



## **Libya: A Conflict Diagnostic**

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## Introduction

### Executive Summary

Libya faces many of the same challenges in 2022 as it did in 2015; growing polarization between east and west fuelled by foreign states' supply of arms [1], rising disenchantment with a UN-supported political dialogue and ceasefire [2], the presence of armed militias and non-state actors, and an uncertain economic and social path ahead. If Libya manages to substantively build towards presidential and parliamentary elections, if international stakeholders support the peace-building process rather than arming militia groups, and if Libya is able to see strong economic growth in key sectors, it may be able to chart a better course. However, if polarization intensifies and foreign stakeholders back away from the peace process, Libya is likely to see a return to violence and instability. The most likely path for Libya is continued uncertainty, with paralysis at the political level, instability at the security level, and a struggle to balance the economic growth of its oil and gas industry against institutional corruption. The addition of foreign states acting as spoilers [3] in Libya's conflict resolution is also a key obstacle towards peace.

### Background

After Muammar Gaddafi's 42-year reign of power ended with the 2011 Arab Spring protest, Libyans dreamed of a self-owned democratic government. However, after ousting the former dictator, disputed Parliamentary elections in 2014 plunged Libya into a civil war between rivals of the Tripoli-based Government of Nation Accord (GNA) and the Tobruk-based Libyan National Army (LNA) and House of Representatives (HoR) that decimated key institutions and ruined Libya's internal capacity—leaving a legitimacy vacuum that has allowed foreign powers to support combatting sides in this North African proxy war [4]. After years of fighting, the two sides agreed to a ceasefire in October 2020 that paved the way for the unified, interim provisional Government of National Unity (GNU). Recently planned elections to extend the GNU's mandate and elect a new leader in December 2021 were postponed, threatening a re-emergence of the East-West conflict. In examining the conflict baseline established in 2014 with the resumption of the second Libyan Civil War, Libya faces several challenges in resolving this structural conflict, including its lack of democratic institutions to address the multiple interests at stake, heavy and unreliable dependence on its oil sector, and regional ethnic fragmentation that threatens a continued division. To make matters worse, Libya's conflict has become an internationalized civil war with spoiler states having competing interests over geopolitics, energy, migration, and terrorism, to name a few [5]. The reality of the current situation is a precarious peace that can see a re-emergence of conflict at any moment should the GNU fail to deliver on its election and stabilizing promises.

### Priority Indicators:

#### Governance and Political Instability

High Risk (Deteriorating ↑)

Stabilizing Factors	Explanation
Maintenance of Ceasefire	The October 2020 UN-backed ceasefire [6] has remained in place. Despite minor infractions of the ceasefire [7], domestic and international stakeholders have resisted a return to pre-ceasefire civil war conditions.
Unity Government	The interim Government of National Unity (GNU), formed in early 2021 [8], has remained in place. Despite the postponement of general elections [9], the GNU still has political buy-in from Libya's eastern and western political stakeholders.
Destabilizing Factors	
Postponed Elections and Political Turmoil in GNU	Despite the agreed-upon political framework for presidential elections to be held in December 2021 and January 2022 [10], elections have been postponed. Libya's parliament refuses to announce a new date for elections [11]. The Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) has pushed for the replacement of the current PM, Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, and appointment of a new cabinet [12]. Even if the HoR's efforts fail, it risks destabilizing Libya's roadmap to peace.
Lack of Constitution	Libya's constitutional process has been in stasis since 2017. Dbeibah supports establishing a constitution before elections are called, but no other domestic stakeholders support this [13].
Ineffective Government, Rule of Law & Corruption	The World Bank puts Libya's 2020 government effectiveness score in the 1.92 percentile [14]. Despite the unified government, Libya's government lacks structures enforcing rule of law [15], and much of its territory is still controlled by militia groups and other non-state actors. Corruption is endemic in Libya, with the World Bank's Worldwide Governance indicators putting its control of corruption in the 2.88 percentile [16]. A lack of enforcement at the fiscal, judicial, and political levels in Libya has led to systemic corruption by international actors, non-state militias, criminal enterprises, and its extractive industries [17].
Assessment	Elements of the 2020 ceasefire and the 2021 unity government remain in place for Libya. The benefits of these two elements for Libya's political stability cannot be understated. However, recent events have put this stability at risk. If the impeachment of PM Dbeibah goes through, the appointment of a successor could risk undoing the unity government, and retrenching the political divides between Libya's east and west [18]. Even if Dbeibah isn't replaced or if his successor is amenable to all stakeholders, the indefinite postponement of scheduled elections risks de-legitimizing the GNU in the eyes of Libya's citizenry. Moreover, Libya still lacks a constitution, effective political institutions, and rule of law [19]. While it is unclear if resolving the current political crisis would result in a period of effective institution-building for Libya, it is clear that a deepening of the political crisis risks plunging Libya back into the bloodshed of its pre-ceasefire period. The extension of the UNSMIL's mandate in Libya until the end of April 2022 [20] increases the odds that Libyan political stakeholders can be convinced to move back towards holding elections, but the short timeframe of the mandate heightens the risk of political destabilization.

#### Economic Indicators

High Risk ↓

Stabilizing Factors	Explanation
International Economic Organization Membership	Libya's membership to 18 international organizations that focus specifically on development, trade, and the economy [21] shows that it is invested in making sure its economy thrives and follows international examples [22].
Destabilizing Factors	
Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows	According to the World Bank, Libya was reported to have an FDI of 0.7% of its GDP. This is generally due to the instability within the country, which does not encourage foreign investment [23]. The US Department of State explains the many barriers to foreign investment in Libya, citing "political instability and security risks...non-state actors' seizure of key economic infrastructure...opaque bureaucracy, onerous regulations, and widespread rent-seeking activity in public administration" [24].

Economic Indicators		High Risk ↓
Official Exchange Rate	According to the Central Bank of Libya, its current exchange rate has grown worse since its stable period in 2013, now resting at 4.62 LYD per 1 USD [25]. Despite recent attempts by the government to stabilize the exchange rate, it is too early to tell whether these efforts will pay off [26].	
GDP Growth Rate and the Oil Sector	After the increased unrest in 2015, Libya's GDP Growth Rate managed to have a couple years of steady growth, moving from -8.9% in 2015 to 26.7% in 2017 [27]. However, continued instability politically and in the oil market has resulted in a steep decline in GDP growth since 2017, declining to -31.3% in 2020 [28]. However, World Bank reports that, due to changing situations in the oil industry, GDP growth rate is projected to reach 78.2% [29]. Libya's economic stability is closely tied to its standing in the oil industry [30], while it has one of the largest oil industries in the region [31] much of its economic issues stem from this sector. Libya's oil industry is growing, and is back to its 2019 levels after a dip in 2020 due to an oil blockade [32]. If this continues, Libya's GDP is expected to maintain this upward trend into 2022 [33]. However, there has been continued conflict surrounding the oil industry in recent years both politically and militarily, and this unrest has resulted in economic instability within the country [34].	
Inflation	Since 2015, Libya has been suffering from extreme fluctuations in inflation rates. Libya peaked in inflation in 2017 with 28.05% despite only being at 14.85% the year previous [35]. The country then experienced negative inflation growth in 2018 at -1.8%, and the estimated rate for 2020 was 2.82% [36]. However, in recent years, economic reporting has declined, making concrete data hard to come by. It is believed that in 2021, Libya once again suffered severe inflation, with a rate of 21.11% [37]. This constant fluctuation can have severe negative effects on purchasing power, potentially fuelling unrest in the region, and providing politicians and militants with a means of motivation. The lack of reporting is likely due to the existence of 2 finance ministries and central banks [38].	
GDP Per Capita	Libya's current GDP per capita PPP stands at just over \$10,842 [39]. The current world average using the same scale is just over \$17,082 [40]. However, \$10,842 is far less than the \$19,631 recorded in 2017 [41], showing a decrease in GDP per capita and purchasing power.	
<b>Assessment</b>	While Libya is still struggling economically, it is attempting to grow despite internal hardships. However, until concrete steps have been made, the Libyan economy must be considered deteriorating as it is still declining, and a high risk to internal stability. The control of the oil industry by the military is having a major negative impact on the Libyan economy as the country's trade and exports heavily rely on this industry. However, it must be pointed out that current statistics on Libya should be interpreted with care, because there is little incentive or resource availability for sound statistical collection within the country [42].	

International Linkages		Moderate Risk ↑
<b>Stabilizing Factors</b>	<b>Explanation</b>	
Awareness in International Organizations (IOs)	Libya, a part of several IOs, has been maintained as a topic of discussion to address the various ongoing issues by the regional and international community [56].	
Capacity-Building Activities	Various international actors and IOs, most notably the EU [57] and the UN [58], have undertaken frequent and intensive capacity-building activities.	
<b>Destabilizing Factors</b>		
Neighboring Territorial Dispute & Weak Borders	Multiple dormant border disputes with Algeria, Chad, and Niger sour relations with Libya's neighbours and weak border controls allow easy access to foreign fighters and extremists [59].	
Continued Foreign Power Involvement	A suspended proxy war continues in the background from Turkey and Qatar backing Tripoli and Russia, the UAE, and Egypt backing Tobruk. Should the GNU fail, a resumption of foreign support and aggression would almost certainly restart as well [60].	
<b>Assessment</b>	By remaining on the agenda of IOs such as the UN and AU, Libya's conflict has been spotlighted and discussed internationally amongst its international organizational partners to find solutions. For example, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) is a prime example of how Libya uses international linkages to support capacity-building efforts to stem the previous trend of conflict [61]. These stabilizing efforts since 2015 have helped address some conflict and capacity issues, however, Libya's weak borders and neighbouring disputes have been detrimental to its stability and persistence of conflict. The nearly unrestricted flow of extremists and foreign fighters backed by various states, coupled with its neighbouring states' reluctance to resolve the issue due to bilateral border disputes, have continued to affect Libya's peace [62]. Should heavy fighting re-emerge in the near future, neighbouring states could close their borders due to poor relations and disputes with Libya that could exacerbate the humanitarian crisis and contribute to more violence. The primary international linkage that's contributed to Libya's conflict risk has been foreign powers supporting various Libyan actors. These states are involved in Libya due to various issues such as; oil (France, Italy, Turkey), geopolitical influence (Turkey, Russia, Qatar, the UAE, and Egypt), terrorism (the EU, Egypt), and migration (the EU, Turkey, Italy) [63]. Since 2015, continual foreign state involvement has supported conflict-reducing elements (drone strikes on extremists) while others haven't (supplying arms to various actors), having a mixed impact on conflict-inducing elements [64].	

**Secondary Indicators:**

Militarization		High Risk ↑
<b>Stabilizing Factors</b>	<b>Explanation</b>	
UN Arms Embargo	UNSC 1970 calling for an arms embargo on Libya has been in place since 2011 [43].	
<b>Destabilizing Factors</b>		
UN Arms Embargo Violations	Despite the multilateral arms embargo, foreign powers continue to arm various internal actors and fuel the conflict [44].	
Oil Militarization	The primary economic driver in Libya has and can continue to be held ransom by opposing sides through its militarization as a bargaining chip and rent-generator to inflame the conflict should it erupt again [45].	

Militarization		High Risk ↑
Existing and Continued Fragmentation	The GNU represents a temporary solution to the deep divide between East and West forces and lacks legislative representation that could appease divided Libyans. Moreover, the GNU relies on cooperation with smaller rival militias that it cannot entirely control for security. During this sensitive truce, the LNA also continues to operate independently from GNU forces in Eastern, Central, and Southern Libya [46].	
Assessment	The continual supply of arms from various actors such as Turkey, Russia, and several Arab states supporting opposing forces has been a contributing factor to a heightened risk of conflict. The stable arms supply to both sides by foreign powers will allow for a quick re-militarization of both the GNA and LNA [47]. The oil sector and resource-rich areas have been continually militarized since 2015 to finance armed actors operating in Libya through oil exports. To worsen the situation, the fragmentation with the two rival factions and excluded militias fighting the LNA contributes to a tense environment for peace, which militarization and illegal arms supply since 2015 allows opposing groups an easy option to resume conflict should they feel the GNU peace has run its course, for unilateral power, or many other reasons contributing to Libya's tense environment.	
History of Armed Conflict		High Risk (Stable ↔)
Stabilizing Factors	Explanation	
Recent Ceasefire and Formation of GNU	Following the October 2020 ceasefire, the LPDF voted and selected a Prime Minister and relevant government positions to the HoR, forming the unified interim GNU in March 2021 [48].	
Continued Reductions in Violence	Since the formation of the GNU, major East-West fighting has been reduced to localized fighting and smaller territorial gains where violence remains [49].	
Destabilizing Factors	Explanation	
Large Refugee Population and Primary Regional Refugee Departure Location	Libya is host to more than 43,000 refugees and asylum seekers from the region seeking to travel to Europe [50]. Approximately 90% of refugees crossing the Mediterranean to Europe depart from Libya [51].	
High IDP Population	There are currently over 215,000 Libyans internally displaced inside the country [52].	
Assessment	The recent political stability in Libya with the GNU in Spring between the main internal aggressors has drastically reduced violence [53]. Despite recent trends of political stability reducing the risk of conflict to a medium level, Libya continues to struggle with its large refugee and IDP populations. While the number of refugees has stabilized in recent years since 2015 [54], the constant arrival of refugees continues to overwhelm the low-capacity country and threatens to further destabilize the region by contributing to militant recruitments of vulnerable refugees susceptible to participate in the conflict. Moreover, IDPs vulnerability to recruitment by militia and contributes to instability through frustration on political, economic, and social stagnation. These internal and latent considerations continue to be of relative importance in determining the high risk in predicting the resurgence of conflict by examining how and why conflict can continue. Coupled with continual militarization supported by foreign actors and the time-sensitive political unity of the GNU with little political progress and expired mandate [55], structural eruption of the conflict can occur.	
Population Heterogeneity		Moderate Risk ↔
Stabilizing Factors	Explanation	
Religious Diversity Score	97% of the population identify as Sunni Islam in 2021 [65].	
Immigration	There have been -1.15 migrants/1000 population revealing that more people have been leaving Libya than entering it. Plus, 80,000 left Libya at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 [66].	
Destabilizing Factors	Explanation	
Ethnic Diversity Score	Over 93% of the population is Arab. The remaining 7% are minority groups consisting of the Tebu, Amazigh, and Tuareg communities who have faced discriminative laws as their culture does not fit the Arab nationalist ideology. They have led protests to end discriminatory rules against them [67][68].	
Risk of Ethnic Rebellion	Based on the population of the ethnic minorities in Libya, the risk of ethnic rebellion is moderate due to the ongoing political, economic, and cultural discrimination along with cultural identity [69].	
Assessment	The problems associated with religion are very low as the majority of the population practices the same faith. However, the discriminatory policies that treat the Libyan ethnic minorities unfairly had led to protests, and rising tensions, as they do not fit in the national Arab perspective. The issues with ethnic diversity do not exacerbate the current problems in Libya but it further complicates the current tensions and can stall any progress being made by the Libyan government.	
Demographic Stress and Human Development		Low/Moderate Risk ↔
Stabilizing Factors	Explanation	
Population Demographics	The national population is 6.87M [70]. The population has been slowly growing by 1.4% as of 2021 [71]. The population density has been slowly increasing and as of 2020, there are 3.905 people per sq.km [72].	

Urban Population and Urban Population Growth Rate	The urban population was 5.54 million and 80.2% of the total population in 2020 [73]. The urban population growth rate has been slowly increasing at 1.745% as of 2020 [74].
Youth Bulge	27.03% of the population is youth in 2020 [75].
Life Expectancy	The life expectancy has been gradually increasing and in 2019 it was 72.9 years [76].
Infant and Maternal Mortality Rate	The infant mortality rate is slowly decreasing where in 2020, the rate was 11.1 per 1000 live births [77]. There is a stable maternal mortality rate of 72 per 100,000 births in 2020 [78].
HIV/AIDS	0.08% of the national population has HIV and/or AIDS [79].
<b>Destabilizing Factors</b>	
IDP and Asylum Seekers	There are approximately 278,177 internally displaced persons in Libya as of 2020 [80]. 43,000 individuals have sought refugees or asylum status in Libya in 2020. Many face high levels of assault [81].
Human Trafficking and Slavery	Over 20,000 individuals are tricked into coming to Libya for a better life than their home country but are held at ransom for more money and being forced to work for dire wages [82]. This has increased due to the lack of security and good police force. Libya is ranked 29th out of 167 countries in the Global Slavery Index [83].
Access to Improved Water Source and Access to Sanitation	Only 60% of the population has access to improved water sources in 2017 and this has gradually improved through the immense funding from international organizations [84][85]. 21.62% of the population has access to sanitation products as of 2020 with the help of foreign funding [86].
Literacy Rate	83.7% for women and 96.1% for men in 2017 according to the UN Education Index. The conflict has damaged over 300 educational institutions which are used for shelters for internally displaced persons [87].
Children in Labour	17% of children in Libya are in some type of child labour as of 2020, which is worsened due to the lack of access to education and household income [88].
<b>Assessment</b>	As the majority of the labour force is adults, in the future, there will be more employment opportunities for youth as the amount of youth is significantly lower than adults as seen in the youth bulge. The slow population growth over the past decade can be due to a lack of basic resources such as healthcare and water. Due to the excessive rate of internally displaced peoples over the last 5 years, human trafficking, slavery, and asylum seekers, there has been an increase in the overall poverty rate. In sum, demographic stress poses very moderate level impact on the ongoing conflict in Libya. Furthermore, Libyans are restrained from most basic essentials such as water and sanitation. 60% of the population have access to an improved water source and only one-fifth of the population can obtain sanitation products. Though, the mortality rates are stable, the ongoing decline of essentials can worsen the mortality rate. The gender discrepancy in education is a significant different negatively impacting women, demonstrating that women were not given priority to attend schools.

## Environmental Stress

Low Risk ↔

Stabilizing Factors	Explanation
Arable Land/hectares per person	Over the past decade, arable land has been gradually decreasing. In 2018, there was 0.258 hectares per person of arable land, which is almost double the global average [89].
Carbon Dioxide Emissions/ per Capita	In the past decade, carbon dioxide emissions have decreased significantly, and in 2018, there was 7.38 polluted of carbon dioxide polluted into the atmosphere [90].
<b>Destabilizing Factors</b>	
Forests and Freshwater Resources	In 2018, only 0.1% of the land was forests because most of the land is dry desert [91]. Over the past decade, the freshwater resources have decreased gradually. In 2017, there was 106 cubic metres of freshwater resources per capita, which is 1/54 of the global average [92]. The Libyan freshwater project "Great Manmade River Project" has been affected by poor maintenance by the government, leading to rusts in the pipelines and inadequate supply of the water to all areas of the country [93].
<b>Assessment</b>	Having proper access to water is the most superior issue to the Libyan population because it is administered by the government. With inadequate water supply, Libyans are not able to take advantage of the arable lands, preventing them from producing more food domestically, resorting to importing from other countries. After the end of the conflict, carbon dioxide emissions have declined after the civil conflict.

## Primary Stakeholders

<b>GNU</b>	Positive Impact	Unity Government between eastern House of Representatives (HoR) and western Government of National Accord (GNA), formed in early 2021 as a result of the Libya Political Dialogue Forum [94]. Key part of reduction of violence in Libya, though the recent delay in holding planned Presidential elections has damaged the legitimacy of the GNU in Libya's east [95].
<b>LNA &amp; Khalifa Haftar</b>	Mixed Impact	Libyan military faction led by Khalifa Haftar, comprising roughly 20,000 fighters [96]. Nominally controls much of Libya's East and South regions, attempted unsuccessfully to topple the GNA in 2019/2020 [97]. Currently abiding by UN-backed ceasefire signed in October 2020 [98], but has not disarmed and could return to violence if the political situation deteriorates. Former Head of the Libya National Army. Led unsuccessful effort to topple the GNA in 2019/2020, but inflicted heavy economic and humanitarian costs on Libya in the process [99].

### Primary Stakeholders

<b>Abdul Hamid Dbeibah</b>	Mixed Impact	Interim Prime Minister of Libya, appointed through LPDF [100]. Has presided over the political deterioration of Libya due to his decision to run for President in upcoming elections, despite promising not to [101]. Dbeibah is also facing a removal effort from the HoR as a result of the postponed Presidential elections [102].
<b>House of Representatives</b>	Mixed Impact	Libya's parliamentary body, formed in 2014 to govern until a Libyan constitution was put in place[103]. The HoR represents the interests of eastern Libya and supports Khalifa Haftar's campaign against the western GNA [104]. Currently collaborating with the GNU, but has passed no confidence votes against it in past [105], and is currently attempting to impeach the GNU PM due to Libya's postponed elections [106]
<b>Aguila Saleh</b>	Mixed Impact	Current speaker of the House of Representatives. Has claimed most of the political authority in eastern Libya, supported Haftar's attempt to topple the GNA [107]. Recently announced a run for President, has stoked tension by attempting to undermine legitimacy of GNU[xvii] amid efforts to replace PM Dbeibah [108]
<b>Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi</b>	Negative Impact	Son of Muammar Gaddafi. Imprisoned by Libyan militia groups from 2011-2017, sentenced to death by Libyan courts for crimes committed during the first Libyan Civil War [109]. Was given amnesty by Khalifa Haftar in 2017 [110], and has declared his candidacy for upcoming Libyan presidential elections [111]. An election of a Qaddafi would bring considerable uncertainty for both domestic and international stakeholders.
<b>Militias and Extremists</b>	Negative Impact	Predominantly suppressed by the LNA and GNU forces, ISIS and non-GNU supporting militias continue to remain active in Southern Libya. These groups contribute to continued conflict with both major parties and the current GNU government. The lack of monopoly over the use of force by the main GNA and LNU over the years, and now presently the GNU, has resulted in extremists capitalizing on existing ethnic fragmentation and harm Libyans [112].

### Secondary Stakeholders

<b>UNSMIL</b>	Positive Impact	UN-authorized mission to Libya, charged with improving the security and humanitarian situation in Libya, and institution-building [113]. UNSMIL's mandate was extended for another three months (April 2022) [114] amid Russia-US disagreements over its longevity[115].
<b>LPDF</b>	Positive Impact	A product of UNSMIL, the LPDF-supported intra-party dialogue among Libyan stakeholders to build a unity government, and a path to general elections. It remains active to mediate disagreements among stakeholders and to uphold the roadmap to Libya's political transition. [116]
<b>Turkey &amp; Qatar</b>	Mixed Impact	Since 2015, Turkey and Qatar have been firm supporters of the GNA, supplying the Tripoli Government with arms, support, and foreign fighters [117]. These states have helped the GNA stay afloat at its darkest times during the conflict and have a stake in oil, curbing migration, combating extremism, and competing geopolitics with other states involved [118]. Both currently support the GNU and present political unity, but their continual supply of arms over the years has created a structural ability for conflict to more easily emerge and intensify should the GNU breakdown in the absence of elections [119].
<b>Russia, UAE, Egypt</b>	Mixed Impact	These states have been fervent supporters of Haftar's LNA forces since 2015 and have been supplying arms, conducting airstrikes, and providing foreign fighters and mercenaries [120]. This trend over the years has contributed to deep structural roots of conflict in Libya by flooding the country with the means to sustain conflict. Although presently supporting the GNU, should the political unity divide, these states will likely resume supporting Haftar for oil, ideological, and geopolitical motivations [121].
<b>OECD and EU</b>	Positive Impact	Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the OECD, in conjunction with the EU, has helped create a Public-Private Dialogue to aid in economic diversification [122].

### Scenarios

<b>Best</b>	The GNU remains legitimate despite the likely impeachment of PM Dbeibeh, with restored buy-in from eastern and western political factions. A date is set for presidential and parliamentary elections in line with the LPDF, and elections are held in a free and fair (or free enough and fair enough) manner. The UNSMIL has its mandate renewed past the April 2022 deadline, and contributes to improving the political, security, and economic situation of Libya. As the political track trends towards success, the Libyan state and international stakeholders are better able to demilitarize militia groups and extend effective control over the state. Foreign stakeholders begin to draw down their arms sales to militias and political groups, leading to a more stabilized security situation and meaningful enforcement of the UN arms embargo. With improved security and political capacities, Libya is better able to engage with its IDP and refugee populations. The growth in oil and gas prices means that the Libyan economy, even with corruption in those industries, is able to begin recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic and its civil war. Foreign stakeholders, such as Russia and Turkey, begin exploring bilateral investment deals in Libya, further reducing incentives to destabilize the country. NGOs (UNESCO et al.) are able to act more freely in the region, reducing inequalities and improving opportunities for dialogue with minority and female populations in Libya.
<b>Most Likely</b>	The likely replacement of PM Dbeibeh does not solve the gridlock of Libya's political system. No fixed date is set for parliamentary and presidential elections, increasing disenchantment with the GNU and the LPDF among Libyan citizens and political stakeholders. The UNSMIL will remain in Libya in the short term, but the uncertainty over the continuation of the UNSMIL's mandate past April 2022 will reduce its effectiveness. Libya experiences notable, but unstable economic growth due to its oil and gas industry. Some of this economic growth is lost to the corruption, mismanagement, and politicization of its oil and gas sector. IDPs and refugees continue to flow in and out of Libya, compounded by the demographic pressures of a young, economically impoverished population. Foreign powers are split between symbolic support for the peace process and preparations to resupply their preferred factions if the GNU falls apart. Militias and extremist groups remain a destabilizing force within Libya, but are unable to threaten major population centers in Libya.
<b>Worst</b>	The impeachment of PM Dbeibeh leads to the collapse of the GNU, and a return to polarization between eastern and western stakeholders. The UNSMIL's mandate is not renewed past April 2022, further weakening Libya's political, economic, and security climate. This leads to widespread disenchantment with the LPDF and the UN backed peace process, and an acceptance of the re-militarization of Libya. The UN backed ceasefire falls apart, and foreign stakeholders return to arming and sending mercenaries to support their preferred factions. Rising inflation and continued corruption in Libya's oil and gas sector leads to worsening inequality, and the increased economic influence of foreign stakeholders, non-state actors, and the black market. Militias and extremist groups in Libya grow in influence and power, contributing to the growth of IDPs and refugee populations in the region. With a severely weakened government, Libya is unable to generate political will towards decreasing discrimination towards women and minority groups. IDPs and refugees are either recruited/strong-armed into militia groups, or are more vulnerable to being victims of human trafficking. A deteriorating security situation and the absence of UNSMIL leads to the departure of more NGOs, and increased violations of the basic human rights of Libyan citizens.

## End Notes

- [1] “Continued Violations of Arms Embargo, Delays in Withdrawing Foreign Mercenaries Threatening Hard-Won Gains in Libya, Special Envoy Warns Security Council | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases.” United Nations. United Nations. Accessed February 8, 2022. <https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14526.doc.htm>.
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