


# State Fragility in Burkina Faso

## Analysis and Policy Brief

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# Introduction & Overview

- Burkina Faso appears to be exiting fragility but faces a transnational security threat that originates beyond its borders.
- Exogenous security shocks challenge state resilience and risk a return to fragility
- Heavy reliance the ALC cluster analysis, but also use Call's non-universal analysis to increase granularity in our analysis
- Global Affairs Canada is our target audience and desired policy proponent



# Background and Current Status

- **Background**
  - Deterioration of Security Landscape
  - The economic outlook is mainly stable, despite the COVID-19 pandemic and security crisis
- **Current Status**
  - Recent November 2020 presidential election represents a new chapter for Burkina Faso's democratic system
  - Burkina Faso is on an upward slope away from fragility



# Key Actors

- **Internal Stakeholders:**




- Burkina Faso State Officials (Drivers of the PNDES)
- Burkina Faso Armed Forces and Members of the Security Sector
- Mossi and Foulse Self-Defense Militias (Koglwéogo)
- National Labour Unions

- **External Stakeholders:**


- The Sahel Coalition
- Members of the Islamic State, Al-Qaida, and Other Extremist Groups
- Border States (Mali and Niger)



# General Trends of Fragility



# Key Drivers of Fragility




# Economic Development

Risk Intensity	Direction
Moderate-Severe	Improving

What did Burkina Faso export in 2016?

Shown: \$2.43B | Total: \$2.43B



- **Fundamental Issues**

- Lack of diversification and inability to withstand environmental and economic shocks
- Lack of investment in infrastructure = limited growth potential
- (Informal) Urban service sector growth = lack of tradable goods

- **Opportunities**

- *Plan national de développement économique et social (PNDES)*

# Human Development and Service Delivery

Risk Intensity	Direction
Moderate-Severe	Improving


- **Fundamental Issues**

- Lack of investment in human development (education, trade services, health, etc.)
- Few opportunities to move past subsistence farming (youth bulge + stagnant agricultural sector)
- Immense urban-rural disparity (water, sanitation, electricity, etc.)

- **Opportunities**

- *Plan national de développement économique et social (PNDES)*

Figure 1: Trends in Burkina Faso's HDI component indices 2000-2018



# Governance

Risk Intensity	Direction
Moderate-Severe	Improving

- Mistrust in the government's capacity to contain violence
  - Violence targeted towards the Fulani ethnic group
- No clear separation of power in practice
  - Traditional chiefdoms in the management of power
- Burkina Faso is willing to improve the structural development & and well-being of Burkinabés
  - *Plan national de développement économique et social* (PNDES)
  - Committed to promote women's inclusive policies

# Environment

Risk Intensity	Direction
Moderate	Improving

- Limited natural resources and highly vulnerable to climate change
- Burkina Faso signatory of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1993 and published the National Adaptation Plan (PNA) in 2015
  - Focused on the most vulnerable sectors: agriculture, water resources, livestock and forests/biodiversity




**PROGRAMME D'ACTION NATIONAL D'ADAPTATION  
A LA VARIABILITE ET  
AUX CHANGEMENTS CLIMATIQUES  
(PANA DU BURKINA FASO)**

# Demography and Population

Risk Intensity	Direction
Moderate	Improving

- Steadily increasing life expectancy and birth rates create growing population
- informal service delivery systems and property rights regimes
- Rapid urbanization
- Internally displaced people and migration loss
- Islam majority; Mossi/Foulse dominance and Fulani prejudice




# Security and Crime

- Reductions of the security apparatus under democratic rule
- Security indices do not acknowledge military variance
- Self-defence militias
- Civil unrest & Police Unease
- Low criminal activity reported
- Transregional VEOs offers the Sahel Region as a sanctuary
- State of Emergency across most of the countryside

Risk Intensity	Direction
Severe	Deteriorating



# ALC Overview and Trends



# Authority

Current Level	Direction
Medium-Low	Falling

- Northern jihadist proto-state provides lucrative extraction of precious minerals that benefit global extremism. Unlikely to be given back without a fight.
- Informal systems of enforcement remain durable regardless of exogenous shocks
- Inability to secure investments and populations could result in a 'trap' or downward economic spiral
- Low productivity within international security partnerships. Appeals for support have not been answered.

# Capacity

Current Level	Direction
Low	Rising

- Stable growth in most areas of capacity and service delivery - yet growth is slow and baseline levels are still low – even in comparison to other West African countries
- High urbanization rates and dispersal of rural communities lead to enormous urban-rural disparities despite the fact that roughly 70% of the population resides therein
- Gaps in rural service delivery are compounded along gender lines: high national averages which mask strong regional disparities
- Security and COVID – exogenous shocks to supply chains and development opportunities

# Legitimacy

Current Level	Direction
Medium	Rising

- Burkinabé views its relationship with the current government as improving
- Corruption remains a large issue of legitimacy, however, decreased in the past year.



# Baseline Scenario



- Slowly improving during the years, however, the level of authority, legitimacy and capacity remains relatively low
- Burkina Faso's stable environment is in danger of vanishing due to the current security situation and the impacts of COVID-19
- The next six months is essential in determining the overall trajectory of Burkina Faso

# Best Case Scenario


## Return to normalcy



- Revives the stable backdrop that allowed for movement away from fragility over previous years
- Entails strong leadership and **management of the current security situation**
- At minimum: return to slow yet stable growth and improvement
- Optimistically: Burkina Faso is able to increase its baseline growth through economic transformation, gender equity and increased human development targeted at rural populations - some of which are currently in place (PNDES, National Plan, etc.)

# Worst Case Scenario

## Convergence of shocks



- The severity of transregional violence exacerbates dramatically;
- A 'second-wave' of COVID-19 further disrupts supply chains and access to services;
- Burkina Faso's fragile sense of democracy is tested due to tensions following the November election
  
- Effective removal of any sense of stability and security which shatters the state's authority to protect from violence, capacity to deliver services to its population, and perception of legitimacy both internationally and domestically
  
- A Return to Compaoré-era levels of fragility

# Wild Card Scenario

## Eruption of Vigilantism



- Mossi and Foulse Self-Defense Militias actively target Fulani communities
- Human rights abuses between majority and minority ethnicities would become apparent in the media – the International community is forced to intervene
- Peacekeeping forces or other third-party actors would remain in Burkina Faso's northeastern regions for an extended period of time, shifting the factors and dynamics of fragility

# Policy Option 1

## Counterterrorism and Military Assistance

- Building partnered capacity of Burkinabe security forces bolsters authority sphere, allows capacity and legitimacy returns to slow incline
- Regional coordination required, likely to foster a coalition approach, strengthening relationships indirectly
- Military operations could disrupt informal systems and critical infrastructure
- Fiscal and battle-centric metrics, possible for civil-military application later on
- 2-3 year mandate; represents a minimalist approach

## Policy Option 2

### **Economic Capacity Building and Developmental Assistance**

- Support to public infrastructure and private investment strengthen governmental service delivery and overall capacity
- Development and economic opportunity challenges extremist recruitment and provides an indirect means of engagement with jihadists
- Private or informal security systems will likely be required as localized offsets
- Transportation and freedom of movement metrics supported by human security improvements such as schools and clinics
- 2-3 year investment; represents an indirect approach

# Policy Option 3

## Security Sector Reform and Nation Assistance

- Incorporates both policy options with holistic foreign policy engagement
- Deeper engagement with Burkina Faso ministries to provide mentored reform as a strong economic and security partner
- Canadian public and political will more dangerous than violent extremism
- Protracted metrics available, measurements of effectiveness vs performance
- 6-8 year engagement plan; represents a long term approach