

Effective Defence Policy for Responding to Failed and Failing States

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Introduction

In the International Policy Statement (IPS) released by the Government of Canada on April 19, 2005, Canada declared unequivocally that its chief international priority for military operations will be interventions in failed or failing states.

The Defence Policy Statement that accompanied the IPS focuses future Canadian Forces development on preparing for the “three block war”. The “three block war” concept posits that a modern western military force launched on a peace enforcement mission in a failed or failing state may be called upon to fight an armed enemy in one city block while at the same time providing security for humanitarian assistance in an adjacent block while arranging a ceasefire or policing a truce in a third.

This objective closely parallels the government’s adoption of a “3D” approach in the carving of a Canadian niche in the global struggle for security and stability. The three “d”s – defence, diplomacy, and development – are supposed to focus Canadian military, diplomatic, and development resources in propping up and helping to rebuild failed or failing states such as Afghanistan.

It is the first of those “d”s – defence - that David Carment addresses in this paper. His study is a hard headed analysis of some of the major considerations that Canada – and the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces – must begin to address when planning military interventions in failed or failing states. Boiled down, Carment’s message is simple: it is easy to talk about such intervention, but when closely examined, such operations pose a myriad of difficult challenges that need to be addressed if there is to be any chance at all of success.

Carment begins with a basic message; defence means security – the “responsibility to protect” - and security means a robust and capable military force that is prepared for virtually any contingency. How to prepare? A key is good intelligence to ensure that the CF has a clear grasp of the overall picture and the capabilities of possible protagonists. A clear mandate, a doable mission, and a realistic exit strategy are also necessary. Canadian military missions must be coordinated with partners and should be accompanied by Canadian diplomatic and aid intervention. The CF is a *sine qua non* for intervention but the CF alone is not sufficient.

Carment also takes a hard look at the past decade of failed/failing states operations. He shows that a lack of preparedness or political will, or both, have precipitated many failures – failures to prevent state collapses, failures to anticipate moral hazards, failures to understand how some forms of intervention could in fact make situations worse, and failures to produce credible responses.

In his conclusion, Carment sums up lessons he believes are vital for the success of future CF operations in failed/failing states. Perhaps the most important – and most revolutionary – is that the Canadian Forces “must...rely on its own sources for decision-making purposes” even in coalition operations. In other words, the CF must develop its very own command capability. His implications are clear: an independent nation fielding its own armed forces must aspire to make its own command decisions no matter how junior it might be in a larger coalition.

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Introduction

Dans l'Énoncé de politique internationale (EPI) publié le 19 avril 2005 par le gouvernement fédéral, le Canada a déclaré sans équivoque que sa priorité internationale au plan des opérations militaires serait d'intervenir dans les États et déroute et fragiles.

L'Énoncé de la politique de défense qui accompagnait l'EPI ciblait le développement futur des Forces canadiennes sur la préparation à la « guerre à trois volets ». Le concept de la « guerre à trois volets » postule qu'une force militaire moderne occidentale engagée dans une mission d'imposition de la paix dans un État et déroute ou fragile pourrait être appelée à combattre des miliciens fortement armés dans un quartier donné tout en s'affairant à des secours humanitaires à quelques rues de là, tandis qu'un autre groupe serait engagé dans l'organisation d'un cessez-le-feu ou le respect d'une trêve dans un pâté de maisons voisin.

Cet objectif épouse étroitement l'adoption par le gouvernement d'une démarche « 3D » où le Canada se fait une place dans la lutte mondiale pour défendre la sécurité et la stabilité. Les trois « d », soit défense, diplomatie et développement, sont censés cibler les ressources militaires, diplomatiques et de développement de manière à soutenir et à contribuer à rebâtir les États et déroute ou fragiles, comme l'Afghanistan.

C'est le premier de ces « d », la défense, qu'aborde David Carment dans son document. Son étude est une analyse réaliste de quelques-uns des principaux facteurs dont le Canada — ainsi que le ministère de la Défense nationale et les Forces canadiennes — doit tenir compte lorsqu'il planifie des interventions militaires dans des États et déroute et fragiles. Le message de M. Carment, qui est simple, revient à ceci : il est aisé de parler d'intervention, mais lorsqu'on examine la question de près, de telles opérations soulèvent toutes sortes de problèmes qui doivent être résolus pour qu'il y ait la moindre chance de succès.

L'auteur commence par un message fondamental : défense veut dire sécurité — la « responsabilité de protéger » — et sécurité veut dire une force militaire robuste et capable, qui est pratiquement prête à tout. Comment se préparer ? La clé repose sur de bons renseignements pour veiller à ce que les FC aient un bon entendement du cadre global et des capacités des protagonistes éventuels. Un mandat clair, une mission faisable et une stratégie de sortie réaliste sont également nécessaires. Les missions militaires canadiennes doivent être coordonnées avec les partenaires et doivent s'accompagner d'une intervention canadienne aux plans de la diplomatie et de l'aide. Les Forces canadiennes sont une condition *sine qua non* de l'intervention, mais en soi, elles ne suffisent pas.

M. Carment examine également de près les 10 dernières années des opérations menées dans les États et déroute et fragiles. Il démontre qu'un manque de disposition ou de volonté politique, ou des deux, a causé bien des échecs — l'incapacité d'empêcher l'effondrement d'un État, l'incapacité d'anticiper les dangers moraux, l'incapacité de comprendre comment certaines formes d'intervention peuvent en fait empirer une situation et l'incapacité de produire une réaction crédible.

Dans sa conclusion, l'auteur récapitule les leçons qui, selon lui, sont essentielles à la réussite des opérations futures des FC dans les États et déroute et fragiles. Le concept probablement le plus important et le plus révolutionnaire, est celui que les Forces canadiennes « doivent compter sur leurs propres sources aux fins de la prise de décision » et ce, même pour les opérations de coalition. Autrement dit, les Forces canadiennes doivent mettre au point leur propre capacité de commandement. Les répercussions sont claires : une nation indépendante déployant ses propres forces armées doit aspirer à prendre ses propres décisions de commandement, quel que soit son degré d'importance au sein d'une grande coalition.

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Executive Summary

State failure is an increasing concern in the 21st century strategic environment. This paper explains how Canada's defence capabilities can respond to both failed and failing states. The paper argues that it is crucial to learn from the mistakes and successes of recent interventions in order to plan and prepare for more effective responses to future problems. These lessons include the need for coherent long term preventive strategies, robust mandates, structured multi-level cooperation, stabilization and a clearly defined exit strategy.

The main role of the military in responding to failed or failing states is security at all stages. This includes all aspects of public safety, a safe and secure environment for aid workers, and the development of legitimate and sustainable security institutions. Security Sector Reform programmes that reflect the union between security and development must be duly reflected in military doctrine and concepts. The Canadian Forces (CF) should be a key component, but not the sole element, in Canada's response to both failed and failing states. The continuing changes in military operations have placed growing importance on the benefits that can be attained from well coordinated operations between different countries, branches of the military and government agencies in response to failing states. The development of CF capabilities in state failure operations includes the need for rapid response, comprehensive intelligence, self-sufficient command and interoperability.

Résumé

Les États en déroute représentent un problème croissant du milieu stratégique du ^{xxi}^e siècle. Le présent document explique comment les capacités de défense du Canada peuvent réagir face aux États en déroute et fragiles. L'auteur soutient qu'il est essentiel de tirer sa leçon des erreurs du passé et des succès des interventions récentes pour être en mesure de planifier et de préparer une réponse plus efficace face aux problèmes futurs. Il faut notamment comprendre le besoin d'avoir des stratégies préventives cohérentes à long terme, un mandat solide, une coopération structurée multiniveau, de la stabilisation et une stratégie de sortie clairement établie.

Le rôle principal des militaires face aux États en déroute et fragiles est celui de la sécurité à toutes les étapes. Ceci englobe tous les volets de sécurité publique, un milieu sûr pour les travailleurs de l'aide et le développement d'organismes de sécurité légitimes et soutenables. Des programmes de réforme du secteur de la sécurité qui tiennent compte de l'union entre la sécurité et le développement doivent également se refléter dûment dans la doctrine et les concepts militaires. Les Forces canadiennes (FC) doivent représenter un élément clé, mais non le seul élément, de la réponse canadienne face aux États en déroute et fragiles. La modification constante des opérations militaires a donné une importance croissante aux avantages que l'on peut dériver d'opérations bien coordonnées entre divers pays, diverses branches de l'armée et divers organismes gouvernementaux face aux États en déroute. La mise au point des capacités des FC pour les opérations dans les États en déroute comprend notamment le besoin d'une intervention rapide, des renseignements détaillés, un commandement autonome et l'interopérabilité.

Overview

In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, the US president's National Security Strategy (NSS), identified America's main threat as failing states and discounted deterrence and containment as ineffective in a world of nebulous and ill-defined terrorist networks.¹ The NSS document is laudable in recognizing state failure as an immense structural and global problem which is unlikely to go away in the short run.² According to Rotberg:

State failure threatens global stability because national governments have become the primary building blocks of order. International security relies on states to protect against chaos at home and limit the cancerous spread of anarchy beyond their borders and throughout the world. States exist to deliver political (i.e., public) goods to their inhabitants. When they function as they ideally should, they mediate between the constraints and challenges of the international arena and the dynamic forces of their own internal economic, political, and social realities.³

The list of failing states is extensive and growing, and all regions of the world are affected by the multiple consequences of these failures.⁴ State failures serve as the potential breeding ground for extremist groups. Most contemporary wars are fought either within nation-states or between states and non-state actors. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, media reports indicated that primary countries harbouring terrorists included Afghanistan, Sudan, and Algeria.

1 National Security Strategy, US Government Document, 2002. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>.

2 State failure, the overarching concept, is defined by the State Failure Task Force as the collapse of authority of the central government to impose order in situations of civil war, revolutionary war, genocide, politicide, and adverse or disruptive regime transition. While the Task Force definition is predominant it is not the only one. Rotberg characterizes failed states as being marked by an inability to provide basic political goods – especially security, dispute resolution and norm regulation, and political participation – to many, if not most, of its citizens. Robert Rotberg, "The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair," in Rotberg (ed.), *When States Fail*, 5-10, PUP, Princeton, 2003). Jack Goldstone et al., *State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings*, (McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), 2000), available: <<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/stfail/>>.

3 Robert Rotberg "Failed States in a World of Terror," *Foreign Affairs*; New York; Jul/Aug 2002., p. 3.

4 David Carment "Rethinking Intervention" presentation made to DND's Chiefs of Staff and 300 Canadian Officers at the 21st Century's Strategic Environment Symposium, Ottawa, January 14, 15, 2003. http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/vcds-exec/pubs/strategic-symposium/intro_e.asp. Though estimates vary, there are anywhere between 25 and 50 states that are currently effectively failed, or are at a high risk of failing in the near future. Michael Ignatieff characterizes weak and collapsing states as the chief source of human rights abuses in the post-Cold War world. Michael Ignatieff, "Intervention and State Failure", *Dissent*, Vol. 49, No. 1 2002, p. 115. For a comparative list and detailed analysis see David Carment, John Gazo and Stewart Prest see "State Failure and Risk Assessment" in *Global Society*, January, 2006. See also David Carment, "The Struggle for Peace" *Harvard International Review*, June, 2001.

However, dismantling the *Al-Qaeda* now involves intelligence and law enforcement efforts in many more countries where the terrorist organization is believed to have cells.⁵

To be sure, the Bush government's efforts to address threats abroad do take other forms beyond military intervention. These include training for armies and police forces trying to deal with terrorism, such as in the Philippines, Pakistan and Yemen; enhanced American participation in multilateral aid programs, where aid is increasingly tied to 'good governance' by recipient countries; and the pursuit of 'integration', which has the US directing many of its policies towards helping countries to join the international flow of trade and finance. The US government's development arm, USAID, clearly places poverty reduction within the context of, and subordinate to, overall US national security strategy.⁶

By American standards, there is some urgency to all this activity. A 2005 report by the National Intelligence Council estimated that failed states in Africa "plagued by poor leadership, divisive ethnic politics, decayed government institutions, geographic constraints and a brain drain may be unable to engage the international economy to reverse their downward trajectory."⁷ The report also concluded that Nigeria, among several others, was at risk of collapse.

A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, drafted by the UN's High Level Panel On Threats, Challenges, and Change, offers the most wide-ranging explanation for involvement in failed states. In its account of the most pressing threats to national and international security, the panel includes terrorism; nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons proliferation; emerging pandemics; environmental degradation; and poverty traps.⁸

5 There is considerable debate about the extent and depth of terrorist networks in failed and failing states. For a comprehensive and detailed assessment see: Jenn Carter and Meghan Hanley, "International Terrorism in Africa: An Open Source Review of Current Literature and Policy Initiatives," (Unpublished manuscript, FAC, Ottawa, 2005).

6. USAID report, entitled "Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity", which stresses the need for aid to align with American national strategic priorities. See "Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity", *USAID Task Force Report* (2002), available: <www.usaid.gov/fani/Full_Report--Foreign_Aid_in_the_National_Interest.pdf>.

7 National Intelligence Council "Mapping Sub-Saharan Africa's Future (2005. p. 1). See also Sub-Sahara Africa Risk Assessment report (www.carleton.ca/cifp/risk.htm).

8 High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, "A more secure world: Our shared responsibility", *UN, 2004*, p. 14-16. Available:<www.un.org/secureworld>. See also David Carment, "The Struggle for Peace" *Harvard International Review*, June, 2001.

State failure is also a key feature of the Canadian government's recently released International Policy Statement, *Pride and Influence in the World*. In the defence portion of the statement, failed states are identified as a dual challenge because the humanitarian suffering in these situations is an affront to Canadian values and because failed and failing states plant the seeds for regional and global insecurity. According to the statement, the ability to respond to the challenge of failed and failing states will serve as a benchmark for the Canadian Forces (CF).⁹ The document calls for a more effective mix of maritime, land, air and special operations, a CF capability that is more relevant to addressing threats from failed states and a CF that is more responsive, acting quickly in times of crisis. The statement goes further by making the point that international organizations are the foundation for a stable and peaceful international system, a principle Canada has stood by for five decades and will continue to do so even in the context of responding to state failure.

Finally, the statement identifies several principles which will guide the decision to enter a failed or failing state.¹⁰ These include, a mission that supports the goals and objectives of Canada's foreign policy; a mandate that is realistic, clear and enforceable, including a clearly defined concept of the operation, effective command and control structure and clear rules of engagement, sufficient international financial and political support for the mission, adequate and properly equipped forces, an effective process of consultation between mission partners and a clear exit strategy. In principle, the basic points identified in the International Policy Statement make sense and perhaps, to some, are far too obvious.

Even with a coherent and structured set of policies on state failure, is the Canadian government and by extension the Department of National Defence adequately prepared and capable of developing an effective response? The CF should be a key component, but not the

⁹ International Policy Statement http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/dps/main/toc_e.asp.

¹⁰ International Policy Statement http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/dps/main/toc_e.asp.

sole element in Canada's response to both failed and failing states. A failed state strategy must include long-term, coherent and structured policies of preventive action in advance of failure and stabilization and intervention capabilities under conditions of state collapse. This includes creating a safe and secure environment for aid workers and the development of legitimate and sustainable security institutions. Security Sector Reform (SSR) programmes that reflect the union between security and development must be duly reflected in military doctrine and concepts. The continuing changes in military operations have placed growing importance on the benefits that can be attained from well coordinated operations between countries and branches of the military, as well as between government and non-governmental agencies. CF-specific capabilities in failed state operations relate to the need for long term commitment, comprehensive intelligence, self-sufficient command and interoperability.

The Responsibilities to Protect and to Prevent

The main role of the military in responding to failed or failing states is security at all stages. Security entails not only force protection but protection for ordinary citizens. The so-called "right of humanitarian intervention" has been one of the most controversial foreign policy issues of the last decade, both when intervention has happened, as in Kosovo, and when it has failed to happen, as in Rwanda.¹¹ The Canadian-led *Responsibility to Protect (ICISS)* report was developed to resolve this contentious issue and to focus the debate on those requiring protection, not on those intervening. The document outlines three responsibilities: the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.¹²

¹¹ *The Responsibility to Protect*, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa, 2001.

¹² *The Responsibility to Protect*, 2001: xi.

The ICISS report acknowledges that the decision to intervene militarily is a difficult one and provides six criteria for making such a decision, including: the right authority; just cause; right intention; last resort; proportional means; and reasonable prospects of success. The right authority lies primarily with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The two broad circumstances for military intervention are:

1. large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or
2. large scale “ethnic cleansing” actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.¹³

The right intention principle stipulates that an intervention must be initiated with a primary motivation for the alleviation or halt of human suffering. The ICISS report, although supporting military intervention to protect civilians as a last resort, does so based on the responsibility to prevent. All measures, diplomatic and non-military, should first be explored.

A Role for Canada?

The call for more robust engagement to protect ordinary citizens in a failed state situation is a noble one. Unfortunately, there are few success stories to draw from so that policy makers can develop an effective template for future missions. Perhaps even more troubling, responding to a failed state situation does not follow the model of traditional peacekeeping missions that were the norm during the Cold War. First, the frequent absence of unambiguous consent on the part of the parties in conflict makes failed states operations ever more dangerous. Second, the complexity of state failure places additional demands on the intelligence capabilities of intervening forces. Third, there is a need to plan well in advance the expected outcomes and anticipated impact, both positive and negative, of specific military, diplomatic and developmental objectives. Fourth, there are a wide range of military tasks, including: assisting in

¹³ *The Responsibility to Protect*, 2001, p. 32.

disarmament and demobilization, monitoring of elections, de-mining assistance, restoration of infrastructure and conducting concurrent enforcement operations. Maritime and air forces may have particular diplomatic, limited deterrent, enforcement or intelligence gathering functions, while land forces will generally conduct the detailed control of the operation at the tactical level.

Maritime and air forces help to create the conditions for the conduct of land operations and their joint efforts are designed to ensure a stable environment that allows the civilian agencies to achieve their political and developmental objectives.¹⁴ Due to the complexity and uniqueness of each state failure situation, it is difficult to apply a specific formula or set-piece approach, for each will require individual analysis and attention.¹⁵

A more difficult question is where should Canadian Forces be deployed? The simple answer is that the CF are already deeply involved in at least one current failed state situation in Afghanistan and have been deployed in several others over the last decade in Somalia, Haiti and the Balkans. Even though the rhetoric might suggest that Canada commits its troops based on “Canadian values” and the desire to “do the right thing,” it is proper risk analysis and national strategic interests that must determine where Canada will go. It is a reality that Canada cannot do everything, all the time, all over the world and therefore it is important to prioritize which regions of the world are of strategic interest and where Canada can make the greatest impact.

Two obvious criteria can be considered. The first is that Canada will continue to work alongside its key allies either within the UN or NATO.¹⁶ Training and military assistance will be

¹⁴ *Peace Support Operations* Joint Doctrine Manual, Department of National Defence, November 6, 2002.

¹⁵ Canada's defence policy, which was outlined in the 1994 White Paper as well as in the recent International Policy Statement, is foremost directed at protecting Canada, defending North America in co-operation with the United States and contributing to peace and international security through such organizations as NATO and the United Nations.

¹⁶ Canada should remain committed to its faith in the multilateral approach. Fundamental features of Canadian politics include consensus-seeking, accommodation and working within the auspices of the United Nations or other multinational organizations (NATO for instance). This commitment to international organizations was reiterated in the Government of Canada's International Policy Statement, *Pride and Influence in the World*. Furthermore, Canada lacks the political, economic and military strength to act unilaterally and its commitment to international peace and security will be achieved through coalition building and multilateralism. Coordination is complicated at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. At the strategic planning level, if leaders of NGOs, governments, and international organizations are unclear on exactly how a mission is to accomplish its goals, the operation may suffer from lack of clarity. The relationship between external military and civilian actors has also begun to change from detachment and suspicion towards an institutionalization of civil-military cooperation.

provided for regional organizations such as the Africa Union (AU). A second is the scope and effectiveness of Canadian air and naval lift capacity. In this regard, Canada's navy could provide an appropriate lift capacity to move Canadian troops quickly into failed or failing littoral states in Latin and Central America and the Caribbean.

A less obvious criteria is "goodness of fit". In what ways do Canadian capabilities and interests match the problems "on the ground"? The International Policy Statement makes it clear that responding to failed and failing states requires more than a military response. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) also have explicit failed state policy initiatives, priorities and objectives. For example FAC has introduced the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) to be deployed in close cooperation with similar initiatives from key allies such as the United States. CIDA has begun the process of focusing its aid on key structural problems that give rise to state weakness and fragility. Its Canada Corps programme is designed to assist specific countries in developing good governance.

"3D" (Defence, Diplomacy and Development) is now touted as the strategy to deal with state failure and to be sure, the concept looks promising on paper. However, the concept must be fully incorporated into the decision making and planning process of various departments. The British example of Conflict Prevention Pools (CPPs) is an incentive-based model which Canada is using to organize itself but it is not a substitute for overarching strategic guidance and decision making.¹⁷ In fact, the Canadian government is set to put in place a variety of funding pools designed to create incentives for integrated responses. The most notable example is the Peace and Security Fund discussed in the IPS. However, for these pools to function properly, all

17 The UK government has created two Conflict Prevention Pools (CPPs), one for Sub-Saharan Africa (ACPP) and one for outside Africa (Global CPP or GCPP) to improve department coordination and priority-setting. The CPPs are jointly funded administered by three departments of state: the Ministry of Defence (MOD), Department for International Development (DfID) and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The main new organizational additions were an inter-departmental steering mechanism and a process for joint priority-setting for each conflict. Once established, the CPPs brought together budgets for programme spending and peacekeeping costs. Although still in development, this coordinated effort is an example of a commitment to cooperation between departments to ensure an intervening effort that includes all aspects of reconstruction, from security to economics, participation and social development.

relevant departments must clearly understand their objectives, their mandates and how their capabilities correspond to those of other departments. This level of cooperation requires an overarching country strategy, strong leadership to enforce that strategy, and a full understanding of the costs and risks of pursuing a particular course of action. Only after these conditions are met will departments recognize that they are working together for a common goal and not competing with, but complementing each other. Identifying lead departments at the earliest possible stage is crucial to avoid confusion and duplication of processes.

Today's complex situations also require increased cooperation between non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the military. Civil military cooperation (CIMIC) entails the harmonization of civilian and military interests within a theatre of operations. CIMIC includes transactions with local government authorities, the UN and NGOs, and with local civilians, refugees and displaced persons. It is vital that civil-military programmes be fully integrated into the overall campaign, and the day-to-day conduct of operations. Priorities for achieving effective CIMIC include coordination at the formation level and integration into the theatre-wide plan.¹⁸

Effect Based Operations (EBO) are an idea that emanates from the Canadian Forces Experimental Centre in Kanata. EBO are a valuable analytical tool to ensure that all aspects of security and development are incorporated into the planning and implementation of failed state operations. EBO are necessary to enhance a nation's (or coalition's) strategic capabilities at the political, economic, technological, and information networking levels in order to achieve politically satisfactory outcomes for that nation or coalition.¹⁹ Success will depend on the ability to forecast the end-state or *effects* desired and deploying in advance the appropriate resources to achieve such effects. EBO are a way of leveraging the resources available to achieve maximum impact and they allow a nation or coalition to achieve its strategic objectives at minimal costs.

18 Swedish Armed Forces, *Joint Military Doctrine: Peace Support Operations*, Stockholm, 1997, p. 53.

19 Robert Vermaas, "Future Perfect: Effects Based Operations, Complexity and the Human Environment" Directorate of Operational Research Note, Department of National Defence, January 2004, p. 4.

EBO are advantageous because they go beyond the initial military campaign to include economic, human development and participation. EBO-based planning also requires acknowledgement of, and consequently a contingency plan for, any unwanted or negative effects (moral hazards) the campaign may encourage. Due to the inherent riskiness of intervening in a failed state, planning must include an analysis of all unintended consequences. This analysis includes the identification of the resources required to handle unfavourable situations, a broad mandate to escalate in deteriorating situations and under extreme circumstances political support for the possibility of early withdrawal.²⁰

There has been substantial research conducted on unintended consequences and moral hazard problems.²¹ Moral hazards can arise from a number of different causes and the first source of moral hazard is the traditional one of incomplete information.²² Lake and Rothchild argue that the difficulty in acquiring information about motives, tactics, and capabilities is a common contributing factor to inter-group conflict.²³ If there is lack of information-gathering networks and thus reliance on the perpetrators themselves for intelligence, interveners may be unable to determine the aggressors in a multiparty conflict and may end up contributing to it. Vulnerable communal groups have been known to launch violent challenges against the state, partly because they expected that the international community would intervene militarily to protect them from violent retaliation and thereby help them achieve their goal. In his case

20 This would include the ability of the military to security control situations that escalate in failing states or when the use of force is authorized as a substitute for a comprehensive peace treaty as in the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) in Croatia or the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), respectively. This may require stronger mandates than are sometimes initially requested. It is much easier to respond when required than to try and upgrade a mandate once it is too late. An obvious example of this is in Rwanda and the inability of the UNAMIR to act in an escalating violent situation.

21 Alan J. Kuperman, "The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention" Prepared for delivery at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, LA, March 25-28, 2002; Alan J. Kuperman, "Transnational Causes of Genocide: Or How the West Inadvertently Exacerbates Ethnic Conflict In the Post-Cold War Era," in Raju G. C. Thomas, ed., *Yugoslavia Unravalled: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2003).

22 Incomplete information in the standard insurance problem is the inability of the insurance provider to observe accurately the level of care taken by the insured means that it cannot easily enforce any contractual obligations regarding behavior.

23 David Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," *International Security*, volume 21, No.2, 1996.

studies of Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo, Kuperman shows that state authorities did retaliate violently against rebel groups and following the counter-insurgency, the international community did intervene.²⁴ However, in these cases, the interventions were too late to avert much of the retaliatory violence. There are also moral hazards in not only intervening militarily but also in providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations. Researchers have noted that outside assistance in some situations can do more harm than good²⁵ or can become entangled in the local political economy in such a way as to fuel the conflict.²⁶

The problem of incomplete information can be counteracted by utilizing fact-finding missions, Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and reports from credible NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch who engage in dialogue with both sides of the conflict as well as the affected population.²⁷ In addition, the government of Canada would benefit greatly from a joint “lessons learned” and “impact assessment” process. Currently each department carries out its own monitoring and evaluation of operations or projects. However, in situations where there are multiple departments and other partners involved there are no joint “lessons learned” documents that would help facilitate the process.²⁸

24 Kuperman specifically looks at the invasion by Tutsi rebels from 1990-94 to take political control of Rwanda from the existing Hutu regime, which provoked a retaliatory genocide against Tutsi civilians in 1994; The armed secession from Yugoslavia by Bosnia’s Muslims in 1992, which provoked a civil war and retaliatory killing and ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslim civilians by Serbs from 1992-95; the armed secession from Yugoslavia launched by Kosovo’s Albanian rebels, the Kosovo Liberation Army, which provoked retaliatory killing and ethnic cleansing of Albanian civilians by Serbs in 1999; and the passive resistance policy of Kosovo’s Albanians, led by the Democratic League of Kosovo, from 1989-97. See also Dane Rowlands and David Carment, “Moral Hazard and Conflict Intervention” in Murray Wolfson ed. *The Political Economy of War and Peace* (London: Kluwer, 1998).

25 See Mary B. Anderson, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – Or War* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999).

26 The ‘do no harm’ principle arose from the refugee crisis in Goma after the Rwandan genocide; the humanitarian aid provided actually fed and clothed belligerents and those responsible for the genocide. Aid can also become a source of income for rebel organizations and they can manipulate the aid for their own use, as in the example of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka or the SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan in the South of Sudan. Mats Berdal and David Malone, eds., *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000); and Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars*. (London: Zed. 2001).

27 For example, *Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004*, Geneva: January 25, 2005.

28 For example, it has been suggested that the CF should only be deployed in situations where there are human security issues. Citizens who have had their human rights violated, displaced persons and refugees may require international security forces, in which the CF could be deployed to monitor and patrol the situation. This may also include aiding in the distribution of humanitarian aid. However, as in the case of failed states, the CF’s first concern is security. Any military participation should be in consultation with the development community to ensure that short-term military programs contribute to longer-term development strategies, are culturally integrated and sustainable. *Peace Support Operations Joint Doctrine Manual*, Department of National Defence, November 6, 2002: 206.

A Role for Canadian Forces?

The role of the CF in failed state operations are considered Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) referring to the full range of military operations short of major theatre war. These operations include rendering humanitarian assistance, enforcing embargoes and no-fly zones, evacuating nationals from threatened regions, reinforcing key allies and conducting limited strikes and armed intervention. The Canadian Joint Task List (CJTL)²⁹ establishes a framework for describing and relating the multitude of capabilities that may be required by the CF in various situations. When a failed state situation arises, the CF relies on the risk analysis developed by the CJTL using capability-based planning, as the primary tool for identifying core priorities and appropriate operations.

The specific role of the CF to provide security in a failed state will depend on the current capabilities and resources available within the CF. To this end, military planners need to ask three questions: Will the military's role be restoration – *restoring law and order when the assisted state's law enforcement agencies have failed or are unable to act?* Will its role be complementary – *providing specialized forces beyond the capacity of the police organizations?* Or will it be or be supplementary – *replacing civil law enforcement agencies when needed?*³⁰ Strategists must also look beyond combat security forces to include a vigorous information campaign. The ultimate purpose of Canadian Forces deployment is to compel or persuade the factions to abide by the terms of a ceasefire, peace agreement or international sanctions or resolutions. Therefore, the application of non-violent techniques such as civil-military activities,

29 The Canadian Joint Task List (CJTL) was established to describe and relate the various capabilities required for a range of operations. The CJTL is based on the Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMTEL) developed by the US and the Joint Essential Task List (JETL) created by United Kingdom. In addition, to assist senior officers and officials in ranking the myriad of options, the CF can utilize a decision support tool known as Fundamental Investigation of Defence Options (FIDO) or a risk/gap analysis model known as the Scenario Operational Capability Risk Assessment Model (SOCRAM). These two models should be continually assessed for their effectiveness and technical accuracy, adjusting for any technical concerns or malfunctions. http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dda/cjtl/cjtl14/intro_e.asp (current as of May 25 2005).

30 *Peace Support Operations* Joint Doctrine Manual, Department of National Defence, November 6, 2002.

psychological operations (PSYOP), and public affairs may be more effective than the direct use of force. The key component of information campaigns is the open transparency of the mandate and goals that the intervening force is attempting to achieve. HUMINT is also crucial to developing an effective plan of operation. As noted above, this kind of intelligence gathering includes but is not limited to evaluating belligerent interests, will and capabilities.

In ideal terms, providing security in a failed state will prepare for long term SSR and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). The CF can provide training and help in the recruitment of a new national army (if necessary) and work with the civilian police force (if possible). Canada has the comparative advantage of a strong, highly trained national police force in the RCMP. SSR programmes that reflect the union between security and development must be duly reflected in military doctrine and concepts. Following the deployment of other agencies to a theatre of operations, the military can then determine appropriate transitional management strategies and the 'lines of activity' from which the military can stand back as lead agent³¹

Strategic planning for DDR can and should start prior to any engagement with belligerents in formal negotiations, in order to establish a division of labour between them, develop networks and expertise, as well as build confidence and ensure local ownership. Issues that require additional consideration include the ambiguous status of female ex-combatants who have not necessarily carried weapons, child soldiers, the role of dependents, health issues such as the spread of HIV/AIDS, funding processes, and coordination priorities.³² The tasks of reintegration are part of a provision of economic opportunities for ex-combatants and are not the responsibility of the CF. Their focus must remain on the security side of the equation and allowing the appropriate international organization or NGO to develop a reintegration

31 Ann M Fitz-Gerald, "The Centrality of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict War-to-Peace Transitions: Implications for the Military," Centre for Managing Security in Transitional Societies, Cranfield University, UK Defence Academy, 2004.

32 "A Framework for Lasting Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Crisis Situations," *IPA Workshop Report*, International Peace Academy, December 12-13, 2002, New York.

strategy.³³ The CF can conduct reconnaissance and surveillance missions to determine the effectiveness of demobilization. In brief, there is general agreement that military occupation should be as short-lived as possible, allowing for local authorities to assume control.

However, to avoid leaving a conflict zone prematurely, declaring a stable security environment must be based on proper risk analysis. An exit strategy must include solid intelligence that belligerents have been demobilized and there is an understanding of and commitment to peace. Maintaining sustainable domestic peace in a failed state situation presents more complex challenges than traditional peacekeeping operations. Peace within a failed state becomes sustainable, not when all conflicts are removed from society, but when the underlying sources of instability are resolved through the exercise of state sovereignty and generally, participatory governance. In many cases, an effective strategy for realizing these objectives is to help warring parties to move their political or economic struggles from the battlefield and into an institutional framework where a peaceful settlement process can be engaged and future disputes can be addressed.³⁴

Intelligence capabilities are as crucial at these latter stages of an operation as they are at onset. In the initial stages, intelligence analysis of the belligerents is necessary to ensure that intervening forces are adequately armed. In traditional peacekeeping situations it was often sufficient for troops to be lightly-armed and few in numbers. In more complex peace enforcement operations, the norm in failed or failing states, a more robust force is required. It is at least imperative that the intervening force be superior in capability to their adversaries. Over the course of the campaign, intelligence must be able to address its effectiveness by monitoring the number of militia and/or guerrilla groups still active. Intelligence often focuses on battle damage

33 The specific characteristics of the parties involved must be addressed and there is no set approach to defining an exit strategy timeline. For example, the peace process may be slower and more difficult depending on the history of the conflict, the level of hostility between conflicting factions, the numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees and the condition of state institutions. Providing a stable environment allows for the comprehensive stages of reconstruction and development that the CF need not necessarily be a contributor. For example, the development of the judiciary system and social and economic stabilization are the responsibilities of various UN departments, international financial institutions and large non-governmental organizations.

34 "No Exit Without Strategy: Security Council Decision-Making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," *Report of the Secretary-General 0134362*, United Nations, April 20, 2001.

assessments using surveillance reconnaissance to determine the hard or physical damage but little is done to assess behavioural indicators.

Anticipating and Responding to Failing States

Responding to states in the midst of collapse (as opposed to those that have already failed) can be significantly more complex and will, out of experience, require a more multifaceted and potentially more risky approach. Anticipating failure is like peeling an onion in which each analytical layer reveals progressively longer time lines: long term fundamental dynamics relating to macro-level structural pre-conditions, intermediate behavioural patterns, and immediate micro-level events such as political crises and genocides. A key goal is to provide decision makers with a choice of viable economic, political and military policy options and to do so well in advance of the onset of crisis. As the time frame decreases, so too do the array of response strategies. When collapse is imminent, forceful military intervention, an inherently risky and costly strategy, may be required.

Long term strategies require adequate forewarning in the range of 5-25 years. Warning must come several years in advance to respond strategically to structural problems (development, institution building, establishing infrastructure) but a year (or less) when escalation is imminent and when the tasks are to engage in preventive diplomacy, dialogue and mediation. For military forces, projections of up to 25 years are required in order to develop appropriate weapons capabilities, communications technologies and organizational structures.

The obvious advantage in providing a sound analysis of structural indicators and adequate forecasting is that the range of response options, both structural and operational, will be much broader. Advance warning ensures that there is an optimal combination of interest and capacity.³⁵ Unfortunately knowing when, where and how to respond, are not easily determined

³⁵ Long-term conflict prevention is associated with structural transformations and developmental aid and faces a time lag of approximately 15-20 years before results are easily visible. Positive change can be achieved through partnerships and linkages that emphasise clear, comprehensive strategic plans for high risk regions and priority areas of concern within them.

and there only a few efforts to provide the kind of forecasting necessary for long term response.³⁶ There is the related analytical challenge of identifying the independent effects of specific causal mechanisms that give rise to state failure. There are often contending and conflicting interpretations of the causes of state failure – inequality, insecurity, private incentives and perceptions being key elements. International neglect, in both its political and economic forms, is also touted as a contributing factor to state failure.

With respect to policy implications, one of the key criticisms directed towards the preventive forecasting literature in general is how poorly it translates into meaningful policy-related results. The central deficiency is under-specification of how forecasting results can be rendered meaningful to policy analysts as a complementary tool in their strategic arsenal. While part of this dilemma relates to the need for enhanced organizational resources (human, diplomatic and budgetary) it also involves the fact that risk assessment and early warning are not properly utilised within government structures. Such reasons for the gap include: the traditional governmental separation between analysis/intelligence and policy/operations; the difficulty of planning multi-sectoral responses to complex causes of conflict; the problem that dealing with immediate operations tends to “crowd out” strategic consideration of future issues and potential problems; the lack of a structured model for systematic, rather than ad hoc, early warning and risk analysis; and the ad hoc manner in which warnings are transmitted to decision-makers, and the consequent difficulty in deriving assessments of the operational implications of these warnings.³⁷

36 In particular, the “greed vs. grievance” argument has grown in importance, and become more nuanced over time. For example, conflicts can be generated by the absolute scarcity of resources, an abundance but maldistributed resource base or quick access to lucrative resources. It is well known that dependence on a single commodity can lead to economic stagnation and regional conflagration wherein smuggling, black markets and illicit trade flows are encouraged. Compounding elements include the widespread availability of unemployed youths and collusion between rebel groups for personal gain. Both can prolong conflict through the creation of conflict entrepreneurs, dependents and exploiters. For applications of the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) template see: www.carleton.ca/cifp: *Conflict Risk Assessment Report: Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines (01/01/2002)*; *Conflict Risk Assessment Report: West Africa: Mano River Union and Senegambia (01/04/2002)*; *Conflict Risk Assessment Report Sub-Sahara Africa (4/11/2002)*; *Conflict Risk Assessment Report African Great Lakes (6/9/2003)*; *Conflict Risk Assessment Report: Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine (8/11/2002)*.

37 See Ruddy Doom and Koen Vlassenroot, “Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Minerva’s Wisdom?,” *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk), July 1997, section II.2; Alexander L. George and Jane E. Holl, *The Warning-Response Problem and Missed*

In strategic terms, forestalling a failing state requires long-term structural techniques that extend beyond the purview of military operations. The goal is to encourage behavioural change which can be induced by the promotion of sustainable development, support for human rights, arms control mechanisms, membership in international organizations, security pacts and local participation in political decisions and governance.

However, it is first necessary to consider whether the state is amenable to outside involvement. An assessment of the opportunity structures for effective intervention is required. In this sense, Canada must use a risk calculation that first looks to the potential for failure and the consequences or gravity of that failure. A second risk calculation then determines the costs of pursuing outside involvement; e.g. whether or not a third party would be at all effective given the array of opportunity structures and constraints within the country.³⁸

This kind of risk analysis is derived from the feasibility of preventing the outbreak of violent conflict and potential collapse weighed against the costs of doing so. The questions to be asked are; is there any meaningful entry point for early action and what are the consequences of using it? Some pressure points may be more salient than others and may be more malleable to outside influence. The following entry points are central:

- 1) The extent to which the country is politically and economically open;
- 2) The percentage of moderate politicians operating in the country;
- 3) The number of receptive ministries;
- 4) The effectiveness and scope of civil society in the country;
- 5) The depth and scope of development work and donor involvement that has gone on;
- 6) The extent of strong spoiler or veto groups;

Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy, Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, May 1997, pp. 10-12; and Howard Adelman, "Difficulties in Early Warning: Networking and Conflict Management," in Klaas van Walraven, ed., *Early Warning and Conflict Prevention*, (London: Brill, 1998) pp. 56-57.

³⁸ The Government of Canada is often described as using "soft-power" in situations such as failing states. Soft power should not be a substitute for hard military power but as a positive complement, and in the case of failing states, knowledge, brokerage, public relations campaigns, strategic alliances with the like-minded partnerships with NGOs, and coalition-building with element of civil society (key aspects of soft power) can be very effective.

7) The degree of regional stability.

Lessons Learned

What, if anything, can we learn from past efforts to respond to failed and failing states? The track record, in this regard, is slowly improving but several post-Cold War failures are notable. First, there was the failure to prevent the slow collapse of states in Central and West Africa, despite a clear understanding of when and where such events would occur and the availability of forecasts for predicting and explaining their causes and consequences (as in the Congo, Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone). Second, there were the failures to anticipate the moral hazards that were generated by efforts to address refugee flows, ethnic cleansing, and clan warfare (as in Rwanda and Somalia). Third, there were the failures to understand the way *biased* interventions accelerated conflict between combatants (as in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Liberia). Fourth, there were the failures to produce credible *responses* to warring factions, thereby generating even greater violence (as in Rwanda and Bosnia).

All of these failures point to some fundamental lessons learned. These include, the need for coherent preventive strategies, reliable and thorough intelligence capabilities, a robust mandate, structured multi-level cooperation, a clearly defined exit strategy and a focus on stabilization. While applying broadly across a range of actors, some specific lessons for the CF follow.

First, with respect to preventive strategies, failing to act in an escalating violent situation is the difference between a situation that can be contained and a humanitarian disaster that can spiral beyond control and result in thousands of people being displaced or killed. A failure to act quickly, early and decisively not only leads to conflict escalation but incriminates the Western powers directly in the ensuing violence and severely damages the legitimacy of international norms. Effective conflict prevention requires an appreciation of what is at stake, imagination in designing solutions, stable institutions able to translate ideas into effective action, and above all

strong leadership to mobilize the necessary will and resources. Even though prevention is a risky strategy, the alternatives are often riskier.³⁹

Conflict prevention also includes paying attention to early warning systems that signal a need for third party involvement. For example in East Timor, the fundamental lesson learned was that decisions to act must be based on sound information and must be followed by appropriate resources and the rapid deployment of troops.⁴⁰ It was clear that by early 1999 militia groups, trained and armed by the Indonesian authorities, were involved in a major campaign of terror and intimidation against supporters of independence. Armed UN peacekeeping troops should have been deployed prior to the UN-sponsored vote of Independence from Indonesia on August 30, 1999. But these forces were not deployed despite the warnings and as a result, following the vote, supporters of independence were beaten, raped or killed. By mid-September, buildings were burned or destroyed and some four hundred thousand people (more than half of the population) were forced to flee from their homes. Troops were finally deployed and landed in East Timor by the end of September thanks to the forward thinking and planning of the government of Australia.⁴¹ The reaction and intervention in East Timor no doubt saved the lives of thousands of people though many could have been saved had the UN acted more quickly.

The importance of sound and thorough intelligence is another crucial lesson learned over the past decade. One of the most potent examples of poor intelligence gathering for a peace

39 For example, it is possible to engage in counterfactual analysis by comparing the costs of *actual* conflicts to *estimates* of what it would have cost to prevent these conflicts from taking place. For example, the actual cost of the intervention in Bosnia was \$53.7 billion (US) compared to the cost of prevention, estimated at \$33.3 billion (US). In Haiti the actual cost of intervention was \$5.0 billion (US) and the cost of prevention is estimated at \$2.3 billion (US). Michael E. Brown and Richard N. Rosecrance, *The Case for Conflict Prevention* (Don Mills: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing, 1999).

40 According to the Government of Canada's report, *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations*, (now ten years since its release) rapid reaction includes early-warning mechanisms, an effective decision-making process, readily available transportation and infrastructure, adequate logistical support, adequate finances and well-trained deployable personnel. *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations*, Report of the Government of Canada, September, 1995.

41 The deployment of troops was also a result of the work of a handful of journalist who remained in East Timor and covered the escalation of violence. This coverage promoted infuriated responses from protestors, religious groups and legislators in Australia, Canada and Europe. This was another important lesson learned, not just in East Timor, but in all major modern international crises – the media is often the first to arrive and can prompt swift responses from the public to demand intervention from its leaders.

support operation was that of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda in 1994. Canadian Major General Romeo Dallaire was deployed to Rwanda as the Commander of the UNAMIR with an under-funded and ill-equipped observer force with a Chapter VI mandate. In advance of the operation, there was very little intelligence provided to UNAMIR surrounding the struggle between the Hutus and the Tutsis in Rwanda. In the months leading up to the genocide, due to a lack of resources and mandate, UNAMIR was unable to conduct thorough intelligence on its own. More in-depth information may have been able to persuade the UNSC that a robust force and mandate was needed to stop the eventual genocide.⁴²

The humanitarian crisis in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) in 1996, succeeding the Rwandan genocide provides a related lesson-learned. Canada was authorized by the United Nations Security Council to lead a multinational force (MNF) to protect the hundreds of thousands of Rwandan refugees and to open up a humanitarian corridor for relief efforts. A sharp escalation in fighting in eastern Zaire compelled a mass exodus of refugees towards the Rwandan border before the mandates for the MNF could develop. As a result the mission was aborted before it was fully implemented. The MNF lacked secure and non-secure CIS (Communications and Intelligence Systems) with which to process and communicate data and the MNF staff found itself reacting to raw intelligence provided by the media or other sources in Canada and other contributing nations which bypassed the intelligence cell.

As a result, the MNF (Canadian Forces “Operation Assurance”) was an intelligence failure. The operation failed to develop intelligence at both the strategic and tactical level. The lack of intelligence directly affected the ability of the MNF to conduct relief operations. Internally,

42 Critics of early warning question the assumption that enhancing our capacity to gather and process early warning information will improve our ability to predict state failure and, by extension, increase our capacity to fix the problem. These critics generally focus only on the most newsworthy failures to make their point that intelligence and early warnings are rarely heeded or when they are that responses are either inadequate or late. Such arguments do little to advance our understanding of how to render analyses and preventive strategies more effective. The post Cold War era is replete with many good examples of where warnings were heeded and effective preventive action taken. For a thorough and detailed analysis of this question see David Carment, and Albrecht Schnabel, eds. *Conflict Prevention: From Rhetoric to Reality, Volumes I and II* (New York: Lexington Press, 2004) or Jentleson B. ed. *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999) or David Carment and Frank Harvey *Using Force to Prevent Ethnic Violence* (Westport: Praeger Press, 2000).

the Canadian Forces, who were leading the mission, appeared to take accountability for their failures, however, such accountability was inconclusive at the Government of Canada level as well as at the United Nations.⁴³

The UN operation in the former Yugoslavia is an example of inadequate resources, ambiguous policy direction and weak mandate. The United Nations Protection Force's (UNPROFOR) tasks began to multiply in response to a rapidly deteriorating situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and its resources lagged behind its needs as the political process on which it relied for legitimacy and direction was insufficient. Mandates were changed and upgraded in an *ad hoc* fashion indicating that comprehensive analysis and intelligence had not been carried out in the planning stages. Furthermore, the peacekeepers deployed were sent to keep a peace that did not exist because the peace plan was never fully accepted by the local population.

In practice, UNPROFOR was very weak militarily. The belligerents were using heavy weapons against civilians and UNPROFOR was not equipped with the weapons or the initial mandate to respond to the increasingly violent situation.⁴⁴ To ensure safe havens for civilians, NATO became involved in the crisis management process. This was the first cooperative involvement between NATO and the UN. A lesson learned from this cooperative operation was that command and control responsibilities must be clearly identified at the highest level at the earliest possible stage. Up until the summer of 1993, any NATO involvement in the conflict was carried out under the dual key approach of NATO and the UN.⁴⁵

A further lesson-learned is that complex peace support operations now demand increased cooperation between governments of member states and regional organizations as

43 There is considerable debate about the extent to which Canadian Forces intelligence was inadequate to the task. For a critical but accurate assessment of this intelligence failure, including interviews with CF personnel who took part in the mission see: "The Bungle in the Jungle" The Royal Underground Commission, video, Episode Four: The Bungle in the Jungle – from Suez to Zaire, the bookends of Canadian military capability." http://www.cablecastermagazine.com/PR/PR_detail.asp?ID=2477.

44 David Carment and Frank Harvey *Using Force to Prevent Ethnic Violence* (Westport: Praeger Press, 2000).

45 In the summer of 1993 the use of air power (NATO's major contribution to the conflict in Bosnia) in theatre would have to be initiated by the Secretary-General, on the basis of advice received from his Special Representative in the area. See Elinor Sloan, *Bosnia and the New Collective Security*, (Westport: Praeger Press, 1998) p. 40. There was also disagreement about the amount of force implemented as the UN was more reluctant to use air power than NATO.

well as a number of civilian organizations and non-governmental humanitarian agencies (NGHAs/NGOs). Cooperation must be implemented at the strategic, operational and tactical level. At the strategic planning level, if leaders of NGOs, governments and international organizations are unclear on exactly how a mission is to accomplish its goals, the operation may suffer from lack of clarity. The relationship between external military and civilian actors has also begun to change from detachment and suspicion towards an institutionalization of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC).

A properly defined exit strategy is one of the lessons learned from the first intervention in Haiti. The international community's involvement in Haiti from 1994-2001, including a series of United Nations peace support operations, did not lead to the establishment of a stable polity. On February 29, 2004 President Aristide resigned and left the country because of armed opposition taking over the small island. The Security Council authorized a Multinational Interim Force (MIF) which has made way for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) which commenced on June 1, 2004. Haiti returned to instability and violence because of a number of factors, some beyond the control of the international community. However the failures of the past led to the weak structures of the present that were easily toppled by rebels. For example, the time horizons for the first UN missions were too short and finite focusing too much on exiting rather than implementing their mandates. The original missions ranged from two to six months, hardly enough time to accomplish anything sustainable. Financial aid was also ill-timed because there was little absorptive capacity in the country. There was no local ownership of projects and thus self-reliance did not materialize.

Understanding stabilization is the final lesson-learned. The current stabilization mission to Haiti, MINUSTAH will need to focus on the following areas: stability and security so that peacebuilding can take place; institution building, including professionalism and strengthening of the Haitian National Police and judicial system; disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation of armed groups and gangs; and socio-economic development, including

establishment of short, medium and long-term national strategies to create job opportunities, reduce poverty, build economic and social infrastructure and institutions, create an enabling environment for private investment, control drug trafficking, etc. These areas of reconstruction will take a long-term commitment and thus looking for a quick exit will lead to the repeat occurrence of failure in Haiti.

Specific Capabilities for the Canadian Forces: Heeding the Lessons Learned

The current conflicts in Darfur, Sudan and Afghanistan provide contrasting test cases to determine if any of these lessons have indeed been “learned.” In terms of preventing regional and internal instability current efforts in the Sudan are far from sufficient. As the international community focused on formal talks between the Government of Sudan (in the north) and the Sudan’s People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A in the south) the situation in Darfur and its destabilising effects on Uganda were largely ignored. Even though the violence in Darfur escalated sharply in February 2003, it took until the spring of 2004 for the crisis to make it to the international agenda.⁴⁶ It has taken even longer for Canada and the United Nation’s Security Council to seriously respond to the violence. Thousands have already been killed and countless more forcibly displaced by the government-sponsored militias, the rebels and the Government of Sudan.

The Government of Canada has, of late, realized the hazards of deploying its own or a coalition force and believes that any intervention in Darfur must be initiated by the African Union. In the Sudan, Canada is adopting a “whole of Sudan” strategy, whereby activities targeted to specific regions, such as Darfur, are developed and implemented within the context of their impact throughout Sudan. Canada’s activities in Darfur are based on the “3D” approach

⁴⁶ The conflict has been on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council since May 2004, and has been on the agenda at African Union Peace and Security Council since April 2004.

involving diplomatic activity, development and humanitarian aid, and support for improving the security situation through defence and civilian police involvement.⁴⁷

Unfortunately, the AU has neither the mandate nor the capability to properly intervene. Sending in a larger AU force that is under equipped would only ensure greater violence. On the one hand, the UN Security Council has not granted the AU the mandate to conduct a robust intervention force. The AU would be unable to stop the atrocities even it had the capabilities to do so. On the other hand, the AU is lacking in military and logistical resources. This is something that the Government of Canada is slowly recognizing in so far as it is providing the AU with additional military training and equipment.⁴⁸ The crisis in Darfur can still be an opportunity for Canada to effectively respond to a failing state, but it will need the support of its allies, particularly the EU and the US to make a substantial difference.

The current operation in Afghanistan is a positive step in the right direction. Afghanistan is a strategy of longer-term nation building with a focus on stabilization and support for the host government. In these types of missions, the priority for the CF, in coalition with other international forces, is to establish a peaceful, safe environment in which humanitarian assistance can be provided in the short-term and a stable environment capable of development and reconstruction can be obtained over the long term. *Operation ATHENA* (successor to *Operation APOLLO*) is Canada's contribution to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to ensure stability beyond Kabul.

The military campaign to root out the terrorist cells in Afghanistan that was initiated by the United States in September 2001, was successful in its military goals because the campaign was properly funded with the appropriate resources and mandate. However, the country is by no means stable. To this end, public relations campaigns have been put in place to engage the

⁴⁷ Canada has contributed over \$120 million in humanitarian aid and in support to the African Union mission in Sudan, which is deployed in Darfur. Canada's contribution to the African Union includes helicopter support, which is considered the backbone of the operation, critical military and civilian police staff support to assist in planning, and military equipment for the African Union troops. <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/IPS/IPS-Diplomacy6-en.asp>.

⁴⁸ The use of regional organizations is outlined in Chapter 8 of the UN Charter.

Canadian public and to ensure its willingness to support long-term reconstruction in Afghanistan. Public relations experts have done a fairly good job in the public opinion battle at home. Secondly, much has been written about the successful application of the “3D” concept in Afghanistan with all three key departments working closely together, each taking a lead on meeting specific objectives. However, Afghanistan is a case of “in-country 3D” and as such, is not a true “whole of government” approach. “Whole of government” approaches require a formal structure within the Canadian government for integrating responses to both failed *and* failing states.

In sum, international long-term support for stabilization as well as nation and peace building operations such as Afghanistan and Haiti require consistency and focus. If a new crisis arises during a stabilization mission, resources may be conceived as better utilized in the new mission than in the often slow-moving stabilization mission. There is a misplaced desire to be involved during the first stages of the emergency, the time in which the media is focused on the conflict and when the issue is atop the international agenda. Over the years, largely as a result of Canada’s waning resources, the approach has been to apply those resources in an “early in/early out” fashion, leaving little time or resources for effective nation building. As Rotberg points out:

When a state fails or collapses, it destroys trust and mutilates its institutions. That is why sustained state rebuilding requires time and enduring economic and technical commitments. Rich nations must promise not to abandon state rebuilding before the tough work is finished -- before a failed state has functioned well for several years and has had its political, economic, and social health restored. The worst enemy of reconstruction is a premature exit by donors, international agencies, and countries backing reconstruction initiatives. Today's Haiti and Somalia reflect such untimely exit strategies.⁴⁹

Conclusions

The Canadian Government’s 2005 Budget promised the Department of National Defence the largest increase in twenty years - \$13 billion in new funding over the next five years

49 Robert Rotberg “Failed States in a World of Terror,” *Foreign Affairs*; New York; Jul/Aug 2002., p. 9..

including \$3 billion to support the expansion of the CF by 5,000 regular forces and 3,000 reserve force personnel. The Government of Canada must continue this path towards a larger, sustainable force capable of deploying in a range of circumstances.

But purchasing new equipment is not enough. To be effective in the 21st century's strategic environment, Canadian forces must be adequately prepared. Has anything been done in this regard? The simple answer is yes. The Department of National Defence's International Policy Statement has laid out a clear strategy for responding to failed and failing states. These relate to the need for long term commitment, comprehensive intelligence, rapid mobility, self-sufficient command and interoperability.

For example, \$3.2 billion of the budget has been set aside to address sustainability including training and operational readiness. Specific capabilities include battle damage assessment analysts and reconnaissance vehicles. With respect to training, record generation and management and intelligence capacities to assess progress of demobilization and disarmament need to be emphasized. The CF also needs more highly trained experts in public relations and linguistics. The Forces currently lack linguistic capabilities beyond Canada's two official languages, especially in Arabic.⁵⁰

Intelligence gathering is being enhanced, from the strategic planning stages to tactical implementation on the ground. The most important capabilities in this regard are planning and cooperation. Planning begins with a proper risk assessment and the application of effects-based planning. Detailed intelligence assessments considering the historical tendencies, the political will and structure of the current government and the military capability of the belligerents are required. More in-depth intelligence gathering is also crucial for determining mission capabilities. Forecasting potential threats and creating contingency plans will allow the CF to respond more quickly and decisively in potential emergencies.

⁵⁰ Cultural sensitivity training along with historical and contextual preparation for personnel are also of continued importance and a core part of the Canadian Forces' Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) in Kingston, Ontario.

In order to respond quickly and decisively, Canada will focus on rapid, mobile, light weight Tactical Self-Sufficient Units (TSSU). As Canada will most likely be part of a multinational force, TSSU are key assets to the Forces. In addition, the Standing Contingency Task Force,⁵¹ Canada's Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) and Stabilization and Reconstruction Teams are to be supported for their rapid deployability.⁵²

To be sure, Canada cannot rely on its allies for intelligence or strategic level command capacity. Thus, the fourth capability of independent command is essential for communicating with all national and multinational partners in the planning and implementation stages. The IPS has made it clear that the CF will rely on its own sources for decision-making purposes. At both the operational and tactical level, command capability is not currently a high priority for Canada because it operates almost exclusively within coalition or alliance forces. If Canadian forces are to continue to work under the leadership of others on occasion, then as mentioned, a focus on TSSUs is important because it is at this level that the CF are most commonly used by allied forces. Solid, professional and effective units at the tactical level serve as representatives for the entire CF. The situation is similar for strategic level command in the conduct of operations. However, the development and exercise of Canadian operational level leadership capacity in coalition and alliance operations has the potential to directly improve Canada's capacity to influence international operations in an independent and effective manner.⁵³

51 The Standing Contingency Task Force is a high-readiness task force that can deploy in ten days. It is structured to provide initial CF presence in a crisis and work with other security partners to stabilize the situation and allow for a Mission Specific Task Force to take over if necessary. According to the IPS, with respect to *special operations forces*, the Canadian Forces will provide personnel and assets to support integrated Canadian Forces operations worldwide as part of the Special Operations Group, the Standing Contingency Task Force and Mission-Specific Task Forces. http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/dps/facts/fs-land_e.asp.

52 This includes equipping the Canadian Forces to carry out missions abroad, through initiatives such as the Joint Support Ships, the Mobile Gun System and guaranteed access to airlift. <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/ips-overview5-en.asp>.

53 In order for the Forces to carry out its responsibilities in maintaining security at all stages of engagement, the CF will continue to require counter-guerrilla snipers; ordinance and mine detection, crowd control, border/perimeter security, survival transport vehicles, survival transport vehicles, intelligence: Coyotes (reconnaissance vehicles best in the world); and Mobile Gun System (Styrker) LAV III. These vehicles are to largely replace the use of tanks because they provide direct fire support as well as greater speed and flexibility, easier to airlift and require less maintenance and fuel. H. Peter Langille, "Enhancing the Rapid Deployment Capacity of the Canadian Forces" Discussion Paper, CPCC, Peace Operations Working Group NGO-Government Roundtable on The Responsibility to Protect As Part of Canada's Defence Effort, Ottawa September 22, 2003.

Interoperability is the fifth capability. Nation building and peace building are complex and the CF must have the capacity to handle diverse and continuously changing situations on the ground and in the political arena. If Canada is to remain committed to working within alliances and coalitions then interoperability will be necessary for effective cooperation and integration. Interoperability is defined as the ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services exchanged to enable them to operate efficiently together. Interoperability also includes the ability to communicate with the large number of civilian actors. It should be noted that a strong commitment to interoperability also means that the capacity for Canada to deploy alone (outside the framework of alliances and coalitions) could be jeopardized but few would actually consider this to be a possibility in the context of today's missions.⁵⁴ In other words, interoperability is not a panacea.⁵⁵

In conclusion, the military tools that Canada is developing are moving in the right direction. To be sure, it will never be easy to put back together a state that is falling apart. Ultimate success resides in the leadership and commitment of the local population. However, Canada can help these people reach their goals. In the recent past, it was acceptable in Canadian political circles to argue that any activity that advances human security, alleviates poverty, improves human rights, or fosters good and stable governments, contributes in one

54 A focus on interoperability can be seen as a way out for a country that has not committed significant resources to its military. A related point is the debate on whether Canada should focus on strategic airlift capacity. There was a lot of public attention surrounding the CF's dependency on the US Air Force airlifters to carry CF vehicles to Afghanistan. The CF's CC-150 *Polaris* were quite capable of transporting Canada's troops however what they could not do was carry the CF's armoured reconnaissance vehicles, the *Bison* and the *Coyote*. In the past Canada has relied upon the US or the Ukraine for strategic lift incurring tremendous leasing costs. In addition, it requires organizing strategic airlift once the mission has been determined, which will slow down the deployment process. If Canada wants to continue to be "early in" they will have to seriously reconsider the acquisition of its own strategic airlift. Furthermore, although the situation has not occurred where Canada is acting without the support of the United States or the ability to lease from the Ukraine, circumstances may change in this volatile environment of international affairs and depending too much on others may mean Canada cannot participate in all of the missions it would like to or play the role it sees itself playing.

55 The trend toward integrated operations and interoperability could create an unintended interdependence, if the CF units become too immersed in alliance-controlled network systems that require automatic linkages of sensor weapon systems for effective tactical operations. In addition, there is the claim that Canada uses interoperability as a substitute for national responsibility – and it is the "Canadian way of defence policy and planning," an excuse for not maintaining its forces to the fullest extent. Canada's focus on interoperability should remain a priority as today's complex operations require interoperability between allies as well as between the CF's services (the army, navy and air force). As mentioned, Canada does not have an interest or the capabilities to engage in a strategic operation on its own, thus it will continue to work with the multilateral system where interoperability is indispensable. Douglas Bland, "Military Interoperability: As Canadian as a Beaver," in Ann L. Griffiths, ed., *The Canadian Forces and Interoperability: Panacea or Perdition?* (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2002) p.54.

way or another to long term stabilization and the prevention of state failure and violence. If these policies are to be at all effective in today's security environment they will require a much more focused and comprehensive approach as outlined in this paper. Above all, political leadership will be required to ensure they are used strategically and wisely.

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