



Federal Republic of Nigeria

Risk Assessment Report

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CONTEXT



The Federal Republic of Nigeria is the most populous nation in Africa, encompassing 166 million people distributed among more than 250 distinct ethnic and linguistic groups. Muslims dominate the northern rural part of the country, while Christians make up the majority in the oil-rich urban south. Nigeria's population is evenly distributed between rural and urban.

After attaining independence in 1960, military coups and ethnic tensions led to the costly Biafran Civil War. The oil-boom of the 1970's and membership in OPEC in 1971 resulted in an increase in government revenues, although systemic corruption continues to limit economic benefits. Military coups stymied democratization throughout the 1980's and 1990's. Civilian control of the government has continued since 1999. Regular elections have been marred by violence and allegations of fraud.

In 2002 Boko Haram, an Islamist sect dedicated to the spread of Sharia law, began a campaign of violence against Christian minorities, government security personnel, and secular schools in Nigeria's north. In 2004 the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) began an armed insurgency over the continued environmental degradation of their land, and unequal distribution of oil-wealth in the Niger Delta.

KEY INDICATORS AND EVENTS

History of Armed Conflict (Baseline: 3.53 or Low to Moderate)

Stabilizing

- Both refugees hosted and refugees abroad have declined since 2005, from 9,019 to 8,747 and 33,678 to 13,571 respectively.¹
- Conflict with MEND has declined since a 2009 amnesty that resulted in thousands of troops being disarmed; recent attacks have raised questions of whether the group has been reconstituted²

Destabilizing

- A 5-day battle in July 2009 between government troops and Boko Haram militants killed 700 people; Boko Haram's founder, Mohammad Yusuf was captured and killed in police custody; Militancy has increased under successor Abubakar bin Mohammad Shekau; Boko Haram has become an umbrella organization for militant groups with varied agendas³
- Frequency and sophistication of suicide bombings indicates supply connections to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)⁴
- Conflict-related deaths increased annually since 2009;⁵ More than 1,000 casualties resulted from attacks, bombings, and assassinations carried out by Boko Haram and Nigerian security personnel⁶
- Number of internally displaced persons increased to over 90,000 since December, 2011⁷
- As a narcotics trans-shipment hub, Nigeria is facing growing threats from piracy and organized crime⁸

Trend –Worsening

Attacks by Boko Haram have disrupted trade and education in northern Nigeria while encouraging revenge killings by Christian groups. Security personnel commit regular abuses and killings of the civilian population in their attempts to oppose Boko Haram, alienating many Nigerians.⁹ The escalation and increasing sophistication of attacks point to an emerging cycle of violence and retribution.

Governance and Political Instability (Baseline: 7.19 or High)

Stabilizing

- Thirteen years of consecutive civilian rule; marked improvement in terms of election organization and transparency¹⁰
- 2011 *Freedom of Information Bill* strengthens government commitment to a free and independent press¹¹
- Federal state system designed to provide resources and political representation to the many minority groups¹²

Destabilizing

- Weak democratic institutions and poor management obstruct transparency and hinder government legitimacy¹³
- Political competition continues to revolve around influential individuals; Elections coincide with outbreaks of violence¹⁴
- Infrastructure projects and government programs continue to be allotted through cronyism; government corruption rampant¹⁵
- Presidential elections increasingly characterized by north-south divide mirroring religious regionalism¹⁶
- Previous elections have been marred by fraud, violence, intimidation, corruption and mismanagement¹⁷

Trend – Improving

Despite high levels of corruption, state bodies in Nigeria are slowly strengthening with time. Politics in Nigeria continue to be defined by a complex interplay of identity; ethnic, tribal, religious, and regional friction makes the outbreak of conflict difficult to predict.

Militarization (Baseline: 3.75 or High)

Stabilizing

- Total armed forces remained at 2005 levels;¹⁸ Armed forces per 10,000 people has declined to 9.76 in 2012¹⁹
- With the largest military budget in the region any change in spending produces a negligible effect on regional balance of power; Spending at 1.01% of GDP is below the regional average of 1.05%²⁰

Destabilizing

- President Goodluck Jonathan is investing in a Nigerian arms industry producing vehicles and body armour²¹
- Military expenditure set to double from \$2.19B in 2012 to \$4.76B by 2016²²

Trend – Increasing Militarization

Doubling military spending, coupled with the development of a domestic arms manufacturing industry points to a long-term strategy of using military power to ensure stability in the country, and to reduce reliance on foreign suppliers susceptible to international action.

Population Heterogeneity (Baseline: 7.67 or High)

Destabilizing

- Nigeria has more than 250 ethnic groups; English is the official language, though there are over 500 indigenous languages²³
- 50% of the population is Muslim while 40% are Christian; The remaining 10% practice various indigenous beliefs²⁴

Trend –Worsening

Clashing diversity, North-South divides, and strong cultural/religious ties are resulting in an increasingly heterogeneous country that is regionally homogenous and susceptible to widespread ethnic rebellion.

Demographic Stress (Baseline: 7.37 or High)

Stabilizing

- Urban population growth rate decreased by 5% since 2005²⁵

Destabilizing

- Annual population growth of 2.5%/year since 2005;²⁶ Increase of 200m people expected by 2050²⁷
- Population density of 178.9 people/km², increasing by 3%/year since 2005²⁸ and expected to reach 400 people/km² by 2050²⁹
- Urban population growth concentrated in Lagos, reaching 3.71%/annum by 2025;³⁰ 71% of the urban population and 6 of the 10 largest urban agglomerations, are found in the southern half of the country
- Median age of 19.2 with a current 0-14 age cohort representing 42.8% of total population resulting in a long-term youth bulge³¹

Trend – Worsening

Population indicators are on an unmanageable trajectory. A large and expanding youth cohort, combined with high and increasing population density concentrated by rural-urban migration, pressures food and water supplies, infrastructure, and housing. Social instability is probable in urban areas arrayed on a north/south axis exacerbating existing sectarian divisions.

Economic Performance (Baseline: 6.62 or Moderate to High)

Stabilizing

- Inflation declined by 70% between 2005 and 2007³² following \$18bn. \$USD in debt relief;³³ Currently 39% below 2005 levels³⁴
- Converted 1.4% of reserves into ¥CNY³⁵ as China and Nigeria explore new markets of oil; Majority of currency reserves in \$USD³⁶
- Budget deficit of 2.85% is within the 3% *Fiscal Responsibility Act* target; Debt to GDP ratio is 17.8%;³⁷ debt service to revenue is 19%
- 2.4% increase in GDP with a 26% increase in GDP per capita since 2005³⁸
- Only 50% of designated farmland (35.6 million ha) is under cultivation; Currently on offer for \$10,000/ha/20-30 years³⁹

Destabilizing

- ₦NGN exchange has decreased against the \$USD by 17.8% since 2005;⁴⁰ Inflation has increased to 10% in 2011⁴¹
- Trade as % of GDP has decreased 8.4% since 2005 despite a 2.4% increase in GDP⁴²
- GINI score has increased since 2004; Nigeria is 26th globally; GDP growth is concentrated among higher income earners
- Passage of *Petroleum Industry Bill* may lead to declining FDI for petroleum development,⁴³ exacerbating an existing 1.45% decrease since 2005;⁴⁴ 79.5% of government revenues and 97% of all foreign exchange come from oil industry⁴⁵

Trend – Neutral to Worsening

Investments in agriculture signal economic diversification and expansion. The passage of the *Petroleum Industry Bill* may increase government revenue at the risk of discouraging foreign investment in the sector. Income inequality, unpredictable and systemic inflation above 10% are concerning. Sustainable full use of agricultural land while limiting deforestation is key to long-term economic growth.

Human Development (Baseline: 9.02 or High)

Stabilizing

- Total population with access to safe drinking water has risen from 53% in the year 2000 to 58% in 2010⁴⁶
- Life expectancy has increased from 46.2 in the year 2000 to 51.4 in 2010⁴⁷
- Infant mortality rate, amongst the highest in the world, has dropped 28% to 80.8 per 1000 between 2000 and 2010⁴⁸
- Maternal mortality rate decreased 35% to 630/100,000 live births between 2010⁴⁹
- Number of adults living with HIV/AIDS has decreased from 5.8% in 2001 to 4.1% in 2010⁵⁰
- Net enrolment ratio in primary education reached 9 in every 10 eligible children in 2007⁵¹

- Literacy rate increased from 54.7% in 2003 to 60.8% in 2009⁵² among adults aged 15 and above

Destabilizing

- Access to safe drinking water is critical in the urban and rural areas now, and in the face of future population growth
- The population with access to basic sanitation has been dropping from 34% in 2000 to 31% in 2010⁵³
- Ranks amongst the poorest in the world in terms of life expectancy, maternal mortality and the prevalence of HIV/AIDS

Trend – Improving

Over the past decade, Nigeria has carried out substantial reforms in human development yet remains among the most impoverished nations in the world.

Environmental Stress (Baseline: 6.67 or Moderate to High)

Destabilizing

- Lost 2 million ha of forest/year since 2005 to logging, agriculture and infrastructure development⁵⁴; highest rate of deforestation in the world; 280% loss since 2005, there is estimated to be no old/original growth forest remaining⁵⁵
- Monoculture agricultural practices are destabilizing soil nutrients and limiting the longevity of cleared land
- Frequent oil spills undermine agriculture and fisheries as mangrove swamps and inter-tidal streams are destroyed; Air pollution affects >1million people⁵⁶; Cleanup of Ogoniland estimated at \$1bn for first 5 years of 25-30 year cleanup⁵⁷
- Arable land per person has dropped by 12% since 2005; Farmland is under-utilized despite representing 40% of economic activity
- Number of improved water sources increased by 2% in rural areas; Water connections are insufficient for urban population growth

Trend – Worsening

Environmental concerns precipitated an armed insurgency by MEND in the Niger Delta in 2004. Environmental degradation from deforestation and pollution, amplified by the effects of demographic growth and density, was and continues to be a source of conflict

International Linkages (Baseline: 5.46 or Moderate)

Stabilizing

- Nigeria has abided by the 2006 International Court of Justice ruling concerning the Bakassi peninsula territory, resolving the ongoing dispute with Cameroon⁵⁸
- Nigeria actively co-operates with the Chadian government to eliminate cross-border movement and supply of Boko Haram.⁵⁹

Destabilizing

- Violence in neighbouring states has contributed to large numbers of small arms being readily available in Nigeria
- Government reliance on oil for revenue makes Nigeria sensitive to global economic fluctuations via oil market exposure

Trend – Improving

Despite ongoing violence in West Africa, Nigeria has shown a commitment to maintaining peace and stability in the region.

STAKEHOLDER	PEACE GENERATING FACTORS	CONFLICT GENERATING FACTORS
Oil Industry (ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, CNOOC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 15% of Nigerian GDP is based on the extraction and exportation of oil; provides 79.5% of all government revenue 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Terrible environmental record; staunchly opposes polluter pays • Threatening to reduce industrial development and infrastructure investment due to <i>Petroleum Industry Bill</i> • History of using violence against opposition
Boko Haram	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seeks primarily to destabilize the country, but its specific goals are different to gauge due to lack of centralized leadership⁶⁰ • Attacks have effectively paralyzed education, health care, and trade in the northern states⁶¹ • Benefit from abusive military crackdowns⁶²
Goodluck Jonathan People's Democratic Party (PDP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The current regime has shown a commitment to government reform and increased transparency, strengthening existing legislation pertaining to freedoms of the press, pursuing a policy of non-interference with the electoral process, and a tougher stance on corruption 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The PDP's continued dominance of federal politics poses the danger of marginalizing northern political elites • Goodluck Jonathan's refusal to 'revolve' the party leadership between a Muslim candidate has been controversial
MEND	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The amnesty program has potential to reform and reintegrate former insurgents, stabilizing the most economically important region of the country 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Despite the amnesty program, violence continues; Infrequent attacks in Abuja and in the Delta have been claimed by MEND junior commanders

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A failure to continue the amnesty program, coupled with government delays in developing the Niger delta and addressing the environmental degradation could result in a rapid resurgence of the insurgency
Neighbours (Mali, Niger, Cameroon, Chad)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chadian and Nigerien governments have expressed interest in joint military cooperation to combat Islamist insurgents⁶³ So far Boko Haram seems intent on focusing on Nigeria, but its increasing ties to AQIM might push it to expand its operations⁶⁴ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Boko Haram recruits are drawn from these states Since the March coup in Mali, elements of AQIM have taken control of the north, supported by weapons from the fallout of Libya's civil war.⁶⁵ Niger is being used as a transit route for supplies between AQIM in Mali and Boko Haram in Nigeria⁶⁶ Potential for violation of sovereignty in the name of combating terrorism which could lead to wider conflict in the region (as with Kenya in Somalia)

SCENARIOS

Worst Case

Improvements in human development are overshadowed by uncontrolled population growth. The Nigerian economy is unable to accommodate this strain; the youth cohort and migrants to the urban centers suffer the most. Corruption effectively paralyzes the government and renders it unable to address northern grievances in any meaningful way. Consequently, wealth disparity and religious divisions between north and south deepen, and support for groups such as Boko Haram and AQIM increases. Unchecked environmental degradation and the government's inability to continue the amnesty program result in a resurgence of MEND led attacks on oil infrastructure in the Delta. Capitalizing on instability in Northern Mali and Niger, Boko Haram is able to solidify ties to African jihadist groups such as AQIM, leading to a rapid escalation of attacks. With increased support from economically disenfranchised youth, and northern alienation derived from the continued PDP's dominance of the federal government, Boko Haram is able to morph into a regional threat, prompting cross-border retaliations by neighboring states. These violations of sovereignty could lead to war, or at the very least further destabilize an already sensitive region. The expanded military proves unable to maintain basic security in the northern parts of the country, and virtual secession is achieved, bringing with it the possibility of a civil war. This is further compounded by an inability to limit civilian abuses perpetrated by state security forces, which further harden North-South identities. In response to the *Petroleum Industry Bill*, oil companies reduce investment in Nigeria, and government revenue plummets. As a result, the government must increasingly rely on the military to stabilize the country, paving the way for a charismatic military leader to facilitate a coup against the civilian government. With its focus directed elsewhere, the police forces ignore drug crime and piracy, leaving their development virtually unchecked. Violence in all parts of the country escalates to levels not seen since the last civil war, putting into jeopardy the 2015 presidential elections and the economic gains of the last half-century.

Best Case

In response to rapidly growing urban populations, the Nigerian government undertakes extensive investment in human development related infrastructure, increasing access to sanitation, potable water, housing and electricity. The large youth cohort and rural to urban migration continue to impose strains on public services and goods. The North-South division along religious lines is ameliorated with increased investment and attention by the federal government, but continues to plague Nigerian politics. MEND continues to adhere to the amnesty program, and more initiatives to protect the environment and create jobs in the area help to reduce conflict among MEND splinter groups. Corruption continues to hinder political legitimacy in the country, but convictions of some high-ranking officials lend credence to anti-corruption measures. Oil companies continue to invest in Nigeria despite the passage of the *Petroleum Industry Bill*, and the government is able to collect significant revenues to put towards social and economic development. In cooperation with Niger and Chad, the Nigerian government is able to effectively cripple Boko Haram's logistical capabilities; a more professional and sophisticated military is able to deal decisive blows to the organization, resulting in a low-intensity conflict limited to the north and border regions. This allows police forces to focus more attention on dealing with piracy and organized drug crime.

Most Likely Case

Although improvements are made in human development areas such as access to clean water, Nigeria remains ranked among the most impoverished countries in the world. Unchecked population growth, a significant youth cohort, and continued rural to urban migration put increased strain on public services. The North-South political and economic stratification of Nigeria continues to polarize the population along religious lines and has the effect of increasing the appeal of armed groups such as Boko Haram. Environmental degradation and wealth disparity proceed unchecked, encouraging intermittent attacks by MEND splinter groups, although the majority of members adhere to the 2009 amnesty program. The government attempts to address northern grievances, but is undermined by its own systemic corruption. The passage of the *Petroleum Industry Bill* is mitigated in such a way that foreign investment in the oil sector continues, with some increase in government revenue. With its support base and supply connections to AQIM steadily growing, Boko Haram continues to disrupt trade, education, and infrastructure development in the north while increasing its profile in the southern urban centers. An expanded Nigerian military increases its influence and power over the civilian government in the wake of volatility in the north. Security forces continue to conduct abuses against the civilian population. Cooperation with neighboring states results in the conflict with Boko Haram being confined to Nigeria, but escalating in severity leading up to the 2015 election. Drug-running and piracy remain nascent but growing problems.

Endnotes

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