A Global Review for Canada: Options and Insights

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Foreword

Foreign Policy Reviews : A Civil Society Contribution to Kick Start the Process

At a time of extreme economic volatility and unanticipated global challenges, it is difficult to imagine a newly elected government wanting to conduct a painstaking and thorough foreign policy review. Such a distraction , one might think, is an encumbrance to getting things done. If the purpose of a review is to establish parameters, identify means, specify objectives and operationalize goals in a way that the general public can appreciate and value, then a foreign policy review can be an extremely complex, time consuming task. But because it's difficult doesn't mean it shouldn't be done. This country has gone without long enough.

Indeed, with the Liberal government in power for just 100 days, there is at the very minimum the need for stock taking in which various departments have an opportunity to appraise their existing resources to determine if they are up to the challenges facing them. Further, in an era of widespread social media, government twitter accounts and Diplomacy 2.0 the government is already expected to have their collective ear to the proverbial ground. Ministers are presumably already listening and consulting with stakeholders.

Since Canadians were introduced to their first foreign policy review, during a series of lectures at the University of Toronto by Louis St Laurent, the review process has been considered a crucial element in a new government's contribution to public discourse. In his address, St. Laurent spoke broadly of many problems facing Canada after World War Two, but chief among them was the singular need for Canada to uphold and defend the core values of freedom and liberty in the face of rising tyranny from the Soviet Bloc.

In contrast, Paul Martin's International Policy Statement, from about 12 years ago, identified the core responsibilities of efficiency and effectiveness in fixing the problems of a post-Cold War world confronted by failed and failing states, terrorism, and economic uncertainty. Though facing vastly different problems, both leaders understood that to identify ends, meant also showing to Canadians how those ends could realistically be achieved. Martin recognized that a pooling of resources and capabilities was an appropriate means to tackle the complex and interrelated problems facing Canada and the world. For St. Laurent, international organizations such as the United Nations and the Commonwealth and later NATO were central to achieving his objectives.

Over the sixty years or so that spanned these two reviews, Canada's foreign policy review process has been captivated by three or perhaps four ends: the establishment of peace and security through the rule of law, maintaining a harmonious and productive relationship with the United States, and ensuring economic prosperity and competiveness through trade and investment. To these three core elements we might add enhancing national unity and its corollary strengthening Canadian sovereignty.

From a Public Diplomacy perspective foreign policy reviews are important for reasons of accountability and transparency. They ensure the direction the current government provides to its bureaucrats is backed up by commensurate resources and capabilities. The Trudeau government can only meet its commitments, if support for capabilities are actually built into the policy itself. This support requires that diplomats at Global Affairs Canada and related departments clearly understand their objectives and their mandates and how their capabilities correspond to one another. Provinces, municipalities and civil society have a critical role to play here as they are often more deeply engaged than the federal government on many issues.

It also involves the fact that evidence-based decision making must be properly and continuously utilized within government structures in order to assess the effectiveness and impact of Canada's foreign policies. Evidence-based decision making implies that a government is actually interested in making a difference, that it opens its policies up to independent evaluation and that it looks to independent scientifically grounded research to formulate and evaluate those policies and their impacts.

It was with these ideas in mind, that last fall the NPSIA students enrolled in my Canada and International Affairs graduate seminar embarked on a four month evaluation of Canada's foreign policy priorities. The collated results, carefully revised, are presented here. Some of what appears in this review, draws on individual experiences such as working and volunteering abroad and at home. But more importantly, it reflects a painstaking effort to gather and evaluate the evidence, objectively and succinctly. Working in groups, the students had the good fortune to have their class coincide with an election year, giving them an opportunity to not only look to the past but to consider the future, a future that is, for all intents and purposes, an open book in which they get the chance to write the script. These students represent Canada's future and it is vital we listen to them. History shows that Canadian foreign policy is perhaps the last bastion of elite decision making in this country, with large sums of discretionary spending at the government's disposal and an unchanging small circle of experts steering the process. It is time for that to change if answers to complex global problems are to be found. This foreign policy review is a small but important step in kick starting that change.
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David Carment

Canada's International Development Policy

Executive Summary

This review on Canada's foreign aid is intended for the Honourable Stéphane Dion, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Honourable Marie-Claude Bibeau,

Minister of International Development and La Francophonie. Its primary goal is to strengthen the process of Canada's Official Development Assistance (ODA). To contextualize its recommendations, this review seeks to address three main problems:

> Current Problems
> - Reduced funding
> - Proliferation of projects
> - Lack of policy coherence

Each problem poses an individual constraint to Canadian ODA. Canada's reduced ODA funding means Canada fails to meet the growing global demand for ODA; threatening to make it an unreliable ally and donor. The proliferation of projects means that Canada's ODA is saddled with administrative costs, tying up resources that otherwise could be used to help existing projects. Lastly, the lack of a coherent policy harms the efficiency of Canadian aid and reduces co-operative effectiveness.

To solve these issues, this review proposes three main policy recommendations to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and International Development and La Francophonie:

> Recommendations
> - Reverse the declining foreign aid budget
> - Increase coordination and cooperation
> - Ensure policy coherence

These solutions will tackle the problems in three main ways. First, increasing the foreign aid budget with pragmatic and targeted goals will meet the growing demand for ODA and bolster Canada's donor-credibility. Second, the increase in coordination and cooperation will improve aid efforts between Canada and key stakeholders and allies in order to more effectively target ODA resources. Lastly, making Canada's ODA process coherent reduces cross-departmental policy tensions and ensures consistent aid policy.

Advisors for GAC (formerly DFATD) speak with members of Save the Children in the Philippines during operation RENAISSANCE. Courtesy of Combat Camera on Flickr.

Section 1: Current Problems

Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 1998-2014, Canada

Source: OECD Development Assistance Committee member profile: Canada

Reduced Funding

From 2001 to 2014, Canadian aid spending has increased from $2,969 million to $4,898 million. Despite this, its aid contribution as a percent of Gross National Income (GNI) has been on the decline and is well below its other rich peers, ranking 9th (0.26% of GNI) out of 26 countries.[1] This engagement gap makes Canada appear to be an unresponsive actor in the global community. Furthermore, Canada has failed to spend large amounts of its aid money; in 2013 – 2014 it failed to spend $125.9 million of promised aid money.[2] Coupled with official budget cuts, Canada's failure to spend leads to a growing disconnect between a growing demand for aid and a decreasing supply of it.[3] In other words, Canada will be seen as an unreliable ally and donor because its budget does not reflect the growing demand for foreign assistance nor is Canada fulfilling its spending promises.[4]

Burden of Administrative Costs

Canada is also below the average of its peers when it comes to reducing the burden of administrative costs; it has too many small projects and cannot maximize its aid due to a lack of coordination with other donors.[5] The proliferation of many small projects not only includes many unnecessary administrative costs that take up valuable ODA resources, but it reduces the effectiveness of existing projects established by local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or civil society.[6]

Lack of Policy Coherence

Canada currently lacks a clear and focused strategy for ODA. Canada's aid priorities changed six times between 1995 and 2009.[7] Each new government "improves aid" by continuously narrowing the focus of aid on an increasingly smaller group of recipient countries, which means Canada's priorities are highly changeable.[8] Canadian ODA's five primary objectives of increasing food security, securing the future of children and youth, stimulating sustainable economic growth, advancing democracy, and promoting stability and security are not reflected directly through Canadian Foreign Policy in a simple and consistent vision; it is decentralized.[9] This leads to new aid policies and initiatives pursued by different government departments to be often fragmented, which has a negative influence on the effectiveness of Canada's aid irrespective of institutional resources and structures.[10]

Packets of therapeutic food to help fight malnutrition as a part of Canadian ODA to Ethiopia. Courtesy of Results Canada on Flickr.

Section 2: Past Policy and Critical Moments

Birth of Canadian Aid

After WWII, Canada and its allies affirmed the need for development aid, and had committed themselves to the target of spending 0.7% of GNI on foreign aid. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) was created in 1968 to direct this aid and focus it on poverty reduction. The highest GNI spending achieved was under the Mulroney government; Canada was able to achieve 0.5 % of GNI.[11] At the turn of the 21st century, ODA was hovering between 0.3% and 0.4% of GNI even though Canada's raw volume of aid had doubled between 2001 and 2010 – Canada was becoming wealthier but spending less on aid.[12]

Aid Refocused

CIDA was absorbed into what was then called the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAIT) in 2013. This was a critical moment for Canada because it signalled aid's strengthening ties to business and trade interests. For example,

statuses as "an important commercial and political partner" became more important in deciding the level of aid a recipient country receives.

Additionally, the previous government complimented its five aid priorities by adding three cross cutting themes of increasing environmental sustainability, advancing gender equality, and strengthening governance institutions which seek to address poverty and underdevelopment. [13]

Policy Trends and Constraints

Trends

This approach to addressing the context of poverty is part of a grander trend in Canada's attitude towards development aid. Canada is always approaching problems through new and innovative solutions that seek to address the bigger picture of poverty rather than through narrow orthodoxy. This is accompanied by the fact that in the last decade, Canada has had a rep-

utation for setting strict project guidelines for its aid projects. [14]

Furthermore, Canada has been narrowing its aid disbursement to concentrate on countries of focus, effectively focusing more resources for a greater effect in these countries.[15] Canada's long history and commitment to improving the living standards of the world's poorest has led it to achieve many successes.[16]

Constraints

Despite these successes, Canada faces several constraints. The largest constraints facing Canadian ODA is civil society's view of aid as a priority coupled with its reluctance to increase aid funding. As of 2015, 94% of Canadians believe it is important to improve health, economic opportunity, and education for the world's poorest.[17] Despite this, 73% of Canadians do not want to spend more on ODA.[18]

The difference in the development priorities for Canadians and their willingness to spend more on it constrains the size of the aid budget and further reflects the inconsistency in government policy. Furthermore, Canadian ODA priorities have been increasingly involved with non-aid policies such as trade, investment, and migration, and without a clear aid framework these non-aid policies have the potential to dominate the priorities of Canadian aid.[19]

A CC-177 Globemaster readies to depart for Nepal with Canadian disaster relief aid. Courtesy of GAC on Flickr.

Section 3: Goals and Objectives

- Reverse the declining foreign aid budget
- Increase coordination and cooperation
- Ensure policy coherence

Key Stakeholders

Key stakeholders are actors that have a stake or an interest in foreign aid/ international development and are affected by or affect policy. It is essential that the interests of Canada's stakeholders are considered by Global Affairs Canada (GAC) in the policy making process.

Oxfam Aid in East Africa. Courtesy of Oxfam East Africa.

Key Stakeholder	Role	Interest in Aid
Multilateral organizations and global partners	Building consensus on global issues and ensuring the effectiveness and transparency of aid	Helping developing countries to build sustainable development for a more stable world
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)	To balance the power of government and to promote political participation among citizens	Creating a relationship with the government to ensure Canadians are given a voice in the policy decision-making process
Diaspora communities in Canada	To advocate issues on behalf of their home country	Lobbying the Canadian government to take action in their home country
Private sector	To generate profits	Conducting business ventures abroad while engaging with local communities to create opportunities for economic growth

Allies:

Allies to Canadian foreign aid policies are those who share a common interest in supporting international development.

(1) Multilateral organizations and global partners (refer to Appendix C)

As one third of Canada's ODA is channeled through multilateral organizations, global alliances are key allies in achieving Canada's development objectives.[20] Canada's engagement with multilateral organizations such as the commonwealth, World Bank, UNDP, IMF, and WHO is critical in coordinating aid and maximizing aid effectiveness.

2) Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs)

NGOs are an important ally for the Canadian government to consult. NGOs are a resource that can provide innovative strategies and solutions in the policy making process. NGOs such as the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC), Red Cross, Doctors without Borders, and Free the Children are important Canadian actors for the government to utilize. NGOs in developing countries also obtain knowledge first hand and can target specific needs relative to their own countries.

Detractors:

Detractors to Canadian foreign aid policies are those that may hinder the policy process.

(1) Special Interest Groups

Groups such as diaspora communities, economic interest groups, and other lobbying groups that act in self-interest. The influence of these groups can bias the decision-making policy process.

(2) Canadian Public
The Canadian public has a significant role in deterring the government from spending more money on foreign aid. While the government has the power to make policy, the public's influence is fundamental to the decision-making process.

Canada is committed to ensuring that its aid efforts are helping to alleviate poverty in the world's poorest areas. The reductions in aid funding, proliferation of projects, and lack of policy coherence, all pose obstacles to the process of organizing and delivering effective aid. Therefore, in order to meet its goals and objectives, Canada needs programs that address the following programmatic needs:

Volunteers from Oxfam Quebec in Benin. Courtesy of GAC on Flickr.

Programmatic Needs

- Ensure that Canadian aid has the adequate resources to meet the growing demand for aid;
- Reduce the overhead costs associated with aid projects in order to maximize the amount of funding directly received by recipient countries;
- Effectively communicate process and objectives of Canadian aid to ensure successful dialogue and accountability to Canadian civil society;
- Adopt a central foreign aid policy with long-term guidance and coherence for Canada's government at large.

Costed Options

To address those needs, there are a number of viable options for the Canadian Government to consider. The following table outlines four options:

Option 1: Reassess countries of focus	Option 2: Restructuring aid institutions: reinstate CIDA	Option 3: Continue on the current course of Canadian ODA	Option 4: Reform the aid process
Expected outcome: Canadian ODA would be given to priority countries that are the poorest among the developing world.	**Expected outcome:** CIDA as a separate entity would give development its own legislative framework and the potential to improve Canada's development efforts.	**Expected outcome:** Canada's development objectives and strategy would remain the same with the aid budget having the potential to decline in coming years.	**Expected outcome:** Reframing the actual aid process would meet the growing demand for foreign aid, maximize the efficiency of development projects and bolster cohesion among policy makers and stakeholders.
Pro: New countries would be provided with development opportunities through Canadian ODA. **Con**: Reassessing Canada's current recipient countries and reallocating ODA would only further demonstrate the volatility of Canadian aid priorities, which has been a significant problem for Canada in the past. Shifting its focus may also hinder long-term sustainable development.	**Pro:** Isolating Canada's development priorities from trade and other foreign policy objectives under GAC would give development policy greater precedence and priority; separating development from commercial and economic interests. **Con:** The administrative costs of reinstating CIDA would likely be very costly for the government.	**Pro:** No further costs would be incurred by the government. **Con:** Canada's global engagement gap and reputation as a donor would not benefit from the current strategy.	**Pro:** Enhancing the aid process would increase the efficiency and effectiveness of aid. **Con:** Reforming the process would require an increase in resources and money.

While the first three options address specific facets of Canadian ODA's process problem, the fourth option of reforming the aid process offers a holistic solution to maximizing the efficiency of ODA. From this option, three specific recommendations are proposed.

A member of Canada's civilian disaster assessment team surveys damage in Nepal. Courtesy of GAC on Flickr.

Section 4: Recommendations

(1) Increase foreign aid budget to 0.41% of Canadian GNI by 2019

At its highest peak in 2011, Canada spent $5,723 million (0.41% of GNI) in foreign aid. In 2014, its spending declined to $4,898 million (0.26% of GNI).[21] Rather than striving for the 0.7% of GNI target, which is an unrealistic goal for Canada to pursue in four years, the government should set a goal of spending 0.41% of GNI. As Canada has reached this level of spending in 2011, this goal is achievable. It is in the interest of Canadians to increase aid funding because Canada's security is affected by the development of countries abroad. In addition, by increasing the foreign aid budget, Canada has the potential to conduct larger projects and be more effective in aid allocations. Ultimately by spending more, Canada can reduce its global engagement gap, meet the growing demand for aid, and be a leader for international development.

Costs ($)	Implementation/ Expected Impact	Timeline[22]	Communication Strategy
Projected cost to increase the aid budget over the next three fiscal years (FY): 825 million. (5,723 million in 2011 – 4,898 million in 2014 = 825 million) Approximately 275 million in costs each FY (825/3=275 million).	Increase the aid budget as a percentage of GNI by 0.05% over the next three years to bring spending levels back up to 0.41% of GNI. Work with parliament to increase budget (does not conflict with current government's three year plan for a budget deficit). Work with NGOs to raise funds for development projects. The budget increase will allow Canada to increase its aid flow and have a greater impact through its projects in developing countries.	Effective March 31st 2016 (beginning of new FY). (1) FY 2016-2017: Increase from 0.26% of GNI to 0.31%. (2) FY 2017-2018: Increase from 0.31% of GNI to 0.36%. (3) FY 2018-2019: Increase from .36% of GNI to 0.41%.	Inform Canadian citizens on the importance of a robust foreign aid budget. Launch a campaign to increase civil society engagement regarding foreign aid and development. For the purpose of transparency and awareness, make the plan accessible on the Canadian Government's website.

2) Increase Canada's joint missions to 40% of all its development missions by 2020

Improving coordination and cooperation among aid donors and recipients through multilateral organizations is fundamental to Canada's aid effectiveness. Reducing parallel implementation structures and increasing joint development missions will maximize the utility of resources, cut ad- ministrative costs (currently 8% of ODA money goes to overhead costs), and increase efficiency.[23] More importantly increasing joint missions will also reduce the problem of the proliferation of projects. Rather than providing aid to a number of small development projects, Canada can work in conjunction with other donors on larger projects that will be more efficient in building long-term sustainable development.

As of 2010, 15% of Canada's development projects were joint missions, which is well off from the Paris Declarations global target of 40%.[24] Canada should strive to reach the 40% target by 2020. It is in the interest of Canada to meet this target and to increase its cooperation with multilaterals as it will save on overhead costs and improve Canada's reputation as a global leader.

Costs	Implementation/ Expected Impact	Timeline[25]	Communication Strategy
Projected cost: Included in the foreign aid budget outlined in recommendation 1.	Increase the percentage of Canada's joint missions from 15% to 40% over the next four years by converting an extra 25% of total ODA projects to joint missions. Participate more in development projects that are constructed multilaterally. A 25% increase of joint missions will cut administrative costs by 25% (40% - 15%) and save 2% in overhead spending.[26] Canada will benefit from a reputation as a cooperative global leader and maximize its resources, ultimately increasing aid effectiveness.	Effective January 1st 2016. (1) 2016: Increase joint missions from 15% to 21.25%. (2) 2017: Increase joint missions from 21.25% to 27.5%. (3) 2018: Increase joint missions from 27.5% to 33.75%. (4) 2019: Increase joint missions from 33.75% to 40%.	Making Canada's allies aware that Canada is seeking further multilateral engagement. Participating at annual conferences and meetings to ensure physical and active engagement with multilateral organizations.

3) Ensure the goals and priorities across relevant departments within the Canadian Government are coherent

Canada should focus on its current development objectives outlined by GAC, the government needs to ensure that the objectives of relevant departments (refer to Appendix F) that contribute to the aid budget such as the Department of Finance, Citizenship and Immigration and Health Canada align with those of GAC.[27] Greater coordination and communication across relevant departments within the Canadian Government will help focus the scope of Canadian aid and address key goals and priorities as outlined by GAC. Ensuring coherence will provide clarity and address the problem of any misperceptions that the Canadian public or recipient countries may have regarding Canadian aid and development priorities. Greater cohesion among departments will also reduce the proliferation of projects. Departments should focus on combining aid efforts rather than separately funding a number of individual projects that may not have as great of an impact.

Costs	Implementation/ Expected Impact	Timeline	Communication Strategy
Projected cost: Included in the foreign aid budget outlined in recommendation 1.	Coordinate with relevant departments and ministers within the Canadian Government to provide a development agenda that is focused on ensuring all governmental aid interests and objectives align. This effectively narrows the focus of development goals and priorities so that priorities are consistent and coherent. Ensuring coherence among internal policy makers will reduce policy tensions.	Effective immediately.	Hold frequent meetings with relevant departments to ensure interests and objectives align and are clearly observable. Distribute one agenda that identifies relevant aid priorities of departments accessible to the public.

Canada's Defence Policy: Redefining Canada's International Engagement

Executive Summary

Canadians expect a defence policy which is representative of the national interest, and a military which is adequately and proportionately equipped to address challenges which threaten Canada and its allies. This policy review aims to modernize aspects of the 2008 *Canada First Defence Strategy* (CFDS) for the Department of Defence, as the international threat environment has become increasingly dynamic and unpredictable. As tensions, terrorism, and conflict persist throughout Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, Canada and its allies are increasingly compelled to promote peace and ensure stability wherever possible. Given the evolving nature of these challenges facing the nation, periodic reassessment of policy is crucial to ensure that Canada remains capable of meeting these challenges.

Any recommendations regarding Canadian military deployment overseas are beyond the scope of this policy. Rather, the following recommendations aim to identify a viable strategy to address the current and anticipated gaps between Canada's capabilities and its operational requirements.

Policy Problem: Canada's military capabilities are diminishing as regional and international challenges surpass the Canadian military's capacity to respond.

Policy Goal: Adapt operational capacity and alliances to meet emerging global challenges and modernize Canada's international engagement strategy.

The CFDS ultimately implemented a 'more with less' strategy which resulted in shortcomings to our military's infrastructure, equipment, and overall readiness relative to Canada's mission goals. An increase in personnel and greater operational demands are correlated with these shortcomings, indicating that previous policies have allowed the Canadian Armed Forces to become over-used and under-prepared.[1] In the interest of maximizing the effectiveness of Canada's overseas engagement, **this policy review makes the following recommendations:**

- Replacement of critical military systems, such as aircraft and ships, to be restructured through a pragmatic and comprehensive procurement strategy.
- Renew the National Fighter Procurement Secretariat (NFPS) to advance the acquisition of Canada's next generation of fighter aircraft, to be phased in by 2025.
- Review the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS) in 2018.
- Ensure timely creation and effective use of the Defence Procurement Secretariat to ensure that operational requirements of the CAF are consistently met.

- Renew Canada's commitment to multilateralism, and pursue the mutual benefits of collaboration with allies in all CAF engagements.
- Incrementally increase the defence budget to two percent of national GDP over five years.
- Ensure timely procurement of Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue aircraft to fulfill commitments to the 2011 Agreement on Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic.

Section 1: Policy Process

Problems facing the nation

The international security environment has undergone numerous changes that are directly impacting Canada. These changes require that Canada ensure that its capabilities meet these challenges. The complexity and dynamism of these challenges suggest that the greater international community should employ an increasingly united approach in ensuring international security. Examples of these challenges are provided below, grouped by indicator and their respective implications for Canada:

Canadian Forces trainers in Ukraine. Courtesy of the Canadian Forces Combat Camera on Flickr.

Figure 1: A changing environment

Indicators	Areas of concern	Implications for Canada
Shifting global balance of power. Realignment between power and economic and political influence.	China's assertion of its sovereignty in the Pacific.[2] Russia's annexation of Crimea, engagement with Ukraine.[3] Europe and U.S. have suffered in the wake of the economic crisis.[4]	U.S./Europe's declining power could lead to further focus on domestic policy rather than international. This would impact Canada since its international involvement must rely upon their support.
Rising challenges to the international security system and sustained levels of conflicts	Instability in the Middle East: emergence of ISIS, Syrian civil war, heightened tension of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[5] Emerging inter-state conflicts (e.g. Russia/Ukraine) Proliferation of WMDs. Evolution of international terrorism.	Canada will face many new threats as a result of these challenges. Canada's contribution is required alongside the international community to help stabilize crisis regions in order to protect the country.
Climate Change, changes in weather patterns	New passages in the Arctic that are of interest for several countries for sea traffic.	Canada must assert its sovereignty.

Currently, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are engaged in 25 sustained operations around the world. These operations categorized by sector, noted below in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Current operations and commitments

Budget: $20 billion[6]	CAF personnel: 68,000 regular force, 27,000 reservists[7]
Operations by Type	**Commitments**
Involvement in Canada and in North America (sea surveillance, national security and defence)	• Operation LIMPID: mission of national surveillance. • Operation NUNAKPUT: patrols of assertion of the sovereignty and safety drills in the upper and East Arctic. • Operation DRIFTNET: Support to Fisheries and Oceans Canada in the enforcement of the global moratorium on high-seas driftnet fishing.
Engagement in International Crisis	• Operation UNIFIER: contribution to Ukrainian armed forces efforts. • Operation IMPACT: contribution to coalition assistance to security forces against ISIS in Iraq and Syria.
Contribution in maintaining Peace and Security	• Operation HAMLET: Participation in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). • Operation REASSURANCE: Support to NATO assurance measures in Central and Eastern Europe. • Operation ARTEMIS: Maritime Security and counterterrorism operations in the Arabian Sea.
Implication against Transnational Threats	• Operation CARIBBE: fight against illicit trafficking by transnational organized crime in the Caribbean basin and the eastern Pacific Ocean.

Source: Department of National Defence[8]

Past Policy

Canada's history demonstrates that the country has preferred focusing on domestic issues rather than military ones. Involvement in significant conflicts has historically been defined by a sense of duty to assist allies and to ensure security in the world.

Trends and critical decisive moments:[9]

With the Ogdensburg agreement in 1940 and NORAD (North American Aerospace Defence Command) agreement in 1957, Canada integrated itself into the American Defence system first within the context of World War II and then the Cold War. Canada has dutifully contributed to NATO, of which it is one of the principal initiators. Since the creation of the UN, Canada has also participated in numerous peacekeeping missions.

The coming to power of Pierre E. Trudeau marked a shift in the Canadian Defence policy. He prioritized sovereignty over international engagement in NORAD, NATO and UN. In this sense, he prioritized the surveillance of Canada's frontier and reduced the overall size of the CAF.

By 1984, Brian Mulroney pledged restoration and modernization of CAF but his plan has rapidly collapsed. Despite Canada's participation in the Gulf War and its peacekeeping contributions in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia between 1990 and 1992, the CAF were reported to have experienced shortcomings in regards to their equipment and training.

After 1993, Liberal policy was driven by the priority of deficit reduction within the Defence department. This led to the accentuation of a weaker army, not aligned with the revolution in military affairs in which new technology became prominent. Two major decisions were made regarding Canada's military at this time: intervention in Afghanistan (2001) and the initiative of staying out of the conflict in Iraq (2003).

The Canadian Defence policy radically shifted after 9/11 and especially under the leadership of former Prime Minister Stephen Harper who significantly increased the Defence budget partly in order to help in the improvement of the Canadian forces involved in Afghanistan. However, by 2009, Harper decided to drastically cut the budget mostly because of deficit reduction. This did not prevent the former Prime Minister from using force in Libya (2011) and in Iraq and Syria against ISIS (2014-2015).

Constraints

The Department of Defence is among those most affected by recent budget cuts, which has led to the delay or stalling of many procurement projects over the past ten years. This provides challenges which make it increasingly difficult for the CAF to perform in a changing environment.

Case Study: The acquisition of the F-35 put on hold.[10]

> **2010** - Defence Minister Peter Mackay announces Canada will purchase 65 F-35s. National Defence says price is $14.7 billion.
>
> **2012** – Auditor General Michael Ferguson releases a report in April that identifies major problems with the procurement process and finds the full cost is closer to $25 billion. By December, the government receives the report from an independent auditor who sets the full cost of Canada's proposed F-35 purchase at $45.8 billion. Acquisition is put on hold.
>
> **2014** - No decision is made by the Conservative government regarding F-35s purchase. Instead, it approves an upgrade to the CF-18 fleet to keep the aircraft operational until 2025.

The F-35's first international flight. Courtesy of Lockheed Martin on Flickr.

Figure 3: *Military expenditure among NATO allies (% of GDP)*

The chart to the right demonstrates that between 2006 and 2014, Canada has generally spent roughly one percent of national GDP, despite a consensus reached by NATO members to raise all defence budgets to two percent GDP in 2006.[11] This demonstrates a significant gap in Canada's ability to meet its international commitments. (Chart data provided by World Bank)

Section 2: Policy Analysis

Goals and Objectives

In the context of ensuring security and stability in crisis areas, Canada's military has a significant role to play. In keeping with our historic proactive contributions to peacekeeping, disaster relief, and multilateralism in the face of intractable conflict, Canadian objectives for maintaining national defence should remain focused on the pursuit of peace, prosperity, and good governance abroad.

More specifically, goals should continue to be prioritized to:

a. Ensure that Canada possess the capacity to protect its own citizens both at home and abroad.

b. Maintain positive relations with our allies by demonstrating commitment to the continental security of North America.

c. Contribute significantly to international security.[12]

Achieving these goals requires that our government first acknowledge existing limitations. While the breadth of these goals effectively capture the mandate of the Canadian military, their realization comes with certain trade offs.

Great ambitions and limited resources make it necessary that our government articulate the intended scope of future military engagements to form the basis of its new strategy.[13]

In addition to the 15% increase in personnel within the CAF since 2008, it remains necessary that our government establish a comprehensive strategy which addresses the remaining three pillars of the Canadian Armed Forces: equipment, readiness, and infrastructure. The primary objective of this review is to reconcile existing gaps between the current capacities of these areas and Canada's operational commitments and ambitions.

Stakeholders

Figure 4: *Domestic and Foreign Stakeholders*

Domestic stakeholders	Relevance to Canada's Defence Policy
Canadian Citizens	• The mandate of the Government of Canada is to serve and protect the interests of Canadians. • As taxpayers, Canadians have a vested interest in the strategic operations of the CAF, as well as other costs related to the procurement and maintenance of military infrastructure.
Canadian Businesses	• With elements of CAF hardware reaching the end of their operational lifespan, the potential for defence procurement contracts to land within Canada is an attractive prospect for many Canadian firms. • In some cases, there is scope for eligible Canadian firms to be leveraged in negotiations with U.S. or other foreign firms to be subcontracted for part manufacturing or maintenance.
Department of National Defence and Global Affairs Canada	• Each of these departments plays a key role in ensuring the success of Canadian operations abroad. Despite the unique mandate of each department, a comprehensive and concerted effort between diplomats, development experts, and our military can ensure greater efficiency in overseas operations.
Industry Canada, Regional Development Agencies, National Research Council	• Industry Canada assesses Canadian capability and ensures that Industrial and Technological Benefits (ITB) and Value Proposition bids are fulfilled. • Regional Development Agencies ensure equality in procurements and that allows evaluating equipment. • The National Research Council does hardware testing.
Foreign stakeholders	
United States/NORAD	• Given Canada's unique geographic situation, the United States relies upon collaboration with Canada to ensure continental security. • Canadian-awarded defence contracts within the US open up potential for enhanced equipment sharing/compatibility, training facilities.
NATO	• European NATO members are look to Canada to demonstrate commitment to their regional security. • Canada may rely upon this alliance if tensions rise in the Arctic which challenge Canada's sovereignty. However, some territorial disputes in the Arctic are also with NATO members.
United Nations	• Stronger support at the UN would express Canada's commitment to multilateralism beyond its NATO allies in areas of peacekeeping, nation building, and crisis management.

Allies and Detractors

In keeping with Canada's enduring values, allies to Canada will support universal access to rule of law, freedom, democracy, and human rights.[14] As many of the challenges facing the nation continue to grow in complexity with a diverse range of state and non-state actors, closer coordination with our allies is becoming increasingly necessary. Furthermore, many of Canada's allies face these challenges with an even greater urgency, creating a mutual incentive for collaborative efforts.

In the context of this review, and the policy objective of reconciling existing gaps between the current capacities and Canada's operational commitments and ambitions, the policy process faces another set of allies and detractors.

Allies expected to be aligned in favour of addressing recapitalization:

- **Defence contractors**
    - Canadian firms, as well as U.S. and other foreign firms would support and accommodate the recapitalization needs of the CAF.

- **NATO**
    - NATO members would welcome the support of a more capable Canadian military.

Detractors expected to offer some level of opposition to addressing recapitalization:

- **Canadian citizens**
    - Concerns regarding how tax dollars will be spent, on what, and whether there is sufficient justification to proceed with specific procurement projects.
- **Special interest groups**
    - Concerns for Canada's reputation and entrenchment into conflict if Canada proceeds to expedite an increase its defence spending and procurement projects.

Programmatic Needs

The resources and capacities required to address the objectives of this review are spread throughout several departments. In order to address the objectives of this review, the coordination of these departments should ensure that Canada meets its international commitments, find a viable pathway to raising the defence budget, and evaluate and proceed with vital procurement projects. The combined mandates of the following programs and offices will be crucial in carrying out the recommendations of this review:

Canadian Forces in Poland training during operation REASSURANCE in Poland. Courtesy of Combat Camera on Flickr.

Recapitalization to update Canada's military

•**National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS)**
Under the direction of Public Works and Procurement Canada, the NSPS was tasked with selecting shipyards to augment the Royal Canadian Navy and the Canadian Coast Guard.

•**National Fighter Procurement Secretariat (NFPS)**
The secretariat's mandate is to complete a thorough market evaluation and cost analysis of eligible fighter aircraft.

•**Defence Procurement Secretariat (DPS)**
The creation of the DPS will enhance coordination and expedite the procurement process to ensure timely delivery on projects which reflect Canada's national interest.[15]

Recommitting to multilateralism

Beyond the Border
- This comprehensive partnership between Canada and the United States represents an opportunity for the Government of Canada to demonstrate its commitment to continental security and the United States as its foremost ally.

North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD)
- The breadth of NORAD's mandate promotes cooperation with the United States to monitor air and sea in remote regions.[16] Expansion of the bilateral cooperation mandated by NORAD could allow for greater access to U.S. resources to protect shared concern areas such as the Arctic.

Joint Delegation of Canada to NATO
- Represents and reports to the Government of Canada on all NATO-related issues.[17] Canada's Chief of the Defence Staff on the Military Committee of the Atlantic Council, is a vital conduit for the Government of Canada to relay its commitments to NATO members.

Stabilization and Reconstruction Taskforce (START)
- START provides operational agility by leading coordinated timely policy responses to international crises. This Taskforce could be improved through the implementation of a sub-group to liaise between DND and Canada's medium and long-term development policymakers.[18]

Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)
- The DART functions as a singular unit within the CAF to provide logistics, security and medical assistance in the immediate wake of international natural disasters and humanitarian crises. Ensuring that the DART is best-equipped to complement relief efforts is crucial to Canada's contribution to its allies and neighbours around the world.[19]

Section 3: Recommendations

Policy Options

The change of government brings about an ideal opportunity to recalibrate Canada's foreign policy towards a new direction. By evaluating Canada's current and anticipated commitments, our government can assess the suitability of existing strategies and commitments.

Canadian Coast Guard Ice Breaker. Courtesy of B C on Flickr.

Figure 5: *Pathways to procurement for critical platforms*

Procurement Strategy	Action	Expected Costs, Outcome
Option 1: Current course for NSPS and F-35 (stalled) procurement	Proceed with current plan to build five Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships. (AOPS)	**Cost:** $4.3 Billion over 25 years **Lifespan:** 2022-2043 **Concern:** Limited patrol and icebreaking capabilities in the Arctic
	Proceed to purchase 65 F-35 aircraft.	**Cost:** $45.8 Billion **Lifespan:** 8,000 flight hours, an estimated 36 years **Concern:** Exceeds budget and operational requirements
Option 2: NSPS assessment and NFPS renewal	The first AOPS will be ready in 2018. Canada's navy could then evaluate its suitability for Arctic operations.	**Outcome:** Additional contracts may be awarded, to complement existing AOPS in favour of further enhancing Canada's operational capacity in the Arctic.
	Conduct open competition with a mandate of selecting a fighter aircraft which aligns with CAF operational requirements, capable of delivery by 2025. Canada's withdrawal from the F-35 project will marginally raise the price of production for allied investors.	**Cost:** Unknown, however cost to be significantly less than F-35. Canadian contractors may lose out on lucrative opportunities to contribute to the F-35 project. **Outcome:** Acquisition of a fleet of fighter aircraft which is proportionate to the operational requirements of the CAF.

Figure 6: *Canada's global engagement strategy*

Engagement Strategy	Action(s)	Expected Costs, Outcome
Unilateralism and Neoconservativism	Government prioritizes use of armed force over diplomacy, often acting independently without consultation with allies.	**Cost:** Unknown, however cost to be significantly greater than operating in collaboration with allies. **Outcome:** Degradation of allied relationships, would face an increased number of detractors, resulting in greater likelihood of being targeted.
Isolationism	Government takes a greater focus on domestic issues, setting aside international engagement including but not limited to use of the CAF.	**Cost:** Unknown **Outcome:** Degradation of allied relationships, Canada will be less protected from international threats, unable to rely on support from allies.
Multilateralism (free rider)	Government maintains current level of contributions to international organizations, and collaboration and with NATO allies	**Cost:** Status quo **Outcome:** Canada is increasingly being labelled as a 'free rider' in the sphere of international engagement. Canada risks foregoing the tangible benefits associated with allied collaboration as allied relationships diminish.
Multilateralism (leader)	Increase Canada's participation to allied defence initiatives, including but not limited to NORAD, Beyond the Border and NATO.	**Cost:** Incremental increase in defence budget to 2% of GDP over five years, approximately an additional $4 billion/ year. **Outcome:** Meeting the expectations of the United States, NATO, and the greater international community will signal that Canada committed to exercising an active role and embracing a multilateral approach to face challenges. Canada will benefit from the tangible benefits of combined efforts with NATO allies.

If our government is to continue to value the benefits of multilateralism, it is necessary that our foreign and defence policies demonstrate this commitment to our allies. The increase of Canada's defence budget to two percent of GDP would send this message and enhance Canada's capacity building efforts simultaneously, empowering our military to meaningfully contribute to the threats facing our allies.

Recommendations

1. Our government should expedite the replacement of critical military platforms.

a. National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy: Our government should ensure that the NSPS addresses the full scope of Canada's needs. To ensure that any modified version of the strategy remains fiscally sustainable, the defence budget should be augmented. (See recommendation 2a.)

b. National Fighter Procurement Secretariat: The current fleet CF-18s

are scheduled to reach the end of their operational life expectancy by 2025.

Our government must accelerate the existing progress of the NFPS to ensure that Canada acquires suitable fighter aircraft, avoiding potential gaps in Canada's operational capabilities.

a. Defence Procurement Secretariat: The creation of an overarching procurement secretariat will ensure that future needs are anticipated, thoughtfully considered, and addressed in a timely manner.[20]

2. Our government should meaningfully renew its commitment to multilateralism.

a. Raise the defence budget to two percent of GDP over the next five years: A robust defence budget would not only match Canada's resources to its ambition; it would demonstrate a commitment to NATO allies that Canada once again sees value in collaborative efforts.

b. Acquire a new fleet of fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft to replace existing Buffalo and Hercules aircraft. This procurement will bolster multilateral relationships by meeting Canada's commitment to the Arctic SAR agreement.

Figure 7: Implementation, Timeline and Expected Impact

Recommendations	Implementation	Timeline	Expected Impact
Replacement of critical military platforms	Ensure that the NSPS fulfills current and anticipated needs.	A performance evaluation of the first AOPS should take place in 2018, with the	The next generation of the Canadian navy is capable of sending armed patrol vessels into Canada's northernmost areas year round.
	Task the NFPS with selecting a replacement for current fleet, excluding F-35.	New aircraft should be operational, to include pilot training, by 2025	The next generation of Canadian fighter aircraft meets the operational requirements of the CAF.
Commitment to Multilateralism	Raise the defence budget to two percent of national GDP.	The federal budget should be structured to incrementally meet this goal by FY 2021.	Bolsters multilateral relationships via greater procurement and deployment resources. Committing to these incremental measures will improve relations with NATO and other allies.

Communication Strategy

Canada's new priorities for national defence should be outlined in the upcoming *Speech from the Throne* when the first session of the 42nd Parliament is opened on December 3, 2015. Greater precision regarding the implementation should be articulated in a Government white paper, which clearly situates Canada's pri-

orities in a global context. The document should be made available to the public on the Department of Defence website.

The Minister of National Defence should proceed to regularly address and update the public through the media, with the goals of:

a. Improving public perceptions of the Department of National

Defence through increased transparency.

b. Developing constructive relationships with domestic and foreign stakeholders, as well as the media.

c. Strengthening communications capabilities, as well as professionalism and morale, across the Department.

Canada's Cybersecurity Policy

Executive Summary

Introduction

Cyber security is the protection of data, data systems and computers from unauthorized access, modification, impairment or interference.[1] Cyber security affects all Canadians. As society becomes increasingly reliant on information technology, we face increasing threats to our safety, privacy, and day-to-day needs. This policy review focuses on all-around improvements to the cyber security sphere.

Policy Problem

Cyberspace is a relatively new area with threats and vulnerabilities. The internet is now a part of infrastructure, which both the private and public sector depend on. Threats in the private sector constitute data breaches and cybercrime, and cyberterrorism and state-sponsored cyberattacks affect the public as a whole.

The current Cybersecurity Strategy does not address difficulties in identifying and prosecuting cyberattackers.

This must be addressed in order to prevent impunity that generally comes with successful cyberattacks.

Current problems also revolve around the gaps between public and private sector approaches to cybersecurity, the latter being criticized for its unwillingness to share information and the former for not seeking to build bridges between the two sectors.

Canada's cybersecurity strategy is solely domestic-focused, which fails to address the jurisdictional issues of international attacks and the multiplier effects that come with attacks to trade and policy partners.

The Strategy also lacks an international outlook, an important aspect of cybersecurity due to the globalized nature of the internet and the multiplier effects that come with cyberattacks.

Another critique of current cybersecurity responses are their reactive nature, rather than an ideal proactive nature. By failing to take future attacks into consideration, the Government of Canada increases the chances of attackers eventually being successful.

Lastly, the current Cyber Security Strategy is far too dated. Being composed mostly of material prior to 2010, the Strategy does not take into account new trends in cybersecurity.

Recommendations:

1) Study ways to better identify sources of cyberattacks.
2) Stronger collaboration between the private sector and the government.
3) Make international collaboration a key pillar of the Cyber Security Strategy.
4) Make proactivity a key pillar of the Cyber Security Strategy.
5) Make the fight against online terrorist recruitment and propaganda a key pillar of the Cyber Security Strategy.
6) Update the current Cyber Security Strategy.

Section 1: Policy Process

Problems facing the nation

Canada's public and private sectors depend on a secure, robust, and stable information infrastructure to conduct day-to-day operations. Below is an overview on how widespread the internet is, and how dependent civilians are on a safe and secure cyberspace:

- 83% of Canadians use the internet for personal reasons, of which 53% of internet users placed an order online in the year 2012.[2]
- 89% of enterprises use the internet. Furthermore, nearly every enterprise uses some form of information and communications technology.[3]
- Canadian online sales were worth more than $136 billion in 2012, a figure that is expected to increase exponentially, as e-commerce sales are growing at over five times the pace of the overall retail trade.[4, 5]
- Hundreds of federal services are offered online, in addition to the ones offered by provincial and municipal governments.[6]

In this internet-reliant environment, cyber security plays a large role in protecting Canada's critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure consists of physical and information technology assets, determined to be incredibly vital as it is labelled the most important area of focus for security agencies. Critical infrastructure includes electricity networks, telecommunications networks, banking systems, transportation systems, as well as government information systems and services that are required for effective functioning of government.[7] The smooth operation of critical infrastructure supports our way of life as well as Canada's economic, political, and social well-being.[8]

Public Safety Canada's Impact Severity Matrix outlines some of the possible cyber threats, and how they could affect society. As can be seen, threats range from having very low and negligible effects to very high and catastrophic effects. Cyberattacks range from "very low impact" to "very high impact".[9]

The concept of cyber security can be divided into three distinct categories:

i) *Cybercrime:* Most activities that traditionally fall under the criminal code tend to fall into cybercrime. Cybercriminals can range from social bullies to skilled cyberattackers. Some of the more sophisticated cybercrimes include money laundering, identity theft, and controlling innocent IT systems to conduct criminal activity.

As our society continuously relies more on the internet, personal information becomes more readily usurped. In 2012, StatsCan found that fraud was the single largest incident of cybercrime, accounting for 54% of such incidents.[10] Other significant sources of cybercrime are intimidation violations, such as uttering threats and criminal harassment, and sexual violations, such as child pornography.[11]

The cybercrime problem is exacerbated by the fact that most private companies fail to report cases of cyberattacks.[12] Furthermore, most cybercrime incidents coming to the attention of police do not find an accused person, meaning that in the majority of cybercrimes an individual is not found responsible.[13]

ii) *Cyberterrorism:* Defined as "unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers, networks, and the information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives".[14]

Image courtesy of Yuri Samoilov on Flickr.

To date, Canada's worst dealings with cyberterrorism have not come from cyberattacks, but from terrorists' use of online mediums to spread their message and for recruitment purposes. Social media is a common tool to recruit and proliferate a message, as it is very easy to access. Online propaganda also serves to normalize extremist behaviour.[15]

Since Canada's current legal framework has some requirements on enterprises to protect themselves against crime, the government could theoretically impose duties on private and public actors to ensure critical infrastructure remains safeguarded against terrorism, including digital aspects.[16]

iii) *State sponsored/military cyberattacks:* Generally considered the most dangerous, albeit the most unlikely type of cyberattack. Compared to terrorists and organized criminals, states have much greater capacity to recruit skilled cryptologic personnel, purchase advanced technology, obtain intelligence about its victims, and coordinate attacks. A successful military cyberattack to Canada's critical infrastructure could have catastrophic effects.[17]

Cyberattacks launched over the internet are the fastest-growing form of espionage. State-sponsored economic or political espionage harms Canadian interests through the theft of confidential strategic government, political and military information or applications, the loss of assets and leading-edge technologies, the theft of intellectual property and commercial or weapons-related information.[18]

Critical decisive moments

In 2011, the federal government experienced a large data breach from foreign hackers who were able to access highly classified information from Defence Research and Development Canada.

When this attack happened, the solution adopted by the federal government was to take the Treasury Board and Finance Department - the most at-risk departments - offline so that **no one** could have access to them. While this may have been effective in preventing further data breaches, it also rendered the departments, and many other related agencies across the government, very inefficient.[19] As with most cases of cybercrime, there was no way to prove beyond reasonable doubt where the attack came from.

International events have demonstrated that cyberattacks have great potential for damage. During the Russia-Georgia conflict of 2008, Georgian government websites, as well as communications and transportation company websites were rendered inoperable due to cyberattacks. This demonstrated a way that cyberattacks worked alongside with typical war methods.[20] Another example occurred in 2010, when "Stuxnet" cyberattacks against Iran's nuclear facilities, led to damage worth up to four years of nuclear efforts.[21] This event demonstrated that cyberattacks on infrastructure could have real physical effects.

Gas centrifuges like the ones destroyed by Stuxnet. Courtesy of CartoonPeril2011 on Flickr.

Federal agencies in charge of cybersecurity [22]

CCIRC: Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre is typically an affected organization's first contact with the federal government. As Canada's national coordination centre for cyber security, CCRC prevents, mitigates and responds to most cyber incidents.[23]

CSE: The Communications Security Establishment is the federal agency responsible for the collection of foreign cyber intelligence and Canada's interface with the international cryptologic community. CSEC monitors and defends Government of Canada networks from cyber threats to the government, and provides advice and guidance to government departments to help them recover from cyber incidents.

CSIS: The Canadian Security Intelligence Service provides analysis needed to understand the intentions and capabilities of cyber actors. Conducts national security investigations, as well as reporting and advising on activities that constitute a threat to the security of Canada.

Department of National Defense: Provides cyber security information from military allies, monitoring and reporting on technological threats, and provides options analysis for potential military response.

Defence Research and Development Canada: leads the development of military cyber security science and technology in support of the Canadian Forces. Also undertakes cyber security efforts not specifically assigned to another department.

RCMP: Royal Canadian Mounted Police leads the criminal investigative response to suspected cyber-crimes.

Several other organizations that also play significant roles in cybersecurity include the Treasury Board Secretariat, Shared Services Canada, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, the Office of Privacy Commissioner, and Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre.

Section 2: Policy Analysis

Current goals and objectives

The 2010-2015 Cyber Security Strategy consists of three pillars:[24]

Securing government systems: Government systems must be secured because of the vast information held about citizens and corporations. These systems are also vital for the administration of services, and maintenance of critical infrastructure.

Partnering to secure vital cyber systems outside the federal government: Canada's economic and social prosperity depends on the smooth functioning of systems outside government. The federal government must work alongside the private sector and other levels of government to support mutual interests in cyber security.

Helping Canadians to be secure online: The government must assist Canadians in getting the information they need to protect themselves online.

Areas for Improvement

Canada's cybersecurity policies have improved over time.[25] However, there is still much more that can be done to ensure that our cyber systems are safe from cyberattacks.

Lack of international cooperation:
Globalization and advancements in technology have led countries to become increasingly reliant on secure interconnectedness. A successful cyberattack on one country will have significant impact on that country's partners in trade, defence, and policy. This means that cyberattacks have a multiplier effect, affecting more than just the direct target.[26] This possibility becomes apparent by the fact that in 2012, 41% of UN members did not have any identifiable cyber security effort. Of those that did, many did not have cyber security standards that matched Canadian standards.[27] This is worrisome because it puts our nation at risk when communicating with these states. By that same token, Canada must ensure that its own cyber security policies are not negatively affecting others.

Despite the importance of international cooperation, Canada's 2010-2015 cyber security strategy did not have global outlook as one of its pillars.

Use of cyber networks for non-cyberattacks:
Many terrorist and organized criminals take advantage of the interconnectedness of cyber networks without necessarily attacking cyber domains. Cyber networks can be used for propaganda, recruitment, fundraising, and operational planning.[28] Canada's cybersecurity policy makes no mention of ways in which cyberspace aids traditional terrorists and criminal acts. Canada's new cyber security policy must address the difficult reality that cyberspace can be used in ways that are detrimental to Canada without launching cyberattacks. Research and resources should be devoted to combatting this rising trend.

Current non-unified strategy between government and private sector:
In 2012, the *Cyber Action Plan* was reviewed by the Auditor General who found problems relating to the sharing of information between government agencies and stakeholders. Ultimately, the Auditor General found that there was an inability for the government to respond to cyberattacks and overall lack of awareness of these issues. The Auditor General also criticised CCIRC for only operating during business hours, despite it being initially conceived as a 24/7 service. Thus, if private sector partners ever need the government's help in an after-hours cyber-emergency, mitigation attempts may be delayed or jeopardized.[29]

Cooperation can be also be improved by increasing private sector awareness about Canada's cyber security strategy. In a 2013 study of Canadian businesses from different sectors, only seven percent of respondents were aware of Canada's Cyber Security Strategy, and forty percent would not know who to contact if they encountered a cyber-crime attack.[30] If the ultimate aim of this strategy is the protection of the information-based society as a whole (beyond simply government systems), then the private sector must be on board to guard against cyber threats. Canadians depend on critical assets provided by the private sector. Given the private sector's lack of information in case of a cyberattack, the government must do more to educate enterprises.

Public Safety Canada launched the Get Cyber Safe initiative to increase awareness about internet security, and to educate Canadians on simple steps to protect themselves. For individuals in the IT sector, CCIRC offers workshops to teach more advanced cyber security practices.[31] However, as is demonstrated by the above statistics, the federal government must do more to increase public knowledge about cyber security.

Increase private sector responsibility in cases of cyberattacks:
Canada's Cyber Incident Management Framework states that enterprises are expected to be secure against cyber threats. However, it does not spell out what the implications will be for most private companies who do not protect themselves against such threats.

However, it does not spell out what the implications will be for most private companies who do not protect themselves against such threats. Given the multiplier effect, attacks against private companies can affect a whole range of other national and international partners. To continue improving cooperation, the federal government must set out strict expectations for the private sector.

At present, private corporations are free to disregard Government advice. Government has few mandates to force companies to accept its help even in cases of cyberattacks on critical infrastructure.[32] The wide freedom given to corporations stems from the fact that the Federal Government's role on cyber security has mostly been one of coordination, not regulation.

Coordination and regulation should not be mutually exclusive. At the same time as Government promotes coordination, it must pass laws for corporations to protect themselves, their customers and associates.

Information sharing:

Because the cyber threat is continually evolving, both government and industry must be proactive in reviewing alternative approaches to cyber defense. In order to do this, an effective information-sharing environment must be promoted.

One difficulty in implementing information-sharing comes from the fact that private companies are generally not required to share information. Under current Canadian federal law, private sector entities, including critical infrastructure owners and operators, are not required to share cyber security information with other organizations or government authorities. Furthermore, enterprises tend to be protective of what they regard as their commercially sensitive information.[33]

To address this issue, the federal government must first the make private sector aware of the positives that come with sharing.
- Government can create a mutually-beneficial relationship by sharing information itself; with its great intelligence collecting abilities,

Government has much useful intelligence for the private sector.

- To calm fears about commercially-sensitive information being released, Government must make the private sector aware that their information will not be subject to access-to-information laws.

- The Canadian government should consider following in the steps of United States, passing legislation that limits the enterprises' legal liabilities in cases where they share self-detrimental information in the interest of openness.

Lastly, Government can pressure corporations into sharing information by making them aware that there are some legal requirements to disclose certain information, and actively enforcing this practice.

Proactivity:

As technology is always evolving, the government cannot be passive as new threats emerge. A proactive approach is exemplified by supporting initiatives to prevent attacks rather than merely responding to them.

The Government of Canada can be proactive by promoting research that supports cyber defences, as is being done in United Kingdom. New research will allow Government to stay ahead of attackers, as well as help offer solutions to current problems, such as the difficulties in finding perpetrators of cyberattacks.

The government can also improve proactivity by considering a more offense-minded approach to cyber security. A new trend in cyber security, titled "cyberdeterrence", is based on making attackers aware of the high counterattacks that may be conducted against them. This approach believes that if cyberattackers fear repercussions they will not attack in the first place. As cyberdeterrence is still a new approach, there are some unanswered questions and unknown risks.

While no department within Canada's security community acknowledges having a mandate for offensive cybersecurity, there is a general consensus that a more aggressive, defence strategy is required to intercept cyberattacks and combat national threats.[34] Canada should explore this new type of cyber security to ensure that the government gains an edge over attackers. As with the earlier point, research must be conducted so that Canada has enough information about new cyber trends, such as cyber-deterrence.

Cyber security fundamentals set out by the Cyber Safe Guide set out by the Government of Canada. Courtesy of http://www.getcybersafe.gc.ca

Allies and Detractors:

Depending on the way that the federal government chooses to craft policy, it may count on more or less members of society to help promote policies.

Allies

Detractors

Provinces and Territories:
Answerable for their citizens' safety, these allies want to ensure cyber attackers are not successful.

Global partners:
Want global trade and cooperation to continue in a safe and prosperous manner. However, agreement must be reached in terms of adequate mutual practices.

Citizens:
Want to be safe from cyber threats, yet do not want their privacy breached

Infrastructure owners and operators:
Have shown willingness to cooperate with federal government given their importance to Canadian society. However, overregulation may overburden their work.

Private enterprises:
Do not want to be attacked by cybercriminals. However, wary of financial costs that come with increased protection. Also reluctant to have their corporate images lowered by sharing incidents of cyberattacks.

Civil liberty groups:
Generally against giving greater online powers to governments and corporations.

Section 3: Recommendations

1) Study ways to better identify the sources of cyberattacks

Implementation: The government should create a working group to help identify cyberattackers, as it is currently very difficult to charge a cybercriminal, cyberterrorist, or state-sponsored attacker due to the anonymous nature of the internet. The analysis will shed new light on ways to improve the identification and lead to ways to better prosecute attackers. The working group should consist of academics, retired judges, retired senior employees of Canada's security agencies, individuals with experience in federal cabinet and IT specialists.

Costs: Costs will depend on the expertise provided by the civil servants and the investigative costs associated with research and analysis.

Timeline: The establishment of a working group should be completed by Spring 2016. The working group may take several months to conclude its findings, depending on the extent of its probe.

Expected Impact: The government will have a better idea of how often Canada is targeted by cyberattacks and will be able to analyze trends and patterns of reoccurrence. The private sector will also benefit from increased information available.

Programmatic Needs:
- The working group will need a legal mandate to compel government agencies and private enterprises to share confidential information.
- All parties must be willing to meaningfully contribute their knowledge and expertise.

2) Stronger collaboration between the private sector and the government

The government must provide both incentives and repercussions to promote greater collaboration.

Implementation: Government should begin sharing its own information to promote an atmosphere of collaboration. An awareness campaign to promote the benefits of collaboration is ideal, and will demonstrate possible repercussions of not sharing critical information. Legal obligations could be implemented to oblige the private sector to share more information with government.

Costs: Higher cyber security standards for private companies may increase their operating costs. The oversight of more private companies will likely require an increased budget for Public Safety Canada.

Timeline: Spring 2016.

Expected Impact: Deeper collaboration between the private and public sector ensures that the best policies from all sectors are implemented and that often-complex work is made more efficient.

Programmatic Needs:
- Office of the Privacy Commissioner may be tasked to oversee that personal information is protected.
- Public Safety Canada should be tasked to ensure that new legislation puts adequate expectations on corporations to protect against cyberattacks. CCIRC will play a great role in this recommendation.
- Security clearances will need to be provided prior to private-sector individuals receiving intelligence reports. This may put added strains on Canada's security agencies.

3) Make international collaboration a key pillar of the Cyber Security Strategy

Work closely with our allies to set minimum cyber security standards. Develop best practices among international government agencies and private companies.

Implementation: Create minimum guidelines and ensure all international state partners adhere to them. An international panel may be set up for all relevant parties to discuss their needs, and to create agreed upon standards that are practical for all parties.

Costs: With the added international scope, there will additional costs for security agencies due to new liaison duties. However, these costs will be significantly less than the cost of the agencies collecting and analyzing the intelligence themselves.

Timeline: Spring 2016; perhaps at an international meeting such as the UN.

Expected Impact: International partners will be able to conduct business in more secure manners.

Programmatic Needs:
- Sharing information with international partners opens the possibility that Canadians' privacy may be breached or mishandled. The Privacy Commissioner may need an expanded mandate to examine actions of international partners.
- Global Affairs Canada may be asked to contribute a larger role in this matter than it previously had to. The Department should be tapped on to build bridges between Canadian personnel and foreign personnel.

4) Make proactivity a key pillar of the Cyber Security Strategy

Canada must act proactively to ensure that attacks do not happen in the first place, and that our security agencies are aware and working against future methods of attacks.

Implementation: Promote research that will contribute to our knowledge of technology and expected cyberattacks. Research should also be done to understand ways that Canada can use offensive-defence cyber security strategies, if at all. American security agencies may offer insight on this latter point, as that is the nation that has done the most exploration on the topic. Legal sources must be consulted to determine the legality of offensive cyberdefence.

Costs: There will be financial commitments to fund academic research. There will be minor costs to the initial consideration of Canada's offensive cyberdefence. However, should the government choose to adopt a more offensive way of conducting cyberdefence, there will be high costs to improving federal agencies' capacities.

Timeline: Promotion of research can be started within months, but the research results will vary. Creating a capable offensive cyberdefence strategy for security agencies will likely take over a year.

Expected Impact: Cyberattacks will be stopped before they take effect.

Programmatic Needs:
- Canada's security agencies do not have much experience in proactive defence; they may need to adopt new operational frameworks.
- In some cases, agencies may not have a mandate in adopting offensive defence. Legal sources will need to be consulted to ensure that expanded mandates are legal.

5) Make the fight against terrorist propaganda and online recruitment a key priority

Canada needs to develop a plan that will limit the spread of terrorist propaganda and online recruitment tactics to terrorist groups.

Implementation: Violent extremism and propaganda must be clearly defined in order to better identify cases that fall under this category. Using Australia's online extremist reporting form as an example, create a system that allows citizens to report instances of extremism and online recruitment tactics that can investigated. Work alongside international partners to prevent and remove extremism.

Costs: Costs for setting up a system to do this may be minimal. However, it may be necessary to create some staff positions to follow up and investigate reported instances.

Timeline: Spring 2016

Expected Impact: An attempt to see less converts to extremism.

Programmatic Needs:
- Further co-operation between international partners, as national borders do not exist online. It may be difficult to take information and propaganda down due to jurisdictional lines.

6) Update the current Cyber Security Strategy

The 2010-2015 Cyber Security Strategy is currently out of date. An updated Strategy that addresses new one needs to be created.

Implementation: The Cyber Security Strategy will have three pillars added. The six pillars will be:
• Secure Government Systems
• Partner Outside the Federal Government
• Help Canadians Remain Safe Online
• Stop the Spread of Terrorist Recruitment and Propaganda
• Collaborate with International Partners
• Promote Proactivity

Costs: Most of the costs will be used from existing Public Safety Canada budget. However, additional research and communications officers may be needed to promote the new pillars, as well as to finish the Strategy in a timely fashion.

Timeline: Spring 2016, when the new Liberal government is well versed in Canada's cybersecurity status.

Expected Impact: The new Strategy will guide Canada's federal agencies in ways to improve the current state of cybersecurity. This will include information about new and current threats, relevant ways for citizens to stay informed, and training for law enforcement on new techniques for prevention and response.

AG - *Auditor General of Canada*
CESD - *Commissioner on the Environment and Sustainable Development*
FIPA - *Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement*
ICCPR - *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*
INAC - *Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada*
OAG - *Office of the Auditor General*
UN - *United Nations*
UN DESA - *Department of Economic and Social and Affairs to the United Nations Secretariat*
UNDRIP - *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*
UNHRC - *United Nations Human Rights Committee*
UNPFII - *United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues*

Inside this section:

Canada's International Indigenous Policy

Executive Summary

Globalization has brought attention to the domestic legacy of Canada's historic treatment of indigenous peoples. Increased interconnectivity between nations and states has contributed to a growing sentiment of international intolerance for ongoing subjugation. Canada is drawing negative attention for failing to rectify the sociopolitical and economic inequality of indigenous peoples in the post-colonial era. There are two overarching issues that Canada must deal with to improve the situation:

1. Outdated legislation on issues affecting indigenous peoples.
2. Underperforming government programs to improve quality of life and standard of living.

Canada's primary indigenous policy goal should be to create the legislative conditions that support a domestic culture of respect between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples to advance the socioeconomic conditions detracting from their quality of life.

The newly elected government's platform was based on a number of promises aimed at achieving this goal, including signing the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). However, for Canada to commit to the principles of the doctrine, it is necessary to consider the complicated nature of the domestic and international landscape.

To address the two issues affecting Canada's capacity to change the domestic policy course and engage in the international arena as a human rights leader, this review considers options and outcomes and makes the following recommendations:

1. A legislative cleanup.
2. Stringent programmatic evaluation with more oversight.

Indigenous groups gather to demonstrate on Parliament Hill (Mickey G-Flickr).

Section 1: Policy Process

Problems Facing the Nation

From a foreign policy perspective, international attention has brought to light a contradiction between Canada's values and behaviour that challenges its authority to act as a human rights leader. International human rights groups have chastised Canada for the continued maltreatment of indigenous peoples.[1] This sentiment is constraining Canada's ability to engage in diplomatic relations, particularly criticizing and taking action against human rights lapses among other nations in other states. With the 2006 introduction of United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), there is now an international standard for the treatment of indigenous peoples. While Canada was a contributor to the creation of this document, it is not a signatory due to concerns regarding increasing responsibilities of the state, as well as rights to self-determination and land claims (see Appendix A for the articles in the problematic sections of UNDRIP).[2] There have been recent efforts by the Canadian government toward rapprochement with indigenous peoples, but shortfalls in finding actionable solutions with measurable outcomes. This is reflected in the outdated legislation that continues to facilitate underperforming programs. These issues will continue to impede Canada's international reputation as long as they are left unaddressed.

ISSUE	CRITICAL CONCERNS	INDICATORS
Outdated legislation		
Conflicting doctrine around indigenous rights	Some of the overlapping domestic acts in the Minister of Indigenous Affair's portfolio back to the 1800s, continuing regulations that contrast contemporary international human rights obligations The constitution states only "existing rights" limiting the ability to create new ones consistent with international obligations[3] Indigenous rights in the constitution are still subject to Canadian laws that oftentimes undermine them	Canada has been challenged before by the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) on the discriminatory domestic provisions (see Appendix B). Case law rulings have created gaps between laws governing indigenous peoples and the nation (see Appendix B).
Compromised trade relations	A lack of indigenous voices in major Canadian multilateral and bilateral trade relations concerning indigenous lands and peoples has led to complications, including around Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (FIPAs)	Indigenous land claims in Canada challenge the economic capacity of the tar sands and other natural-resource-related projects (see Appendix B). Indigenous peoples in other states where Canada has foreign investments can and are suing over rights violations related to extractive practices (see Appendix B).
Multi-jurisdictional and multi-departmental paralysis	A concerted effort between jurisdictions and departments is not being undertaken	Stagnation on complex files that involve different departments and jurisdictions to addressing problems.

ISSUE	CRITICAL CONCERNS	INDICATORS
Underperforming Programs		
Governance	Indigenous communities have autonomy over how they govern and mandatory reporting to the federal government reveal elements of corruption in some[4]	Large-scale discrepancies between the quality of reserve leadership as well as poverty levels and affluence.[5]
Social Assistance	Alarming statistical trends relative to non-indigenous people A lack of clarity around measures to gauge improvement via federal programs	Higher infant mortality, and suicide, rates among indigenous peoples than non-indigenous peoples; lower education attainment, median income and employment rate.[6] Absence of concrete targets for multiple INAC programs (See Appendix C).
Infrastructure	Regulatory gap that leads to low or non-existent standards for essential infrastructure and services	Buildings are not subject to national or provincial building codes or fire safety standards. Fire deaths on reserves are 10 times higher.[7]

Canada's newly elected government has promised to implement the UNDRIP,[8] although aspects of the it pose significant challenges to Canada. In support of the principles outlined in the UNDRIP, Canada pledged to:

- Lift 2% funding cap for reserve programs and services

- Make "significant" investments in education, including new funding for supporting and preserving indigenous languages and culture

- Develop a reconciliation framework that recognizes titles and treaty rights

- Implement the 94 recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on Indian Residential Schools by establishing a National Council for Reconciliation

- Return to the consultative principles and objectives of the Kelowna Accord

- Hold mandatory annual meetings between the Prime Minister and First Nations Chiefs

- Call an immediate national inquiry into missing and murdered indigenous women[9]

- Give veto vote to indigenous groups regarding development on their territories[10]

- End boil-water advisories on reserves[11]

The purpose of this review is not to break down the probability of pursing these platform promises in detail, but instead is to determine how to establish the necessary domestic environment to achieve the international standards Canada is expected to strive for under new leadership.

Past Policy (and Trends)

Canada's indigenous policy has traditionally had an international dimension. During the colonial period, indigenous contingencies travelled abroad, making unsuccessful overtures to the crown directly to secure their rights before the federation legislatively stripped them.[12] Interestingly, foreign policy reviews have corresponded with turning points in indigenous policy in Canada, but are not reflective of that.

Critical moments

- The 1969 Statement of the Government on Indian Policy (The White Paper) versus the 1970 Foreign Policy for Canadians

The White Paper proposed the abolition of the Indian Act under the auspices of equality, but indigenous peoples were not consulted about how this could affect their status and responded negatively.[13] When the government released its foreign policy review the following year, it did not include a strategy for indigenous peoples despite indigenous peoples connecting transnationally since the creation of the UN.[14]

- The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (1991-1996) versus the 1995 Canada in the World

First Nations, Metis, and Inuit protest Residential Schools outside Parliament. *Courtesy of Mikey G Ottawa on Flickr*

The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples was established following a series of domestic conflicts over the treaty and title rights of indigenous peoples.[15] It produced a report of hundreds of recommendations to improve the relations between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples, including many that explored self-governing options, which were never implemented. The 1995 Canada in the World review did not explicitly consider indigenous peoples as international actors.

- The 2005 Kelowna Accord versus the 2005 International Policy Statement

The federal government held a series of consultations with provincial and territorial leaders and national indigenous groups, producing a framework for improving the socio-economic and political lives of indigenous peoples.[16] The International Policy Statement paid homage to this and the consequences: "There are cracks in our model, seen most visibly in the condition of Canada's First Nations people. Yet our continuing ability to adapt our political and social union are important not only for ourselves, but also can be useful in engaging with other societies around the globe."[17] However, the successor government did not endorse the Kelowna Accord, nor did it produce a subsequent foreign policy review.

Section 2: Policy Analysis

Interests and Values

Canada's international agenda have long been motivated by inherent national interests of maintaining security and ensuring prosperity. These national interests are further shaped by unique Canadian values of: rule of law, freedom, democracy, and human Rights.[18] However, the reality facing indigenous peoples in Canada is not fully reflected in these values. This leads to our primary goal.

Goal and Objectives

Canada's primary indigenous policy goal should be to foster a domestic culture of acceptance and respect between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples while improving socio-economic conditions, particularly on reserves. Consciously and actively working toward this will eliminate the juxtaposition between the values Canada espouse on the international stage and its reality at home.

To achieve this goal, Canada should strive towards the following objectives:

1. Create the macro environment legislatively to facilitate policy change.
2. Ensure effective micro programs to address individual issues.

Key Players (including Institutions and Organizations)

DIRECT STAKEHOLDER	STRATEGIC INTEREST
First Nations/Inuit/Metis	Subject to rights and treaty violations and lower living standards.
Government of Canada	Made promises to rectify inequality between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples.
Federal Departments *Because of the multidimensional nature of the promises made in addition to INAC, several, if not almost all other departments, will be involved	INAC will be the lead department. It is INAC's responsibility to make "Canada a better place for Aboriginal and northern peoples and communities."[19]
Provinces and Territories	Have jurisdiction over many issues that affect indigenous peoples.

ALLY	STRATEGIC INTEREST
UN UNPFII UN DESA	Recognized internationally the disadvantaged position of most indigenous peoples in their home states UNPFII is an advisory board for indigenous issues representing a significant international body that can offer support for planning domestic policies and programs. UN DESA is designed is to aid countries in developing programs that are translated from policy frameworks developed at UN conferences and summits. Canada can draw upon its expertise to develop programs that support
Civil society/NGOs	Civil society and NGOs can contribute to the direction of conversation through policy formation, facilitating increased cooperation between indigenous peoples and the government.

DETRACTOR	STRATEGIC INTEREST
Other countries (with indigenous peoples that have not signed the UNDRIP)[20]: United States Australia New Zealand	May not provide support for new policies as it will increase pressure for them to do the same.

Programmatic Needs

The platform promises related to indigenous issues are indicative of the direction the current government wants to take with its program priorities.

While the previous government planned to reduce INAC's $8 billion annual budget by $1 billion by 2018, the current government has pledged to prioritize an additional $1.6 billion between 2016 and 2019 across five issue areas:


Figure 1: Priority Areas for New Investments (Data from Liberal Costing Plan)

Constraints

1.Budgetary

Despite additional funding, the new government will not have the financial resources to undertake all of the multidimensional commitments it avowed to indigenous peoples during its term in office.

2. Systemic discontinuity

The changing of governments disrupts policy, made obvious between the old and new governments and their different approaches to indigenous

issues. For major projects, such as the ones proposed by the new government,

Figure 2: INAC new budget forecast (Data courtesy of: 2015-16 Report on Plans and Priorities, Liberal Costing Plan)

to be successful over the long-term, the support of opposition parties will be needed. There is still even better certainty working toward pledges achievable in four years.

3. Historic divide

The legacy of colonialism in Canada has created a divide between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples. Important promises made to indigenous peoples by the successive governments have been broken, fostering distrust over and a hesitancy to engage in relations.

(Data courtesy of: *2015-16 Report on Plans and Priorities,* Liberal Costing Plan)

Budget Priorities	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18
Education	$3,809,005,746.00	$4,170,276,224.00	$4,139,063,394.00
Reconciliation	$443,210,887.00	$-	$-
Land Claims	$733,370,302.00	$758,754,184.00	$262,040,944.00
Self Government Agreements	$87,163,078.00	$40,460,426.00	$41,854,768.00
Agreements and Treaties	$740,282,191.00	$792,625,691.00	$747,327,336.00

Issue Breakdown

OUTDATED LEGISLATION: Legislation sets the precedent for creating an environment in which to conduct relations with indigenous peoples, however, the current framework is outdated, and confusing.

ISSUE	OPTIONS	OUTCOMES
Conflicting doctrine around indigenous rights	Establish working groups to: Synthesize overlapping acts. Evaluate indigenous rights under the constitution.	More accepted and circumstantially fair definitions to provide more legal clarity and eliminate contradictory or repetitive clauses.
Compromised trade relations	Enshrine an indigenous right to be consulted on trade issues involving their lands and an obligation to consult indigenous groups in other states on trade relations involving their lands. Re-visit (and potentially renegotiate) agreements that do not support this principle.	Facilitate greater indigenous and non-indigenous co-operation to achieve economic prosperity.
Multi-jurisdictional and multi-departmental paralysis	Create a procedural protocol to include representation from each affected entity when addressing specific indigenous issue requiring consultation to implement and manage legislation.	Improved capacity to complete projects as all knowledge leaders in relevant areas are involved.

UNDERPERFORMING PROGRAMS: Programming is necessary to improve the quality of life for indigenous peoples in Canada, however, the effectiveness of the programming in place is questionable.

ISSUE	OPTIONS	OUTCOMES
Governance	Establish an indigenous auditor general responsible for monitoring funds to avoid corruption (see Appendix D). Develop a cross-community learning strategy (see Appendix E).	Reduce corruption and improve sociopolitical and economic conditions while maintaining indigenous autonomy to govern.
Social Assistance	Create working groups to co-ordinate with UN DESA to create metrics based on surveys. Solidify partnership with the Treasury Board to do programmatic evaluations through the Audit and Evaluation Sector of INAC to monitor performance metrics. (for stronger, stringent, more incisive evaluation)[21.]	Measure impact, allowing for reassessment for future planning for programs.
Infrastructure	Create working groups to establish standards with UN DESA to develop infrastructure indicators. Use metrics to gauge infrastructure needs.	Fewer safety hazards.

Section 3: Recommendations

Unfortunately, due to the current domestic landscape, Canada is not in a position to drastically alter its indigenous policies to conform with the international obligations it hopes to.

To act on the platform promises, the current government will require a two-pronged approach, as outlined in our objectives. Firstly, it will need to create an environment in which policy changes can occur, beginning with

a legislative overhaul. Secondly, it will need to address program effectiveness through the lessons learned from shortcomings in previous efforts.

Recommendation 1: A Legislative Clean-up

The issues associated with the patchwork of indigenous legislation leads to the immediate focus on establishing working groups to address the current constitution and overlapping acts. This will include ensuring that indigenous peoples are consulted over trade agreements that involve their lands. Additionally, a strategy to overcome multi-departmental and multi-jurisdictional paralysis on specific issues requiring joint efforts is needed. By rectifying the domestic legislative problems, Canada will be able to meet the requirements to sign the UNDRIP.

Cost-Benefit

The most effective way to conduct legislative amendments is to create working groups concerned with the constitution and overlapping acts, as well as a working group to assess problems associated with multi-departmental and multi-jurisdictional issues.

Managing the department budget will be the leading constraint on the ability to create and manage these working groups, which will require the attention of salaried staff. A second potential constraint is the discontinuity of government should the legislation not be ratified within four years. If a new government that does not have this priority is elected next term, then the working groups and recommendations could be nullified. Finally, the historic divide will be a constraint as mistrust between indigenous peoples and the government could stall progress.

Despite these constraints, improving the current legislation by including indigenous input will help Canada's progress domestically in domestic law toward the international principles it hopes to aspire to. Legislative change is a necessary step and therefore, it is recommended that the following implementation steps are taken.

Implementation

INAC will lead the facilitation of the working groups, with support from the Privy Council Office, which is necessary to create instruments of government. The recommended composition of the working groups is 60:40 indigenous peoples to non-indigenous legislative experts. This will alleviate tensions associated with historic divide.

INAC will also need to work on a strategy for projects that involve other departments. This framework of procedural protocol can be extended for consultation with the provinces as well as the groups of provincial indigenous leaders.

Finally, a framework for creating future acts should be developed so that there is a standard for the co-operation and input of indigenous peoples, ensuring legislative problems are not re-created.

Timeline

Working Group on Constitutional Definition			
Working Groups on Act			
Develop Strategy for Dealing with Multiple Stakeholders			
		Propose Amendments	
			Legislation to be Changed Before Parliament
			Communicate Legislative Changes to Public
2016	2017	2018	2019

Recommendation 2: Stringent Programmatic Evaluation with More Oversight

The goals of the current government focus on programs for education and infrastructure. To successfully implement these programs, it is necessary to create and utilize more stringent metrics in order to measure progress and accurately understand funding impacts. Governance is also a critical area to address, as identified in the issue breakdown.

Cost-Benefit

A portion of the budget will need to be allocated to measurement rather than into programs. While this may detract from the government's ability at the outset to quantify progress, it is essential to create these metrics in order to implement effective and efficient programs. Raising the standard of living for indigenous peoples in Canada translates into an improved capacity to support human rights topics on the international stage.

Implementation

The primary step will be to continue the surveys of indigenous socio-economic and demographic information that were being conducted by the previous government.[22] INAC will again be the lead agency in this, but should work with the Treasury Board on baselines. The results from these surveys will then be used to create clear measurements and goals for the programs that are to be pursued by the current government. Furthermore, UN DESA should be consulted to create social and infrastructure goals that will allow Canada to meet UNDRIP standards. Working groups should be established in order to identify innovative methods to conduct these programs. The surveys should not be stopped after the initial period, but continued to continuously monitor progress and reassess goals.

To improve governance, the position of Indigenous Auditor General, responsible to the Office of the Auditor General, should be created.

It would be the Auditor General's job to provide information on the spending and performance of indigenous governments and provide an annual report to parliament.[23] A system for community to community learning where leaders who have implemented successful projects in their communities can share their lessons with other indigenous communities should be developed. An annual round table will be held where leaders of communities are brought together to facilitate knowledge sharing.

Timeline

Create Indigenous Auditor General Position			
Conduct Surveys			
Create Working Groups			
Develop Metrics			
Review and Create Program			
Implement New Programs			
Annual Report from Auditor General			
2016	2017	2018	2019

Canada's Global Health Policy

Executive Summary

The World Health Organization (WHO) defines health as "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity."[1] Health is not an isolated concept, but a factor that is intertwined with topics ranging from trade to security.

Solely safeguarding the health of Canadians from domestic threats is not sufficient in today's globalized world; international health threats can arise rapidly and unexpectedly. Canada must be on constant guard. Pandemic preparedness, health aid coordination, global research collaboration, and multilateral organization engagement represent the salient issues that Canada's federal stakeholders must grapple with when examining its global health strategy.

Canadian Forces Doctor delivers medical assistance in Haiti. *Courtesy of Combat Camera*

Canada, as a highly-industrialized country that holds a high regard for human rights and dignity, has an ethical responsibility to assist poor nations in achieving greater quality of life and greater health outcomes for their citizens. With the 2010 Muskoka Initiative,[2] Canada galvanized international efforts to improve the health of mothers, newborns, and children around the world. Canada's Muskoka Initiative has been largely successful, but questions remain over whether, in totality, Canada's current global health policy is sufficiently addressing health needs at home and abroad.

Recommendations to Government

1. Syndicate an interdepartmental, overhead committee to coordinate Canada's global health strategies and responses: The Global Health Taskforce.

2. Update and evolve Canada's Maternal, Newborn, and Child Health (MNCH) development focus to match current United Nations (UN) priorities, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This involves working to increase Canada's international development aid spending to 0.35% of Gross National Income (GNI).

Secondary Recommendations to Government

To support the primary recommendations outlined before:

1. Coordinate Canada's global effect on health and the social determinants of health. Work through Export Development Canada (EDC) to control the actions of Canadian corporations active abroad. Invoke stricter enforceable standards on environmental, social, civic, and health impacts.

2. Encourage and facilitate further private sector coordination on health development aid and global health research.

3. Re-examine Canada's position in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) on intellectual property rights and the pharmaceutical industry to ensure access to affordable medicine for Canadians as well as for populations around the world.

Section 1: History and Policy Process

Issue	Specifics
Lack of coordination among government departments and agencies	Within the federal government, global health governance is spread across at least two departments (Health Canada [HC], and Global Affairs Canada [GAC]), as well as one agency (Public Health Agency of Canada [PHAC]). While each body holds an important stake in achieving global health, their actions lack close collaboration and coordination, which potentially detracts from Canada's success in achieving greater global health.
Lack of a clear global health strategy which articulates Canada's vision for engagement in global health	Researchers have passed criticism on Canada for lacking a coherent global health strategy.[3] Often global health is viewed by the government through a domestic (HC) or development (GAC) lens, making its translation to the international sphere difficult.[4]
Absence of central body to facilitate and organize domestic and international collaboration of Canadian health research centres and institutions	Within Canada, there is a multiplicity of researchers who engage in advanced and innovative research on the most pressing global health issues. However, the government does not offer a central authority through which research can be displayed and discussed either domestically or internationally.[5]
Inadequate budget to meet global health needs	The government is failing to meet the UN official development assistance target of 0.7% of GNI, despite repeated calls from the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade to strengthen efforts to reach the target.[6]

Policy/Convention/Initiative	Relevance to Global Health
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control Adopted May 2003 Entered into force February 2005	• Negotiations led by Canada. • Represents the only global health treaty.[7] • Developed in response to the globalization of the tobacco epidemic to reiterate the rights of all individuals to the highest standard of health.[8]
WHO International Health Regulations (2005) Entered into force in June 2007	• An agreement between 169 countries to work collaboratively to achieve global health and security. • Under the Regulations, countries have agreed to build their capacities to detect, assess, and report public health events.[9]
UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Target date: 2015	• Eight targets agreed to by all countries and leading development institutions to meet the needs of the world's poor. • Three targets have a specific health focus (reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, and combatting HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases).[10]

Critical Moments

Critical Moment	Details
MNCH	• In 2010, Prime Minister Harper launched the Muskoka Initiative on MNCH to accelerate women's and children's health in developing countries at the Group of 8 (G8) meeting. Canada and its partners committed US$7.3 billion between 2010 and 2015. Canada has now committed an additional $3.5 billion to MNCH for 2015–2020 (See figure 1). • Canada's approach to MNCH involves three health foci: 1) to strengthen health care systems for women and children by increasing the number of health care workers and improving local government's civil registration and vital statistics capacity; 2) to support nutrition by encouraging breastfeeding and ensuring access to essential micronutrients for mothers and children; and 3) to reduce disease burden by ensuring that mothers and children receive vaccinations. • Canada has 10 MNCH countries of bilateral focus: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Haiti, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Sudan and Tanzania. • Since 2010, maternal mortality rates have declined in target countries, and millions more children are reaching the age of five. • At the 69th session of the UN General Assembly in September 2014, Canada urged the Assembly to ensure that MNCH remains a top priority in the post-2015 development agenda.[11]
Pandemics	• The Swine Flu, Bird Flu, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, and the West Nile Virus are recent international health scares that elicited Canada's pandemic preparedness policy response. (See figure 2) • The 2014-2015 Ebola outbreak in Western Africa invoked Canada's pandemic prevention response across health stakeholders in Canada. Canada committed over $110 million in health, humanitarian, and security aid to fight the spread of Ebola.[12] The government also provided donations of the Canadian-developed Ebola vaccine. However, members of Canada's medical community have been outspoken about the shortfalls of Canada's Ebola response. New Brunswick's Chief Medical Officer of Health recommended that in the future, Canada be prepared to immediately deploy PHAC teams abroad to aid in the response.[13] Canada's Ebola response reveals Canadian health stakeholder coordination issues. • Consideration must be given to the fact that the above-noted viruses did not reach epidemic proportions within Canada, and casualties within Canada remained minimal.[14] Thus, Canada achieved its broad mandates of protecting the Canadian population from health threats, as well as protecting the world's population by limiting the contagious capacity of the Canadian population (a global public good).

Figure 1: Canada's Commitment to MNCH[15]

$2.85B
2010-2015
Commitment to MNCH

$3.5B
2015-2020
Commitment to MNCH

Figure 2: Swine Flu Fatalities Remained Low in Canada[16]

Wednesday, July 15, 2009

	Deaths	Total Cases	New*
B.C. . . .	1	382	22
Alta. . . .	3	1,348	92
Sask. . .	3	859	4
Man. . .	6	831	44
Ont. . . .	15	3,636	
Que. . . .	17	2,259	67
N.B. . . .	0	42	9
N.S. . . .	0	330	48
P.E.I. . .	0	5	
N.L. . . .	0	44	2
Terr. . . .	0	420	13
Canada	**45**	**10,156**	**301**

Source: Public Health Agency of Canada
* New cases reported between July 14 and July 15

Deaths
1-50 51-100 101-250 251-500 501-750 751-1000 1001-2500 2501-5K 5001+

CNS
Canwest News Service

Trends in Policy

Foreign Aid in Decline: Canada's foreign aid spending has undertaken a downward trend. In 2014, foreign aid spending totaled CAD $4.9 billion, a clear decline from 2013's $5.4 billion and 2011's $5.7 billion. Additionally, as a result, GNI spending fell from 0.27% in 2013 to 0.24% in 2014.[17] Moreover, according to the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), Canada ranks below the 2014 GNI average of 0.29% in foreign aid spending.[18]

Net ODA in 2013 - as a percentage of GNI

Source: OECD, 8 April 2014.

Figure 3 (above right):
OECD spending as a percentage of GNI.[19] Canada ranks 15 out of 28 countries.

Canada's health spending has been on an increasing trend over the past 5 years, unlike Canada's overall development spending. Canada's health development spending has increased since 2010, especially the reproductive health spending. Spending peaked in 2011 because of Canada's commitments to the 2010 Muskoka Initiative. Health development spending has increased steadily since 2000, in line with Canada's GNI growth.[20]

Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Canada's Health Aid	US$944,000,000	$2,056,480,000	$994,790,000	$996,950,000	$1,086,000,000

Reactive/Emergency Oriented Assistance: Canada has steered away from undertaking long-term assistance projects that contribute to the social determinants of health in favour of short-term emergency spending.[21]

Inefficient Delivery of Aid: Canada's foreign aid effectiveness has been diminishing due to inefficient delivery. After examining 42 Foreign Affairs (GAC) projects totaling $172 million, in response to eight global crises that each had health components between April 2011 and December 2013, the Auditor General found a lack of "clarity" in how Foreign Affairs (GAC) funds aid projects and a lack of timeliness in response.[22] However, as of January 2015, Canada disbursed more than 97% of the $2.85 billion devoted to MNCH.[23]

Constraints

Constraint	Specifics
Narrow focus towards the MNCH Initiative	MNCH excludes the provision of reproductive services for women (funding for safe abortions,[24] family planning and access to contraception), severely inhibiting the initiative's success. Reproductive services are essential for women's health because they allow for control over pregnancy timing.[25]
Unrealistic Global Health Goals	The MDGs, although having been replaced by the SDGs, represent an unrealistic global health initiative that was undertaken internationally and continues to be an active component guiding Canada's programming. The MDGs focused only on three aspects of health, making them effectively too limited in scope to facilitate substantial changes in the state of global health.[26]
Private Industry's Desire for Profit at Expense of the Public Good	The pharmaceutical and extractive industries are private actors that significantly impact global health. Through their pursuit of profit at the expense of public health, the industries detract from improvements to global health. The industries can often work against the positive action of Canada's global health initiatives. For the pharmaceutical industry, the "profit-before-patients" mentality is displayed in lobbying for extended patent protection. For the Canadian extractive industries, lobbying for less social responsibility is better for their profit margins, but harms community health in developing countries.

Section 2: Policy Analysis

Goals and Objectives

Goal: Clarify roles and responsibilities, and create synergy between government stakeholders and research institutions in order to effectively safeguard the health of Canadians and address the most pertinent global health issues.

Objective: To protect and support the health of Canadians and people worldwide.

Interests: Ensuring the Canadian health system is capable of addressing health issues which emanate domestically or internationally. This includes preservation of the social determinants of health.

Values: Recognizing health as a human right and identifying health as possessing a moral dimension.[27]

Key Stakeholders, Allies, and Detractors*

Stakeholders	Relationship to Policy	Interests
Allies		
Federal Departments and Agencies *HC, GAC, PHAC*	Responsible for safeguarding the health of Canadians; implementing international development policies aimed at increasing global health; and facilitating national approaches to public health policy.	Promoting innovation in healthcare;[28] translating international research and development to Canada's public health programs; preventing and controlling infectious disease, chronic disease, and injuries.[29]
Provincial/Territorial Ministries of Health	Responsible for the administration and delivery of healthcare services to Canadians.[30]	Creating a sustainable public health care system;[31] achieving a healthy physical and social environment;[32] protecting the health system for future generations.[33]
Health Research Centres *Canadian Institutes of Health Research, International Development Research Centre, the Global Health Research Initiative*	Conduct research on global health; foster the development of stronger health care systems and new health products and services;[34] and provide focused programming to assist Canada in its foreign affairs goals.[35]	Developing a health research capacity; undertaking research initiatives aimed at increasing global health;[36] strengthening the ability of low and middle-income countries to utilize research.[37]
The WHO and Members of the UN System *World Bank, International Labour Organization, UN Development Programme[38]*	Responsible for providing global leadership in public health.[39]	Promoting health as a human right; attaining the highest possible level of health for all peoples; monitoring health situations for trends;[40] providing assistance on prevention, treatment, and care.[41]
Independent, Non-profit and/or Non-governmental Organizations *Canadian Red Cross, Canadian Society for International Health, Doctors Without Borders*	Actors who provide emergency healthcare assistance and/or medical relief to low and middle-income countries; build healthcare capacity; and fund health initiatives.	Improving quality of life standards; ensuring access to essential healthcare services by reducing global inequalities; identifying health issues and developing responses.
Detractors		
Private Industry *Pharmaceutical Companies, Canadian Extraction Companies Abroad*	Actors who produce goods that impact global health (medicines, vaccines) or who detrimentally modify the environment, creating a lower standard of health.	Generating profit; promoting a positive image to governments and citizens through the use of corporate social responsibility.

* Uncoordinated policies between stakeholders can turn allies into detractors

Programmatic Needs

Program	Existing Mandate	Gap
HC's International Affairs Directorate	The Directorate represents the primary contact for the WHO in Canada. The Directorate is responsible for providing representation and coordination for the Canadian Health Sector (federal and provincial stakeholders; the private sector; and NGOs).[42]	Lacking overall strategy to coordinate Canada's global health stakeholders with international bodies.
MNCH (see figure 3 on page 46)	MNCH, a Canadian initiative seeking to lead a global effort to improve maternal, newborn, and child health through: the strengthening of health systems to improve service delivery, reducing the burden of disease, and improving nutrition.[43]	Neglects reproductive health services (family planning, contraception and abortion).[44] Wide criticism because of this.
SDGs Target date: 2030	Released in September 2015, the SDGs include 17 goals and 169 targets which seek to build upon the MDGs and complete what they did not achieve.[45] Goal 3 targets health: "ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for *all* at all *ages*."[46]	Canada lacks a coherent strategy to achieve Goal 3. Canada's current MNCH programming targets children and mothers, not "all at all ages."
Health Research Centers and Initiatives	Identify pertinent global health issues and research solutions. This includes international and domestic collaboration.	Hundreds of domestic research institutions currently lack coordination.
Access to Pharmaceuticals under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)/ Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)/ TPP[47]	Considerations: 1. NAFTA/TRIPS - Article 1709(5) on Pharmaceuticals: The term of protection of a patent is to be at least 20 years from the date a patent application is filed or 17 years from the date a patent is granted.[48] 2. Because of the public health problems afflicting developing countries, namely HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, in 2003, the World Trade Organization General Council waived the provisions of the TRIPS which could have prevented developing countries from importing less-expensive versions (generics) of patented pharmaceutical products produced under compulsory license. 3. Given its novelty, the effect of the TPP on pharmaceutical patents and public health concerns remains unclear.[49]	Currently unclear how the TPP will affect Canada's access to affordable pharmaceuticals. Growth in domestic healthcare costs is related to increases in costs of patented pharmaceuticals.[50] Canada is ranks 8th in the OECD in terms of health spending (see figure 4 below). Therefore, the TPP must allow for access to generics (especially for poorer countries), as well as support patents enough to encourage strong research and development practices within the pharmaceutical industry.
EDC Social and Environmental Standards	EDC's Environmental Review Directive is a social and environmental review process of Canadian companies before loans/grants are approved for business abroad.	The Review Directive's standards and surveillance mechanisms are lacking. Corporate social responsibility initiatives are weak and patchwork. The Directive does not explicitly address the impacts of industry activity on *population health*.[51]

Figure 4: Canada Ranks High on Healthcare Spending[52]

Healthcare Spending as % GDP

Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. OECD Health Data, 2008 (Paris: OECD, 2008).
Note: For countries not reporting 2006 data, data from previous years is substituted.

Section 3: Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Develop an Overhead Interdepartmental Global Health Taskforce

The overhead interdepartmental Global Health Taskforce would be responsible for coordinating Canadian global health policies internally and externally. This office would hold three key mandates, including:

1) The governance of high priority globally-relevant health issues (e.g., Influenza, HIV).
2) The coordination of global partners, Canadian federal departments, and provincial/territorial health partners in the event of health emergencies and health development aid.
3) The development of a global health agenda that utilizes a 'social determinants of health' lens and harmonizes Canada's research efforts.

Ultimately, the Minister of Health, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of International Development would have control over the Taskforce. This taskforce would attempt to give Canadian global health policy structured coherence across departments. It would be modelled after American and British strategies recently put in place.[53] Please see figures 5 and 6 on the following page for further details.

The Taskforce will be an institutionalized mechanism that promotes and facilitates coordination and collaboration between HC's International Affairs Directorate, GAC's international development section, and PHAC. Key members from each department will meet monthly (or as needed to address pressing global health issues). Coordination and collaboration will focus on aligning development objectives with preventative and reactive capacity to global health threats and creating a yearly strategy on global health matters.

**Figure 5: The Current Coordination Strategy for Federal Stakeholders on Global Health**

Figure 6: The Proposed Coordination Strategy for Federal Stakeholders on Global Health

1) Develop an Overhead Interdepartmental Global Health Taskforce

Costed Options:
Minimal changes to budgetary performance of involved departments.

Implementation strategy:
The Minister of Health and the Minister of International Development will implement the construction of the Taskforce. Departments of Health, GAC, and PHAC will be approached to determine the relevant focal points for the Taskforce. Tasks will be re-assigned to department employees as is necessary.

Expected Impacts:
The Taskforce will provide a renewed and effective strategic vision for Canada's global health involvement.

Timeline of Programmatic Intervention:
Implementation of the Taskforce will begin with the 2016 fiscal year. The Taskforce is expected to be operational within six weeks of implementation. The Taskforce will have a clear global health mandate established for the upcoming G8 meeting in Tokyo, which takes place on July 7-9, 2016.

Communication Strategy:
The offices of the Minister of Health and the Minister of International Development will distribute a memorandum to the focal point departments to signify the creation of the Global Health Taskforce. The Prime Minister is encouraged to issue a press release highlighting the implementation of the innovative and progressive Taskforce designed to enhance Canada's impact on health both domestically and internationally. A permanent digital media platform will be created for interface with the public.

Recommendation 2: MNCH Update with Focus on SDGs

This strategy aims to realign the focus of Canada's global health agenda with the UN's new agenda to tackle global health development: the SDGs. The Muskoka Initiative's maternal and child health focus was based upon two of the MDGs (numbers 4 and 5), but failed to provide aid for reproductive health services. Therefore, an increase in the MNCH project scope is recommended to include funding for reproductive health, including the provision of: 1) safe abortion services; 2) access to contraceptives; and 3) family planning services. Moreover, with the expiration of the MDGs and the collaboration of the international community around the SDGs, Canada should update its overall

global health priorities to align with the SDGs. Goal 3 targets of the SDGs explicitly targets health: "ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for *all* at all *ages*."[54] It is important to note that even with a realignment of focus; a significant amount of Canada's health aid budget can still be directed towards successful MNCH programming

In order to align with the SDGs, Canada should aim to incrementally increase its development assistance

Prime Minister Harper promotes "Canada's flagship development priority" at the 2014 Maternal, Newborn and Child Health Summit in Toronto. *Courtesy of Nathan Denette / Canadian Press*

budget to 0.35% of GNI, which represents a halfway point-value of the GNI target encouraged by the UN (0.7% of GNI).[55] 0.7% of GNI is unrealistic for Canada to achieve in a timely manner; therefore 0.35% is recommended. Canada should seek to attain the 0.35% target by 2020.

Costed Options:

For 2013-2014 Canadian development aid spending totaled US $4,396,802,515. Of this amount, $1,086,000,000 went specifically to health development aid programming, representing approximately one-quarter of Canada's official development spending.

With the new 0.35% official development assistance target, Canada would have to allocate by 2020, US $6,155,523,520 of its GNI per year to development aid, keeping 2014 GNI constant.[56] Given the present projections, by 2020 health spending would equal $1,538,880,800 as a result of the incremental increases to the budget. A percentage of this health spending will go towards updating the MNCH to offer the reproductive health services for women.

With the additional health budget, the MNCH could be expanded past the initial 10 countries[57] to include additional countries where women and children are most vulnerable. As the aid budget increases from 0.25% to 0.35% between 2015 and 2020, additional health aid funding will be allocated to MNCH (40% of new funds) and SDG programming (60% of new funds).

The additional funds required to attain the 0.35% target will be reallocated from the Trudeau government's planned Canada Child Benefit to Canada's international development budget. This budget reallocation will reduce the size of the Child Benefit, but it will not eliminate the benefit or the Middle Class Tax cut.[58]

Year	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Total Aid Budget Allocated (as % of GNI)	0.27%	0.29%	0.31%	0.33%	0.35%

Expected Impacts:

By striving towards the 0.35% of GNI, and by working towards the SDGs, Canada's relationship to the UN and multilateral partnerships will be strengthened.

Canada's contribution to women and children's health in disadvantaged countries, as well as to the SDGs, will increase and thus should have a positive impact on these populations' health.

Although the direct monetary benefit to Canadians will be lessened (funds reallocation from Child Benefit), the global public good provision of the increased international aid will have a significant long-term benefit for all Canadians.

The SDGs utilize a 'social determinants of health' perspective; therefore, a shift in perspective in Canada's international development programs will be in order.

Timeline of Programmatic Intervention:

The reallocation of funding will begin at the start of the new fiscal year (April 2016), as indicated in the Liberal Party Fiscal Plan and Costing.[59] Programmatic alteration to the MNCH and the renewed focus on the SDGs can begin immediately within the GAC.

Communication Strategy:

The Minister of International Development will notify the employees of GAC of the budgetary and programmatic alterations to the MNCH, as well as the addition of further SDGs projects to GAC programming. A press release must be issued detailing the change to the proposed budget, specifically noting the reallocation of a portion of the Canada Child Benefit to international development projects. Digital public interfaces must be re-branded to reflect the changes in health aid programming. The Prime Minister is encouraged to declare Canada's renewed commitments to global health and development at the next meeting of the UN General Assembly in 2016.

*Coordinate recommendations 1 & 2 – Global Health Task Force will be the coordinating focal point to enact the proposed changes (MNCH Updates and SDGs' Adoption) amongst stakeholders in Canadian government.

Secondary Recommendations:

These are premised on supporting the objectives of the primary recommendations:

1) Coordinate Canadian's global effect on health and the social determinants of health. Work through EDC to control the actions of Canadian corporations active abroad. Invoke stricter enforceable standards on health impacts.

2) Encourage and facilitate further private sector coordination on health development aid and global health research.

3) Re-examine Canada's position in the TPP on intellectual property rights and the pharmaceutical industry to ensure access to affordable medicine for Canadians as well as for populations around the world. The Patented Medicine Prices Review Board may be involved.

Conclusions:

Investments in global health today will advance Canada's standing and influence in the international community for years to come. By implementing the aforementioned primary and secondary recommendations, Canada will make a considerable impact on the health, well-being, security, and economic stability of populations around the world. Canadians will benefit from greater health security, increased access to affordable healthcare goods, and the positive externalities of international development that make a more vibrant, secure, and stable world.

Canada's Climate Change Policy

Executive Summary

Introduction

On November 30th 2015, a Canadian coalition of federal and provincial representatives will join over 190 other nations in Paris, France to review the implementation of the UN Framework on Climate Change at the 21st Conference of Parties (COP21). In anticipation of this event, the following policy analysis has been prepared for the Minister of Environment and Climate Change. This review identifies deficiencies in current climate change policy and provides recommendations to address these gaps.

Policy Problem

Canada continues to seek better means of addressing the negative impacts of climate change. An analysis of national climate change policy reveals a significant gap in Canada's current approach. Namely, Canada has failed to meet its stated climate change reduction goals, and will need to implement new climate change initiatives in order to address this policy gap.

Analysis of the current policy gap has identified the following key drivers:

Meeting International Obligations	• Canada actively participates in global efforts to address climate change • Commitment targets continue to surpass actual reduction levels
The Accountabilty Gap	• There is a complex responsibility matrix for climate change issues • Federal and Provincial governments share legislative power in this area
Balancing National Interests	• Climate Change intiatives will inevitably impact key economic sectors • Measures must balance economic growth with enviromental protection

Recommendation Overview

The following approach and recommendations are offered to address the identified policy gap:

Framework: A Hybrid Carbon Pricing Collaborative Approach

- Create a federally-led, provincial-administered, hybrid carbon pricing approach to reduce emissions and meet international targets.

Specific Recommendations

- Hold a Council of the Federation (COF) meeting to establish tax rate and national carbon emissions cap.

- The federal government will distribute a national quota through auction and lottery while the provinces will administer compliance, testing outputs, and the coordination tax fines and credits.

- The program will be implemented in 6 months with COF Climate Change meetings taking place at least once a year to ensure program effectiveness.

Section 1: Problems Facing the Nation

**Canada and the global climate change challenge:**
Climate change continues to pose a significant challenge to Canada through its negative impacts on the Canadian environment. Between 1950 and 2010, the annual average surface air temperature across Canada has warmed by over 1.5°C, resulting in decreases in permafrost cover, increasing sea levels, and changes to Canada's biodiversity makeup.[1] While the effect of these changes can be a mixed blessing for Canada, as arctic trade routes open and general food production windows increase, they also intensify human health risks, reduce biodiversity levels, and decrease the availability of certain natural resources, all while taking a negative toll on Canadian infrastructure.[2] As such, Canada is committed to mitigating the negative effects of climate change through various means including: scientific engagement, mitigation and adaptation measures, and participation in international climate change reduction efforts. Canada engages in scientific research by participating in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, a transnational body of scientists and climate experts that conduct comprehensive assessments of climate change and its consequences.[3]

Canada also promotes global mitigation and adaptation initiatives designed to help developing countries adapt to climate change by investing $1.2 billion dollars in fast-start financing programs over the last three fiscal years.[4] Finally, Canada is a signatory to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), to which it contributes annual statistics on greenhouse gas emission levels, financial and technical resources to developing countries, and scientific research on climate change and its impacts.[5]

Figure 1 - *This graph provides a visual comparison between the actual Canadian emission trendline over the last three decades compared to the 2020 indicator representing Canada's most recent emissions target.*
(Source: Environment Canada, National Inventory Report 1990-2013)

Canada's participation in international climate change efforts:
As a signatory to the UNFCCC, a near universal international agreement with over 190 parties recognizing climate change as a critical issue, Canada participates in the annual Conference of Parties (COP) sessions.[6] These discussions focus on global action on climate change and provide a forum in which to gather and share information on greenhouse gas emissions, discuss national policies and best practices, and take stock of national and international progress to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In addition to these information gathering exercises, the COPs are also an opportunity for Canada to participate in the international negotiation of global emissions reduction targets.

Canada's initial significant contribution to such target setting initiatives occurred in 1997 at COP3 in Kyoto, Japan, where the first internationally binding targets were agreed upon. Canada agreed to a 6% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions compared to 1990 levels by 2012.[7] However, in the absence of any concrete national climate change policy, Canadian greenhouse gas emissions rose by over 24% in the decade following the commitment.[8] This accountability gap eventually led to Canada's withdrawal from the Kyoto protocol in 2012 in order to avoid impending penalties estimated at nearly $14 Billion.[9]

The year before this withdrawal, however, Canada participated in COP15 in Copenhagen and pledged a new target of 17% below 2005 emission levels by 2020.[10] This contribution to the Copenhagen accord remained Canada's reduction target for the last decade despite its non-binding nature and now limited chance of success. Environment Canada announced in 2012 that Canada was halfway towards achieving this goal, yet current estimates indicate a stagnation of any further reductions.[11]

The most recent instance of international target pledging is Canada's most ambitious yet. In May 2015, Canada submitted its *Intended Nationally Determined Contribution* report (INDC) to the UNFCCC. This document outlines Canada's new climate change commitment and pledges a 30% reduction in emissions below 2005 levels by 2030.[12] An aspiring goal which would bring Canadian emission levels to an output equivalent to a 2% reduction below pre-1990 industrial emission levels.[13] This commitment has likely been made in response to a number of reports suggesting Canada's stance on addressing climate challenge has fallen so below expectations it is now considered by many in the international forum to be a part of growing problem of climate change, rather than its solution.[14] Furthermore, in comparison with other industrialized countries, a 2014 report by sustainable development advocacy group Germanwatch and Climate Action Network Europe ranked Canada as the worst nation in climate change performance. Rankings are based off of a variety of factors such as, emission indicators, levels of efficiency, efficiency use, renewable energy, total energy supply, and assessments from climate change experts.[15]

Figure 2 - *This chart depicts the Climate Action Network Europe rankings of the G8 countries relative to 58 industrialized nations. (Source: Climate Change Performance Index 2014, Germanwatch/Climate Action Network Europe)*

Climate Change Performance Index for G8 Countries

Rank	Country	Score	Rank	Country	Score	Rank	Country	Score
5	United Kingdom	69.66	19	Germany	61.90	56	Russian Fed.	43.64
10	France	65.90	43	United States	52.93	58	Canada	40.39
18	Italy	62.90	50	Japan	47.21			© Germanwatch 2013

Performance: Very good | Good | Moderate | Poor | Very poor

The relative success of current climate change measures:

Despite the uncertainty surrounding Canada's ability to meet its most recent target, it is crucial to acknowledge the relative successes of its current climate change measures. These measures include a series of federal and provincial initiatives (outlined below; see section 2.2 - Past Policy Trends) designed to limit greenhouse gas production. As mentioned above, Canada has managed to reduce its carbon footprint by half its Copenhagen target, a net savings of over 130MT of emission gasses. While more recent data suggest that this trend appears to leveling out, it is important to note that Canada has still managed to achieve a 5.1% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from 2005 to 2012, a period in which Canada's national economy has grown by 10.6%. [16]


Figure 2 - *This graph provides a visual comparison between the actual Canadian emission trend line over the last three decades compared to the 2020 indicator representing Canada's most recent emissions target. (Source: Canada's INDC Submission to the UNFCCC)*

Strategic woes and the commitment gap:

The driving factor behind this commitment gap lies in Canada's strategic approach to climate change. Canada's current strategic policy can be described as an International/Federalist approach, which emphasizes the federal government's role as sovereign state actor and lead coordinator of climate change policy. This agenda setting framework is driven first by engagement at the international level, through multilateral and bilateral initiatives, and then imposed on the provinces through various compliance mechanisms designed to hold Canada accountable to these targets.

As demonstrated above, however, this strategy continues to fail repeatedly. The key driver of this breakdown can be attributed to the accountability gap created by the divisions of power and dominion over climate change and energy policy between the federal and provincial governments. As such, any future policy considerations must be designed to compliment Canada's federalist governing structure, rather than conflict with it. A federal-provincial collaborative approach will need to leverage the unique position of the provinces as policy brokers between international action and economic interests.

Figure 3 - (Left)
This graph traces the trend line of anticipated Canadian carbon emissions both with and without current reduction measures. It provides a clear representation of how current measures are helping but still insufficient to meet targets.
(Source: Environment Canada, Canada's Emission Trends)

Figure 4 – (Right)
This chart highlights Canadian carbon emissions by industrial sector in 2005, 2012 and 2020 (projected), alongside the number of provincial and federal climate measures already in place across Canada. Mitigation effects shown by 2020 projection outlines. (Source: 2014 Fall Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development)

Past Policy Trends

National Strategic Climate Policy

Because the Canadian constitution does not specifically address the environment, climate change strategy is an "an area of shared jurisdiction as governments have taken action according to their respective authorities" and as such "constitutional jurisprudence continues to evolve in this area".[17] From a political standpoint, action can be organized at the provincial, federal, and International Level. Internationally, Canada is involved and a party to a multitude of regimes that include, but are not limited to:

- The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

- The Kyoto Protocol Partnership in the Global Methane Initiative (GMI)

- The Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate

- The Copenhagen Accord

- The Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF)

- Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC)

- Canada-U.S. Clean Energy Dialogue

- Aligned Vehicle Regulations

- The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

- The Arctic Council

Generally, these regimes drive a global dialogue on climate change and help create frameworks from which international agreements, commitments, and treaties are produced.

However, few are binding under international law and it is difficult for states to agree to binding obligations that opens up the possibility of fines or legal action against them in the fu-ture. This, when combined with potential future economic uncertainty and the lengthy timelines given for agreement, ratification, and commitment, often contributes to the inability for these regimes to achieve truly global climate change action. [18]

UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen. *Courtesy of CIAT on Flickr*

Federal Level Initiatives

The Federal Government has developed a series of short-reaching regulations to combat climate change including the targeting emission levels from coal-fired electricity and transportation sources. However, short of Federal Environmental Protection legislation, Canada has no specific legislation designed to combat climate change at the Federal level. [19]

Provincial Level Initiatives

Some, but not all, provinces have developed and implemented their own climate change initiatives some of which specifically designed to combat climate change. For example:

- Ontario has adopted the 2009 Green Energy Act and has been part of the Western Climate Initiative since its inception in 2007.

- Alberta has the 2003 Climate Change and Emissions Act but was recently cited by the Auditor General of Alberta for failing to properly manage emission levels.

- British Columbia has the 2008 Carbon Tax Act and the 2010 Clean Energy Act in addition to being part of the Western Climate Initiative.

- Quebec has a 2013 Climate Change Action Plan in addition to a cap and trade system in place for Quebec companies.

Municipal Level Initiatives

In addition to the provinces and the federal government, cities play a large role in the effort to combat climate change as they are responsible for a large portion of emissions but have the ability to create and lead initiatives at the grassroots level. As the C40 maintains:

"Cities consume over two-thirds of the world's energy and account for more than 70% of global CO2 emissions. And with 90 percent of the world's urban areas situated on coastlines, cities are at high risk from some of the devastating impacts of climate change, such as rising sea levels and powerful coastal storms."[20]

As such, cities are positioned well, under provinces, to take strategies for climate change reduction seriously and to implement change that has the ability to hinder and eliminate sources of emissions.

The C40 Initiative — How it works

Policy Timeline

1992	• Canada signs on to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
1998	• Canada signs on to the Kyoto Protocol
2005	• Canada becomes a partner in the Global Methane Initiative (GMI)
2007	• Canada joins the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (2007-2011)
2008	• Canada enters a recession period that stagnates economic growth and shifts the national focus from climate protection to economic protection
2009	• Canada signs the Copenhagen Accord, participates in the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate and establishes the bilateral Clean Energy Dialogue with the United States
2011	• Canada announces its withdrawl from the Kyoto Accord to avoid penalities with the acknowledgement that it unable to meet its reduction targets
2012	• Canada becomes a founding member of the Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC)
2014	• Bilateral Aligned Vehicle Regulations enacted with the United States
2015	• COP21 international conference to be held in Paris, France

Section 3: Policy Analysis

Policy Objectives:

Given Canada's interest in addressing and mitigating the negative effects of climate change, and the past policy trends that have failed to realize this objective, the following strategic objectives have been identified:

- Address the accountability and commitment gaps in current Canadian climate change policy;

- Design a national climate change strategy to prepare for anticipated COP 21 obligations;

- Balance economic growth and sustainability with a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions;

- Reduce conflict between stakeholders and promote shared responsibility for climate change.

Stakeholders

Stakeholder	Role and Responsibility	Interests/Considerations
International Partners	To hold Canada accountable and provide obligation oversight for all climate change commitments and agreements	Establishing a global governance framework for addressing climate change.
Federal Government	Creates national legislation on climate change National climate policy lead, organizes and coordinates a strategic approach to climate control in Canada Accountable to international commitments	Represents, and is accountable to, the interests of Canadian citizens Coordination lead for any national climate change strategy Must manage and balance the interests of a variety of departments
Provincial Governments	Must apply national policy objectives to unique regional and economic contexts Responsible for implementing respective climate change policies	Represents, and is accountable to, the interests of their constituents Promotes provincial economic growth over
Industry	Group of the largest pollutants (Oil and Gas 25%, Electricity 12%, Emissions intensive and trade exposed 11%, agriculture 10%, Buildings 12%)	Profit driven sector The economic sector most impacted by climate control regulations
Canadian Citizens	Represents the collective public interest Tax base	Maintain a high quality of life through the economic growth and environmental sustainability
Private Business	A cornerstone of the Canadian economy, private business are a tax base that is subject to climate control legislation and regulation	Profit driven enterprises that are traditionally averse to regulation controls that impede profit margins

Allies and Detractors

Allies

ENVIRONMENT GROUPS	MUNICIPALITIES	INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS
- Will support climate change initiatives as they want better regulation	- Promotes grassroots level climate initiatives, but must consider the economic costs of new legislation	- Generally support global climate initiatives and commitments, but can be hesitant about trade impacts
CANADIAN CITIZENS	**CABINET**	**INDUSTRY**
- Want clean energy solutions and climate change protections, yet wary of individual economic costs	- Represents all government interests, must balance economic growth with climate protections	- Supports climate initiatives that reinvest in their economic sector, but generally anti-regulation
PARLIAMENT	**UNIONS**	**LOBBY EFFORTS**
- Agrees on the need, but not the means, to address climate change. Equally conscious of economic costs	- Recognizes climate change issue, likely to resist initiatives that negatively impact worker livelihood	- Often refutes climate change as a problem, interests are exclusive to the promotion of economic growth

Detractors

The aforementioned groups in the Allies and Detractors Chart represent specific examples of stakeholders whose interests in further climate change initiatives will vary. From top left (allies) to bottom right (detractors) in the table on page 61, the five layers of striation provide a matrix outlining the stakeholder's level of support for such efforts.

Programmatic Needs

Canada is an active participant in the global effort to address the challenges posed by climate change. It continues to make international commitments that support a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, yet has consistently failed to meet these targets. This commitment gap highlights an obvious deficiency in the current national climate change strategy, and a pressing need to review and refine Canada's climate change reduction and mitigation policies.

The following programmatic needs have been identified as key drivers for developing new climate initiatives. They represent guiding principles that should underpin strategic planning efforts made to address gaps in Canadian climate change policy.

1. Adopt a standardized national carbon pricing mechanism to economically motivate emission producers into the reduce their carbon footprint;
2. Balance the national interests of reducing the national carbon footprint while maintaining economic growth and upholding international commitments;
3. Require a coordinated and consistent national approach that remains flexible enough to accommodate the unique circumstances of each province; and
4. Safeguard public-private partnerships in order to foster sentiments of shared responsibility and equal participation to reduce accountability conflicts and resistance.

Section 4: Policy Recommendations

Policy Options Analysis

The following three policy options are proposed to fulfill the programmatic needs highlighted above:

Option 1: The Carbon Tax Regime

- Carbon tax is a federally mandated fee imposed on Canadian businesses and industries for each tonne of carbon emissions produced.
- The federal government establishes a tax rate per tonne and then collects this amount annually from companies and industry while enforcing non-compliance with legal and financial penalties.
- The tax rate is set annually, and is designed to set the price of producing carbon emissions at market equilibrium, thereby incentivizing a reduction in emissions without comprising economic growth.
- The benefits of a carbon tax are that it increases the price to emit carbon thereby increasing the demand for more efficient uses of carbon and the demand by the consumer for greener technologies.

Anticipated Benefits	Possible Consequences	Key Considerations
The market price of carbon is kept stable, thereby reducing economic uncertainty for industry.	Introduction of additional manufacturing costs through taxes may cause corporations to relocate outside of Canada.	Carbon tax is politically charged, as carbon tax costs will be passed on to the consumers, who dislike new taxes.
Has the ability to generate revenue for federal government for re-investment in green technologies.	Tax initiatives are expensive; promoting, implementing, and enforcing compliance each carry their own additional costs.	Smaller and mid-sized corporations and industries are more likely to be impacted and face significantly more risks due to carbon taxes than larger, more wealthy, companies.
Incentivizes the use and development of traditionally more expensive green technologies by artificially raising the price of more emissions heavy processes.	Difficult determine the most optimal tax rate, in order to incentivise industry without stifling growth.	Companies may try and circumvent federally imposed taxes by misrepresenting their annual outputs, thereby skewing critical scientific research in this area in addition to shirking their tax responsibilities.

Option 2: The Cap-and-Trade System

- The cap-and-trade system uses an allowance mechanism for carbon pricing. Under this framework, the federal government sets a limit on the total amount of carbon emissions Canadian industries are allowed to produce every year, and then lowers that amount annually to reach its intended target.
- The credits available under this carbon cap are then distributed amongst industries and businesses through an auction and lottery process to ensure fair distribution.
- As the carbon cap lowers each year, companies are incentivized to either take action to reduce emissions or are forced to purchase quota credits from other companies on the emissions trading market.
- As more companies seek to purchase quota credits, the price of carbon emissions rise and further incentivizes companies to seek out greener energy and manufacturing solutions or risk being forced to pay extremely high premiums for additions quotas.

Anticipated Benefits	Possible Consequences	Key Considerations
The primary benefit of the cap-and-trade system is that, in theory, it should ensure an annual reduction in carbon emissions through the constant reduction of the overall national emissions cap. Source of government revenue through the initial auction, that can be reinvested in green technologies. Promotes efficient and early investment in alternative carbon neutral technology to save costs in the long term.	Risks letting the market price of quota credits spiral out of control, thereby halting or seriously impacting the growth and viability of smaller companies. Introduces the possibility of coercive market actions, lobbying, and alliances to artificially control and influence the emissions market. Significant administrative costs for establishing amount of credits, overseeing their distribution and creating the emissions market.	As the number of credit quotas is determined arbitrarily, there is a risk that too many or too few credits will prevent the market from functioning as intended. Can be difficult to enforce when industry is in charge of overseeing and managing their own credits allowances and carbon outputs. Carbon pricing mechanisms such as the cap-and-trade system may push industries and manufacturers to relocate if they believe they are not strong enough to compete in the emissions trading market.

Option 3: The Hybrid Carbon Pricing Approach

- The hybrid carbon pricing system is an approach that combines both the flexibility of the cap-and-trade system with the stability of the carbon tax regime.
- A gradually reducing cap of carbon credits is determined annually by the federal government and then distributed to the industries and business through the auction and lottery system.
- Following that, and rather than creating an open market to exchange credits as per the cap-trade-system, the government imposes a tax mechanism to ensure compliance with the established quotas.
- Penalizing non-compliance with additional taxes, and rewarding those who conserve their outputs below their quotas with federal tax-credits at the same rate.
- This system incentivizes carbon reduction while causing the least impact on the economy.

Anticipated Benefits	Possible Consequences	Key Considerations
Reduces volatility in the emissions market by having the government set the market price.	Introduces the possibility of coercive market actions, lobbying, and alliances to artificially control and influence the emissions market.	Increases the government's role and places a significant amount of responsibility on the government for coordinating and implementing such an approach.
Capped reductions that diminish annually allows for clear goal setting and strategic reduction planning.	Significant administrative costs for establishing amount of credits, overseeing their distribution	A complex system that is relatively untested that has the potential to be ineffective or easily manipulated.
Doubles the incentive to reduce emissions by imposing additional costs for high emitters and rewarding innovation and additional emission cutting through the tax credit system. As under emitting becomes so incentivized, this system creates a reduction-friendly norm.	Difficult determine the most optimal tax rate, in order to incentivise industry without stifling growth.	Requires more intervention and regulation by the federal government, through market and economic analysis, scientific and environmental testing, and compliance enforcement.

Policy Recommendation

The inter-provincial collaborative approach is the recommended policy framework in which to address the programmatic needs identified above. Given its collaborative framework designed to compliment Canada's federalist governing structure and leverage the provinces unique position as policy brokers, this approach will act as a solid foundation on which to base further policy recommendations.

This approach is recommended over the Industry-As-Principle approach as it isolates government from its mandated roles and risks creating private industry driven policies and self-regulation. It was also chosen over the international/federalist approach as that approach fails to engage with critical stakeholders and risks creating unattainable policy goals.

Given the proposed intra-provincial policy approach, the following recommendation is made:

Create a federally-led, provincial-administered, hybrid carbon pricing approach to reduce emissions and meet international targets.

DETAILED RECOMMENDATION

- Though the Federal Government and the Provinces share jurisdiction on environmental issues, the lack of engagement between the two levels leads to disjointed Federal policy creation and implementation. While the federal government can spearhead initiatives through its access to national funds and participate in international target setting, the provinces are equally important given their power over energy policy and ability to best implement climate strategies.
- A truly national strategy to combat climate change needs to fully incorporate both levels of government. The federal government, as the national exchequer, would be responsible leading the auctioning and tax rate setting of quotas with support and guidance from the provinces as policy brokers.
- A Council of the Federation (COF) meeting will be established to allow for this necessary level of coordination. The COF will be tasked with establishing the amount of emissions to be capped, the number of quotas to be auctioned, the tax rates for credits and penalties and any other administrative processes related to the hybrid carbon pricing approach.

IMPLEMENTATION	IMPACT
Have a COF meeting on Climate Change to establish tax rate and national carbon emissions cap.	Provinces introduce/continue climate change legislation/ strategy to reduce emission levels as agreed
The federal government is responsible for auctioning and distributing through lottery all national quotas. The provinces are to then carry the administrative burden of ensuring compliance, testing outputs, and coordinating tax fines and credits.	Balance struck between reducing emission levels and strong economic growth
	More investment in green technologies and renewal energy sources
The program will be implemented in 6 months with COF Climate Change meetings taking place at least once a year to ensure program effectiveness. A policy review will be conducted every 5 years to ensure Canada remains on track with its targets.	More international obligations fulfilled

TIMELINE	COMMUNICATIONS
COF meeting takes place with 6 months	The proposed courses of action is expected to generate media coverage.
Cap and Trade System implemented for the next fiscal year	It is suggested that Minister of Environment and Climate Change take action to create a series of news releases, media briefings, and parliamentary statements.
Annual reports to the premiers and PM	
Program review and evaluation every 5 years	In keeping with the spirit of the proposed recommendations, a joint press conference should be held with provincial premiers.
	Before any public announcement is made, however, these policy changes should be internally circulated amongst all levels of government and parliament.

Canada's Refugee Policy

Executive Summary

This report begins from the premise that:

1) Canada has earned the enviable reputation of being a world leader in protecting refugees; however, recent policy shifts are resulting in the destruction of its international reputation.

2) The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has identified a need to resettle refugees, largely due to the ongoing crisis in Syria. There are approximately 4,300,000 refugees from Syria alone.

3) Decisions in refugee cases affect the life, liberty and security of the claimant. These decisions also affect the integrity and reputation of Canada's immigration and refugee programs. Specialized and trained public servants who are impartial to make better decisions.

4) Immigrants and refugees have always contributed significantly to Canada's growth and development. Accepting refugees is not only part of Canadian national values, but is also obligated to as signatory to the 1951 United Nations Convention on Refugees.

The following **recommendations** are therefore proposed:

1) Accept 200,000 Syrian refugees

2) Decentralize Ministerial responsibilities

3) Change the rhetoric used in refugee matters

The purpose of reviewing Canada's refugee policies is to critically examine the proposed and established policies in order to make recommendations to ameliorate these policies. The following policy review has been prepared for the Minister of Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship Canada, the Honourable John McCallum. The review will describe some of the major policy amendments in recent years and evaluate its impacts. Next, it will consider the role that Canada is playing in the current refugee crisis, to determine whether it is out of sync with the fundamental values of Canadians and the collective experience that Canadians share as an immigrant society. Lastly, the review will compare Canada's responses to past and present refugee's crises, to the responses and policies of comparable democracies in order to make informed recommendations for Canadian policy. Canadian policy and decision makers will be faced with a number of questions. These questions have guided our policy review:

1) How can Canada improve upon its international reputation?

2) How should Canada respond to the moral and political pressure to accept higher numbers of refugees from the unfolding international refugee crisis?

3) What values and interests are at stake?

4) How will Canada balance its security interest with its values of accepting refugees?

5) To what international commitments is Canada bound?

6) How has Canada responded to international crises in the past?

Section 1: History and Policy Process

Problems Facing the Nation
(1) Burden Sharing:
The immediate problem that Canada faces is in its response to the world's refugee crisis. As of October 2015, there are over 4 million Syrian refugees registered with the UNHCR.[1] In response to this overwhelming number of refugees, at the beginning of the 2015-2016 fiscal year the Harper government committed Canada to accepting 5,800-6,500 Government Assisted Refugees (GAR) by the end of each calendar year.[2] Under the newly elected Trudeau government, Canada has committed to bring in 25,000 Syrian refugees by the end of the February 2016.[3] In comparison to other countries accepting refugees, Canada has to question whether it is pulling its own weight in responding to this crisis. For example, Germany has said it can take half a million refugees a year and Sweden this past September has already taken in 64,700 requests.[4, 5]

(2) Canada's reputation:
In the past, providing asylum to refugees enabled Canada to be a global leader in responding to world refugee crises, in fact in 1986 the UNHCR awarded Canada with the Nansen Refugee Award for its "major and sustained contribution to the cause of refugees".[6] Today concerns are growing that recent policy shifts are resulting in the destruction of its international reputation.[7] In past refugee crises, Canada quickly responded by allowing a large number of refugees to seek asylum in Canada. Following the aftermath of World War Two, Canada accepted 40,000 refugees and displaced persons.[8] Canada also responded to resettling refugees after the Czech conflict in 1968 by accepting 12,000 refugees.[9] Only a couple of years later in 1979, Canada took on a leading role in responding to a refugee crisis that had resulted from the Vietnam war. The Canadian government, with help from citizens and private organizations who were given the opportunity to privately sponsor refugees,

Refugees who became Canadian Permanent Residents by Category
1980 to 2014

resettled 70,000 refugees by the end of 1981.[10] Also, in response to the bombings in Yugoslavia in 1999, the Canadian government accepted 20,000 refugees from Kosovo within a four-month period.[11] Canada has recently attracted a great deal of negative attention due to the recent and unprecedented changes to the refugee system that has influenced Canada's meager response to the current Syrian refugee crises.

3) Independence of the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB):
As an administrative tribunal responsible for hearing and making decisions on a wide range of immigration-related issues and cases, the IRB reports to Parliament through the Minister of Immigration but is considered an independent decision making body.[12] Recent policies changes have increased Ministerial power in refugee matters affecting the independence of the IRB.[13]

Immigration Policy between 2009 and 2012 showed a marked protectionist turn

Critical Policy Moments

Policy Before 2008:
In 1976, Canada established the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*, which declared that refugees were going to be a classification of immigrants that would be eligible to come to Canada.[14] Almost three decades later, the Canadian government made changes to the 1976 Act and implemented the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2002*. Changes were made with the purpose of implementing stricter immigration policies.[15]

Policy 2009 to Present:: The trend of implementing stricter refugee policies continued again between 2008-2012 with the *Omnibus Bill C-31*, *Balanced Refugee Reform Act (BRRA)*, and *Protecting Canada's Immigration System Act (PCISA)*. The drivers behind the changes were to prevent immigration fraud, to limit people from abusing the immigration and refugee system, and to deal with the large number of backlogged claims.[16] In the *Omnibus Bill C-31*, the government adopted a new refugee classification, "irregular migrants", which includes refugee claimants coming from specific countries or refugees who have come in groups.[17] Clause 10 under this bill gave the Minister of Public Safety discretionary power to designate a group as an irregular arrival. These "irregular migrants" are not given appeal rights and have delayed access to permanent residency, family reunification and travel documents.[18]

Trends in Policy

On average, since 2005, approximately 10.3% of permanent residents have come to Canada through the refugee stream (see Appendix 3). Refugees are admitted to Canada through three different paths: some are selected abroad with the assistance of the UNHCR and migrate to Canada through either government sponsored or privately sponsored programs, while others claim asylum at Canada's borders. The time series line chart below demonstrates the trends over the past 35 years.[19]

After 2010, the number of GARs as well as the number of Privately Sponsored Refugees (PSR) begins to contradict historic patterns. Despite an ongoing global refugee crisis in Syria, a corresponding spike in the number of refugees resettled in Canada is not observed. On the same graph, it is possible to attribute the other notable spikes in refugees to Canada to other known world crises.

For example, the first spike in the data, around 1980, corresponds to the end of the Vietnam War. Between 1978 and 1980, more than 70, 000 Vietnamese refugees were resettled in Canada.[20] This was done through a matching formula under which the government sponsored one refugee for each PSR.[21]

Constraints

In recent years, Canada's policy towards refugees have been constrained by multiple factors, including the recent across-the-board cuts to reduce overall government spending -- introduced in 2012 under the workforce adjustment and deficit reduction action plans. This plan, which required all Federal Departments to make at minimum a 5% reduction in departmental spending, limited both the financial and human resources of CIC and the IRB.[23] Other constraints to Canada's refugee system stem from global events that have resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of refugees.

The heightened security concerns of the post 9/11 world have also posed a constraint. These security concerns, however, may be exaggerated in the case of UNHCR identified refugees. The UNHCR makes efforts to prioritize the most vulnerable for resettlement in third countries, for example children.[24] With only one- or two-per-cent of the refugee population that are even considered for resettlement, experts suggest that any refugee that could pose a security would be unlikely to make the UNHCR pool.[25] The next step in the security screening process involves a Canadian visa officer who must reach a comparable conclusion to the UNHCR, agreeing that a given individual is a good candidate for resettlement. Lastly, since 2001 Canadian legislation has mandated that all resettlement cases be carefully screened by CSIS, the RCMP and Canada Border Services to ensure that there are no issues related to security, criminality or health. Since CSIS began screening all refugee claimants, the number of claimants found to represent any kind of security concern has been negligible. For example, the Canadian Council for Refugees reports that in 2003, of the 31,837 refugee claims made in Canada, only two claims were found ineligible on the basis of security.[26]

Refugees who became Canadian Permanent Residents by Category
1980 to 2014

Legend: Government-assisted refugees; Privately sponsored refugees; Refugees landed in Canada

Source: Graph prepared by authors using data made available through the Government of Canada Open Data Portal - Facts & Figures 2014: Immigration Overview - Permanent Residents – Permanent residents by category.[20]

Section 2: Policy Analysis

Goals and Objectives

1. Canada's International Reputation - upholding commitments to the 1951 Convention on the Protection of Refugees and appropriately sharing in the burden of taking in Syrian refugees.

2. Decentralization of decision making surrounding refugees.

3. Positively change the way refugees are perceived in Canada.

Key Stakeholders

Many actors are involved in or affected by the Government of Canada's refugee policies.

The stakeholders listed below have an interest in certain aspects of Canadian refugee policies as they can either affect the policies or can be affected by the policies.

Stakeholders	Relationship to Policy and	Interests
Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC)	Develops and implements policies, programs and services on refugees. CIC programs would be affected by **Recommendation 1** requiring increased resources to accept a higher number of refugees.	Achieving and maintaining a healthy and strong Canadian society. Accepting refugee claimants who will prosper in Canada and who do not pose a threat.
Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB)	Refugee policies affect the way in which the IRB makes decisions on refugee claims. The IRB would be affected by **Recommendation 2** as it would revise the reappointment process for key members of their staff, Members to the Board.	Having the ability to make impartial, well-rounded decisions on refugee claims which is in accordance with legislation
Prospective Refugee Claimants	The ones who are directly affected by any change in refugee policy. Claimants for refugee status in Canada would be most affected by **Recommendation 1 and 3**. Accepting more refugees would increase their likelihood of resettlement in Canada and a change in government rhetoric could positively contribute to perceptions of refugees in Canada.	Being allowed to seek asylum in Canada, with limited barriers.
Canadian provinces and cities	Policies to accept more refugees affects the services and resources of Canadian communities and provinces. Canadian Cities and Provinces will be affected in different degrees by **Recommendation 1**, with major cities such as Toronto and Montreal receiving the majority of refugees.[27]	Many Canadian cities are interested in accepting more refugees although some are hesitant about their capacity to accept high numbers.

Allies and Detractors

Allies:

Allies to Canadian refugee policies are those who help support efforts in promoting and creating sound policies in order to assist refugees in seeking asylum in Canada. Some possible allies include:

- Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and lobby groups, such as the Canadian Council for Refugees and Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers, who try and advocate for policies that will help facilitate the processing of refugees seeking asylum in Canada. They lobby the government to allow for more open policies. NGOs have played a strong role in shaping Canada's refugee legislation.[28]

- Academia analyzes the status of and changes made to Canadian refugee policies and looks to see how Canada should respond to the current refugee crisis.

- The UNHCR provides a leadership role in coordinating the international community to help protect people who have been displaced from their homeland because of conflict, violence or threat of prosecution.[29]

The UNHCR encourages Canada to help host, resettle, and provide protection for refugees.[30]

- The International Organization for Migration helps to coordinate responses to the refugee crisis, helping to support Canada in the challenge of irregular migrants and assisting with the integration of refugees.

- Private Sponsors help Canada take in more refugees because they take on some of the financial and resettlement costs.

- The Media brings public awareness to Canadian citizens about the refugee crisis as well as providing an open forum for discussions on what Canada's response should be to the crisis.

- The Five Eyes alliance sharing intelligence information on the status of certain refugees and ensuring that countries involved (UK, US, CAN, AUS, NZ) are maintaining secure borders.

Detractors:

Detractors from Canadian refugee policy are people; groups or events that take away from the quality and value of refugee policies, or that undeservedly diminish Canada's reputation of promoting strong refugee policies. Some possible detractors include:

Interests groups (including private citizens and politicians) that have rigid anti-refugee ideologies.

Overblown/unfounded security fears.

Media, only if: presenting a distortion of reality, or attempting to temporarily sensationalize an issue. The Canadian election of 2015: candidates' attempts to capitalize at the expense of each other through the use of hyperbole and strategic assignment of blame.

Negative rhetoric surrounding refugees on government websites and said in Minister's speeches, For example: frequently using the term "bogus" when referring to unfounded asylum claims, diverting attention away from the fact that most asylum seekers are in dire need of protection.

Programmatic Needs

The key programs applicable to this review on refugee policy are:

Within the IRB:
The Refugee Protection Division (RPD)
- This Division is made up of Members to the Board who decide claims for refugee protection (For Budgetary information see Appendix 5)
Within CIC:
The Government-Assisted Refugees Program
- Comprised of visa officers abroad who work with the UNHCR and other referral agencies to identify and select as permanent residents refugees abroad for resettlement in Canada. This Program uses the number of GARs as its indicator and targets between 5,800–6,500 refugees per year. (For Budgetary and Human Resource Information see Appendix 6.)

The Privately Sponsored Refugee Program
- Partners with civil society to resettle refugees (more than would otherwise be admitted under the GAR Program). Canadian visa officers select Convention Refugees Abroad and refer them to private sponsors. This program uses the number of PSRs admitted as its indicator and targets between 4,500 and 6,500 per year. (For Budgetary and Human Resource Information see Appendix 7.)
- The In-Canada Asylum Program ensures that fair consideration is granted to those who come to Can-

Canadian Red Cross worker welcomes a Syrian refugee family in Montreal. *Courtesy of Canadian Red Cross on Flickr.*

ada claiming persecution. Those found by the IRB to be in need of refugee protection receive protected person status, and may apply for permanent residence. This program uses the number of admissions of protected persons in-Canada and their dependents abroad as its indicator and targets between 10,000 - 11,000 per year. (For Budgetary and Human Resource Information see Appendix 8).

Section 3: Recommendations

The recent policy changes have been beneficial in reducing the backlog of refugee cases and preventing fraudulent claims, however they also carry potentially detrimental consequences for Canada at large. It is therefore recommended that CIC, along with arm's length institutions (the IRB) consider implementation of the following option, which are specified in order of priority:

Recommendation 1:
Accept more Syrian refugees
To meet the objective of boosting Canada's international reputation of on refugee issues, the Canadian government should take on more of the burden sharing of the Syrian refugee crisis by accepting 200,000 refugees over the next four fiscal years.[31] This will require increasing support to CIC's Refugee Protection Program by an additional 1 billion dollars.

Programs in need of additional funding include the GAR Program, the PSR Program, and the In-Canada Asylum Program.

Purpose/Expected Impact: The purpose of accepting 200,000 Syrian refugees over the next four years is to help redeem Canada's humanitarian image, to rebuild Canada's international reputation, and to indicate to the world that Canada is ready to be more engaged in the Syrian refugee crises.

Costs	Implementation Requirements	Timeline	Communication Strategy
Costs to accept 200,000 refugees over the next four fiscal years (FY) will be $1,040,600,000.[32] Cost breakdown by year: (1) FY 2015-16: $130,075,000 (2) FY 2016-17: $303,511,802 (3) FY 2017-18: $303,506,599 (4) FY 2018-19: $303,506,599	CIC will lead the implementation in coordination with the IRB and the UNHCR. 1. Launch the Emergency Refugee Contingency Plan that was used in 2002 to respond to the refugee crisis in Kosovo. This plan entails opening up refugee reception centers, getting the Canadian military bases set up to host the refugees, and sending more officials overseas to process claims.[33] 2. Coordinate with the provincial and municipal governments in determining how many refugees they are willing to accept.[34] 3. Process quickly the claims from Syrian refugees who have family ties in Canada. Family ties include extended family members (grandparents, aunts, uncles, nephews, parents, etc.)[35] 4. Ask Canadians to privately sponsor refugees, with no cap on how many PSRs can be accepted per year. 5. Ask Canadians to contribute through financial donations.[36] 6. Increase the dollar amount in the contribution agreements that CIC has with Service Provider Organizations providing resettlement pro-	Effective immediately, the launch of the emergency contingency plan. (1) FY 2015-16: Accept 25,000 refugees. (2) FY 2016-17: Accept 58,334 refugees. (3) FY 2017-18: Accept 58,333 refugees. (4) FY 2018-19: Accept 58, 333 refugees.	Hold a press release to indicate how many refugees Canada is going to commit to taking over the next four years.

Recommendation 2: Decentralize Ministerial Responsibilities

Recommendation: Initiate an omnibus bill to be passed in parliament that seeks to amend/repeal recent changes to ministerial responsibilities in the *Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act* and the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*. This omnibus bill will also seek to enact new legislation, which decentralizes ministerial powers over the re-appointment of IRB Board Members.

Purpose/Expected Impact: Tying these two issues together in one omnibus renders the proposed bill more intelligible for parliamentary purposes and facilitates a more coherent parliamentary debate on limiting the responsibilities of the Minister on refugee policy. It is also a more efficient way to make all the legislative amendments needed to decentralize ministerial responsibilities related to refugee policy. The specific issues are:

(1) Reverse *Omnibus Bill C-31*, which amended the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*, giving the Minister of Public Safety discretionary power to designate a group as an irregular arrival. Instead, give the discretionary power over to trained and impartial immigration officers.[37] **(2)** Legislate the appointment and reappointment process for Members to the IRB. Currently the Minister of CIC has the power to recommend Members for reappointment.[38] This may lead to a conflict of interest in which Members may make decisions based on the Minister's expectation in exchange for reappointment. This proposed legislation would recognize that Members to the IRB are experienced non-partisan experts in deciding claimants that have a legitimate fear of persecution and those who do not. The decision requires independent and qualified decision makers in order to make the refugee claim system more reliable and effective in accepting the most vulnerable claimants.[39] By decentralizing ministerial responsibilities to public servants who are non-partisan and with exceptional expertise in the subject matter will make the refugee decision making process more transparent to the Canadian public and to the world.

Costs	Implementation	Timeline	Communication Strategy
No additional funds required. Sufficient financial and human resource capacity exists within CIC to fulfill all proposed amendments and legislative changes under the new omnibus bill.	Create a new omnibus bill to decentralize ministerial power on refugee issues.	Propose the new omnibus bill within the first 100 sitting days of parliament.	Issue press releases and backgrounders from PMO and Minister's Office (CIC) to highlight this action in the first 100 days. This signals Canada's shift in foreign relations and reclaims reputation as valuable contributor to global refugee issues as well as government's commitment to decen-

Recommended Shift in Ministry Organization

CENTRALIZED

DECENTRALIZED

Recommendation 3: Change the rhetoric used in refugee matters

Recommendation: Make changes to the rhetoric used to describe refugee policies. The recent changes in Canadian refugee policy have created a view that breed's suspicion of refugees. When the government describes refugee claimants with the word "bogus" or "potential security threats" it is using anti-refugee rhetoric that becomes entrenched in the public's consciousness. The use of this kind of rhetoric makes the assumption that refugee claimants are fraudulent, an assumption that is not in accordance with international law and which decreases Canada's responsibility in giving refugee claimants due process.[40] Instead of using words that needlessly make the public perceive refugees as threats or bogus, the government should use wording that is used by the UNHCR such as "vulnerable" and "forcibly displaced".

Purpose/Expected Impact: Changing the language used in refugee matters will help change the way refugees are perceived and will help foster among Canadians a more empathic and welcoming atmosphere.


New refugee rhetoric could have a positive effect on policy and public perception. *Courtesy of Domnic Santiago on Flickr.*

Costs	Implementation Requirements	Timeline	Communication Strategy
No additional funds required as there are no additional financial costs to the Department (only the in-kind support of the communications branch for which capacity is adequate).	Change the wording used by the Minister's office when sending out communications on refugee matters. Change wording on the Citizenship and Immigration Canada website. Will not change the words in the Acts because this cannot be done easily, but as new refugee policies are implemented make sure that the new wording does not refer to refugee claimants as "bogus" or "security threats".	Introduce immediately.	Send out a memorandum from the Minister's office notifying CIC that the rhetoric around refugees is going to be changed from "bogus" and "potential security threats" to "vulnerable" and "forcibly displaced" people.

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15. See Appendix A for a map of Canadian aid across the globe, and see Appendix B for a list of the 25 "countries of focus"

16. This spirit is the driving force behind this review's assessment of and recommendations for Canadian ODA.

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26. With 8% estimated overhead cost since 2009, a conversion of 25% of projects to joint projects would mean savings equal to a quarter of total overhead costs (8% x .25 = 2%). Estimate taken from: Bhushan, Aniket. 2012. "Fiscal Austerity and Foreign Aid." *Canadian International Development Platform.* Accessed November 25, 2015.

27. Refer to Appendix F.

Appendices

Appendix A (Canadian Aid programs as of 2014)

Source: CIDP. 2015. "Canada's Foreign Aid." Accessed November 14, 2015. http://cidpnsi.ca/canadas-foreign-aid-2012-2/

Appendix B (25 Countries of Focus)

- Americas
  - Caribbean Region
  - Colombia
  - Haiti
  - Honduras
  - Peru

- Africa
  - Burkina Faso
  - Benin
  - Democratic Republic of Congo
  - Ethiopia
  - Ghana
  - Mali
  - Mozambique
  - Senegal
  - South Sudan
  - Tanzania

Asia
- Afghanistan
- Bangladesh
- Burma
- Indonesia
- Mongolia
- Philippines
- Vietnam

Europe
- Ukraine

Middle East
- Jordan
- West Bank and Gaza

Appendix C

African Development Bank (AfDB)
Asian Development Bank (ADB)
Caribbean Development Bank (CDB)
Commonwealth
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance
Global Environment Facility (GEF)
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (RCM)
La Francophonie
UNAIDS (Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS)
UNICEF
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
World Bank Group (WBG)
World Food Programme (WFP)
World Health Organization (WHO)

Source: Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development. 2015. "Key Multilateral Partners." Accessed November 25, 2015. http://www.international.gc.ca/development-developpement/partners-partenaires/key_partners-partenaires_cles/index.aspx?lang=eng

Appendix D

Timeline of ODA Funding Increase

Appendix E

Timeline for Increase in Joint Projects

Appendix F

TABLE 1:[2] OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE DISBURSEMENTS BY DEPARTMENT – 2013–2014[3]	
DEPARTMENT	**DISBURSEMENTS** (C$ millions)
Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada	3,646.70
of which administrative costs	*202.53*
Department of Finance Canada	502.81
International Development Research Centre	204.68
Citizenship and Immigration Canada	105.54
Department of National Defence	30.10
Royal Canadian Mounted Police	27.34
Public Health Agency of Canada	13.30
Environment Canada	7.64
Natural Resources Canada	1.84
Parks Canada	1.76
Labour Canada	1.12
Industry Canada	0.87
Transport Canada	0.32
Subtotal	**4,544.00**
Services supporting DFATD activities[4]	23.47
TOTAL	**4,567.47**

Source: Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development. 2014. "Report to the Parliament on the Government of Canada's Official Development Assistance." Accessed November 25, 2015. http://www.international.gc.ca/development-developpement/assets/pdfs/2013-14oda_report.pdf

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Appendices

APPENDIX A: Impact Severity Matrix

Impact Severity Matrix						
Impact	**Info Disclosure**	**Life or Injury**	**Economic**	**Health and Safety**	**Essential Services**	**Public Confidence / Media**
Very low *negligible effect*	Publicly available info = Unclassified	Minor discomfort for some	Small impact on SME / medium effect for individual Damages < $1K	F/P/T/M and CI able to provide for Canadians' welfare	Small group = temp loss(< 24 hrs.)	Negligible effect
Low *Minor effect*	Low sensitivity info = Protected A	Moderate to serious discomfort for some	Small effect on Canada's economic sector Large impact for SME $1K < Damages < $100K	Lead response agency requires surge resources to contain a problem / Other H+S services are not significantly impacted	Small group / small city = medium (between 24 and 72 hrs.) / temp loss	Letters to the editor / Phone complaints / Local news coverage
Medium *Major effect*	Medium sensitivity info or injury to the national interest = Protected B / Confidential	Serious discomfort / injury / illness for many	Medium effect on Canada's economic sector Very large impact for SME $100K < Damages < $10M	Lead response agency requires surge resources to contain a problem / Other H+S services are adversely impacted	Small group / small city / large city = Long (>72 hrs.) / medium / temp loss	Media editorials / National media coverage / Focussed debate in Parliament
High *Significant effect*	High sensitivity info or serious injury to the national interest = Protected C or Secret	Potential loss of life / permanent disability	Canada's economy / strategic economic objectives damaged $10M < Damages < $1B	Lead response agency approaching capacity to contain a problem / Other H+S services becomes ineffective	Large group / large city / P/T = Long / medium / temp loss	Gov. policy challenged / Extensive international media coverage / Acts of civil disobedience
Very High *Catastrophic effect*	Exceptionally grave injury to the national interest = Top Secret	Potential for widespread loss of life	Extensive damage to Canada's economy / strategic economic objectives Damages > $1B	Lead response agency's capacity to contain a problem is exceeded / Other H+S services are halted	Large City / P/T = long / medium loss	Disruption of Gov. Services / Violent demonstrations / Focused international media coverage / Canadians severely impacted

Source: Public Safety Canada. (2014, March 4). Cyber incident management framework for Canada. The Government of Canada. Retrieved from http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/cbr-ncdnt-frmwrk/index-eng.aspx#_Toc360619104

APPENDIX B: Police-reported cybercrime

Chart 1
Police-reported cybercrime, by violation type, selected police services, 2012

Source: Statistics Canada. (2014, September 24). Police-reported cybercrime in Canada, 2012. The Government of Canada. Retrieved from http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2014001/article/14093-eng.pdf

APPENDIX C: Past federal policies

Year	Source	Federal government commitment
2001	OCIPEP mandate	Provide national leadership to help ensure the protection of Canada's critical infrastructure, both physical and cyber elements.
2004	National Security Policy	Government committed to building partnerships; securing government systems; developing a critical infrastructure protection strategy; and developing a national cyber security strategy.
2005	Review of the National Security Policy	The Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre (CCIRC) was announced with the mandate of serving as the focal point for cyber security readiness and response; dealing with threats and attacks to Canada's cyber critical infrastructure
2010	National strategy and action plan for critical infrastructure	The strategy's goal is to enhance the resiliency of critical infrastructure in Canada by building partnerships, and advancing information sharing and protection.
2010	Canada's Cyber Security Strategy	Canada plans to meet the cyber threat by securing government systems; partnering to secure vital cyber systems outside the federal government; and helping Canadians to be secure online.
2013	Cyber Incident Management Framework	Clarified roles, responsibilities, authorities and capabilities of stakeholders in the cyber security community;
June, 2015	Canada's Digital Privacy Act	Requires private companies to report to the Privacy Commissioner any breaches to personal information.

Source: Office of the Auditor General of Canada. (2012, October 23). 2012 Fall Report of the Auditor General of Canada: Chapter 3 - Protecting Canadian critical infrastructure against cyber threats. The Government of Canada. Retrieved from http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201210_03_e_37347.html and Public Safety Canada. (2014, March 4). Cyber incident management framework for Canada. The Government of Canada. Retrieved from http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/cbr-ncdnt-frmwrk/index-eng.aspx#_Toc360619104

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Appendix A: Problematic Articles for Canada in UNDRIP

Article 3: Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

Article 4: Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.[24]

Article 8: (1) Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture; (2) States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for:

(a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities;

(b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources;

(c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights;

(d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration;

(e) Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination directed against them.[25]

Article 43: The rights recognized herein constitute the minimum standards for the survival, dignity and well-being of the indigenous peoples of the world.

Article 44: All the rights and freedoms recognized herein are equally guaranteed to male and female indigenous individuals.

Article 45: Nothing in this Declaration may be construed as diminishing or extinguishing the rights indigenous peoples have now or may acquire in the future.[26]

Appendix B: Outdated Legislation Indicators

Canada challenged by the UNHRC: The Sandra Lovelace Case

Sandra Lovelace married a "non-Indian man" and was no longer considered to have indigenous status. When they got divorced and she wanted to return to the reserve and buy land she was not allowed as she did not have priority to land without having indigenous status. She submitted an application to the Human Rights Committee challenging the loss of her status under various articles in the Indian Act. Amendments to the act were made in order to recognize the rights to status of indigenous women, "However, the current legislation still discriminates against certain aboriginal women, as compared to aboriginal men. In addition, the Supreme Court of British Columbia, found that the 1985 amendments did not eliminate all instances of gender discrimination because the children of women born of Indian mothers and non-Indian fathers could still be denied the right to Indian status."[27]

Lovelace's case was founded in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

Article 1

All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.

The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 2

Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Where not already provided for by existing

legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.

Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:

(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;

(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial

remedy;

(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.[28]

Indigenous Rights Case Law: The Marshall Decision

Donald Marshall Jr. had his equipment taken and was charged for fishing without a license, to which he claimed he was legally entitled to do under a British Columbia treaty. The Supreme Court confirmed that Marshall had a right to fish for and sell the eel. However, afterward it was ruled that fishing activities could be regulated and are not unlimited.[29]

Land Claims: The Northern Gateway Project

A Supreme Court ruling that gives indigenous peoples the power to decide how their land is used can create problems for

business, as demonstrated with Enbridge Inc.'s Northern Gateway project. This is because their consent is necessary on land that indigenous people have ancestral claims over.[30]

Foreign Investment Challenges : Chevron

Canada needs to be aware of more than just the groups of indigenous peoples in Canada, as exemplified in the fact that indigenous communities in order countries can sue Canadian companies for human rights violations. "The lawsuit was brought by 47 indigenous villagers over harm to their lands and way of life from pollution between 1972 and 1990, allegedly caused by Texaco

The villagers have sued in Argentina, Brazil and Canada to enforce the judgment."[31]

Appendix C: Problems with INAC's Existing Metrics

Example 1:
Program 2.1, Education

Performance Measurement

Expected Results	Performance Indicators	Targets	Date to be Achieved
First Nations and Inuit students enabled through funding to achieve levels of education comparable to other Canadians	Percentage of First Nation students ordinarily resident on reserve who graduated from high school	Incremental increase year after year	N/A
	Number of First Nations and Inuit Post-Secondary Student Support Program (PSSSP) students who graduate with a post-secondary degree/diploma/certificate	Data for this indicator began to be collected in 2012–2013 and another year is required in order to set baseline and targets	Reporting against established baseline will begin in 2013–2014
	Percentage of First Nation and Inuit population with post-secondary degree/certificate	Incremental increase over five years	Reporting against established baseline will begin in 2013–2014

(Chart courtesy of: 2015-16 Report on Plans and Priorities, pg. 33)

Some of the problem associated with this metric is the lack of clear targets. While it does strive for incremental increases, a concrete target would lend itself for a more effective program design.

Example 2
Program 3.4.2: Education facilities (See opposite page, top)

Performance Measurement

(Chart courtesy of: 2015-16 Report on Plans and Priorities, pg 62)

Expected Results	Performance Indicators	Targets	Date to be Achieved
First Nation communities have a base of education facilities that meet established standards	Percentage of First Nation schools with a greater than "fair" condition rating (based on physical/structural conditions) as assessed through Asset Condition Report (ACRS) inspections	70% (2011 baseline)	by March 31, 2015

The terminology utilized in this metric is vague- what is considered "fair infrastructure?" How does this goal compare to what is allowed for education infrastructure in non-indigenous communities?

Appendix D: Further information on the proposed Aboriginal Auditor General

Auditor General Report

Existing Oversight and Reporting Mechanisms

The Office of the Auditor General (OAG) provides Parliamentarians with objective information on the spending and performance of government. The OAG is responsible for legislative auditing; more specifically, financial audits, special examinations and performance audits. Financial audits ensure that financial statements are an accurate reflection of spending practices. Special examinations refer to the auditing of Crown Corporations. Performance audits, as per the OAG website, "examine the government's management practices, controls, and reporting systems with a focus on results" (Office of the Auditor General of Canada 2011). The OAG has considerable discretion with respect to the area and scope of performance audits. The OAG reports are tabled in Parliament and then communicated to the media and the public. It is important to note that the Auditor General (AG) of Canada is not the auditor of First Nations. That said, the AG has become an important check on First Nations programs and spending in its oversight of federal programs.[32]

Authority

In the discussion of an Aboriginal Auditor General, a preliminary question might be: from what or whom does this institution draw authority?[33] Where would such an office reside and to whom would it report? An Aboriginal Auditor General could be placed under the authority of the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) of Canada, as is the case with the Commissioner on the Environment and Sustainable Development (CESD). Such an arrangement allows for a new office or agent to borrow from the capacity, reputation and infrastructure of an existing institution in order establish its legitimacy. The OAG could retain discretion over financial and performance auditing of First Nations programs, while an AAG could conduct recipient audits of First Nation communities. Alternatively, an AAG could take over all auditing practices related to First Nations. In this scenario, an AAG might table reports annually in Parliament as does the CESD. However, it must be said that having an AAG that reports from within an existing federal agency could be seen by the Aboriginal community to be a continuation of paternalistic oversight by the Crown. As an alternative, the mandate of the Auditor General of Canada might be expanded to include recipient audits of First Nations. This would hold First Nation governments more directly accountable for spending to their citizens, and would be an efficient option since it would make use of existing capacity and expertise within the federal government.

Appendix E: information on the Aboriginal Governance Index (AGI)

The AGI is a measurement of the perception of governance on First Nations by First Nations peoples on the Prairies in four broad categories of governance—services, elections, human rights and transparency. If anything, our Index clearly tells us what expectations reserve residents have of their local governments and whether and how those governments are meeting these expectations.

Each band's overall ranking is based on a weighted composite of scores that evaluate four broad areas of good governance (previously, we had five). The dimensions of good governance evaluated in this report are as follows:

• Services - How well are health, education, social and other public services delivered?

• Elections - How fair and impartial are votes for leaders?

• Human Rights - How much regard is assigned to basic rights?

• Transparency - How well-informed are citizens about their government?[34]

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Appendices

Appendix 1
Contributions to UNHCR for the budget year 2015 (as of September 18, 2015)

Source: http://www.unhcr.org/558a639f9.html

Appendix 2 - Facts and figures 2014 – Immigration overview: Permanent residents

Total by Category

Category	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Family class	63,374	70,516	66,242	65,584	65,208	60,226	56,455	65,012	81,843	66,661
Economic immigrants	156,312	138,252	131,244	149,069	153,490	186,915	156,115	160,793	148,155	165,089
Refugees	35,775	32,499	27,954	21,859	22,849	24,697	27,873	23,079	23,831	23,286
Other immigrants	6,779	10,371	11,312	10,730	10,622	8,842	8,301	9,014	5,194	5,367
Category not stated	2	2	1	2	1	7	3	5	0	1
Total by Category	262,242	251,640	236,753	247,244	252,170	280,687	248,747	257,903	259,023	260,404

Appendix 3 - Canada — Permanent residents by category (percentage distribution)

Total by Category (percentage distribution)

Category	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Family class	24.2	28.0	28.0	26.5	25.9	21.5	22.7	25.2	31.6	25.6
Economic immigrants	59.6	54.9	55.4	60.3	60.9	66.6	62.8	62.3	57.2	63.4
Refugees	13.6	12.9	11.8	8.8	9.1	8.8	11.2	8.9	9.2	8.9
Other immigrants	2.6	4.1	4.8	4.3	4.2	3.2	3.3	3.5	2.0	2.1
Category not stated	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total by Category	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Appendix 4 - Refugees by Category

Refugees

Category	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Government-assisted refugees	7,424	7,326	7,572	7,295	7,425	7,264	7,363	5,412	5,661	7,573
Privately sponsored refugees	2,976	3,337	3,588	3,512	5,036	4,833	5,584	4,225	6,269	4,560
Refugees landed in Canada	19,934	15,883	11,696	6,995	7,206	9,038	10,743	8,586	8,036	7,749
Refugee dependants	5,441	5,953	5,098	4,057	3,182	3,562	4,183	4,856	3,712	3,227
Blended Visa Office-Referred refugees									153	177
Total Refugees	35,775	32,499	27,954	21,859	22,849	24,697	27,873	23,079	23,831	23,286

Appendix 5 - Budget and planned Expenditures for the IRB Refugee Protection Division

Budgetary Financial Resources (dollars)

Refugee Protection Division Budgetary Financial Resources

2014–15 Main Estimates	2014–15 Planned Spending	2015–16 Planned Spending	2016–17 Planned Spending
53,292,210	53,292,210	50,147,257	50,147,257

Human Resources (FTEs)

Refugee Protection Division Human Resources

2014–15	2015–16	2016–17
525	505	505

Appendix 6 - Budgetary and Human Resource Information for the Government-Assisted Refugees

Budgetary Financial Resources (dollars)

2015–16 Planned Spending	2016–17 Planned Spending	2017–18 Planned Spending
5,267,340	5,777,824	5,701,440

Human Resources (FTEs)

2015–16	2016–17	2017–18
38	42	41

Appendix 7 - Budgetary and Human Resource Information for the Privately Sponsored Refugee Program

Budgetary Financial Resources (dollars)

2015–16 Planned Spending	2016–17 Planned Spending	2017–18 Planned Spending
4,010,873	4,382,234	4,337,221

Human Resources (FTEs)

2015–16	2016–17	2017–18
37	41	40

Appendix 8 -Budgetary and Human Resource Information for the In-Canada Asylum Program

Budgetary Financial Resources (dollars)

2015–16 Planned Spending	2016–17 Planned Spending	2017–18 Planned Spending
15,073,049	9,915,171	9,834,895

Reduction in planned spending for this program is mainly attributable to the sunset of funding for a Ministerial Reviews and Intervention pilot for In-Canada Asylum.

Human Resources (FTEs)

2015–16	2016–17	2017–18
173	108	106

Appendix 9: Budgetary and Human Resource Information for the Migration Control and Security Management Program

Budgetary Financial Resources (dollars)

2015–16 Main Estimates	2015–16 Planned Spending	2016–17 Planned Spending	2017–18 Planned Spending
124,537,482	124,537,482	120,437,839	118,721,869

Human Resources (FTEs)

2015–16	2016–17	2017–18
809	786	770