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FRAGILITY ASSESSMENT OF CHAD



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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Chad's trajectory is shaped by a history of conflict, ethnic cleavages, and unequal power relations. The current President, Idriss Deby, has been in power for 30 years and will likely stay in office until 2033. During his time in office, the President's main priorities have been maintaining his privileged position and the development of oil for rents. Consequently, the drivers of fragility are most prominent in economic development and governance clusters, while demographic, environmental and human development are only marginally better. The state's Authority, Legitimacy and Capacity, are all extremely weak. The state cannot monopolize violence throughout the country, is unable to provide public services to the population, and has not developed a strong state-society relationship. Projections for the next six months cover these issues, along with on-going conflict with Boko Haram and the impact of climate change. Three policy options are provided for the World Bank on anti-corruption and governance mechanisms throughout the election process, decentralized land and resource management, and infrastructure development for economic diversity. All three of these policies fit the World Bank's mandate and address the state's fragility.

2. METHODS

This brief is based on quantitative and qualitative research on the root causes of fragility in Chad. Much of this research has been guided by the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) framework [1]. The six clusters used in the CIFP framework: Governance, Economics, Security and Crime; Human Development; Demography; and Environment, are the basis for the structural analysis of the current situation in Chad. Within these clusters, trends in relevant indicators were analyzed over a ten-year period. The indicators' data is from primary sources, including the World Bank, Freedom House, the United Nations, INFORM (non-exhaustive). The bulk of the qualitative data is from government documents and reports created by major indices, such as the BTI organization and human rights organizations. While every attempt was made to use sources from Chad, this proved difficult due to the state's control over most of the media and almost all Chadian sources writing in French. Essential data from the government of Chad was translated from French to English by one of the authors with the assistance of online translating services. This information, guided by the CIFP's Authority, Legitimacy and Capacity (ALC) framework, was used to identify the main drivers of fragility.

This brief draws from key concepts of Horizontal Inequalities [2], Hybrid Regimes [3], Capacity Development [4] and Resource Rents. Based on this comprehensive analysis, three policies are proposed for the World Bank to prevent further deterioration of Chad's statehood.

3. END USER

This policy brief is presented to the World Bank to support the re-assessment of the World Bank's development strategy in Chad. The World Bank's operations in Chad are aligned with the government's goals and steered by the Country Partnership Framework which is scheduled to be renewed for the 2021-2025 period [5]. The three policies provided in this report build on the achievements of the previous frameworks.

The World Bank's mandate consists of the twin goals of eliminating extreme poverty and achieving shared prosperity. While both goals are extremely relevant to the situation in Chad (see Human Development Table), the need for World Bank support goes beyond these figures. First, the World Bank and Chad have a long-standing relationship. While the projects have varied in success, the World Bank has gained valuable experience and a strong understanding of the informal political dynamics of the country. Along with this experience, the World Bank has the technical capacity and the clout to carry out complex projects in Chad. Current projects that could facilitate the three policy recommendations include: the Albia - Local Development and Adaptation Project, the Fiscal Consolidation Support Grant, and the Chad Digitalization of Revenue Administrations and COVID-19 Response Project [6]

4. BACKGROUND

Chad was a part of France's territory until its independence in 1960. Since independence, internal and external conflict have been a common feature of Chadian society. In 1990, The Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS), a guerilla group commanded by Idriss Deby, successfully staged a coup d'etat against President Hissene Habre. Deby assumed leadership and won the country's first presidential elections in 1996. In 2001, Deby won the presidency for his second term [7]. In 2005, Deby made amendments to the constitution to eliminate presidential term limits. [8]. Deby's opposition boycotted both the 2006 and the 2011 [7] elections due to disagreements about the electoral process [9] [10]. His opposition ran during the 2016 elections, but President Idriss Deby increased registration costs for parties and created new parties to

lower his oppositions' votes. President Deby won again, but the legitimacy of the elections was questioned [11].

In 2018, changes were made to the constitution that increased the term lengths to 6 years. As a result, President Idriss Deby can run again in 2021 and 2027 [12]. Changes in the constitution also removed the southern Prime Minister position [13], giving more power to the Muslim and Zaghawan groups, and eliminating Christian political representation. Deby's administration marginalized Christian representation, despite Christians representing over 45% of the population [8]. The next presidential elections will take place in April 2021 [14].

In 2003, Chad started drilling and selling oil. The three main oil companies in Chad are Exxon, China National Petroleum Corporation International and Glencore Energy [15]. Exxon is a key stakeholder in the pipeline from Chad to Cameroon, financed by the World Bank [16]. In 2006, the World Bank suspended its loans because the Chadian government did not want oversight on its oil revenues [17]. In 2014, Glencore had provided a loan valuing more than \$1.4 billion to Chad's state-owned oil company, Société des Hydrocarbures du Tchad [18]. After the loan, the oil price fell, and the economy's dependence on oil has made it difficult for the government to pay back Glencore and restructure the loan [19]. The Deby administration uses oil rents to secure its position and invested a large portion into strengthening the security apparatus rather than improving public services [20].

In 2001, Chad started granting asylum to many refugees from neighbouring countries in conflict [21]. While this has increased the administration's international legitimacy, it has exacerbated resource shortages and weak service delivery. This has resulted in conflict in the Southern agriculture provinces, mainly between pastoralists and farmers. Moreover, Boko Haram, a militant organization that started in Nigeria whose activities now spread across the Sahel, has contributed to this influx of refugees and displaced people. Since 2015, Boko Haram has occupied the Lac province in Chad and frequently attacks villages and the military [22].

5. STAKEHOLDERS

PRIMARY INTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS	INTERESTS
Idriss Deby	President of Chad, former Chief of Army, leader of Mouvement Patriotique du Salut, and member of Zaghawan group [23]. His interests are to hold onto power through changing members of cabinet who do not agree with him [23], increasing the strength of the military [24], arresting outspoken individuals, providing immunity under the law for those close to him, and suppressing the media, other political parties and NGOs [23]. Recently, changes were made to the constitution to eliminate the Prime Minister position, which further removed Christian representation and provided more power to President Idriss Deby and the Zaghawa minority [23]. His recent focuses have been to suppress Islamic culture [25] and secure further control of the state.
Mouvement Patriotique du Salut (MPS)	MPS is the dominating party with membership consisting of Deby's close circle [26]. No other party in Chad has the capabilities to be known throughout the whole country [27]. Of the 188 seats available in the National Assembly, MPS members have 117 [13]. The party

	continues to prioritize holding onto power and serving member’s self interests.
Saleh Kebzabo	Leader of Union Nationale pour la Démocratie et le Renouveau (UNDR). Saleh Kebzabo is the main opposition of President Idriss Deby and the MPS party [28]. Saleh continues to be very outspoken about Idriss Deby. Interviews have shown that he believes Chad’s main problems are political and that he believes the economy would benefit from focusing more on livestock rather than large industries [29].
Boko Haram	This Islamic militant group began in Nigeria in 2002, with the overall goal of turning Nigeria in to an Islamic state. The militant group, led by Abubakar Shekau [30], started attacking Chad in 2015 because of the country’s military support to neighboring countries. Currently, Boko Haram is battling Chadian security forces in the Lake Chad region [22]. The group uses violence to recruit new members, and in other circumstances, people will join because of a lack of attractive income-generating opportunities [31].
FONAC (Front de l’opposition nouvelle pour l’alternance et le changement)	FONAC is a coalition of 29 opposition parties who do not recognize Deby’s presidency. It includes the 2016 opposition presidential candidates. Saleh is the president of FONAC [27].
Société des Hydrocarbures du Tchad (SHT)	Created in 2006, Chad’s state-owned oil company seeks rents through producing oil and petroleum sharing contracts with Exxon, CNPCI and Glencore [32]. The director-general is Ibrahim Mahamat Djamooss, and it used to be Seid Idriss Deby, the son of President Idriss Deby [33]. The mandate of SHT was revised in 2017, and SHT will now participate in sale, exploration, transport, development and production of oil and gas [32].

PRIMARY EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS INTERESTS

Nigeria	Nigeria and Chad contribute most of the troops for the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). Chad is also helping fight Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria. The Nigeria-Chad border is closed which has increased trade costs between the two countries [27].
Sudan (Mixed)	In 2010, Deby and Omar al-Bashir signed a Peace agreement putting an end to a five-year proxy war carried out by rebel groups in both countries [34]. The two presidents were close allies until Bashir was ousted in 2019. Current relations between Chad and Sudan are weaker than before but are stable. While the countries no longer conduct joint-border operations, they continue to share intelligence with one another [35]. The instability in Darfur, and conflicts in Chad continue to pose a risk to both countries. There are active cross-border rebel groups between the Chad-Sudan-Libya triangle, with allegiances to ethnic communities in all three countries [34]
Central African Republic (CAR)	CAR and Chad have a controversial relationship. Chad’s 2015 intervention in CAR was criticized by the international community

	based on the extreme actions of Chad’s soldiers, and viewed the intervention as a way for the Deby’s regime to further national interest and influence CAR politics [36]. Approximately 180,000 CAR citizens are displaced in Chad [23]. Historically, CAR pastoralists have cross-border activity, and enter Chad during the dry season [27].
Niger	Niger and Chad have a security relationship. Both countries are members of G5 Sahel and the MNJTF. The two countries have supported military operations in Mali and fighting Boko Haram in Nigeria [27].
Cameroon	The Cameroon-Chad border is currently closed, and trade routes have been disrupted by Boko Haram. This has increased trade costs for both countries. Chad and Cameroon also share an oil pipeline. [23]
Mali	In 2013, Chad supported France’s Operation Serval to help the government reclaim territory taken by Tuareg rebels [27]. Mali is also a member of G5 Sahel [36].
Libya	In the years prior to his murder, General Muammar Qaddafi and Idriss Déby had a strong allyship. Déby currently supports the Libyan National Army (LNA) lead by Khalifa Haftar in Libya [35]. LNA is also fighting Chadian rebels in the South of Libya [35]. In March 2020, Déby along with other African state leaders met in the Republic of Congo to discuss the facilitation of a national dialogue and a cease fire in the country [37].
France (Positive)	France is the former colonial ruler of Chad, and presently a strong ally for the Déby regime. The relationship goes beyond counter-terrorism operations, with France’s overall view that the Déby regime is critical to maintaining stability in the Sahel. [25]. France’s “Operation Barkhane” headquarters are based in N’Djamena. France is also helping strengthen Chad’s internal security and has previously provided training and expertise to Chad’s armed forces. In the 2016 elections, the French government provided biometric identification technology to ensure legitimate voter registration [27]. In the threat of a coup against Déby, or if domestic instability in Chad peaked, it is highly likely that France would provide military assistance to Déby. In 2019, the French government conducted airstrikes in Southern Chad against rebels, after a request from Déby [38]
Exxon: Esso Exploration & Production Chad Inc.	ExxonMobil produces oil in the Doba region, and their extraction began in 2003 [32]. Exxon is the main oil producer in Chad and their headquarters is in N’Djamena. Exxon is involved in a pipeline project with Petronas and Société des Hydrocarbures du Tchad, that transports oil from Chad to Cameroon [39], but recent reports state that Exxon wants to exit the project [40]. Exxon currently has a contract that will allow it to keep producing oil until 2050 [41].
China National Petroleum Corporation International (CNPCI)	CNPCI’s interests in Chad’s oil began in 2003 [42], and it is investing heavily. It is currently Chad’s largest oil collector, and it wants to increase production [32].

Glencore Energy	Glencore produces oil in Chad and provided a loan for Société des Hydrocarbures du Tchad in 2014 that was for \$1.4 billion, which Chad is still struggling to repay. The loan will mature in 2030 [43].
Olam International	Olam is a Singaporean agriculture company. In 2018, Olam purchased 60% of the country's cotton industry, which used to belong to a state-owned company [44]. Olam is planning on investing a lot, including repairing roads that will help with transportation [45].

INDICATOR ASSESSMENT

Impact on Fragility	High	Constant	Low
Trend (2009-most current)	Deteriorating	Stable	Improving

6. FRAGILITY DRIVERS

PRIMARY DRIVERS

1) GOVERNANCE

Indicator	Value	Trend
Voice and Accountability [46] Percentile Rank (0-100) 100 corresponds to highest possible rank	9.36 (2019)	Deteriorating
Government Effectiveness [46] Percentile Rank (0-100) 100 corresponds to highest possible rank	5.77 (2019)	Improving
Rule of Law [46] Percentile Rank (0-100) 100 corresponds to highest possible rank	7.21 (2019)	Improving
Control of Corruption [46] Percentile Rank (0-100) 100 corresponds to highest possible rank	5.77 (2019)	Constant
Corruption Perceptions Index [47] Numbered Rank (0-100) 100 corresponds to highest possible rank	20 (2019)	Constant
Freedom of Civil Rights [26] Score (0-60) 60 corresponds to highest possible rank	3 (2020)	Constant
Freedom of Political Rights [26] Numbered Rank (0-40) 40 corresponds to highest possible rank	3(2020)	Deteriorating
Religious Freedom [26]	1 (2020)	Constant

Numbered Rank (0-4) 4 corresponds to highest possible rank		
Domestic general government health expenditure (% of general government expenditure) [48]	4.678 (2017)	Constant
Government expenditure on education, total (% of total government expenditure) [48]	16.4 (2017)	Improving
Prosecution of Office Abuse [49] Score (1-10) 10 corresponds to greatest Prosecution of Office Abuse	3 (2020)	Constant
Prioritization [49] Score (1-10) 10 corresponds to greatest Prioritization	1 (2020)	Constant

ASSESSMENT

Idriss Deby's close circle dominates positions of power in the state [13]. Idriss Deby has placed his family members in key positions of the state, including his daughter as a director of the refinery [50], and his son, who used to be a director of SHT [33]. Most of the government is Muslim, with a prioritization of the inclusion of the Zaghawa group [51].

The current regime has gone through a lot to keep their power. In the 2016 elections, the government increased the cost of party registration, and over 100 new parties were created to limit oppositions' chances of gaining majority support. The African Union raised concerns with the electoral processes as ballot boxes were not checked before voting [11]. Most of the parties are allied with MPS, and the current regime does not face strong political opposition. Furthermore, the 2018 constitution reforms increased the concentration of power among the Zaghawa elite [13].

Corruption and improper spending are a major concern. Table 1 in Annex D provides an overview of government expenditure. The table shows that the annual defense expenditure is higher than the combined expenditure on health and sanitation services [52]. This has played a key role in the poor service delivery in the country and the lack of human capital. Governance data in Annex A shows an increase in government education expenditure relative to total government expenditure. This does indicate the government's recent recognition for the needs of its citizens, however; the domestic government's expenditure on healthcare relative to total government expenditure has lowered significantly since 2005 (from 12.4% to 4.7%) [48], indicating the government's lack of prioritization.

TREND

Voice and Accountability has stayed stagnant since 2010 [53], and Freedom House has constantly given the media's ability to speak freely a low score since 2017 [54]. HAMA has begun to show signs that they will exhibit the same behaviour as the High Council of Communication and limit journalistic freedom [55]. Radio stations that are critical of the MPS party will likely be shut down before the upcoming elections. Indicators for freedom of media and expression will most likely not improve short-term.

Freedom House lowered Chad’s score in 2019 for freedom of religion [54], and this is likely because of Chad’s new rules for banning turbans and burqas [25]. Since Boko Haram is a constant threat [56], this indicator will continue to remain low.

Government effectiveness has remained stagnant since 2013 [53], and the BTI index has constantly scored Chad’s government as having horrible prioritization [49]. The increase in government expenditure on education [48] does show an increase in prioritization. It is most likely to continue to increase as community schools are closing and public school teachers are going on strikes [13]. The domestic general government expenditure on healthcare as a percentage of government expenditure will most likely continue to decrease, as the government is seemingly relying on external sources for healthcare expenditure [48].

Control of Corruption, Rule of Law [53], Corruption Perception Index [47], Freedom of Political Rights [54], and Prosecution of Office Abuse [49] have all remained rather stagnant and low since 2012. These will likely lower, as many of President Idriss Deby’s recent actions have been to maintain power. Corruption will likely continue through the next elections, and President Idriss Deby will almost certainly win the 2021 elections.

2) ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Indicator	Value	Trend
Market Organization [49] Score (1-10) 10 corresponds to greatest Market Organization	3 (2020)	Constant
Starting a Business Cost (% of income per capita) [57]	169.3 (2020)	Improving
Starting a Business Procedures [57] Number of procedures Higher scores correspond to more procedures	8 (2020)	Improving
Starting a Business Time (Days) [57] Number of days Higher scores correspond to more days	58 (2020)	Constant
Vulnerable Employment (% of total employment) [48]	92.969 (2020)	Constant
Informal employment (% of total non-agricultural employment) [48]	90.12 (2018)	
Regulatory Quality [46] Percentile Rank (0-100) 100 corresponds to greatest Regulatory Quality	11.06 (2019)	Deteriorating
Total Tax Revenue (Millions XAF) [58]	437,105 (2018)	Improving
Tax of Individuals (Millions XAF) [58]	85,027 (2018)	Constant
Corporate Tax (Millions XAF) [58]	165,042 (2018)	Improving

Oil rents (% of GDP) [48]	20.1% (2018)	Improving
Getting Electricity - Cost (% of income per capita) [57]	9,628.6% (2020)	Constant

ASSESSMENT

Chad has had a rentier regime since oil extraction began in 2003. Since the state has consistently had poor prioritization [49] and relies on oil revenues, it has not created an economy to acquire taxes from, and tax revenues from companies are largely dependent on the oil price [20]. Chad’s rentier regime has proven to be extremely costly for them, as a loan acquired from Glencore for \$1.4 billion has placed the economy in a compromising position. After SHT acquired the loan, the oil price decreased, and Chad has struggled to pay back this loan [18].

Most of the population works in the informal sector and in vulnerable employment because Chad never focused on economic diversity. The cost of starting a business and getting electricity are much too high for the general population to strengthen the economy [59]. A finance law established in 2018 has made it the business’ duty to submit personal income taxes for its employees [60], but since most of the country’s employment is informal [48], the country cannot collect income taxes from them. As shown in the annex, individual income tax has remained relatively constant since 2010, while company income tax has been dependent on the price of oil [58].

TREND

Chad’s market organization [49], regulatory quality [53] and time to start a business [57] have remained almost constant since 2006. Oil rents (% of GDP) will fluctuate with the price of oil. The procedures for starting a business and the price of getting electricity have not improved since 2013, and the cost of starting a business have decreased dramatically since 2006 [57]. These costs will most likely continue to decrease as Chad tries to diversify its economy, but it will be many years until the costs have lowered enough and the population has started businesses. Chad’s low mean years of schooling [61] and literacy rates [48] will also lower the ability of the population to create and expand profitable and businesses, thus limiting any potential for a large formal economy. Until the rate of education increases and business costs lower, the informal economy and amount of vulnerable employment will most likely stay constant.

Company income tax is currently dependent on the oil price [20]. Olam may help slightly by providing other sources of company income tax, but other international companies are still hesitant to enter Chad because of corruption [62]. It is unlikely that Chad will be able to significantly increase its company income tax from international actors in the short term because of governance. Until the costs of starting a business lowers significantly, company income tax will continue to be dependent on oil prices. This is also the case for individual income taxes. Also, until costs of electricity and infrastructure are improved in Chad, it will be considered an unattractive business environment for many companies to enter and expand in.

3) HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Indicator	Value	Trend
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Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above) [48]	22.3% (2016)	
Mean years of schooling (years) [61]	2.4 (2018)	Slight improvement
Mean years of schooling, female (years) [61]	1.3 (2018)	Slight improvement
Child malnutrition, stunting (moderate or severe) (% under-age 5) [61]	39.8 (2010-2018)	
Human Development Index [61] Score (0-1) 1 corresponds to greatest possible Human Development	0.401 (2018)	Constant
Gender Inequality Index (GII) [61] Score (0-1) 1 corresponds to largest possible Gender Inequality	0.701	Improving
Maternal mortality ratio (deaths per 100,000 live births) [61]	856 (2015)	Improving
Prevalence of female genital mutilation/cutting among girls and women (% of girls and young women ages 15–49) [61]	38.4 (2004-2018)	

ASSESSMENT

There are currently three types of schools in Chad: Community, Private and Public [63]. Private schools are not a primary concern in Chad, but both Community and Public schools are. In 2016, 64% of teachers were community teachers, and 57.2% of community teachers were unqualified [64]. Community schools used to get subsidies through the state, but this has been discontinued since 2016 because of the government's finance issues. In 2016, 45% of community teachers were paid by parents of the students [65]. Rural areas are having difficulties supporting community schools, and as a result, 109 closed in 2018 [66]. The government has not been paying public school teachers their full wages, and as a result, they have been going on strike [13]. Schools years have been lost because of strikes from public school teachers and community schools shutting down [13] [66]. The World Bank does show that Chad has increased its expenditure on education as percentage of total government expenditure has increased since 2009 [48], but it is clearly not enough or not managed correctly. These circumstances have caused the mean years of schooling for girls and the population, along with the literacy rate, to be so low [61] [48].

There are three sources of funding for the healthcare sector: the government, external actors, and domestic private actors [67]. Since 2001, the domestic government's health expenditure as percentage of current health expenditure has decreased significantly, from 34.9% to 15.8%, and external health expenditure has increased from 3.5% to 21.1%. Domestic private health expenditure has been over 50% of current health expenditure since 2001. The government has placed the responsibility of health care expenditure on external actors. Despite this, current health expenditure has been between 4 and 5% of GDP almost every year since 2001, which may explain why it performs so poorly on health indicators [48]. The improvements in health indicators like life expectancy at birth and maternal mortality rate [61] may be explained through the

external health expenditure’s management and coordination. There have recently been strikes from healthcare workers since the government has been unable to pay healthcare workers [13].

TREND

There have been no improvements in the government’s expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP (%). Although the expenditure on education as a percentage of total government expenditure (%) has increased since 2009 [48], community schools are closing due to lack of funds [66], and public-school teachers are going on strikes because they are not getting paid [13]. The size of the formal economy and Chad’s dependence on oil will most likely not change significantly in the short-term, therefore; Chad’s tax revenues will not cause any large increases or more reliable funding for Chad’s education system. This will lead to a decrease in mean years of schooling and literacy rate for future adults.

External healthcare expenditure as a percentage of total healthcare expenditure is increasing, while domestic government’s expenditure as a percentage of total healthcare expenditure is decreasing [48]. This trend is correlated with improvements in the life expectancy at birth and the maternal mortality rate [61]. External healthcare will most likely remain prevalent or increase, therefore; healthcare indicators will most likely improve.

4) ENVIRONMENT

Indicator	Value	Trend
Water Stress [68] Score (0-5) 5 corresponds to the highest possible Water Stress	1.54 (2020)	-
Droughts [68] Score (0-5) 5 corresponds to the highest risk of Droughts	3.16 (2020)	-
Flood [68] Score (0-5) 5 corresponds to the highest risk of Floods	4 (2020)	-
Resource Scarcity [68] Score (0-3) 3 corresponds to the highest possible Resource Scarcity	2 (2020)	-
Arable Land (% of Land Available) [48]	3.89136 (2016)	Constant
Degraded Land (% of Total Land Area) [48]	34 (2015)	-
Resilience [68] Score (0-6) 6 corresponds to the worse Resilience	6 (2020)	-

CPIA policy and institutions for environmental sustainability rating (1=low to 6=high) [48]	3 (2019)	Improving
Population using improved drinking-water sources (% of Total Population) [69]	8.90% (2017)	Detoriarating
Population using improved sanitation facilities (% of Total Population) [70]	8% (2017)	Detoriarating

ASSESSMENT

Chad is extremely vulnerable to climate change and much of the population lacks the resources to cope with climate related pressures. In 2020, Chad experienced a record amount of rainfall causing floods in 20 out of the 23 provinces in the country [71]. The floods destroyed 150,000 hectares of cultivated land, which has increased food insecurity, and threatened the livelihood of farmers [71]. Given that most of the country works in agriculture, there is a strong need for improved climate resiliency plans.

Additionally, changes in the environment are also impacting social dynamics. Deforestation along with drought increase the burden of labor experienced by women who are responsible for fetching wood and water. This has heightened the risk for sexual violence against women who have to travel further from home to gather these resources [72]. Women are also at risk for gender-based violence due to domestic tensions over reduced food and income in farming households [72]. Similarly, the decreasing availability of land continues to fuel competition over resources and disrupt social cohesion between communities [73]. Extreme weather events have also increased the presence of refugees and displaced population's within Chad. In the absence of strong governance system, land tenure, and service delivery there is a risk of conflict between displaced population's and host communities.

Finally, low, and worsening, access to basic water and sanitation services causes dysentery, cholera, and chronic diarrhea. This is especially concerning for children's health and is contributing to chronic malnutrition and the high under-five mortality rates in Chad [74]. UNICEF and WHO have programs addressing these conditions but are unable to fill the gap in the government's poor service delivery.

TREND

The population and oil production will continue to increase in Chad stressing both resource scarcity and environmental integrity. Chad has ratified the Paris Agreement [75], and its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution states that Chad would like to unconditionally reduce emissions by 18.2%, and conditionally reduce emissions by 71% by 2030. The total implementation cost is 21.233 billion USD [76], which is most likely to much for Chad to pay given the loan Chad must repay to Glencore. Therefore, Chad will most likely not be able to meet its conditional goals, and environment conditions are not likely to improve. Climate change will compound the existing weaknesses in the government's poor governance and service delivery capabilities, and there will be on-going risk for climate-related conflict.

SECONDARY DRIVERS

5) DEMOGRAPHY AND POPULATION

Indicator	Value	Trend
Total population (millions) [69]	15.5 (2020)	Detoriarating
Population Growth Rate [48]	3.0% (2020)	Improving
Life expectancy at birth [69]	54.0 years (2018)	Improving
Rural Population (% of total population) [48]	76.72 (2019)	Detoriarating
Fertility rate (Average number of children per woman) [69]	5.85 children per women (2018)	Improving
Infant mortality rate (per 1000 births) [69]	74.5 (2020)	Improving
Age Dependency Ratio (% of Working Population) [48]	97.29 (2019)	Decreasing
Refugees and IDP's (Fragile States Index) [77] Percentile Rank (0-100) 100 corresponds to highest possible rank	9.2 (2020)	Improving
Demographic Pressure [77] Percentile Rank (0-100) 100 corresponds to highest possible rank	9.6 (2020)	Detoriarating
Group Grievances [77] Percentile Rank (0-100) 100 corresponds to highest possible rank	8.3 (2020)	Improving

ASSESSMENT

The State lacks the capacity and authority to address demographic and population stresses. First, the country has one of the youngest and most dependent populations in the world. There is a higher concentration of youth in urban areas due to education and employment opportunities. The 2018 austerity measures, specifically the cancellation of government scholarships, were a catalyst for youth movements in urban areas [78]. Moreover, in the absence of formal income opportunities, youth face fewer opportunity-costs for joining Boko Haram or other terrorist organizations [35]. The temptations may be amplified by ethnic, provincial, and urban-rural horizontal inequalities among the population.

Additionally, land scarcity and competition over resources are often the sources of conflict between communities. Given the country's tremendous diversity, conflicts are often divided among tribal lines and ethnically politicized [35]. Border areas are especially vulnerable to violence due to the government's weakened legitimacy in these communities and cross-border intercommunal connections. In the East, these problems are being amplified by the high population concentration. Between 1964 and 1993, the province of Sila's population grew by 400% [35]. The area is plagued by frequent disputes over land and water-use rights between the nomadic, indigenous populations and the settled pastoralists. Moreover, ethnic allegiances strengthened during the Darfur crisis between Ouaddaïans and Sudan's non-Arab population, as well as Chad's Arab population and the Janjaweed militia group, pose a threat for cross-border, large-scale violence [35].

Finally, Chad is home to the largest population of refugees in the Sahel region. As of October 2020, 473,000 people were forced or fled to Chad due to instability in neighbouring countries [79]. Additionally, more than 230,000 people are internally displaced around Lake Chad. The government is unable to tackle these populations' needs, given its limited-service delivery capacity and the country's lack of infrastructure [79].

TREND

Fertility rates and population growth rate are declining, though the positive effects will take many years to be felt on the fragility levels. The youth population in Chad will grow rapidly as infant mortality rates fall [80] Youth will continue to migrate to urban areas in search of employment opportunities. It is unlikely that the government will be able to address the educational and occupational aspirations of this population. Desertification will shift additional groups to the Southern and Eastern provinces. Without adequate resource management, conflict will likely continue between these populations.

6) SECURITY AND CRIME

Indicator	Value	Trend
Organized Conflict (Internal) [81] Numbered Score (1-5) 5 corresponds to most possible Organized Conflict	4 (2020)	Constant
Terrorist Activity [81] Numbered Score (1-5) 5 corresponds to most possible Terrorist Activity	2.91 (2020)	Constant
Internal Conflicts Fought [81] Numbered Score (1-5) 5 corresponds to most possible Internal Conflicts Fought	2.77 (2020)	Deteriorating
Homicides [81] Numbered Score (1-5) 5 corresponds to most possible Homicides	3.76 (2020)	Constant
Violent Crime [81] Numbered Score (1-5)	3 (2020)	Constant

5 corresponds to most possible Violent Crime		
Incidents [82] Number of terrorist attacks	4 (2018)	Constant
Fatalities [82] Number of deaths from terrorist attacks	47 (2018)	Deteriorating
Injuries [82] Number of injuries from terrorist attacks	2 (2018)	Constant
Property [82] Number of property damage from terrorist attacks	0 (2018)	Constant
Boko Haram Attacks [56] Number of incidents with Boko Haram in Chad	13 (2019)	Deteriorating

ASSESSMENT

Chad's security situation is threatened by continued presence of organized and every-day violent crime and geopolitical tensions. The Chadian National Army (ANT) continues to fight Boko Haram, a transnational terrorist organization in the Lake Chad Region. As shown by the UCDP database, the number of Boko Haram conflicts increased significantly in 2019 [56].

Internal conflicts in Chad are common among pastoralists and herders [83]. In Eastern Chad, there is on-going conflict between members of the Zaghawa (herders) canton and the Ouaddaïans (pastoralists) over rural territory and scarce resources. In May 2019, a wildfire further exasperated the conflict leading to animal theft, and the death of six people [35]. Three months later, the death of a Zaghawa teen sparked additional conflict between the communities. While this conflict originally was between a small group of people, it now involves various other communities across the region [35]. This conflict will likely worsen as climate change impacts become more pronounced. The conflict reflects the government's inability to provide basic resources and create measures to overcome climate-related scarcity. Moreover, the involved actors' use of violence rather than using formal methods of dispute management is indicative of the weak authority that the state has over rural territory.

TREND

Boko Haram's presence will depend on their funding, but based off the increased presence in 2019 [84], it is likely that there will be increased presence in the future,

The population of Chad is continuing to grow, and resources are becoming scarcer. Therefore, violent conflicts between farmers and pastoralists are likely to increase.

7. ALC ANALYSIS

AUTHORITY

THE ABILITY OF THE STATE TO PROVIDE SECURITY AND EXERCISE CONTROL
WITHIN ITS TERRITORY

Demography and population, environment and security and crime are all primary drivers for the state's lack of authority in rural areas, and governance and human development are increasing the potential for conflict.

The main risks to the government's authority are terrorism, corruption, and rule of law. Boko Haram is a greater threat than in the past [56], and the militant group's frequent attacks have resulted in deaths of civilians and mass-displacement. The group has undermined the state's ability to keep civilians safe.

Additionally, the government is unable to properly regulate employees and prevent them from abusing their position. Police officers engage in improper practices, often ignoring arrest warrants for members of their own clan and well-connected individuals [78]. Elite capture of the government and the use of rents for personal gain has stifled public wellbeing. In response, there have been multiple protests in urban areas that were all violently shutdown by the police [85] [78]. The government's authority is also undermined by arbitrary arrests against citizens and civil society organizations that publicly criticizes the state [85].

One of the challenges to state authority is traditional customs and practices, which undermine the state's ability to govern and ensure the population complies with legislation. Many of these customary practices have to do with family law and perpetuate gender inequality against women. For example, the law states that the age for marriage is 18, but 68% of girls were married before the legal age according to a study conducted in Mandou, Ouaddai and Tandjile [86]. Finally, Chad's constitution prohibits violence against women and girls, though in the Sila and Salamat regions, over 90% of women have gone through female genital mutilation [87]. The state has failed to protect women in rural areas, including refugee camps and communities, where women are no longer allowed to be out alone in some camps because of higher rates of sexual violence [88]. The state's inability to eliminate violence against women demonstrates its limited authority in rural areas.

Furthermore, increases in population and the movement of people has placed a strain on the resources of the country, causing violence between pastoralists and farmers [23]. The state has failed to resolve the conflict in the south between herders and pastoralists [23]. Both demography and population, along with the environment are diminishing the state's authority.

The government has negotiated Peace agreements with rebel groups in the past. For example, in 2002, the Déby Regime reached an agreement for the Movement for Democracy and Justice (MDJT) to incorporate the rebels into the government and military [34]. However, there is no indication of the government replicating that process to ensure more inclusive governance. A key tactic used by Déby is to poach leaders of opposition movements into his circle to avoid challenges to his authority [27].

The state has a high potential for further conflict, as changes to the constitution and Chad's inability to provide public services will increase horizontal inequalities. These changes have created a more caused both political and socioeconomic horizontal inequalities to run in the same direction [2], favoring the Zaghawa group [23]. Furthermore, Chad's religious intolerance [25], increase horizontal inequalities and risks future conflict [89]. It does not seem like there are any elites that can effectively mobilize the other groups, but the risk is still present.

Finally, Chad's recent actions of trying to neglect rule of law for the elite [90] has increased the perception of horizontal inequalities. Protests recently broke out after the son of an elite was exempt from punishment for sexual violence [27]. Along with this, Chad's education system is going through difficulties [66] [13], causing the population's level of education to lower. Since Chad has a lot of oil, a young population, and

the access to their minimal education is deteriorating even more recently, the risk of conflict has increased [91]. Both governance and human development are increasing the risk of conflict and limiting authority.

LEGITIMACY

THE POPULATION'S ALLEGIANCE TO THE STATE AND FOCUSES ON STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS

Although legitimacy within the state is difficult to measure, indicators and surveys give evidence that economic development and governance are the primary drivers for the state's legitimacy.

Economic Development has limited the opportunities available to strengthen the country's legitimacy. Dependence on oil, high costs to starting a business and getting electricity have made the social contract created through a tax system completely non-existent. International companies are also wary of expanding their businesses to Chad due to corruption [62], again limiting any possibility of creating a contract between the state and its civilians. The costs of starting a business are decreasing [57], and once businesses are created, legitimacy will begin to improve.

Governance's impact on legitimacy has been present recently through the civilians' actions. The government's increased expenditure on education as a percentage of government expenditure [48] has not been perceived by the public employees, as community schools are closing [66], and strikes from public employees [13]. Furthermore, Chad is a hybrid regime [3], and its claim of being a democracy is isomorphic mimicry [92]. Institutions such as fair elections, and free media and religion are key institutions to democracies, but the state does not abide by them [11] [25]. This has increased the distrust between it and the population. With elections approaching in 2021, it is very likely that MPS's actions will be motivated by power, and the relationship between the state and the population will deteriorate even further.

Deby's regime also derives much of its legitimacy from its international relationships [93]. Chad has framed itself as a regional military leader, a position that was reinforced by the country's success in reducing the Boko Haram threat in Nigeria. The country has also established itself as a vital force in fighting terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa. Chad's counter-terrorism operations have strengthened the relationship with France and have created international recognition for the Deby regime [93]. Deby's appointment to the head of the African Union, along with Chad's efforts to offer asylum to refugees have also increased the regimes international legitimacy.

Furthermore, legitimacy between women and their communities is also weak. A survey taken in the Lac province proves that women do not feel that their voice is heard in their communities. It states that 87% of men thought the community worked together on issues, while only 44% of women agreed. Also, only 38% of women compared to 57% of men felt that leaders wanted them involved in the decision-making process of the community [94]. Communities need to strengthen their legitimacy with women.

CAPACITY

THE POTENTIAL FOR THE STATE TO RESPOND AND PROVIDE RESOURCES TO THE POPULATION

Governance and economic development are primary drivers for capacity, and human development is a secondary driver.

Elite capture has caused the government to struggle in providing basic services, as evident by the weak capabilities of the education and healthcare sectors [61]. The state's recent increase in expenditure on education as a percentage of government expenditure, along with support from external sources for healthcare [48] may improve the state's capacity in the future. Also, once the Glencore loan has been paid off, the state will be able to invest more in public services. In this case, governance could potentially be a positive driver for capacity in the future.

The government's prioritization of oil development has resulted in undiversified, and highly informal economy. The state's unreliable tax revenue [58] is unable to improve in public service provision. Olam's recent joining of Chad's private sector [44], along with lowering business costs [57] will improve the state's ability to collect taxes and invest them in public services, however; it will take many years for the costs of starting a business and getting electricity to decrease enough before a large private sector is present. Therefore, economic development will be a positive driver for capacity in the long-term.

Public services like education and healthcare are declining because of the deteriorating effects of governance and economic development on capacity. As a result, these clusters have negatively affected human development's impact on capacity. Since the lack of human development in the state lowers education and healthcare, the state has no future development in qualified teachers and healthcare professionals, causing human development to be a negative secondary driver for capacity. Governance and economic development are expected to improve long-term, and as a result, public services will improve and become more robust, making human development a positive driver for capacity in the long-term.

Many people in rural areas, especially women and breeders, do not feel that they have equal access and rights to resources. A survey taken in the Lac province stated that only 23% of breeders, and 27% of women agreed that they had the same rights to the rest of the population to resources. Meanwhile, 39% of farmers and 43% of men thought they had the same rights [94]. This shows that although a large proportion of the community believes they are excluded from the same resources as others, the feeling is most common among breeders and women. Communities lack the capacity to provide resources in a manner that any segment of the population feels that they have the same rights as others to resources.

8. SCENARIOS

Baseline Scenario:

As elections approached in April 2021, the MPS party used HAMA to silence any media criticisms and used public funds to increase their chances of winning the elections. President Idriss Deby won the elections by a large margin, but MPS is accused of election fraud facilitated by insufficient oversight of the elections by CENI. Saleh Kebzabo tried to raise the public's awareness of it. Protests over election results occurred in the capital but were quickly silenced. The government has not placed much emphasis on economic environment during this period because of its focus on elections, and as a result, the economy remains relatively unchanged. Electricity and business costs are still much too high to expand the formal economy. The unreliable income tax revenues have not increased enough for any significant increases in funding for public services. Education expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure has remained constant, and healthcare expenditure is still largely supported by external sources, but public-school teachers and healthcare workers are both on strike, and more community schools are shutting down. The oil price has increased slightly since 2020, and the low oil profits are used to pay back Glencore. Boko Haram continues to have a presence in Lake Chad, and resource scarcity combined with displaced and refugee populations aggravates conflict between farmers and pastoralists.

Best Case Scenario:

During the lead-up to the elections, MPS used its funding to focus on public services rather than illicitly funding their campaign. The public has accepted the election result with minimal opposition. MPS realizes that the oil price has proven to be unreliable to depend on, and as a result, the government attempts to spur growth in other sectors of the economy. The government lowers the costs of starting new businesses and electricity to increase domestic businesses, encourage domestic markets, and increase company and individual income taxes. MPS plans to use the taxes to invest in their education and healthcare systems, causing public school strikes to come to an end. The dry season has lowered the curve for chikungunya in the country, allowing the state to focus its health priorities on Covid-19. Boko Haram's presence has been limited because of the Multinational Joint Taskforce. The government makes attempts to revitalize land-use policies in response to the high presence of refugees and IDPs in the country. Pastoralists and farmers continue to have tense relations over resource scarcity, but the government hopes future job opportunities and clarity of land-use rights will prevent future conflict.

Worst Case Scenario:

In the lead-up to the election, MPS used expenditures meant for the education system to increase the likelihood of Deby winning the presidency. Saleh Kebzabo and FONAC brought public attention to MPS' corruption and disregard for the rule of law. Protests have erupted since President Idriss Deby announced his victory. The public is also more aware of the horizontal inequalities facilitated by the government, which has led to a state of unrest and widespread violence. No attempts to improve the business environment have been made, and the government continues to rely on oil profits to sustain the economy. Oil price fluctuation has led to inconsistent payments for public employees, resulting in more strikes from public school teachers and healthcare workers. Boko Haram has also increased their presence in Lake Chad, causing even more people to flee and disrupting major trade routes in the region. The high presence of refugees and IDP's in the South has increased conflicts over resources, and urban and rural populations across the country are experiencing food insecurity.

Wild Card:

Change in Election Date: Protests begin to rise over the government's misconduct. The government recognizes the peoples' anger towards them during protests and decides to push April's elections back further. The government states that the reason for moving the election is because of coronavirus and funding issues.

COVID-19 and Neighboring Conflict Wild Card: Instability in neighboring conflict results in an influx of refugees across the border into Chad. The government's delayed response allows intermingling between communities and the lack of adequate water and sanitation services causes an outbreak of COVID-19. The previous initiatives including, sending community health educators door-to-door to explain COVID-19 measures and radio broadcasts do not reach the refugee population. Given the high population density in border areas, the virus spreads quickly. The weakness in the healthcare system, and the overburdened NGOs in the country are unable to provide treatment to infected populations.

9. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Option 1: Anti-corruption mechanism: Government Procurement and Accountability Committee

The first recommendation is that the World Bank support a committee to oversee the national government, with the specific mandate to prevent improper spending and to ensure accountability in the government procurement of infrastructure contracts. For the six-months, this committee would have a sub-mandate of acting as a safeguard to ensure PLM does not use public funds for election campaigning

and promotion. The committee should be made up of primarily civil society members, members of local NGOs, and members of the public that have shown a commitment to accountable and transparent governance.

Entry Points:

Chad's strong relationship with Paris could be leveraged to encourage the Deby regime to accept this project. Stability in Chad is essential for Paris to fight Islamic militants in the region, the Macron government should be on board as this policy is necessary to address public dissent and growing frustrations with the government. High ranking French officials could facilitate the adoption of this policy. Additionally, The Ministry of Justice and Human Rights has helped to coordinate human right protection activities between local NGO's. While the Ministry does have limited capacity, it is reportedly free from elite influence [95]. The Ministry could assist in the procedures of the committee. Moreover, Saleh Kebzabo and FONAC could provide insight on the deeper working of elite networks, though, the overall use of opposition political figures should be limited to ensure the Deby Regime supports the plan. President Deby once started an anti-corruption measure called Operation Cobra. The framework of this operation could be implemented again, but from a non-partisan source.

Agents of Change:

The Chadian Association for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LDTH) mandate includes a commitment to ensuring good governance in Chad. The current President of this committee, Jacqueline Moudeina could support the creation of the committee and would have insighting on strong CSO's to include in the member selection process. [96] [85]

Civil Society Organizations: Civil Society Organizations have actively protested throughout the Deby regime. In 2016, protests erupted across Chad, primarily due to economic frustrations, and the governments lack of response to these protests. Prominent civil society organizations can be found in Annex B.

Resistance Points:

The major resistance will be from the political and economic elite that benefit from this current system, and the clients that benefit from their privileged position. Specifically, there may be friction with the Ministry of Infrastructure as this ministry is responsible for allocating funds to other ministries.

Risks:

The main risks are that the political and economic elite infiltrate the oversight committee or that the elite co-opts group members. The other risk is that low-level corruption or inefficiencies undermine the potential improvements in services, which prevents capacity gains. Finally, this initiative will disturb the patron-client relationships established by Deby and the rest of the government. This could threaten the president's support base and create instability in the capital.

Relevance to End User:

Corruption contributes to both the complex environment, the high fragility, and severe poverty in Chad. As a result, the elites' control of rents is the main driver of low human and economic development in Chad. The World Bank has experience working in both areas. Moreover, the World Bank-Chad oil project provides insight into the extent of corruption in the country and the necessity for an oversight committee.

Expected Outcome:

First, this initiative will strengthen civil society, provide an outlet for citizens to get their voices heard, which is necessary to keep the government accountable in the long run. Civil society groups and locals

are familiar with the country's dynamics and have a vested interest in successful governance. Ensuring the committee includes members from typically marginalized ethnic groups and giving them a common purpose can positively affect group fractionalization.

An oversight committee would allocate public funds more transparently, improving the government's legitimacy. Moreover, the oversight committee would make it harder for officials to use public funds illicitly, which will reduce the funds being diverted away from services. Ideally, increased funds will improve the quality of the public and strengthen the capacity of the government. An improvement in services will reduce the tensions associated with demographic pressures and the youth bulge. Improved services will help build human capital in the country so the economy can reach its full potential. Moreover, fair procurement will reduce some of the inequality in the community as contracts will no longer be awarded to a handful of companies with political value. This policy can successfully achieve the best-case scenario by directly targeting governance and human development, and indirectly improving economic development.

Measurement/verification and results:

The measurement of this program will be done through subjective-based and data-driven methods. The subjective-based methods will use a widely distributed survey to measure changes in public perception of the government's conduct. This will be useful for identifying links to legitimacy. The data-driven method will assess indicators on corruption, including information from the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) to identify cross-cultural comparisons and ensure validity.

Option 2: Decentralized Land Administration and Resource Management

Chad's central environmental and resource management policy is inefficient leading to the underdevelopment of the agriculture sector and a lack of climate resiliency. This is aggravating conflicts among communities in Southern provinces and Eastern provinces. A decentralized land and resource management system would build local resiliency to climate change and strengthen the capacity of local actors to address land-related disputes.

Entry Points for Action:

The Chadian Civil Code supports property rights for individual in businesses, however, there are not clearly defined rights on customary ownership [97]. In 2018, the International Development Agency funded a Household Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) that assessed agriculture productivity weaknesses. The information from this survey can be used to identify critical areas that require policy improvement. The survey already found that there are only 7000 registered land titles in all of Chad [98]. Moreover, registering land is a 30-step process, and costs around a quarter of the GDP per capita (approximately \$170 USD) [98] [27]. Reducing the cost and simplifying the process should be one of the initial steps of this project. The IDA is also financing an Agriculture and Livelihood program in Chad, that could serve as the first few trial communities [6].

Currently, The Ministry of Land Affairs is responsible for providing land titles. In 2013, the Ministry created the On-Stop Land Titling Office to reduce the time it takes to secure land ownership [97]. This office could provide insight on the barriers preventing people from acquiring land tenure. This office can also help develop the capacity of local offices and familiarize them with the process of formalizing citizens tenure

In terms of land disputes, while local chiefs have less power than in the past, they continue to mediate land conflicts [99]. Local chiefs can receive capacity training from local lawyers and the formal judicial branch. Currently, 80% of court cases are related to land disputes so increasing the capabilities of local chiefs will eliminate much of the burden faced by the judicial branch of the government [98].

Finally, the UNDP is developing and implementing an information system that provides up-to-date climate data to support resilient resource-use policy development. This system will be useful for local communities in the management of resources.

Agents of Change:

LDTH: The LDTH can also work with local chiefs to ensure fair and equal treatment of vulnerable groups, including IDPs and women. The group's mandate includes promoting and ensuring social and economic rights, fighting discrimination, and protecting vulnerable populations [100],

Chadian Non-Violence Association (ATNV): Members of this NGO could support capacity building of chiefs as well as local government members when dealing with over-lapping resources [85].

Resistance Points and Costs

Currently, Chad does not have a central resource management policy, and most of the land is an open-access situation. The lack of ownership has resulted in over-grazing, conflict and has made the effects of climate change more pronounced. The law gives equal inheritance to laws to men and women but land disputes, often mediated by local leaders, prioritize men [5]. For this project to be successful, it is necessary to address customary laws that discriminate against women's land ownership. Additionally, corruption at local levels, related to bribes and unfair allocation is a possibility. Finally, there could be issues decentralizing resource management because the federal government will want to have rights to all oil or gold discovered in the country. As a result, provisions would be needed to overcome resistance from Deby administration. The main costs associated with this project would involve capacity development and technical training of local civil servants

Relevance to End User:

This policy would accomplish the World Bank's twin goals of reducing poverty and inclusive growth. 75% of Chad's population lives in rural areas, and 87% of this population lives on less than a dollar a day [48]. Most of the impoverished population is dependent on agriculture as the main source of livelihood. An improved, decentralized land management system could help the agriculture sector reach its full potential, and improve the economic security of much of the population.

Expected Impact:

To avoid the worst-case scenario, Chad must decentralize land and resource management and administration. The main impact of this project is to improve the capacity of local government and actors for more sustainable resource management. Additionally, local governments providing land titleship should make the process easier and reduce the cost of titleship. This should increase the number of people that have land security. The new system will reduce land-related conflict between pastoralists and herders, and local populations with IDP's and refugees. The new dispute body will address customary practices that discriminate against women. Eliminating harmful customary practice is the first step to ending cultural violence experienced by Chadian women, and to change societal perceptions of women's capacity and capabilities. Ownership of land assets will also empower women and is crucial to wealth creation. Additionally, land tenure is linked to increased productivity, soil conservation, and encourages more sustainable practices [98]. This is especially important as women-headed agriculture households in Chad are on average 20% less productive [98].

Localized resource management will give more of a voice to those in the community. This will lead to better climate resiliency because community members have the best understanding of the condition of resources and the urgency of conservation measures [98].

Measurement/verification and results:

The measurement of this policy would include Project Standards Measurement Study in the host communities that this was implemented. Surveys will be used to obtain qualitative data on participant communities' opinion on political commitment, feasibility, and overall public confidence in the project. This will provide insight on the successes and on-going challenges associated with the project. Statistics provided by local governments on the amount of registered land titles and disputes, along with other relevant indicators to measure the overall progress of the report.

Option 3) Improve Infrastructure and Subsidize Domestic Companies

The World Bank should focus on improving Chad's infrastructure to reduce the costs of starting businesses and getting electricity, along with subsidizing the costs for domestic companies in the meantime. Infrastructure like roads and electricity are of particular focus.

Point of Entry and Agents of Change: Chad has created a masterplan for economic development, and this policy should begin immediately to align with Chad's indicated landmarks. The plan focuses on increasing manufacturing and exports. The plan will run until 2030 and hopes to diversify the economy [101]. The plan is supported by both President Idriss Deby and Issa Doubragne, the Minister of Economy, Development Planning, and International Cooperation [102]. An economic market formed through domestic companies is also supported by Ahmat Abakar Aguid [103], the Minister of Infrastructure and Transportation. Saleh Kebzabo, MPS' main opposition, would also be in favor of the creation of smaller businesses [29]. An increase supply of electricity and renewable energy has been expressed by the government [104], and the Sahel presents opportunities for solar power [105], indicating that this policy would address Chad's infrastructure needs. The agents of change include President Idriss Deby, the Ministry of Economy, Development Planning, and International Cooperation, the Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transportation, and Societe Nationale d'Electricite.

Resistance Points: The government may resist committing to a large infrastructure project because of its current commitments of paying back Glencore, and meeting its funding to requirements for the Intended Nationally Determined Contribution.

Relevance to End User: The World Bank's mandate is focused on reducing poverty. Ideally, this project will facilitate the creation of domestic companies in the short-run and allow them to be self reliant in the long-run.

Expected Impact: Investment in infrastructure will target both primary and secondary drivers. Decreasing the costs of electricity and starting a business will lead to the creation of domestic companies, which will allow for a larger and more diversified formal economy. The government will be able to rely on higher and more consistent income taxes. As a result, Chad's dependence on oil will decline, and the government will be able to increase its funds to public services, thus increasing the state's capacity. The increase in education and healthcare will be important investments for the future of Chad's economy, as both sectors need more qualified employees [64] [67]. A social contract will also be formed through the personal income taxes, which will improve the legitimacy of the state. An increase in more ethnicities into the formal economy will lower socioeconomic horizontal inequalities between the Zaghawa group and other ethnicities, reducing the likelihood of violence [89] and conflict from farmers and pastoralists over scarce resources, increasing the authority of the state. Improving infrastructure like roads and the capacity of electricity will increase the capabilities of the markets in Chad, and Chad's ability to invest in future projects in rural areas.

Risks: There is a risk that only elite groups who have education will create companies, which will increase socioeconomic horizontal inequalities, thus elevating the likelihood of conflict [89]. The main actors that the World Bank will engage with are government bodies, therefore; risk of corruption and the misuse of

funds needs to be taken into consideration. Without full transparency or control of funds, the probability of large sums of money being unaccounted for are large. Finally, allowing the World Bank to support this project may cause the Chadian government to disregard its primary responsibilities.

Costs: A major infrastructure project will cost billions of USD and be a long-term project.

Measurement/verification and results: This is a long-term project, and a large change in the monitored indicators should not be expected for at least 4-6 years. The following indicators should be monitored: Vulnerable Employment (% of total employment), Informal employment (% of total non-agricultural employment), Market Organization, Tax of Individuals (Millions XAF), Corporate Tax (Millions XAF), Oil rents (% of GDP), Starting a Business Cost (% of income per capita), and Getting Electricity - Cost (% of income per capita).

ANNEX A: DECAL DATA FOR INDICATORS

GOVERNANCE DATA

	World Bank Governance Indicators [53]					Transparency International [47]	Freedom House [106] [107] [108] [26]			World Development Indicators [48]		BTI [49]	
	Voice and Accountability	Government Effectiveness	Rule of Law	Regulatory Quality	Control of Corruption		Corruption Perception Index	Freedom of Civil Liberties	Freedom of Political Rights	Freedom to practice and express their religious faith	Domestic general government health expenditure (% of general government expenditure)	Government expenditure on education as % of total government expenditure (%)	Prosecution of Office Abuse
2006	8.65	4.39	2.87	14.71	4.88	2				7.14	..	3	1
2007	8.65	2.43	4.31	13.11	3.88	1.8				5.99	..		
2008	8.65	2.43	2.40	12.14	1.46	1.6				4.23	..	2	1
2009	9.0	4.31	3.79	14.83	2.87	1.6				3.83	9.54159		
2010	10.43	4.31	3.32	14.35	2.86	1.7				3.50	8.11928	2	1
2011	10.80	6.64	2.35	16.11	4.74	2				3.74	10.08326		
2012	9.86	3.32	2.82	13.27	3.79	19				4.00	9.21241	3	1
2013	10.33	7.11	5.63	17.06	4.27	19				4.98	12.46146		
2014	10.84	6.25	9.62	10.58	6.25	22				5.62	..	3	1
2015	11.33	6.73	8.65	9.13	5.29	22				5.25	..		
2016	9.36	6.25	7.69	9.62	4.81	20				5.73	..	3	1
2017	11.82	6.25	8.65	9.13	5.29	20	14	4		4.68	16.36275		
2018	8.37	6.73	7.21	11.54	6.73	20	14	4	1	3	1
2019	9.36	5.77	7.21	11.06	5.77		14	4	1		
2020							14	3	1	3	1

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DATA

	BTI [49]	Doing Business Report [57]				World Development Indicators [48]		World Governance Indicators [53]	OECD.Stat [58]		
	Market Organization	Getting Electricity - Cost (% of income per capita)	Starting a Business Cost (% of income per capita)	Starting a Business Procedures	Starting a Business Time (Days)	Vulnerable Employment (% of total employment)	Informal employment (% of total non-agricultural employment)	Regulatory Quality	Total Tax revenue (Millions XAF)	Income Tax of Individuals (Millions XAF)	Income Tax Corporate (Millions XAF)
2006	2		478.4	13	62	93.6					
2007			241.6	13	62	93.5					
2008	3		273.3	13	62	93.5					
2009			253.1	13	62	93.4					
2010	3	14,057	246.4	13	62	93.2		14.4	777,726	55,327	539,410
2011		14,720	226.9	13	62	93.2					
2012	3	13,124	208.5	11	53	93.1		13.3			
2013		11,018	202.0	9	60	93.0		17.1	982,340	92,272	638,233
2014	3	9,580	186.3	9	60	93.0		10.6	762,016	97,997	404,027
2015		7,678	150.6	9	60	92.9		9.1	369,818	94,216	114,480
2016	3	7,661	150.4	9	60	93.0		9.6	245,465	86,497	36,730
2017		8,527	159.8	9	60	93.1		9.1	345,712	88,590	83,464
2018	3	9,821	171.3	9	60	93.0	90.1	11.5	437,105	85,027	165,042
2019		9,916	172.3	8	58	93.0		11.1			
2020	3	9,629	169.3	8	58	93.0					

SECURITY AND CRIME DATA

Global Peace Index [81]

Global Terrorism Index [82]

UCDP
[56]

	Organized conflict (internal)	Terrorist Activity	Internal conflicts fought	Homicides	Violent Crime	Incidents	Fatalities	Injuries	Property	Boko Haram Conflicts
2009	5	3.48	3.06	4.07	3.5	3	0	1	0	
2010	5	3.22	3.06	4.07	4	1	0	0	0	
2011	4	2.96	3.06	3.92	4	0	0	0	0	
2012	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	
2013	4	2.32	2.03	3.92	4	0	0	0	0	
2014	4	2.32	1.59	3.92	4	1	6	0	0	
2015	4	1.86	1.44	3.92	4	22	206	410	2	
2016	4	3.31	1.29	3.92	4	3	7	56	0	3
2017	4	3.09	1.74	3.92	4	4	13	1	1	2
2018	4	2.9	1.88	3.76	3	4	47	2	0	5
2019	4	2.9	2.33	3.76	3					13
2020	4	2.91	2.77	3.76	3					-

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT DATA

	Human Development Index [61]							World Development Indicators [48]
	Life expectancy at birth (UNDP)	Mean years of schooling (years)	Mean years of schooling, female (years)	Child malnutrition, stunting (moderate or severe) (% under age 5)	HDI value	Maternal mortality ratio (deaths per 100,000 live births)	Prevalence of female genital mutilation/cutting among girls and women (% of girls and young women ages 15–49)	Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)
2005	48.5	1.5	0.7		0.331	1170	38.4	
2006	48.9	1.6			0.337			
2007	49.3	1.7			0.345			
2008	49.8	1.8			0.35			
2009	50.3	1.8			0.366			
2010	50.9	1.9	1	39.8	0.374	1040		
2011	51.4	2	1		0.385	984		
2012	51.9	2.1	1.1		0.393	931		
2013	52.4	2.1	1.1		0.399	901		
2014	52.8	2.2	1.2		0.406	881		
2015	53.1	2.3	1.2		0.403	856		26.00299
2016	53.4	2.4	1.2		0.398			22.31155
2017	53.7	2.4	1.2		0.401			
2018	54	2.4	1.3		0.401			

DEMOGRAPHY AND POPULATION DATA

Year	United Nations [61]		World Bank Data [61]				Fragile State's Index [77]		
	Total Population (Millions)	Population Growth Rate	Urban population (% of total population)	Rural Population (annual %)	Fertility Rate, total (births per woman)	Infant mortality rate (Per 1000 Births)	Age Dependency Ratio (% of Working Population)	Refugees and IDP'	Demographic Pressure
2006		3.5		3.5	7.0		107.75	9.0	9.0
2007		3.4		3.3	6.9		107.53	8.9	9.1
2008		3.3		3.3	6.8		107.03	9.2	9.1
2009		3.3		3.3	6.7		106.31	9.4	9.3
2010	12.0	3.3	22.0	3.3	6.6	85.2	104.93	9.5	9.4
2011	12.4	3.4	22.1	3.3	6.5	83.4	104.94	9.5	9.2
2012	12.8	3.4	22.1	3.3	6.4	81.7	104.20	9.5	9.3
2013	13.2	3.4	22.2	3.2	6.3	80.1	103.29	9.7	9.8
2014	13.7	3.3	22.4	3.1	6.2	78.4	102.26	9.8	9.5
2015	14.1	3.2	22.5	3.0	6.0	76.7	101.13	10.0	9.6
2016	14.6	3.1	22.7	2.9	5.9	75.0	100.37	9.8	9.7
2017	15.0	3.1	22.9	2.8	5.8	73.4	99.47	9.6	10.0
2018	15.5	3.0	23.1	2.8	5.7		98.44	9.3	10.0
2019		3.0		2.7			97.29	9.5	9.5
2020								9.2	9.6

ENVIRONMENT DATA

Ecological Threat Register [68]


World Development
Indicators [48]

Human
Development
Index [61]

	Water Stress	Droughts	Flood	Resource Scarcity	Resilience	Arable land (% of land area)	CPIA policy and institutions for environmental sustainability rating (1=low to 6=high)	Degraded Land (% of total land area)
2006						3.534	2.5	
2007						3.415	2.5	
2008						3.415	2	
2009						3.415	2	
2010						3.574	2	
2011						3.891	2.5	
2012						3.891	2.5	
2013						3.891	2.5	
2014						3.891	2.5	
2015						3.891	2.5	34
2016						3.891	2.5	
2017						..	2.5	
2018						..	2.5	
2019						..	3	
2020	1.54	3.16	4	2	6	

ANNEX B: HEALTHCARE EXPENDITURE

Figure 1: Chad Healthcare Expenditure by Source



Source: The World Bank [48]

ANNEX C: SECONDARY STAKEHOLDERS

Students	In 2016, there were mass protests of students over a gang-rape committed by the sons of two high ranking Army officials, and the son of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Since then, students have primarily been concerned with corruption and impunity of the elite circle and their families [27]. The students are also concerned with a lack of job opportunities [85].
The Chadian Association of Unions	This organization are concerned with a repression of civil rights in the country. Leaders and Union members of this organization have been arrested repeatedly from simply exercising their right to protest [85]
Human Rights Advocates	Various human rights advocates are concerned with government corruption and the improper treatment of prisoners in Chad. [96] [85]
“That’s Enough” (Ça suffit) and “Enough is Enough” (Trop, c'est trop)	The political organization is concerned with the excessive corruption in the President Deby regime. That’s Enough want’s Deby to resign, and want to end the stronghold of the country’s elite over the economy and politics. The organization is also concerned with the impunity of the elite [109]. Members of this organization have been arrested for peacefully protesting [85].
Chadian Convention for Human Rights (Convention tchadienne pour la défense des droits humains, CTDDH)	A human-rights NGO with a mandate of improving governance and addressing inequality [85]. The members have often been injured or arrested at protests [96]
Diaspora	About 20,000 Chadian Diaspora live in Europe [110]. In 2019, there were multiple protests over France’s airstrikes against a Chadian rebel group threatening to overthrow the Deby regime. The diaspora feel that France’s intervention in Chadian politics is a form of neocolonialism and is helping to sustain the corrupt Deby regime [110].

Public Internal Stakeholders

Chad's Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI)

Interests

CENI was created to monitor and ensure a free and fair election. However, the members of CENI are selected by Chadian political elite, through the National Framework for Political Dialogue (CNDFP) [26]. Civil society does not get to participate in selecting members. Most of the CENI members have a vested interest in the continuation of the Deby regime due to their client relationship.


ANNEX D: GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AND REVENUE

Table 1: Total Government Expenditure in Percent of Total

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Defense	7.7	5.9	11.3	10.9	7.8
Economic affairs	14.2	10.6	7.5	13.3	11.4
Education	11.8	8.9	10.7	13.0	10.6
General public services	32.8	45.4	33.5	39.6	53.7
Health	7.0	4.9	6.6	6.3	4.8
Housing	2.2	0.9	1.3	0.4	0.0
Public order	5.2	5.6	7.4	6.5	5.2
Recreation, culture, religion	1.0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Social protection	1.0	0.6	0.8	0.7	0.5
Transport and infrastructure	14.6	16.5	16.4	5.3	5.6
Water and sanitation	2.5	0.1	4.1	3.5	0.0
Total	100	100	100	100	100


Source: World Bank [52]

Figure 2: Government Revenues



Source:

Figure 3: Company and Individual Tax Revenues




Source: OECD [58]

ANNEX E: ADDITIONAL FIGURES

Figure 4: Climate Conflict Trap

THE CLIMATE CONFLICT TRAP

CLIMATE CHANGE CONTRIBUTES TO THE DRIVERS OF CONFLICT
AND CONFLICT AFFECTS PEOPLES' ADAPTATION CAPACITIES



Source: Shoring Up Stability [111]

Figure 5: Price of Oil Predictions

Prices				
	2018	2019	2020	2021
WTI Crude Oil^a (dollars per barrel)	65.07	56.99	38.96	45.78
Brent Crude Oil (dollars per barrel)	71.21	64.34	41.43	48.53
Gasoline^b (dollars testper gallon)	2.73	2.60	2.17	2.27
Diesel^c (dollars per gallon)	3.18	3.06	2.55	2.62
Heating Oil^d (dollars per gallon)	3.01	3.00	2.47	2.68
Natural Gas^d (dollars per thousand cubic feet)	10.46	10.46	10.51	10.65
Electricity^d (cents per kilowatthour)	12.87	13.01	13.12	13.24
Coal^e (dollars per million Btu)	2.06	2.01	1.94	2.05

^aWest Texas Intermediate.

^bAverage regular pump price.

^cOn-highway retail.

^dU.S. Residential average.

^eElectric power generation fuel cost.

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration [112]

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