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POLICY PAPER

HAITI

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Executive Summary

The following policy paper focuses on the capacity and legitimacy trap Haiti faces resulting from its long history of fragility. Governance, security & crime, and economic/human development are identified as the main drivers of fragility in Haiti. We recommend the second policy option we have presented; the Government of Canada should call for the extension of the MINUJUSTH mandate to overcome the persisting challenges Haiti continues to face. Although all primary drivers are of equal significance contributing to Haiti's fragility, this recommendation will provide much needed support that will allow Haiti to strengthen its institutions to fulfill its social contract under its Governance driver, increasing the state's legitimacy and capacity. Only once this is achieved will the government have the capacity to make policy improvements in regards to the three remaining primary drivers of fragility.

Overview


The paper begins with a brief description of the overall methodology employed and an overview of the potential limitations of this analysis. This is followed by a timeline of key events in Haiti's history that have contributed to its current fragility which is accompanied by brief descriptions of these events. Information on the targeted end user of this policy paper is provided which then leads to a discussion of key internal and external stakeholders in reference to Haiti's fragility. A fragility risk assessment is then conducted through which Haiti's fragility is explained using primary and secondary drivers informed by the ALC theoretical framework. Using information provided in the risk assessment, scenario predictions- most likely, best case, worst case, and wild card- are presented for a projected relevance period of 6 months. These scenarios are used to inform the policy options that are presented at the end of the paper alongside the key recommendation put forward for the end user.

Methodology

Qualitative and quantitative methodologies have been used to form the overall analysis provided in this paper using a variety of sources including scholarly articles, news reports, government websites, NGO publications, and international research databases. A variety of indicators were used to guide the analysis which were extracted from many databases including, but not limited to: The World Bank GovData 360, CIPF Global Fragility Ranking, Bertlesmann Transformation Index, etc.

It is important to note limitations that were present during the course of our research which include: limitations in obtaining up-to date statistical data, a lack of information on informal power structures in Haiti, as well as a lack of neutrality when it comes to Haitian government publications. Another limitation was the existence of inconsistent reporting periods on different indicators. However, efforts to overcome these limitations were employed through events monitoring via news outlets and peer-reviewed publications to fill in gaps with more recent and unbiased data.

History of fragility in Haiti



Haiti has a long history of fragility, consistently being ranked in the bottom 15 countries in the world by the Fragile States Index.ⁱ Haiti's history as a slave state under colonial rule by the Spanish and later French is important to note when discussing its current state of fragility. Haiti achieved independence in 1804, and has experienced political instability, including military coup d'états in 1958, 1988, 1991 and most recently in 2004.ⁱⁱ Following the 2004 coup which removed then President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the United Nations Security Council authorized the deployment of an interim peacekeeping force in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The United Nations stabilization mission was replaced in 2017 by the UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), which is smaller in scale, and is set to withdraw from Haiti in April of 2019.ⁱⁱⁱ

Haiti's fragile nature was exacerbated in 2010 after a devastating earthquake killed more than 250,000 and left 1.5 million people homeless.^{iv} In the months following the earthquake, an outbreak of cholera was confirmed. The outbreak was one of the worst in modern history, with over 665,000 cases and 8,183 deaths.^v In response to the earthquake, the international community gave over 3 billion USD in ODA to Haiti in 2010 to help in the rebuilding efforts.^{vi}

Haiti was struck with another natural disaster in 2016 with the landfall of Hurricane Mathew, a category 4 hurricane. As a result of Mathew, 546 people were killed and more than 175,000 needed immediate humanitarian assistance.^{vii} Haiti continues to be at a high risk of natural hazards as it is one of the countries most affected by natural disasters due its low resiliency and capacity to deal with these shocks.

Haiti's current President, Jovenel Moise was inaugurated in 2017 two years after former President Michel Martelly was unable to organize an orderly transfer of power in 2015 and was forced to resign.^{viii} The election of Moise was heavily criticized as being illegitimate, as the voter participation rate was only 21%.^{ix}

In 2018, the government of Haiti and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to a deal that would introduce new fiscal policy measures to improve domestic resource mobilization to create more space for 'priority expenditures' i.e., health and education. This plan consisted of the removal of fuel price subsidies in 2018 as these subsidies were said to primarily go to the richest Haitians who owned vehicles.^x When the government introduced this removal policy

however, mass protests broke out in the country's capital as the removal of subsidies raised petrol prices by approximately 38%.^{xi} Even after the government suspended the policy, protests and strikes were still prevalent in the country and the IMF did not withdraw its support for fuel subsidy removals from its new deal with the Haitian government. Instead, the IMF stated that the subsidies should be reduced gradually over time.^{xii} Thus, President Moïse continues to face pressure from the IMF deal to remove fuel subsidies and from the Haitian public.

End Users

This policy brief is directed towards Global Affairs Canada (GAC)- Peace and Stabilization Operations Programs (PSOP) bureau, as well as to the Haiti geographic desk at GAC. These stakeholders were selected as they each have a pivotal role in Canada's aid and development program in Haiti. PSOP has a mandate to provide leadership, help deliver conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives in countries such as Haiti, which is listed as a geographic priority. The Haiti geographic desk at GAC is also a key end user for the purpose of this analysis as it covers the bilateral aid relations between Canada and Haiti.

Internal Stakeholders

Gangs

Within Haiti and particularly the capital city of Port au Prince, gangs hold a significant presence. These gangs work within Haiti's current capacity gap and often fulfill a role as a de facto government in the poorer neighbourhoods, specifically in Martissant.^{xiii} These gangs refer to themselves as "la baz" or "the base" of the neighbourhood. Gangs in Haiti have historically performed political roles, as under the Aristide government a gang known as "Chimeres", was used by the government to control the streets and silence the opposition.^{xiv}

NGO's

As can be expected after a shock such as the 2010 earthquake, there was a large influx of international aid that entered Haiti to help rebuild the nation following the mass destruction. The net ODA and official aid received in 2010 was approximately \$3.1 billion USD.^{xv} In 2009 there were 30 officially registered NGO's working in Haiti but by December 2010 this number tripled with 93 registered NGO's. Over time, due to several factors which include reduced media attention in Haiti as well as decreasing donor support, this number currently sits at 26 NGO's.^{xvi} (Refer to Annex for Registered NGO trends). It's important to highlight the significant influence that non-state private actors, primarily NGO's, have in Haiti. It is reported that prior to the 2010 earthquake, there were an estimated 10,000 NGO's operating in Haiti.^{xvii} The state only received approximately one percent of international aid in response to the earthquake with the rest concentrated in NGO's.^{xviii} However, these NGO's are very difficult to keep track of as the numbers provided above are the only 'registered' NGO's. Nonetheless, local NGO's are a vital part of Haitian social fabric as public polls have shown that there exists high public trust in NGO's in comparison to the low levels of public trust in the Haitian government.^{xix}

Parti Haïtien tèt kale (PHTK)

Currently in power, this center-right political party with a liberal tendency was officially founded in 2012.^{xx} In November 2016, Jovenal Moïse, leader of the PHTK was elected president of the republic with 55.7% of the votes.^{xxi} Although this party has promised a deep and lasting transformation for the country, the party and the candidate were heavily criticized for corruption.^{xxii}

Ligue alternative pour le progrès et l'émancipation haïtienne (LAPEH)

Founded in 2015 specifically to support the election candidacy of Jude Célestin, this party is an association of a few political parties including: Inite, Vérité, OPL (Organisation du peuple en lutte) and MAS (Mouvement d'action socialist).^{xxxiii} In November 2016, LAPEH won 19.7% of the votes resulting in a second-place finish and maintaining some political power within Haiti.^{xxxiv}

Parti Pitit Dessalines

In the November 2016 election, Jean-Charles Moïse was the candidate for Pitit Dessalines. The party received 11% of the votes.^{xxv} The party platform promotes sovereignty (political), solidarity (social) and prosperity (economical) for the country.^{xxvi}

Fanmi Lavalas

This political party was founded in 1996.^{xxvii} The party emerged from the Lavalas Political Organization who split in two rival factions, the Fanmi Lavalas and OPL.^{xxviii} Jean-Bertrand Aristide, former president in exile, and Yvon Neptune, former prime minister share the leadership role of this party.^{xxix} Despite the former president being in exile, this party plays an important role in Haiti's political scene.^{xxx} In November 2016, the candidate Maryse Narcisse received 9% of the votes.^{xxxi}

External Stakeholders

Haitian Diaspora

The Haitian diaspora is extremely large with over 1.3 million people who were born in Haiti living abroad. In Canada alone, there are approximately 200,000 Haitians, with the majority residing in Quebec, particularly in Montreal.^{xxxii} The Haitian diaspora is integral to the Haitian economy with remittances totaling 29.25% of Haiti's GDP in 2017.^{xxxiii} The size of the Haitian diaspora, and the large amounts of money sent back to the country show the level of investment the diaspora has within their home country.

Dominican Republic

Due to their shared border, the largest number of immigrants to the Dominican Republic have historically been Haitians. According to the UN DESA consensus, in 2015, 79% of immigrants to the Dominican Republic were of Haitian origin.^{xxxiv} This number is heavily affected by shocks to fragility that Haiti faces such as the 2010 earthquake and Hurricane Mathew in 2016. Following that shock, in 2012, 89% of all immigrants to the Dominican Republic were Haitian.^{xxxv} In addition to natural disasters, poverty and political unrest have been large factors that have led to increased migration to the Dominican Republic as well.^{xxxvi} Public perception of this large influx of Haitians entering the Dominican Republic has been largely met with negative sentiments and the Dominican government has implemented stricter border control and tighter migration policies to restrict the influx of Haitian migrants over the years.^{xxxvii}

MINUSTAH & MINUJUSTH

In 2004, resolution 1542 was taken by the Security Council to establish the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) with the mandate to restore a secure and stable environment, promote political processes, strengthen Haiti's Government institutions and rule of law structures, as well as promote and protect human rights^{xxxviii}. The mission ended in 2017 with resolution 2350 and a smaller scale follow up mission for Justice Support in Haiti

(MINUJUSTH) was created^{xxxix}. MINUJUSTH’s mandate is to assist the Government of Haiti to further develop the Haitian National Police (HNP); strengthen Haiti’s rule of law institutions, including the justice and prisons; and to promote and protect human rights - all with a view to improve the everyday lives of the Haitian people.^{xi} As of May 2018, MINUJUSTH had a total of 1,564 personnel including 325 Civilians, 1,233 Police, and 6 UN Volunteer.^{xli}

Fragility Risk Assessment

Authority, Legitimacy, and Capacity (ALC) Framework

Based on the 2017 Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) report, Haiti’s Global Fragility Ranking based on 2016 data was the 21st worst out of 199 countries, categorizing it as a country with serious fragility.^{xlii} This data was based on the ALC theoretical framework where a government must possess fundamental properties of authority, legitimacy, and capacity to function properly.^{xliii}

Authority: CIFP 2017- 6.83 (8.38= the worst score that year)^{xliv}
 Legitimacy: CIFP 2017- 6.47 (7.99= the worst score that year)^{xlv}
 Capacity: CIFP 2017- 6.74 (7.46= the worst score that year)^{xlvi}

Based on all three indicators, Haiti scored very poorly on Authority (A) and extremely poorly for Capacity (C) and Legitimacy (L) as it was among the top 20 worst countries for both L and C. This refers to the capacity and legitimacy trap Haiti’s state institutions have been experiencing. Based on the information provided by these indicators, this paper will further expand on the two worst performing indicators: capacity and legitimacy, through a Fragility Risk Assessment that will seek to explain why the nation remains in a fragility trap.

Legend on Risk			
Risk Intensity	Low	Moderate	High
Legend on Description			
Description	Low Improvement, Stagnant: refers to drivers that have shown insignificant changes in the past few years and are likely to follow the same trendline in the coming 6 months	Volatile: refers to drivers that are likely to change suddenly in the next 6 months	Deteriorating: refers to drivers that are likely to worsen in the next 6 months
*It’s important to note that this legend does not correspond to the colours above			

Primary Drivers of Fragility

Governance Low Improvement, Stagnant	
Indicator	Description
Electoral Process (1=extremely undemocratic, 12=very democratic)	2018: 5 ^{xlvii} 2017: 3 ^{xlviii} 2016: 4 ^{xlix}
Levels of Corruption (0=totally corrupt, 100=no corruption)	2017: 22 ^l Ranked 157/180
Government Effectiveness (-2.5= worst, 2.5=best)	2017: -2.0 ⁱⁱ 2016: -2.1 ⁱⁱⁱ 2015: -2.1 ^{liii}
Wastefulness of Government Spending (1=extremely inefficient, 7= extremely efficient at providing goods and services)	2016: 2.5 ^{liv} 2015: 2.5 ^{lv}
Public Trust in Politicians (1=extremely low, 7=extremely high)	2017: 1.92 ^{lvi} 2015: 1.91 ^{lvii} 2014: 1.98 ^{lviii}
Assessment	
<p>Governance is one of the key drivers of fragility in Haiti. The election of current President Jovenal Moïse took over two years to complete, with the electoral process beginning in 2015, and inauguration occurring in 2017. The voter turnout for the presidential election was very low, which led to some critics to claim that the election was illegitimate. The electoral process has been judged by Freedom House as being undemocratic, and the World Bank has ranked Haiti's government effectiveness as continuously very poor. Protests against the government have been occurring in the capital. In July, Prime Minister Jack Guy Lafontant resigned due to pressures after the government announced plans to raise fuel costs.^{lix} Haiti has had a long history of corruption, and there are no current mechanisms to reign in the levels of corruption. Due to the political instability, low legitimacy and low capacity to deliver public goods and services, this driver of fragility is high risk. Examples of governance capacity gaps are discussed in detail under the Human Development risk assessment.</p>	

Security and Crime Volatile	
Indicator	Description
Border Control	Uncontrolled
Drug Trafficking	limited control
Human Trafficking	limited control
Money Laundering	Uncontrolled
External Military Presence	1233 MINUJUSTH police

HNP	limited control
Abuses by officials	Uncontrolled
Assessment	
<p>Since the adoption of resolution 1542 in 2004 that established the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) Haiti has received extensive support from the international community.^{lx} Due to the limited capacity of the Haitian government, the country has very limited control of its borders.^{lxi} This poor management leaves room for gangs to further engage in international drug trafficking.^{lxii} Haiti is a transit point for cocaine from South America and marijuana from Jamaica headed to U.S., and other markets.^{lxiii} Also, men, women and children are all subject to human trafficking as the country is recognized to be a source of transit and destination specifically for forced labor and sex trafficking.^{lxiv} The government has put some measures in place through the establishment of a prevention of anti-trafficking law enforcement unit, but this measure has not brought about any significant changes in this area. Moreover, the Haitian judicial system remain extremely weak with limited ability to prosecute offenders.^{lxv} The preparation for the transition to a non-peacekeeping presence, beginning in October 2019 brings up persisting challenges as the Haitian National Police (HNP) still need to be strengthened to be able to have the capacity, authority and legitimacy on its own to secure the country.^{lxvi} The government does not have the capacity to process, advance strategic planning, plan budgets, enforce effective policies, or monitoring progress on its own. The Security and Crime situation in Haiti can be identified as high risk and volatile as the situation can change rapidly and unpredictably if any shock were to occur. (Refer to annex for indicator description and analysis)</p>	

Economic Development
Low Improvement, Stagnant

Indicators	Description
GDP: (current US\$)	2017: \$8.41 billion ^{lxxvii} 2016: \$7.97 billion ^{lxxviii} 2015: \$8.72 billion ^{lxxix}
GDP growth: (annual %)	2017: 1.17% ^{lxxx} 2016: 1.45% ^{lxxxi} 2015: 1.21% ^{lxxxii}
Inflation: (annual %)	2017: 14.7% ^{lxxxiii} 2016: 13.8% ^{lxxxiv} 2015: 9.1% ^{lxxxv}
Unemployment rate (% of Labour Force)	2017: 14% ^{lxxxvi} 2016: 14% ^{lxxxvii} 2015: 14% ^{lxxxviii}
Employment in Agricultural Sector: (% of total employment)	2017: 41% ^{lxxxix}
Remittances received (% of GDP)	2017: 29% ^{lxxx} 2016: 29% ^{lxxxii} 2015: 25% ^{lxxxiii}

Assessment

Although Haiti is in close proximity to the U.S market, its economy remains heavily undiversified and largely dependent on foreign aid and remittances. In 2016 alone, international aid and official development assistance amounted to a total of \$1.1 billion.^{lxxxiiii} With the large decline of international aid since the 2010 earthquake, Haiti's economy has been unable to offset the effects of this reduced influx of aid. The unemployment rate remains consistently high with no state measures currently in place to combat this high percentage. Although 41% of total employment is in the agricultural sector, investment in this area remains low with Haiti dependant on imports. In 2017 alone, Haiti spent over \$4.7 billion on exports.^{lxxxv}

Investment in the agricultural sector has the potential of increasing economic growth, reducing inequalities between rural and urban populations in Haiti, and decreasing levels of migration from rural to urban cities.^{lxxxvi} However, extreme difficulties are faced when attempting to attract investors due to the very high-risk business climate in Haiti. According to the Global Competitiveness Index which measures factors that determine levels of economic productivity of a country, Haiti is ranked 137/139 (139 being the lowest).^{lxxxvii} Similarly, the Inward FDI Potential Index ranked Haiti as the second worst country in the world for FDI investments.^{lxxxviii} Thus, economic development remains low and investment climate remains high risk due to a variety of factors including political instability and inadequate infrastructure.^{lxxxix}

Currently, less than 5% of Haiti's overall GDP is spent on health, education, and other social provisions.^{lxxxix}

The Haitian government's new deal with the IMF (to remove fuel subsidies to increase public expenditure budgets) came to a violent stop as mass protests broke out in response to the increased price of fuel. Although this policy was increased in an attempt to have more financial resources to spend on public goods and services, this has reduced the new governments legitimacy in the eyes of the Haitian public with increased sentiments of distrust in the governments new economic reform plan. In consultation with the IMF, the subsidies will be removed gradually, the implications of which are likely to be violent as well.

Thus, Haiti's economic development is stagnant and any improvement in the last few years has been insignificant due to the international aid and remittances that represent a large portion of Haiti's overall GDP. This remains a high risk driver as well as it contributes to Haiti's legitimacy trap i.e., low unemployment rates, high inequality between urban and rural populations, and the governments low expenditure on public good and services increases public sentiments of distrust in the government.

Human Development (Low Improvement, Stagnant)	
Indicators	Description
Human Development Index: (measures standard of living, life expectancy, and education) Score/Rank (out of 189)	2017 : 0.498/168 ^{xc} 2016 : 0.496/167 ^{xi}
Change in HDI Rank	2012-2017 : 0 ^{xcii}
Life Expectancy at Birth: (years)	2017 : 63.6 ^{xciii} 2016 : 63.33 ^{xciv} 2015 : 62.76 ^{xcv}
Expected years of schooling: (years)	2017 : 9.3 ^{x cvi} 2016 : 9.2 ^{x cvii} 2015 : 9.1 ^{x cviii}
Inequality Index (Gini Coefficient) (1= unequal, 0=equal)	2012 : 0.61 ^{xcix}
Poverty: (% of population living below poverty line of US\$2.41 per day) (% of population living below extreme national poverty line of US\$1.23 per day)	2012: 59% ^c 2012: 24% ^{ci}
Assessment	

Haiti's Human Development remains the lowest among the poorest countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region^{cii} (Refer to Annex for chart). With extremely low performing state institutions, these numbers have not shown any significant improvements in the past few years as seen above. Additionally, Haiti continually remains as one of the lowest ranking countries in the world in terms of HDI^{ciii}. With the state being stuck in a capacity trap, education rates are extremely low due to the privatization of schooling. In 2015, it was reported that over 200,000 children remain out of school due to 90% of Haiti's schools being private leading to financial restrictions for parents attempting to enrol their children in schools.^{civ} However, there have been incremental improvements in this sector which may be correlated to the temporary successes of tuition waiver programs.^{cv} With NGO's and private non state actors providing a majority of human development related public goods and services in Haiti, the slight progress made in a few indicators such as Life Expectancy and Expected years of schooling are not sustainable in the long term unless Haiti's state institutions regain capacity.

Poverty and inequality remain one of the worst human development indicators for Haiti. Approximately 38,000 individuals still reside in displacement camps since the 2010 earthquake with the state's failure to provide any resettlement services. Adding on to this number, more than 175,000 individuals remain displaced following the aftermath of Hurricane Mathew in 2016 ^{cvi} Furthermore, the number of child domestic workers in Haiti is staggeringly high with numbers estimated to be between 225,00 to 300,000 children.^{cvii}

Thus, Human Development has shown low improvement in the past few years which means its forecast can be projected to follow these stagnating trends as well. This remains a high-risk driver contributing to Haiti's fragility. Refer to Annex for HDI trends

Secondary Drivers of Fragility

Environment (Low Improvement, Stagnant)	
Indicators	Description
Environmental Risk (0=no risk, 10=extreme risk)	2017: 6.3/10 2016: 6.1/10 2015: 6.2/10 ^{cviii}
Coping Capabilities (0=totally capable, 10=no capabilities)	2017: 7.4/10 2016: 7.4/10 2015: 7.5/10 ^{cix}
Likelihood of Hazards (0=no chance of hazard, 10= 100% chance of hazard)	Cyclone: 7.1/10 Tsunami: 6.1/10 Earthquake: 5.7/10 ^{cx}
Assessment	

Haiti is extremely vulnerable to natural hazards. Its geographic location puts in in the path of many tropical storms and hurricanes, and Haiti rests on two seismic fault lines.^{cxix} Haiti is also deeply affected by global warming, as warmer ocean waters result in more volatile hurricanes.^{cxii}

While Haiti’s neighbouring countries face the same issues in regard to hurricanes, tsunamis and earthquakes, Haiti’s ability to cope with these disasters is much worse. In 2017, Haiti received a score of 6.3 for its overall environmental risk level, while neighbouring Dominican Republic had a score of 3.9. Haiti’s score was much worse because of its weak institutions and governance, as well as a lack of access to healthcare.

Although Haiti is particularly vulnerable to environmental shocks, this is deemed as a secondary driver of fragility as the government’s inability to respond to these risks (i.e., low capacity) , is what makes Haiti especially vulnerable to these shocks.

Demographics (Deteriorating)	
Indicators	Description
Life Expectancy	63.33 years ^{cxiii}
Population	11,163,987 ^{cxiv}
Net Migration Rate	-2 migrants/1000 population ^{cxv}
Haitian Diaspora	2017: 1.3 million people born in Haiti living abroad ^{cxvi} 2010: 1.1 million people born in Haiti living abroad ^{cxvii} 2000: 800 thousand people born in Haiti living abroad ^{cxviii}
Rural population size	2013: 44% 2010: 48% 2000: 64% ^{cxix}
Work Force Size	Number of Haitians under 25: 53.4% ^{cxx}
Assessment	
<p>Haiti has a very young population, with over half of all Haitian under the age of 25. This is combined with a youth unemployment rate of 36%^{cxxi} that has led to many people leaving Haiti and moving to the United States, the Dominican Republic and Canada. The Haitian diaspora is over 1.3 million people and is continuing to grow as Haiti has a negative net migration rate. Haiti has also seen a remarkable rural to urban migration, with the rural population size shrinking from 64% to 44% between 2000 and 2013. The absence of strong government institutions in Haiti has led to a large number of informal religious, political and cultural groups which yield local influence.</p> <p>This is deemed a Low risk but deteriorating driver of fragility due to the following reasons: with the government’s inability to alleviate the large inequalities between rural and urban Haitians, as well as the United States and the Dominican Republic being less receptive to Haitian migrants, this driver of fragility is deteriorating as the government does not have the capacity to address these issues. The United States has announced the termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitians which will commence in 2019, resulting in the removal of undocumented Haitians^{cxvii}</p>	

Scenarios

Most Likely

GDP growth will be minimal and inflation rates will continue to increase. The total amount of foreign aid to Haiti will decrease. The government will be faced with the decision to gradually decrease fuel subsidies in keeping with the IMF deal which will further deteriorate government legitimacy levels and will increase the number of violent protests. This will result in the government halting fuel subsidy removals yet again and the state's capacity to provide social goods and services will remain low and stagnant. Also contributing to deteriorating legitimacy, corruption levels are still high and there are no indicators that suggest that these issues will be alleviated in the short to medium term. With MINUSJUSTH completing its term in April 2019, there will be a gap in security provisions which will leave Haiti's population more susceptible to violence, and illegal activities will be more prominent.

Best Case scenario

The mandate of MINUJUSTH will be renewed with increased focus on strengthening rule of law and security institutions, increasing governance capacity. From this, the government's anti-corruption department will gain independence from externalities and will put in place some feasible anti-corruption measures. In the long term this would increase public perceptions of the state, increasing state legitimacy. The new cohort of HNP that will be entering the workforce in 2019 will be trained effectively to provide more security for Haitians and reducing illegal activities. The international community will redirect some of its foreign aid to the government and other local institutions to strengthen institutional capacity to carry out public services and increase Haiti's resiliency to wild cards. Increased investment in agribusinesses as a result of greater functioning governance mechanisms will foster greater economic growth which will offset the effects of decreased donor funds. This will allow for greater job opportunities for youth and will lead to a gradual reduction of urban-rural inequalities. Greater economic growth will allow for the government's capacity to provide public goods and services to increase and will allow for a more gradual reduction of fuel subsidies which will result in minimal public disturbances.

Worst Case scenario

Further reduction of funds from Haiti's largest donors will occur. This drop in the government budget will force the Haitian government to reduce fuel subsidies altogether which will lead to mass violence and public protests again. The state's legitimacy will be called into question once again with the new Prime Minister Jean-Henry Ceant stepping down less than a year after the previous Prime Minister Jack Guy Lafontant stepped down. NGO's will continue to provide Haiti with some public goods and services but at a reduced level due to decreased international aid. Corruption in the government and NGO's, as a result of further public scandals, would call into question NGO legitimacy which would again lead to donors reducing fund to Haiti. This would result in a feedback loop of increased fragility and corruption, deteriorating legitimacy, and reduced donor aid. Economic growth would deteriorate with increased inflation and youth unemployment rates. Inequalities will rise between urban and rural populations leading to a hike in emigration rates to the Dominican Republic, the United States, and Canada.

Wild Card Scenario #1: Natural Disaster

With Haiti, as one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change affects, another earthquake or hurricane would lead to mass casualties and destruction. Depending on the amount of international media coverage, this could potentially lead to a large influx of international aid. This aid would be concentrated to Haiti's NGO sector and the government institutions will fail to build resiliency against these events. GDP will increase in proportion to the amount of aid received but this would be very temporary growth. Emigration levels would increase again, but the United States would re-establish the TPS for Haitians. Human development indicators would suffer as a result of the poor management of funds and low government capacity to provide services for its citizens. Corruption levels will increase with the influx of financial aid

Wild Card Scenario #2: Elections

The next election will lead to further civil unrest if corruption levels are not reduced by then. This has the potential impact of increasing public sentiments of distrust in politicians and NGO's and other private sector institutions will be relied on for the provision of public goods and services. With MINUJUSTH presence removed from Haiti by the next election, electoral monitoring will be weak and anti-corruption protests may occur with minimal security provisions in place to diffuse the situation.

Policy Options

1. *Calls on the government of Canada to continue its current aid and development programs, specifically in the areas of Public Sector Policy, democratic participation and agricultural development.*

The government of Canada, overseen by the Haiti geographic desk at Global Affairs Canada has invested over \$126 million in various programs to address Haiti's governance, security, and economic shortfalls. A large portion of this funding is for projects in line with the Feminist International Assistance Policy, which has the empowerment of women, peace and security and inclusive governance as three of its core objectives. This recommendation would allow for the full results of these programs to be seen, as it may be too soon to determine the effectiveness of Canadian Aid efforts. One possible risk factor as a result of choosing this policy option is that although there have been some improvements in many of the development indicators, this success has been slow, especially when considering the large amounts of ODA that has been given to Haiti. Continuing Canada's current aid and development programming may not achieve the goals of the Canadian government as quickly as other policy options.

2. *The government of Canada should call for the extension of the MINUJUSTH mandate under guidance of the PSOP*

MINUJUSTH, headquartered in Port-au-Prince, has the mandate of focusing on assisting the government of Haiti in the development of the HNP Force, strengthening the country's rule of law institutions as well as human rights promotion and protection. Since HNP remains below optimal size, and is currently underfunded, this has brought on concerns regarding whether the force will be able to maintain security and stability without the backup of international forces

once they pull out. Canada should call for an extension of MINUJUSTH mandate with increased focus on strengthening rule of law and security institutions. The government's anti-corruption department needs to gain independence and feasible anti-corruption measures need to be implemented. In the long run, this would increase public perceptions of the state, increasing state legitimacy. One possible risk factor to this policy option is that Canada could be, once again, linked with scandals that MINUSTAH was accused of, which could result in a reputational hazard.

3. *Calls on The Government of Canada to increase investment in Haiti's agricultural sector and environmental resiliency, through development projects overseen by the Haiti geographic desk, at Global Affairs Canada*

As mentioned under the Economic Development risk assessment section, in order for the Haitian government to provide for its citizens, alongside addressing its legitimacy problems, the government must have the capacity to provide for its people and unemployment is one of the areas in greatest need of improvement. Stimulating economic growth through investments in Haiti's agricultural sector is one such way to begin this long-term process. However, this agricultural investment must be accompanied with projects that also address Haiti's environmental resiliency shortcomings to ensure that agricultural investments are not as heavily affected by shocks. The Government of Canada should invest in these two areas to ensure that the work of MINUJUSTH is complemented with stimulating economic growth and increasing job opportunities for rural youth. Choosing this option may lead to the following risk: With the limited amount of funds the Haiti geographic desk has to spend on funding development projects in Haiti, there is a risk that investing in the agricultural sector and environmental resiliency through development projects may involve the redirection of funds from other vital development areas.

Recommendation: *The government of Canada should call for the extension of the MINUJUSTH mandate under guidance of the PSOP*

Based on the key drivers of fragility highlighted in the Fragility Risk Assessment, this policy option is a vital first step to ensure further capacity building of Haiti's security and legal institutions. This is a feasible short to medium term goal with the hope that the strengthening of these institutions will increase public perceptions of legitimacy in Haiti's state institutions and the capacity of these institutions to provide effective public services. Only once this is achieved, and the governance driver has shown improvement, will it be possible for the other drivers of fragility to be addressed. This is because all other drivers require government institutional capacity to carry out effective change through policy reforms. The absence of MINUJUSTH in 2019 has the potential of leaving concerning gaps in Haiti's public institutions which threatens to increase Haiti's fragility. Renewing this mandate is essential to ensure further progress is made in Haiti's institutions.

Although MINUSTAH suffered from scandals which reduced the legitimacy of this project (explained in the Annex in further detail), the rebranding into MINUJUSTH and

measures taken by the UN to address previous concerns are enough to mitigate the risks for Canada's reputation.

Annex

Security and Crime Indicators Description

Border Control

Following MINUSTAH's withdrawal from Haiti, the defense ministry of the Dominican Republic sent additional soldiers to the shared border to stop illegal immigration^{cxxiii}. The Haiti's land border with the Dominican Republic is uncontrolled^{cxxiv}, and the underequipped Haitian Coast Guard has minimal ability to patrol Haiti's maritime borders: it has only five operational boats and 160 officers to monitor 1,100 miles of coastline and seven international ports^{cxxv}. A conflict concerning the status of citizenship of Haitians in the Dominican Republic arose between the two countries because of authorities of the Dominican Republic were accused of deportations and assaults of people with Haitian descent^{cxxvi}.

Drug Trafficking

Although Haiti does not produce a significant number of illicit drugs for export, criminal gangs in Haiti are involved in international drug trafficking^{cxxvii}. Haiti is a transit point for cocaine from South America and marijuana from Jamaica headed to U.S. and other markets^{cxxviii}. Moreover, the role of drug-trafficking and its impact on politics are underestimated by the international community as they remain unclear in their impact^{cxxix}. According to several human rights organizations in Haiti, the 2017 parliament is dominated primarily by individuals who have been associated with criminal activities such money laundering and drug dealing^{cxxx}. Reminding that Haiti's judicial system remains extremely weak, limiting its ability to prosecute drug traffickers or money launderers^{cxxxi}.

Human Trafficking

Haiti is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children subject to force labor and sex trafficking^{cxxxii}. Often, poor families place their children in such situations with the expectation they will be housed, fed, and educated. Instead, many are kept in slave-like conditions, are physically and sexually abused, and do not go to school^{cxxxiii}. Orphans are placed in secret establishments which allow avoiding control but attracting donations from international NGOs^{cxxxiv}. The money, worth approximately ten millions of dollars, is hijacked by officials^{cxxxv}. Orphans, in addition to being exploited, found themselves at the heart of human trafficking where authorities have discovered networks of prostitution and organ trafficking in clandestine^{cxxxvi}. The Haitian government increased efforts in prevention and antitrafficking law enforcement, resulting in its first three convictions for trafficking^{cxxxvii}. The government is developing some programs to comply with the 2014 Haitian antitrafficking law, but has not yet implemented many of them^{cxxxviii}.

Money Laundering

Haiti's judicial system remains extremely weak, limiting its ability to prosecute drug and human traffickers or money launderers^{cxix}. In terms of money laundering and financial crimes, the State Department has classified Haiti as a major money laundering country, statutorily defined as one "whose financial institutions engage in currency transactions involving significant amounts of proceeds from international narcotics trafficking^{cxl}." In fact, following the outbreak in 2015, an employee involved in a money laundering case explained that he and other locally engaged staff (LES) received bribes as part of an extremely well organized system established at the Canadian Diplomatic Mission. He explained that "when he arrived at the Mission, all the schemes were already in place"^{cxli}.

External Military Presence

For more than 13 years, the country has hosted a U.N. mission that meets most of Haiti's security needs and is also charged to assist the Government of Haiti to further develop the HNP, strengthen Haiti's rule of law institutions, including the justice and prisons^{cxlii}.

MINUSTAH had a total of 5,063 personnel. Of those, 3,887 were uniformed personnel, consisting of 1,505 troops and 2,329 police officers^{cxliii}. The following U.N. Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), headquartered in Port-au-Prince, is to focus on assisting the government in the development of the HNP Force, strengthening Haiti's rule of law institutions as well as human rights promotion and protection^{cxliv}. MINUJUSTH was initially authorized from October 16, 2017 to April 15, 2018, but is now planning for the transition to a non-peacekeeping presence, beginning in October 2019, facing persisting challenges^{cxlv}. Currently, the rate of police officers per 1,000 citizens has slightly dropped to 1.32 due to resignations and other reasons, dedicated intervention is necessary to ensure that the development plan of the HNP is fully implemented before the end of the mission^{cxlvi}. The 2017-2022 Plan enables the transfer of responsibility to national police, but given recent protests against the planned increase of prices in fuel products, the situation on the ground must be monitored very carefully and the authorities must address the root causes of the socioeconomic issues^{cxlvii}. Armed gangs also continue to pose a threat to the stability of the country, progress on several benchmarks hinges and on the adoption and promulgation of key rule of law legislation, including the criminal code are necessary to be implemented also before the end of the mission^{cxlviii}.

HNP

Although the HNP became increasingly professionalized and have now taken on responsibility for domestic security, doubts have been repeatedly raised as to whether the national police force is able to guarantee the security needed to protect citizens, enforce the law and promote political stability^{cxlix}. New police commissariats have been built in areas previously not served by police to give more Haitians access to security services^{cl}. Also, a police academy class graduated in 2017 bringing approximately police force to 14,500 officers. By the end of this year, the force is expected to meet its five-year development plan goal of 15,000 officers^{cli}. However, concerns remain that the Haitian police force remains below optimal size, and is underfunded which bring wonder about whether the force will be able to maintain security and stability without the backup of international forces^{clii}. Bearing in mind that the country's administrative system suffers from a lack of incentives to motivate civil servants, low wages reinforce corruption which have come to be deeply embedded in the system^{cliii}.

Abuses by officials

In Haiti, impunity for abuses by security forces is widespread. Although corruption is endemic and widespread, there is no single case yet where a civil servant has been condemned for office abuse^{cliv}. High-ranking security officials are involved in cases of kidnapping and organized crime^{clv}. Among other examples, complaints were pledge against MINUSTAH^{clvi} and Oxfam UK was subject to an important sex scandal^{clvii}. Charges of sexual abuse by MINUSTAH personnel fueled anti-MINUSTAH sentiment; the U.N. substantiated 35 of 82 alleged sexual abuse and exploitation cases among MINUSTAH personnel^{clviii}.

Due to the gravity of these allegations and the importance of the international actors' legitimacy, ways to improve capacity and respond to sexual abuses by official cases has been to increase the number of women recruited in the HNP and the establishment of a specialized office for sexual violence crimes^{clix}.

Environmental Risk and Government Corruption Data

Probabilistic risk results


What's this? ▾

Average Annual Loss (AAL) by hazard

Hazard	Absolute [Million US\$]	Capital stock [%]	GFCF [%]	Social exp [%]	Total Reserves [%]	Gross Savings [%]
Earthquake	119.53	0.423	0.000	32.525	6.887	6.196
Wind	40.65	0.144	0.000	11.061	2.342	2.107
Storm Surge	10.51	0.037	0.000	2.860	0.606	0.545
Tsunami	0.12	0.000	0.000	0.033	0.007	0.006
Flood	32.76	0.116	0.000	8.914	1.887	1.698
Multi-Hazard	203.57	0.720	0.000	55.392	11.729	10.552

Source: <https://www.preventionweb.net/countries/hti/data/>

INFORM 2018 Risk Index




Historical Data API Alerts Forecast




Source: <https://tradingeconomics.com/haiti/corruption-index>

International Aid and Remittances to Haiti: Trends




Source: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?locations=HT>



Source: https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Haiti/remittances_percent_GDP/

CIFP Indicators




Source: CIFP (2017), *CIFP 2017 Fragility Report*, Carleton University, Ottawa, p.15

In the graph above, Haiti's drivers of fragility are compared to the poorest performing countries in Latin America and The Caribbean. With this, it can be seen that Human Development in Haiti

is substantially worse in Haiti in comparison to the other countries. Similarly, Governance and Economics are high risk drivers as well. Since this data is from 2016, Security and Crime is shown as a relatively low risk driver, however due to recent changes which are mentioned in detail in the Security and Crime Risk Assessment, this has now become a high risk driver as well.

Haiti HDI Trends

Figure 1: Trends in Haiti's HDI component indices 1990-2017



Source: "Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update," UNDP, accessed Nov. 12, 2018, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/HTI.pdf (p.3)

This graph gives a better breakdown of the Human Development Indicators within the last few decades. Through this it can be seen that there hasn't been any significant progress made with these indicators in the last decade where it appears to begin plateauing by the end of the trendline.


Haiti's "Registered" NGO Trends

\$1,955,134,357 (TOTAL PROJECT BUDGETS)³

■ MIN. (USD): \$80

■ MEDIAN (USD): \$114,643

□ MAX. (USD): \$104,807,220



Source: "NGOs and the Business of Poverty in Haiti," NACLA, accessed Nov. 12, 2018, <https://nacla.org/news/ngos-and-business-poverty-haiti>

The graph above illustrates the decline in the number of active 'registered' NGO's in Haiti since 2010. Through this it can be seen that the number of NGO's has steadily declined in Haiti over the last few years.

Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and Administrative deferral of removals (ADR)

Temporary Protected Status (TPS)

The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is responsible to grant a TPS to a country. Haiti currently holds a TPS since October 3r, 2018¹. As the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services explains, "USCIS may grant TPS to eligible nationals of certain countries (or parts of countries), who are already in the United States to stay here for a limited period of time. Eligible individuals without nationality who last resided in the designated country may also be granted TPS"¹.

Administrative deferral of removals (ADR)

The Canadian Border Services Agency is responsible to secure Canada's border by enforcing acts and regulations. When a removal order is given, the recipients cannot legally remain in Canada and must leave the country¹. AS CBSA explains, an "ADR is meant to be a temporary measure

when immediate action is needed to temporarily defer removals in situations of humanitarian crisis. The ADR is not meant to address persistent and systematic human rights problems which constitute individualized risk. Once the situation in a country stabilizes the ADR is lifted and the CBSA resumes removals for individuals who are inadmissible to Canada and have a removal order in effect. An individual who is not allowed into Canada on grounds of criminality, international or human rights violations, organized crime, or security can still be removed despite the ADRⁱ. Haiti currently does not hold an ADR which lead to a demonstration from the members of the Haitian community in Montreal to demand the end of removals to Haiti as some argues fearing for their lives¹.

It is important to bear in mind that TPS and ADR are not the same thing, but both impact Haitian in Haiti, in the US and in Canada differently. They are therefore important to consider in mapping different scenarios as their impacts will depend if such status is granted or not and also depending on the period of time they are valid once granted.

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