are persistently high instances of forced marriages, rape and honour crimes. Widespread intimidation and violence is commonly used to discourage females from attending educational institutions or assuming professional employment. Education levels are poor, and the government's capacity to improve the educational infrastructure is weak. Many children are educated in religious schools known as madrassas, which are often unregulated and in many cases associated with religious extremism. This creates a long-term security risk as many children are educated in an extremist environment. The overall literacy rate is 49.9%, and only 36% of all females literate. One positive area is that HIV infections are currently low. Health infrastructure is weak however, leaving the population vulnerable to a resurgence of polio.

**EVENTS** President Musharraf initiated a policy of 'enlightened moderation' promising to increase women's rights. However, his proposal to remove rape from Islamic law failed, as it faced strong public opposition led by a large number of religious parties. This forced the government to limit its proposed reforms. International media reports suggest there has been a 'Talibanization' of regions along the Afghanistan border. In these regions, female education institutions and barbershops are often the targets of intimidation and violence. On the other hand, the government is updating school textbooks with a section encouraging diversity. This is a positive long-term strategy, but it can be expected to have a minimal short-term effect on security. Drug use in urban areas appears to be fuelling an increase in HIV infection rates, with the UN estimating that more than 200,000 Pakistanis have the virus.

#### KEY EVENTS

- **Religious Intolerance Growing in Pakistan — Study**  
*5 September 2006, Reuters Newswire*  
Human rights groups are expressing increasing concerns over an increase in the 'Talibanization' of the North West Frontier Province as evidenced by attacks against barbershops and female schools
- **Violence against Women Continues – AGHS Report**  
*19 January 2007, The Daily Times (Lahore)*  
A released report claims a rapid increase in violence towards women and notes there has been no legislation passed to combat the trend
- **'Taleban Law' passed in Pakistan**  
*13 November 2006, BBC News*  
The government of the North West Frontier Province has authorized government departments to use the media and the police to promote Islamic values



## SECONDARY DRIVERS


### ECONOMICS

**SUMMARY** President Musharraf's government has vigorously pursued a policy of economic liberalization since assuming power in 2000. Economic growth has since been high; GDP growth in 2006 is estimated at 6.5%. In addition to internal reforms, economic growth was fuelled by an influx of money from foreign sources. Aside from significant increases in international aid, Pakistani emigrants are high contributors to economic growth. Between 2001 and 2002, annual remittances from expatriates have risen from nearly \$1 billion US to approximately \$4 billion. The influx of money has caused the growth of an affluent middle class in urban areas. While conducive to achieving future stability, the impoverished segments of Pakistan's population have garnered little or no benefit from the recent economic growth. Inequality is therefore growing, and unemployment remains widespread. In November 2006, the government signed a free trade agreement with China, a traditional strategic ally and trading partner. Government officials predict annual bilateral trade with China could triple to \$15 billion US within five years. While this prediction may be overly enthusiastic, there is little doubt that the Pakistani economy can expect to see steady growth in the coming years. The State Bank of Pakistan expects GDP growth of 7% in 2007 and foreign investment to increase by 50%.

## SECONDARY DRIVERS


### ENVIRONMENT

**SUMMARY** Pakistan's environment does not present an extreme fragility threat. The highest environmental risk to the country is the high potential for natural disasters and widespread vulnerability of certain segments of the population. Earthquakes and landslides are common, resulting in high civilian casualties and displacement when occurring in highly populated areas. Few natural disasters occurred during the reporting period, with loss of life limited to 15 people killed in a landslide in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir in January. Commercial energy consumption is problematic, as reliance on solid fuels is high. Still, carbon dioxide emissions remain relative low, a reflection of the country's limited industrial development. However, given the positive outlook for Pakistan's economy, economic improvements are likely to have a secondary result of increased pollution and environmental decline.



### DEMOGRAPHY

**SUMMARY** Pakistan's demographic situation is strongly affected by the prevalence of displaced persons. The UNHCR cites Pakistan as having the largest asylum population in the world, and Pakistan has hosted several million Afghan refugees since the Soviet invasion in 1979. As of 2005, 1.1 million Afghan refugees lived in refugee camps in Pakistan and received the assistance of the UNHCR. Additionally, an estimated 1.5 million Afghans live in Pakistan outside of these camps. The Pakistani economy has proved unable to easily absorb the influx of refugees, and the government is dependent on foreign assistance to finance the refugee camps. Over the past several years, many refugees have returned to Afghanistan, and the Pakistani government has encouraged the voluntary repatriation of these refugees. In 2005, close to 200,000 Afghan refugees voluntarily returned to their country from Pakistan. The repatriation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan slowed during the reporting period as violence resumed in Afghanistan in 2006. This trend can be expected to continue if widespread violence continues in Afghanistan.



## CANADA AND PAKISTAN

### CANADIAN CONTRIBUTIONS

- Democratic Governance Program**  
*Project duration:* 2003–2008  
*CIDA contribution:* \$12 million  
 Promoting local democratic governance with special emphasis on participation of women
- Social Policy & Development Centre (SPDC) Project**  
*Project duration:* 1995–2008  
*CIDA contribution:* \$16.3 million  
 CIDA supports the SPDC, which develops the capacity of NGOs, public and private institutions to implement social programs
- Pakistan-Canada Debt for Education Conversion Agreement**  
*Project duration:* 2006–2010  
*Canadian Contribution:* \$132 million  
 The funds are used to develop primary and middle school teachers
- Earthquake Relief and Reconstruction**  
 The Canadian government has provided over \$130 million used in several projects to assist relief and reconstruction efforts of the Oct 2005 earthquake in northern Pakistan
- Democratic Advocacy**  
 DFAIT is supporting international efforts to promote democratic practices and is monitoring the upcoming 2007 elections

### LINKS

- Canadian exports to Pakistan (2006):** CAD \$397 million (0.09% of Canada's total) with and vegetable products and machinery and electrical products leading; up from CAD \$317 million in 2005
- Canadian imports from Pakistan (2006):** CAD \$277 million (0.07% of Canada's total) with textile products heavily dominant; up from CAD \$248 million in 2005
- Canadian direct investment in Pakistan (2005):** statistics unavailable
- Pakistani direct investment in Canada (2005):** statistics unavailable
- Development engagement:** During fiscal year 2004–2005, Canada allocated CAD \$49.78 million in official development assistance to Pakistan
- Pakistani diaspora in Canada (2001):** Estimated at 300,000; in 2006, 20,000 Pakistanis entered Canada as immigrants or non-permanent residents. Immigrants of Pakistani descent comprise 0.95% of Canada's population and 0.20% of Pakistan's population

(Data from CIDA, 2007, and DFAIT, 2006)

## 6—12 MONTH SCENARIOS

### BASELINE LIKELY CASE *BASED ON MOST LIKELY*

#### ASSUMPTIONS FOR EACH CLUSTER

The government continues to make peace and cooperate with those militant groups deemed impossible to defeat while simultaneously attempting to militarily defeat others. Government legitimacy, authority and capacity remain weak in North and South Waziristan, as peace agreements with pro-Taliban militant groups remain intact. Tensions remain high with Afghanistan due to cross-border attacks and Pakistani support to pro-Taliban militant groups. President Musharraf continues to make vague assurances of free elections, but will fail to introduce meaningful democratic reforms. The status of women remains poor as limited government reforms spur little improvement. The repatriation of Afghan refugees will continue to slow as the internal situation in Afghanistan becomes more violent and dangerous. Strong economic growth continues in urban areas, but distribution of growth is limited by widespread corruption.

### ALTERNATIVE LIKELY CASE *BASED ON VARIATION IN WEAK-EST ASSUMPTION — STATUS AND ACTIVITIES OF MILITANT GROUPS*

Militant groups make limited gains against the Pakistani military in the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. This causes a further reduction in state capacity as the government does not attempt to regain local control of authority or capacity in North and South Waziristan. Recognizing his limited support base, President Musharraf cedes to pressure from religious leaders and extremists and does not introduce any further reforms to improve the status of women. The government of the United States makes general statements intended to pressure Musharraf to take a tougher stance against militant groups and extend greater human rights to women, but does not threaten to remove financial assistance. Economic growth continues, given a slight boost by the new free trade agreement with China.

### BEST CASE *BASED ON ASSUMPTION THAT VIOLENCE REDUCES*

The government abides by the peace treaty signed with militants in the Waziristan provinces and diverts its military resources to contain the militant groups in Baluchistan. The government also increases its involvement along the border with Afghanistan, leading to a decrease in cross-border attacks. President Musharraf, appeasing the West in an effort for more financial aid, rejects criticism of his 'enlightened moderation' strategy and introduces new laws intended to improve the status of women, including laws that ban forced marriages are introduced. President Musharraf allows free debate in parliamentary elections, and he permits some weaker exiled leaders (who do not pose a serious threat to his hold on power) to participate in upcoming elections.

### WORST CASE *BASED ON ASSUMPTION THAT VIOLENCE ESCALATES*

The Pakistani government escalates military operations against extremists to assert government control. These operations include several raids of madrassas, which are followed by reports of heavy collateral damage, including children. This causes outrage throughout religious communities, fuelling further dissatisfaction with the government. Militant groups vow revenge and increase their operations against the Pakistani military and government. The intensity of the conflict increases, increasing the risk of civil war and state collapse. State infrastructure is damaged by the conflict, decreasing economic growth and foreign investment, further weakening the permanence of the government.

#### POSSIBLE POLICY ENTRY POINTS

##### Security & Crime:

An improved security environment would facilitate strengthening measure in other areas.

- Long-term security can be improved by providing financial assistance for primary education by moderate-run public schools, decreasing the enrolment in radical madrassas

##### •Economics:

Despite impressive economic growth, poverty and inequality continue to be pressing concerns.

- Community-based poverty reduction in rural regions and poor urban areas

##### Governance:

Effective governance could strengthen stability throughout parts of the country

- Accountability programs can help combat corruption and promote state legitimacy

##### Human Development:

Building human capital can ensure long-term consolidation of gains made in all areas of fragility.

- Strengthening female education in areas relatively free of militant resistance
- Improving literacy skills (current literacy rate: 49.9%)

##### •Environment:

Disaster preparedness efforts are needed to help residents overcome frequent natural disasters


- Food supply needed in displacement camps

# MAPS

**MAP 1: INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN PAKISTAN AS OF OCT 2006**




**MAP 2: ASSISTED VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION TO AFGHANISTAN – BY PROVINCE OF COUNTRY OF ASYLUM – PAKISTAN – NOV 2006**



# EVENTS MONITORING CHARTS


**TABLE 1: OVERALL EVENTS CHART**



**READING THE EVENTS CHART**

- Red line (solid):** Trend line for events; downward slope left to right is negative
  - Blue line (solid):** Trend line for number of events
  - Purple line (dotted):** This indicates the sum total scores of events (positive or negative), as coded in the event monitoring process; the red trend line is derived from these values.
  - Blue line (dotted):** The total number of events; the blue trend line is derived from these values
- A more detailed description of the methodology is provided as an annex to this report*

**TABLE 2: SECURITY AND CRIME EVENTS CHART**




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
**TABLE 3: GOVERNANCE EVENTS CHART**



**READING THE EVENTS CHART**

- Red line (solid):** Trend line for events; downward slope left to right is negative
  - Blue line (solid):** Trend line for number of events
  - Purple line (dotted):** This indicates the sum total scores of events (positive or negative), as coded in the event monitoring process; the red trend line is derived from these values.
  - Blue line (dotted):** The total number of events; the blue trend line is derived from these values
- A more detailed description of the methodology is provided as an annex to this report*

**TABLE 4: ECONOMICS EVENTS CHART**



**READING THE EVENTS CHART**

- Red line (solid):** Trend line for events; downward slope left to right is negative
  - Blue line (solid):** Trend line for number of events
  - Purple line (dotted):** This indicates the sum total scores of events (positive or negative), as coded in the event monitoring process; the red trend line is derived from these values.
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<b>STRUCTURAL DATA (SOURCE AND SCALE OF RAW DATA IN PARENTHESES)</b>	<b>Cluster avg.</b>	<b>Fragility index score</b>	<b>Fragility index rank</b>	<b>Raw Data -- Five year avg</b>	<b>Last Year of Data</b>	<b>Trend Score</b>
<b>1. Governance</b>	<b>6.74</b>					
Freedom of the Press (FH, index, 0-100)		6.0	73	59.2	2006	s.q.
Gov't Effectiveness (WB Governance Matters, index, Deviation from mean)		6.1	70	-0.5	2005	*
Level of Corruption (TI, index, 0-10)		7.9	27	2.3	2006	neg
Level of Democracy (Polity IV, index, (-10 - 10))		7.6	29	-5.4	2004	pos
Level of participation in international political organizations (CIFP)		5.8	68	7.0	2005	*
Percentage of Female Parliamentarians, index, (WB WDI)		2.6	154	21.8	2005	*
Permanence of Regime Type (Polity IV, years since regime change)		7.8	25	3.0	2004	s.q.
Refugees hosted (UNHCR, total)		9.0	1	1319167.8	2005	pos
Restrictions on Civil Liberties (FH, index, 1-7)		6.5	35	5.0	2005	s.q.
Restrictions on Political Rights (FH, index, 1-7)		6.9	23	6.0	2005	s.q.
Rule of Law (WB GM, Deviation from mean)		6.8	53	-0.8	2005	*
Voice and Accountability in Decision-making (WB GM, Dev. from mean)		7.8	29	-1.2	2005	*
<b>2. Economics</b>	<b>5.47</b>					
Economic growth — Percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		4.0	125	4.8	2005	pos
Economic Size — Relative (WB WDI, GDP per capita, constant 2000 US\$)		6.9	47	553.3	2005	s.q.
Economic Size — Total (WB WD, GDP, constant 2000 US\$)		3.0	136	8.23E+10	2005	pos
External Debt — percentage of GNI (WB WDI)		3.4	92	35.3	2004	*
FDI — percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		2.8	141	0.8	2004	s.q.
Foreign Aid — percent of Central Government Expenditures (WB WDI)		6.5	25	11.6	2004	s.q.
Foreign Aid — Total per capita (WB WDI)		3.0	126	10.0	2004	s.q.
Inequality — GINI Coefficient (WB WDI)		2.3	101	30.6	2003	*
Inflation (WB WDI)		5.8	58	5.2	2005	neg
Informal Economy — Black Market (Heritage Fund, Index, 1-5)		5.2	44	4.0	2006	s.q.
Informal Economy — Ratio of PPP to GDP (WB WDI)		6.3	55	3.6	2005	pos
Infrastructure — Reliability of Electricity Supply (WB, % output lost)		8.2	12	25.7	2003	s.q.
Infrastructure — Telephone mainlines per 1000 inhabitants (WB)		7.0	49	25.4	2004	s.q.
Infrastructure — Internet Usage per 1000 inhabitants (WB)		7.3	40	7.3	2004	s.q.
Investment Climate — Contract Regulation (Heritage Foundation, Index, 1-5)		2.7	85	3.2	2006	pos
Level of participation in international economic organizations (CIFP)		8.0	24	2.0	2005	*
Paying Taxes (WB Doing Business, global rank)		7.4	32	141.5	2006	*
Regulatory Quality (WB GM, deviation from mean)		7.2	42	-0.8	2005	*
Remittances Received — percentage of GDP (WB)		6.3	52	0.0	2004	neg
Reserve Holdings — Total (WB)		3.4	121	9.33E+09	2005	s.q.
Trade Balance — percentage of GDP (WB)		3.1	112	2.3	2004	s.q.
Trade Openness — percentage of GDP (WB)		8.8	5	32.2	2005	s.q.
Unemployment — Total (WB)		3.9	60	6.9	2002	neg
Percentage of Women in the Labour Force (WB)		8.5	13	26.2	2005	pos
<b>3. Security &amp; Crime</b>	<b>7.44</b>					
Conflict intensity (Uppasala PRIO, number of conflict-related deaths)		1.0	35	0.0	2005	*
Dependence on External Military Support (FFP, Index, 1-10)		8.1	12	8.9	2006	*
Human Rights — Empowerment (CIRI, Index, 0-10)		8.0	29	2.0	2004	s.q.
Human Rights — Physical Integrity (CIRI, Index, 0-8)		8.5	14	1.6	2004	s.q.
Military Expenditure — percentage of GDP (WDI)		7.5	21	3.8	2005	s.q.
Political Stability (WB GM, deviation from mean)		8.3	15	-1.6	2005	*
Refugees Produced (WB, total)		6.9	34	19191.6	2004	neg
Risk of ethnic Rebellion (CIFP, based on MaR dataset)		8.7	5	13.0	2005	*
Terrorism -- Number of fatalities (US NCTC, number of fatalities)		8.7	6	306.5	2005	*
Terrorism -- Number of Incidents (US NCTC, number of incidents)		8.7	7	294.5	2005	*

## STRUCTURAL DATA (CONT'D)

<b>4. Human Development</b>	<b>6.15</b>					
Access to Improved Water (WB, percent of the population)	4.7	94	91.0	2004	*	
Access to Sanitation (WB, percent of the population)	5.9	65	59.0	2004	*	
Education — Primary Completion — female (WB, percent)	..	..	..	..	..	
Education — Primary Completion — total (WB, percent)	..	..	..	..	..	
Education — Primary Enrolment — total (WB, percent)	..	..	..	..	..	
Education — Primary Enrolment — Ratio Female to Male (WB)	8.8	5	69.8	2004	pos	
Food Security — Aid as percentage of total consumption (FAO STAT)	5.0	64	0.8	2001	*	
Gender Empowerment Measure (UNDP, index, 0-1)	8.0	10	0.4	2004	*	
Gender-related Development Index (UNDP, index, 0-1)	7.4	30	0.5	2004	pos	
Health Infrastructure — Expenditures as a percentage of GDP (WB)	8.6	11	2.8	2003	neg	
HIV/AIDS — New AIDS Cases Reported (UN, total)	3.8	65	16.4	2001	*	
HIV/AIDS — Percent of Adult Females Infected (WB)	1.3	107	15.0	2005	*	
HIV/AIDS — Percent of Adult population infected (WB)	1.3	143	0.1	2005	*	
Human Development Index (UNDP, index 0-1)	7.3	40	0.5	2004	pos	
Infant Mortality (WB, per 1000 live births)	7.7	29	82.6	2004	*	
Literacy (WB, percent of population age 15 and above)	8.2	13	49.9	2004	*	
Literacy — female (WB, percent of female population age 15 and above)	8.2	11	36.0	2004	*	
<b>5. Demography</b>	<b>6.62</b>					
Life Expectancy — Female (WB)	6.5	58	65.2	2004	*	
Life Expectancy — Total (WB)	6.3	66	64.2	2004	*	
Migration — Estimated Net Rate (UN)	7.4	38	-2.4	2005	*	
Population Density (WB, population per square km)	7.6	35	192.7	2005	neg	
Population Diversity — Ethnic (CIFP)	..	..	..	..	..	
Population Diversity — Religious (CIFP)	4.9	81	0.4	2005	*	
Population Growth (WB, annual percent)	7.5	34	2.4	2005	s.q.	
Slum Population — proportion of population (WDI, UN)	5.8	41	0.3	2001	*	
Urban Growth Rate — Annual percent (WB)	7.1	46	3.5	2005	s.q.	
Youth Bulge — Percent aged 0-14 of total population (WB)	6.4	59	39.5	2005	pos	
<b>6. Environment</b>	<b>5.64</b>					
Arable/fertile land availability (WB, hectares per person)	5.5	86	0.1	2004	s.q.	
Consumption — Commercial energy consumption per capita (UN, kg of oil equivalent)	3.4	127	284.3	2003	s.q.	
Consumption — Use of solid fuels (UN, percent of population using)	6.7	48	72.0	2003	*	
Disaster Risk Index, (UNDP, average number of deaths per million)	6.3	58	2.6	2001	*	
Ecological Footprint — Global hectares per capita (WWF, Global Footprint Network)	1.3	144	0.6	2003	*	
Water — Annual withdrawal (FAO STAT, percent of total renewable)	8.2	16	76.1	2002	*	
Water — Available renewable per capita (FAO STAT, m <sup>3</sup> /inhabitants/year)	7.5	34	1433.5	2006	*	
Forest — Annual percent change in area (FAO)	8.5	10	-2.1	2005	*	
Pollution — CO <sub>2</sub> emissions per capita (WB, metric tons per capita)	3.4	126	0.8	2002	s.q.	
Pollution — CO <sub>2</sub> emissions per dollar PPP (WB, kg per 2000 US\$ PPP)	5.6	71	0.4	2002	s.q.	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>6.18</b>					

For trend scores, (s.q.) indicates continuation of status quo, (pos) indicates a positive trend toward stability, and (neg) indicates a negative trend toward fragility. (\*) indicates insufficient data for calculation of trend and volatility scores.

# STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

## PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT

- President Pervez Musharraf, previously a General in the Pakistani Army, assumed power in a 1999 coup

### Interests

- Retaining control of provinces along the Afghan border where militant opposition appears to be containable
- Maintaining close ties with the USA in order to ensure economic, military, and political support
- Securing agreements with militant groups considered too powerful to contain

### Recent Actions and Attitude

- Has secured fragile peace deals with some militant groups, allowing partially autonomous, militant-controlled governance
- Has promised free elections in 2007 but has not allowed the participation of exiled and banned leaders

## MILITARY

- Since Pakistan gained independence in 1947, the military has frequently controlled the civilian government
- The military possesses nuclear weapons and the powerful Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency

### Interests

- Maintaining Pakistani-controlled Kashmir
- Controlling the insurgency in Baluchistan
- Reducing opposition from strong militant groups
- Maintaining links with sympathetic groups in Afghanistan, including elements of the Taliban

### Recent Actions and Attitude

- The military was unable to find success against pro-Taliban militants in North and South Waziristan; the government was forced to cede autonomy to the militants in several tribal regions
- The military continues to conduct operations against many militant groups throughout the country
- Military action in Kashmir has decreased in recent years as India-Pakistan relations have improved

## PAKISTANI POPULATION

### Background

- Islamist laws restrict the rights of women
- Emerging middle class in some urban areas
- Economic growth has not eased poverty in rural and some urban areas
- Literacy rates very low among much of the population

### Interests

- Peace and security
- Economic development and distribution

## UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

- Staunch supporter of Musharraf
- Large contributor of economic and military aid

### Interests

- Reducing power of pro-Taliban groups near the Afghanistan border
- Control of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border
- Longevity of the Musharraf government

### Recent Actions and Attitude

- Increased military and economic aid
- Pressuring the government to crackdown on militants within Pakistan

## OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

- China
- Iran
- Saudi Arabia

### Interests

- China is traditionally a strategic military ally against India
- Iran provides support to Shia militant groups
- Donors from Saudi Arabia provide support to Sunni militant groups and radical madrassas

### Recent Actions and Attitude

- China and Pakistan concluded a free trade agreement
- China is financing construction of a naval base in Gwadar

# STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

## INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN

- India and Pakistan have been rivals since gaining independence from Great Britain in 1947
- Several border disputes persist between India and Pakistan, including Kashmir
- Pakistan strongly supported the former Taliban government in Afghanistan

### Interests

- Militant groups within Pakistan conducting operations in Kashmir and eastern Afghanistan
- Insecure borders
- Nuclear weapons

### Recent Actions and Attitude

- Afghanistan has accused Musharraf of supporting the Taliban
- The Indian government accuses the Pakistani government of providing support to militants launch terrorist attacks against India
- Relations between India and Pakistan have improved in recent years

## PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES

- Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (six-party coalition of religious parties without a leader)
- Pakistan Muslim League
- Pakistan People's Party

### Interests

- The Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal are opposed to perceived attempts by Musharraf to secularize or 'Westernize' the government
- The Pakistan Muslim League is the largest party in parliament and supports President Musharraf
- The Pakistan People's Party is in favour of greater women's rights and improving democratic rights

### Recent Actions and Attitude

- Conservatives have led opposition to proposed reforms to enhance women's rights and frequently organizes mass rallies in opposition of government policies
- The Pakistan People's Party is attempting to pressure Musharraf to allow its leader to run in the 2007 elections

## MILITANT GROUPS

### Major Militant Groups

- Tanzeem-e-Nifaz
- Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
- Sipah-e-Sahaba
- Tehrik-e-Jafria
- Baluchistan Liberation Army

### Background

- There are many militant groups varying in size in strength from small tribal groups to nationwide militant organizations
- Tanzeem-e-Nifaz, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and Sipah-e-Sahaba are Sunni Muslim groups
- Tehrik-e-Jafria is a Shia Muslim group
- Baluchistan Liberation Army is a rebel insurgent group in Baluchistan province
- There are many pro-Taliban militant groups situated in North and South Waziristan and the North West Frontier Province

### Interests

- Some groups occasionally cooperate, but they are often engaged in low intensity violent conflicts with each other
- Sunni Muslim groups demand the strict application of Islamic laws
- The Baluchistan Liberation Army desires autonomy for the Baluchistan province

### Recent Actions and Attitude

- Pro-Taliban groups have signed agreements with the government for greater autonomy over tribal regions in North and South Waziristan
- Sunni and Shia militant groups continue to attack one another
- The Baluchistan Liberation Army is leading an insurgency against the Pakistani government in Baluchistan province

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## EVENT MONITORING SOURCES

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Associated Press	The Globe And Mail
BBC News	The Guardian
BBC Monitoring South Asia	The New York Times
The Boston Globe	Reuters Newsire
CNN	

## ABOUT THE STATE FRAGILITY PROJECT

This project is intended to contribute to a better understanding of fragility in Pakistan, thereby providing support to decision-making for Canadian foreign policy and development actors in the country. The project aims to support informed, evidence-based decision making for Canadian foreign policy and development assistance related to fragile states. The report is intended to communicate the preliminary findings of the project; its findings should not be considered definitive or final.

The report is based on three elements. First, structural indicators are grouped into six clusters capturing different facets of state fragility: Security and Crime, Governance, Economics, Human Development, Environment and Demography. The structural data includes more than 80 separate structural indicators providing a detailed quantitative baseline portrait of the country.

Second, the analysis draws on event monitoring data compiled by CIFP researchers over a six month period extending from September 2006 to February 2007. Collected from a variety of web-based news aggregators, which include both international and domestic news sources, the events are evaluated and assigned quantitative scores to identify fragility trends. Third, the report includes a series of analytical exercises, including stakeholder analysis and scenario generation. This multi-source data structure enables more robust analysis than any single method of data collection and assessment.

## ABOUT COUNTRY INDICATORS FOR FOREIGN POLICY

CIFP is a project located at Carleton University. Its core mandate is to develop analytical methodologies that will generate information on the key features of the political, economic, social and cultural environments of countries around the world, providing at-a-glance global overviews, issue-based perspectives and country performance measures. While the initial dataset focuses on measures of domestic armed conflict, as part of this project that database has been substantially revised to capture state fragility.

The CIFP database includes statistical data in the form of over one hundred performance indicators for 197 countries. With its focus on policy relevance, the CIFP provides a rich information resource to policy officers across all government departments. By offering a detailed assessment methodology for evaluating individual country performance, the CIFP provides guidance to program officers working in complex and fragile environments, enabling them to focus their efforts and resources on the root structural causes rather than the outward symptoms of a problem.

Norman Paterson School  
of International Affairs  
Carleton University  
1125 Colonel By Drive  
Ottawa ON, K1S 5B6

Phone: 520-2600 ext. 6662  
Fax: 613-520-2889  
cifp@carleton.ca

## ABOUT FRAGILITY

CIFP employs fragility as the most effective lens through which to view state risk, broadly understood. Though the use of the concept of the concept remains controversial, when properly understood as a technical term of country analysis, it enables analysts to conduct a more thorough assessment of country risk than more specific concepts such as conflict or human development, both of which are effectively components of overall state fragility. Further, the concept allows the incorporation of environmental, demographic, political, and economic considerations, providing a more complete portrait of a state's overall risk than narrow examination of any one of those factors. In effect, the concept incorporates all such areas of study into a complete analysis of the risks present in a given state or region.

When understood in this sense, all states exhibit some elements of fragility, whether in the form of demographic stress, politicized ethnic divisions, high levels of pollution, the presence of internal conflict, or low levels of human development. Through the use of transparent and quantifiable data, CIFP strives to bring together all such phenomena into a coherent country narrative, thereby rendering the concept of fragility an objective aid to country analysis, rather than a divisive element of subjective political discourse.

[www.carleton.ca/cifp](http://www.carleton.ca/cifp)

