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FRICITION ALONG THE SAHELIAN FAULT LINE: ETHNIC CONFLICT IN NORTHERN MALI

Policy Briefing presented to:
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Canada



Agenda

- Objective
- Background
- 2012 – Current Conflict
 - New Actors
 - Causes
 - Current Conditions
- Policy Analysis
 - Methodology
 - Options
 - Recommendation





Objective

- Obtain approval-in-principle for recommended policy option to address current conflict in Mali from a Government of Canada (GC) perspective.





Background



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Country statistics

- Geographic Area: 1.2 M km²
- Total Population: 14.2 M
- Ethnic Concentration:

Mande 50%

Peul 17%

Voltaic 12%

Tuareg 10%

Songai 6%

Other: 5%



- GDP/Capita: \$1,200 USD
- Human Development Index: 175 out of 187
- Democracy Index: 63 out of 167
- Corruption Perception Index: 118 out of 182
- World Press Freedom: 25 out of 179



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
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Traditional actors

Direct

- Tuareg Groups and Moors
- Mali Government
- Mali Military
- Ganda Koy


Indirect

- Libya
 - Niger
 - Algeria
- 






Traditional grievances and causes

- Post – Colonialism
 - Desertification and Droughts
 - Ethnic Tension for Resources and Opportunities
 - Lack of Government Capacity
 - Economic Capacity
 - Security Capacity
 - Minority Marginalization
 - Military Experience Gained Abroad
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Quick timeline of events up to 2012



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Current conflict (2012)



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New actors

- *National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) (Mohammed Ag Najm)*
- *National Front for the Liberation of Azawad*
- *Ansar Dine (Iyad Ag Ghali)*
- *Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).*
- *CNRDRE (Captain Amadou Sanogo)*
- *ECOWAS*
- *MRRA*
- *Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa*
- *Boko Haram*
- *Arab militias*



Causes of Contemporary conflict

- Spill-Over from Libya
- Coup D'état
- Deep Mistrust
- Fundamentalist Islam
- Organized Terrorist Groups
- Rent-seeking
- Independence





Financial and military resources

- MNLA & Ansar - Dine
 - Income is from regional diaspora
 - Human and drug smuggling
 - Weapons from Libya (plus support from high level Libyan military figures) + weapons from Tuareg fighters in Niger
 - Support from Al – Qaeda’s global network





Lack of internal cohesion

- Complication over Sharia Law in Azawad
 - Tuareg want a more moderate state
- In-fighting within CNRDRE
 - Attack on President by civilians
 - Refuse to have ECOWAS forces in Mali






Conditions as they are today

Political Situation

- Interim Government in the South
- Prime Ministers leads while President is getting medical treatment
- Complete rebel control in the North (drafting a new constitution)
- ECOWAS – standby force of 3,000

Economic Situation

- Gov't financial situation is getting worse even after budget cuts
 - Only 29 % of taxes are collected
 - Cuts from Financial Partners
 - Limited formal economy in Azawad
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Policy Analysis




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Methodology

- GC Options
- GC Strategic Alignment:
 - Budget 2012;
 - PCO; and
 - DFAIT, CIDA, CIC, DND priorities.
- TBS Common Risk Impact Scale
- Impact / Constraints
 - Mali
 - Canada





Option 1: Status Quo

- No Action
- Alignment: Fiscal austerity
- Impact:
 - Continued conflict
 - Precedent setting
 - Potential refugee crisis
- Constraints:
 - GC “Policy Laggard”
- Risk: Very high
- Cost: No additional cost






Option 2: Quiet Diplomacy

- Wait for UN, EU, US positions. Act in unity.
- Alignment: Global governance, fiscal austerity, partnerships
- Impact:
 - Buys time
 - Reinforces integrity of Mali
 - Prevents radical Islamist state
 - Conflict continued
 - Strong strategic alignment
- Constraints:
 - GC “Policy Laggard”
- Risk: Low
- Cost: May require new investment / re-allocation of international envelope.






Option 3: Official Development Assistance (ODA)

- ODA to improve Government capacity for effective representation
 - Alignment: partnerships, promotion of int'l best practices
 - Impact:
 - More effective programs and services
 - Tuareg representation
 - Country of Interest
 - Constraints:
 - GC suspended all bilateral ODA
 - Alternative delivery mechanisms required
 - Already attempted
 - Requires value-for-money study (time constraint)
 - Risk: Moderate
 - Cost: Re-allocation of funding from other countries of interest
- 





Option 4: Integration

- Integration of Tuareg population into Mali
 - Alignment: Partnerships, promotion of int'l best practices
 - Impact:
 - Focus on commonalities, mutual respect, social and economic integration
 - Constraints:
 - Previously attempted
 - New model required
 - Success?
 - Risk: High
 - Cost: Significant increase in funding would be required
- 





Option 5: Recognition of Azawad Sovereignty

- Recognize Azawad independence and assist Tuareg population in quest for sovereignty
- Alignment: Not aligned
- Impact:
 - Conflict may dissipate
 - May cause other countries to side with Canada
 - Canada may break “policy laggard” reputation
- Constraints:
 - Possible domino effect (Fearon)
 - Negative press
- Risk: very high
- Cost: Within existing GC International allocation





Policy Recommendation: Quiet Diplomacy

- Risk averse for GC
- Strong GC strategic alignment
- Will reinforce integrity of Mali
- Will prevent radical Islamist state





Questions?



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Additional Slides




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Military expenditure as % of central government expenditure

Military expenditure (% of central government exp... ?



Data from [World Bank](#) Last updated: Jun 5, 2012

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
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Military expenditure as % of GDP

Military expenditure as percentage of GDP ?



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