



State Fragility in Mali

Ebyan Farah
Raji Gandhi
Sophie Robidoux

Outline

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- End Users
- Policy Recommendations
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- Key Drivers
- Scenarios
- Conclusion

Overview



End User

This policy brief is directed towards:

- Global Affairs Canada (GAC) - Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOPs)
- Department of National Defence (DND)
- The Canadian Armed Forces

Policy Recommendations

1. Calls on PSOPs to partner with CANADEM ahead of the 2018 legislative elections
2. Calls on PSOPs to deepen engagement with civil society actors through financial and technical assistance
3. Calls on the expansion of the role of the Canadian Armed Forces in Operation PRESENCE to extend training the Malian Armed Forces and local police under the European Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) and United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).
4. Recommends supporting the G5 Sahel Joint Force through financial aid.



***Inability to address
Legitimacy Problem
perpetuates Capacity
Trap***

**Capacity
Trap**

- Inability of Government to provide public services like education, health care, and economic opportunities
- Lack of public security provisions
- Weak policy implementation by Government
- Lack of state resources
- Lack of ability in dispensing justice. Government is able to maximize off of state fragility.

**Legitimacy
Problem**

Insurgent groups able to maximize off of capacity trap to gain legitimacy in north by providing services


- Resource distribution by insurgent groups not regulated. There is a limit in their delivery of goods in north. This leads to the fractionalization of service delivery by insurgent groups. Not all ethnic groups receive same resources.

Corruption present in elections and known to be maximized by the government in power.

- Government's lack of effective address to issues in legitimacy in turn lead to a lack of trust by civil society in the north and south
- Government conducts extrajudicial killings. This leads to a negative response by insurgent groups and a rise in violence and conflict.

Fueling civil unrest because of corruption that is known in civil society.

Insurgent group attacks minimize delivery of services



ALC

Legitimacy:

CIFP 2012 ranking: 6.32

CIFP 2018 ranking: 7.107

Capacity:

CIFP 2012 ranking: 7.04

CIFP 2018 ranking: 7.196

Authority:


CIFP 2012 Ranking: 6.87

CIFP 2018 Ranking: 6.71

Drivers

Driver	Rank	Direction
Security and Crime	1	↓ Deteriorating
Governance	1	↓ Deteriorating
Economy	2	↓ Deteriorating
Human Development	3	↓ Deteriorating
Environment	4	↓ Deteriorating
Demographics	5	→ Stable

Figure 1. Number of fatalities in armed conflict, by region, 2010–2018



Source: ACLED data retrieved 08 June 2018.

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Scenarios

Most Likely:

- Violence and corruption around the legislative election is almost inevitable as seen during the Presidential elections
- It is predicted that insurgent groups will continue to move further south into Mali
- Service delivery of health, food, and education will continue to be a major issue.
- Continued issue of acute youth unemployment

Best Case:

- Legislative elections proceed with minimal violence. The outcome is reflective of different social groups in Mali.
- Security situation will stabilize, with the level and intensity of violence across the country not surpassing current levels
- Continued local and national efforts (such as AJCET and TRC), and international assistance for stabilization (such as MINUSMA training)
- Stabilization allows for more service delivery
- Continued upward trajectory of the Malian GDP

Worst Case:

- Electoral violence to evolve into a national crisis as it moves from the north and centre spreading towards the south.
- As the state falls further into fragility, rebel groups may once again take advantage and intensify their actions, pushing further towards the south.
- Lastly we'd see an increase in rebel presence in northern and central regions which will jeopardize international efforts in providing services.

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THANK YOU

Questions, comments, concerns?