



Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

A Risk Assessment Report
October 2012

Prepared by: Jim Carr, Nour Fadol,
Katie Gauthier, Hossein Moghtaderi







Historical Background

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has a long history of power struggles and regime changes. A landlocked country in a volatile region, Afghanistan is home to many ethnic and religious minorities. It has struggled with corruption, civil unrest, and outside influences since its independence in 1919.¹ It transitioned from a constitutional monarchy in 1964, to a declared republic after a political coup in 1973.² Shortly after leader Mohammed Daoud was overthrown by the leftist People's Democratic Party in 1978, Afghanistan was invaded by USSR troops trying to end an Islamist insurgency. Soviet control lasted until 1989,³ when religious guerrilla Mujahadeen successfully ousted their presence. In 1996, the Taliban (a militant movement of Pashtun extremists), took control of the government and established a repressive regime, enforcing Sharia Law, and remaining unacknowledged by the majority of the international community.⁴ Following the 9/11 attacks, the United States invaded Afghanistan, put an end to the Taliban regime, and Hamid Karzai took over as President of Afghanistan.⁵ Since 2001, Afghanistan has been dependent on international aid in helping to stabilize infrastructure and development and has been faced with serious challenges. With a promise of NATO troop withdrawal by 2014, Afghanistan continues to face political and civil unrest.⁶



Legend	Intensity/Risk level	Extreme	High	Medium	Low
	Condition	Deteriorating ↓	Unchanged →	Improving ↑	
Indicator 1: History of Armed Conflict					↓
Variables	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A decade has past since the start of the mission in Afghanistan and the death tolls signal a state of war based on the number of battle-related casualties,⁷ the conflict remains an international armed conflict given the presence of coalition forces; coalition forces have a planned withdrawal date of 2014 On average, one out of four refugees in the world were from Afghanistan (largest population of refugee by country of origin in 2011);⁸ Afghanistan is also among the top host countries to refugees⁹ 				
Analysis	While the intensity level remains high, the death tolls have shown a decreasing trend since 2010; ¹⁰ signalling positive effects of coalition presence. Increasing Green-on-Blue attacks indicate the fragile state Afghanistan is in, contrary to what the withdrawal plan would suggest. ¹¹ The absence of a legal and appropriate framework to address the needs of refugees and IDPs remains a destabilizing factor.				
Indicator 2: Governance and Political Instability					→
V	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Low regime durability (durability variable:2); additionally rule of law, accountability and government effectiveness are volatile (consistently in the high intensity zone between 1.6 and 1.9)¹² Political activity remains restricted through the use of violence and repression (including legal loopholes exploited to deny party registration); all levels of government showcase crippling corruption/nepotism¹³ (-1.55)¹⁴ Although legally speaking, media is more free than ever, journalists get arrested, threatened and harassed by politicians, warlords and many other powerful figures; simultaneously, radio stations, publications and internet usage continue to increase¹⁵ Basic civil and political rights are inconsistently upheld and civil society is continuously threatened 				
A	Although many democratic initiatives have been undertaken, the trend towards concentrating power within the government suggests regression. Women and citizens are given more rights and freedoms, but lack of enforcement in addition to the inability of Karzai to control corruption creates distrust in the system and officials, which neutralizes the positive steps.				
Indicator 3: Militarization					→
V	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Military expenditures increased by 36% in 2011;¹⁶ and expenditures (%GDP) grew from 2-3.8% in 2010¹⁷ Afghan National Army achieved its recruitment goal of 195,000 troops; Air Force: 5,728 personnel, 98 aircraft; Armed Forces/1000: 6.6¹⁸ There are currently about 130,000 foreign troops but NATO plans to withdraw by the end of 2014.¹⁹ 				

A	<p>Most armed forces growth targets have been met or are moving well in the right direction;²⁰ however, corruption continues to destabilize such progress.²¹ NATO pledged \$4.1 billion for military assistance during their post-2014 training role,²² but increasing insider attacks by Afghan soldiers on coalition forces (15% total coalition casualties)²³ suggest that mere government militarization doesn't ensure security and thus stability.</p>
Indicator 4: Population Heterogeneity 	
V	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ethnic Diversity: 42% Pashtun (beneath unity against Afghan government, Pashtun militants are divided reflecting tribal divides in larger community)²⁴; 27% Tajik, 9% Hazara, 9% Uzbek, 4% Aimak, 3% Turkmen, 2% Baloch, 4% other²⁵ • Religious Diversity: 80% Sunni Muslim, 19% Shia Muslim, 1% other²⁶ • Risk of Ethnic Rebellion: desire for greater control over majority areas is prevalent within Tajiks, Hazaras as well as Uzbeks- the former suffering much less from lack of political power and economic hardships, and the Uzbeks showcasing all of the factors encouraging rebellion.²⁷
A	<p>Although political and economic discrimination and inequality do exist and inter-communal clashes continue, it is not likely that there will be any major uprisings as these minorities have representation in the central government. Instability and conflict increase in likelihood inversely to government effectiveness. If central government is ineffective and does not constrain warlords and tribal leaders, or the representation of these minorities is diminished, unaddressed grievances have an extremely high likelihood of manifesting themselves through increased conflict.</p>
Indicator 5: Demographic Stress 	
V	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Though population growth rates have remained relatively stable over the last 15 years at 2.9% (2011),²⁸ it is very high compared to the global average (1.2%)²⁹ • Movement into city centres has increased; urban population growth rate (4.41%) is very high, and is augmenting steadily (2011);³⁰ urban population remains very low, at 24.8%.³¹ • The number of youth as a total percentage of the population has slightly decreased (from 48% in 2005 to 46%),³² however this remains an extremely large portion of the total population in Afghanistan (2011)
A	<p>Since 2002, 5.7 million refugees have returned to Afghanistan,³³ causing very high population growth rates and urban growth rates. This is causing a large strain on urban centres, which are not exempt from conflict, and tensions have caused increased destruction to infrastructure. Rebuilding efforts have put pressure on economy within urban centres. Large city centres are not well equipped to accommodate growing numbers. The large number of youth, though decreasing, presents a potential danger as an excess of young people frustrated with their situation (growing up surrounded by constant violence and war) can cause increased tensions and insurgency.</p>
Indicator 6: Economic Performance 	
V	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GDP: \$30.11 billion (2011); GDP/capita: \$1,000 (2011),³⁴ Total debt service (%GNI): 0.1 (2010)³⁵ • Inflation rate: 7.7% (2011); Exchange rate: 46.75 Afghanis per US dollar (2011)³⁶ • Foreign Direct Investment (Net Inflows): \$75.65 million (BoP, current US\$) (2010)³⁷ • Trade Openness (Trade as a % of GDP): N/A³⁸ • GINI Index: 27.8 (2008)³⁹
A	<p>Indicators remain in flux and subpar as economic performance reflects volatility in security and good governance. Continued poor short-term performance with potentially strong long-term growth via international infrastructure development and aid projects (\$16 billion in civilian aid over next 4 years) is contingent on decreased corruption and increased stability. More than 95% of GDP comes from aid.⁴⁰ Opium cultivation (90% of world supply) continues to finance illicit activities, fuel corruption, and indebted farmers and undermine development projects (about \$2.8 billion earned by Taliban, traffickers and farmers in 2009).⁴¹</p>
Indicator 7: Human Development 	
V	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Although access to water and sanitation is on an upward climb, it is still only available to a small percentage of the population (48% for access to improved water source, 37% for access to improved sanitation).⁴² In rural areas, only 39% have access to an improved water source and only 30% have access to improved sanitation⁴³ (2012) • Life expectancy has gone up from 47 years in 2005, to only 48 years in 2012⁴⁴ • Infant mortality, while decreasing, is still one of the highest in the world at 73 deaths/1000 live births⁴⁵ (2012)

V	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maternal mortality has seen significant improvement, going from 1800 deaths/100 000 live births in 2005, to 460 in 2010.⁴⁶ It is however still one of the highest rates in the world. Secondary school enrolment is improving but still very low, at 46% (2012)⁴⁷ of girls over the age of 25 only 6% have received any formal education⁴⁸ Literacy rates are on a downward trend, with only 26% of adults considered literate in 2008, compared to 28.1% in 2000. Only 12% of women are literate in the country, compared to 39% of men.⁴⁹ (2008) Child labour is a large problem in Afghanistan, with 18% of children in the labour force.⁵⁰ (2012) Primary school enrolment is on an upward climb, going from 90% in 2005 to 97% in 2012.⁵¹ HIV/AIDS remains at a very low rate, with only 0.01% of the population affected.⁵² (2012)
A	There are many developmental challenges that still face Afghanistan. With very low access to basic human needs (clean water, sanitation, and health care), Afghans face some of the lowest human development statistics in the world. Large discrepancies still exist between urban and rural access to improved water and sanitation, as well as between male and female education levels. Over the last 10 years, Afghanistan has been highly dependent on international aid, ⁵³ and it has responded well enough to improve statistics in several human development areas. ⁵⁴

Indicator 8: Environmental Stress






V	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Access to fresh water is at 22% (2009)⁵⁵ The rate of deforestation is steady at 2.2%, which is low on the CIFP scale (score of 2, 2005)
A	The natural environment of Afghanistan, though not conducive to sustain such large population influxes, does not pose any immediate threat to the stability of the country. Access to fresh water is very low, but deforestation rates, as well as people living per square kilometre of arable land, are very stable.



Indicator 9: International Linkages



V	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Afghanistan is a member of over 40 international and regional economic and military organizations, including major UN agencies; In 2012, Afghanistan gained observer status in Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO);⁵⁶ U.S. declared Afghanistan a major non-NATO ally⁵⁷ Border disputes with Pakistan and Iran remain the only international disputes⁵⁸
A	Since 2005 improved security in the capital has resulted in an increasing number of states opening or reopening their embassies. Afghanistan continues to sign bilateral and multilateral strategic and economic agreement with regional countries. U.S. declaration of Afghanistan as a major non-NATO ally indicates US commitment to long-term stability and security even post-2014 withdrawal. Both China and Russia have also secured their interests by granting Afghanistan observer status in the SCO to counter-balance NATO/US influence in the region.

External Stakeholders Impact

	<p>(+) Iran has focused on increasing security and stabilizing the western frontiers of Afghanistan where they share a border and have national interests.⁵⁹</p> <p>(+) Since 2007 they've attempted to counter American influence by providing large financial and training assistance to humanitarian development- \$670 million in aid since fall of Taliban.⁶⁰ (This competition for power in the region could have severely destabilizing effects.</p>
+/-	(-) They are strong promoters of factions of the Northern Alliance and especially the Shiite Hazara minority ⁶¹ (this promotes sectarianism and violence between minorities); they've also supported attacks on US forces
	<p>(-/+) While uniting the two countries, cross border cultural ties to Pashtun in Pakistan are ambivalent – they also can serve as a stimulant to oppressing minorities.</p> <p>(+) A potentially peace-inducing dialogue process began between the two countries in March 2010 to address issues heightening militancy in both territories – concluded with a landmark transit agreement in July 2010.⁶²</p>
-	<p>(-) The continuously disputed borders, especially the Durand Line, are contentious and make security a logistical nightmare. This includes the movement and surveillance of Taliban members and IDPs.</p> <p>(-) Relations between the two deteriorated post July 2011- the discovery of Bin Laden in Pakistan, May 2011 allowed Karzai to resume blaming Pakistan for destabilizing Afghanistan⁶³</p>
	<p>(+) NATO has provided the main security force to remove Taliban</p> <p>(+) Continues withdrawal plan to pull out by 2014 but maintain training role and funding vis-à-vis</p>
+	Afghanistan Transition Plan and ANSF

	(+) the US has made Afghanistan its top foreign affairs priority ⁶⁴ and declared it a major non-NATO ally (+) among top contributors in terms of government structuring, financial aid, development and military.
+	(-) Pull out in 2014 leave destabilizing vacuum – leaves room for Taliban to re-seize power
	(+) Has contributed \$1.3 billion in aid for development projects as well as additionally pledged \$500 million in 2011, signed a strategic partnership deal and won bid to develop Hajigak iron ore deposit ⁶⁵
+	

Internal Stakeholders Impact	
Karzai Administration	(-) Karzai's failure to reduce mass corruption has drawn international criticism as an obstacle to progress (-) Karzai has recently been creating tension and starting fights with NATO in order to increase public popularity through the exploitation of negative public sentiment towards the occupation (+) Government has encouraged peace initiative with Taliban which could have stabilizing effect; however extremist members unwilling to meet conditions continue to stall peace
–	
Taliban	(-) Alongside groups such as Hizb-i-Islami, they're responsible for assassinations. Car bombings, suicide bombings, rocket attacks on cities and ambushes on political and military figures, all meant to undermine the government; also do this by encouraging and taxing illicit drug production— restricts people's attempts at self-sufficiency and independence (-) Try to create discontent among Pashtuns by hindering economic development and aid programs (-) Destabilize more by basing activity in SE Pashtun regional base adjacent to Pakistani Pashtun base ⁶⁶
–	
UNF	(+) United National Front (UNF), as a successor of Northern Alliance (40% of parliament), has called for increased parliamentary powers, direct elections for provincial governors, and expressed dissent with government's inaction regarding civilian deaths from coalition/ security forces ⁶⁷
+/-	
Unity Party	(-) Hezb-e Wahdat (Unity Party) represents Shi'ite Hazara minority which are main benefactors of Iranian support. This is problematic in terms of heterogeneity variable 'risk of ethnic rebellion' as such support can increase tension, sectarianism and prevent national unity ⁶⁸
–	
Islamic Party	(-) Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (Islamic party) was founded by a Pashtun and positioned itself alongside the Taliban against the Karzai government and NATO forces (-) Concentrated along SE border shared with Pakistan, where there is grave concern regarding Islamist access to unsecured border. ⁶⁹
–	

Possible Scenarios	
Worst	Corruption overwhelms government and undermines increased militarization and security efforts. Taliban capacity and activity increases, filling the vacuum left by pull out of NATO military forces. Failure by Karzai to deal with corruption/accountability and maintain good governance will prevent future aid by international donors (contingent on decreased corruption). Civil and political rights deteriorate. As such, the new leadership will be unable to regain control, exasperating violence. Continued opium trade diverts necessary resources to illicit drug trade, fueling Taliban. Iran and Pakistan play off ethnic/religious ties within Afghanistan destabilizing country. Minorities' representation in the government diminishes, turning violence into civil war.
Best	Corruption is reduced and transparency increases due to UN-assisted Afghan government initiatives. This facilitates a peaceful and fair transition of power in the 2014 elections. The Taliban remains too weak vis-à-vis the increasing strength of the Afghan military following NATO 2014 withdrawal. Regional cooperation and increased participation from all levels of the Afghan community lead to more peaceful democratic and pluralistic society. International aid increases human development, economic growth, as well as development and aid projects which reach local people due to increased stability and good governance practices.
Most Likely	Security and stability are improved as Afghan security forces have nearly achieved their growth targets and continued presence by the coalition exists; yet, heightened fragility will increase vulnerability. Despite desires to concentrate power within government, newly emerging civil society will continue to pressure the government for accountability and transparency. Failure to control corruption will inversely affect aid and development. Flaws and ambivalence in the Constitution will create challenges when elections are held in 2014, which are only resolvable with unlikely constitutional reform. The Taliban will maintain an unwavering and inflexible stance on demands which will undermine peace talks and security. Forces in Pakistan will continue hosting and helping them.

-
- ¹ “Afghanistan Profile,” BBC News, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12024253> (accessed October 8, 2012).
- ² “Afghanistan’s turbulent history,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1569826.stm (accessed October 8, 2012).
- ³ Ibid.
- ⁴ Ibid.
- ⁵ Ibid.
- ⁶ “Afghanistan’s government ‘could collapse’ after 2014: report,” BBC News, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19868043>, (accessed on October 8, 2012).
- ⁷ “UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset,” *Uppsala Conflict Data Project*, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/ (accessed October 3, 2012).
- ⁸ “2012 UNHCR country operations profile – Afghanistan,” *UNHCR*, <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486eb6.html> (accessed October 3, 2012).
- ⁹ “UNHCR Global Trends 2011,” *UNHCR*, <http://www.unhcr.org/4fd6f87f9.html> (accessed October 3, 2012).
- ¹⁰ “Operation Enduring Freedom Casualties,” *i-casualties*, <http://icasualties.org/OEF/index.aspx> (accessed October 3, 2012).
- ¹¹ “Green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan: the data,” *Long War Journal* http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/08/green-on-blue_attack.php (accessed October 8, 2012).
- ¹² “World Governance Indicators,” World Data Bank, http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=2&id=4&hActiveDimensionId=WGI_Series (accessed October 2, 2012).
- ¹³ “Afghanistan,” Freedom House, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/afghanistan-0> (accessed October 2, 2012).
- ¹⁴ “Worldwide Governance Indicators: Afghanistan,” the World Bank Group, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp, (accessed October 3, 2012).
- ¹⁵ “Afghanistan,” Freedom House, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/afghanistan-0> (accessed October 2, 2012).
- ¹⁶ “Military Expenditure,” *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex> (accessed October 3, 2012).
- ¹⁷ “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database (accessed October 3, 2012).
- ¹⁸ “Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF): Training and Development,” *NATO Media Backgrounder ANSF*, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20120516_media_backgrounder_ANSF_en.pdf (accessed October 3, 2012).
- ¹⁹ “Afghan Turmoil,” *Alert Net*, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/crisis-centre/crisis/afghan-turmoil> (accessed October 3, 2012).
- ²⁰ “Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF): Training and Development,” *NATO Media Backgrounder ANSF*, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20120516_media_backgrounder_ANSF_en.pdf (accessed October 3, 2012).
- ²¹ Joshua Hersch, “Afghan Army General: Corruption Sometimes Makes It Impossible To Do Our Job,” *Huffington Post*, May 18, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/18/afghan-general-corruption_n_1527448.html (accessed October 3, 2012).
- ²² “Afghanistan Aid: Donors Pledge \$16bn at Tokyo Meeting,” *BBC News*, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18758148> (accessed October 3, 2012).
- ²³ “Afghan ‘Insider’ Attack Claims at Least Two Lives,” *The Muslim News*, September 30, 2012, <http://www.muslimnews.co.uk/news/news.php?article=23501> (accessed October 3, 2012).
- ²⁴ “Assessment for Pashtuns in Afghanistan,” *Minorities At Risk*, <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=70002> (accessed October 3, 2012).
- ²⁵ “South Asia: Afghanistan,” *CIA World Factbook*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html> (accessed October 2, 2012).
- ²⁶ Ibid.
- ²⁷ “Assessment for Tajiks in Afghanistan,” *Minorities at Risk*, <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=70003> (accessed October 2, 2012); “Assessment for

Hazaras in Afghanistan”, Minorities at Risk, <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=70001> (accessed October 2, 2012); “Assessment for Uzbeks in Afghanistan”, Minorities at Risk, <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=70004> (accessed October 2, 2012).

²⁸ “Population Growth Rate,” *The World Bank Group*, http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/html-jsp/QuickViewReport.jsp?RowAxis=WDI_Series~&ColAxis=WDI_Time~&PageAxis=WDI_Ctry~&PageAxisCaption=Country~&RowAxisCaption=Series~&ColAxisCaption=Time~&NEW_REPORT_SCALE=1&NEW_REPORT_PRECISION=0&newReport=yes&ROW_COUNT=7&COLUMN_COUNT=10&PAGE_COUNT=1&COMMA_SEP=true (accessed September 29, 2012).

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ “Country Profile: Afghanistan,” *United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs*, http://esa.un.org/unup/Country-Profiles/country-profiles_1.htm (accessed October 1, 2012).

³¹ Ibid.

³² “Population (Ages 0-14), Afghanistan,” *The World Bank Group*, http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/html-jsp/QuickViewReport.jsp?RowAxis=WDI_Series~&ColAxis=WDI_Time~&PageAxis=WDI_Ctry~&PageAxisCaption=Country~&RowAxisCaption=Series~&ColAxisCaption=Time~&NEW_REPORT_SCALE=1&NEW_REPORT_PRECISION=0&newReport=yes&ROW_COUNT=7&COLUMN_COUNT=10&PAGE_COUNT=1&COMMA_SEP=true (accessed September 29, 2012).

³³ “2012 UNHCR country operations profile – Afghanistan,” *The UN Refugee Agency*, <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486eb6.html> (accessed October 3, 2012).

³⁴ “Afghanistan,” *CIA: The World Factbook*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html> (accessed October 3, 2012).

³⁵ “Total debt service (%GNI),” *The World Bank*, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.TDS.DECT.GN.ZS> (accessed October 8, 2012).

³⁶ “Afghanistan,” *CIA: The World Factbook*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html> (accessed October 3, 2012).

³⁷ “Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (BoP current US\$),” *The World Bank*, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD> (accessed October 8, 2012).

³⁸ “Trade Openness (Trade as a % of GDP),” *The World Bank*, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BG.GSR.NFSV.GD.ZS/countries/AF?display=graph> (accessed October 8, 2012).

³⁹ “GINI Index,” *The World Bank*, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI> (accessed October 8, 2012).

⁴⁰ “Afghanistan Aid: Donors Pledge \$16bn at Tokyo Meeting,” *BBC News*, July 8, 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18758148> (accessed October 3, 2012).

⁴¹ “Afghan Turmoil,” *Alert Net*, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/crisis-centre/crisis/afghan-turmoil> (accessed October 3, 2012).

⁴² “Countries: Afghanistan,” *World Health Organization*, <http://www.who.int/countries/afg/en/> (accessed September 30, 2012), and “Afghanistan: Health Profile,” *World Health Organization*, <http://www.who.int/gho/countries/afg.pdf> (accessed September 30, 2012).

⁴³ Ibid

⁴⁴ “Life Expectancy: Afghanistan,” *The World Bank Group*, http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/html-jsp/QuickViewReport.jsp?RowAxis=WDI_Series~&ColAxis=WDI_Time~&PageAxis=WDI_Ctry~&PageAxisCaption=Country~&RowAxisCaption=Series~&ColAxisCaption=Time~&NEW_REPORT_SCALE=1&NEW_REPORT_PRECISION=0&newReport=yes&ROW_COUNT=7&COLUMN_COUNT=10&PAGE_COUNT=1&COMMA_SEP=true (accessed September 29, 2012).

⁴⁵ Ibid., “Infant and under-five mortality in Afghanistan: current estimates and limitations,” *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*, <http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/88/8/09-068957/en/index.html> (accessed September 30, 2012).

⁴⁶ “Maternal Mortality, Afghanistan,” *The World Bank Group*, http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/html-jsp/QuickViewReport.jsp?RowAxis=WDI_Series~&ColAxis=WDI_Time~&PageAxis=WDI_Ctry~&PageAxisCaption=Country~&RowAxisCaption=Series~&ColAxisCaption=Time~&NEW_REPORT_SCALE=1&NEW_REPORT_PRECISION=0&newReport=yes&ROW_COUNT=7&COLUMN_COUNT=10&PAGE_COUNT=1&COMMA_SEP=true (accessed September 29, 2012), and “Maternal mortality for 181 countries, 1980-2008: a systematic analysis of progress towards Millennium Development Goal 5”, *Institute for Health Metrics and*

Evaluation, http://cdrwww.who.int/pmnch/topics/maternal/20100402_ihmearticle.pdf, (accessed October 3), and “Afghanistan maternal mortality drops, survey suggests,” BBC News, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15942940>, (accessed October 1, 2012).

⁴⁷ “Afghanistan Statistics,” UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/afghanistan_statistics.html (accessed October 1, 2012), and “Afghanistan: School Enrollment,” *Indexmundi*, <http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/afghanistan/school-enrollment>, (accessed September 30, 2012).

⁴⁸ “Despite Deadly Risks, Afghan Girls Take Brave First Step,” *CNN News*, <http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/26/world/asia/cnnheroes-afghan-schoolgirls/index.html>, (accessed October 8, 2012); see also “Can Afghanistan Get All Its Girls In School?,” *The World Bank*, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTEDUCATION/0,,contentMDK:21100416~menuPK:617572~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:282386,00.html>, (accessed October 8, 2012).

⁴⁹ CIA World Factbook, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/afghanistan_statistics.html, http://outlookafghanistan.net/topics.php?post_id=931

⁵⁰ “Afghanistan 1999-2008,” *Laborista Internet*, <http://laborsta.ilo.org/default.html> (accessed October 3, 2012), and “Children of Conflict,” *BBC World Service*, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/people/features/childrensrights/childrenofconflict/work.shtml> (accessed on October 8, 2012).

⁵¹ “Afghanistan Statistics,” UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/afghanistan_statistics.html (accessed October 1, 2012), and “Afghanistan,” *UN Data*, <http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx> (accessed October 3, 2012), and “Afghanistan: School Enrollment,” *Indexmundi*, <http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/afghanistan/school-enrollment> (accessed September 30, 2012).

⁵² “Afghanistan,” *UNAIDS*, <http://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/afghanistan/>, (accessed October 3, 2012), and “Country Progress Report: The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,” *UNAIDS*, [http://www.unaids.org/en/dataanalysis/knowyourresponse/countryprogressreports/2012countries/ce_AF_Narrative_Report\[1\].pdf](http://www.unaids.org/en/dataanalysis/knowyourresponse/countryprogressreports/2012countries/ce_AF_Narrative_Report[1].pdf) (accessed October 3, 2012).

⁵³ “Afghanistan,” *Canadian International Development Agency*, <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/En/JUD-129153625-S6T>, (accessed September 30, 2012), and “Aid and Conflict in Afghanistan,” *International Crisis Group*, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/210-aid-and-conflict-in-afghanistan.aspx> (accessed October 1, 2012), and “International donors offer Afghanistan 16B,” *CBC News*, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2012/07/08/afghanistan-tokyo-donor-conference.html> (accessed October 5, 2012).

⁵⁴ “Improving access to safe water, sanitation, and hygiene for children in Afghanistan,” UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/afghanistan_48619.html (accessed October 3, 2012), and “Afghanistan: Data, Projects & Research,” *The World Bank*, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/AFGHANISTANEXTN/0,,menuPK:305990~pagePK:141159~piPK:141110~theSitePK:305985,00.html> (accessed October 3, 2012).

⁵⁵ “Afghanistan Forest Information and Data,” *Mongabay*, <http://rainforests.mongabay.com/deforestation/2000/Afghanistan.htm> (accessed October 2, 2012), and “Statistics: Afghanistan,” *Mongabay*, <http://rainforests.mongabay.com/deforestation/archive/Afghanistan.htm> (accessed October 2, 2012).

⁵⁶ “SCO accepts Afghanistan as observer, Turkey dialogue partner,” *Official Website of the SCO Summit 2012*, http://www.scosummit2012.org/english/2012-06/07/c_131637206.html (accessed October 2, 2012).

⁵⁷ “U.S. declares Afghanistan major non-NATO ally,” *The Associated Press*, July 7, 2012, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2012/07/07/afghanistan.html/>.

⁵⁸ “The World Factbook: Afghanistan,” *Central Intelligence Agency*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html> (accessed October 2, 2012).

⁵⁹ “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Pakistan,” *Centre for Strategic and International Studies*, <http://csis.org/publication/us-and-iranian-strategic-competition-impact-afghanistan-central-asia-and-pakistan> (accessed October 8, 2012).

⁶⁰ “Afghanistan- Recent Analysis: Political”, IHS Global Insight, <http://myinsight.ihsglobalinsight.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/servlet/cats?filterID=1041&serviceID=4078&typeID=34614&pageContent=report&pageType=ALL> (accessed October 4, 2012)

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ “Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF): Training and Development,” *NATO Media Backgrounder ANSF*, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20120516_media_backgrounder_ANSF_en.pdf (accessed October 3, 2012).

⁶⁴ “Afghanistan- Recent Analysis: Political”, IHS Global Insight, <http://myinsight.ihsglobalinsight.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/servlet/cats?filterID=1041&serviceID=4078&typeID=34614&pageContent=report&pageType=ALL> (accessed October 4, 2012)

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=70002> – Minorities at Risk : Pashtun

⁶⁷ “Afghanistan- Recent Analysis: Political”, IHS Global Insight, <http://myinsight.ihsglobalinsight.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/servlet/cats?filterID=1041&serviceID=4078&typeID=34614&pageContent=report&pageType=ALL> (accessed October 4, 2012)

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.