

VENGEANCE AND INTERVENTION: CAN THIRD PARTIES BRING PEACE WITHOUT SEPARATION?

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FROM a legal and practical point of view, separation is never easy. On the one hand, there is the perceived need to support struggling minorities who demand self-determination as an inalienable right. This impulse is demonstrated by the fundamental role of the 1947 UN Human Rights Sub-commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, associated with the post-Second World War decolonization process. Occasionally, this and other UN declarations of self-determination are cited as support for a minority's claims about historical injustice or threats to identity.¹ On the other hand, there are the legal, theoretical, and practical imperatives of maintaining a functioning state-based international system, which require reasonably coherent and stable nations.

During the cold war, the international community was willing to recognize the self-determination of peoples as a bulwark against "imperialism" but not at the cost of disrupting the integrity of the state-system. Parts of UN Resolution 1514 reveal the inherent dilemma in granting self-determination:

- (2) All peoples have the right to self-determination . . .
- (4) All armed action of repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and fully their right to complete independence . . .
- (6) Any attempt at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.²

Studies of attempts at ethnic conflict management by third parties underscore the complex problem in finding a balance between rights to

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1. Another example would be Article 1 of both the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant of Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, drawn directly from UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (Declaration of Decolonization, 1960): "By virtue of that right they [self-designated minorities] freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development" (Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics* [Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993: 150]).

2. *Ibid.*, 151.

self-determination and maintaining the integrity of states. For example, in their examination of five failed domestic "Peace Accords" (Canada, Cyprus, India, Sri Lanka, and Sudan) Samarasinghe and de Silva suggest that without the presence of a third party, the potential for transforming existing state structures is minimal.³ Third party involvement has the potential to do two things. External involvement can partially reduce levels of conflict between separatist groups and the state-centre when there is support for the state-centre. If one side of the international community supports self-determination, however, while the other supports the state-centre, then the possibility of conflict diffusion is greatly increased. The latter situation describes the cold war situation as well as the Yugoslavian case and other post-cold war scenarios because of the potential for involvement by external actors on both sides of the ethnic issue.

Principles of conflict management and responses to ethnic separatism served a specific purpose during the cold war, a period which was perceived in the West as a Manichean struggle of right versus wrong. Within this struggle, international instruments were developed to hold in check the expansionist aims of some states and to prevent separatist conflicts from spreading. Maintaining international stability, at least for the West, was a system-wide concern.⁴ In contrast, today's struggles often consist of impossibly competing ethnic identities and mutually incompatible dreams of national self-determination. Within this matrix of competing claims, the conventional wisdom persists in the belief that the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of states within the established international system, and the principle of self-determination for peoples, are compatible.

Chaim Kaufmann offers a potential way out of this international law vs realpolitik debate. Kaufmann's argument relies on simple indicators or thresholds to determine when separation of ethnic groups should be the preferred option. Kaufmann argues that in cases of massive and ongoing ethnic tensions, partition should be undertaken resolutely and swiftly. He goes further by suggesting that after a substantial amount of civilian killing has occurred, the least-worst solution above all else is full separation. This should be done by outside forces since otherwise it will be done by the two sides at a much higher cost.

At face value, Kaufmann's argument makes eminent sense, but it runs contrary to both the bulk of traditional ethnic conflict management practice

3. K. M. de Silva, and S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe, eds., *Peace Accords and Ethnic Conflict* (New York: Pinter, 1993).

4. Astri Suhrke and Lela Garner Noble, eds., *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations* (New York: Praeger, 1977); Michael Brecher, *Crises in World Politics* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1993); Moynihan, *Pandaemonium*.

and UN Charter law. In some other important ways, however, his argument is consistent with current practice on intervention which places far greater emphasis on individual and group protection from the state.⁵ For example Kaufmann argues that when ethnic conflicts turn violent they generate spontaneous refugee movements, and thus “the question . . . is not whether the groups will be separated, but how. With protection, transport, subsistence, and resettlement organised by outside institutions, or at the mercy of their ethnic enemies.”⁶ Looking further back in time, Kaufmann suggests that it was the failure to partition completely India and Pakistan in 1948 that led to the protracted conflicts there and the immediate deaths of over one million people.⁷

Cases like the Indian partition are suggestive of what can happen when competing groups separate themselves, but the fact that it was messy there doesn't mean it will be less messy if it gets done by outsiders. Kaufmann concludes by arguing that the international community needs to devise ways to identify those cases where partition is the only option because there is no hope of attaining civil peace. Partitioning must be “complete” and it must “unmix” the populations or it will lead to renewed hostilities.

This article has two purposes. First, we examine whether the empirical record provides any a priori support for Kaufmann's claim that extended conflicts involving extensive bloodshed require partition as a solution. Second, on the basis of the case evidence we use to examine Kaufmann's theory, we try to identify any implications that arise regarding the role of third parties in ending these types of disputes. We begin by considering some of the difficulties that arise both from testing Kaufmann's argument, and from teasing out its implications for third party interveners.

5. See the *Independent International Commission on Kosovo*, and *The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* which both elaborate on basic criteria justifying intervention, for example, the suffering of civilians owing to human rights violations or the breakdown of government, the commitment to protect the civilian population and the calculation that the intervention has a reasonable chance of ending the conflict.

6. Chaim D. Kaufmann, “When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century,” *International Security* 23, no. 2 (Fall 1998): 120–56.

7. Partition is not the only answer. Cloughley, for example, argues that with respect to Kashmir, combining an agreement to move mortars out of range of the Line of Control with a withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani troops from the Siachen Glacier to pre-1971 positions and holding Pakistan to the Simla Accord vis-à-vis insurgents, should help prepare the ground for de-escalation of hostilities. While all of these actions are confidence building measures (CBMs), because of the deep suspicion between India and Pakistan the CBMs themselves would require third-party verification. Cloughley explicitly believes that no aspect of the Kashmir conflict can be dealt with purely on a bilateral basis, despite India's desire to keep relations that way. Brian Cloughley, “Violence in Kashmir,” *Security Dialogue* 30, no. 2 (June 1999): 225–38.

INTERPRETING KAUFMANN

IT IS perhaps fitting to start with Kaufmann's conclusions regarding partition. He draws three lessons from his analysis.⁸ First, we must "identify the threshold of intergroup violence and mutual security threats beyond which we must resort to separation and partition."⁹ Second, partition should be pursued only when the pre-existing separation of the warring ethnic groups is extensive. Third, refugee flows must be facilitated instead of prevented due to the greater risk of continued and escalating violence compared to the risks of flight. Implicitly all three lessons are to be learned by the international community, and they are deemed to thus have a central role to play in the management of these conflicts.

Kaufmann's lessons are not without their practical problems, many of which he acknowledges. There are nuances in all three of these recommendations that require the exercise of considerable judgement on the part of intervenors. Taking the recommendation in order, the first difficulty is indeed to identify the threshold of intergroup violence beyond which attempting to maintain a state's integrity is both futile and bloody. Through case studies Kaufmann can identify some important factors that may influence how such a threshold is to be determined, but there is no testable model or formula that can be applied in general. The feasibility of this first central requirement, then, is debatable.

Second, by the time a conflict has reached clearly identifiable thresholds it may be too late for third parties to act effectively, no matter how unanimous they may be on the need for separation. A delay in response is problematic since many players, both state and non-state, internal and external, will have at this stage become involved in the conflict on an ongoing basis—making separatist conflicts inherently less manageable but also making the tasks of separation even more difficult. An increase in the number of stakeholders, and the hardening of positions in any conflict means, by definition, that resolution and the negotiated solution upon which a lasting separation depends, will be more difficult to obtain and enforce over the long run. Further, waiting for a clear signal of having crossed the threshold also means waiting for additional deaths, the presumed best signal.

A similar problem of judgement lies in Kaufmann's second conclusion, that separation should be used only when the "national communities are already largely separate or will be separated at the same time."¹⁰ There is the obvious

8. Kaufmann, "When All Else Fails."

9. *Ibid.*, 155.

10. *Ibid.* 155.

problem of how separate should “largely separate” be. There is also the related problem in implementation of the extent to which warring parties need to be physically isolated from one another. Obviously, the idea of complete partition is difficult to attain even under the best of conditions; in practice it is extremely difficult to unmix populations. Ghosh, for example, traces the complex ways that population flows resulting from ethnic hostilities, environmental disasters, and wars in South Asia, continue to cause ethnic hostilities in their host states even after unmixing has occurred.¹¹ Partitions are no barrier to the movements of people. Ghosh argues that instead of considering separation as an alternative, the community of states need to sign, ratify and more stringently adhere to international refugee treaties to ensure fair treatment for displaced persons.

It also needs to be noted that in his normative policy proposals Kaufmann seems to have assumed two reasonable but opposing elements of the intervener’s preference structure, and then sought to balance them. First, there is the assumption that third-parties value a peaceful settlement, presumably to reduce casualties and promote stability. As a consequence he concludes that since separation of the warring sides is the only (or at least the most effective) way of achieving a peaceful settlement, this ought to be the goal of intervention. Against this preferred option, however, Kaufmann appears to weigh the costs of the intervention by suggesting that the policy be pursued only when the two sides are already largely separate. Therefore Kaufmann’s approach to handling these severe conflicts seems to require a delicate balance between the necessity of separation and the presence of circumstances that facilitate such a separation. What is not clear is whether the balance is contingent on intervener effort, or whether there is yet again a fundamental threshold of required pre-separation of the hostile groups beyond which any level of resource expenditure is futile.

In some sense Ghosh’s suggestion is diametrically opposed to Kaufmann’s last conclusion, that the movement of people should be facilitated rather than suppressed. Ghosh takes what Kaufmann identifies as the UNHCR policy approach of improving the safety of people where they are, instead of moving them. Once again the problem lies in the detail: how much effort to move people how far? To be even more pointed, when does facilitating the separation of populations become collaboration in ethnic cleansing? Implicitly it seems

11. Ghosh, Partha, “Regional Security and Cross-Border Population Movements in South Asia,” in *Regional Security, Ethnicity and Governance*, ed. Justus Richter and Christian Wagner (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1998), 66.

that Kaufmann is taking the quite legitimate position that saving lives in the immediate conflict outweighs the associated problems of moral hazard in terms of potentially encouraging those who maliciously use ethnicity as a political tool.

Notwithstanding these practical difficulties, Kaufmann has presented a coherent and compelling argument with crucial policy implications. In this article we take up the challenge of testing aspects of Kaufmann's argument to see whether his theoretical and policy inferences stand up to the stylized facts of identity-based conflicts. Specifically, we consider two interrelated components: is there a threshold which divides conflicts between those in which separation is essential and those in which it is not, and are third parties necessary for the process of separation.

The remainder of this article unfolds as follows. First we derive the propositions for testing by reviewing Kaufmann's argument. We then test these against a database of conflicts. We focus on two related types of conflict. We initially consider as a more direct test of Kaufmann's arguments those conflicts in which separation has been identified as an important causal factor. These are the cases for which Kaufmann's argument is arguably the most appropriate, as there is at least a clearly identified party willing to be separated from the current state. We then examine how the outcomes of these conflicts are related both to the level of violence and the activities of third party interveners. One observation worth noting at the outset is that there are few cases where there is outright international support for separatists and there are far more cases of international support for state integrity, so much of our investigation is necessarily of the conjectural what-if variety. We then widen the analysis to consider conflicts with an important ethnic dimension, but not an explicitly separatist conflict. In these cases separation is also theoretically possible though perhaps less tenable. Inclusion of these latter cases, then, constitutes the weaker test of the hypotheses we derive from Kaufmann. We consider ethnic conflict cases where separation is a stated goal of the rebels as well as where it is not.

In evaluating the empirical content of the hypotheses we do not engage in a formal statistical analysis. Instead, we use the data to test whether the empirical record conforms to the a priori expectations derived from the hypotheses. We believe this approach is justified because Kaufmann has presented a valuable yet very general theory that, as we have argued, is insufficiently developed to deduce formal propositions due to the critical role of judgment. Thus we wish to supplement our analysis with inductive insights from the data that may help to guide further refinements of Kaufmann's theory. This approach can be justified as a tool to evaluate the logical consistency of a model, to clarify the

propositions, and examine critical questions of inference.¹² This method allows us to evaluate the underlying assumptions that are embedded in the ad hoc elements of Kaufmann's argument. Further, it stimulates the production of additional propositions for later testing. Finally, we recognize that irregularities between our findings and Kaufmann's claims are not insufficient to refute or prove the hypotheses we have identified, or Kaufmann's theory as a whole. This approach, however, may lead us to question or reject some interpretations of his theory, while pointing to alternatives that are more clearly consistent with the empirical record.

HYPOTHESES

KAUFMANN'S ANALYSIS lends itself to the identification of several hypotheses. Some are quite explicit, others need to be teased out from the underlying logic. Further, some of these hypotheses deal with very general elements of conflict and conflict resolution, while others can be made specific to the context of third party intervention. We frame the hypotheses so as to make the null the contrary to our interpretation of Kaufmann's argument.

The central hypothesis that emerges from Kaufmann's builds on his argument that after a certain level of violence has been reached, and after the different sides in a dispute suffer a sufficiently high number of casualties, groups will find it impossible to live peacefully with one another. The level of hostility and the generation of group-based myths will ensure that the two sides continue their conflict, with vengeance for past misdeeds driving a cycle of violence. Consequently, the only viable solution would be to separate the combatants territorially. The strongest form of this argument would be to say that peaceful coexistence cannot be brought about after an intergroup conflict has resulted in high number of casualties. It is possible, however, that some intermediating factors could dilute the proposition to one which stipulates that a conflict with a high number of casualties would significantly reduce the probability of post-conflict coexistence. By investigating cases of conflict

12. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "An Expected Utility Theory of International Conflict," *American Political Science Review* 74 (December 1980): 917-31, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Toward a Scientific Understanding of International Conflict: A Personal View," in "Symposium: Methodological Foundations of the Study of International Conflict," *International Studies Quarterly* 29, no. 2. (June 1985): 121-36, Bruce Russett, *Power and Community in World Politics* (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1974); Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

with high numbers of casualties we may thus examine the degree of empirical support for Kaufmann's hypothesis, as well as identify what the associated threshold of violence might be. We can write the first hypothesis as:

HYPOTHESIS 1: If a Conflict Generates a High Number of Casualties, then any Peaceful Settlements should be Based on Territorial Separation

Although some general insights may be derived from an examination of Kaufmann's central hypothesis, our other interest here is to translate Kaufmann's ideas into propositions regarding the role of third party interveners and the outcomes of their efforts. Intervention, therefore, might be one of those important intermediating factors which dilute the purer forms of Kaufmann's hypotheses. For example, the strength of the intervention, as well as the strength of the other protagonists, will clearly influence how hypothesis 1 might be modified.

First, if the intervener is sufficiently strong it may be possible to suppress the violence and potentially promote a settlement regardless of its orientation or bias. The capacity of the intervener to impose a settlement, in turn, depends on the absolute and relative strength of the combatants. An intervention on behalf of a weaker side may prolong a conflict by encouraging it to prosecute the war rather than surrender its desire for a separate state, on the one hand, or a unified state, on the other. These modifications to the hypothesis are of practical importance as well, since interveners seem loath to support separatist movements for a variety of reasons.¹³ Therefore, there are unlikely to be many observations of interventions in support of separation. Therefore a related hypothesis can be identified.

HYPOTHESIS 2: If a Conflict Generates a High Number of Casualties, then Peaceful Settlements that do not Involve Separation will Require Either Very Strong and Extended Interventions, Very Weak Separatist Groups, or a Very Strong Central Government

Finally, we can consider the nature of the intervention. For our purposes we can think of three pure forms of intervention: those that support the integrity of the state, those that support partition, and those that are effectively neutral. In addition there may be multiple interveners with different goals. These interventions may also come in various forms of robustness, and will interact

13. Heraclides, "The Ending of Unending Conflicts: Separatist Wars," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 26, no. 3 (summer, 1997): 679-703."

with combatants of various strengths. What hypotheses might emerge from the consequences of intervention?

Kaufmann's argument is that separation is essential for the resolution of ethnic conflicts with high-numbers of casualties, because the bitterness engendered by the amount of killing will make the peaceful integration of the fighting communities impossible. Interventions that support the separatists in such a conflict should thus be more successful in bringing about a rapid end to the violence and inducing a settlement than those that are either neutral or support the integrity of the pre-existing state. Interventions of the latter kind, therefore, should be expected to be longer and more protracted, without necessarily arriving at a permanent solution. We might thus consider the following hypothesis as a consequence of Kaufmann's theory:

HYPOTHESIS 3: If a Conflict Generates a High Number of Casualties, then Faster and More Stable Settlements will Result if Third Party Interventions Support Separation

Before proceeding to the data, we want to stress that we do not want to formulate a normative test of what third parties ought to do to try and mitigate the violence of a conflict, as that would not necessarily have any relevance for testing the content of Kaufmann's argument. Kaufmann has argued that third parties ought to try and separate warring factions when it is clear they can no longer reside within the same state. This does not mean that we will necessarily observe any such cases, as other policy options may well have been pursued, correctly or otherwise. For these reasons we focus on the positive side of how conflict outcomes are linked to casualties and third part activity.

CASE SELECTION

IN EVALUATING Kaufmann's argument we consider two sets of cases. The first set comprises cases where separation is deemed to be more tenable, and are pre-identified by the presence of an agenda that includes separation. In other words, where there is a the potential for territorial demarcation, an informal or formal declaration of intent, a concentration of ethnic groups and divided political leadership on the desirability for separation. Therefore, tenable cases of separation are situations where at least one party to the conflict wants separation.

If neither party has ever identified separation as an option, or there is little potential for territorial demarcation (because groups are scattered), then the

third party is likely to find separation to be extremely difficult. Therefore, the first component of our test will focus on cases identified specifically as having a core separatist component, as identified by Heraclides.¹⁴

In tenable cases, when a separatist group makes a formal declaration of independence, that certifies the separatist group as “secessionist *stricto sensu*.”¹⁵ Secessions *stricto sensu* usually follow on from “incremental secessions” that involve ongoing and gradually increasing political and military activity aimed at independence or some form of autonomy. Incremental secessions are usually and more accurately referred to as separatist movements because, initially at least, there is no formal declaration of independence.

It is important to note that both secessions *stricto sensu* and incremental separatist movements possess a territorial base for a collectivity and a sizeable and distinct minority, both key ingredients in determining whether separation is viable.¹⁶ There are also claims that there is an unequal relationship between the minority group and the state-centre, another important factor for third parties to consider since much of their judgement on the viability of separation and who to support should depend on how the parties to a conflict treat one another.¹⁷

We have selected Heraclides’ 1997 study of separatist wars to evaluate third party involvement in tenable cases. According to the Heraclides study, six outcomes are possible:

- 1) Nineteen cases involve victory by the state-centre (as in the Thai Malay of Thailand);
- 2) Twenty-two conflicts involve some form of autonomy or accommodation through a peace accord (as in the Gorkhas in India or the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina);
- 3) Eight conflicts remain unresolved with the separatist group either in disarray or temporarily quiescent;
- 4) Eight cases have tenuous or ambiguous cease-fires as in the Shan, Mon and Karen separatist movements in Burma;
- 5) Thirteen conflicts remain deadlocked with sporadic and ongoing violence (as in Kashmir or the Kurds of Iraq), and
- 6) Only five conflicts have resulted in outright victories by the separatist group: Tigray, Bangladesh, Eritrea, Croatia, and Slovenia.¹⁸

14. Alexis Heraclides, “The Ending of Unending Conflicts: Separatist Wars.”

15. Alexis Heraclides, *The Self-determination of Minorities in International Politics* (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1991), 344.

16. Alexis Heraclides, “Secessionist Minorities and External Involvement,” *International Or-*

Of the seventy-five cases where the state-centre opted for a military solution against a minority, the result has been either de-facto autonomous administrations or lost territory for the state-centre. Only in eleven of the seventy-five major separatist conflicts of the last half century has successful military conquest led to the settlement of the conflict between a minority and the state-centre (either victory by the state-center or by the separating group).

Heraclides' evaluation highlights several characteristics of violent separatist conflict. First, at one of the end of the spectrum it is important to note that all separatist wars have occurred in settings where power is highly centralised and democracy is weak or non-existent.¹⁹ Second, there are outside partisan actors in those instances where separation is pursued through violence.²⁰ Finally, all seventy-five of Heraclides' separatist wars involve minorities at risk of political and economic discrimination or military repression, though data problems eliminated some of these observations.

A fair assessment of Kaufmann's arguments requires, however, that we also consider other cases where separation was never at the core of the conflict but where levels of violence are so high that separation is viable compared against either continued fighting or brokering a negotiated power sharing agreement. In these cases ethnicity is specified as a motivating dimension of the conflict, suggesting that there are grounds for distinguishing between combatants on some reasonably transparent basis. Kaufmann's logic still seems applicable to these cases, despite the potentially extreme difficulty of executing a reasonable policy of territorial separation. Even if different factions in a country did not originally contemplate separation, the emergence of ethnic or other affiliations on different sides of a conflict and the potential ill generated by casualties may make reconciliation extremely difficult. Indeed a subsidiary test of hypothesis 1 is to examine the case evidence to see whether a high number of casualties in conflicts with some form of identity component eventually produce a separatist element.

To examine this wider set of conflicts, Heraclides' set of separatist wars was augmented by data from Regan, Licklider, HIIK, and the Europa World Yearbook.²¹ The conflicts identified as ethnic, religious, or identity-based by

ganization 44, no. 3 (summer 1990): 341–78.

17. Heraclides, *The Self-determination of Minorities in International Politics*.

18. Heraclides' 1997 assessment excludes low-intensity, low fatality separatist conflicts such as the Basque separatist movement in Spain ("The Ending of Unending Conflicts").

19. George Tsebelis, *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990); Timothy Sisk, *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1996).

20. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," *International Security* 21, no. 2 (fall 1996): 41–75.

these authors, but not identified as separatist, constituted an additional sample of cases.

In the context of balancing minority claims of unfair treatment against maintaining state integrity, third parties have been important but extremely uneven players.²² This variability results from the fact that, during the post-cold war era, most ethnic conflicts have not been directly connected to broader patterns of competitive international relations, as was the case during the cold war. Even though there has been a considerable shift away from supporting proxy wars—a major source of conflict escalation in many cases in the past—toward mutual reconciliation, few international efforts have been directed towards specific problems in reconciling ethnic tensions or even in considering the possibilities and viability of separation.

EVALUATION OF THE HYPOTHESES

FOR A very basic examination of hypothesis 1 we need only look at the set of conflict situations and compare the outcomes of high casualty and low-casualty conflicts. Four problems with this approach arise very quickly. First, how do we define “high” in a conflict with a high number of casualties? Casualty levels may be determined in absolute terms as the number of deaths, or in relative terms, by the rate of casualties relative to the size of the population. Should we define a conflict with ten thousand fatalities out of a population of one million people as a conflict with a higher casualty level than one with one thousand fatalities out of ten thousand people? The former is ten times worse in absolute terms, but only one tenth as bad as a proportion of population. We have chosen the absolute casualty numbers as the better indicator, though we acknowledge that this is far from perfect and may perturb the comparisons. The justification is that it is difficult to know exactly which is the relevant population base to choose. A highly regionalized dispute between two ethnic

21. Patrick Regan, “Conditions for Successful Third Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40, no. 2 (1996): 336–59; Roy Licklider, “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlement, 1945–1993,” *American Political Science Review* 89, no. 3 (September 1995): 681–90; Heidelberger Institut für Internationale Konfliktforschung (HIK) e.v., 2001, www.hiik.de/de/index_d.htm; *Europa World Yearbook* (London: Europa Publishing, 2002).

22. Third parties are important under those very rare instances when separation is agreed to by both sides. Though only a handful of cases can be characterized as such, peaceful separation has occurred in the last fifty years in at least five cases and this has been due largely to the presence of three factors: a) a constitutional basis for managing the dispute peacefully; b) a formal declaration of the intent to separate; and c) the presence of outside powers. Young, “How do Peaceful Separations Happen?” 45–60; and Heraclides, “The Ending of Unending Conflicts.”

groups within a very large country (such as India, for example) may appear to have a low rate of casualties based on total national population. For the local groups involved in the violence, however, these casualties might be quite significant and contribute to hardening of community feelings. Conflicts with 5,000 deaths or fewer are classified as low-casualty, while conflicts with 45,000 deaths or more are classified as high casualty.

Second, Kaufmann's conceptual framework is not formal enough to identify specific thresholds that might be relevant to the analysis. Is the relationship between casualties (in either absolute or relative terms) and the diminished likelihood of peace without separation, linear, or even monotonic? Or does the level of casualties cross some sort of (possibly context-specific) threshold below which reconciliation may be possible? If Kaufmann's idea is theoretically correct, it might not be reflected in the data if current conflict levels have not crossed this threshold, or have not done so with sufficient frequency to permit for solid statistical tests of significance. Thus we will pay particular attention to those conflicts with casualty levels similar to those discussed in Kaufmann.²³

A similar problem arises in identifying cases of territorial separation. Partition into two (or more) states is the most extreme case of potential separation, though even this dramatic step may not be sufficient to separate warring ethnic groups without further population transfers. What is less clear is whether less formal arrangements are sufficient. Will the creation of autonomous regions suffice? Will decentralization or even federalism suffice?

Third, the question of causality, and the possibility of tautology, must be taken into account. High-casualty conflicts are often associated with conflicts of long duration. Why is there such a high number of casualties in the conflict? Because both sides have resisted peace. The causal factors relating these two clearly linked events may, or may not, have anything to do with the forces identified and analyzed by Kaufmann.²⁴

Finally, the presence of complicating factors mean that a simple examination of the data can only be suggestive, not definitive. Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine the degree to which high casualties as a causal factor determining

23. "When All Else Fails."

24. The causality issue is also closely tied to the timing and data problems that emerge. At the beginning of a conflict, casualties may be quite low, but these will eventually accumulate. When we examine a case, therefore, timing matters in terms of how the conflict is characterized. Further, the data on conflict casualties are problematic. Estimates are often very poor, and may or may not include civilian deaths that are more indirectly linked to the actual fighting. For example, famine killed many in Biafra, but some estimates of casualties for that conflict put it below the high casualty cut-off we are using. The actual conflict data, therefore, may only give us some rough notions about the plausibility of Kaufmann's argument, rather than a definitive test of their legitimacy.

conflict outcomes interacts with other determinants. A perusal of the actual cases may, however, help to identify explanatory variables for more formal testing. Of specific interest is the role of third party interveners, on whom we focus our later analysis.

We first examined the sixty cases of separatist-driven conflict, of which twenty-three are classified as low casualty and twenty-one were classified as high casualty. The remaining sixteen cases are between the limits discussed above. The high casualty cases are identified in table 1. We have used the 2002 *Europa World Yearbook* to update the status of each conflict as a supplement to the coding provided by others.

There are two primary tests for hypothesis 1. As a general examination we compare first the outcomes of the low and high casualty separatist conflicts. The evidence is weakly supportive of the hypothesis. Of twenty-one cases of high-casualty conflict, nine have some degree of settlement and six are clearly still active. Of the remaining six cases four involved separation and two are primarily suppressed. In contrast, of the twenty-two lower-casualty conflicts, thirteen have some degree of settlement and only three are clearly active. Of the remaining six cases there is one separation and five primarily suppressed.

The second test of hypothesis one involves a focus on the high casualty conflicts. In discussing these we can also identify the degree to which hypothesis 2 is supported or not. There are six cases that conform to hypothesis 1 in so far as high-casualty civil conflicts have endured. Some of these are fairly recent in their modern form, having emerged (or re-emerged) after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Chechnya-Russia and Abkhazia-Georgia). Three cases are of particular interest due to their longevity and the display of a common cycle of violence, partial settlement, and renewed violence. The conflicts involving the Karen in Myanmar, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, and the Southern areas in Sudan, have all moved through ebbs and flows of violence.

The case of Sudan is illustrative. In the earliest phase of the civil war in Sudan, lasting from the early 1960s until the early 1970s, the government and the opposition attempted a peaceful reconciliation after the two sides had fought to a military stalemate. After a decade of relative calm the arrangement collapsed, however, and civil war returned. Although there have been sporadic ceasefires and agreements between the two sides, at the time of writing no solution has yet emerged on anything approaching a permanent basis. This case would appear to conform with Kaufmann's argument, while also being a ripe candidate for his recommendation of formal separation. Although by no means perfectly separated, the main combatants can be roughly (though not completely accurately) divided into two ethnically divergent groups that

Table 1a
SEPARATIST CONFLICTS: LOW CASUALTY

Case	Number of deaths	Outcome	Third party (current)	Third party (past)
India/Nagas	0	Partial settlement/ dormant	Absent	None
India/Bodoland	34	Partial settlement/active	Absent	None
India/Mizoram	63	Mostly settled	Absent	None
Slovenia/Yugoslavia	100	Separation/settlement	Absent	None
China/Xingjiang	200	Suppressed	Absent	None
Niger/Tuareg	200	Mostly settled	Absent	None
Mali/Tuareg	1000	Mostly settled	Absent	None
Moldova/Transdnierstra	1000	Mostly settled/dormant	Absent	Rebel
Spain/Basques	1000	Partial settlement/active	Absent	None
Senegal/Casamance	1250	Active/partial settlement	Absent	State
India/Assam	2000	Mostly settled	Absent	None
Yemen/South Yemen	2000	Suppressed	Absent	None
Burma/Rohingyas	2500	Suppressed	Absent	None
Burma/Karenni	2800	Active	Absent	None
Burma/Mon	2800	Suppressed	Absent	None
Iran/Kurds	3000	Suppressed	Absent	Rebel
Northern Ireland	3000	Mostly settled	Absent	None
Papua New Guinea/ Bougainville	3000	Mostly settled	Absent	State
India/Tripura	3500	Partially settled	Absent	None
Cyprus	5000	Suppressed/separated	Neutral	Divided/ neutral
Indonesia/Aceh	5000	Active	Absent	None
Indonesia/Irian Jaya	5000	Active	Absent	None

Note: The tables were based on the data present in Heraclides (“The Ending of Unending Conflicts: Separatist Wars”); Regan (“Conditions for Successful Third Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts”); Licklider (“The Consequences of Negotiated Settlement, 1945–1993”); and the Heidelberg Institut für Internationale Konfliktforschung data. The level of casualties were generally taken from Regan or an average of the HIIK data. The outcome column refers to coding presented in the data sets supplemented by updated information from the *Europa World Yearbook 2002*. In the outcome column there are several adjectives. “Active” refers to conflicts in which substantial violence is ongoing. “Partial settlement” implies that there has been some degree of political settlement though important issues remain unresolved. “Mostly settled” refers to cases in which the large majority of the aggrieved group or groups appear to have accepted a political settlement, though some tension remains. “Dormant” conflicts are those for which no apparent political solution was reached but violence appears to have largely ceased. “Suppressed” refers to conflicts where a dominant party has overwhelmed an

are also geographically more clearly separated than in several other cases of conflict. In the absence of formal political separation or the interposition of third party forces to separate the two sides, Kaufmann's logic suggests that this conflict will remain unsettled and violent.

Hypothesis 1 is also supported to a degree by the presence of peaceful agreements accompanied by territorial separation. In the most successful case of peace, Bangladesh's independence from Pakistan, settlement emerged as a consequence of territorial separation.²⁵ The fact that the two do not share a border undoubtedly limited the opportunities for subsequent violent interaction.

There are three other cases of formal separation in this group that offer mixed support for hypothesis 1. The India-Pakistan partition and the Eritrean-Ethiopian split both conform to Kaufmann's requirement of setting up separate states for combatants. Neither relationship, however, has been subsequently free of violence. Both borders have been the scene of renewed tension and fighting since the acceptance of independence. What the level of violence would have been in the counter-factual case of no separation, however, is unknown. Though it is tempting to say that violence would likely have been much worse, the potential for a nuclear exchange in the Indian sub-continent is arguably greater now given the presence of two independent states. The fourth case of successful separation, East Timor, was accompanied by considerable protracted violence, though there were many years of relative calm due to the successful suppression of the relatively weak separatists by a powerful central government. It is too early to determine the long-term prospects for bringing peace to the island, though outside support for the new nation will likely ensure its survival.

Two cases have been classified primarily as suppressed, with little or no evidence of an attempt to engage the separatists in a settlement. One case is the Tibet-China conflict. There is little information to allow us to judge whether and to what extent the Tibetans have come to accept the authority of the Chinese government. In the second case of the Kurdish people in Iraq, overt conflict has been suppressed by the central authority in some years, or

opponent and is able to end most violence without addressing the root causes of the conflict. The presence and activity of third parties are described in the last two columns. "Present" activity refers to the presence or absence of third parties in providing significant presence in enforcing the current outcome of a conflict, and identifies which combatant is being supported. "Past" activity refers to the presence, absence, and the combatant supported by third parties in the past with significant effort at crucial periods of the conflict.

25. There are additional cases of territorial separation not considered here. These are the cases emerging from the dissolutions of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. In the latter case there were few casualties directly relating to independence struggles, while in the latter the casualties were either conflated with other ethnic violence (Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina) or limited in scope (Slovenia, Macedonia).

Table 1b
SEPARATIST CONFLICTS: HIGH CASUALTY

Case	Number of Deaths	Outcome	Third party (current)	Third party (past)
Ethiopia/Eritrea	45,000	Separation	Absent	Divided
Burma/Karen	50,000	Active	Absent	None
Indonesia/W. Sumatra	50,000	Active	Absent	State
Burma/Kachin	54,000	Partial settlement/suppressed	Absent	None
Philippines/Moros	60,000	Partial settlement/active	State	State
China/Tibet	65,000	Suppressed	Absent	None
Croatia/Serbs	65,000	Settled	Absent	Divided/state
Sri Lanka/Tamil	65,000	Active	Absent	Neutral/state
Russia/Chechnya	72,000	Active	Absent	None
Georgia/Abkhazia	100,000	Active	Absent	Rebels
Laos/Meos	100,000	Partial settlement/suppressed	Absent	Divided
Iraq/Kurds	186,000	Suppressed	Rebel	Divided/rebels
Indonesia/East Timor	200,000	Separation	Rebel/neutral	Rebels
Bangladesh/Chakmas	200,000	Mostly settled	Absent	None
Bosnia/Croats	200,000	Mostly settled/suppressed	State	State
Bosnia/Serbs	200,000	Mostly settled/suppressed	State	State
Congo/Katanga	300,000	Partial settlement/suppressed/dormant	Absent	State/divided
India/Pakistan Partition	500,000	Separation/active	Absent	Rebels/neutral
Bangladesh	1,259,000	Separation/not contiguous	Absent	Rebels
Nigeria/Biafra	1,500,000	Mostly settled/suppressed/dormant	Absent	None
Sudan	1,500,000	Active	Absent	Divided

by third parties since the first Gulf War. In Iraq the northern protectorate and no-fly zone effectively kept the Iraqi army from pursuing the conflict against the Kurds between 1990 and 2003. It should be noted, however, that the Kurds and the Iraqi regime have a complex relationship, and that the Kurds themselves are split into competing factions. Periodic evidence of reduced tension and cooperation, however, seem to be just that: periodic. A permanent appraisal of Iraqi-Kurdish relations is currently impossible due to the recent war and American-led coalition occupation. In some sense this case does conform to hypothesis 2, where powerful third-party forces have been able to overcome the violent tendencies identified by Kaufmann by enforcing a de facto separation of forces without acknowledging political independence.

Nine cases that have involved some degree of settlement present the clearest challenge to hypothesis 1, though some conform to hypothesis 2. Thus, the Myanmar-Kachin and Laos-Meos settlements seem largely to have come about through successful suppression. A third case, that of the Moros in the Philippines, is difficult to assess since it involves a mix of successful government counter-insurgency, partial settlement, and remaining activity.

Three cases are of special interest due to the recentness of their settlement and the role of third parties. The Croatian and Serbian separatist groups in Bosnia, and, to a degree, the Serb rebellion within Croatia, were all pacified to a degree by the imposition of de facto solutions. Furthermore, though Croatia's settlement with its Serb population seems to be remarkably robust, inter-ethnic contact has been reduced by previous population transfers and expulsions.

In Bosnia, the Croats and Serbs were wrestled into political accommodation that maintained the territorial integrity of Bosnia while recognizing the de-facto separation of Serbs from the Federation. Peaceful political ties between the different component parts, however, seem to be maturing. Furthermore, the withdrawal of active support from neighbouring ethnic brethren in Serbia proper and their apparent abandonment of irredentist sympathies has undoubtedly diminished the capacity of separatists in Bosnia to pursue their struggle. Four factors are of particular interest appear in this case. First, the sides are, to a degree, separated both administratively and ethnically. Ethnic cleansing during the civil war left large areas of Bosnia more homogeneous than before, and the three distinct groups based on ethnicity and religion have been given considerable local autonomy in a quasi-federalist arrangement. Thus, one of Kaufmann's main requirements has been fulfilled, at least in part.

Kaufmann says little about two other potentially interesting elements of these types of conflict. Thus, a second feature of the Bosnian case is the

relatively advanced economic state of the country prior to the civil war, at least in comparison to many other cases. With more to lose materially, and with greater prospects for wealth through trade and investment ties with Europe, the combatants in Bosnia may be more open to considering political accommodation. Slovenia's rapid political and economic stabilization and ties to the European Union provide a powerful example to those contemplating their future in Bosnia. Therefore, it seems reasonable to ask whether economic circumstances can blunt or cancel the kinds of forces that drive Kaufmann's analysis.

History, and possibly ideology—a third factor—provide similar potential challenges to Kaufmann. Thousands of Yugoslavians died during the Second World War at the hands of either partisans or Nazi sympathizers. These divisions were themselves exacerbated by interethnic hostilities of even longer pedigree. Yet, after 1945, Yugoslavia was held together in relative peace and prosperity, if only by the presence of powerful internal forces based partly on ideology. Nonetheless, these forces were sufficient to repress ethnic violence and maintain territorial cohesion. This period of more than forty years can hardly be treated by a theory as a temporary aberration. Having succeeded in dealing with ethnic divisions once, Bosnians may be encouraged to try ethnic accommodation yet again.

Fourth, the question of how permanent and peaceful the settlement actually is remains open. The current structure can hardly be considered stable, self-sustaining, and cordial. The presence or threat of force applied by NATO's SFOR, and the significant involvement of the EU, UN, and OSCE in the current administration of the country, highlights the potentially crucial role outside intervention may play in these cases. We return to this fourth factor later on.

In all three of these cases, therefore, the currently observed reduction in violence has been accompanied by the engagement of third parties that have made the pursuit of conflict either extremely difficult or unnecessary. Once these third parties leave, it is not clear that system stability will be maintained. Indeed, what emerges after their eventual departure will serve as a good test for hypotheses 1 and 2. Yet, it appears that third parties can indeed overwhelm the violent tendencies identified by Kaufmann, at least temporarily and if the intervention is sufficiently forceful.

The most direct challenge to Kaufmann's ideas emerge from the remaining three cases. Of these the Bangladesh-Chakma settlement is fairly recent and it is unclear the degree to which further suppression of the insurgency is required to maintain the peace. Nonetheless, it is a situation where a largely peaceful settlement has emerged without territorial separation, and without complete victory by the government forces.

The final two cases, of Biafran-Nigeria and Katanga-Congo, seem clearly to contradict Kaufmann's arguments. Although these conflicts were settled initially by outright government victory (in one instance with third party assistance), they have remained peaceful, or at least dormant, for an extended period of time. There are occasional acts of violence or calls for independence, but these areas have managed to exist within their nations for long periods of time without substantial enmity being exhibited, without the need for extraordinary government suppression targeting the dissenting group, and with an apparent genuine acceptance of their participation in national affairs. What may explain these cases?

It took UN intervention on the side of the government in the 1960–63 period eventually to bring a settlement in the Congo-Katanga war. The departure of the intervening troops, however, did not lead to a significant re-ignition of the conflict. Despite an estimated 300,000 casualties (Regan puts this number lower at 60,000), and the presence of sporadic fighting that emerged afterwards (particularly 1977–78), this conflict may hold some lessons for how the two sides in a bloody conflict might be sufficiently reconciled to live in the same country. One potential interpretation is that the Congo was a largely dysfunctional kleptocracy which was hardly capable of exerting significant control over its more distant regions, making Katanga effectively separate. The absence of a full-fledged war of independence, though, or even of particularly violent relations between Katanga and the central government, makes this qualification a weak defense. In fact, given the virtual collapse of the Democratic Republic of the Congo during its recent civil war, it is remarkable that regions such as Katanga did not more forcefully assert their independence.

The Biafran civil war in Nigeria offers another case of a violent conflict which has failed to erupt into renewed civil war. Ethnic tensions remain in Nigeria, and occasionally give rise to violence, but the focus does not seem to be exclusively or predominantly along the ethnic fault lines that characterized the Biafran war. Much of the current violence focuses on religious and North-South differences, albeit with strong ethnic and religious undertones, as groups in the north agitate to establish Islamic law. The presence of authoritarian governments has undoubtedly helped to suppress any attempts to unravel the Nigerian federal system, but there has been a remarkable absence of any effort to rekindle the arguments and animosities that animated the previous war. Indeed, the failure of recent episodes of ethnic violence to spark a wider rebellion by appealing to the ethnic hatreds that underpin Kaufmann's analysis calls into question the general applicability of the hypotheses.

In these two cases third parties have not played a significant role in maintaining the peace after the initial conflict. It is possible to suggest that there is a force acting in opposition to Kaufmann's argument regarding the accumulation of enmity: fear. In the face of a bloody quelling of their uprising, could it be the case that an ethnic group will abandon its separatist cause for fear of provoking another round of violent suppression? Such a response would certainly be consistent with rationalist models of conflict. It is then necessary to determine how desirable, stable and permanent the emerging peace should be considered.

It should be noted that these conclusions cannot be ascribed to an inappropriate identification of the high-casualty threshold. First, one of Kaufmann's own cases (Cyprus) is, in fact, in the low-casualty list, suggesting that all of the high-casualty cases are well above the threshold Kaufmann implicitly used. Second, the two most challenging cases have casualty levels that are extremely high (in the top five) and with an order of magnitude similar to Kaufmann's case of the India-Pakistan partition.

For purposes of comparison, the low-casualty cases of attempted or successful separation were also examined. A slightly higher proportion of these seemed to have been at least partially settled without the need for extensive or continuing third party involvement, an observation consistent with hypothesis 1. The relative absence of third-party interveners, both as short-term mediators and long-term participants, contrasts sharply with the situation in high-casualty conflicts. Some of the settlements that do arise, however, are the consequence of the outright victory of the state centre and the effective political and military suppression of the opposition. In fact, many of the cases seem to involve fairly small independence movements against a very large state center, making suppression fairly easy and the likelihood of a high number of casualties fairly low.

As a third test of the first two hypotheses, the preceding analysis was repeated with the set of cases in which ethnicity, religion or other identity-based conflicts were present. Of the twenty-five cases we examined, eleven were identified as having casualty levels above 45,000, eight are low casualty, and six are ranked in between.

Of the high casualty cases two (Tajikistan and Guatemala) seem to be largely settled. Both, however, are of questionable relevance to Kaufmann's hypothesis. The Tajikistan conflict was largely a battle over who would govern after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and ideology and personality seemed to be as prominent as the ethnic dimensions exhibited by the participants? Similarly, Guatemala is probably better classified as an economic conflict,

though the fact that indigenous groups were overwhelmingly on one side due to their poverty gave the conflict an identity dimension.

Three conflicts that are somewhat harder to interpret in the context of hypothesis 1 occurred in Uganda, Somalia, and Angola. In Uganda, there are many facets to the conflicts that have erupted, and some seem to pass away for extended periods of time while others erupt. There are some connections between different bouts of conflict, but the composition of the various factions shift, making it difficult to determine the extent to which accumulated ethnic rivalry and hatred contribute to each manifestation of violence. Thus, while Milton Obote's overthrow of Idi Amin, the coup against Obote and subsequent victory of Yoweri Museveni, and Museveni's own problems with various rebel groups, all provide vehicles for the expression of ethnic competition, their weight relative to other factors is not definitive.

Somalia provides yet another challenge.²⁶ The overall number of casualties is estimated to be high, but these figures would be divided between many factions. With the high level of bloodshed, however, it is reasonable to expect that Kaufmann's process of unquenchable ethnic hatred should arise. Separation has indeed occurred with various bits (Somaliland and Puntland) declaring their own unrecognized independence. These areas, however, saw relatively little fighting compared to the South. Yet an accord of sorts has been reached between the various fairly evenly balanced warring factions, without strong and current third party intervention. This would appear to violate both hypothesis 1 and 2, although no stable government has emerged and the peace remains fragile.

The third case, Angola, shares with Somalia the difficulty in projecting forward from the current fragile agreements for peace. At different junctures of the Angolan civil war, military stalemate and external pressure brought the UNITA guerrillas and the MPLA government to the negotiation table, though the cease-fire and political accommodations were generally stillborn or short-lived. Only the military defeat of UNITA and the death of Savimbi provide grounds for optimism regarding the current peace settlement. Furthermore, it is difficult to say categorically that the Angolan civil war was primarily founded

26. Somalia represents a challenge for those using the empirical record to investigate Kaufmann, rather than challenge to his theory. The case of Somaliland's de facto (though unrecognized) separation from the rest of the country occurred at the same time as the violent power struggles in the south of the country. The casualty figures for the general conflict were not separated from those associated with the secession. Therefore the general breakdown of order in Somalia and the data problems make this observation largely inadmissible, though anecdotal evidence suggest that casualties in the north were probably quite low.

on separatist intentions, territorial ambitions, or even ethnicity. While ethnic divisions played a major role in the conflict, ideological differences derived in part from external sponsorship were prominent in the early stages of the conflict. As casualties mounted, ethnic divisions hardened.

Lebanon, Syria, and the Iraq-Shi'ite conflicts all seem to be largely suppressed. Of these, the Syrian conflict seems to be settled, though it is obviously impossible to say definitively that similar tensions will not arise in the future. The Iraq-Shi'ite conflict is at least in stasis until a wider settlement in Iraq is reached.

Of these cases, Lebanon casts the greatest doubt on the need for territorial separation as a precursor to restoring reasonably peaceful relations. Despite the bitterness of the Lebanon conflict, a war that claimed more than 100,000 lives according to Regan's data, the country has managed to remain both intact and relatively calm. The likelihood that civil war will re-emerge is difficult to determine. Political accommodation among the various groups is probable. The role of a third party (Syria) in freezing the current situation, the degree to which accommodation rested on the military defeat of one of the key combatants, and the presence of more than two combatants, all play some role in modifying Kaufmann's central argument. At the least, the Lebanon case reinforces questions about when political accommodation is voluntary rather than coerced, the meaning of territorial separation, and to what degree must violence be eliminated before peace is considered to have been restored.

The remaining three conflicts in table 2 that need to be mentioned all support hypothesis 1. The conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi, and Liberia have all been coded as still active. While partial accommodations have been reached in all three of these cases at the time of writing, it is too early to identify these efforts as successful.

Finally, the low-casualty identity based conflicts can also be examined to see whether they provide support for Kaufmann's argument. While the test is far less conclusive, it is none-the-less true that for low casualty conflicts there are several instances of conflict settlement. These settlements, however, are more frequently based on victory and suppression by states rather than voluntary political accommodation.

Therefore hypothesis 1 seems to have some support in a probabilistic sense (from the first test) but does not hold universally. Aspects of Kaufmann's argument appear as highly accurate in certain cases, while in others it applies only when modified to reflect other conflict characteristics. Finally, there are some cases that simply seem to contradict hypothesis 1.

Insights into hypothesis 2 also emerge from the high casualty cases. Settlements without separation that arise are often linked to the presence of

Table 2
NON-SEPARATIST CONFLICTS

Case	Number of Deaths	Outcome	Third party (current)	Third party (past)
Low casualty cases				
Mauritania/Polisario	1,000	Settled/state withdrawal	Absent	Divided
Nigeria/Muslims	1,000	Mostly settled	Absent	Absent
China/Taiwan	1,400	Separated/dormant	Absent	Absent/rebels
Uganda/Obote	1,500	Mostly settled/suppressed	Absent	Rebels
Oman/Dhofar	2,000	Suppressed/dormant	Absent	Divided
Paraguay	2,500	Suppressed/mostly settled	Absent	State
Indonesia/ Islam	5,000	Suppressed	Absent	Absent
Iraq/Shammar	5,000	Suppressed/dormant	Absent	Divided
High casualty cases				
Angola/Unita	50,000	Suppressed/partly settled	Absent	Divided
Burundi	100,000	Partly settled/active	Absent	State/divided
Guatemala	100,000	Mostly settled	Absent	Absent/state
Tajikistan	100,000	Mostly settled	Absent	Divided/state
Lebanon	125,000	Mostly settled/suppressed	State	Divided/state
Liberia	150,000	Active	Absent	State/divided
Syria	200,000	Suppressed/dormant	Absent	Absent
Somalia	410,000	Partial settlement/partial separation	Absent	Neutral/none
Uganda	500,000	Partly settled/active	Absent	Rebels
Iraq/Shi'ites	500,000	Unclear/partial settlement/suppressed	Rebels	Rebels
Rwanda	520,000	Partly settled/active/suppressed	Absent	Divided/neutral

either a strong government suppressing a relatively weak separatist group, or a strong third party intervener forcing or maintaining a peaceful arrangement. For example, there is no doubt that strong central governments or supporting interveners played a role in initially suppressing the rebellions in Biafra and Katanga. The absence of subsequent third party involvement or extensive, enduring and regionally specific repression suggests, however, that other factors seem to be at play in explaining the relative calm that emerged after the extensive violence.

Examining hypothesis 3 and the nature of third party intervention more generally is difficult. Not only are there few cases of support for separatists, but situations of intervention include even more room for interpretation. Among the complicating factors is the potential for both neighbouring states and global powers to intervene in a conflict. These interveners may have divergent interests in terms of who they are supporting, and different motives ranging from territorial to humanitarian. It is also difficult to gauge the extent of the support interveners may offer their clients, especially if it is provided secretly or through other third party channels. Related to this problem is the question of formal versus informal support or intervention. In some cases ethnic groups may offer support to their brethren in a neighbouring country without the explicit support of their own government, or governments may themselves offer support through clandestine means.

Further, third-party behavior is far from constant over the life of a conflict. Beside ebbing and flowing in terms of the amount of support, sides can be switched and motivations changed with great fluidity. Variance in third party behaviour may well be endogenous to a conflict, or related to their own civil wars. For example, a meddlesome third party might be quite happy to support a rebel group in a neighbouring country if it keeps that country unstable, and possibly unable to support rebel groups on its side of the border. The conflicts in Sudan and Uganda may be illustrative of this situation. Third parties may also be induced into intervention as a consequence of a high number of casualties, particularly if concerns over regional stability are raised or affective humanitarian emotions aroused.

Finally, for a strict test of hypotheses 3 we would need more data. The timing of third party intervention in terms of the increasing number of casualties is necessary for a solid test of whether certain forms of intervention appear successful in terms of reducing subsequent violence. Even more data are required to try and establish statistically robust counterfactual benchmarks for comparison. What follows, then, is a preliminary and informal test. Additional insights into hypothesis 2, or reinforcement of those observed above, are also found by focusing on the question of intervention.

From table 1, four cases of separation occurred in high casualty conflicts with separatist dimensions. In two of these cases the participation of third parties in support of the separating group were crucial. Bangladesh's independence was won partly as a consequence of India's intervention on its behalf. Similarly, in East Timor, a UN intervention was instrumental in securing independence from a politically weakened Indonesia. In the other two cases, third parties played minimal roles, due to the two sides reaching an agreement regarding partition, amicable or otherwise. Eritrea's independence from Ethiopia was the consequence of its central role in the rebellion that led to the overthrow of the Dergue regime (1974–91) that ruled Ethiopia after the toppling of Emperor Haile Selassie. Independence, in a sense, had been pre-arranged with the other rebel groups, and was the reward for victory. Third party intervention was unnecessary since the new government was willing to grant independence, though there were external supporters of both sides during the initial civil war. Similarly, the partition between India and Pakistan, was jointly agreed to by both sides and supported by the departing colonial power, Britain, though the agreement was far from harmonious.

From these four cases it is tempting to make the preliminary observation that in the first two cases where third parties supported separatists, post-partition violence has been limited. In the other two cases, subsequent wars have emerged between the separated sides. The evidence needs to be viewed with caution, however. On the one hand, Bangladesh, and Pakistan do not border each other and so the role of India in suppressing post-separatist violence is rather moot. The case of East Timor is probably too recent to compare with the other separations in terms of opportunity for violence to be renewed, although undoubtedly the continued presence of UN forces have prevented anti-independence militias from escalating further violent conflict. On the other hand, the latter two cases suggest that third party participation may be useful in preventing subsequent conflict. Care must be taken even with this restricted conclusion, however, as Somaliland's self-declared independence has received no recognition or third party support, and yet has not provoked a violent challenge. This case, however, is one of a low number of casualties.

There are few general lessons that emerge from reviewing the pattern of outcomes and the pattern of past and current third party intervention into high casualty disputes. Coding is extremely difficult, however. In the cases selected, separation did not emerge when there was strong support by a third party for the state center, though separation did occur either with support for the rebels, or weak or divided support. Intervention was not necessary for peaceful settlement to be brought about either, as the Kachin, Chakma, and Biafran

rebellions illustrate. There were no instances of settlement (partial or complete) when rebel groups received substantial assistance. These conflicts are either settled through separation (East Timor and Bangladesh), suppression (Iraqi-Shi'ites) or coded as on-going (Uganda, Abkhazia).

To give a sense of the complexity of the potential relationships, however, consider the case of Angola. American support for UNITA in Angola ebbed and flowed for a variety of mainly political reasons (including the actions of other states, such as South Africa and Cuba). Support faded away to a more neutral stance born of humanitarian concerns, before shifting in favour of the MPLA government derived in part from economic motivations. South Africa's support for UNITA similarly faded. Thus, by the end of the conflict most third parties to the Angolan conflict either supported the government to various degrees, or were neutral.

Great power or strong multilateral support is not a guarantee of victory for either side in a separatist conflict, nor is the direction of support always the same. In some cases strong third parties have supported the rebel movements (Russia in Georgia, the UN in East Timor) with very different outcomes. The degree of support and goals of the intervener are important, however. Russia is unlikely to desire Georgia's partition, merely its acquiescence to Russia's other security goals. When deployed on behalf of the state, strong power support has generally been associated with a settlement that supports the integrity of the state (Congo and Bosnia). One interesting possible exception in a low-casualty case is Cyprus, although, again, the competing visions for a permanent settlement have been successfully subordinated to the more immediate intervener requirement of a cessation of hostilities. Therefore a guarded but intuitively appealing conclusion seems to be that committed intervention by a strong third party is generally successful in achieving the intervener's primary goals, regardless of whether it supports the separatist side or the state centre.

Such a conclusion begs some questions, however, and these are highlighted by a consideration of the non-separatist cases. Table 2 contains two of the more dramatic failures of third party intervention, in Lebanon and Somalia. In both cases local groups challenged the commitment of some interveners and successfully drove them out. So the intuitive appeal of a proposition that committed strong interveners always win is at least partly, or potentially, tautological.

Intervention by other regional powers or neighbouring countries are even harder to summarize. Again, commitment and strength of all the parties to the conflict, including the interveners, can potentially play a role in determining the outcome; no simple rules emerge. In some cases (Iraq's Kurds, for example) rebel groups are defeated despite their receipt of external support. In other

cases (Somali opposition victory against a Libyan-supported government) rebels can win despite the state being supported. In other cases, such as India's intervention in Sri Lanka, no permanent change in the conflict is perceptible.

There is, therefore, qualified evidence in support of hypotheses 2 and 3. In cases of a high number of casualties, separation seems less likely to occur when third parties support the state center, and are less likely to remain peaceful in the absence of third party support for the secessionists. Overall, however, the evidence from the cases suggest that simple relationships do not exist. Not surprisingly, there appear to be several potential explanatory variables that need to be taken into consideration when trying to determine the likelihood of peaceful settlements in secessionist or ethnically based conflicts. So while the number of casualties may play an important intervening role in determining the prospects for peaceful settlement, at best it interacts with, rather than subordinates, these other explanatory factors.

ASSESSING KAUFMANN'S CLAIMS: SUMMARY

OUR PRELIMINARY findings indicate that, to some extent, third parties have been usually unwilling to support the separation of states even when the number of casualties is high. Our data and the evaluation of it against the hypotheses derived from Kaufmann's argument, however, should not be taken as a definitive test of the legitimacy of separation or of the ability of third parties to achieve a definitive outcome.

We began by suggesting that there has been a bias against the disruption of the integrity of the state-system especially during the cold war era. In order to meet the challenge of violent separation, third parties must be in a position to at least partially reduce levels of conflict between separatist groups and the state-centre. Several cases, however, present problems for Kaufmann's hypothesis by challenging, in varying degrees, the notion that a high number of casualties prevents political accommodation and, further, that third parties can reduce violence. Some of these challenges arise because many of the cases evaluated for this study are either on-going, stalemated without settlement, or have ended with military victory by one side. In other cases of severe conflict, however, the levels of violence have subsided substantially without separation having occurred. In sum, some important cases cast doubt on the need for territorial separation as a precursor to restoring reasonably peaceful relations between ethnic groups that have engaged in extensive bloody conflict with one another.