



CHAD

CONFLICT DIAGNOSTIC

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
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Chad, the landlocked 'Dead Heart of Africa', has never been a simple place for its people to thrive. Even so, the last decade has seen the country presented with a period of particular crisis and opportunity. Plagued by fighting between rebel and government forces, conflict has been exacerbated by an unstable relationship with neighboring Sudan. In contrast, the exploitation of oil resources has brought with it a massive expansion in the Chadian economy, buoyed by foreign investment.

In the end, however, neither the worst fears nor the best hopes have been realized. While rebels have not been able to topple the government as of yet, few development benefits from the economic boom have reached the Chadian people. Beyond these issues, Chad's future is further burdened with a fragile environment, poor governance and a refugee crisis spilling in from Darfur. In all, the unfortunate sum of these trend-lines suggests that the crises and delayed promises of the past decade will continue into the next.



CONFLICT INDICATORS AND ASSESSMENT

*History of
Armed Conflict*

Risk Level:

High

Trend:

Destabilizing

Stabilizing:

- In February 2010, Chad and Sudan held peace talks in Khartoum and subsequently deployed joint forces to monitor situation along shared border.ⁱ The force will help prevent cross-border raids and monitor irregular forces between the two countries.
- In 2009, approximately 1,800 refugees returned to their countries of origin and about 20,700 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) returned to their homes.ⁱⁱ

Destabilizing:

- In January 2008, a rebel coalition carried out a 3 day offensive that reached N'Djamena, but was eventually repelled.ⁱⁱⁱ The fighting resulted in around 700 casualties, about 400 of which are civilians.^{iv}
- In June/July 2008, cross border attacks from Sudan by Chadian rebels caused interruptions to UNHCR, MSF, ICRC and Oxfam operations.^v In November 2009, humanitarian organizations suspended work in Eastern Chad again, citing risks to their personnel.^{vi}
- In January 2009, eight rebel groups formed the Union of Resistance Forces (URF).^{vii} This represents a more significant coalition than that which attacked N'Djamena in early 2008.
- President Idriss Déby considers MINURCAT to be a failure and pressured the UN to ensure that its mandate is not renewed. As a result, UN Resolution 1923 was passed by the Security Council, directing MINURCAT to redeploy from Chad by the end of 2010.^{viii}
- Chad continues to host almost 270,000 Sudanese refugees, as well as 57,000 from the Central African Republic in the south (as of January 2010).^{ix}
- There are approximately 170,000 IDPs living in 38 camps across Chad (as of mid-2010); circulation of small arms in these camps contributes to militarization.^x

*Population
Heterogeneity*

Risk Level:

High

Trend:

Neutral

Stabilizing:

- Déby's nephew, Timan Erdimi, has been elected as the leader of URF, indicating that a degree of unity has been established between Chad's different ethnic groupings.^{xi}

Destabilizing:

- Déby's patronage of his Zaghawa ethnic group has intensified existing ethnic tensions, particularly with the Tama.^{xiii}
- Tensions between Muslim and Christian groups have become infused within ethnic tensions and have acquired a regional dimension.^{xiv}
- The presence of refugees from Sudan and the CAR have intensified the struggle for resources, and aggravated pre-existing inter-ethnic confrontations and tensions between Christians and Muslims.^{xv}

*Governance and
Political
Democracy*

Risk Level:

High

Trend:
Neutral

Stabilizing:

- Chad made an initial effort to establish democracy in 1989; its constitution has been in place since 1996.^{xvi}
- Regular presidential elections (last election in May 2006, next election April 2011).^{xvii}
- The August 2007 EU-brokered agreement between government and main opposition parties appears to be a step towards free and fair elections.^{xviii}

Destabilizing:

- President Déby has held office since 1990. The removal of presidential term limits in 2005 enables him to hold his position indefinitely.^{xix}
- Presidential powers of political appointment and the current fragmentation and weakness of the political opposition render Déby's authority highly centralized.^{xx}
- Large unbudgeted expenditures, neglect of social development investments, and patronage appointments contribute to Chad's high corruption rankings.^{xxi}
- Due in part to the lack of judicial effectiveness, high levels of political terror, repression of civil society, and restrictions on press freedom have not seen improvement.^{xxii}

*Economic
Performance*

Risk Level:

**Moderate-
high**

Trend:
**Neutral-
Destabilizing**

Stabilizing:

- Oil resources have led to rapid GDP growth over the decade. The World Bank and subsequently China have been the largest investors in industry infrastructure.^{xxiii}

Destabilizing:

- Although oil wealth accounts for 46% of GDP, roughly 80% of the population works in agriculture and stock-breeding (19% of GDP)^{xxiv}, with little labour-force migration.^{xxv}
- The World Bank exited Chad in 2008, after development money from oil revenues was redirected to the military, or lost to corruption.^{xxvi} China's 'non-interference' policy means that its investment has few provisions for development spending.^{xxvii}
- Explosive GDP growth in the middle part of the decade, peaking at 33% in 2005, has been followed by contraction in recent years, averaging around -2.5%.^{xxviii}
- Inflation rates have become increasingly unstable, with 2007-2008 seeing a year-to-year swing of -8.9% and +10.3% respectively, hitting poor Chadians hardest.^{xxix}

*International
Linkages*

Risk Level:

**Moderate-
high**

Trend:
Neutral

Stabilizing:

- Chad is a member of a number of international and regional groups, including the UN, the Sahelo-Saharan Organization (SEN-SAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC), and the Economic and Monetary Union of Central African (CEMAC).^{xxx}
- In 2008 Chad and the Sudan signed the Dakar Accord, which formerly ended the five-year conflict between the two states.^{xxxi} Despite subsequent tension between the two signatories, they met in February 2010 to discuss a full normalization of ties and to deploy a joint force to monitor the border between the countries.^{xxxii}
- Chad remains a member of the Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Partnership, which is a military program providing logistical and capacity-building support from the US.^{xxxiii}

Destabilizing:

- Chad has accused Sudan of backing URF operations.^{xxxiv}
- Linkages with regional human trafficking networks. Chad remains a source, destination and transit country regarding children trafficked for forced labour and sexual exploitation.^{xxxv}
- Chad has not ratified the Lake Chad Commission's delimitation treaty, the source of a border dispute with Nigeria concerning the shrinking of the lake.^{xxxvi}

Human Development

Risk Level:
High

Trend:
Destabilizing

Stabilizing

- Low HIV prevalence rate (3.3%). Given financing efforts by the international community towards HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment, the trend is likely to continue.^{xxxvii}
- Significant progress in the primary school enrolment rates (83%).^{xxxviii}

Destabilizing

- Very low life expectancy (49 years).^{xxxix}
- Very low rate of secondary school enrolment (19%).^{xl} Maternal mortality rates high – 1500 per 100 000 live births – in part a result of understaffed medical wards.^{xli}
- Increased sexual violence in the refugee camps.^{xlii}
- Only 23% of urban population and 4% of rural population having access to improved sanitation facilities.^{xliii} Frequent outbreaks of cholera is just one of the major health issues this contributes to.^{xliv}
- Very high infant mortality rate (124/1000 live births),^{xlv} which may be exacerbated by food shortages.^{xlvi}

Environmental Stresses

Risk Level:
High

Trend:
Destabilizing

Stabilizing:

- Efforts to increase access to fresh/improved water sources have been slow-moving but largely successful, with 50% of Chadians having access as of 2009.^{xlvii}

Destabilizing:

- Decades of drought have accelerated the desertification of Chad. As a result, Lake Chad, a vital source of fresh water for irrigation and agriculture, is one-fifth its 1964 size.^{xlviii}
- Flooding in September, 2010 affects close to 150,000 people, approximately 70,000 of whom are homeless and likely to become internally displaced.^{xlix}
- Deforestation, brought on by resource mismanagement and the unsustainable use of wood fuel has increased the rate of desertification, soil erosion and flash flooding.^l

Militarization

Risk Level:
Moderate

Trend:
Neutral

Stabilizing:

- Following a spike in military expenditure relative to GDP in 2005 when fighting broke out in the country, spending has dropped to pre-conflict levels and currently sits at 1.7 percent of GDP.^{li}
- From 2000 to 2009 Chad increased its military spending by 663%, investing heavily in capacity-building programs.^{lii}
- In April 2008 MINURCAT launched the *Détachement Intégré de Sécurité* (DIS), a program to train Chadian police and gendarmerie commanders in law and order and respect for human rights (813 active-duty as of 29 April 2010).^{liii}

Destabilizing:

- MINURCAT is scheduled to re-deploy from Chad by 31 December 2010.^{liv}
- Forced recruitment of civilians - including children - by state security forces persists.^{lv}
- Chad has made very little progress towards much called-for security sector reform.^{lvi}

Demographic Stress

Risk Level: **Moderate**

Trend: **Neutral-stabilizing**

Stabilizing:

- Annual population growth rate has been continuously slowing down to 2.8% for the past 5 years.^{lvii}
- Population density is low - only 9 people per sq. km.^{lviii} Decreases in the growth of urban population (4.4%) can reduce strains on the urban infrastructure.^{lix}

Destabilizing:

- Significant youth bulge (45.6%), creates a significant stress on education and social services and represents the major source of unemployment. The grievances of unemployed youth are high and costs of attracting them into the conflict are low.^{lx}

EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS

France: As the former colonial power, France has long been involved in Chad. Most recently, it promoted EU involvement in the Chad peacekeeping mission (EUFOR) and its UN successor MINURCAT. In 2008, French forces supported the government of President Déby against Sudanese-backed rebels.

China: As one of the major investors in Chad's oil development, China has some influence over the government. However, its 'non interference' policy could mean its concerns will not extend far beyond the oil projects.

Sudan: The Chad-Sudan relationship remains complex, alternating between periods of conflict and alliances, though recent improvements are encouraging.^{lxix} However, the Sudanese refugees continue to have a destabilizing influence, and further internal instability in Sudan may spill over to Chad.^{lxxii}

Libya: Libya's leader Col. Gaddafi mediated previous regional conflicts, including the 2007 Sirte Accord between Chad and four rebel groups. However, Libya's enforcement of such agreements has been historically weak.

INTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS

Chadian Government: President Déby continues to need the support of his ethnic group (Zaghawa) to remain in power, but policies to improve relations with Sudan have cost him some internal support. Increased public budget spending may partially reverse this trend. The government also uses oil revenue to "buy out" some opponents, which may reduce the risk of immediate conflict.

Rebel Groups: There are several rebel group fractions in Chad, mostly organised along the ethnic lines. Traditionally, many rebel groups were supported by Sudanese government., which has been reduced since the 2008 Khartoum accord. The new formal alliance (URF) allows them to coordinate their fight against the government, and clashes continue. However, various mediation attempts are under way.

SCENARIOS

Worst Case – Total State Failure: A breakdown of relations with Sudan increases cross-border attacks by rebel groups and exacerbates violence. NGOs depart even as the flow of refugees increases, amplifying the need while decreasing the provision for aid. Stake breakdown, with Déby likely ousted, leads to open violence between (ex)government and rebel groups, intensifies ethnic tensions, and undermines the prospects for settlement. Continued corruption, economic contraction, and environmental degradation increase the struggle for resources, while erratic inflation in the absence of state services or aid heighten health and human development concerns.

Best Case – Peace and Stability: The tentative peace between Chad and Sudan holds, with Khartoum curtailing its support of Chadian rebel groups. Improved capacity of the armed forces brings success in its struggle against insurgent groups. After the failed attack on Eastern Chad, the URF splinters, with many rebels calling for negotiations based on the 2007 Sirte Agreement. Peace talks lead to resettlement of many ex-belligerents. Elections are held as planned, and though they not judged "free and fair" by international observers, stability persists and President Déby and his party remain in power. With a new political mandate and stabilizing world oil prices, the government allocates increased funding to economic development. The de-escalation of violence in Chad leads many NGOs to resume their activities, leading to a stabilization of declining HDI indicators.

Likely Case – Continued Conflict and Instability: The peace between Chad and Sudan holds. President Déby remains concerned about the level of support that Sudan is providing the URF, with the likelihood that diplomatic relations are broken off. The URF successfully tests the Chadian military forces, achieving a balance-of-power that tips slightly in favour of the state. As such, the coalition is able to raid refugee/IDP camps and contest government power in most areas of the country (with the exception of N'Djamena). Without MINURCAT and a sub-optimal DIS, the situation for civilians, humanitarian aid workers, refugees and IDPs steadily worsens. Some aid organizations are forced to suspend operations due to a lack of basic security. The ongoing lack of security results in an inhospitable environment for investment, and thus the economy continues to contract. Flooding, which has already displaced thousands of Chadians, is exacerbated by the rainy season. The additional displacement is not addressed due to the chronic lack of security.

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- ⁱ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1068745.stm
- ⁱⁱ <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e45c226#>
- ⁱⁱⁱ http://www.alertnet.org/db/crisisprofiles/TD_REB.htm?v=in_detail
- ^{iv} <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L06624633.htm>
- ^v http://www.alertnet.org/db/crisisprofiles/TD_REB.htm?v=timeline
- ^{vi} http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1068745.stm
- ^{vii} http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1068745.stm
- ^{viii} <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,UNSC.RESOLUTION.TCD,,4c1f33272,0.html>
- ^{ix} <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e45c226>
- ^x [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpCountries\)/69BB2800A93D1374C12571560029544F?opendocument](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/69BB2800A93D1374C12571560029544F?opendocument)
- ^{xi} The various rebel factions are of different ethnic or tribal bases. The UFDD is composed of Gorane tribe, Eridimi (UFR) is an ethnic Zaghawa. AFP. <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gAKr1Hkwn8EEs90TI-I93HVg4CIA>. Bertelsmann Foundation. http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/fileadmin/pdf/Gutachten_BT12010/WCA/Chad.pdf
- ^{xii} Chad consists of over 200 ethnic groups. In the north, the Arabs (12.3%), Kanem-Bornou (9%), Ouaddai (8.7%), Hadjarai (6.7%) and Gorane (6.3%) predominate. In the south, the Sara (27.7%), Mayo-Kebbi (11.5%) and Fitri- Batha (4.7%) predominate in addition to the Tandjile (6.5%) and other tribes (6.4%) (1993 census). CIA World Factbook, U.S. Department of State.
- ^{xiii} Since 2006, government efforts to conciliate the Dadjo ethnic group have failed. International Crisis Group.
- ^{xiv} Many different tribal-associated religions are practiced (animist 7.3%, other 0.5%), though the majority of Chad's population is Muslim (53.1%), and there is a strong Christian presence (Catholic 20.1%, Protestant 14.2%). The Muslim community is concentrated in the North and Eastern part of Chad, while South and Western part of Chad is mostly Christian. The Muslim population has adopted the Tidjaniya doctrine, which has been adopted in many African states (Senegal, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Mauritania). The clash of interests between Muslims and Christians has created tensions, which have assumed a regional dimension. The radicalization of Islam and emergence of Arab ethnic Janjaweed groups on both sides of the Chad-Sudan border has resulted in highly violent conflict since 2003. CIA World Factbook.
- ^{xv} In addition to other migrants to Chad, these refugees contribute to over 3.5% of the total population. This massive influx of Sudanese refugees has upset eastern Chad's demographic balance. Global Peace Index. <http://www.visionofhumanity.org/gpi-data/#/2010/scor/TD>; United Nations Statistics Division. <http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crname=CHAD>; Voice of America News (VOA). <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/west/Chad-Hit-by-Worst-Floods-in-Four-Decades-103150069.html>
- ^{xvi} Economist Intelligence Unit. http://www.eiu.com/report_dl.asp?issue_id=1317397516&mode=pdf&rf=0
- ^{xvii} The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). <http://www.idea.int/uid/countryview.cfm?id=213>.
- ^{xviii} U.S. Department of State. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/37992.htm>
- ^{xix} CIA World Factbook. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cd.html>
- ^{xx} CIA World Factbook; Economist Intelligence Unit; United States Institute of Peace, p.2. http://www.usip.org/files/resources/USIP_1208_5.PDF
- ^{xxi} EIU; USIP; International Crisis Group (2008, p.2-3, 5-6). <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/Chad%20A%20New%20Conflict%20Resolution%20Framework.ashx>; Transparency International. http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table
- ^{xxii} Amnesty International. <http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=ar&yr=2010&c=TCD>; Human Rights Watch. <http://www.hrw.org/en/world-report-2009/chad>; International Crisis Group. <http://www.hrw.org/en/world-report-2009/chad>; Reporters Without Borders. http://en.rsf.org/spip.php?page=classement&id_rubrique=1001
- ^{xxiii} Polgreen, L & French, H. *China, filling a void, drills for riches in Chad*. New York Times. August 13, 2007.
- ^{xxiv} African Development Bank. *Chad: Country Strategy Paper 2010-2014*. p.4
- ^{xxv} Worryingly, the majority of oil workers being foreigners. Al Jazeera (9.13.2010)
- ^{xxvi} Polgreen, L. *World Bank ends effort to help Chad ease poverty*. New York Times. September 10th, 2008.
- ^{xxvii} Polgreen & French. NYT
- ^{xxviii} The World Bank. *Chad – Data Tables*. <http://data.worldbank.org/country/chad>
- ^{xxix} In particular, this can severely affect the purchasing power of average Chadians, many of whom (83% as of 2003) live with less than \$2 a day .The World Bank. *Chad – Data Tables*. <http://data.worldbank.org/country/chad>. See also: United Nations. *UNData Country Profile – Chad*. <http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=CHAD>
- ^{xxx} U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Chad, online: < <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/37992.htm>>.
- ^{xxxi} <http://minurcat.unmissions.org/Portals/MINURCAT/Dakar%20Agreement.pdf>.
- ^{xxxii} http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1068745.stm.
- ^{xxxiii} The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Project, online: <<http://www.africom.mil/tsctp.asp>>
- ^{xxxiv} <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8037127.stm>.
- ^{xxxv} <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cd.html>
- ^{xxxvi} <http://www.oieau.fr/ciedd/contributions/atriob/contribution/cblt.htm>

- ^{xxxvii} The World Bank Board of Executive Directors approved an International Development Association (IDA) grant of US\$20 million equivalent for Chad to support the implementation of the Government of Chad's Second Population and HIV/AIDS Project for the period 2010-2012 available at <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/CHADEXTN/0,,contentMDK:22629170~menuPK:50003484~pagePK:2865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:349862.00.html> retrieved on October 2, 2010
- ^{xxxviii} World Development Indicators 2009, World Bank available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/> retrieved on October 2, 2010
- ^{xxxix} World Development Indicators 2009, World Bank available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN> retrieved on October 2, 2010
- ^{xl} World Development Indicators 2009, World Bank available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/> retrieved on October 2, 2010
- ^{xli} In 2005, there was 1 doctor per 27,680 inhabitants, 1 nurse per 6,453 inhabitants, and 1 midwife per 9,074 women of childbearing age, PRSP 2010, IMF
- ^{xlii} Increased mobility due to infrastructure projects may lead to an increase in HIV transmission rate. RAPPORT DE LA SITUATION NATIONALE A L'INTENTION DE L'UNGASS, Republique du Tchad, 2010
- ^{xliii} Desertification, deforestation and the lack of arable land not only place economic and health stresses on Chadians, but also push them towards the towns and cities, whose antiquated sewage and water systems are ill-prepared for the expanding population. See: Progress on Sanitation and Drinking-water: 2010 Update, World Health Organization and UNICEF. Also: United Nations Common Country Assessments (CCA). *Etat de la pauverte humaine au Tchad, 2000-2004*. pp.19-20
- ^{xliv} "Between late-June to the end of September, a total of 2,422 cholera cases and 109 deaths were recorded in 12 health districts, mainly in central and western regions of the country." Chadians face a threefold emergency of hunger, floods and cholera, Medicines Sans Frontieres, October 2010, http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?objectid=76D329E4-15C5-F00A-256D7B15C583E90F&component=toolkit.article&method=full_html, retrieved October 3, 2010
- ^{xlv} World Development Indicators 2009, World Bank available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN> retrieved on October 2, 2010
- ^{xlvi} In parts of Chad acute malnutrition levels far exceed the international emergency threshold, according to a new study acute malnutrition strikes 27.2 percent and 21 percent of under-five children, IRIN News August 24, 2010
- ^{xlvii} In the south, UNHCR provided an average of 22 litres of water per person per day. In the east, access to water remained more difficult, with each person receiving an average of only 13 litres per day. UNHCR Global Report 2009 - Republic of Chad available at <http://www.unhcr.org/4c08f2a19.html> retrieved on October 2, 2010 Also: African Development Bank, pp.11-12 and African Development Bank. p.8
- ^{xlviii} The overwhelming of outdated irrigation techniques has led to the expansion of grazing grounds.^{xlviii} This loss of arable land is undermining the agriculture sector, a stable economic driver. See: UN News Centre. *Shrinking Lake Chad could trigger humanitarian disaster, UN warns*. 15 October, 2009. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=32555>
- ^{xlix} <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/UNHCR/34d7075c379e5f52f6c67757eb1c0afd.htm>
- ^l Oil exploration in the 90s and 2000s contributed a great deal to this, but it is the ongoing use of wood fuel (90% of all rural use) that is proving unsustainable. United Nations. *Bilan Commun de Pays au Tchad – Common Country Assessment (CCA)*. February 2000. pp.59-60
- ^{li} However, it should be noted that from 2000 to 2009, Chad increased its military budget by 663 percent, due in large part to new revenue from oil over the past decade. Stockholm National Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, <http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4>
- ^{lii} Due, in large, part to the oil-generated GDP boom, the increase in relative spending over this time period was the world's largest. See: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/resultoutput/trends/recent_trends_default/?searchterm=chad%20AND%20663 & <http://www.marines.mil/unit/marforeur/Pages/Marines%20arrive%20in%20Chad.%20begin%20Pan%20Sahel%20Initiative.aspx>
- ^{liiii} The program's mandate is to train 850 Chadian security forces to work in refugee and IDP camps in the east of Chad. However, there has been a fair degree of attrition, with a number of DIS troops resigning or dismissed over the past months. This could indicate serious flaws – such as morale or issues with pay – in the mechanism itself, or may simply reflect the natural evolution of a new program. See: [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/%28httpDocuments%29/20A5DA75653588FDC125772600340ADC/\\$file/Report+of+the+UN+Secretary-General+on+MINURCAT+-+29+Apr+10.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/%28httpDocuments%29/20A5DA75653588FDC125772600340ADC/$file/Report+of+the+UN+Secretary-General+on+MINURCAT+-+29+Apr+10.pdf) Also: <http://minurcat.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=282> Also, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=26248&Cr=chad&Cr1>
- ^{liv} http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1923%282010%29
- ^{lv} Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, *Chad: Forced recruitment by the army including of children; whether this is ongoing; location where raids are being conducted*, 25 June 2008, TCD102853.E, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49b92b571e.html>
- ^{lvi} See Human Rights Watch, *Letter to UN on Consequences of MINURCAT Withdrawal*. <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/02/17/letter-un-security-council-consequences-minurcat-withdrawal-chad>, Also, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc10008.doc.htm>.

lvii World Development Indicators 2009, World Bank available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW> retrieved on [October 2, 2010](#)

lviii Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, *World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision*, <http://esa.un.org/unpp>

lix World Development Indicators 2009, World Bank available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW> retrieved on [October 2, 2010](#)

lx Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, *World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision*, <http://esa.un.org/unpp>

lxi Examples the February 2010 Accord and the Chad's refusal to arrest Sudan's President Al Bashir under an ICC mandate.

lxii Key risks include further conflict in the Darfur region and a January 2011 scheduled referendum in Southern Sudan.