

Sub-national Report for Kaliningrad: Events, Scenarios and Analysis

FINAL REPORT July 2006

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Part A: Overview

1. Note

About this Report

This sub-national report has been produced by the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) for use by non-governmental organizations, businesses, academics, Canadian policy-makers, and other parties concerned with the current and future state of sub-national regions. The Iraqi Kurdistan Events Monitoring Profile is based on a fusion of CIFP Risk Assessment and Events Monitoring methodologies.¹

About the Author

Adam Fysh is a researcher based in Ottawa, Canada. His Masters dissertation focused on the use of environmental indicators in conflict prediction methodologies. He is a principal investigator for the Enver Group and his current research focuses on the use of neural nets and graphic data modelling for conflict analysis. Mr. Fysh has been a curriculum designer and trainer in skills for peace operations and has traveled extensively for those purposes in Africa, East Asia and the Americas.

About CIFP

CIFP has its origins in a prototype geopolitical database developed by the Canadian Department of National Defence in 1991. The prototype project called GEOPOL covered a wide range of political, economic, social, military, and environmental indicators through the medium of a rating system. In 1997, under the guidance of Andre Ouellete, John Patterson, Tony Kellett and Paul Sutherland, the Canadian Department of

Foreign Affairs and International Trade decided to adopt some elements of GEOPOL to meet the needs of policy makers, the academic community and the private sector. The CIFP project as it became known has since then operated under the guidance of principal investigator David Carment of Carleton University and has received funding from DFAIT, IDRC and CIDA. The project represents an on-going effort to identify and assemble statistical information conveying the key features of the political, economic, social and cultural environments of countries around the world.

The cross-national data generated through CIFP was intended to have a variety of applications in government departments, NGOs, and by users in the private sector. The data set provides at-a-glance global overviews, issue-based perspectives and country performance measures. Currently, the data set includes measures of domestic armed conflict, governance and political instability, militarization, religious and ethnic diversity, demographic stress, economic performance, human development, environmental stress, and international linkages.

The CIFP database currently includes statistical data in the above issue areas, in the form of over one hundred performance indicators for 196 countries, spanning fifteen years (1985 to 2000) for most indicators. These indicators are drawn from a variety of open sources, including the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and the Minorities at Risk and POLITY IV data sets from the University of Maryland.

¹ For information on the structural risk assessment, see Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (2001) *Risk Assessment Template*, Available: <http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/docs/studra1101.pdf>.

2. Executive Summary

The Kaliningrad Events Monitoring Profile is based on a fusion of CIFP Risk Assessment and Events Monitoring methodologies.²

Profile

- Kaliningrad was a contested city near the end of World War II.
- As a German city on the Baltic Sea, it was identified by the British as a high-value military target and was firebombed in 1944. Red Army troops marched into the city and expelled its remaining German inhabitants. As a part of the Potsdam Conference settlement, Kaliningrad became Soviet territory in 1945.
- With European expansion into Eastern Europe, Kaliningrad became even more

isolated from isolated from Russia. Concerns about the transport of trade goods and the travel of Russian citizens through EU territory required diplomatic management and a travel exception was enacted in 2005.

- Kaliningrad has Special Economic Zone status which has yielded mixed results for the economy of the sub region³ but can be credited for the relatively strong economy of Kaliningrad in comparison to the rest of Russia.⁴

Baseline analysis

- Kaliningrad is a medium-risk region
- The primary destabilizing clusters are Governance and Political Instability, Militarization and Population Heterogeneity.




Figure 1. Chart of trend lines for all events and the count of events by week

² For information on the structural risk assessment, see Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (2001) *Risk Assessment Template*, Available: <http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/docs/studra1101.pdf> (Accessed 13 May 2006). For information on the events monitoring methodology see the annex.

³ Radio Free Europe. 'Russia: Surviving On 'The Norm' In Kaliningrad'. See: <http://www.rferl.org/features/2002/10/04102002165306.asp>

⁴ Though Kaliningrad does not have the strongest regional economy in the Federation but it is among the better performing cohort.

- These clusters are destabilizing but only mildly so. Because of its unique geography and demographics, the structural effects of that afflict the rest of Russia do not manifest to the same destabilizing extent in Kaliningrad.

Event Trends

- 47 events were monitored between 28 October 2005 and 28 April 2006.
- The trend analysis concluded that Kaliningrad is on a generally balanced trajectory with strong prospects for continued prosperity and stability.
- The balanced trend is due to a uniform and almost continuous series of stabilizing events over the reporting period. Neither the magnitude nor the variability change significantly. The dramatic modulation, evident in the graph below, may be explained by the effects of the few destabilizing events on the overall trend.

Primary drivers of event trends

- Though Kaliningrad shares many of the same potentially destabilizing as Russian structural analysis would indicate, it is isolated from many of those structural impacts by distance and a controlled community.
- The primary driver of event trends for the reporting period was that of Economic performance. News events were overwhelmingly stabilizing and included the long-sought Special Economic Zone

status and the settlement of transit visas for Kaliningrad residents in Europe.

Scenarios

- Most likely case: Kaliningrad maintains a stable profile for the future. Minor trade or demographic events are the most destabilizing effects.
- Best case: Improvement in clusters such as Human Development and Environmental Stress benefit all residents of Kaliningrad but do not change its overall risk categorization.
- Worst case: Citizens agitate for further benefits and services not available from the Russian government. Demographic change adds to the disenchantment of youth and police are compelled to quell protests.

Conclusion

- If the types of destabilizing events that affect Russia at large were more present in Kaliningrad, it may be at higher risk associated with the rest of Russia. Though the risks are as structurally significant to Kaliningrad as they are to Russia, the likelihood that certain sources of instability endemic to the country would afflict Kaliningrad is probably lower than for the rest of Russia. Why? The destabilizing effects of armed conflict, for example, have a clear impact on the economic growth, or employment rates.
- Kaliningrad's risk outlook is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

3. Event Trends Summary

Overall

General Trend



- The overwhelming proportion of stabilizing events was of sufficiently weak magnitude that the few powerful destabilizing events serve as a balance and result in an overall balanced trend line.
- The primary source of the trend lies in the Economic Performance cluster.

Events in other clusters typically appeared in small groups. The relatively small territory of Kaliningrad and linguistic and political isolation give many of its news events a municipal rather than national tenor.

Primary Drivers

Primary drivers are those clusters that contain more than twenty events. These clusters are the main areas of activity in the region, with the greatest contribution to the overall trend.

Economic Performance

General Trend



- Granting of Kaliningrad's Special Economic Zone status for Kaliningrad
- Regional trade and tariff agreements with Belarus and Poland
- Installation of new automobile manufacturing plants, refineries and services available to European markets
- Sub regional focus on Banking and financial services due to Special Economic Status

Secondary Drivers

Secondary drivers are those clusters with less than twenty monitored events. These clusters provide supplementary information to the overall analysis.

History of Armed Conflict

- Violent activity has been negligible in Kaliningrad since the end of World War II

Militarization

- Repurposing defence facilities for civilian use
- Arms presence in Kaliningrad
- Presence of tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad⁵

Governance and Political Instability

- Travel restrictions for residents of the exclave eased in the reporting period

Population Heterogeneity

- Residents of Kaliningrad are almost entirely transplants from the post-war period and are all ethnic Russians of common background and religion

Environmental Stress

- Vulnerability to maritime environmental issues such as tanker fires and icing

Demographic Stress

- Neither territorial size nor demographic settlement patterns demonstrate cause for concern

Human Development

- Kaliningrad is roughly on par with mainstream Russia in terms of Human Development – there are significant concerns in some sectors, but nothing significantly concerning for the sub region.

International Linkages

- Visits from international dignitaries and trade commissions
- Negotiations over border and travel conventions between Kaliningrad and the European Union.

⁵ Free Republic 'Russia Spreading Influence in Asia, Mideast: Experts Concerned Over Major Arms Deals' See: <http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a3a8d82b3277a.htm>

4. Forecasting

Most Likely Case

In the most likely scenario, Kaliningrad experiences a very even set of indicators in the short term with the potential to fall into a lower risk category in the longer term.

Because Kaliningrad is populated by specially-selected Russians and the economy is so closely controlled by Moscow, it is unlikely that the exclave will agitate for more autonomy in the near term. Its proximity to Europe, its status as the only ice-free port in Russia and its special economic status may result in Kaliningrad surpassing the rest of Russia for economic development. Unless the disparity becomes overwhelming, Kaliningrad will remain the stable and uncomplicated outpost of Russia in Europe.

Best Case

In the best case, Kaliningrad will experience modest improvements in the Human Development cluster but will not change its overall categorization while it remains a part of Russia.

Kaliningrad's status at present is stable and experiencing controlled economic growth with hardly any demographic stress. Only by stronger influence from Russia or the European Union could Kaliningrad find itself faced with the prospect of strife. Improvements could be found in indicators such as press freedom, reduction in corruption and militarization but considering its geographic and historical status, Kaliningrad is in the most stable and secure position possible.

Worst Case

In the worst case, Kaliningrad could find itself in a higher risk category in the unlikely event that its proximity to Europe engenders an independence movement.

By agitating for further autonomy (beyond its Special Economic Status) or closer relations with the European Union, Kaliningrad could suffer from repercussions from Moscow which would result in higher risk categorization. Likewise, closing its borders and hemming closer to a conservative and closed political culture could stagnate the healthy economy and have undesirable effects on the human development, economic performance and demographic stress of this sub region.

Part B: Detail

5. Profile

The territorial oblast of Kaliningrad has a rich cultural and political history that has led it to its unique global position today. The territory is geographically isolated from greater-Russia though is politically and culturally a part of the centre of gravity of Moscow. Once the home of Emmanuel Kant and Hannah Arendt and a major city of the Enlightenment, what was the German city of Königsberg became a major target in World War II.

Königsberg was the capital of East Prussia and a connection between Berlin and St. Petersburg.⁶ Prussia's government was usurped and militarized by the Third Reich government in 1933. Multiple army units were stationed there as well as a mechanized division.⁷ Unsurprisingly, this strategic port soon drew the attention of British bombers in 1944 and much of the city was destroyed in the firebombing. Just before the war ended, the city was taken by Red Army troops and the remaining Germans were replaced by Russians.⁸ Renamed for Vladimir Kalinin, the city undertook a total transformation from German fortress city to the headquarters of the Soviet Baltic Fleet. Historical references to the city's past were ignored or obliterated.

Kaliningrad is the only Russian port that does not fill with ice in the winter which makes it a strategically and economically indispensable territory to Russia. As the Warsaw Pact dissolved in the early 1990s and Lithuania and Poland acceded to the

European Union, Kaliningrad became a tiny island of Russia in the middle of Eastern Europe. Today, residents must traverse at least two European Union countries to rejoin mainstream Russia.

The requirement to cross through Europe for Kaliningrad residents has caused recent strife between Moscow and authorities within the European Union. One of the results of European accession for Poland and Lithuania has been an easing of internal borders and a concomitant strengthening of external borders. Because Russia is not an EU state and Kaliningrad is part of Russia, travellers were required to pass a rigorous security process.

Despite its isolated status, there is no political autonomy controversy to speak of in Kaliningrad. Its citizens are almost entirely loyal to Kremlin policies. European Union visa concerns have been resolved and the political future of Kaliningrad is becoming easier to envisage as a disconnected satellite as electronic business reduces the requirement for travel to and from the capital.

The main issues facing Kaliningrad today are more related to its economic agreements and status as Russia's satellite in Europe than they are of a political, autonomy or security nature. The culture is monolithically Russian and differences with Europe are negotiable and diplomatic. The special status afforded to Kaliningrad in the past 12 months⁹ will more likely reduce sentiments of being stifled by Moscow and will ultimately serve to bring the residents and politics of the sub region closer to those of Russia proper.

⁶ For more information on the history of the Trans-Sib rail service, see:

<http://www.visitrussia.com/transsib/history.htm>

⁷ One infantry corps and one infantry division were hosted in Kaliningrad, totalling between 50,000 to 70,000 troops.

⁸ Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 'Forced Migrations in Europe, 1938-48' See:

<http://library.fes.de/library/netzquelle/zwangsmigration/en-33vertrpl.html>

⁹ For more information, see *Legislation on the Special Economic Zone*: <http://www.hkhamb-ahk-kaliningrad.com/en/chap02.html>

6. Stakeholders

In Kaliningrad there are seven main stakeholder categories that are affected by changes in the political environment. Each stakeholder is composed of a variety of actors that have their own grievances and interests.

Russia has three internal stakeholder groups related to the sub-region, including national leadership, sub-regional

leadership and civilian populations. There are also four external stakeholder groups including the neighbouring countries and the International Community.

Many of Kaliningrad's stakeholders have historical relationships or interests; most are only peripherally related to contemporary political realities of Kaliningrad.

Table 1. Internal Stakeholders

<i>Stakeholder</i>	<i>Composition</i>	<i>Grievances/Interests</i>
1. Russian national leadership	- President Vladimir Putin	- Balancing political management of sub-national structures with demands for services and governance - Diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe - Stability and prosperity - Security and safety of Russia's citizens – global respect
2. Kaliningrad sub-regional leadership	- Georgy Valentinovich Boos, Governor of Kaliningrad	- Seeking increased prosperity and contact with European Community - Pro-Moscow
3. Citizens of Kaliningrad	- Ethnic Russian population	- Largest ethnic group in sub region - Historically and ethnically allied with Moscow - Some sentiments of resentment for non-ethnic residents
	- Non-Russian population	- Minority ethnic groups (>20% total population) - Seeking respect and rights within structures of dominant culture

Table 2. External Stakeholders

4. European Union	-	- Aid and governance support donors - Interest in security and stability at the edges of Europe - Interested in promotion of trade and cultural openness - The promotion of Human Rights, access to health, education, clean water, etc.
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5. Lithuania	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Supportive of Kaliningrad prosperity and benefactor of trade relations - New ascent to EU status makes border security much higher concern
6. Poland	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Supportive of Kaliningrad prosperity and benefactor of trade relations - New ascent to EU status makes border security much higher concern
7. Germany	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Almost no remaining Germans in Kaliningrad - Diplomatic relations associated with Kaliningrad's status are no longer tense

7. Sub-National Risk Indicators

7.1. Summary

Medium risk (5.56)

According to CIPF risk analysis, Kaliningrad is a medium risk region with an assessment of 5.56. This analysis is based on an assessment of nine clusters that affect a country's risk for future conflict: History of Armed Conflict, Governance & Political Instability, Militarization, Population Heterogeneity, Economic Performance, International Linkages, Environment, Demographic Stress, and Human Development.¹⁰

A risk assessment analysis for each cluster finds that the main areas of concern for this sub region are History of Armed Conflict, Militarization, Governance & Political Instability, and Population Heterogeneity; all score as high risk on the CIPF database.

Demographic Stress, Economic Performance, Human Development & International Linkages list as medium risk with environmental stress rated as low.

In most instances, the sub-regional rating for Kaliningrad is be more stable or equal to Russia proper.

Russia is listed as high risk in History of Armed Conflict due to very high scores for refugees hosted and high for armed conflict but these are issues related almost entirely to the Caucasus and are nearly non-existent in Kaliningrad. It can be presumed that these numbers are lower in Kaliningrad where surrounding countries are generally prosperous and successful.

In Governance and Political Instability, Kaliningrad is listed as extremely high risk in regime durability and corruption.

Kaliningrad's import rate of weapons is low; still, it scores very highly in militarization due to a large armed forces presence in the exclave. Kaliningrad, because of its historical and geopolitical importance holds significant Russian armories, particularly naval weaponry.

In Population Heterogeneity, Russia is at high risk, in particular due to a high risk rating for risk of ethnic rebellion but this risk is all but neutralized by the hand-picked citizenry of Kaliningrad. Because of the historic domestic peace within the oblast, it is unlikely that Russia's high risk rating is a result of Kaliningrad's demographics.

In other clusters Kaliningrad is rated as medium or low risk despite high or very high risk for indicators like press freedom, inflation and trade openness.

¹⁰ For more information about the clusters and their application to risk analysis see CIPF Conflict Risk Assessment Report 2006.
<http://www.carleton.ca/cifp>

7.2. Risk indicators by cluster

7.2.1. History of Armed Conflict

Medium risk (6.27)

Stabilizing Factors

- The near total lack of political violence in this sub region in the past 50 years

Destabilizing Factors

- High level of militarization

Potential spoilers

- A weapons accident or terrorist attack on the arms-rich oblast

7.2.2. Governance and Political Instability

High risk (8.13)

Stabilizing Factors

- Positive and stable relations between Kaliningrad and Moscow
- Promising commitments by political leaders to good governance and stability

Destabilizing Factors

- High level of corruption

Potential spoilers

- Political leadership crisis
- Change in government for Russia

7.2.3. Militarization

High risk (7.53)

Stabilizing Factors

- Repurposing redundant military assets to civilian use

Destabilizing Factors

- Arms production and availability remains consistently high in Kaliningrad

Potential spoilers

- Military accident or the arming of a non-state group

7.2.4. Population Heterogeneity

High risk (7.00)

Stabilizing Factors

- Extreme homogeneity of Kaliningrad's population

Destabilizing Factors

- Relaxing borders portends immigration and demographic change for the exclave

Potential spoilers

- Initiation of identity-based politics by underground groups

7.2.5. Economic Performance

Medium risk (5.60)

Stabilizing Factors

- Open and diversifying economy
- Initiation of Special Economic Status and increased trade openness with neighbouring European countries
- International support and investment in local industry

Destabilizing Factors

- Resource focused economy is susceptible to accidents and uncontrollable environmental shifts.

Potential spoilers

- Failure to find or convince investors and customers for large industrial and resource sector
- Currency collapse

7.2.6. International Linkages

Medium risk (5.38)

Stabilizing Factors

- Expanding European interest supporting peace building and economic development initiatives in Kaliningrad.
- Regional trade and tariff agreements with non-traditional partners

Destabilizing Factors

- Simmering low-grade land dispute with Lithuania

Potential spoilers

- Change in policy or leadership from Moscow that could isolate Russia from diplomatic relations with Europe
- Oppressive trade or travel restrictions at the edges of Europe

7.2.7. Environmental Stress

Low risk (1.67)

Stabilizing Factors

- Aims to increase tourism and openness of the city to visitors and investors results in emphasis on environmental protection
- Proximity to Europe and EU standards for ecological protection

Destabilizing Factors

- High level of industrial activity and emphasis on growth over environmental issues
- Industrial and shipping pollution

Potential spoilers

- Natural disaster

7.2.8. Demographic Stress

Medium risk (3.53)

Stabilizing Factors

- Stable population growth
- Managed immigration policy

Destabilizing Factors

- Shift from almost homogenous ethnic and cultural heritage of Kaliningrad
- Activism of right-wing hate groups

Potential spoilers

- Racist action against immigrants

7.2.9. Human Development

Medium risk (4.19)

Stabilizing Factors

- Prosperity and controlled population is manageable by social and political structures for the provision of state services
- High level of industry ensures regular employment
- Proximity to European services through simplified travel limitations

Destabilizing Factors

- Increased contact with Europe could result in increased demand for state services not available from Russia
- Emphasis on growth and economic development to the detriment of social and cultural growth
- Tensions surrounding the city's historical past as a major German centre emerging in contemporary dialogue

Potential spoilers

- Isolation and insulation of community increases the risks associated with communicable disease or humanitarian emergency




8. Events Data: Trends and Analysis

8.1. Summary

Table 3. Overall statistics

	Total number of events	Average event score	Average score as a percent of total possible (9)
All	47	2	22%
Stabilizing	37	3.49	39%
Destabilizing	10	-3.5	-39%

Table 4. Overall event trends

	All events	Stabilizing events	Destabilizing events
	Status quo	Status quo	Moderately negative
Weekly aggregate			

Between 28 October 2005 and 28 April 2006, 47 events were recorded for the Kaliningrad region. Of these events, 37 (79%) were stabilizing, and 10 (21%) were destabilizing. The overall statistics from this 28 week period indicate that Kaliningrad is in a steady pattern of primarily stabilizing events and punctuated with a few meaningful destabilizing events.

The overall trends exhibit very gently negative slopes. This signifies that individual event scores are actually decreasing slightly in magnitude as well as in frequency. Negative events represent a relatively small proportion of all events and were distributed throughout the reporting period. The primary driver of the slightly negative trend is related, in

large measure, to characteristics surrounding stabilizing events.

The fact that there was no overwhelmingly positive or negative series of connected news events in the reporting period is testament to the relatively balanced political outlook.

The outlook in Kaliningrad is positive in the near term but it should be noted that marked shifts in any crucial clusters for Kaliningrad could prove to be significantly destabilizing. A significant demographic shift, a medical epidemic or economic crash could all destabilize this sub region. At present, Kaliningrad is isolated from many of the destabilizing structural characteristics of the majority of Russia but as its borders open and its residents travel through the Euro zone, Russia's ability to moderate outside influences will diminish.

The only primary driver cluster for this sub region is that of Economic Performance. As the possibilities of the Special Economic Zone become more fruitful in the European environment, Kaliningrad will become wealthier, which is a stabilizing trend. Regional and national government have recognized the importance of keeping that trend isolated from destabilizing tendencies in other key clusters.

8.2. Primary Drivers




Primary drivers are those clusters that contain more than twenty events. These clusters are the main areas of activity in the region, with the greatest contribution to the overall trend.

8.2.1. Economic Performance

Table 5. Economic Performance statistics

	Total number of events	Average score	Average score % of possible 9
All	21	2.62	29.1%
Stabilizing	18	3.61	40.1%
Destabilizing	3	-3.33	-37%

Table 6. Economic Performance event trends

	<i>All events</i>	<i>Stabilizing events</i>	<i>Destabilizing events</i>
	Status quo	Status quo	Strongly negative
Weekly aggregate			

Kaliningrad's Economic Performance cluster bears a very balanced, even slope due to regular and well-reported positive activities. The magnitude of average event scores (40%) is significantly positive and destabilizing events are so rare that the validity of the slope for those events is weak.

Overview of Stabilizing Events

- New automobile factory opening
- Expansion of Special Economic Zone
- Expansion of banking services

Overview of Destabilizing Events

- Cancelled oil refinery project due to lack of funds from external sources
- Accidental oil tanker explosion

8.3. Secondary Drivers

Secondary drivers are those clusters with less than twenty monitored events. These clusters provide supplementary information to the overall analysis.

8.3.1. Armed Conflict

Armed conflict is a nearly absent cluster in contemporary Kaliningrad. Significant violence has not occurred since the end of World War II, though it should be noted that increasingly militant right-wing hate-groups have occasionally employed violent tactics.¹¹

8.3.2. Militarization

The militarization of Kaliningrad has long been one of its defining features. Because of its historically contested nature and strategic location, it has been highly fortified for nearly 100 years. Presently, the city is home of the Russian Baltic Fleet but activities are ongoing to repurpose many of the outdated or unused assets for civilian use.¹²

8.3.3. Population Heterogeneity

Since the occupation and annexation of then-Königsberg (and expulsion of surviving Germans) by Russian forces in 1945, the city has been relatively homogenous in both religious and ethnic diversity. Expansion of immigration and proximity to Europe may be diversifying the sub region, but not markedly.

8.3.4. Demographic Stress

Population heterogeneity events for Kaliningrad in this reporting period were of relatively low magnitude. Among the reported events was a condemnation by Kaliningrad's Muslims of the controversial Danish 'Muhammad' newspaper cartoons.

8.3.5. International Linkages

The demarcation and clarification of borders and trade agenda items dominate this cluster for the reporting period. Bilateral trade and transit negotiations with Lithuania also contributed an influential set of events for Kaliningrad in this cluster.

8.3.6. Environmental Stress

A trend for Environmental Stress cannot be adequately analysed due to insufficient data points. Events of significance included an accidental explosion of an oil tanker in the Kaliningrad Harbour and the requirement for agricultural support after a difficult winter.

8.3.7. Human Development

In the six-month tracking period, this cluster registered very few significant events. Party members lobbying for a commemorative statue of Stalin and an announcement by President Putin regarding his desire for Baltic Russians to migrate to Kaliningrad - by extolling the high quality of life in that region - were among the relatively non-influential events for the reporting period.

¹¹ Radio Free Europe 'Russia: A Timeline Of Recent Racial Incidents' See: <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/04/7519d643-4b94-4a1f-856c-83324e05520f.html>

¹² Warfare.ru "Baltic Fleet" See: <http://www.warfare.ru/?catid=321&linkid=2230>

Part C: Annex

9. Summary of Data

Table 7. Overall data

Risk indicator	All events		Stabilizing events		Destabilizing events		
	Trend	Avg.	Trend	Avg.	Trend	Avg.	
Medium risk	(5.56)	.07	2	-.08	3.49	-.17	-3.5

Table 8. Data for primary drivers

Cluster	Risk indicator	All events		Stabilizing events		Destabilizing events		
		Trend	Avg.	Trend	Avg.	Trend	Avg.	
Economic Performance	Medium risk	(5.6)	-.06	2.36	-.03	3.61	-3.33	-3.25

Table 9. Data for Secondary Drivers

Cluster	Risk indicator
Armed Conflict	Medium risk (6.27)
Militarization	High risk (7.53)
Population Heterogeneity	High risk (7.00)
Governance and Political Instability	High risk (8.13)
Demographic Stress	
International Linkages	Medium risk (5.38)
Environmental Stress	Low risk (1.67)
Human Development	Medium risk (4.19)

10. Trend Line Charts

10.1. All events




Figure 2. Chart of trend lines for all events and the count of events by week

10.2. Stabilizing events




Figure 3. Chart of trend lines for stabilizing events and the count of events by week

10.3. Destabilizing events




Figure 4. Chart of trend lines for destabilizing events and the count of events by week

11. Maps



Figure 5. Map of Kaliningrad from Wikipedia

12. Bibliography

12.1. Event Sources

The 47 events were obtained using Google Alerts (<http://www.google.com/alerts>), which provided a daily summary of news reports for the search term 'Kaliningrad' and 'Kalingrad'. The news reports originated from a wide variety of local and international sources, including:

- ABC News
- Agenzia Giornalistica Italia
- Antara News
- Bahrain News Agency - Bahrain
- BBC News
- Bucharest Daily News
- Bulgarian News Network
- BusinessWeek
- Financial times
- Focus News
- Forbes
- Hindu - India
- Houston Chronicle
- ICRC
- Institute for War and Peace Reporting
- Institutional Investor - New York
- Interfax Russia, Moscow
- International Herald Tribune
- Islamic Republic News Agency - Tehran
- ISN - Zurich, Switzerland
- ITAR-TASS-Moscow
- Monsters and critics - Glasgow
- NBC
- Mainichi Daily News - Japan
- New York Times
- Noticias - Spain
- NRCU - Ukrainian Radio - Kiyv, Ukraine
- OneWorld.net
- Prague Watchdog
- 5TV
- RuBiCon
- UPI
- Xinhua
- Zee news - India
- Canada.com
- China Post
- Civil Georgia
- CRI - Beijing, China
- Czech news agency
- DefenseNews.com
- Dtt.net - Brussels
- Euroobserver
- EUPolitix.com - Brussels
- Euronews.net
- People's Daily Online
- Prague daily monitor
- Pravda
- Prensa Latina - Havana, Cuba
- Radio Free Europe
- Regnum news agency - Russia
- Reliefweb
- Reuters
- RIA Novosti - Moscow
- Scotsman UK
- Seattle Post Intelligencer
- Special Broadcasting Service - Australia
- Stratfor USA
- Swissinfo
- Taipai Times - Taiwan
- TCMnet
- Turkish Press
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13. Methodology

13.1. Description of Events Monitoring

Event trends are assessed using the slope of time-series trend lines that are provided by plotting event data over a given period of time. First, based on the context of the region as described by the Background, Stakeholders and Risk Indicators sections, events are identified as being generally stabilizing or destabilizing¹³ and given a sign of either +1 (stabilizing) or -1 (destabilizing). Events are then coded on a scale of 1 to 3 for three dimensions: the degree to which they can be linked to the risk of future peace or conflict – Causality (Ca); whether the event is typical or constitutes an acceleration of events – Escalation (Es); and the degree to which the event affects relevant stakeholders– Centrality (Ce). Causality and Escalation are coded based on a qualitative analysis of the event considered within the context of the region’s risk indicators. Centrality is coded using a quantitative analysis of the proportion of stakeholders affected by the event.

A conflict indicator statistic is then calculated by summing the three dimensions of an event (Ca+Es+Ce), and multiplying it by the sign to provide a stabilizing indicator of +3 to +9 and a destabilizing indicator of -3 to -9. The analyst can use this conflict indicator to explore summary statistics as well as trend lines of the region’s events.

Summary statistics provide the analyst with an overview of the average event scores. The total number of events and the average conflict indicator statistics are calculated, including sub-calculations by sign. For the average scores, a percentage is calculated based on the highest score for that conflict indicator statistic. For instance, an average Ca+Es+Ce can score as high (or low) as +/- 9, so a score of

+/- 2 achieves a percentage of +/- 22%. Positive percentages are indicative of an environment that on average experiences stabilizing events, as there are either more stabilizing events or more strongly valued stabilizing events. Negative percentages indicate the opposite, an environment characterized by destabilizing events. The closer the percentage comes to +/- 100% the better (or worse) events tend to be.






The second avenue of analysis is via trend lines to observe whether the events demonstrate any positive or negative trend over time. The conflict indicators are plotted against time – usually six months – and trend lines are generated, based on ordinary least squares regression, and compared in two different ways. The first comparison, the individual event trend line, plots the conflict indicators of each event over time. This is useful in that it indicates whether and to what degree the individual event conflict indicators have a positive or negative trend over time. However, it does not account for an increase or decrease in the total *number* of events, so the second trend analysis is that of the weekly aggregate. To attain this trend line, the conflict indicators are first summed by week; for instance, if one week has four events with the conflict indicators of +2, +2, -2 and -2, the overall weekly aggregate would be 0, the stabilizing weekly aggregate would be +4 and the destabilizing weekly aggregate would be -4. The weekly aggregate is then plotted over time to produce a trend line that incorporates the theory that an increase or decrease in total number of events should matter in addition to their changing value. That is, one would presume that a rapid increase in the number of stabilizing events would indicate an improving trend, even if the conflict indicators for the individual events remain largely unchanged.

¹³ Note that in some unique cases an event will be coded as both stabilizing and destabilizing.

Taken together, these two trend analyses provide an overview of the general event developments over the previous months. In the analysis, both stabilizing and destabilizing trend lines reflect improvements through positive slopes,

indicating the reduction in conflict vulnerability. On the other hand, negative slopes denote a deteriorating situation – an increase in conflict vulnerability. The degree of improvement or deterioration is identified as status quo, moderate, or strong, based on the slope and according to the following chart:

Table 10. Matrix of Trend Magnitudes and associated symbols

Trend Magnitude	Strongly Negative	Moderately Negative	Status quo	Moderately Positive	Strongly Positive
Slope size	Below -1	Between -1 and -.1	Between -.1 and .1	Between +.1 and +1	Over +1
Symbol					

Finally, scenarios are created for best case, worst case and status quo situations, based on an analysis of overall and cluster summary statistics and trends. The best and worst cases consider the trends among stabilizing and destabilizing events. The best case assumes that the strongest of the positive trends will hold for the future time period, and the worst case assumes that the strongest of the negative trends will occur. This holds regardless of whether the positive (or negative) trend occurs among destabilizing (or stabilizing) events. For instance, if there is strongly positive trend among destabilizing events, this trend would be used to extrapolate events for the best case scenario. If there is a strongly negative trend among stabilizing events, this trend would be used for the worst case. The status quo, on the other hand, will extrapolate future tendencies based on the overall trend. For instance, if there is moderate overall improvement, then the status quo assumes that this is

the trend for the future. Events are then surmised based on these trends in order to provide a conjectured future case.

Each case concludes by estimating the region’s future capacity to absorb damaging events and take advantage of peace-building opportunities by forecasting the best, worst or status quo trends. The conclusion will also state the likelihood that the region will approach a higher or lower risk level; this analysis is based on whether the current risk level is already near a lower or higher category and the magnitude of the trend under consideration. For example, a medium-risk region of 3.6 with a strongly positive trend line is likely to move into the low risk level. Alternatively, a medium-risk region of 6.4 with a weak trend line is unlikely to move into the low risk level, but it could move into a high risk level with a moderately deteriorating trend.

13.2. Description of Events Data Collection

Events were collected in one of two methods for this study.

In most cases, the news-parsing technology of Google-Alerts (www.google.com/alerts) was employed to scan and collect daily reports of events data reported by the international press about the particular sub-national region of interest. Search terms were identified by the sub-national region itself and as a result of the stakeholder analysis (if one actor or group tended to garner a significant amount of press but not necessarily reported in the same news stories as the name of the sub-national region); in some cases, alternate spellings and transliterations were used as search terms to ensure a more robust set of data. News reports were then delivered to

analysts as daily emails (if news events were found for that day) which were then coded into a Microsoft Access Database using the methodology described above.

The other method by which data was gathered for this study was to collect the data post-facto. Some sub-national regions' data was collected only partially using Google-Alerts so a more robust reassessment of the monitoring time period was required. To do this, analysts employed a LexisNexis search for the monitoring period and using the same search parameters as had been used with Google-Alerts. The events collected using this methodology are identical in type to the daily digest-type – the only difference is the timing in which the analysts coded the events was not continuous.