



STATE FRAGILITY IN MALI

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Executive Summary

This policy brief finds that Mali is suffering from a capacity trap: a failure to provide basic services (equally across the territory and across groups) has weakened the social contract and undermined the legitimacy of the state. Mali also suffers from an authority problem, linked to the state's lack of capacity to extend its authority across its territory. We identify that governance, security and crime, and economic issues are the main drivers of this fragility in Mali. As such, we recommend that the Canadian government: partner with CANADEM to monitor the April 2019 elections; deepen partnerships with local non-governmental organizations; expand the role of the Canadian Armed Forces in Operation PRESENCE to include training the Malian Armed Forces and local police under the European Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) and the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA); and lastly, support the G5 Sahel Joint Force through financial aid.

Methodology

This policy brief makes use of quantitative and qualitative methodologies to form the overall analysis. Specifically, we draw on the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP)¹ methodology to identify the key drivers of fragility in Mali. We collected primary data in six clusters (governance; economy; security and crime; human development; demographics; and environment), and analyzed fragility along three dimensions (capacity, legitimacy, and authority). Finally, we generated scenarios using trend line sources such as the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED).

Limitations which restricted our research included: lack of local level data; lack of transparency in the official data by the Malian government; and a lack of data on horizontal inequalities. For example, we found that quantitative data on the Tuareg population is scarce. Furthermore, we found limitations in finding information regarding candidates and regional representation in the upcoming legislative election cycle. This demonstrates a lack of available information and transparency by the government. Another limitation is the regional nature of Mali's fragility problem. This made it difficult to isolate the causal mechanisms driving fragility in the country. To overcome these limitations, we relied on secondary analyses and events monitoring to supplement our quantitative data.

Summary of Conflict and Current Status

The multi-dimensional security threats present in Mali are a result of the ongoing micro conflicts that have built up since the nation's independence in 1960 (refer to Annex 1).² As the Tuareg unrest grew, the government's mishandling of the rebellion led to the country's third coup d'état in 2012. This coup gave room for the Tuareg and other groups to grow rapidly and seize control of northern Mali, in what they proclaim to be Azawad.³

There are now numerous insurgent and radically motivated groups such as the Groupe Autodefense Touareg Imghad et Allies (GATIA), Ansar Dine, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Boko Haram (refer to Annex 2). Since 2012, these groups have increased in size and have moved further into Mali's central and southern regions, increasing casualties in these areas (refer to Annex 3).⁴ These groups stem from both a North-South conflict and a secular-extremist conflict.⁵

In 2013, the United Nations launched its Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) alongside France's counterinsurgency mission, Operation SERVAL. MINUSMA aims to support political processes in Mali and carry out a number of security related tasks.⁶ As tensions have persisted since 2012, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) have deployed under Operation PRESENCE for a 12-month period since August 1st, 2018. This combat enabling mission aims to support MINUSMA through transportation, medical evacuations and by providing humanitarian aid.⁷



Map of Mali: Reeve, "Mali on the brink," 10.

The August 2018 Presidential elections increased security concerns in Mali. On the eve of the elections, insurgent groups threatened the holding of the elections by burning and looting polling stations. On July 23rd, airport facilities were under direct fire by two rockets.⁸ On July 29th, terrorist groups destroyed up to 50 polling stations in the Mopti, Segou and Timbuktu regions.⁹ There were also claims of corruption against the government with the final results leading to the election of incumbent President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita. Many politicians called for a recount.¹⁰ On the day of the runoff election, in the Timbuktu region, armed assailants shot dead the head of one of the polling stations and robbed electoral officers.¹¹ A total of three civilians and six members of the Malian Armed Forces were killed in attacks during the electoral process.¹² During this period, armed groups conducted 58 attacks against the Malian Armed Forces, MINUSMA and UN agencies.¹³

This policy brief will focus on three main drivers of the current state of fragility: the state's failed establishment of security; inadequate provision of public services; and lastly, a lack of economic opportunities. These drivers were selected as they encompass the above-mentioned developments, and are highly correlated.

End Users (Refer to Annex 4)

This policy brief is directed towards the Global Affairs Canada (GAC) - Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOPs), the Department of National Defence (DND), and the CAF. PSOPs was selected due to Mali being identified as one of the programs annual geographic priorities.¹⁴ DND and the CAF were selected in conjunction as they both hold responsibility for Canada's current peacekeeping mission in Mali.¹⁵ Under the Government of Canada's whole-of-government framework, these federal departments are expected to map out their financial and non-financial contributions in Mali by aligning their program activities to a set of high-level outcome areas defined by the government.¹⁶ In doing so, the effort of each department works towards a strategic outcome.

External and Internal Stakeholders (Refer to Annex 5)

Primary Stakeholders

Malian State: Officials and Departments

The Malian state is led by President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (leader of Rally for Mali).¹⁷ Northern region of Timbuktu remains outside of state control, administered instead by armed groups.¹⁸ For example, as of August 31, 2018, only 31% of state officials were present at their duties in northern regions and in Mopti.¹⁹

The Malian Security Service

The Malian security services are responsible for abuses of power. Human Rights Watch has documented 15 extrajudicial killings and 27 forced disappearances perpetrated by the Malian security forces between late 2016 and early 2018.²⁰ The Malian Armed Forces have also been a key player in major periods of political upheaval such as the 2012 coup.²¹

Radical Islamist Groups

The following are radical Islamist groups currently operating in Mali who are motivated by religious extremism: AQIM; Boko Haram; MUJAO; the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara; and Ansar Dine.²² In March 2017, several radical extremist groups, including Ansar Dine and AQIM, merged to form Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM). JNIM is now led by Iyad Ag Ghali, the head of Ansar Dine. JNIM merges ethnic politics with Islamist extremism.²³ Cooperation between these groups has increased their spread across Mali.²⁴ The marginalization of Fulani herders is of particular concern, with more Fulani joining jihadist groups in central Mali than any other ethnic group.²⁵

Other Armed Groups

Rebel groups like the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) and the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) are motivated to fight the state in order to establish an independent or autonomous region (Azawad). On the other hand, the following groups are fighting against these separatist movements, in favour of the government: Coordination of Movements and Front of Patriotic Resistance (CM-FPR) and GATIA.²⁶ The proliferation of armed groups in Mali reflects inter and intra-ethnic violence. There is a growing divide among Tuareg groups

such as those within CMA and GATIA, as their allegiances to the state differ.²⁷ Rebel groups fighting for autonomy in the north (such as CMA) have taken over state functions to provide public services such as food and education.²⁸ (Refer to Annex 2)

MINUSMA

MINUSMA is a key stakeholder aiming to support and implement the 2015 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation for Mali (Bamako Agreement), restore state authority, and stabilize the territory.²⁹ MINUSMA currently has a gender unit, in which the CAF is a strong actor in providing Gender-based Analysis Plus (GBA+) training to peacekeepers and local actors to ensure the inclusion of women in the peace and stabilization discussions.³⁰ MINUSMA has increasingly become the target of high profile violent attacks, prompting the mission to move south towards Mopti and extend its operational presence.³¹

Religious Leaders

Religious leaders are increasingly associated with Malian politics.³² In particular, the President of the High Islamic Council, Wahhabi Mahmoud Dicko, and the Co-President Sufi M. Cherif Ousamne Madani Haidara both express political opinions and openly ask their religious supporters to vote according to their preferences (e.g. supporting President Keita).³³ Dicko has also been associated to militant organizations such as Ansar Dine.³⁴

Secondary Stakeholders

Association of Youth Against Recruitment into Terrorism

With the worsening political and security conditions in Mali, local organizations such as the Association of Youth Against Recruitment into Terrorism (AJCET), have increased their efforts to help prevent Malian youth from joining armed groups. AJCET works diligently to provide young people access to social services as well as provide economic opportunities.³⁵

African Union and Economic Community for West African States

In 2012, the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) strategically pushed for a UN Security Council Resolution to authorize a military intervention in Mali known as the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). Unfortunately, the UN intervention was not well received by Malian political and military leaders who criticized their lack of standing military forces, financial resources and overall readiness.³⁶


French military forces

Following the Tuareg separatist uprising in 2012, France began military Operation Serval.³⁷ The successor Operation Barkhane focuses on counter-terrorism operations across the Sahel region which includes the following neighboring countries of Mali: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania and Niger.³⁸ The French mission is intended to work alongside MINUSMA in their peacebuilding efforts as well as the G5 Sahel, the joint counter-terrorism force between the above-mentioned countries.³⁹ As a former colonial power, France holds close political and cultural ties with Mali due to the increasing bilateral relations and large Malian diaspora in France.⁴⁰ France also holds economic interest in the region, with Mali's neighbouring country of Niger being its largest source of electricity.⁴¹ The multidimensional interests of France in Mali and overall concern with the potential for Islamic radicalism to spill over into neighbouring regions are the driving forces behind France's extensive counter-insurgency intervention.

Key Issues

For the following analysis, we have selected CIPF rankings for the years 2012 and 2018, to demonstrate the country's current standing since the 2012 coup d'état. According to CIPF methodology, higher scores along Authority, Legitimacy and Capacity dimensions indicate poor performance. Specifically, a score above 6.5 is considered a situation of serious fragility.⁴²

Mali faces a capacity trap that is intimately linked to the state's legitimacy problem (refer to Annex 6). Without understanding the relationship between the two, and their impact on authority, failures in one area will perpetuate problems in the other.



Legitimacy

CIFP 2012 ranking: 6.32

CIFP 2018 ranking: 7.107

President Keita was democratically re-elected in 2018. However, contention and the rise of violence from insurgent groups around the presidential race indicate the distrust, lack of public loyalty, and lack of support between these groups and the government.⁴³ Northern rebellion and insurgent groups have also begun to spread further south, progressing towards the Mopti region in order to claim their own legitimacy over the state of Azawad, in which the government and international actors have minimal control over (Refer to Annex 3).⁴⁴ The northern regions are governed by these rebellion and insurgent groups which displaces legitimacy away from the government. The 2018 Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI) scores give Mali a 5.17/10 on the Governance Index and a 5.95/10 on the Political Transformation index.⁴⁵ Between 2012 and 2018, Mali's legitimacy score has deteriorated significantly, rising to 7.107 thus highlighting the growing legitimacy problem.

Capacity

CIFP 2012 ranking: 7.04

CIFP 2018 ranking: 7.196

Consistent with Mali's capacity trap, the state has continued to maintain perilously high capacity scores between 2012 and 2018. Although the Malian government is heavily reliant on foreign aid to administer public goods and services, citizens continue to lack access to basic needs.⁴⁶ The volatile security environment in the northern region has begun to spread into central and southern regions forcing many into internal displacement within Mali and in neighboring countries such as Mauritania and Burkina Faso.⁴⁷ These internally displaced persons (IDP), particularly in northern Mali, lack access to basic services such as health, shelter, water, education and food.⁴⁸ The need for foreign aid and development assistance has grown over the years as the security conditions worsen and the number of IDP increases.

The issue of government capability is most evident in northern Mali due to the lack of state presence. The 2012 coup allowed for radical armed groups and Tuareg separatists to seize control of the north, thus diminishing the government's ability to provide services to the public.⁴⁹ These northern groups have taken it upon themselves to provide goods and services to citizens.⁵⁰ Although it is commendable, their efforts are unregulated and thus unpredictable. Without a formal state presence in the north, Malians continue to suffer. The state's fragility in the north could be viewed as a function of rent seeking by northern groups that hold control. It is easier for the Tuareg separatists and armed groups to maintain their power in fragile situations. Through this perspective, it could be argued that northern groups in control consciously prevent the development of Mali as it may threaten their control. International actors in the north such as MINUSMA have noted the difficulty in having to cooperate with these groups in order to gain access to citizens.⁵¹

Authority

CIFP 2012 Ranking: 6.87

CIFP 2018 Ranking: 6.71

The persistence of violent conflict demonstrates that the state lacks a monopoly over the legitimate use of force, with a score of 4/10 on the BTI.⁵² Consistently high scores along the authority dimension in the CIFP rankings demonstrate the persistence of fragility in Mali. Although the CIFP score is slightly improved for 2018 as compared to 2012, there are trends that suggest that Mali’s authority problem is not improving. Since 2017, armed attacks have gradually spread southward, becoming a national, rather than regional phenomenon.⁵³ Violence is now more geographically spread out than any time since independence in 1960.⁵⁴ The state has proved unable to protect marginalized groups, resulting in violent clashes between herders and farmers, and, increasingly, the recruitment of Fulani herders into armed militias.⁵⁵ Mali’s authority problem is in this way linked to its capacity failures, and, in particular, an inability to provide basic services, including security. Similarly, in the ungoverned spaces of northern Mali, failure to deliver basic services has led people to turn to illicit trade and organized crime as means of survival.⁵⁶ This then creates a vicious feedback loop, because the state lacks the authority to enforce a legal framework to manage illicit trafficking.⁵⁷ The linkage between capacity and authority is also highlighted by Mali’s inability to defend its territory independently. In response to armed challenges to state authority, Mali is extremely dependent on foreign military aid and MINUSMA.⁵⁸

Cluster Analysis

LEGEND:

Risk Intensity	Low <i>Unlikely to deteriorate significantly</i>	Moderate <i>Likely to have an impact, but not extreme</i>	High <i>Extreme likelihood of worsening significantly</i>
Direction	↑ Improving	→ Stable	↓ Deteriorating

In addition to their risk intensity and direction, the following indicators are ranked according to their importance. Primary drivers include: Security and Crime; Governance; and Economy. The secondary drivers are therefore: Human Development; Environment; and Demographics. These drivers were categorized as secondary because, as compared to the primary drivers, they are not directly contributing to fragility in Mali. Rather, their impact is increased when combined with the aforementioned primary drivers, and aggravated when interacting with Mali’s capacity trap. Of note, we rank both Security and Crime and Governance as 1, because they are of equal importance in perpetuating Mali’s fragility.

SECURITY AND CRIME	RANK 1	DETERIORATING ↓
Indicators	Description	
Malian Military Strength	15,500 personnel ⁵⁹	
Measures of terrorism	Number fatalities in armed conflict 2018: Approx 675 ⁶⁰	
External Military Presence	4,000 French soldiers present with MINUSMA’s 15,476 total troops. 250 Canadian troops. ⁶¹ 173 MINUSMA fatalities ⁶²	
Political Instability	58 attacks during the 2018 election period ⁶³	
Mali’s security situation since the coup in 2012 has only further deteriorated. Since then, insurgent groups have increased their presence and attacks have only spread. The Malian government has little control over stabilization of these groups and has secretly supported the GATIA in trying to control the movement of other insurgent groups. ⁶⁴ This has failed on the government’s part. In 2018, violent		

extremism continues to escalate due to the mismanagement, corruption and distrust in the government which links the security issues to Mali's governance. There is minimal transparency in elections which only furthers this distrust.⁶⁵ The legislative elections have been moved from November 25th and December 16th to April 2019 due the increase in security concerns.⁶⁶ With links to Al-Qaeda and ISIS, terrorist organizations have risen and have stabilized their legitimacy in Mali's northern regions.⁶⁷ These extremist groups have also escalated human trafficking, the recruitment of child soldiers, and drug production.⁶⁸ The North of the Segou region has also seen an increase in ambushes, ethnic tensions, IED's, and extrajudicial executions.⁶⁹ Despite the French, through Operation SERVAL and BARKHANE, and MINUSMA being present since 2012, the United Nations has declared Mali to be the deadliest UN Mission in history.⁷⁰ There has been an increase in attacks on UN agencies and locations where MINUSMA is present.⁷¹ The legitimacy problem faced by Mali derives from its weak governance that has fueled insurgent and extremist groups to seize control due to their own history of mistreatment by the government. Key triggers of a rise in security issues revolve around political elections.⁷² Other factors that contribute are a lack of job creation and campaigns for youth recruitment into insurgent groups.⁷³ The Association of Youth Against Recruitment into Terrorism in the Mopti region, are vital in ensuring the growth in insurgent groups does not rise.⁷⁴ However, capacity is an area in which Mali continuously falls back into the fragility trap, because it is unable to provide security for the population, making it difficult for institutions to successfully implement their programs.

GOVERNANCE	RANK 1	DETERIORATING ↓
Indicators		Description
Steering Capability and Implementation (BTI)		5/10 ⁷⁵
Anti-Corruption Policy (BTI)		4/10 ⁷⁶
Consensus Building (BTI)		5.4/10 ⁷⁷
Stability of Democratic Institutions (BTI)		6/10 ⁷⁸
Prosecution of Office Abuse (BTI)		4/10 ⁷⁹

The recent Presidential elections led to an increase in protests by civil society, and attacks by insurgent groups on polling stations, civilians and UN agencies.⁸⁰ Violence was used as a political tool by insurgent groups as many polling stations were burned down and looted.⁸¹ Security tensions arise from the government's inability to adequately provide a platform of representation for minority groups, such as the Tuareg.⁸² Many local state actors are kept out of politics which only fuels insurgent and rebel groups away from supporting the government.⁸³ Civil society and insurgent groups questioned the legitimacy of the re-election of President Keita as government actors seemed to have skewed ballots.⁸⁴ Protests also stemmed from candidates who believed there to be rigged voting. Additionally, many polling stations were not in use⁸⁵ Corruption is high in the Malian government which only furthers this distrust.⁸⁶ There have been five failed peace accords since the 1960s.⁸⁷ Failures in the enforcement of the peace accords since 2012 and 2015 also further the distrust between the public and the government.⁸⁸ Representation issues that were to be resolved during the Bamako Agreement need to be implemented to ensure representation and for initiating capacity building between the different actors. A report from 2017 states that the governance structures have lacked in their capability in managing commitments, transparency and have spread misinformation to rebel leaders, thus only furthering the divide.⁸⁹ Non-governmental organizations also face numerous capacity issues as 59% do not receive adequate funding.⁹⁰ These civil society organizations engage in politics, provide welfare services and set up small enterprises in order to generate income outside family networks which help to integrate the North into the larger Malian civil society. However, these organizations have limited internal management and coordination capabilities due to many only existing on paper.

ECONOMY	RANK 2	DETERIORATING↓
Indicators		Description
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth (annual %)		-0.836 (2012) ⁹¹ 5.3% (2017) ⁹²
GDP per capita (2011 PPP\$)		1971 (2016) ⁹³ 2014 (2017) ⁹⁴
Budget deficit (as GDP%)		3.9% (2016) ⁹⁵ 2.9% (2017) ⁹⁶
Unemployment rate (% of labour force)		7.8 (2017) ⁹⁷
Youth unemployment rate (% of ages 15-24)		8.4 (2014) ⁹⁸ 18.0 (2017) ⁹⁹
Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)		50.6 % (2014) ¹⁰⁰
<p>The Malian economy is highly undiversified, relying heavily upon agriculture and fisheries, and as such, is vulnerable to price fluctuations and climate change.¹⁰¹ Three quarters of the Malian population rely on agriculture as their source of income and food, and many engage in subsistence farming.¹⁰² Although the majority of the population is engaged in agriculture, approximately 30% suffer from malnourishment.¹⁰³ This is due to low productivity, post-harvest crop losses, under-developed markets, vulnerability to climate change effects, and the insecurity of central and northern Mali. Despite the deteriorating security and increased political instability, the state has experienced GDP growth and a decrease in the budget deficit. Despite these accomplishments, unemployment has steadily increased since 2014. Most notably, youth unemployment has skyrocketed from 8.4% in 2014 to 18.0% in 2017. With almost 65% of the Malian population under the age of 25, the rising youth unemployment rate is a growing concern for the state.¹⁰⁴ As the labour force continues to grow Mali faces issues of providing sufficient job supply.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, GDP growth has not positively impacted the population in an equitable manner. Distribution inequalities persist, with northern regions disproportionately suffering economically as compared to the south. For example, although it is only 1.2% of the national GDP, tourism represented over 80 billion West African francs and provided jobs for 17,000 people in central and northern regions in 2005.¹⁰⁶ However, between 2009 and 2011, 8,000 people lost their jobs in the industry, and revenue dropped by 50 million West African francs.¹⁰⁷ As such, GDP growth does not translate into equal benefit for all members of society.</p>		

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	RANK 3	DETERIORATING ↓
Indicators		Description
HDI rank and value		182/189 0.427 (2017) ¹⁰⁸
Inequality in life expectancy at birth (%)		36.8 % (2017) ¹⁰⁹
Inequality in education (%)		46.2 % (2017) ¹¹⁰
Gender Inequality value and rank		0.678 157/160 (2017) ¹¹¹
Literacy rate, adult (% ages 15 or older)		33.1 (2016) ¹¹²

Expected years of schooling	7.7 (2017) ¹¹³
Mean years of schooling	2.3 (2017) ¹¹⁴
Life expectancy at birth	58.5 (2017) ¹¹⁵
<p>As of 2017, Mali is ranked 182nd out of 189 countries on the United Nations Human Development Index, making it one of the poorest countries in the world.¹¹⁶ In respect to gender inequalities, womens right to access public services such as education, economic opportunities and health-care services are not recognized throughout the country. Such inequalities are reflected in Mali’s gender inequality ranking and value. These deeply rooted practices of gender inequality are also found within government representation, with only 8.8% of parliamentary seats held by women.¹¹⁷ Mali’s low HDI ranking can be attributed to the minimal provision of public services such as education. Only 16.4% of males and 7.3% of females have reached a secondary level of education.¹¹⁸ The international development community has categorized Mali in an educational crisis due to the low enrolment rates, poor quality of education, and ethnic and gender disparities. The lack of functional health institutions has also limited the access to healthcare for residents, particularly for women and children.¹¹⁹ These issues have attributed to the low life expectancy in Mali which currently sits at 58.5 years.¹²⁰</p>	

ENVIRONMENT	RANK 4	DETERIORATING ↓
Indicators	Description	
Rainfall Patterns	Average rainfall decreased by 30% since 1998 ¹²¹	
Food Insecurity	300% increase in number of food insecure people from 2017 to 2018 ¹²²	
Environmental Performance Index (EPI)	147/180 countries score of 43 ¹²³	
Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN)	166 th in world, score of 33.6 ¹²⁴	
<p>With decreasing rainfall affecting crops and food supply, armed groups have used food incentives to recruit people in northern Mali (“food for jihad”).¹²⁵ Environmental changes have also led herders from neighbouring Algeria and Niger to move into Tuareg regions used for grazing, creating conflict.¹²⁶ According to a 2017 Afrobarometer survey, 60% of Malians believe agricultural conditions linked to climate change have worsened and 72% say that climate change has worsened the quality of life in Mali.¹²⁷ Regardless of actual climate fluctuations, these perceptions indicate that there are popular grievances linked to environmental change. However, the causal link between environmental change and fragility is not necessarily direct. Mali lacks the capacity required to deal with these environmental challenges. Weak performance on the EPI and the ND-GAIN is indicative of poor policy implementation, high vulnerability, and low readiness. Additionally, the state does not provide sufficient welfare services to support those impacted by environmental pressures. In rural areas, family networks, and, increasingly, non-state armed groups provide most of the welfare services, essentially substituting for the state.¹²⁸ The lack of state presence creates competition over land claims, allowing armed groups to make opportunistic land grabs without any oversight.¹²⁹</p>		

DEMOGRAPHICS	RANK 5	STABLE →
Indicators	Description	
Population Growth Rate	3.02% ¹³⁰	

Population Density	15.916/sq km (overall) (2017) ¹³¹ , 1.6/sq km (north) ¹³²
Ethnic Diversity	Bambara 34.1%, Fulani (Peul) 14.7%, Sarakole 10.8%, Senoufo 10.5%, Dogon 8.9%, Malinke 8.7%, Bobo 2.9%, Songhai 1.6%, Tuareg 0.9%, other Malian 6.1%, from member of Economic Community of West African States 0.3%, other 0.4% (2017) ¹³³
Youth Dependency Ratio	96.8 (2017) ¹³⁴
Rurality	Northern Mali covers 66% of the national territory, but is home to 8.6% of the population. This northern population is highly rural, with only 8% of people residing in urban agglomerations of over 10,000 people. ¹³⁵
Migration	Malian refugees in neighbouring countries (Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Niger): 140,123 (2018) Refugees in Mali (Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, and Côte d'Ivoire): 24,418 (2018) Internally displaced persons: 69,993 (2018) ¹³⁶

As with environmental changes, demographic factors are a secondary driver of fragility because the key issue is the lack of capacity to deal with these challenges. The state does not have the capacity to reach extremely rural populations. For example, there are 630 judges in Mali (for a population of 15 million), and most are based in Bamako.¹³⁷ As a result, over 80% of legal disputes are settled outside the formal legal system.¹³⁸ The challenges of extremely rural populations are compounded by the distribution of ethnic groups across the population. Although the Tuareg only make up 0.9% of Malian territory, these communities are disproportionately concentrated in remote northern regions. In contrast, the Bambara (34.1% of the population) are concentrated in the south, around Bamako (refer to Annex 7).¹³⁹ This has fuelled grievances among northern populations, as they tend to be marginalized economically and politically as a result of their geographic distance, as well as historical divisions between north and south. External donors therefore play a role in mitigating demographic pressures in Mali. For example, the World Food Programme activated an internal level 3 emergency for the fall of 2018 in the Sahel, stepping up provision of emergency food assistance in Mali.¹⁴⁰ This is indicative of the state's reliance on external support to deal with the ongoing humanitarian crisis. Where the state is absent, rebel groups such as the CMA are stepping in to provide basic services.

Scenarios

The following section will examine the most likely, worst and best-case scenarios for the next six months (**November 23rd, 2018 - May 23rd, 2019**). Each scenario will examine our forecasts for the April 2019 legislative elections¹⁴¹, as well as how we anticipate the key drivers of fragility to evolve. We conclude with a brief summary of potential wild card shocks that may impact these scenarios.

Most Likely:

Violence and corruption around the legislative election is almost inevitable as seen during the Presidential elections. Based on the examples from August 2018, allegations of stuffed ballots, theft of election material, threats and attacks against election staff can be anticipated. There is also potential for corruption amongst candidates which could lead to further uprising in rebel groups and civilian distrust. Corruption entrenches elite interests in the status quo (e.g. state officials profiting from illicit trade), thereby sustaining the illegal networks for the months to come.

The trends over the past years has shown extremist and rebel groups recruiting, moving and attacking further south into Mali. This is predicted to continue over the next months if MINUSMA and the Malian Armed Forces cannot stabilize their movements. Training done by MINUSMA for Malian military and local police will continue, which could aid in addressing the proliferation of armed groups.

Service delivery of health, food, and education continues to be a major issue. The state lacks the resources to provide these services, as well as the security to ensure this capacity can be adequately delivered. This then continues to undermine legitimacy, because, without providing basic services, the state erodes the social contract and drives dissatisfaction. It is foreseeable that the marginalization in terms of access to services like the northern region as “ungoverned spaces”, lack of state presence, and chronic food insecurity will only continue and divide the different actors.

It is also likely that acute youth unemployment will continue. This is concerning as youth unemployment undermines security as this vulnerable group becomes a target for recruitment into armed groups.

Best Case:

In the best-case scenario, the legislative elections proceed with minimal violence as MINUSMA and other actors are able to mitigate the security concerns that pushed back the election date.

There is an increase in voter turnout, facilitated by a decrease in electoral violence as compared to the Presidential elections. The outcome is reflective of different social groups in Mali. In this best-case scenario, historically marginalized groups such as the northern Tuareg are represented in the formal state apparatus. We predict that the security situation will stabilize, with the level and intensity of violence across the country not surpassing current levels (highest intensity since independence). We also predict that local level deterrence against radical groups, such as the work of the AJCET will continue. These initiatives will be supported by national level assistance to the military and police provided by MINUSMA. The Truth Commission will continue to collection evidence at a national level, across all regions, facilitated by the stabilized security situation. The best-case scenario would include some stabilization of the north and centre to enable increased service delivery. Concretely, this might resemble a stronger state presence across the country through ensuring that regional administration officials are present at their duties. Additionally, increased service delivery might take the form of a continued partnership with the World Food Programme, in order to address major food insecurity. The best-case scenario would also involved the continued upward trajectory of the Malian GDP.

Worst Case:

The worst-case scenario may be either of the following predictions: in the first instance, due to the deteriorating security conditions, the election is postponed indefinitely until the security condition improves. Without the presence of an election, citizens lack the democratic forum to critique government corruption. In the second instance, violence erupts from the April 2019 legislative election, forcing numerous polling stations to close. This electoral violence could evolve into a national crisis as it moves from the north and centre, spreading towards the south. Due to an imbalance of regional representatives, with the majority deriving from the south, election results are highly contested. The international community acknowledges the high rate of corruption and condemns the Malian government for not holding a just and fair election. Similar to Canada’s response to the 2012 coup, donors may consider pulling foreign aid as the rise in violence, government corruption and growing failure of the state’s ability to control against internal threats demonstrates a possible ineffectiveness of foreign efforts. If foreign assistance is pulled it will leave a highly aid dependent country even more vulnerable to internal and external threats.

The growing civilian distrust and resentment towards the Malian government may ignite public enlistment into Northern separatists or insurgent groups. As the state falls further into fragility, rebel groups may once again take advantage and intensify their actions, pushing further towards the south. Such actions may threaten the existing institutional structures in place. The failure to contain the conflict may cause a spillover into neighbouring countries such as Mauritania, which is currently facing a surge of conflict. An increase in rebel presence in northern and central regions will jeopardize international efforts in providing services. Lastly, the deterioration of economic opportunity due to rising conflict may drive more civilians into extreme poverty.

Shock: Drought	In the case of a sudden drought, we predict increased food shortages due to the inability of the government to deliver humanitarian aid. This would most likely be accompanied by a major increase in current migration trends away from drought-affected areas. ¹⁴² This may increase recruitment to armed groups, or the formation of new rebel groups due to a lack of aid delivery by the government.
Shock: Terrorist Attack	MINUSMA is the most deadly UN mission, and has been increasingly targeted by jihadist groups. As such, we foresee a large-scale attack, with potential impact on UN actors, civilians, and/or political leaders. This shock may lead MINUSMA's contributors, including Canada, to withdraw from the mission.

Policy Options

The following policy options are recommended to work in conjunction with one another in achieving practical steps for the Canadian government to take in the state of Mali. These initiatives will take place through increased lines of communication between various departments in an attempt to remove potential conflict from the different end user mandates. It is important to note that Canada's impact in Mali is susceptible to unforeseen external forces. This reinforces the importance of maintaining communication with our partners and other stakeholders. We recognize that these policy recommendations have limits in their overall potential impact, as Canada's contributions in Mali are only one part of a multidimensional solution. However, based on our previous analysis we have identified these policies as our best means for enabling stabilization for the foreseeable future.

Due to Canada's extensive development efforts committed to improving Mali's economic standing, we have not provided any policy recommendations towards this issue. Since 1972, Canada has maintained a longstanding relationship with Mali, providing international assistance to the country. Mali is the fifth largest recipient of Canada's international assistance, receiving nearly \$1.5 billion towards development since 2006.¹⁴³ Canada intends to reduce inequality and poverty among the most vulnerable in Mali which includes women and youth through the international development program. The program has four key objectives, including economic growth with a focus on agriculture and irrigation productivity. Gender equality is an objective that will be implemented across all initiatives. Canada is working to support the crop production and market access for farmers within local regions as well as neighboring countries. This initiative will contribute to the enhancement of food security and stabilization of pricing. Between 2014-2017, Canada provided financial services such as agricultural credit and crop insurance to approximately 700,000 people of which 67% were women. Canada intends to continue its provision of international assistance in Mali, with a focus to supporting economic growth among vulnerable populations.¹⁴⁴ In response to the 2012 coup, Canada suspended its direct aid to the Government of Mali, solely providing humanitarian assistance to the region during the crisis. As of January 2014, Canada has resumed the provision of aid and has committed approximately \$106 million until 2019.¹⁴⁵ To complement these efforts, we recommend the following actions:

1. Calls on PSOPs to partner with CANADEM ahead of the 2019 legislative elections

CANADEM is a Canadian civilian organization that mobilizes experts for electoral monitoring and democracy promotion.¹⁴⁶ As transparency is an ongoing issue that has led to the increase in violence this recommendation aims to facilitate the democratic process on election day and prevent the violent contestation of election results. CANADEM is the most well suited partner for GAC, with experience in fragile contexts, including Mali.¹⁴⁷ It has worked extensively with the Canadian government in the past, and receives GAC financial support.¹⁴⁸ As part of this partnership, PSOPs should work with CANADEM to ensure cooperation with Mali's Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) and the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization.¹⁴⁹ This is consistent with the Paris Principles on Aid Effectiveness, to ensure local ownership of any initiative.¹⁵⁰ Additionally, coordination with local organizations will allow for capacity building through knowledge transfer and training, thereby contributing directly to decreasing Mali's capacity trap.

It should be noted that this policy option does not provide long-term solutions for governance failures in Mali. However, with the elections identified as a potential turning point, supporting their successful execution is

important in order to avoid the worst-case scenario. This option is also an opportunity for GAC to draw on existing expertise. Electoral monitoring is a feasible option that targets important aspects of governance such as inclusion, participation, and legitimacy. Success will be measured with reporting back to PSOPs, and would resemble an accurate and impartial assessment of the elections, as well as cooperation with local actors. PSOPs should monitor CANADEM's deployment to Mali, as well as pre and post election assessments.

2. Recommends PSOPs to deepen engagement with civil society actors through financial and technical assistance

Examples of civil society engagement could include partnering with local organizations like AJCET, and/or Malian chapters of regional organizations such as the African Parliamentarians Network Against Corruption (APNAC). With limited state reach in the north, there is a need in Mali to strengthen the linkages between state and non-state service providers. Civil society is a potential entry point for Canada to move beyond election-day assistance and to address long-term governance gaps.

Beyond providing financial assistance, PSOPs should work to establish communication links and networking opportunities between civil society partners on the ground. This would extend GAC's current commitments in order to target specific aspects of fragility as detailed in this report. For example, providing the financial and logistical capacity to allow coordination between local civil society groups is an opportunity to include a variety of actors, and help facilitate inter and intra-community dialogue to overcome existing micro-conflicts. This recommendation therefore targets local-level security and governance failures, addressing Mali's capacity challenges by providing financial and technical support for NGOs and allowing for the meaningful inclusion of local actors. Success will be measured with reporting back to PSOPs, and will require transparency and communication with local actors in order to monitor concrete progress in different areas.

The constellation of actors in Mali presents a risk for Canada in terms of selecting non-state partners that align with Canadian development priorities, but also hold local legitimacy. One way to limit this risk is for NGOs in Mali to "self-select", submitting proposals to receive PSOP funding. Additionally, GAC should invest in continual monitoring of the local situation in order to manage the risks associated with operating in a fluid context. Building local partnerships provides an opportunity for the meaningful inclusion of women, youth, and excluded groups. Local level organizations provide an entry point for PSOPs, with the required in-depth understanding of the local context in order to operate successfully in a rapidly changing situation.

3. Calls on the expansion of the role of the Canadian Armed Forces in Operation PRESENCE to extend training the Malian Armed Forces and local police under the European Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) and MINUSMA.

The most common type of UN peacekeeper tends to be an infantry soldier, however given the nature of this current conflict the need for "combat enablers" are paramount.¹⁵¹ The relevance of this expansion comes in Canada having a tangible impact in addressing the capacity trap as there is a lack of public security provisions. Increasing our enabling capabilities could begin to address this issue by supporting the capacity building of the Malian Armed Forces and local police. As the lack of trust between civil society and government actors perpetuates the capacity trap and legitimacy problem, security actors should hold regular meetings with local populations to consult on the progress of security situations and distribute information about patrol routes for increased transparency.¹⁵² Traditional chiefs in Ansongo, Bourem and Gao have indicated a willingness to be more involved in the stabilization process.¹⁵³ This can be furthered by promoting communal dialogues and meetings between regional chiefs.¹⁵⁴ The impact of these entry points can contribute to the trust and capacity building of the Malian Armed Forces in the country.

EUTM's four pillars are advice giving, training, military education and support for the G5 Sahel Joint Force.¹⁵⁵ The current mission has been extended from 2018-2020 and has a budget of 57.7 million euros.¹⁵⁶ The CAF can support this by contributing 25-75 troops to this mission. As this mission already comprises a limited number of personnel we do not anticipate the CAF willing to deploy more than these numbers. This would roughly cost 2 to 6 million dollars and will positively impact EUTM's training efforts.¹⁵⁷

The impact of this can be in contributing to the capacity building of the Malian Armed Forces in the south and central regions of the country that have also seen an increase in attacks. It should be noted that from the Canadian domestic political sphere, the government may not look favourably upon extending our reach due to the upcoming federal election in 2019. Despite the risks faced by training and expanding Operation PRESENCE's mandate, this would be the most feasibly tangible means of positively impacting capacity building. Success will be measured through reporting back to DND and CAF of the number of soldiers and police trained and through the CAF's active participation in EUTM's initiatives.

4. Recommends supporting the G5 Sahel Joint Force through financial aid.

In February 2018, Norway committed to supporting the civilian components of the G5 Sahel's Joint Force by providing training on international humanitarian law and human rights for G5 Sahel troops in an effort to increase trust between the troops and the local population.¹⁵⁸ By following Norway's path, DND can support this effort through monetary funds that it deems best. This would be relevant towards combating the capacity trap as this would increase public security provisions and increase trust between the government, military actors and civilians. As the Canadian government is looking to increase multilateral strength training this initiative may be beneficial from a domestic political stance. Success will be measured through reporting back to DND.

Annex 1: Summary of Prior Political Instability

Since independence in the 1960s, there have been three coups and consistent insecurity. In 1968 Mobido Keita's regime was overthrown by army Lieutenant, Moussa Traoré, due to the dissatisfaction with the economic and financial state.¹⁵⁹ Environmental factors leading to a poor harvest also had an impact in mobilizing this dissatisfaction.¹⁶⁰ In 1991 a military coup motivated by poor economic conditions, exclusion from political power, and corruption led to the overthrow of Mali's authoritarian government.¹⁶¹ Throughout these decades of instability, and amidst the ongoing military and government tensions in the North, the Tuareg (traditionally called the Tamasheq) tribe have consistently been oppressed through government policies, land reform, and a lack of political representation.¹⁶²

Annex 2: Dynamics of Armed Conflict in Mali

The following details the major armed groups operating in Mali.¹⁶³

- **Al-Qaida Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM):** this group emerged in Algeria in 1998, and declared support for al-Qaeda in 2003. While the organization has spread across the Sahel, its leadership remains largely Algerian, leading to break-off organizations in Mali such as MUJAO.
- **Boko Haram:** founded in Nigeria in 2002, the organization has been active in Mali since 2011, and is linked to AQIM.
- **Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO):** although it is a splinter group from AQIM, the two organizations often cooperate militarily in northern Mali. It is based in Gao, and often plays on anti-Tuareg sentiment among the Songhai ethnic group in order to recruit from the local population. Many senior leaders are thus of Songhai origin.
- **Ansar Dine:** this primarily group was founded in late 2011 by Iyad Ag Ghali, a significant figure in the Tuareg uprisings in the 1990s. The group often cooperates with AQIM and MUJAO to carry out attacks on MINUSMA troops and on the Malian army.
- **Islamic State in the Greater Sahara:** this section of Islamic State was founded in 2015, and is based in the border areas of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. It has escalated attacks throughout 2017 and 2018.
- **Coordination of Movements and Front of Patriotic Resistance (CM-FPR):** this loose coalition of Songhai and Fulani armed groups was established in 2012 to counter Islamic extremist groups and Tuareg rebels in northern Mali.
- **Self-Defence Group of Imghad Tuareg and its Allies (GATIA):** this pro-government group after the Malian army withdrew from Kidal in 2014. It reflects divisions within the Tuareg community over autonomy demands. This group of Imghad Tuareg remains loyal to the state, and is made up of many former members of the Malian army.
- **Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA):** this Arab group emerged in 2012 and was formed by members of the business community in Timbuktu opposed to Ansar Dine, AQIM, and MUJAO.
- **Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA):** this mainly Tuareg separatist group has operated in northern Mali since 2012, and draws support from the Kel Adagh confederation of clans.

Regional dimensions of armed conflict:

Many of these groups are not contained to Mali, but operate fluidly across the porous border of the Sahel. Like the spread of radical ideology, arms proliferation is also a regional phenomenon.¹⁶⁴ The fragility of neighbouring states also has a direct impact on Mali. For example, since the fall of the Qaddafi regime in Libya, Tuareg fighters that had trained under Qaddafi returned to Mali, armed and joining rebel groups in the north.¹⁶⁵ Therefore, fragility in Mali has a regional dimension, and is impacted by transnational dynamics.

Annex 3: Fatalities in Armed Conflict by Region¹⁶⁶

Referring to the trends from 2010 to 2018 in the graph below, there is a clear movement of insurgent groups further into the central and southern regions of the country, which have increased overall casualties. For example, Kidal, Mopti and Gao (in the North) in 2013 had a much higher rate as compared to other regions. By 2017 Kidal's rates had decreased and Segou, which is further south, had drastically increased.





Figure 1. Number of fatalities in armed conflict, by region, 2010–2018



Source: ACLED data retrieved 08 June 2018.

Annex 4: End User Background Information

Background on the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces involvement in Mali:

The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is supporting MINUSMA in the Gao region under Operation PRESENCE. The Air Task Force deployed reached initial operating capabilities as of August 1, 2018 and will be deployed for a 12-month period. This task force includes three CH-147F Chinook helicopters, five CH-146 Griffon helicopters and approximately 250 personnel. As combat enablers, the CAF's support for MINUSMA is demonstrated through medical evacuations, transportation of troops, equipment, food and supplies, and reconnaissance missions.¹⁶⁷

On October 27th, 2018 there was an attack on the United Nations camp in Ber, Mali in which UN soldiers were wounded and killed. Operation PRESENCE's helicopters and crew responded to the attack by launching two CH-146 Griffon helicopters from Gao to Timbuktu in which they conducted a reconnaissance mission, flew in explosive ordnance for disposal of the second vehicle borne IED remaining in the camp and transported the EOD team back to Timbuktu.¹⁶⁸

Background on Global Affairs Canada involvement in Mali:



The bulk of GAC projects in Mali are currently aimed at reproductive health, capacity building, economic growth, and public sector reform, particularly for marginalized groups. For example, Canada provides budgetary support to the Malian health sector to improve access to reproductive and maternal health care services. Between 2014 and 2017, Canada co-funded over 250 hydro-agricultural systems, reaching 25,000 farmers. Canada also supported Mali's Direction générale des impôts in order to increase the tax ratio from 15.7% to 16.3% in 2017.¹⁶⁹

Annex 5: List of Stakeholders¹⁷⁰

		Sector		
		Security	Civil Society	Governmental
Level	International	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MINUSMA • EU Training Mission • G5 Sahel • French Forces • Foreign armed groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International NGOs • Foreign non-state donors • Foreign Media • Regional CSOs (e.g. WANEP) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UN • African Union • ECOWAS • Other States • International Donors
	National	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mali Armed Forces (FAMa) • Rebel armed groups • Ministries of defence, security and interior 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Youth Council • Islamic High Council (HCIM) • National Media • Trades Unions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • President • Ministries • National Assembly • High Council of Collectivités Territoriales (Regional Authorities) • Higher courts
	Local	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional Police • Locally deployed armed forces • 'Traditional' hunters • Rebel factions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local CSOs • Religious leaders • Traditional communicators • Women's and Youth groups • Local media (radio) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governors • Regional Councils • Commune Councils • Local Authorities • Customary Chiefs • Local justice/courts


Annex 6: Capacity Trap and Legitimacy Problem¹⁷¹

This figure summarizes the linkages between Mali's capacity trap and its legitimacy problem. As per Takeuchi et al., the state is stuck in a capacity trap because it cannot ensure security, which weakens its ability to deliver other basic services. This then weakens state legitimacy, which, in turn, then undermines the state's capacity.




THE POPULATION OF NORTHERN MALI

Simplified spatial distribution



Spatial occupation of the North



Desert. Significant nomadic behavior. Several tens of thousands of people. No settlement of more than 5 000 inhabitants with the exception of Kidal (30 000 inhabitants).

The majority of the population of Northern Mali (95%) is concentrated along 800 km of valley on both sides of the Niger River.

Cities (population estimated in 2014)

- more than 100 000 inhab.
- from 50 000 to 100 000 inhab.
- from 25 000 to 50 000 inhab.
- from 15 000 to 25 000 inhab.
- from 10 000 to 15 000 inhab.

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