



# **THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN FRAGILE STATE ANALYSIS: POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA**

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## **Executive summary:**

This policy brief finds that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan's (Jordan's) state legitimacy is declining. Jordan's currently classified as a brittle state as the general function of the state is particularly fragile, yet the Jordanian government's slow pace in curbing corruption and slow economic growth has resulted in large scale group grievances of the middle and working class towards the state. The decline of legitimacy will continue if the economic situation worsens. Legitimacy will also deteriorate if the state does not act on the pressing issues of corruption, migration and effects of climate change. If this trend persists Jordan could become a fragile state. Therefore, we recommend that the Government of Canada expand the scope of economic and infrastructural development, along with technical support in combating corruption.

## **End user:**

The policy brief proposal is directed towards Global Affairs Canada (GAC). Jordan's dire economic situation have put the country on the precipice of economic disaster and Jordan desperately requires to address structural problems with its economic management. Canada is in the perfect situation to help Jordan, a traditional Canadian ally, with these problems.

## **Methodology:**

This analysis will rely on both qualitative and quantitative data to ensure that our findings are supported by facts. The fragility analysis use quantitative and qualitative data to determine the overall trend for that driver of fragility. The impact these trends have on Jordan's authority, legitimacy, and capacity are indicated. Our data comes from a wide variety of sources, including government departments, NGOs, international organizations, and think tanks. We supplement this hard data with news reports to ensure that our analysis includes all available perspectives.

## **Authority – Legitimacy – Capacity (ALC):**

The Authority - Legitimacy - Capacity (ALC) framework is a three dimensional method created by David Carment, Yiagadeesen Samy, and Stewart Prest. The ALC measures the fundamental properties of a state. According to the ALC theory, weaknesses in one or more dimensions of the ALC will increase the fragility of a state.<sup>1</sup> Authority measures the extent to which a state is able to project binding authority and the rule of law within its territory.<sup>2</sup> Capacity measures a state's ability to dispatch resources to achieve effective results, examples include public service delivery.<sup>3</sup> Legitimacy measures the level of loyalty and satisfaction a state's populace has over policy and legislation.<sup>4</sup>

### **Authority:**

Jordan scores highly in authority. When using different indicators such as the World Bank Governance Index, Jordan ranks above average in the Middle East in terms of rule of law with 61 out of 100 rating. This stems from Jordan's relatively strong security apparatus, ranked at 5.6/10.<sup>63</sup> Jordan's security and intelligence agencies have been deemed effective by their western counterparts.<sup>64</sup> According to CIA officials, Jordan's General Intelligence Directorate has been more effective at combating terror than the Israeli Mossad.<sup>65</sup> On the other hand Jordan's threat of terrorism still looms. There have been several failed terrorist attacks including in 2014 and 2018.

### **Legitimacy:**

Jordan's legitimacy is declining. Despite liberalization efforts by the government, Jordanians are increasingly dissatisfied with the Jordanian state. This stems from Jordan's inability to combat corruption along with the implementation of austerity measures.<sup>69</sup> Jordan's worsening weak economy reduced people's trust of the government. As legitimacy decreases, this will destabilize Jordan.

Jordan's decreasing legitimacy is significant because much of the anger directed at the state comes from its traditional bases of support. Jordan's poor fiscal situation has necessitated austerity measures that caused significant protest against the state.<sup>70</sup>

### **Capacity:**

The ability to deliver public services remains one of Jordan's strongest attributes. According to the Fragile States Index, Jordan ranks 3.9 making it the best performing index for Jordan. On the other hand, despite this, Jordan's efficiency for providing these resources is lacking. The Jordanian state faces a significant problem of corruption. According to the World Economic Forum's World Competitiveness Report, this is one of Jordan's main obstacles to attracting foreign investment.<sup>68</sup>

### **Key Drivers of Fragility:**

Jordan's fiscal policy produces structural deficits and Jordan relies on foreign aid to bankroll government spending in excess of government revenues. This structural reliance on foreign aid is the most significant driver of Jordan's fragility. Jordan implemented austerity measures in an attempt to bring government spending down but the measures prompted a public outcry and the government was forced to cancel the planned measures. Reimplementing austerity measures is seen by many Jordanians as a political red line but the long-term costs of failing to bring spending under control will be far worse.

Jordan's structural deficits are the result of an expensive military, bloated public service, public subsidies provided to citizens, and the costs of providing services to refugees. Aid comes in the form of economic development, military aid, and UNRWA aid for refugees.

Climate change also contributes to Jordan's poor economic outlook. As less water is supplied to Jordan's agricultural sector we see a rise in unemployment and urbanization. This places a greater pressure on the government to facilitate employment in Jordan's urban centres. The country's inability to combat corruption, along with austerity measures are all drivers against the state's legitimacy amongst its citizens. Although Jordan is relatively a secure country in the MENA region, this does come at high financial cost for the government. As more resources are allocated to security, rather than economic growth.

### **Timeline of Jordan's Fragility:**

From Jordan's independence until the early 1970s, Jordan experienced through a turbulent time. Jordan was struck with a large migration of Palestinian refugees, two major wars with Israel, several attempted coups, a civil war, and a Syrian invasion.<sup>5</sup> The country began to stabilize after its short-lived civil war (between Palestinians and Jordanian) in 1970. They built closer relations with the west which meant more aid and development packages.

Following the 1967 Arab - Israeli war, Jordan granted the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) the ability to use Jordanian territory to launch attacks against the Israeli military. Instead of only

launching attacks against Israel, the PLO instead attempted to exert their influence over Jordan. This put the PLO in a crash course with the Jordanian state. On September 15th 1970 the Jordanian Armed Forces began military operation against the PLO to oust the PLO from the Kingdom. The Jordanian military were victorious in their campaign against the PLO. The war had changed the social contract in the country. The role Jordanians of Palestinian became very limited in government.

Jordan experienced two shocks on its stability in the 1990's. The first was in 1991 following the Gulf War; because Iraq was Jordan's largest trading partner, this caused an economic downturn for the country. The Gulf War also led to nearly 300,000 Palestinians relocating to Jordan from Kuwait which put tremendous pressure on the state.<sup>6</sup> The second shock was the 1994 Peace Agreement with Israel. The Peace Agreement caused massive social unrest domestically, specifically from Jordan's large Palestinian population. The early 2000s were again, a stable time for Jordan with fragility indexes falling. This period ended with the Arab Spring in 2011, as the massive influx of Syrian refugees along with domestic pressure for political and economic reform took place.

## **Primary Stakeholders**

### ***The Jordanian Monarchy:***

Jordan is a constitutional monarchy. The Hashemite royal family is lead by King Abdullah the Second who holds the majority of the power in the Kingdom.<sup>7</sup> The King, along with other members of his family, hold positions within the Jordanian Armed Forces.<sup>8</sup> The monarch's connection with the military composed of prodeminty Jordanian tribal men has fostered a strong nexus between the monarch and the Jordanian tribes.<sup>19</sup>

### ***East Bankers tribes:***

The East Bankers are the bedouin and farmer tribes of Jordan proper (east of the Jordan River) . They are also referred to as indigenou Jordanians. The Jordanian tribes have been historical allies of the monarchy.<sup>11</sup> The relationship between the monarch and tribes was created with an agreement the monarch would provide good quality public services while respecting tribal dispute solving mechanisms along with internal charitable arrangements.<sup>12</sup>

Since the 1970 September Civil War, the Jordanian military, security apparatus and bureaucracy have mostly been composed of East Bankers.<sup>13</sup> This relationship between the Monarch, military and East Banker tribes limits the political influence of the Jordanians of Palestinian descent who make up roughly 50% of the population.

### ***Jordanians of Palestinian descent:***

Palestinians first arrived in Jordan in 1948, 1867, and 1991.<sup>14</sup>After the 1970 war, Palestinians in Jordan worked primarily within the private sector.<sup>18</sup> This was reinforced following the 1991 Gulf War, where thousands of Palestinians arrived in Jordan and brought with them business and commerce. Today,

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<sup>1</sup> Francis, Ellen. "Jordan Unions Strike after New PM Appointed." Reuters. June 06, 2018. Accessed November 19, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-jordan-protests/some-big-jordanian-unions-strike-despite-replacement-of-pm-idUSKCN1J211Z>.

Palestinians in Jordan makeup roughly half of the population which sparks fears amongst East Bankers that they could one day challenge their political power.<sup>19</sup> The stability of the large Palestinian population in Jordan is also highly influenced by Jordanian foreign policy decisions, particularly regarding Jordanian relations with Israel.

### ***The Gulf Cooperation Council States:***

The GCC states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) are major donors to Jordan and home to Jordan's largest diaspora community. These migrant workers send significant remittances from the GCC back to Jordan.<sup>25</sup> Yet GCC financial support comes with many political strings attached.<sup>26</sup>

### ***Israel:***

Jordan is constantly working to balance its relationship with Israel and the large Palestinian population within the Jordan. The mismanagement of this relationship contributed to the 1970 September Civil War in Jordan.

### ***The United States:***

The United States has been the largest aid donor to Jordan, providing roughly \$1.5 billion of aid in 2017.<sup>28</sup> The United States is also the largest supplier of arms for the Jordanian Armed Forces and Security apparatus.<sup>29</sup> The United States' activism in the region also has the potential to be a destabilizing factor. For example, the current US-led peace talks for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is wildly unpopular in Jordan and would put additional pressure on the state to provide public services to refugees.<sup>31</sup>

## **Secondary Stakeholders**

### ***Muslim Brotherhood:***

The Muslim Brotherhood first came to Jordan in the 1950<sup>20</sup> Through the years the Muslim brotherhood has become particularly critical of the Jordanian monarchy's close relationship with the west and Israel.<sup>21</sup> The majority of the Muslim Brotherhood's support comes from the Jordanians of Palestinian descent and religiously motivated Jordanians.

### ***The National Committee of Military Veterans:***

The Committee is made up of former military officers of East Banker descent. This committee is the first organized opposition coming from the usual base of support of the Jordanian monarch, retired East Bankers military officers.<sup>23</sup> The committee is relatively small with only 60 members, but their opposition is nonetheless very significant because East Bankers and military officers are normally the monarchy's staunchest supporters.

## **Fragility Analysis**

### **Primary Drivers:**

### ***ECONOMY***



The fundamentals of Jordan’s economy are **poor, and worsening. Jordan’s poor economy negatively impacts its authority, legitimacy, and capacity.**

GDP growth has slowed in recent years, this has caused a decrease in government revenues just as new and expensive dilemmas emerge for Jordan. Regional conflict has caused local trade and economic development to slow. Government debt is nearing 100% of GDP and Jordan has been forced to implement domestically unpopular austerity measures.

<b>INDICATORS</b>	
<b>GDP Growth<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>Government Debt as Percentage of GDP<sup>3</sup></b>
<p>Jordan has faced low levels of annual GDP growth since 2009. Since 2009, Jordan, as well as the entire MENA region have seen low economic activity due to global economic slowdown as well as regional conflict. The conflicts in Iraq and Syria has cost Jordan billions of dollars in lost trade annually.</p>	<p>Recently, Jordan has relied on government debt to satisfy government spending because it has received less foreign aid. As government debt rises closer to 100%, investors will lose confidence in Jordan and its creditors will lend less money and at higher rates of interest. Such a situation could be catastrophic for Jordan because of its knock-off effects and the negative feedback loop it would begin.</p>

<sup>2</sup> “Jordan’s GDP” *Trading Economics*, accessed December 7, 2018 from <https://tradingeconomics.com/jordan/gdp>.

<sup>3</sup> “Jordan’s National Debt in Relation to Gross Domestic Product” *Statista*, accessed December 7, 2018, from <https://www.statista.com/statistics/385716/national-debt-of-jordan-in-relation-to-gross-domestic-product-gdp/>.

Foreign Direct Investment, billion dollars <sup>4</sup>	Youth Unemployment <sup>5</sup>																																																										
 <table border="1"> <caption>Foreign Direct Investment (billion dollars)</caption> <thead> <tr><th>Year</th><th>FDI (billion dollars)</th></tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>2004</td><td>1.0</td></tr> <tr><td>2005</td><td>2.0</td></tr> <tr><td>2006</td><td>3.5</td></tr> <tr><td>2007</td><td>2.6</td></tr> <tr><td>2008</td><td>2.8</td></tr> <tr><td>2009</td><td>2.4</td></tr> <tr><td>2010</td><td>1.7</td></tr> <tr><td>2011</td><td>1.5</td></tr> <tr><td>2012</td><td>1.6</td></tr> <tr><td>2013</td><td>2.0</td></tr> <tr><td>2014</td><td>2.2</td></tr> <tr><td>2015</td><td>1.6</td></tr> <tr><td>2016</td><td>1.5</td></tr> <tr><td>2017</td><td>1.6</td></tr> </tbody> </table>	Year	FDI (billion dollars)	2004	1.0	2005	2.0	2006	3.5	2007	2.6	2008	2.8	2009	2.4	2010	1.7	2011	1.5	2012	1.6	2013	2.0	2014	2.2	2015	1.6	2016	1.5	2017	1.6	 <table border="1"> <caption>Youth Unemployment (%)</caption> <thead> <tr><th>Year</th><th>Youth Unemployment (%)</th></tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>2006</td><td>29.00</td></tr> <tr><td>2007</td><td>28.50</td></tr> <tr><td>2008</td><td>29.00</td></tr> <tr><td>2009</td><td>30.00</td></tr> <tr><td>2010</td><td>31.00</td></tr> <tr><td>2011</td><td>31.50</td></tr> <tr><td>2012</td><td>32.00</td></tr> <tr><td>2013</td><td>32.50</td></tr> <tr><td>2014</td><td>33.00</td></tr> <tr><td>2015</td><td>33.50</td></tr> <tr><td>2016</td><td>35.00</td></tr> <tr><td>2017</td><td>38.00</td></tr> <tr><td>2018</td><td>40.00</td></tr> </tbody> </table>	Year	Youth Unemployment (%)	2006	29.00	2007	28.50	2008	29.00	2009	30.00	2010	31.00	2011	31.50	2012	32.00	2013	32.50	2014	33.00	2015	33.50	2016	35.00	2017	38.00	2018	40.00
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<p>In recent years, Jordan has attempted to increase foreign direct investment in an effort to finance a large number of capital projects. Jordan hopes that new investments in large infrastructure projects will stimulate the overall economy. However, in recent years Jordan has struggled to attract capital both because of the global economic slowdown and Jordan’s own economic slowdown that has made investment in Jordan less attractive. Jordan’s long-term plan for economic development requires significant investments in Jordan’s economy and these can only be financed with outside investment. Jordan’s economy is dominated by the public sector and has historically struggled with transitioning to an economy whose growth is led by the private sector.</p>	<p>While Jordan has a high level of overall unemployment, its even higher level of youth unemployment is emblematic of a far more significant problem. Jordan’s secondary education institutions are producing more educated individuals than there are jobs available. Jordan has an extremely young population and while this will be examined separately in the demographics analysis, this also has negative repercussions for Jordan’s economy. Jordan’s large youth population is coming of age and entering the workforce at a time when there is already high levels of unemployment. Together with the large number of migrant and refugee workers, youth unemployment will produce ethnic and social tensions as groups and people are forced to compete for jobs.</p>																																																										
<p align="center"><b>Trade with Iraq and Syria<sup>6</sup></b></p>	<p align="center"><b>Tourism<sup>7</sup></b></p>																																																										

<sup>4</sup> “Jordan FDI” *The Global Economy*, accessed December 7, 2018m from [https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Jordan/fdi\\_dollars/](https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Jordan/fdi_dollars/).

<sup>5</sup> “Youth Unemployment in Jordan” *Statista*, accessed December 7, 2018 from <https://www.statista.com/statistics/812127/youth-unemployment-rate-in-jordan/>.

<sup>6</sup> “Unstable Neighbours and Bad Policy are Just Two of Jordan’s Problems,” *The Economist*, accessed December 7, 2018. <https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/04/28/unstable-neighbours-and-bad-policy-are-just-two-of-jordans-problems>

<sup>7</sup> “Jordanian Tourism Collapses in 2010” *Alghad*, Accessed December 7, 2018, from <https://www.alghad.com/articles/929098-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%85%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%81%D9%82%D8%AF-6->.

<p>In 2010, before Arab Spring, Syria and Iraq accounted for 20% of Jordan's exports. The conflicts in Iraq and Syria caused the closure of Jordan's borders with both Iraq and Syria and exports to these two countries fell by 60%. In 2016, exports to Iraq were less than \$700M whereas before the conflict they were approximately \$2B.</p>	<p>Jordan has historically had a vibrant tourism sector that brings in significant sums of money for the economy and directly employs around 50,000 people. Tourists come primarily from Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the US. However, following the global recession and Arab Spring, tourism collapsed in 2011. Following a peak of 8.2M annual tourists in 2010, Jordan had only 4.18M visit the country in 2016.</p>
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
**Jordan's Long-Term Reliance on Foreign Aid<sup>8</sup>**

Aid has historically come primarily from the US, the Gulf States, and the EU with each donating roughly a third of the aid Jordan receives. Following the 2014 global recession, Jordan's donors decreased their overall spending on aid for Jordan. This prompted austerity measures in Jordan that provoked significant domestic protests. More recently, Jordan has secured medium term agreements by both the US and the Gulf States to commit \$1.3B and \$2.5B in aid respectfully.

**Internal Security**

The fundamentals of Jordan's internal security situation are **positive, and stable. Jordan's positive internal security is indicative of Jordan's high authority and capacity.**

Jordan's strong military, special forces, and internal policing service are among the best trained and equipped in the region. Jordan's security apparatus has long been a source of pride for the country as well as force for national unity. However, these successes come at a high cost as indicated by the recent increase in military expenditure at a time when Jordan is struggling to make revenues meet expenditures.



<sup>8</sup> "Slowing Jordan's Slide into Debt" *Carnegie Institute*, March 22, 2018, accessed December 7, 2018, from <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/75865>.

<sup>9</sup> "Jordan's Military Expenditure" *Trading Economics*, accessed December 7, 2018 from <https://tradingeconomics.com/jordan/military-expenditure>.

<p>In recent years, Jordan has increased its military expenditures in response to the worsening situation in the wider MENA region. Jordan has weathered the current conflicts and protests across the MENA region better than most of its neighbours. However, this has come at the cost of an increase in military expenditures when Jordan desperately needs to bring down government spending.</p>	<p>Jordan managed to weather the rise of Daesh and the associated regional violence better than most of its neighbours. Jordan’s well trained military has effectively prevented any significant incursions from hostile militants outside its borders. More recently, Jordan suffered high profile lone-wolf style terrorist attacks in 2016. It is yet to be seen whether these attacks were an anomaly or the beginning of a dangerous new trend.</p>
<p><b>Jordanian Foreign Fighters</b></p>	<p><b>External Military Presence<sup>10</sup></b></p>
<p>Jordan has a much lower rate of foreign fighters (125 per 100,000) than some neighbouring states in the MENA region such as Tunisia. Regardless, the possibility these foreign fighters will return to Jordan remains a distinct and negative possibility.</p>	<p>Jordan houses one of the US’s most important overseas air bases. America has 1,500 soldiers permanently stationed in Jordan and also has a number of drones and other support aircraft. Additionally, America conducts large-scale training programs for the Jordanian military.</p>

**External Security and Geopolitical Situation**

Jordan’s external security and geopolitical situation is **poor, and worsening. Jordan’s capacity will decrease if this worsening situation causes a decrease in Jordan’s foreign aid.**

Jordan has historically relied on its geopolitical position as a bastion of security and western support in a region that historically has little of either. However, international and regional dynamics are quickly shifting and Jordan must reposition itself to ensure relevance in the new regional order.

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy</b></p>
<p>Jordan’s reliance on external funding to balance its budgets have necessitated Jordan</p>

<sup>10</sup> “Thousands of US troops and Marines Arrive in Jordan” *Marine Corps Times*, accessed December 7, 2018 from <https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2018/04/13/thousands-of-us-troops-and-marines-arrive-in-jordan/>.

soliciting funding from its more wealthy and powerful allies for most of Jordan's modern history. This trend began during the Cold War when the Jordanian monarchy positioned itself as a staunchly conservative and anti-communist force at a time when Egypt and Syria were positioning themselves as allies and beneficiaries of Soviet largesse. Jordan has successfully managed to navigate the increasingly complicated modern world of international diplomacy and alliances. Most recently, Jordan staved off what might have been an existential debt crisis by securing aid packages from both the US and the Gulf States. As important as this aid is to Jordan, this aid does not come free, and each donor state expects a return on investment for its aid.

### **Jordan and Israel**

In 1994 Jordan was the second Arab state to publically sign a peace agreement with Israel. Jordan's position within the Arab world as a trusted interlocutor between Arabs and Israel has long afforded Jordan significant diplomatic power. As Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Arab world comes closer normalizing relations with Israel, Jordan's unique relationship with Israel becomes less important. Jordan's strong relations with the West generally requires that Jordan refrain from violent or aggressive rhetoric against Israel. For a nation where more than half of the population is of Palestinian descent, this international requirement to have normal relations with Israel imposes a domestic cost. Despite generally strong state-to-state relations between Jordan and Israel, the Jordanian populace is heavily critical of Israel.

### **Jordan and the Gulf States**

Only days after finalizing a \$2.5B aid package from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States, Jordan recalled its ambassador to Iran and has not appointed a new one. This is a clear example of how Jordan regulates its own behavior because of the implicit or explicit strings attached with Gulf aid. In another example, Jordan supported Saudi Arabia against Canada following their recent diplomatic spat. This is significant because there are generally strong relations between Canada and Jordan. What this incident indicates therefore, is the lengths Jordan must go to in order to secure its necessary external financing.



### **Jordan and the US**

Jordan has been an important security ally of the US since it first started receiving US funding during the Cold War. Presently, Jordan receives approximately \$1.3B from the US annually in aid. The US, under President Trump, has been more explicit to Jordan that US aid is dependent on Jordan acting according to US interests. For example, the US explicitly stated that beneficiaries of US aid had to vote in favour of the US or risk losing their aid. Despite Jordan voting against the US at this vote, Jordan was later successful in getting the US to commit to raise its annual level of funding from \$1B to \$1.3B.

## **HUMAN DEVELOPMENT**

The fundamentals of Jordan’s human development are **positive, but stagnant. Because of citizens’ expectations of rising or maintaining the same standard of living, this stagnation will decrease Jordan’s legitimacy.**

Jordan saw a rapid increase in its human development index between 1960-2000 however this rapid growth has slowed to a crawl since approximately 2000. There is nothing inherently wrong with human development stagnating when it has already reached a level as high as Jordan has. However, many Jordanians have been conditioned by rapidly increasing standards of living to continue to expect such increases. Jordan now faces the difficult problem of managing its citizens expectations when it comes to human development.

Life Expectancy <sup>11</sup>	Infant Mortality Rates (deaths/1,000 births)																												
 <table border="1"> <caption>Life Expectancy Data</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Year</th> <th>Life Expectancy</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>1960</td><td>47.2</td></tr> <tr><td>1970</td><td>54.6</td></tr> <tr><td>1980</td><td>62.7</td></tr> <tr><td>1990</td><td>67.2</td></tr> <tr><td>2000</td><td>71.7</td></tr> <tr><td>2010</td><td>73.4</td></tr> <tr><td>2018</td><td>74.4</td></tr> </tbody> </table>	Year	Life Expectancy	1960	47.2	1970	54.6	1980	62.7	1990	67.2	2000	71.7	2010	73.4	2018	74.4	 <table border="1"> <caption>Infant Mortality Rates Data</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Year</th> <th>Rate (deaths/1,000 births)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>2002</td><td>21.11</td></tr> <tr><td>2004</td><td>18.11</td></tr> <tr><td>2008</td><td>15.37</td></tr> <tr><td>2012</td><td>15.83</td></tr> <tr><td>2016</td><td>14.7</td></tr> </tbody> </table>	Year	Rate (deaths/1,000 births)	2002	21.11	2004	18.11	2008	15.37	2012	15.83	2016	14.7
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<p>Life expectancy in Jordan has skyrocketed since the 1960s and is now on par with other recently developed countries. Rapid increases in life expectancy from 1960-2000 are indicative of Jordan’s rapid industrialization and rise in standards of living. However, since 2000 Jordan’s life expectancy has remained in the 75-80 range and this stagnation is also indicative of Jordan’s overall stagnation in human development.</p>	<p>The rate of infant mortality has continued to decrease since the 2000s, albeit at a rate slower than from 1960-2000.</p>																												
Literacy Rate	Gender Empowerment																												
<p>The literacy rate in Jordan is 97.7% for men and 92.9% for women. This is because Jordanian society places more value on men becoming educated and entering the workforce than it does for women.</p>	<p>The mean age at which a mother gives birth in Jordan is 24.7 which is slightly lower than the global average of 25-29. Additionally, in 2012, a study reported the contraceptive prevalence rate was 61.2%. Both of these statistics speak to a society that is still largely patriarchal where women are expected to</p>																												

<sup>11</sup> “Jordan’s Life Expectancy” *World Life Expectancy*, accessed December 7, 2018 from <https://www.worldlifeexpectancy.com/jordan-life-expectancy>.

	perform roles traditionally assigned to women.
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**Governance and Political stability:**

The fundamentals of Jordan’s governance and political stability are **deteriorating**. Despite improvements in political freedoms and public services, **group grievances are rapidly increasing**. This is due to the Jordanians governments **inability to combat corruption** and improve the **economic standards**. This will further **decrease Jordans state legitimacy**.

Governance and Political Stability ↓	
Indicators	Description
Government Effectiveness Worldwide Governance indicator (0 is bad - 100 excellent)) Jordan and Middle East average	Pre Arab Spring 2007 - Jordan: 62 MENA: 46 <sup>32</sup> Arab Spring 2012 - Jordan: 56 MENA: 46 <sup>33</sup> Post Arab Spring 2017 - Jordan: 58 MENA: 44 <sup>34</sup> Despite regional difficulties Jordans government effectiveness has not declined significantly. This due to Jordan ability to provide strong capacity and authority in the Kingdom.
Rule of Law Worldwide Governance indicator (0 is bad - 100 excellent)) Jordan and Middle East average	Pre Arab Spring 2007 - Jordan: 61 MENA: 45 <sup>35</sup> Arab Spring 2012 - Jordan: 63 MENA: 45 <sup>36</sup> Post Arab Spring 2017 - Jordan: 61 MENA: 43 <sup>37</sup> Jordanian rule of law remains higher than the meaning region. This is due to the regimes monopoly on enforcement.

<p>Corruption in public service Corruption perceptions index (0 is bad - 100 Excellent)</p>	<p>Jordan 2012: 48<sup>38</sup></p> <p>Jordan 2014 49<sup>39</sup></p> <p>Jordan 2017: 48<sup>40</sup></p> <p>Despite widespread discontent with corruption. The Jordanian government has not been successful at tackling corruption. This holds the potential for further destabilization.</p>
<p>Political rights Freedom house (1 most free - 7 least free)</p>	<p>Jordan 2012: 6 not free<sup>41</sup></p> <p>Jordan 2015: 6 not free<sup>42</sup></p> <p>Jordan 2018: 5 partly free<sup>43</sup></p> <p>Political rights in Jordan are slowly improving.</p>
<p>Public Services Variable within the Fragile states index (0 is Excellent - 10 is bad)</p>	<p>Jordan 2012: 4.6<sup>44</sup></p> <p>Jordan 2015: 4.7<sup>45</sup></p> <p>Jordan 2018: 3.9<sup>46</sup></p> <p>The Jordanian government strongest edge it providing basic public services to Jordanian citizens.</p>
<p>State legitimacy Variable within the Fragile states index (0 is Excellent - 10 is bad)</p>	<p>Jordan 2012: 5.7<sup>47</sup></p> <p>Jordan 2015: 6.1<sup>48</sup></p> <p>Jordan 2018: 6.1<sup>49</sup></p> <p>The Jordanian state legitimacy is high. As Group grievances are on the rise, this is set to become even worse. Increasing state fragility</p>
<p>Group Grievance Variable within the Fragile states index (0 is Excellent - 10 is bad)</p>	<p>Jordan 2012: 7.0<sup>50</sup></p> <p>Jordan 2015: 6.8<sup>51</sup></p> <p>Jordan 2018: 8.3<sup>52</sup></p> <p>The Jordanians government's failure to combat corruption and improve the economy has increased group grievances.</p>

Assessment and causal	
<p>In 2011 the Kingdom had received an aid package from the GCC in order to curb the effects of the Arab Spring.<sup>53</sup> The influx of Syrian refugees in 2011 put pressure on the Jordanian state to deliver public services, this resulted in the GCC, the United States, Canada and the EU increasing their aid to the Kingdom to improve its capability in order to widen and improve the quality of public services. Although these aid packages were successful at improving Jordans state capacity, it did not address Jordans structural economic and political issues. As most of the aid was designated to deal with the influx of refugees. The state's inability to tackle corruption and weak economy resulted greater dissatisfaction with the state. Therefore, from 2012 to 2018 Jordanian state legitimacy had declined; we also see a spike in group grievance. Throughout this timeframe Jordan had experienced a number of protests and general strikes over austerity measures and tax hikes by the government.<sup>55</sup> This has resulted in the fall of two governments. Throughout these acts of social strife, protesters had repeatedly spoken against corruption. Despite these protests, Jordan’s corruption index has not changed from the 2012 and 2017 levels, remaining at 48. Therefore, this could explain why state legitimacy has declined despite improvements in public services, government effectiveness and freedom levels.</p> <p>In 2016, Freedom House institute had promoted Jordan from not free to partially free. This comes at the same year of the 2016 Jordanian parliamentary election. EU observers claimed that the election was executed well.<sup>54</sup> The improvement of political freedoms in Jordan opens the door for further pressure on the government to deliver on its promise to improve economic standards and combat corruption. Therefore, this could be a developing constructive force on the government to act.</p>	

**Environmental Stress:**

The Jordans environmental stress is **increasing**. Climate change is set to hit Jordan very **negatively**, as rainfall is set to decrease. Jordans poor water infrastructure makes the government less resilient in adapting to environmental changes. This will have economic implications particularly for the rural East Bankers who are dependent on agriculture for their livelihood. Therefore, if the Jordanian government does not adopt act, this will **decrease state legitimacy and capacity**.

Environmental stress ↓	
Droughts	Jordan is constantly threatened by droughts as rainfall is set to decline, due to global warming. <sup>56</sup>
Water management	50% of water is wasted due to bad water infrastructure. <sup>57</sup> Jordan consumes more water than is available. Increasing number of Syrians in Jordans meant more demand on Jordan’s water supply. <sup>58</sup>
Arable land	2.5% of land is arable in Jordan. <sup>59</sup>

## Assessment

Jordan is vulnerable to threat of climate change. Jordan is already considered one of the poorest in the world in regards to water resources, although 98% of Jordanians have access to drinking water.<sup>60</sup> Scientists predict that average amount of rainfall in Jordan will decrease by over 30% within the next twenty years. Water coming from the Yarmouk river in Syria has also been on the decline.<sup>61</sup> Therefore, Jordan is at risk of the effects of climate change. The effects of climate change would devastate the agricultural sector, due to the decrease in the sufficient amount of water. Jordans decreasing supply of water also has negative implications on Jordans agricultural sector. From 2004 to 2017 Jordans level of urbanization has increased from 78% to 91%. This has put greater pressure on the state to facilitate employment in Jordans urban centres. Therefore, if the decline in water supply persists we expect to see higher rates of urbanization as more villagers who are dependent on agricultural sector move to the cities.

## Scenarios

### **Best case:**

The best case for Jordan would be a political resolution to the Syrian conflict. This would reopen trade between Jordan and Syria, which would strengthen the economy. Furthermore, in a scenario where the Syrian conflict ends peacefully, Jordan could take full advantage to reap the economic benefits of the reconstruction period within Syria.

Jared Kushner's peace deal for the Palestinian - Israeli conflict would spare the shutting down of UNRWA. This would have two stabilizing factors. First, it would not add additional pressure to the already stressed Jordanian state capacity. Second, the 2.1 million Palestinians who are registered as refugees in Jordan would not be fully patriated into Jordan's political domain which relieves the concerns of the East Bankers that Palestinians will take over their monopoly on political power.

### **Most likely:**

Jordan will continue to remain aid dependent meaning that the tax hikes and austerity measures will go hand in hand with the level of foreign aid that the Kingdom receives. For the foreseeable future Jordan does not need to reimplement austerity measures because of the \$2.5 billion package from the GCC. The Jordanian state will continue on its slow path of political reform which has the potential to further increase group grievances and decrease state legitimacy.

Climate change will start to take its toll on Jordan as rainfall levels are expected to drop. This has the potential to disrupt the Kingdom's agricultural sector, which could increase internal migration to Jordanian cities, thus placing more pressure on the government to decrease the nearly 20% unemployment rate.

### **Worst Case:**

The worst possible scenario for Jordan would be if their economy fails to recover and continues its slow growth while at the same time the international community sends less aid to Jordan. Without significant

foreign aid, Jordan will be forced to take dramatic austerity measures. In 2018, Jordan's public indicated that certain austerity measures are political red lines when protests forced Jordan cancel austerity measures. Regardless, Jordan would be forced to raise taxes and decrease subsidies. These measures are likely to provoke a significant public outcry in Jordan. Jordan's legitimacy will continue to decrease and that may finally cause protests in Jordan calling for the removal of the king.

### ***Wild Card:***

Throughout the Syrian conflict, Iran and Israel have waged an increasingly violent and destructive proxy war within Syria. This process is likely to continue its natural escalation absent strong political intervention from the US or Russia which is increasingly unlikely. As Iran and Israel wage an ever more violent proxy conflict, Jordan's geographical position between the two states will become a liability.

If there is a drawn out conflict between Israel and Iran, Jordan may be able to parlay its involvement in the conflict into economic support from Israel and other countries. However, it is just as likely that the conflict would exacerbate internal tensions within Jordan and perhaps even finally cause a permanent rift between Jordanians that support closer ties with the west and those that do not.

## **Policy Proposals**

Jordan's most significant contribution to fragility is its weak economy. Therefore, our first and strongest policy recommendation is for Canada to encourage Canadian investment in Jordan. If this policy is successful, it has the potential to increase Jordan's authority, legitimacy, and capacity because all are negatively affected by Jordan's structurally weak economy. Our second recommendation is for Canada to encourage Jordan institutes an anti-corruption campaign to increase legitimacy. Our third and final recommendation is for Canada to fund the improvement of Jordan's water infrastructure to increase capacity.

### ***Policy 1: Encourage Canadian Investment in Jordan (Targets A,L, & C)***

Canada should encourage Canadian investment in the Jordanian economy. This policy would have the greatest effect possible if Canadians could be incentivized to invest in specific sectors of the Jordanian economy. For example, Jordan requires a significant investment in its water infrastructure. If Canadians invested in this sector of the economy, not only would it drive economic growth and shore up Jordan's flagging foreign direct investment, it would ensure Jordan has the infrastructure necessary to weather the adverse effects of climate change.

***Relevance for recipient:*** Jordan suffers from an incredibly low rate of investment from outside the country. Approximately \$4B is invested yearly into the Jordanian economy but only around \$400M-\$500M comes from outside of Jordan. The rest of the investment comes from Jordanian citizens. Jordan desperately needs to increase the level of foreign investment if it hopes to succeed in its goal of privatizing and diversifying its economy. Canadian investment would reduce the unemployment pressure on the Jordanian state.

**Relevance for donor:** Investing in Jordan’s economy will result in an economically prosperous Jordan less reliant on foreign aid. Canada wants Jordan’s aid requirements to decrease both so Canada can reallocate aid to other countries that need it more and so that Canada can simply spend less on aid.

**Measurement of Risk and Success:** This policy will have succeeded if the amount of Canadian investment in Jordan increases and will have failed if the amount decreases. There is currently so little Canadian investment in Jordan that Global Affairs Canada does not even post official statistics on its economic fact sheet.<sup>12</sup>

**Consequences of Actions on Stakeholders:** None of Jordan’s internal or external stakeholders will oppose Canadian investment in Jordan. The only problem that may arise would be if internal stakeholders attempt to use Canadian investments to supplement their own patronage networks. Canada must prevent Canadian investments from being directed by Jordanian authorities to areas of the country based on clientelism and corruption rather than where they are objectively needed the most.

**Access point:** Canada’s embassy in Jordan is the perfect access point for this policy proposal. The embassy contains a trade officer that has studied the Jordanian business community and investment environment. Additionally, Canada could partner with NGOs that are experts in the field of both water infrastructure and building-up domestic economies such as Building Markets.

### ***Policy 2: Anti-corruption campaign (Targets L)***

Canada may encourage Jordan to enact serious mechanisms and reforms against corruption. Within the span of five years the corruption index for Jordan has stayed the same at 48, despite the Jordanian government’s public desire to combat corruption. This negatively affects the legitimacy of the Jordanian state, destabilizing the kingdom.

**Relevance for recipient:** Public perception in Jordan of the state’s failure to act against corruption has led to numerous demonstrations and acts of social unrest. Therefore, if Canada provides technical assistance at combating corruption, Jordan’s legitimacy may rise.

**Relevance for donor:** Corruption reduction has always been in line with Canadian International Development. Canada has given technical assistance in combating corruption to other countries in the past.<sup>13</sup> The Canadian government has given a substantial amount of aid to Jordan throughout the years, but most of which has been through capacity and authority building. Little attention has been placed on legitimacy building which is now declining in Jordan.

**Measurement of Risk and Success:** The success or failure of this policy can be measured with Jordan’s corruption index.

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<sup>12</sup> “Foreign Direct Investment Statistics - Inward and Outward Stocks” *Global Affairs Canada*, [http://www.international.gc.ca/economist-economiste/statistics-statistiques/outward\\_inward-actifs\\_passif.aspx?lang=eng](http://www.international.gc.ca/economist-economiste/statistics-statistiques/outward_inward-actifs_passif.aspx?lang=eng)

<sup>13</sup>

**Consequences of Actions on Stakeholders:** The average Jordanian citizen is negatively affected by corruption. All stakeholders have an interest in the decline of corruption.

**Access point:** The Jordanian Integrity and Anti-Corruption commission is the government commission responsible for identifying and tackling corruption within government.<sup>78</sup> The Canadian Government should give technical assistance to strengthen their capacity to tackle corruption. The Government of Canada could also assist with Jordanian civil society groups who are raising awareness against corruption such as the Rasheed group.<sup>79</sup> The Rasheed group is the Jordanian chapter for transparency international.<sup>80</sup>

### ***Policy 3: Build up Water Capacity (Targets C)***

The Government of Canada may develop and strengthen Jordan's water infrastructure and assist NGOs in increasing water use awareness. Climate change will most likely decrease the levels of rainfall and water reserves in Jordan, estimates state that nearly 50% of Jordan's water supply is wasted on a municipal level in service delivery.<sup>71</sup> GAC can assist by upgrading Jordan's water infrastructure.

**Relevance for recipient:** The scarcity of water in Jordan is a destabilizing factor. Jordan's lack of capacity to provide safe and clean water negatively impacts Jordan's state legitimacy. Therefore, increasing Jordan's capacity to provide this vital service will prevent a decrease in Jordan's legitimacy.

**Relevance for donor:** The Government of Canada has allocated \$2.65 billion under the international climate change financing program to developing countries.<sup>72</sup> In 2011 Canada began assisting in Jordan's green energy capability, by funding solar panels in Jordan. By 2018 Jordan has become one of the world's leading countries in green energy growth.<sup>73</sup> Canada has been successful in the past in implementing programs in Jordan.

**Measurement of Risk and Success:** Canada should modernize Jordan's aging water system to decrease the amount of water Jordan loses due to leaks. Additionally, Canada should seek to increase the amount of irrigated farmland in Jordan.

**Consequences of Actions on Stakeholders:** The primary stakeholder in the water sphere is Jordan's East Banker tribes. Jordan's agricultural industry is mostly comprised of East Bankers.<sup>74</sup> As rainfall and water reserves decrease due to climate change, the livelihood of the East Banker farmers would be at risk. This has the potential to stress the Jordanian monarchies main base of support which could result in destabilization. If Canada is able to improve water preservation in Jordan, this could retain the East Banker farmers their livelihood.

**Access Points:** The NGO Ecopeace Middle East is based in Jordan, Israel and the West Bank. The NGOs mandate is to raise public awareness on water preservation and efficiency in the Jordan Valley (Where most of Jordan arable land are).<sup>75</sup> Assisting this NGO would increase there scope and means. In terms of capacity building, the Government of Canada could work with other international actors who have experience with water development, such as the UNDP and USAID.<sup>7677</sup>

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