

Conflict Diagnostic:

Guatemala



Emily Black
Sarah Araujo
Andrew Conte

Executive Summary & Most Likely Scenario

Since 2006, Guatemala has undergone numerous trade reforms and experienced favorable economic progress, yet continues to be ranked near the bottom of most global indices for equality and social indicators.^{1,2} The 1996 Peace Accord, which put an end to 36 years of civil war between the government and various insurgent groups has enabled subsequent governments to focus their efforts on economic growth and stability. Many of the underlying conditions that initially fueled the conflict, however, remain. The enduring power of elites, inadequate land and judicial reforms, and a growing gap between macroeconomic growth and household income have all hindered development and contributed to instability. As a result, new sources of violence – namely from drug trafficking, cartels, and gangs – have found a fertile environment from which to work, and have proliferated across the state (particularly the north) over the past decade.

Over the past year, the Guatemalan government has resorted to heavy-handed tactics to contain violent conflicts instigated by drug cartels. In December 2010 and May 2011, the government enacted regional states of siege and called for marshal law to be imposed in the Northern department of Alta Verapaz.³ Guatemala, along with Honduras and El Salvador are collectively known as the “Northern Triangle,” which is currently considered to be one of the most dangerous regions in the world with homicide rates having more than doubled over the last decade.⁴ Much of this violence can be attributed to the increase in overland drug trafficking along the isthmus and the incursion of Mexican cartels into Guatemala. The increased trafficking and presence of cartels in Guatemala is largely attributed to the successes achieved in Colombia’s ‘war on drugs’, which crippled Colombian cartels and interrupted trafficking routes to Mexico. This consequently pushed the violence north as traffickers sought alternate territory and transportation routes.⁵ Having previously endured civil conflicts, Guatemala as well as Honduras and El Salvador, have become particularly vulnerable to crime and violence due to their insufficient institutional capacity. Additionally, Guatemala is amidst an already contentious federal election, in which voter safety is a major barrier to democracy.

Going forward, inadequate judicial capacity, political instability and increased drug trafficking will create fertile territory for cartels to expand their operations. Turf wars and scare tactics resulting from increased drug trafficking will likely give way to Guatemala’s descent in to state of perpetual violence, and power-struggles among the state and cartels. Under heavy pressure from the Guatemalan people for authoritative controls, the newly elected government will be forced to use *mano duro* policies to enforce rule of law and ensure the safety of the population. This in turn will instigate further violence from cartels looking to exert their power and render the population submissive.

Background: Guatemala in Context

Guatemala is the largest Central American country, encompassing 108,890 sq. km with a population of approximately 14.7 million. It is bordered by Mexico to its north, Belize to its east and Honduras and El Salvador to its southeast. Once a Spanish colony, Guatemala gained its independence in 1821 and has since become a constitutional democracy. With a GDP per capita of approximately US\$2660, Guatemala ranks 116th in the world and is one of the lowest in Latin America with only Honduras and Bolivia ranking lower. Although the official language is Spanish, there are approximately 53 ethnic languages spoken among the indigenous population, which comprise nearly half the entire population. Ethnic inequality has long been a problem in Guatemala.

Long characterized by political instability and internal repression, Guatemala erupted into a 36-year civil war in 1960 following the popular uprising against military seizure of the civil government. Approximately 40,000 – 50,000 people were reported as missing/disappeared and an additional 200,000, mostly indigenous Maya, were killed. In 1996, a Peace Accord was signed between the government and insurgents. Two years later, former guerrilla groups became a legal political party known as the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (UNRG), and have consistently held seats in congress since. With the signing of the peace agreement, levels of political violence have since decreased, although human rights violations remain a problem, propelled by high impunity rates and corruption.

While *political* violence has leveled off, the increased presence of drug traffickers and the incursion of Mexican cartels into Guatemala over the last ten years, have exacerbated levels of violence and are now challenging the government’s ability to maintain peace. With the 2011 elections currently underway in Guatemala, the election of a new government will be a turning point in the state’s domestic policies as public opinion is calling for an ‘iron fist’ approach against the drug cartels. The first round of elections, held on September 11th, were largely criticized by the international community for intimidation and violence against voters. The November 6th election will represent a critical moment for Guatemala and its people.

Worse Case Scenario:

With elections less than a month away, a low voter turnout will create biased election results not deemed free and fair by the international community and domestic watchdogs. As a result, the new government’s legitimacy is compromised and creates an atmosphere of political instability while drug traffickers and cartels seize the opportunity to

engage in a full-scale drug wars. Violence quickly spreads from rural to urban areas, including Antigua and Guatemala City. Already considered more dangerous than Mexico, the escalation in violence proves extremely difficult for the Guatemalan government and the international community to contain. Major industries, such as the agricultural and manufacturing sectors will be impacted by an increase in violence over territorial disputes, which will lead to a significant decrease in exports and FDI. Consequently, the military will utilize extremely heavy-handed and aggressive tactics reminiscent of those seen during their civil war, with an increase in the use of martial law and states of siege across departments. As cartels begin to infiltrate and influence politics, Guatemala descends in to a narco-state.

Best Case Scenario:

Free and fair elections (in which voter turnout is not hindered by fear) result in a democratically elected government supported by its constituents. Following elections, the new government is able to implement progressive tax reforms, and address persistent problems of inequality and economic disparity. With popular support, the government begins to invest in tighter border security and surveillance to suppress drug trafficking. To ensure greater law enforcement capacity, the government leverages U.N.-sanctioned International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) to expand their investments in training and effectiveness of police, prosecutors, and other law enforcement personnel. A better-equipped, better-trained and larger police force is able address the issue of violence and homicides. As the country becomes more secure, freedom of the press, civil liberties and political rights slowly increase.

1. Stakeholder Analysis

Key Actors	Effects	Interests
Internal Stakeholders		
Military	Mixed	To protect from external, and sometimes internal threats; lack capabilities and manpower; corruption
Guatemalan Government	Mixed	With elections set to take place next month, it is yet unclear who will win; how they will run the country
Political Parties ⁶	Mixed	To gain power; with the preliminary results of the September elections contested, there's potential for future disputes after November's elections
Organized Crime Syndicates ⁷	Negative	To stay above the law; profit from illegal activity; control trafficking routes, control their neighborhoods
Regional Stakeholders		
Organization of American States (OAS)	Positive	Foster democracy, human rights, security and democracy across the hemisphere
Central American Integration System	Positive	To integrate Central America in order to promote a region of peace, freedom, democracy and development
International Stakeholders		
United Nations and UN Agencies ⁸	Positive	To bring stability through funding, training, programming initiatives, observers and development
International Committee against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG)	Positive	Investigate and prosecute crimes committed in connection with illegal security forces and clandestine security organizations. ⁹
NGOs	Positive	Promote human rights, human security, equality
United States	Positive	To help quash the violence, reduce the drug trade; heavily invested in the region;

2. Risk Assessment Indicators

Armed Conflict

Stabilizing Factors:

- Increased international assistance provided by various organizations
- The US-CARSI initiative provides Central America with \$165 million to enhance the capacity of the law and security forces, public security and gang prevention against the spread of violence¹⁰
- 1996 Peace Accord has done well to maintain peace between the Government and the opposition and guerrilla groups.

Destabilizing Factors:

- Major route for drug traffickers, caught between the world's largest producer (Colombia) and consumer (USA) of cocaine¹¹
- Increased presence of Mexican cartels leading to increased violence as turf wars for control are being fought and opposition figures are being assaulted and/or killed¹²

- Rising gang membership due to: 1) the deportation of gang members from the US into Guatemala¹³; and 2) high unemployment rate among youth¹⁴
- More than 1.6 million illegal firearms in circulation¹⁵
- High levels of corruption among police, law enforcement, senior officials and anti-drug agents¹⁶
- High impunity rates due to a lack of public confidence in law enforcement and government officials¹⁷
- Military and police forces too weak to combat the growing number of cartels, traffickers and gangs¹⁸
- Growth of organized crime syndicates; human trafficking, migrant smuggling, drug trafficking etc

Governance & Political Stability

Stabilizing

- Level of democracy has remained constant since 2001, with changes in government every four years.
- New Attorney General convicted human rights violators from Special Forces for 1982 massacres.¹⁹
- Human Rights activist, Helen Mack appointed head of Presidential Police Reform Commission.²⁰
- Since 2006, CICIG has been investigating and dismantling illegal security groups and clandestine criminal organizations, some of which have been tied to the Guatemalan state.²¹
- For the first time in Guatemala's democratic history, women made up more than 50 % of voters in September.²²

Destabilizing

- Currently in the process of elections which will see a change in political power.²³
- Increasing levels of violence towards voters in upcoming elections. Responding to the increasing levels of violence has become the primary focus of the upcoming presidential elections.
- Public demand for quick results and support for heavy-handed responses to bring down crime rates.²⁴
- Political Rights and Civil Liberty scores consistently mediocre; Freedom House classification: “partially free.”
- Freedom of the press has remained consistently suppressed since 2006, with common instances of threats and murder.²⁵
- Slight improvement in corruption levels since 2006; however, the country is still largely corrupt.
- Between January and August 2011, 302 attacks against human rights defenders were documented.²⁶
- Since January, 800 families have been forcefully displaced from their communities in the Polochic Valley by private security forces and members of the police and Guatemalan Army.²⁷
- The international community criticized the first round of elections in September.

Militarization

Stabilizing Factors:

- 1996 Peace Accord mandated that the military be used exclusively against external threats²⁸
- Former military officers arrested and convicted for their part in the disappearances and murders of civilians during civil war²⁹
- Military expenditure as part of the GDP has not exceeded 0.4% since 2006 and accounts for 3.6% of government expenditure³⁰
- As of 2010, the military numbered approximately 16,100; approx. 1% of the entire labor force³¹
- The elimination of 19 military zones;³² rewriting of military doctrine³³

Destabilizing Factors:

- The increase in violence has left many calling for a greater military presence³⁴

Population Heterogeneity

Stabilizing Factors:

- Resolution of ethnic differences among Europeans & Ladinos (60% of population), and Mayans & indigenous non-Mayans (40% of population) is emerging through efforts to reconfigure state institutions and national culture.^{35, 36}
- The absence of open government repression has underscored the relative stability of its relationship with the indigenous community since the 1996 peace accord.³⁷
- Significant state efforts since 2006 to reduce horizontal inequality between the indigenous and ladino populations with a particular focus on the education sector.³⁸

Destabilizing Factors:

- Debates over ethnic separation or integration among Mayans and Ladinos continue with polarized views of hegemony and cultural purity from each side.³⁹
- Indigenous groups have persistently protested over the past decade for more equitable labor rights, the fulfillment of land distribution agreements, forced evictions, and pervasive social and political exclusion by the government.⁴⁰

Demographic Stress

Stabilizing Factors:

- Population has been growing consistently at 2-3% a year since the early 2000s.⁴¹
- Urban population has been growing steadily at 3% a year since the early 2000s.⁴²

Destabilizing Factors:

- Youth aged 0-14 has been slowly declining since 2001, but remains very high at 41%.⁴³

Economic Performance

Stabilizing Factors:

- Forecasts for real GDP growth and inflation are stable at 2.6% and 5.5% in 2011 respectively and correspond to recovery trends following the 2008 global crisis.^{44, 45, 46}
- Total debt servicing and FDI remained stable at 5% GDP and 2% GDP from 2006 to 2009 year over year respectively.^{47, 48}
- Trade liberalization strategies have steadily expanded industrial and agricultural sectors while relative import and export levels have stabilized after a moderate downward adjustment of trade activity among Central American Common Market states following 2008.^{49, 50}
- Since joining the Central American Free Trade Agreement with the United States in 2006, total exports increased nearly 42% for the period to 2010; the quetzal was stable over the same period.^{51, 52}
- Current capital and financial account positions are healthy and expected to increase the country's foreign reserve buffer and external account surpluses in the short term.⁵³

Destabilizing Factors:

- After having achieved balanced current accounts in 2009, a trade deficit of 2.2% GDP is expected in 2011 and is expected to increase over the medium term.^{54, 55}
- Despite the largest economy in the Central American region, and although GDP per capita has doubled in the past decade, income inequality has persisted as Guatemala continues to hold the second highest GINI indicator in the region and one of the worst in the world.^{56, 57, 58}
- Since 2010, significant foreign investment in the mining sector threatens the exacerbation of political corruption, marginalizing indigenous populations, and environmental degradation.⁵⁹
- A heavy reliance on remittance inflows equivalent to nearly two-thirds of exports or one-tenth of GDP, threatened by probability of future U.S. market downturn.⁶⁰
- At only 10.5% of GDP in 2010, Guatemala's tax revenue is low compared to the Latin American average of 13.9%.⁶¹
- More than 70 % of the land is owned by less than 2% of the population.⁶²

Human Development

Stabilizing Factors:

- Material living standards have improved significantly over the past decade: 94% access to improved water sources and 81% access to sanitation.⁶³
- Life expectancy at birth has been slowly increasing, currently 71 years.⁶⁴
- Infant mortality has slowly been declining, currently 25 deaths for every 1000 live births.⁶⁵
- Maternal Mortality remains relatively unchanged at 110 deaths for every 1000 live births.⁶⁶
- Primary school enrollment has been consistently increasing and is very high at 95%. Secondary enrollment has always been steadily increasing but remains low at 40%.⁶⁷
- Economically active children (7-14) has declined slightly since the early 2000s, residing at 18%.⁶⁸

Destabilizing Factors:

- 51% of Guatemalans are living below the poverty line⁶⁹
- 11th most unequal country in the world, 4th in Latin America.⁷⁰

Environmental Stress

Stabilizing Factors:

- CALAS (Legal, Environmental and Social Action Centre of Guatemala) officials maintain a close watch on the environmental protection¹
- The revision of the Forest Action Plan in 2002-2003¹

Destabilizing Factors:

- Deforestation in the Peten rainforest continues, as does soil erosion and water pollution

International Linkages

Stabilizing Factors:

- The U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) was entered into force in 2006, prioritizing the elimination of tariffs and providing for protection of international labor rights and environmental standards.⁷¹
- Although delisted from CIDA *countries of focus* in 2009, aid is maintained on increasing domestic food production, improving food security policy and support to ensure commitment to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.⁷²
- The International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) was established by the UN in January 2008 with the objective of dismantling violent criminal organizations and the paralysis in the country's justice system.⁷³

Destabilizing Factors:

- Guatemala persists in its territorial claim to half of Belize, but agrees to keep squatters out of Belize's interior.⁷⁴
- Mexico must deal with thousands of impoverished Guatemalans who cross the porous border looking for work in Mexico

and the United States.⁷⁵

- Remains a major transit country for drugs and money laundering affiliated with Mexican and Colombia markets.⁷⁶

¹ IndexMundi, “GDP per capita, PPP (current international \$)”online;

<http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD/compare#country=gt> accessed 30 September 2011

² World Bank, World Development Indicators, “Exports of goods and services (BoP, current US\$)” 2006-2010, online; <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.GSR.GNFS.CD> accessed 30 September 2011.

³ See, The World. “Mexico’s Drug War Comes to Guatemala” Feb 2011. Online;

<http://www.theworld.org/2011/02/mexicos-drug-war-comes-to-guatemala> accessed on 11 October 2011 and Central American Politics. “Peten State of Siege Extended,” June 17. Online;

<http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/2011/06/peten-state-of-siege-extended.html> accessed 11 October 2011,

William Booth & Nick Miroff. “Mexican Drug Cartels Draw Guatemalan Army to Jungles Where it Fought Civil War,” *The Washington Post*, February 2011. Online; <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/09/AR2011020906919.html> accessed 11 October 2011

⁴ See “Informe sobre desarrollo humano para América Central 2009–2010,” United Nations Development Programme, October 2009. See also “Gangs in Central America,” Congressional Research Service, December 4, 2009

⁵ Brice A., *Gangs, drugs fuel violence in Guatemala*, September 9, 2011; online: http://articles.cnn.com/2011-09-09/world/guatemala.violence_1_guatemala-city-zetas-drug-trafficking?_s=PM:WORLD, accessed: October 9, 2011.

⁶ Agreement b/w the united nations CICIG has presented two legal reform packages to the Guatemalan Congress that seek to improve the legal and institutional framework of the criminal prosecution of crimes that fall under CICIG’s jurisdiction. To date, the Congress has approved four essential laws: Law on Arms and Ammunition, Law to Strengthen Criminal Prosecutions, Law on Jurisdiction in High-Risk Criminal Proceedings, and Reforms to the Law Against Organized Crime and Incidents; see Comision Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala; online <http://cicig.org/index.php?page=mandate>; accessed 29 September 2011.

⁷ Organized Crime Syndicates include drug traffickers, cartels, gangs, human smuggles, sex-trade workers.

⁸ UN agencies include, but are not limited to; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; UNICEF; and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

⁹ Agreement between the United Nations and the Guatemalan Government, CICIG has presented two legal reform packages to the Guatemalan Congress that seek to improve the legal and institutional framework of the criminal prosecution of crimes that fall under CICIG’s jurisdiction. To date, the Congress has approved four essential laws: Law on Arms and Ammunition, Law to Strengthen Criminal Prosecutions, Law on Jurisdiction in High-Risk Criminal Proceedings, and Reforms to the Law Against Organized Crime and Incidents. See Comision Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala; online <http://cicig.org>; accessed 29 September 2011.

¹⁰ The five goals of CARSI are: 1) Create safe streets for the citizens in the region; 2) Disrupt the movement of criminals and contraband within and between the nations of Central America; 3) Support the development of strong, capable and accountable Central American Governments; 4) Re-establish effective state presence and security in communities at risk; and 5) Foster enhanced levels of security and rule of law coordination and cooperation between the nations of the region. See US State Department, Bureau of Public Affairs. “The Central American Regional Security Initiative: A Shared Partnership.” online www.state.gov accessed 30 September 2011.

¹¹ Levels of violence in some provinces are actually surpassing those seen during Guatemala’s 36-year civil war; see United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). “World Drug Report 2011,” pg. 200.

¹² Since December 2010, Guatemala’s president, Alvaro Colom, has declared “state of siege” twice and instituted martial law due to the violence committed by Mexican drug cartel, known as Las Zetas; see Human Security Report Project, <http://www.hsrgroup.org/our-work/e-newsletters/archive/archivepost.aspx?storyid=7ef4da70-2f07-4cb6-8ca0-5a5ebcf86721>, accessed 28 September 2011, and UNODC “World Drug Report 2010,” pg 244 -245, and “Human Rights Watch 2011,” pg. 2.

¹³ The World Bank, World Development Report 2011, “Conflict, Security and Development,” pgs. 106 & 173, and Hal Brands. “Crime, Violence, and the Crisis in Guatemala. A Case Study in the Erosion of the State,” *Strategic Studies Institute*, 2010 pg. 26

¹⁴ Human Right Watch, “Guatemala” 2011, pg 1, and Hal Brands. “Crime, Violence, and the Crisis in Guatemala. A Case Study in the Erosion of the State,” *Strategic Studies Institute*, 2010 pg. 26

¹⁵ United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. “UNODC assists Guatemala to Tackle Organized Crime; online <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2010/March/unodc-assists-guatemala-to-fight-organized-crime.html> accessed 01 October 2011

¹⁶ Ibid. *also see* United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). “World Drug Report 2011,” pg. 244.

¹⁷ In 2009, Guatemala recorded 6,450 murders and only 231 convictions; see US Dept. of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, “Guatemala 2011 Crime and Safety Reports”

¹⁸ Human Right Watch, “Guatemala” 2011, pg 1.

¹⁹ Since Claudia Paz y Paz became the Attorney General in late 2010, investigations into human rights violations committed during Guatemala’s internal armed conflict have moved forward. On August 2, 2011 a Guatemalan court sentenced four former members of the Guatemalan Special Forces known as the Kaibiles to over 6,000 years in prison for the December 1982 massacre of 201 men, women, and children in the village of Dos Erres. Online; www.wola.org accessed 02 October 2011.

²⁰ In 2010, renowned human rights advocate, Helen Mack, was appointed to head the Presidential Police Reform Commission. Under Mack’s leadership, the Commission has developed and begun implementing a comprehensive plan to do a major overhaul of the police force. Online; www.wola.org accessed 02 October 2011

²¹ While the CICIG alone cannot be expected to resolve Guatemala’s deeply rooted social, economic, and political problems, it is an innovative mechanism that can help lay the groundwork for long-term progress in overcoming the culture of impunity and establishing rule of law and due process in Guatemala.

²² International Foundation for Electoral Systems. Online; www.ifes.org accessed 27 September 2011

²³ In the first round (September 11) Otto Perez Molina triumphed with 36% of the vote, followed by Manual Baldizón. The second round of voting is scheduled for November 6.

²⁴ Both candidates have called for a return to heavy-handed policing strategies.

²⁵ Most recently, television journalist and teacher Yensi Roberto Ordoñez Galdámez was murdered.

²⁶ This is a dramatic increase from the 305 registered during the entire year in 2010. *Guatemalan Office for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders* (UDEFEQUA)

²⁷ These families were evicted in order to install the Chabil Utzaj sugar plantation and this case is just one of hundreds of unresolved land disputes that have their origins in the historic inequalities in Guatemala. Online; www.wola.org accessed 03 October 2011

²⁸ While the mandate exists, former presidents and current president Alvaro Colom used a constitutional clause to order the army to temporarily support the police in response to violent crime US State Department. Online; <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2045.htm#defense> accessed 29 September 2011

²⁹ On August 2, 2011 a Guatemalan court sentenced four former members of the Guatemalan Special Forces known as the Kaibiles to over 6,000 years in prison for the December 1982 massacre of 201 men, women, and children in the village of Dos Erres. Online; www.wola.org accessed 02 October 2011.

³⁰ The World Bank, World Development Report 2011, “Conflict, Security and Development,” pg. 215.

³¹ US State Department, online; <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2045.htm#defense>, accessed 02 October 2011

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ New York Times, “Desperate Guatemalan’s Embrace and Iron Fist” Online; http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/10/world/americas/10guatemala.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all%3Fsrc%3Dtp&smid=fb-share accessed 29 September 2011

³⁵ CIA World Factbook, “Guatemala”: Mestizo (mixed Amerindian-Spanish - in local Spanish called Ladino) and European 59.4%, K’iche 9.1%, Kaqchikel 8.4%, Mam 7.9%, Q’eqchi 6.3%, other Mayan 8.6%, indigenous non-Mayan 0.2%, other 0.1% (2001 census); online; http://www.indexmundi.com/guatemala/ethnic_groups.html, accessed 30 September 2011

³⁶ Warren K.B., *Pan-Mayanism and Multiculturalism in Guatemala* 1998; online: http://ladark.lib.utsa.edu/13/1/Pan-Mayanism_and_multiculturalism_in_Guatemala.htm accessed: 5 October 2011.

³⁷ Minorities At Risk, “Assessment for Indigenous Peoples in Guatemala”; online; <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=9002#references> accessed 03 October 2011

Information current as of December 2006.

³⁸ Stewart F., *Addressing discrimination and inequality among groups* : 2020 Focus Brief on the World’s Poor and Hungry People (October 2007)

³⁹ Fischer E.F. & Benson P.B. *Broccoli and desire: global connections and Maya struggles in postwar Guatemala* (2006), Pg. 144: “The polarities of Indian-ladino or Maya-mestizo meld into an infinity of mestizo identities in which cultural emphasis sometimes tends to the ladino side and sometimes to the Indian side, depending on the existential circumstances, social class, gender, and ethnicity of the individual. So too vary the modalities of discrimination. We have yet to come to terms with our existence as inter-ethnic and intercultural subjects.”

-
- ⁴⁰ Minorities At Risk, “Assessment for Indigenous Peoples in Guatemala”; online; <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=9002#references> accessed 03 October 2011
Information current as of December 2006.
- ⁴¹ World Bank Development Indicators
- ⁴² Ibid.
- ⁴³ Ibid.
- ⁴⁴ Business Monitor International, *Latin America Monitor* : Central America, Monthly Regional Report (June 2011); Vol 28 Issue 6. Online; www.latinamericamonitor.com; accessed 5 October 2011.
- ⁴⁵ World Bank, World Development Indicators, “Real GDP growth (annual %)” 2006-2010, online; <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG> accessed 30 September 2011.
- ⁴⁶ World Bank, World Development Indicators, “Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)” 2006-2010, online; <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG> accessed 30 September 2011.
- ⁴⁷ World Bank, World Development Indicators, “Total Debt Servicing (% GDP)” 2006-2010, online; <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.TDS.DECT.GN.ZS> accessed 30 September 2011.
- ⁴⁸ World Bank, World Development Indicators, “FDI, net inflows (% GDP)” 2006-2010, online; <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS> accessed 30 September 2011.
- ⁴⁹ World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review: Guatemala, February 2009; online; http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp310_e.htm accessed 30 September 2011.
- ⁵⁰ World Bank, World Development Indicators, “Trade (% GDP)” 2006-2010, online; <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS> accessed 30 September 2011.
- ⁵¹ World Bank, World Development Indicators, “Exports of goods and services (BoP, current US\$)” 2006-2010, online; <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.GSR.GNFS.CD> accessed 30 September 2011.
- ⁵² World Bank, World Development Indicators, “Official Exchange Rate (LCU per US\$)” 2006-2010, online; <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.FCRF> accessed 30 September 2011
- ⁵³ Business Monitor International, *Latin America Monitor* : Central America, Monthly Regional Report (June 2011); Vol 28 Issue 6. Online; www.latinamericamonitor.com; accessed 5 October 2011.
- ⁵⁴ Business Monitor International, *Latin America Monitor* : Central America, Monthly Regional Report (June 2011); Vol 28 Issue 6. Online; www.latinamericamonitor.com; accessed 5 October 2011.
- ⁵⁵ World Bank, World Development Indicators, “Current Account Balance (% GDP)” 2006-2010, online; <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BN.CAB.XOKA.GD.ZS> accessed 30 September 2011
- ⁵⁶ IndexMundi, “GDP per capita, PPP (current international \$)” online; <http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD/compare#country=gt> accessed 30 September 2011
- ⁵⁷ Guatemala GINI has improved at a faster average rate of change than in 75 percent of the observed changes in the last 25 years. However, even with the positive change, Guatemala still ranks poorly when comparing the Gini level across all countries. World Bank Group, *Guatemala Poverty Assessment: Good Performances at Low Levels*, March 18, 2009.
- ⁵⁸ IndexMundi, “GINI index” time series country comparison for Central America, online; <http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/SI.POV.GINI/compare#country=bz:cr:sv:gt:hn:ni:p> accessed 5 October 2011.
- ⁵⁹ Martorana K.M., *Making a Grave Concern in Guatemala’s elections*, Policy Innovations, September 9, 2011; online; <http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/commentary/data/000221> accessed 30 September 2011
- ⁶⁰ CIA World Factbook, “Guatemala”, online; <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gt.html>, accessed 30 September 2011
- ⁶¹ U.S. Department of State, *Background Note: Guatemala (July 2011)*; online; <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2045.htm> accessed October 10, 2011.
- ⁶² CIDA country profile: “Guatemala”; online; <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/guatemala-e#a2>; accessed: October 9, 2011
- ⁶³ World Bank Development Indicators
- ⁶⁴ Ibid.
- ⁶⁵ Ibid.
- ⁶⁶ Ibid.
- ⁶⁷ Ibid.
- ⁶⁸ Ibid.
- ⁶⁹ CIA World Factbook. “Guatemala Background.” online; <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gt.html> accessed 28 September 2011

⁷⁰ Gini Coefficient comparison, CIA World Factbook: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2172rank.html>

⁷¹ U.S. Department of State, *Background Note: Guatemala*; online: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2045.htm> accessed October 10, 2011.

⁷² CIDA country profile: "Guatemala"; online: <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/guatemala-e#a2>; accessed: October 9, 2011

⁷³ CIDA country profile: "Guatemala"; online: <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/guatemala-e#a2>; accessed: October 9, 2011

⁷⁴ CIA World Factbook, "Guatemala", online; <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gt.html>, accessed 30 September 2011

⁷⁵ CIA World Factbook, "Guatemala", online; <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gt.html>, accessed 30 September 2011

⁷⁶ CIA World Factbook, "Guatemala", online; <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gt.html>, accessed 30 September 2011