

# Diplomacy – A Canadian Foreign Policy Review 2011

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### **List of Acronyms**

CFPII	Canadian Foreign Policy Interest Indicator
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CUSFTA	Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DND	Department of National Defence
FPDU	Foreign Policy Development Unit
ICT	Information Communications Technology
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PDP	Public Diplomacy Program
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

## Executive Summary

Canada's failure to obtain a seat on the United Nations Security Council last year brought much attention to how far Canada's reputation has fallen. The reputation of Canadian diplomacy was historically held in high regard, first as a loyal yet sensible member of the British Empire, and then as a fervent multilateralist committed to advancing global cooperation and welfare. Canada nurtured and maintained this reputation for many decades, but lately this image has begun to tarnish from neglect.

The decline of Canadian diplomacy coincided with the election of Stephen Harper in 2005. Canada's foreign policy objectives became confused. Apathetic political leadership resulted in a foreign policy void of guiding principles. Foreign policy today is opportunistic, ad hoc, reactive and often manipulated to appease ethnic voters. Canadian interests have suffered as Canadian policy is self-defeating; bureaucrats are unsure about government policy; and the attrition of modern foreign policy tools has reduced Canada's capacity to advance its influence.

Looking forward, but keeping our past in mind, Canadian policy-makers will be faced with a number of questions:

- What does Canada hope to accomplish in the international community?
- Should Canadian diplomacy reflect Canadian values or interests?
- How much capacity does Canada have to effectively project itself internationally?

The world is changing rapidly. Canada no longer enjoys the status it did following World War II. The much vaunted "rise of the rest" has seen the relative decline of Canada's position in the world. Canadian foreign policy today is bounded by the constraints of fiscal austerity, the growing influence of diaspora politics on electoral politics, and political uncertainty from minority governments. Canada cannot be everywhere or do everything at once. Canada's strategy for engaging the world will inevitably result in 'winners' and 'losers' at home and abroad.

The news is not all bad. The new international environment in which Canada finds itself will surely present challenges, but also opportunities. To prepare for this new environment, Canada needs a clear, objective strategy to address both. To this end, the Canadian Foreign Policy Interest Indicator was developed, which measures a region's significance to Canada by integrating Canadian interests and values with Canada's capacity to effect change. It recommends the following:

- Promote trade relations and democracy support in the Asia-Pacific region
- Provide socio-economic assistance and democracy support in Sub-Saharan Africa
- Integrate public and cyber diplomacy practices in engaging the Americas and Europe
- Maintain prudent vigilance over the Middle East and North Africa region
- Establish a Foreign Policy Development Unit to enhance interdepartmental cooperation.

Knowing what one wants is winning half the battle. Canada must seize the moment and reassert itself in the world. This document presents some ideas on how DFAIT can get started on this important task and define Canada for years to come. The world is waiting. Drum rolls. Canada is back, this time for real.

## CONTEXT

### *Current Situation*

The most serious problem facing Canada with respect to diplomacy is the absence of a strategic direction to engage the international community. There is no clear articulation of what Canada hopes to accomplish in the international community. This has resulted in a fragmented foreign policy that is incapable of delivering measurable results for Canadians. The lack of specified goals also means that when a policy is articulated, the bureaucracy is unable to coordinate line departments in an effective and efficient manner. Without a clear vision about its future, implementation difficulties will continue to undermine Canadian diplomatic efforts.

**Di·plo·ma·cy (noun):**  
*The art or practice of conducting international relations.*

In 2007, Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced the launch of the Americas Strategy. By doing so, the government correctly recognized an important constraint of diplomacy: Canada is unable to sustain concerted diplomatic activities around the world simultaneously lest Canadian efforts become “a mile wide and an inch thick.” While a dispassionate analysis of Canadian values and interests demonstrates that a regional approach is certainly desirable, there are other regions that would make for better priorities. Moreover, the Americas strategy has suffered from implementation failures because it was presented in the form of a concept rather than an official strategic document.

### *Past Policy and Trends*

The practice of conducting international policy reviews is not a new phenomenon in Canada. Over the past decades, such reviews have been a normal part of Canadian policy-making. Prime Minister Paul Martin issued the most recent foreign policy review in 2005, entitled *A Role of Pride and Influence*. Ten years earlier, Jean Chrétien articulated Canadian international priorities in *Canada in the World*, and the government of Pierre Elliot Trudeau issued *Foreign Policy for Canadians* in 1970. Although Prime Minister Brian Mulroney did not issue a formal strategic document concerning Canadian diplomacy, his clear choice of focussing on Canada-US relations was evident from his pursuit of NAFTA, the securing of American cooperation over the Northwest Passage, and the signing of an environmental agreement on acid rain.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Paul Heinbecker, *Getting Back in the Game: A Foreign Policy Playbook for Canada* (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2010), 79.

A number of commentators have suggested that the central problem with Canadian diplomacy is that it is significantly underfunded.<sup>2</sup> However, an analysis of Canada's budgets over the past 15 years indicates that the spending trend at DFAIT has actually been steadily increasing over time. DFAIT's planned spending for 2010-2011 represents yet another increase, according to the Treasury Board Secretariat's *Report on Plans and Priorities* (see Appendix A). As such, efforts aimed at improving Canadian diplomatic efforts must not only focus on increasing DFAIT's budget, but must also seek ways to improve efficiency. Articulating a clear foreign policy strategy will allow Canadian diplomatic efforts to be more efficient and consequently more effective.

### *Indicators*

#### 1. Absence of Foreign Policy Reviews

As mentioned above, foreign policy reviews have been important in setting Canada's international agenda. Despite this, after five years the Harper government has failed to issue such a document. The only foreign policy papers released by the current government include the *Global Commerce Strategy* (2008) and the *Canada First Defence Strategy* (2008). This suggests that Harper emphasizes trade and security in engaging the world. However, a lack of overarching policy direction has disjointed these issues from other aspects of Canadian diplomacy.

#### 2. Reactive Policies: UN Security Council, China, Visas

Canada's failed UNSC bid was a focusing event reflecting a lack of long-term diplomatic strategy. Some commentators have asserted that Canada's lost bid is explained by its decreasing ODA to Africa, its reluctance to act on climate change, its withdrawal from UN peacekeeping operations and its unwavering support for Israel.<sup>3</sup> Despite this, Canada decided "at the last moment to blitz a campaign", revealing a reactive and ad hoc approach to conducting foreign policy.<sup>4</sup>

This inconsistency can also be seen in Canada's policies towards China. Upon coming into office, Harper lowered China's priority, emphasized human rights issues to the dismay of

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<sup>2</sup> Anca Gurzu, "Foreign Affairs: Trimmer and Quicker, or Guttled?" *Center for International Governance Innovation*. 3 March 2010. <http://www.cigionline.org/articles/2010/03/foreign-affairs-trimmer-and-quicker-or-guttled> [accessed 7 March 2011]; Heinbecker, *Getting Back in the Game*, 227.

<sup>3</sup> Denis Stairs, "Being Rejected in the United Nations: The Causes and Implications of Canada's Failure to Win a Seat in the UN Security Council," (Calgary: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, March 2011), 10.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, 12.

Chinese leaders, and failed to visit China until 2009. At the same time, Harper sought to increase trade with China and listed the country as a priority market in the *Global Commerce Strategy*.<sup>5</sup>

Finally, Canada's reactive approach to diplomacy is evident from the government's handling of a number of visa issues. In 2009, Immigration Minister Jason Kenney announced that Canada would impose visa restrictions on visitors from Mexico and the Czech Republic in order to stem an increasing flow of asylum claims from those countries.<sup>6</sup> This reactionary decision led to the Czech Republic recalling its ambassador, and both Mexico and the Czech Republic imposing visa requirements on Canadian diplomats.<sup>7</sup> The lack of foresight by Ottawa was later confirmed by an internal report, which admitted the measure would bring in about \$90-million in visa fees, but that Canada would incur \$180 to \$300 million in additional screening costs, not to mention the negative impact it would have on tourism.<sup>8</sup>

### 3. Implementation Failure: Americas Strategy

Four years after announcing the Americas Strategy, there have been few noticeable changes in Canada's relationship with the region. The strategy has been hampered by bureaucratic confusion and a lack of commitment, creating poorly implemented policies which have worked at cross purposes.<sup>9</sup> For example, despite ratifying a free trade agreement with Colombia, Canada still requires visas for Colombians to enter Canada which slows commercial interactions. The agreement has also been criticized as sacrificing economic interest at the expense of Canadian values, considering the level of human rights abuses that are reported in Colombia. An internal report has found that there is no clear understanding of the Americas Strategy within DFAIT, little coordination exists between departments, and no funding increases have been allocated in support of the project.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>DFAIT, "Seizing Global Advantage: A Global Commerce Strategy for Securing Canada's Growth and Prosperity," (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2008): 11.

<sup>6</sup>CBC News, "Mexico Slaps Visa Requirements on Canadian Diplomats," *CBC News Online*. 16 July 2009. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2009/07/16/cannon-mexico-espinoza-visa016.html> [accessed 1 April 2011].

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Campbell Clark, "Ottawa Admits Visa Policy Will Hurt Tourism," *The Globe and Mail Online*. 9 August 2009. <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-admits-visa-policy-will-hurt/article1246287/> [accessed 25 March 2011].

<sup>9</sup>Globe Editorial, "Canada is No Longer a Leader in the Americas," *The Globe and Mail Online*. 9 August 2009. [http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/editorials/canada-is-no-longer-a-leader-in-the-americas/article1968891/?utm\\_medium=Feeds%3A%20RSS%2FAtom&utm\\_source=World&utm\\_content=1968891](http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/editorials/canada-is-no-longer-a-leader-in-the-americas/article1968891/?utm_medium=Feeds%3A%20RSS%2FAtom&utm_source=World&utm_content=1968891) [accessed 2 April 2011].

<sup>10</sup>Jennifer Ditchburn, "Harper's Americas Strategy Falling Short," *The Winnipeg Free Press Online*. 16 March 2011. <http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/canada/breakingnews/harpers-americas-strategy-mucho-talk-poco-action--118120014.html> [accessed 20 March 2011].

#### 4. Capacity: Democracy Promotion and Public Diplomacy

**Public Diplomacy (noun):**

*The ways in which a country or organization communicates with citizens in other societies.*

The absence of guiding principles in Canadian diplomacy has had detrimental effects on Canada's capacity to implement a modernized foreign policy. Since strategies and programs are not rooted in objective analysis of global trends and needs, they will be susceptible to political manipulation. The prominence of ICT has enhanced the importance of using public diplomacy to successfully engage others. Canada's diminishing *traditional influence* suggests that Canada may benefit from a *soft power* approach, especially since DFAIT is considered to have one of the most advanced ICT systems in the world.<sup>11</sup> However, the PDP was shut down in 2005 despite an internal report which found that the program was highly successful and should be mainstreamed into DFAIT's policy-making process.<sup>12</sup>

Apart from facilitating public diplomacy, cyber diplomacy can be used to reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies. For example, cyber diplomacy enables Canada to establish new trade and representation missions abroad that can be rapidly deployed with low staffing requirements. It is estimated that only 1-2 CBS and 3-5 LES would be required for an effective 'cyber' mission.<sup>13</sup>

Lastly, democracy promotion has long been a central element of Canadian foreign policy. It is marketed as a Canadian niche and is consistent with Canadian values. However, democracy-promoting organizations have recently been hampered by budget cuts, program eliminations and political interference.<sup>14</sup> These include DFAIT's Democracy Unit and CIDA's Office for Democratic Governance, both of which have been disbanded. Similarly, political interference in the program activities of Rights and Democracy has led to a partisan democracy promotion agenda. Therefore, the extent to which Canada continues to possess the capacity for democracy promotion is questionable.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Evan Potter, "Canada and the New Public Diplomacy," *International Journal* 58, no. 1 (Winter, 2002 / 2003): 14.

<sup>12</sup> Foreign Affairs Canada and International Trade, "Evaluation of the Public Diplomacy of Foreign Affairs Canada," July 2005. [http://www.international.gc.ca/about-a\\_propos/oig-big/2005/evaluation/diplomacy\\_program-programme\\_diplomatique.aspx?lang=eng#public](http://www.international.gc.ca/about-a_propos/oig-big/2005/evaluation/diplomacy_program-programme_diplomatique.aspx?lang=eng#public) [accessed 7 March 2011].

<sup>13</sup> Smith, Gordon and Allen Sutherland, "Real-Time Implications and Applications," in *Cyber-Diplomacy: Managing Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century*, edited by Evan H. Potter (Montreal: McGill University Press, 2002): 167.

<sup>14</sup> CBC News, "Rights and Democracy Torn by Dissent," 4 February 2010. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2010/02/03/rights-democracy-dissent.html> [accessed 7 March 2011].

<sup>15</sup> Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Official Response to eDiscussion on Democracy Promotion," 20 April 2007. [http://www.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/discussions/democracy-democratie/official\\_response-reponse\\_officiel.aspx?lang=eng](http://www.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/discussions/democracy-democratie/official_response-reponse_officiel.aspx?lang=eng) [accessed 7 March 2011].

## **POLICY PROCESS**

### ***Goals and Objectives, Values and Interests***

Without having issued a foreign policy review, the goals and objectives of the current government remain unclear. However, some of Canada's goals and objectives have remained consistent over time and are unlikely to change with the current government. There are four 'values' that have long been cornerstones of Canadian foreign policy: the rule of law, freedom, democracy and human rights.<sup>16</sup> Canadian 'interests' are motivated by two overarching themes: ensuring Canadian security and securing Canadian economic prosperity.<sup>17</sup> The realization of these goals and objectives should form the basis of Canadian diplomatic activities.

### ***Stakeholders***

**Table 1: Stakeholder Analysis**

<b><u>Stakeholder</u></b>	<b><u>Strategic Interest in Canadian Diplomacy</u></b>
DFAIT / CIDA / DND	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● A coherent strategy demands all "three D" departments to coordinate and increase complementarity of policies.</li><li>● Competition among departments over files may occur.</li></ul>
Democracy-Promoting NGOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Democracy promotion can be claimed as a niche area for Canada, which has developed a reputation in the area.</li><li>● Increased attention can result in these organizations receiving additional funding.</li></ul>
Regional Organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● A regional approach to diplomacy means Canada cannot, and will not, be active in all regions. Some regional organizations will receive more attention relative to others.</li><li>● Canada may not be welcome in all organizations, even as observers.</li></ul>
Canadian Businesses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Some industries will benefit from a regional approach, especially in areas where new trade missions open.</li><li>● Other industries may suffer from a lack of Canadian diplomatic presence in non-priority countries.</li></ul>

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Treasury Board Secretariat of Canada, "Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade – Report on Plans and Priorities," <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2010-2011/inst/ext/ext01-eng.asp#s11> [accessed 18 March 2011].



Ethnic Diasporas in Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Regional focus implies that certain ethnic groups' interest will be prioritized relative to others.</li><li>● Ethnic diasporas may mobilize politically to advocate in favour of engagement in certain regions.</li></ul>
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## **POLICY ANALYSIS**

### *Constraints*

#### 1. Budgetary Constraints

Budgetary constraints have long been a central constraint on DFAIT's activities. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney slashed DFAIT's budget 16 times, which was replicated a further 10 times by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien.<sup>18</sup> Despite the fact that DFAIT's budgets have been increasing in recent years, Canadian diplomacy continues to suffer from resource scarcity. The emergence of new global challenges and the increasing number of actors in the international system means that Canada does not have the resources to tackle every problem and must therefore prioritize diplomatic initiatives accordingly.

#### 2. Systemic Discontinuities of Democratic Governments

Democratic systems constrain viable options for diplomacy because of the uncertainty that occurs during elections. New governments are associated with policy discontinuities. Historically, this has been true in Canada, as exemplified by Harper's shift from Africa to Latin America and Mulroney's promotion of the CUSFTA following Trudeau's nationalistic policies. Elections are systematic barriers to policy continuity and coherency.<sup>19</sup> The problem can only be overcome if governments are willing to base their foreign policy on the best investments for Canada, as derived from a dispassionate analysis of Canadian values, interests, and capacities.

#### 3. Diaspora Politics

Regional engagement may result in diaspora groups lobbying for attention in their respective regions, posing political problems for elected officials. The need to pacify certain diaspora interests may prevent the implementation of an objective policy in Canada's national

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<sup>18</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. "Punching Above our Weight: A History of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade," <http://www.international.gc.ca/history-histoire/departement-ministere/1984-present.aspx?lang=eng> [accessed 18 March 2011].

<sup>19</sup> Brian Tomlin, Norman Hillmer and Fen Hampson, *Canada's International Policies: Agendas, Alternatives, and Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

interest if politicians espouse foreign policies that generate votes but are detrimental to Canada's long-term future.<sup>20</sup>

### ***Alternatives***

The following alternatives represent regions in which Canada may want to seek deeper engagement. The CFPII was created to objectively evaluate where Canada should focus its diplomatic efforts based on the goals and objectives discussed above. This tool balances Canada's interests and values with Canada's capacity to effect change in a given region.

The regional index scores are provided in Table 2 and a complete survey and methodology is provided in Appendix B.

**Table 2: Regional Index Results**

Americas	Europe	Asia-Pacific	Middle East and North Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
5.21	3.21	6.52	5.66	6.56

The CFPII scores indicate that Canada should seek stronger engagement in the Asia-Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa regions. Given that both regions have close scores, policy alternatives will be assessed for both regions. Alternatives will also be considered for other regions, all of which is presented in Tables 3-5.

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<sup>20</sup>Anca Gurzu, "How Diaspora Politics are Beginning to Drive Canada's Foreign Policy," *Embassy Magazine Online*, 16 March 2011. <http://www.embassymag.ca/page/view/ethnic-03-16-2011> [accessed 23 March 2011]; Christian Leuprecht and Todd Hataley, "Just How Liberal and Democratic is Canadian Foreign Policy?" in *The World in Canada: Diaspora, Demography, and Domestic Politics*, edited by David Carment and David Bercuson (Montreal: MQUP, 2008).

**Table 3: Asia-Pacific Alternatives**

Asia-Pacific	Action	Expected Outcomes
Trade Promotion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deploy additional trade officers to key countries in the region, with the intent to secure trade deals and assist Canadians conducting business overseas.</li> <li>• Facilitate visa access for those travelling on business from the Asia-Pacific region.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Canada will incur some cost in opening missions or reallocating diplomats to the Asian-Pacific region. This can be minimized by incorporating elements of cyber-diplomacy into policy execution.</li> <li>• Increased trade linkages and economic opportunities for Canadian businesses.</li> </ul>
Democracy Support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increase democracy support initiatives by deploying to countries in the region where there is a demand for Canadian assistance.</li> <li>• Collaborate with existing democracies in the region (e.g. Japan) to facilitate cultural-linguistic access.</li> <li>• Reopen Canadian democracy support offices in CIDA and/or DFAIT, focusing on Asia-Pacific.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improved civil society participation and more robust pro-democracy movements</li> <li>• Limited impact in authoritarian regimes such as China, North Korea and Burma, which are against foreign intervention in domestic politics.</li> </ul>
Socio-Economic Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide funding to Canadian NGOs to undertake development projects in the Asian-Pacific region.</li> <li>• Cooperate with developed economies in the region and the Asian Development Bank to promote regional development strategies.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Some improvement in the distribution of wealth may result if projects target remote and underdeveloped communities.</li> <li>• Canada's lack of historical and cultural ties may place it at a comparative disadvantage, limiting positive outcomes.</li> </ul>

**Table 4: Sub-Saharan Africa Alternatives**

Sub-Saharan Africa	Action	Expected Outcomes
Trade Promotion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deploy additional trade officers to key countries in the region, with the intent to secure trade deals and assist Canadians conducting business overseas.</li> <li>• Facilitate visa access for those travelling on business from the Sub-Saharan Africa region.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Economic growth is decent but productivity is low; therefore, attractiveness to Canadian investors will remain low.</li> <li>• Trade is unlikely to be profitable across all countries in the region, creating trade ‘darlings’ (e.g. South Africa) and ‘orphans’ (e.g. Zimbabwe).</li> </ul>
Democracy Support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increase democracy support initiatives by deploying resources to regions where there is a demand for Canadian assistance.</li> <li>• Focus Canadian support via the member organizations of the Africa Democracy Forum</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improved democratic institutions across the region.</li> <li>• Canadian reputation in the region may be reclaimed; views of Canada having ‘abandoned’ Africa will be mitigated.</li> <li>• Likelihood of success is high based on cultural and historic affinity with the region.</li> </ul>
Socio-Economic Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Channel ODA to countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa region.</li> <li>• Provide funding to Canadian NGOs to undertake development projects in the Sub-Saharan Africa region.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mitigates suffering from disease, poverty, and environmental degradation.</li> <li>• Canadian reputation in the region will be reclaimed; views of Canada having ‘abandoned’ Africa will be minimized.</li> <li>• Likelihood of success is high, based on cultural and historic affinity with the region.</li> </ul>

**Table 5: Other Regional Alternatives**

Other Regions	Action	Expected Outcomes
Maintain Status Quo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Maintain reactive and ad hoc strategies in dealing with low-priority regions.</li> <li>● Maintain current levels of program funding.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Canada’s reputation may be cemented as a unilateralist and more concerned with domestic priorities rather than international problems.</li> <li>● Decline in foreign service officer morale as opportunities for deployment decrease.</li> <li>● No budget savings are accrued to divert to other programs.</li> </ul>
Disengage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Decrease program activities in low-priority regions.</li> <li>● Reallocate resources from discontinued programs toward regions of focus.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Decline in foreign service officer morale as opportunities for deployment decrease.</li> <li>● Lost opportunities / increased difficulties in access to overseas markets for Canadian businesses.</li> </ul>
Cyber Diplomacy and Public Diplomacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Use ICT to promote the government’s message in regions with high ICT connectivity.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Missions scaled down substantially while reaching a wider public audience, especially in Europe and the Americas.</li> <li>● Canada loses personal interaction with foreign dignitaries and legislators.</li> <li>● Strategy faces major challenges in the Middle East and North African region due to low broadband subscriptions.</li> </ul>

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### 1. Asia Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa

The preceding tables suggest that Canada should seek closer engagement in both the Asia-Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa regions. The close scores between the two regions indicate that they have equal importance in reference to Canada's interests and capacities. At the same time, Canada's interests in the two regions differ substantially. Whereas the Asia-Pacific region is vital for Canadian trade and economic growth, Sub-Saharan Africa is primarily a security-humanitarian and development concern. Therefore, Canadian priorities in Asia-Pacific should be focused on increasing trade and investment, whereas activities in Sub-Saharan Africa should be concerned primarily with socio-economic development.

Although democracy promotion is recommended for both regions, the type of democracy support differs. Threats to freedom and democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa are evident in the number of coups, rigged elections, dictatorships and civil conflicts. Canada's democracy promotion efforts should aim towards institution building, electoral monitoring and maintenance of peace. The main problems facing Asian-Pacific countries are mainly accountability, transparency and government crackdown on civil society. This suggests that Canada's democracy support efforts in the region should focus on strengthening civil society and the rule of law.<sup>21</sup>

### 2. Americas and Europe

To prevent the substantial loss of Canadian influence in other regions, this review recommends the extended use of public diplomacy and cyber-diplomacy to engage Europe and the Americas. These activities are likely to be the most successful in these regions, as they possess relatively high rates of broadband subscriptions (see Appendix C). The United States has already begun this trend by using Latin America and the Caribbean as a testing ground for increased use of cyber-diplomacy.<sup>22</sup> As a cost saving measure, this ensures that more resources will be made available for Canada's priority regions of Asia-Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa.

**Cyber Di·plo·ma·cy (noun):** *New methods and modes of conducting diplomacy and international relations with the help of the Internet and information and communication technologies.*

<sup>21</sup> Arch Puddington, "Freedom in the World 2010: Erosion of Freedom Intensifies," *Freedom House*.  
[http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw10/FIW\\_2010\\_Overview\\_Essay.pdf](http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw10/FIW_2010_Overview_Essay.pdf) [Accessed 1 April 2011].

<sup>22</sup> U.S. Department of State, "Remarks – Judith A. McHale: Public Diplomacy and Social Media in Latin America,"  
<http://www.state.gov/r/remarks/2011/159355.htm> [accessed 1 April 2011].


### 3. Middle East and North Africa

Considering the instability that is currently plaguing the Middle East, Canada's best option is to maintain the status quo in those countries. The outcome of protests and civil uprising is uncertain. Therefore, Canada should be prepared to take a leadership role in democracy promotion if the situation becomes more ripe for such an intervention. However, the current context of instability largely precludes Canada from being able to make a significant contribution in that region.

### 4. Bureaucratic Changes


Lastly, to promote continuity and coherence, the FPDU should be created. The FPDU will be headed by DFAIT and serve as a central coordinating mechanism for all foreign policy initiatives undertaken by DFAIT, CIDA, DND and other government departments (both federal and provincial) that deal with matters of foreign policy. This will allow Canada to speak with one voice on foreign policy matters and reduce policy contradictions.

## Optimal Timeline





**Appendix A - DFAIT Departmental Spending**  
**Actual and Planned (Millions CAD)**



## **Appendix B – Canadian Foreign Policy Interest Indicator Dataset**

The methodology of the CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY INTEREST INDICATOR (CFPII) seeks to assess the suitability of global regions for Canadian engagement. It incorporates Canada's economic-security interests with historical Canadian values. The following proxies are used as indicators of a state's capacity in each category:

<b><u>Variable</u></b>	<b><u>Source</u></b>	<b><u>Method of Measure</u></b>
<b>Security</b>		
<i>Health:</i> Tuberculosis	World Health Organization	Number of reported cases in country is divided by the highest recorded case in dataset. The quotient is then multiplied by 10 to produce an index number.
<i>State Failure:</i> Criminalization / Delegitimization of State	Fund For Peace	Index score directly retrieved from source.
<b>Values</b>		
Democracy	Economist Intelligence Unit	Source index was inverted to make it consistent with CFPII scores.
Rule of Law and Human Rights	Fund For Peace	Index score directly retrieved from source.
<b>Economic</b>		
Economic Growth	Economist Intelligence Unit	Average five-year growth rates directly sourced.

Regional averages were calculated for all indicators. The results for each regional indicator were averaged again at equal weighting to produce a total DEMAND INDEX for each region. The total indicator reflected the need for Canada to engage each region.

The EFFECTIVENESS COEFFICIENT sought to factor Canadian capabilities within each region to ensure Canada had sufficient leverage to pursue its objectives. PERCENT OF TOTAL CANADIAN EXPORTS IN EACH REGION is used as a proxy for Canadian economic leverage and economic, interpersonal and institutional linkages. The NUMBER OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION is assumed to facilitate Canadian influence within a region by allowing direct contact with foreign leaders. The proportion of Canadian representative offices in each region is expressed as a percentage of total Canadian representative's office abroad. The trade distribution variable is weighted at 1/3 while the representation variable is weighted at 2/3. This reflects the importance of having direct access to foreign lawmakers and an acknowledgement of the limits of Canadian economic power. The EFFECTIVENESS COEFFICIENT is the weighted average of the two variables.

The CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY INTEREST INDICATOR SCORE is derived from multiplying the DEMAND INDEX with the EFFECTIVE COEFFICIENT. A higher score indicates that Canada should and could engage to region to promote its interests and values.

COUNTRY	DEMAND INDEX					EFFECTIVENESS COEFFICIENT		CFPII Score		
	SECURITY	VALUES			ECONOMIC	TOTAL	TRADE		REPRESENTATION	TOTAL
	Tuberculosis	Criminalization / Delegitimization of the State	Democracy	Rule of Law / Human Rights	Growth		Canadian Total \$37,3631,259,679		Total: 118 Offices	
SOURCE	WHO	Fund for Peace	Economist Intelligence Unit	Fund For Peace	Economist Intelligence Unit	Industry Canada	DFAIT			
<b>Americas</b>										
Argentina	0.18	3.60	3.16	4.00	5.00					
Bolivia	1.42	7.10	4.08	6.80	3.80					
Brazil	0.24	6.20	2.88	5.60	4.35					
Chile	0.03	1.80	2.33	3.60	5.45					
Colombia	0.31	7.70	3.45	7.20	4.50					
Costa Rica	0.03	3.90	1.96	3.50	4.45					
Cuba	0.02	7.00	6.48	7.40	3.70					
Dominican Republic	0.79	5.60	3.80	6.70	4.85					
Ecuador	0.92	7.40	4.23	6.00	3.00					
El Salvador	0.15	6.80	3.53	6.90	2.35					
Guatemala	0.92	7.10	3.95	7.00	3.15					
Guyana	0.92	6.80	3.95	5.40	3.00	289,935,346,000	54			
Haiti	2.42	9.30	6.00	8.50	7.50					
Honduras	0.66	7.50	4.24	6.30	3.80					
Jamaica	0.07	6.80	2.79	5.70	1.35					
Mexico	0.07	6.60	3.07	5.50	3.80					
Nicaragua	0.22	7.60	4.27	5.80	3.85					
Panama	0.12	4.80	2.85	4.70	5.75					
Paraguay	0.33	8.30	3.60	6.90	5.00					
Peru	0.38	6.90	3.60	5.50	6.30					
Surinam	2.25	6.50	3.35	6.00	3.00					
Trinidad and Tobago	0.15	5.90	2.84	5.60	2.10					
United States of America	0.03	2.50	1.82	4.00	2.80					
Uruguay	0.10	2.60	1.90	2.50	4.50					

Venezuela	0.28	7.20	4.82	7.30	2.10					
<b>AVERAGE</b>	<b>0.52</b>	<b>6.14</b>	<b>3.56</b>	<b>5.78</b>	<b>3.98</b>	<b>3.99</b>	<b>0.77599</b>	<b>0.46</b>	<b>1.56</b>	<b>6.24603</b>

<b>Asia-Pacific</b>										
Afghanistan	2.25	10.00	7.52	8.80	22.50					
Australia	0.04	1.50	0.78	2.50	2.95					
Azerbaijan	1.17	8.00	6.85	7.00	5.10					
Bangladesh	3.42	8.00	4.13	7.60	6.35					
Bhutan	0.80	6.90	5.32	8.40	6.80					
Burma	3.92	9.60	8.23	9.00	0.00					
Cambodia	5.67	8.70	5.13	7.40	5.70					
China	0.73	8.30	6.86	8.90	8.60					
Fiji	0.21	8.90	6.38	6.10	1.55					
India	1.58	5.80	2.72	6.00	8.80					
Indonesia	1.75	6.90	3.47	6.70	6.25					
Japan	0.10	1.80	1.92	3.40	1.35					
Kazakhstan	0.82	7.50	6.70	6.80	5.45	35,246,508,305		30		
DPR Korea	2.25	9.90	8.92	9.50	0.00					
South Korea	0.42	3.90	1.89	2.70	4.35					
Kyrgyzstan	1.17	8.40	5.69	7.60	4.50					
Laos	2.17	8.30	7.90	8.50	7.80					
Malaysia	1.00	5.90	3.81	6.50	5.20					
Mongolia	1.17	6.20	3.64	6.60	13.40					
Nepal	1.42	8.10	5.76	8.70	4.00					
New Zealand	0.04	1.00	0.74	1.70	2.40					
Pakistan	2.58	8.90	5.45	8.90	3.25					
Papua New Guinea	1.08	7.80	3.46	6.50	8.10					
Philippines	4.58	8.60	3.88	7.00	5.45					
Singapore	0.23	4.20	4.11	4.30	4.95					
Sri Lanka	0.61	8.60	3.36	8.50	7.70					

Tajikistan	2.75	8.90	7.49	8.60	6.50					
Thailand	1.33	8.00	3.45	6.90	4.40					
Timor Leste	5.50	9.10	2.78	7.00	7.90					
Turkmenistan	0.15	8.40	8.28	8.90	9.00					
Uzbekistan	1.58	8.50	8.26	9.20	8.85					
Vietnam	2.33	7.30	7.06	7.20	7.20					
<b>AVERAGE</b>	<b>1.71</b>	<b>7.25</b>	<b>5.07</b>	<b>6.98</b>	<b>6.14</b>	<b>5.43</b>	<b>0.09434</b>	<b>0.25</b>	<b>1.20</b>	<b>6.52050</b>

<b>Europe</b>										
Albania	0.08	6.80	4.14	5.80	4.25					
Armenia	0.56	6.60	5.91	6.10	4.20					
Austria	0.01	1.40	1.51	1.60	1.80					
Belarus	0.09	8.70	6.66	8.00	6.00					
Belgium	0.03	2.30	1.95	1.70	1.80					
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.12	8.00	4.68	5.40	2.55					
Bulgaria	0.19	5.30	3.16	4.80	3.05					
Croatia	0.13	4.80	3.19	4.70	2.45					
Cyprus	0.03	5.20	2.71	3.80	1.70					
Czech Republic	0.05	3.40	1.81	3.50	2.45					
Denmark	0.03	1.10	0.48	1.50	1.90					
Estonia	0.12	4.50	2.32	3.50	3.75					
Finland	0.04	0.70	0.81	1.70	2.85					
France	0.02	1.80	2.23	2.90	1.70					
Georgia	0.35	9.00	5.41	7.50	4.75					
Germany	0.02	2.10	1.62	2.50	2.65					
Greece	0.03	4.60	2.08	3.60	-0.90					
Hungary	0.07	5.70	2.79	3.50	2.40					
Iceland	0.01	2.00	0.35	2.10	1.40					
Ireland	0.02	1.60	1.21	1.50	0.40					
Italy	0.04	4.50	2.17	2.60	0.85					
Latvia	0.11	5.40	2.95	3.70	3.70					
							37,869,035,000		30	

Lithuania	0.28	3.90	2.76	3.50	3.35					
Luxembourg	0.01	2.70	1.12	1.50	3.00					
Macedonia	0.06	6.90	3.84	5.30	2.90					
Malta	0.09	4.10	1.72	3.60	2.20					
Moldova	0.75	7.90	3.67	7.00	4.60					
Montenegro	0.05	4.50	3.73	5.50	3.50					
Netherlands	0.03	1.20	1.01	1.20	1.60					
Norway	0.03	0.80	0.20	1.50	2.10					
Poland	0.14	4.50	2.95	4.00	3.85					
Portugal	0.13	1.90	1.98	3.70	1.00					
Romania	0.92	6.00	3.40	4.50	3.00					
Russia	0.58	8.10	5.74	8.30	4.25					
Serbia	0.06	6.80	3.67	5.80	3.80					
Slovakia	0.05	4.10	2.65	4.00	3.55					
Slovenia	0.06	2.80	2.31	3.20	2.40					
Spain	0.07	1.60	1.84	2.70	1.40					
Sweden	0.03	0.80	0.50	1.60	2.95					
Switzerland	0.01	1.00	0.91	1.70	2.00					
Ukraine	0.63	7.20	3.70	5.50	4.25					
<b>AVERAGE</b>	<b>0.15</b>	<b>4.20</b>	<b>2.63</b>	<b>3.81</b>	<b>2.72</b>	<b>2.70</b>	<b>0.10135</b>	<b>0.25</b>	<b>1.20</b>	<b>3.25011</b>

#### Middle East and North Africa

Algeria	0.13	7.50	6.56	7.60	4.00					
Bahrain	0.23	6.70	6.51	5.00	3.15					
Egypt	0.20	8.40	6.93	6.80	5.25					
Iran	0.19	9.00	8.06	8.90	2.35					
Iraq	0.92	9.00	6.00	9.30	7.00	5,318,582,000		17		
Israel	0.03	7.30	2.52	8.00	4.40					
Jordan	0.03	5.90	6.26	6.90	4.45					
Kuwait	0.25	6.00	6.12	6.90	4.25					
Lebanon	0.07	7.30	4.18	6.90	5.30					

Libya	0.23	7.30	8.06	8.10	-6.75					
Mauritania	5.83	7.50	6.14	7.10	6.15					
Morocco	0.40	7.20	6.21	6.70	4.55					
Oman	0.05	6.00	7.14	6.40	4.85					
Qatar	0.45	6.30	6.91	4.50	10.70					
Saudi Arabia	0.10	8.20	8.16	8.90	5.15					
Syria	0.13	8.60	7.69	8.60	4.65					
Tunisia	0.08	6.40	7.21	7.40	3.05					
Turkey	0.18	6.00	4.27	6.00	5.10					
United Arab Emirates	0.06	6.70	7.48	5.80	4.75					
Yemen	0.65	8.70	7.36	7.70	3.00					
<b>AVERAGE</b>	<b>0.51</b>	<b>7.30</b>	<b>6.49</b>	<b>7.18</b>	<b>4.27</b>	<b>5.15</b>	<b>0.01423</b>	<b>0.14</b>	<b>1.10</b>	<b>5.66709</b>

<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>										
Angola	1.58	8.10	6.68	7.20	3.55					
Benin	1.08	6.40	3.83	5.60	3.55					
Botswana	4.67	5.30	2.37	5.00	6.15					
Burkina Faso	4.08	7.70	6.41	6.50	4.40					
Burundi	5.58	7.60	5.99	7.60	4.50					
Cameroon	1.25	9.00	6.59	8.00	3.65					
Cape Verde	2.33	7.20	2.06	6.20	5.75					
Central African Republic	3.50	9.00	8.18	8.90	4.55					
Chad	4.83	9.90	8.48	9.50	5.75	1,753,257,784		19		
Comoros	0.54	8.20	6.59	7.00	2.60					
Democratic Republic of Congo	5.50	8.80	7.85	9.00	6.40					
Republic of Congo	3.25	9.10	7.11	7.90	6.25					
Djibouti	5.58	7.20	7.80	6.20	4.85					
Ethiopia	4.67	7.70	6.32	8.50	9.50					
Equatorial Guinea	0.53	9.60	8.16	9.20	2.30					
Eritrea	0.68	8.80	7.69	7.90	12.00					

Gabon	3.42	7.80	6.71	6.30	5.60					
Gambia	3.25	7.60	6.62	6.90	5.40					
Ghana	3.33	5.10	3.98	4.70	8.10					
Guinea	4.58	9.80	7.21	9.00	4.50					
Guinea-Bissau	1.83	9.10	8.01	8.00	0.30					
Ivory Coast	6.08	9.00	6.98	8.50	0.30					
Kenya	1.50	9.30	5.29	8.20	5.35					
Lesotho	4.08	7.20	3.98	6.50	4.00					
Liberia	3.50	7.10	4.93	6.70	7.65					
Madagascar	3.58	7.10	6.06	5.90	4.00					
Malawi	2.58	8.10	4.16	7.50	6.10					
Mali	6.25	5.40	3.99	5.20	5.45					
Mauritius	0.33	5.10	1.96	3.90	4.00					
Mozambique	3.92	7.50	5.10	7.20	7.40					
Namibia	2.42	4.80	3.77	6.00	4.40					
Niger	2.75	8.90	6.62	8.20	6.75					
Nigeria	5.08	9.40	6.53	8.60	6.35					
Rwanda	6.00	7.50	6.75	7.30	7.40					
Senegal	4.67	5.90	4.73	6.00	4.30					
Sierra Leone	10.00	7.70	5.49	7.00	5.30					
Somalia	3.83	10.00	8.80	9.90	0.00					
South Africa	5.08	5.80	2.21	4.50	3.40					
Sudan	1.33	9.90	7.58	9.80	4.20					
Swaziland	6.42	8.60	7.10	7.50	2.05					
Tanzania	1.08	6.50	4.36	5.80	7.30					
Togo	7.75	7.50	6.55	7.60	3.75					
Uganda	2.83	7.90	4.95	7.70	6.65					
Zambia	2.17	7.50	4.32	5.60	7.00					
Zimbabwe	6.58	9.60	7.36	9.90	0.00					
<b>AVERAGE</b>	<b>3.69</b>	<b>7.83</b>	<b>5.87</b>	<b>7.25</b>	<b>4.95</b>	<b>5.92</b>	<b>0.00469</b>	<b>0.16</b>	<b>1.11</b>	<b>6.56118</b>



### Appendix C - Percentage of Population with Broadband Subscription

Country	Subscription Rate	Country	Subscription Rate	Country	Subscription Rate
<b>Americas</b>		China	28.90	Czech Republic	64.43
Argentina	34.00	Fiji	13.45	Denmark	86.84
Bolivia	11.18	India	5.12	Estonia	72.50
Brazil	39.22	Indonesia	8.70	Finland	82.49
Chile	41.30	Japan	78.00	France	71.58
Colombia	49.36	Kazakhstan	18.20	Georgia	30.51
Costa Rica	32.42	DPR Korea	0.00	Germany	79.26
Cuba	14.33	South Korea	34.82	Greece	44.54
Dominican Republic	26.77	Kyrgyzstan	40.03	Hungary	61.81
Ecuador	24.60	Laos	6.00	Iceland	93.46
El Salvador	12.11	Malaysia	55.90	Ireland	67.38
Guatemala	16.25	Mongolia	0.00	Italy	48.83
Guyana	24.87	Nepal	1.97	Latvia	66.84
Haiti	9.97	New Zealand	79.70	Lithuania	59.76
Honduras	9.80	Pakistan	11.30	Luxembourg	87.31
Jamaica	58.16	Papua New Guinea	1.86	Macedonia	51.77
Mexico	28.30	Philippines	9.00	Malta	58.86
Nicaragua	3.48	Singapore	68.29	Moldova	37.00
Panama	27.79	Sri Lanka	8.78	Montenegro	44.86
Paraguay	17.40	Tajikistan	10.07	Netherlands	89.63
Peru	31.40	Thailand	25.80	Norway	92.08
Surinam	31.36	Timor Leste	0.19	Poland	58.97
Trinidad and Tobago	44.30	Turkmenistan	1.57	Portugal	48.27
United States of America	78.00	Uzbekistan	17.06	Romania	36.60
Uruguay	41.80	Vietnam	26.55	Russia	29.00
Venezuela	31.20	<b>AVERAGE</b>	<b>20.77</b>	Serbia	41.70
<b>AVERAGE</b>	<b>29.57</b>	<b>Europe</b>		Slovakia	75.17
<b>Asia-Pacific</b>		Albania	41.20	Slovenia	64.28
Afghanistan	3.55	Armenia	6.75	Spain	62.62
Australia	74.25	Austria	73.45	Sweden	90.80
Azerbaijan	27.40	Belarus	27.43	Switzerland	81.30
Bangladesh	0.38	Belgium	76.20	Ukraine	17.00
		Bosnia and Herzegovina	37.74	United Kingdom	83.56
				<b>AVERAGE</b>	<b>59.27</b>

Bhutan	7.17	Bulgaria	45.00
Burma	0.22	Croatia	50.58
Cambodia	0.53	Cyprus	49.81

Country	Subscription Rate	Country	Subscription Rate
<b>Middle East and North Africa</b>		Djibouti	3.00
Algeria	13.47	Ethiopia	0.54
Bahrain	53.00	Equatorial Guinea	2.13
Egypt	24.26	Eritrea	0.00
Iran	11.07	Gabon	6.70
Iraq	1.06	Gambia	7.63
Israel	63.12	Ghana	5.44
Jordan	26.00	Guinea	0.94
Kuwait	36.85	Guinea-Bissau	2.30
Lebanon	23.68	Ivory Coast	4.59
Libya	5.51	Kenya	10.04
Mauritania	2.28	Lesotho	3.72
Morocco	41.30	Liberia	0.51
Oman	51.50	Madagascar	1.63
Qatar	40.00	Malawi	4.69
Saudi Arabia	38.00	Mali	1.92
Syria	20.40	Mauritius	22.51
Tunisia	34.07	Mozambique	2.68
Turkey	36.40	Namibia	5.87
United Arab Emirates	75.00	Niger	0.76
Yemen	9.96	Nigeria	28.43
<b>AVERAGE</b>	<b>30.35</b>	Rwanda	4.50
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>		Senegal	14.50
Angola	3.28	Sierra Leone	0.26
Benin	2.24	Somalia	1.16
Botswana	6.15	South Africa	81.60
Burkina Faso	1.13	Sudan	0.00
Burundi	1.90	Swaziland	7.60
		Tanzania	1.55

Cameroon	3.84	Togo	5.38
Cape Verde	29.67	Uganda	9.78
Central African Republic	0.51	Zambia	6.31
Chad	1.50	Zimbabwe	11.36
Comoros	3.59	<b>AVERAGE</b>	<b>7.12</b>
Democratic Republic of Congo	0.00		
Republic of Congo	6.66		